Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 179127 December 24, 2008IN-N-OUT BURGER, INC.,petitioner,vs.SEHWANI, INCORPORATED AND/OR BENITAS FRITES, INC.,respondents.D E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO,J.:This is a Petition for Review onCertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse the Decision1dated 18 July 2006 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92785, which reversed the Decision2dated 23 December 2005 of the Director General of the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) in Appeal No. 10-05-01. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, decreed that the IPO Director of Legal Affairs and the IPO Director General do not have jurisdiction over cases involving unfair competition.Petitioner IN-N-OUT BURGER, INC., a business entity incorporated under the laws of California, United States (US) of America, which is a signatory to the Convention of Paris on Protection of Industrial Property and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Petitioner is engaged mainly in the restaurant business, but it has never engaged in business in the Philippines.3Respondents Sehwani, Incorporated and Benita Frites, Inc. are corporations organized in the Philippines.4On 2 June 1997, petitioner filed trademark and service mark applications with the Bureau of Trademarks (BOT) of the IPO for "IN-N-OUT" and "IN-N-OUT Burger & Arrow Design." Petitioner later found out, through the Official Action Papers issued by the IPO on 31 May 2000, that respondent Sehwani, Incorporated had already obtained Trademark Registration for the mark "IN N OUT (the inside of the letter "O" formed like a star)."5By virtue of a licensing agreement, Benita Frites, Inc. was able to use the registered mark of respondent Sehwani, Incorporated.Petitioner eventually filed on 4 June 2001 before the Bureau of Legal Affairs (BLA) of the IPO an administrative complaint against respondents for unfair competition and cancellation of trademark registration. Petitioner averred in its complaint that it is the owner of the trade name IN-N-OUT and the following trademarks: (1) "IN-N-OUT"; (2) "IN-N-OUT Burger & Arrow Design"; and (3) "IN-N-OUT Burger Logo." These trademarks are registered with the Trademark Office of the US and in various parts of the world, are internationally well-known, and have become distinctive of its business and goods through its long and exclusive commercial use.6Petitioner pointed out that its internationally well-known trademarks and the mark of the respondents are all registered for the restaurant business and are clearly identical and confusingly similar. Petitioner claimed that respondents are making it appear that their goods and services are those of the petitioner, thus, misleading ordinary and unsuspecting consumers that they are purchasing petitioners products.7Following the filing of its complaint, petitioner sent on 18 October 2000 a demand letter directing respondent Sehwani, Incorporated to cease and desist from claiming ownership of the mark "IN-N-OUT" and to voluntarily cancel its trademark registration. In a letter-reply dated 23 October 2000, respondents refused to accede to petitioner demand, but expressed willingness to surrender the registration of respondent Sehwani, Incorporated of the "IN N OUT" trademark for a fair and reasonable consideration.8Petitioner was able to register the mark "Double Double" on 4 July 2002, based on their application filed on 2 June 1997.9It alleged that respondents also used this mark, as well as the menu color scheme. Petitioners also averred that respondent Benitas receipts bore the phrase, "representing IN-N-OUT Burger."10It should be noted that that although respondent Sehwahi, Incorporated registered a mark which appeared as "IN N OUT (the inside of the letter "O" formed like a star)," respondents used the mark "IN-N-OUT."11To counter petitioners complaint, respondents filed before the BLA-IPO an Answer with Counterclaim. Respondents asserted therein that they had been using the mark "IN N OUT" in the Philippines since 15 October 1982. On 15 November 1991, respondent Sehwani, Incorporated filed with the then Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) an application for the registration of the mark "IN N OUT (the inside of the letter "O" formed like a star)." Upon approval of its application, a certificate of registration of the said mark was issued in the name of respondent Sehwani, Incorporated on 17 December 1993. On 30 August 2000, respondents Sehwani, Incorporated and Benita Frites, Inc. entered into a Licensing Agreement, wherein the former entitled the latter to use its registered mark, "IN N OUT." Respondents asserted that respondent Sehwani, Incorporated, being the registered owner of the mark "IN N OUT," should be accorded the presumption of a valid registration of its mark with the exclusive right to use the same. Respondents argued that none of the grounds provided under the Intellectual Property Code for the cancellation of a certificate of registration are present in this case. Additionally, respondents maintained that petitioner had no legal capacity to sue as it had never operated in the Philippines.12Subsequently, the IPO Director of Legal Affairs, Estrellita Beltran-Abelardo, rendered a Decision dated 22 December 2003,13in favor of petitioner. According to said Decision, petitioner had the legal capacity to sue in the Philippines, since its country of origin or domicile was a member of and a signatory to the Convention of Paris on Protection of Industrial Property. And although petitioner had never done business in the Philippines, it was widely known in this country through the use herein of products bearing its corporate and trade name. Petitioners marks are internationally well-known, given the world-wide registration of the mark "IN-N-OUT," and its numerous advertisements in various publications and in the Internet. Moreover, the IPO had already declared in a previous inter partes case that "In-N-Out Burger and Arrow Design" was an internationally well-known mark. Given these circumstances, the IPO Director for Legal Affairs pronounced in her Decision that petitioner had the right to use its tradename and mark "IN-N-OUT" in the Philippines to the exclusion of others, including the respondents. However, respondents used the mark "IN N OUT" in good faith and were not guilty of unfair competition, since respondent Sehwani, Incorporated did not evince any intent to ride upon petitioners goodwill by copying the mark "IN-N-OUT Burger" exactly. The inside of the letter "O" in the mark used by respondents formed a star. In addition, the simple act of respondent Sehwani, Incorporated of inquiring into the existence of a pending application for registration of the "IN-N-OUT" mark was not deemed fraudulent. The dispositive part of the Decision of the IPO Director for Legal Affairs reads:With the foregoing disquisition, Certificate of Registration No. 56666 dated 17 December 1993 for the mark "IN-N-OUT" (the inside of the letter "O" formed like a star) issued in favor of Sehwani, Incorporated is hereby CANCELLED. Consequently, respondents Sehwani, Inc. and Benitas Frites are hereby ordered to permanently cease and desist from using the mark "IN-N-OUT" and "IN-N-OUT BURGER LOGO" on its goods and in its business. With regards the mark "Double-Double," considering that as earlier discussed, the mark has been approved by this Office for publication and that as shown by evidence, Complainant is the owner of the said mark, Respondents are so hereby ordered to permanently cease and desist from using the mark Double-Double. NO COSTS.14Both parties filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration of the aforementioned Decision. Respondents Motion for Reconsideration15and petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsideration16were denied by the IPO Director for Legal Affairs in Resolution No. 2004-1817dated 28 October 2004 and Resolution No. 2005-05 dated 25 April 2005,18respectively.Subsequent events would give rise to two cases before this Court, G.R. No. 171053 and G.R. No. 179127, the case at bar.G.R. No. 171053On 29 October 2004, respondents received a copy of Resolution No. 2004-18 dated 28 October 2004 denying their Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, on 18 November 2004, respondents filed an Appeal Memorandum with IPO Director General Emma Francisco (Director General Francisco). However, in an Order dated 7 December 2004, the appeal was dismissed by the IPO Director General for being filed beyond the15-day reglementary period to appeal.Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, filed on 20 December 2004 and docketed asCA-G.R. SP No. 88004, challenging the dismissal of their appeal by the IPO Director General, which effectively affirmed the Decision dated 22 December 2003 of the IPO Director for Legal Affairs ordering the cancellation of the registration of the disputed trademark in the name of respondent Sehwani, Incorporated and enjoining respondents from using the same. In particular, respondents based their Petition on the following grounds:THE IPO DIRECTOR GENERAL COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN DISMISSING APPEAL NO. 14-2004-00004 ON A MERE TECHNICALITYTHE BUREAU OF LEGAL AFFAIRS (SIC) DECISION AND RESOLUTION (1) CANCELLING RESPONDENTS CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION FOR THE MARK "IN-N-OUT," AND (2) ORDERING PETITIONERS TO PERMANENTLY CEASE AND DESIST FROM USING THE SUBJECT MARK ON ITS GOODS AND BUSINESS ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND/OR IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE.Respondents thus prayed:WHEREFORE, petitioners respectfully pray that this Honorable Court give due course to this petition, and thereafter order the Office of the Director General of the Intellectual Property Office to reinstate and give due course to [respondent]s Appeal No. 14-2004-00004.Other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises, are likewise prayed for.On 21 October 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision denying respondents Petition in CA-G.R SP No. 88004 and affirming the Order dated 7 December 2004 of the IPO Director General. The appellate court confirmed that respondents appeal before the IPO Director General was filed out of time and that it was only proper to cancel the registration of the disputed trademark in the name of respondent Sehwani, Incorporated and to permanently enjoin respondents from using the same. Effectively, the 22 December 2003 Decision of IPO Director of Legal Affairs was likewise affirmed. On 10 November 2005, respondents moved for the reconsideration of the said Decision. On 16 January 2006, the Court of Appeals denied their motion for reconsideration.Dismayed with the outcome of their petition before the Court of Appeals, respondents raised the matter to the Supreme Court in a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed on 30 January 2006, bearing the titleSehwani, Incorporated v. In-N-Out Burgerand docketed asG.R. No. 171053.19This Court promulgated a Decision in G.R. No. 171053 on 15 October 2007,20finding that herein respondents failed to file their Appeal Memorandum before the IPO Director General within the period prescribed by law and, consequently, they lost their right to appeal. The Court further affirmed the Decision dated 22 December 2003 of the IPO Director of Legal Affairs holding that herein petitioner had the legal capacity to sue for the protection of its trademarks, even though it was not doing business in the Philippines, and ordering the cancellation of the registration obtained by herein respondent Sehwani, Incorporated of the internationally well-known marks of petitioner, and directing respondents to stop using the said marks. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 171053, but it was denied with finality in a Resolution dated 21 January 2008.G.R. No. 179127Upon the denial of its Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 22 December 2003 of the IPO Director for Legal Affairs, petitioner was able to file a timely appeal before the IPO Director General on 27 May 2005.During the pendency of petitioners appeal before the IPO Director General, the Court of Appeals already rendered on 21 October 2005 its Decision dismissing respondents Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 88004.In a Decision dated 23 December 2005, IPO Director General Adrian Cristobal, Jr. found petitioners appeal meritorious and modified the Decision dated 22 December 2003 of the IPO Director of Legal Affairs. The IPO Director General declared that respondents were guilty of unfair competition. Despite respondents claims that they had been using the mark since 1982, they only started constructing their restaurant sometime in 2000, after petitioner had already demanded that they desist from claiming ownership of the mark "IN-N-OUT." Moreover, the sole distinction of the mark registered in the name of respondent Sehwani, Incorporated, from those of the petitioner was the star inside the letter "O," a minor difference which still deceived purchasers. Respondents were not even actually using the star in their mark because it was allegedly difficult to print. The IPO Director General expressed his disbelief over the respondents reasoning for the non-use of the star symbol. The IPO Director General also considered respondents use of petitioners registered mark "Double-Double" as a sign of bad faith and an intent to mislead the public. Thus, the IPO Director General ruled that petitioner was entitled to an award for the actual damages it suffered by reason of respondents acts of unfair competition, exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.21Thefalloof the Decision reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [herein respondents] are held guilty of unfair competition. Accordingly, Decision No. 2003-02 dated 22 December 2003 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:[Herein Respondents] are hereby ordered to jointly and severally pay [herein petitioner]:1. Damages in the amount ofTWO HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY FOUR AND 28/100(P212,574.28);2. Exemplary damages in the amount ofFIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00);3. Attorneys fees and expenses of litigation in the amount ofFIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).All products of [herein respondents] including the labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles and materials used by them in committing unfair competition should be without compensation of any sort be seized and disposed of outside the channels of commerce.Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of Bureau of Legal Affairs for appropriate action, and the records be returned to her for proper disposition. Further, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Documentation, Information and Technology Transfer Bureau for their information and records purposes.22Aggrieved, respondents were thus constrained to file on 11 January 2006 before the Court of Appeals another Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed asCA-G.R. SP No. 92785. Respondents based their second Petition before the appellate court on the following grounds:THE IPO DIRECTOR GENERAL COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN HOLDING PETITIONERS LIABLE FOR UNFAIR COMPETITION AND IN ORDERING THEM TO PAY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES TO RESPONDENTSTHE IPO DIRECTOR GENERAL COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE BUREAU OF LEGAL AFFAIRS DECISION (1) CANCELLING PETITIONERS CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION FOR THE MARK "IN-N-OUT," AND (2) ORDERING PETITIONERS TO PERMANENTLY CEASE AND DESIST FROM USING THE SUBJECT MARK ON ITS GOODS AND BUSINESSRespondents assailed before the appellate court the foregoing 23 December 2005 Decision of the IPO Director General, alleging that their use of the disputed mark was not tainted with fraudulent intent; hence, they should not be held liable for damages. They argued that petitioner had never entered into any transaction involving its goods and services in the Philippines and, therefore, could not claim that its goods and services had already been identified in the mind of the public. Respondents added that the disputed mark was not well-known. Finally, they maintained that petitioners complaint was already barred by laches.23At the end of their Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 92785, respondents presented the following prayer:WHEREFORE, [respondents herein] respectfully pray that this Honorable Court:(a) upon the filing of this petition, issue a temporary restraining order enjoining the IPO and [petitioner], their agents, successors and assigns, from executing, enforcing and implementing the IPO Director Generals Decision dated 23 December 2005, which modified the Decision No. 2003-02 dated 22 December 2003 of the BLA, until further orders from this Honorable Court.(b) after notice and hearing, enjoin the IPO and [petitioner], their agents, successors and assigns, from executing, enforcing and implementing the Decision dated 23 December 2005 of the Director General of the IPO in IPV No. 10-2001-00004 and to maintain the status quo ante pending the resolution of the merits of this petition; and(c) after giving due course to this petition:(i) reverse and set aside the Decision dated 23 December 2005 of the Director General of the IPO in IPV No. 10-2001-00004 finding the [respondents] guilty of unfair competition and awarding damages and attorneys fees to the respondent(ii) in lieu thereof, affirm Decision No. 2003-02 of the BLA dated 22 December 2003 and Resolution No. 2005-05 of the BLA dated 25 April 2005, insofar as it finds [respondents] not guilty of unfair competition and hence not liable to the [petitioner] for damages and attorneys fees;(iii) reverse Decision No. 2003-02 of the BLA dated 22 December 2003, and Resolution No. 2005-05 of the BLA dated 25 April 2005, insofar as it upheld [petitioner]s legal capacity to sue; that [petitioner]s trademarks are well-known; and that respondent has the exclusive right to use the same; and(iv) make the injunction permanent.[Respondents] also pray for other reliefs, as may deemed just or equitable.24On 18 July 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision25in CA-G.R. SP No. 92785 reversing the Decision dated 23 December 2005 of the IPO Director General.The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, initially addressed petitioners assertion that respondents had committed forum shopping by the institution of CA-G.R. SP No. 88004 and CA-G.R. SP No. 92785. It ruled that respondents were not guilty of forum shopping, distinguishing between the respondents two Petitions. The subject of Respondents Petition in CA-G.R SP No. 88004 was the 7 December 2004 Decision of the IPO Director General dismissing respondents appeal of the 22 December 2003 Decision of the IPO Director of Legal Affairs. Respondents questioned therein the cancellation of the trademark registration of respondent Sehwani, Incorporated and the order permanently enjoining respondents from using the disputed trademark. Respondents Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 92785 sought the review of the 23 December 2005 Decision of the IPO Director General partially modifying the 22 December 2003 Decision of the IPO Director of Legal Affairs. Respondents raised different issues in their second petition before the appellate court, mainly concerning the finding of the IPO Director General that respondents were guilty of unfair competition and the awarding of actual and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees, to petitioner.The Court of Appeals then proceeded to resolve CA-G.R. SP No. 92785 on jurisdictional grounds not raised by the parties. The appellate court declared that Section 163 of the Intellectual Property Code specifically confers upon the regular courts, and not the BLA-IPO, sole jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving provisions of the Intellectual Property Code, particularly trademarks. Consequently, the IPO Director General had no jurisdiction to rule in its Decision dated 23 December 2005 on supposed violations of these provisions of the Intellectual Property Code.In the end, the Court of Appeals decreed:WHEREFORE, the Petition isGRANTED. The Decision dated 23 December 2005 rendered by the Director General of the Intellectual Property Office of the Philippines in Appeal No. 10-05-01 isREVERSEDandSET ASIDE. Insofar as they pertain to acts governed by Article 168 of R.A. 8293 and other sections enumerated in Section 163 of the same Code, respondents claims in its Complaint docketed as IPV No. 10-2001-00004 are herebyDISMISSED.26The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 31 July 2007,27denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of its aforementioned Decision.Hence, the present Petition, where petitioner raises the following issues:IWHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONEDDECISIONDATED 18 JULY 2006 ANDRESOLUTIONDATED 31 JULY 2007 DECLARING THAT THE IPO HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINTS FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS;IIWHETHER OR NOT THE INSTANT PETITION IS FORMALLY DEFECTIVE; ANDIIIWHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONEDDECISIONDATED 18 JULY 2006 ANDRESOLUTIONDATED 31 JULY 2007 DECLARING THAT SEHWANI AND BENITA ARE NOT GUILTY OF: (A) SUBMITTING A PATENTLY FALSE CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING; AND (B) FORUM SHOPPING PROPER.28As previously narrated herein, on 15 October 2007, during the pendency of the present Petition, this Court already promulgated its Decision29in G.R. No. 171053 on 15 October 2007, which affirmed the IPO Director Generals dismissal of respondents appeal for being filed beyond the reglementary period, and left the 22 December 2003 Decision of the IPO Director for Legal Affairs, canceling the trademark registration of respondent Sehwani, Incorporated and enjoining respondents from using the disputed marks.Before discussing the merits of this case, this Court must first rule on the procedural flaws that each party has attributed to the other.Formal Defects of the PetitionRespondents contend that the Verification/Certification executed by Atty. Edmund Jason Barranda of Villaraza and Angangco, which petitioner attached to the present Petition, is defective and should result in the dismissal of the said Petition.Respondents point out that the Secretarys Certificate executed by Arnold M. Wensinger on 20 August 2007, stating that petitioner had authorized the lawyers of Villaraza and Angangco to represent it in the present Petition and to sign the Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping, among other acts, was not properly notarized. The jurat of the aforementioned Secretarys Certificate reads:Subscribed and sworn to me this 20thday of August 2007 in Irving California.Rachel A. Blake (Sgd.)Notary Public30

Respondents aver that the said Secretarys Certificate cannot properly authorize Atty. Barranda to sign the Verification/Certification on behalf of petitioner because the notary public Rachel A. Blake failed to state that: (1) petitioners Corporate Secretary, Mr. Wensinger, was known to her; (2) he was the same person who acknowledged the instrument; and (3) he acknowledged the same to be his free act and deed, as required under Section 2 of Act No. 2103 andLandingin v. Republic of the Philippines.31Respondents likewise impugn the validity of the notarial certificate of Atty. Aldrich Fitz B. Uy, on Atty. Barandas Verification/Certification attached to the instant Petition, noting the absence of (1) the serial number of the commission of the notary public; (2) the office address of the notary public; (3) the roll of attorneys number and the IBP membership number; and (4) a statement that the Verification/Certification was notarized within the notary publics territorial jurisdiction, as required under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.32Section 2 of Act No. 2103 andLandingin v. Republic of the Philippinesare not applicable to the present case. The requirements enumerated therein refer to documents which require an acknowledgement, and not a merejurat.Ajuratis that part of an affidavit in which the notary certifies that before him/her, the document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor. Ordinarily, the language of thejuratshould avow that the document was subscribed and sworn to before the notary public. In contrast, an acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signor actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.33A Secretarys Certificate, as that executed by petitioner in favor of the lawyers of the Angangco and Villaraza law office, only requires ajurat.34Even assuming that the Secretarys Certificate was flawed, Atty. Barranda may still sign the Verification attached to the Petition at bar. A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.35The party itself need not sign the verification. A partys representative, lawyer or any other person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification.36Atty. Barranda, as petitioners counsel, was in the position to verify the truth and correctness of the allegations of the present Petition. Hence, the Verification signed by Atty. Barranda substantially complies with the formal requirements for such.Moreover, the Court deems it proper not to focus on the supposed technical infirmities of Atty. Barandas Verification. It must be borne in mind that the purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition has been made in good faith; or are true and correct, not merely speculative. This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings, and non-compliance therewith does not necessarily render it fatally defective. Indeed, verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional requirement. In the interest of substantial justice, strict observance of procedural rules may be dispensed with for compelling reasons.37The vital issues raised in the instant Petition on the jurisdiction of the IPO Director for Legal Affairs and the IPO Director General over trademark cases justify the liberal application of the rules, so that the Court may give the said Petition due course and resolve the same on the merits.This Court agrees, nevertheless, that the notaries public, Rachel A. Blake and Aldrich Fitz B. Uy, were less than careful with their jurats or notarial certificates. Parties and their counsel should take care not to abuse the Courts zeal to resolve cases on their merits. Notaries public in the Philippines are reminded to exert utmost care and effort in complying with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Parties and their counsel are further charged with the responsibility of ensuring that documents notarized abroad be in their proper form before presenting said documents before Philippine courts.Forum ShoppingPetitioner next avers that respondents are guilty of forum shopping in filing the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 92785, following their earlier filing of the Petition in CA-G.R SP No. 88004. Petitioner also asserts that respondents were guilty of submitting to the Court of Appeals a patently false Certification of Non-forum Shopping in CA-G.R. SP No. 92785, when they failed to mention therein the pendency of CA-G.R SP No. 88004.Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. It is an act of malpractice and is prohibited and condemned as trifling with courts and abusing their processes. In determining whether or not there is forum shopping, what is important is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative bodies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the process creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different bodies upon the same issues.38Forum shopping is present when, in two or more cases pending, there is identity of (1) parties (2) rights or causes of action and reliefs prayed for, and (3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount tores judicatain the action under consideration.39After a cursory look into the two Petitions in CA-G.R. SP No. 88004 and CA-G.R. SP No. 92785, it would at first seem that respondents are guilty of forum shopping.There is no question that both Petitions involved identical parties, and raised at least one similar ground for which they sought the same relief. Among the grounds stated by the respondents for their Petition in CA-G.R SP No. 88004 was that "[T]he Bureau of Legal Affairs (sic) Decision and Resolution (1) canceling [herein respondent Sehwani, Incorporated]s certificate of registration for the mark IN-N-OUT and (2) ordering [herein respondents] to permanently cease and desist from using the subject mark on its goods and business are contrary to law and/or is (sic) not supported by evidence."40The same ground was again invoked by respondents in their Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 92785, rephrased as follows: "The IPO Director General committed grave error in affirming the Bureau of Legal Affairs (sic) Decision (1) canceling [herein respondent Sehwani, Incorporated]s certificate of registration for the mark "IN-N-OUT," and (2) ordering [herein respondents] to permanently cease and desist from using the subject mark on its goods and business."41Both Petitions, in effect, seek the reversal of the 22 December 2003 Decision of the IPO Director of Legal Affairs. Undoubtedly, a judgment in either one of these Petitions affirming or reversing the said Decision of the IPO Director of Legal Affairs based on the merits thereof would bar the Court of Appeals from making a contrary ruling in the other Petition, under the principle ofres judicata.Upon a closer scrutiny of the two Petitions, however, the Court takes notice of one issue which respondents did not raise in CA-G.R. SP No. 88004, but can be found in CA-G.R. SP No. 92785, i.e., whether respondents are liable for unfair competition. Hence, respondents seek additional reliefs in CA-G.R. SP No. 92785, seeking the reversal of the finding of the IPO Director General that they are guilty of unfair competition, and the nullification of the award of damages in favor of petitioner resulting from said finding. Undoubtedly, respondents could not have raised the issue of unfair competition in CA-G.R. SP No. 88004 because at the time they filed their Petition therein on 28 December 2004, the IPO Director General had not yet rendered its Decision dated 23 December 2005 wherein it ruled that respondents were guilty thereof and awarded damages to petitioner.In arguing in their Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 92785 that they are not liable for unfair competition, it is only predictable, although not necessarily legally tenable, for respondents to reassert their right to register, own, and use the disputed mark. Respondents again raise the issue of who has the better right to the disputed mark, because their defense from the award of damages for unfair competition depends on the resolution of said issue in their favor. While this reasoning may be legally unsound, this Court cannot readily presume bad faith on the part of respondents in filing their Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 92785; or hold that respondents breached the rule on forum shopping by the mere filing of the second petition before the Court of Appeals.True, respondents should have referred to CA-G.R. SP No. 88004 in the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, which they attached to their Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 92785. Nonetheless, the factual background of this case and the importance of resolving the jurisdictional and substantive issues raised herein, justify the relaxation of another procedural rule. Although the submission of a certificate against forum shopping is deemed obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.42Hence, in this case in which such a certification was in fact submitted, only it was defective, the Court may still refuse to dismiss and, instead, give due course to the Petition in light of attendant exceptional circumstances.The parties and their counsel, however, are once again warned against taking procedural rules lightly. It will do them well to remember that the Courts have taken a stricter stance against the disregard of procedural rules, especially in connection with the submission of the certificate against forum shopping, and it will not hesitate to dismiss a Petition for non-compliance therewith in the absence of justifiable circumstances.The Jurisdiction of the IPOThe Court now proceeds to resolve an important issue which arose from the Court of Appeals Decision dated 18 July 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 92785. In the afore-stated Decision, the Court of Appeals adjudged that the IPO Director for Legal Affairs and the IPO Director General had no jurisdiction over the administrative proceedings below to rule on issue of unfair competition, because Section 163 of the Intellectual Property Code confers jurisdiction over particular provisions in the law on trademarks on regular courts exclusively. According to the said provision:Section 163.Jurisdiction of Court.All actions under Sections 150, 155, 164, and 166 to 169 shall be brought before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws.The provisions referred to in Section 163 are: Section 150 on License Contracts; Section 155 on Remedies on Infringement; Section 164 on Notice of Filing Suit Given to the Director; Section 166 on Goods Bearing Infringing Marks or Trade Names; Section 167 on Collective Marks; Section 168 on Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulation and Remedies; and Section 169 on False Designations of Origin, False Description or Representation.The Court disagrees with the Court of Appeals.Section 10 of the Intellectual Property Code specifically identifies the functions of the Bureau of Legal Affairs, thus:Section 10.The Bureau of Legal Affairs.The Bureau of Legal Affairs shall have the following functions:10.1Hear and decideopposition to the application for registration of marks;cancellation of trademarks; subject to the provisions of Section 64, cancellation of patents and utility models, and industrial designs; and petitions for compulsory licensing of patents;10.2 (a)Exercise original jurisdiction in administrative complaints for violations of laws involving intellectual property rights;Provided, That its jurisdiction is limited to complaints where the total damages claimed are not less than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000):Provided,futher, That availment of the provisional remedies may be granted in accordance with the Rules of Court. The Director of Legal Affairs shall have the power to hold and punish for contempt all those who disregard orders or writs issued in the course of the proceedings.(b) After formal investigation, the Director for Legal Affairs may impose one (1) or more of the following administrative penalties:(i) The issuance of a cease and desist order which shall specify the acts that the respondent shall cease and desist from and shall require him to submit a compliance report within a reasonable time which shall be fixed in the order;(ii) The acceptance of a voluntary assurance of compliance or discontinuance as may be imposed. Such voluntary assurance may include one or more of the following:(1) An assurance to comply with the provisions of the intellectual property law violated;(2) An assurance to refrain from engaging in unlawful and unfair acts and practices subject of the formal investigation(3) An assurance to recall, replace, repair, or refund the money value of defective goods distributed in commerce; and(4) An assurance to reimburse the complainant the expenses and costs incurred in prosecuting the case in the Bureau of Legal Affairs.The Director of Legal Affairs may also require the respondent to submit periodic compliance reports and file a bond to guarantee compliance of his undertaking.(iii) The condemnation or seizure of products which are subject of the offense. The goods seized hereunder shall be disposed of in such manner as may be deemed appropriate by the Director of Legal Affairs, such as by sale, donation to distressed local governments or to charitable or relief institutions, exportation, recycling into other goods, or any combination thereof, under such guidelines as he may provide;(iv) The forfeiture of paraphernalia and all real and personal properties which have been used in the commission of the offense;(v) The imposition of administrative fines in such amount as deemed reasonable by the Director of Legal Affairs, which shall in no case be less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000) nor more than One hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000). In addition, an additional fine of not more than One thousand pesos (P1,000) shall be imposed for each day of continuing violation;(vi)The cancellation of any permit, license, authority, or registration which may have been granted by the Office, or the suspension of the validity thereof for such period of time as the Director of Legal Affairs may deem reasonable which shall not exceed one (1) year;(vii) The withholding of any permit, license, authority, or registration which is being secured by the respondent from the Office;(viii)The assessment of damages;(ix) Censure; and(x) Other analogous penalties or sanctions.10.3 The Director General may by Regulations establish the procedure to govern the implementation of this Section.43(Emphasis provided.)Unquestionably, petitioners complaint, which seeks the cancellation of the disputed mark in the name of respondent Sehwani, Incorporated, and damages for violation of petitioners intellectual property rights, falls within the jurisdiction of the IPO Director of Legal Affairs.The Intellectual Property Code also expressly recognizes the appellate jurisdiction of the IPO Director General over the decisions of the IPO Director of Legal Affairs, to wit:Section 7.The Director General and Deputies Director General. 7.1Fuctions.The Director General shall exercise the following powers and functions:x x x xb) Exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all decisions rendered by the Director of Legal Affairs, the Director of Patents, the Director of Trademarks, and the Director of Documentation, Information and Technology Transfer Bureau. The decisions of the Director General in the exercise of his appellate jurisdiction in respect of the decisions of the Director of Patents, and the Director of Trademarks shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Rules of Court; and those in respect of the decisions of the Director of Documentation, Information and Technology Transfer Bureau shall be appealable to the Secretary of Trade and Industry;The Court of Appeals erroneously reasoned that Section 10(a) of the Intellectual Property Code, conferring upon the BLA-IPO jurisdiction over administrative complaints for violations of intellectual property rights, is a general provision, over which the specific provision of Section 163 of the same Code, found under Part III thereof particularly governing trademarks, service marks, and tradenames, must prevail. Proceeding therefrom, the Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that all actions involving trademarks, including charges of unfair competition, are under the exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts.Such interpretation is not supported by the provisions of the Intellectual Property Code. While Section 163 thereof vests in civil courts jurisdiction over cases of unfair competition, nothing in the said section states that the regular courts have sole jurisdiction over unfair competition cases, to the exclusion of administrative bodies. On the contrary, Sections 160 and 170, which are also found under Part III of the Intellectual Property Code, recognize the concurrent jurisdiction of civil courts and the IPO over unfair competition cases. These two provisions read:Section 160.Right of Foreign Corporation to Sue in Trademark or Service Mark Enforcement Action.Any foreign national or juridical person who meets the requirements of Section 3 of this Act and does not engage in business in the Philippines may bring a civil oradministrative actionhereunder for opposition, cancellation, infringement, unfair competition, or false designation of origin and false description, whether or not it is licensed to do business in the Philippines under existing laws.x x x xSection 170.Penalties.Independent of the civil andadministrative sanctionsimposed by law, a criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000), shall be imposed on any person who is found guilty of committing any of the acts mentioned in Section 155, Section168, and Subsection169.1.Based on the foregoing discussion, the IPO Director of Legal Affairs had jurisdiction to decide the petitioners administrative case against respondents and the IPO Director General had exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal of the judgment of the IPO Director of Legal Affairs.Unfair CompetitionThe Court will no longer touch on the issue of the validity or propriety of the 22 December 2003 Decision of the IPO Director of Legal Affairs which: (1) directed the cancellation of the certificate of registration of respondent Sehwani, Incorporated for the mark "IN-N-OUT" and (2) ordered respondents to permanently cease and desist from using the disputed mark on its goods and business. Such an issue has already been settled by this Court in its final and executory Decision dated 15 October 2007 in G.R. No. 171053,Sehwani, Incorporated v. In-N-Out Burger,44ultimately affirming the foregoing judgment of the IPO Director of Legal Affairs. That petitioner has the superior right to own and use the "IN-N-OUT" trademarks vis--vis respondents is a finding which this Court may no longer disturb under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment. In conclusiveness of judgment, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claims, demands, purposes, or subject matters of the two actions are the same.45Thus, the only remaining issue for this Court to resolve is whether the IPO Director General correctly found respondents guilty of unfair competition for which he awarded damages to petitioner.The essential elements of an action for unfair competition are (1) confusing similarity in the general appearance of the goods and (2) intent to deceive the public and defraud a competitor. The confusing similarity may or may not result from similarity in the marks, but may result from other external factors in the packaging or presentation of the goods. The intent to deceive and defraud may be inferred from the similarity of the appearance of the goods as offered for sale to the public. Actual fraudulent intent need not be shown.46In his Decision dated 23 December 2005, the IPO Director General ably explains the basis for his finding of the existence of unfair competition in this case,viz:The evidence on record shows that the [herein respondents] were not using their registered trademark but that of the [petitioner]. [Respondent] SEHWANI, INC. was issued a Certificate of Registration for IN N OUT (with the Inside of the Letter "O" Formed like a Star) for restaurant business in 1993. The restaurant opened only in 2000 but under the name IN-N-OUT BURGER. Apparently, the [respondents] started constructing the restaurant only after the [petitioner] demanded that the latter desist from claiming ownership of the mark IN-N-OUT and voluntarily cancel their trademark registration. Moreover, [respondents] are also using [petitioners] registered mark Double-Double for use on hamburger products. In fact, the burger wrappers and the French fries receptacles the [respondents] are using do not bear the mark registered by the [respondent], but the [petitioners] IN-N-OUT Burgers name and trademark IN-N-OUT with Arrow design.There is no evidence that the [respondents] were authorized by the [petitioner] to use the latters marks in the business. [Respondents] explanation that they are not using their own registered trademark due to the difficulty in printing the "star" does not justify the unauthorized use of the [petitioners] trademark instead.Further, [respondents] are giving their products the general appearance that would likely influence purchasers to believe that these products are those of the [petitioner]. The intention to deceive may be inferred from the similarity of the goods as packed and offered for sale, and, thus, action will lie to restrain such unfair competition. x x x.x x x x[Respondents] use of IN-N-OUT BURGER in busineses signages reveals fraudulent intent to deceive purchasers. Exhibit "GG," which shows the business establishment of [respondents] illustrates the imitation of [petitioners] corporate name IN-N-OUT and signage IN-N-OUT BURGER. Even the Director noticed it and held:"We also note that In-N-Out Burger is likewise, [petitioners] corporate name. It has used the "IN-N-OUT" Burger name in its restaurant business in Baldwin Park, California in the United States of America since 1948. Thus it has the exclusive right to use the tradenems "In-N-Out" Burger in the Philippines and the respondents are unlawfully using and appropriating the same."The Office cannot give credence to the [respondents] claim of good faith and that they have openly and continuously used the subject mark since 1982 and is (sic) in the process of expanding its business. They contend that assuming that there is value in the foreign registrations presented as evidence by the [petitioner], the purported exclusive right to the use of the subject mark based on such foreign registrations is not essential to a right of action for unfair competition. [Respondents] also claim that actual or probable deception and confusion on the part of customers by reason of respondents practices must always appear, and in the present case, the BLA has found none. This Office finds the arguments untenable.In contrast, the [respondents] have the burden of evidence to prove that they do not have fraudulent intent in using the mark IN-N-OUT. To prove their good faith, [respondents] could have easily offered evidence of use of their registered trademark, which they claimed to be using as early as 1982, but did not.[Respondents] also failed to explain why they are using the marks of [petitioner] particularly DOUBLE DOUBLE, and the mark IN-N-OUT Burger and Arrow Design. Even in their listing of menus, [respondents] used [Appellants] marks of DOUBLE DOUBLE and IN-N-OUT Burger and Arrow Design. In addition, in the wrappers and receptacles being used by the [respondents] which also contained the marks of the [petitioner], there is no notice in such wrappers and receptacles that the hamburger and French fries are products of the [respondents]. Furthermore, the receipts issued by the [respondents] even indicate "representing IN-N-OUT." These acts cannot be considered acts in good faith.47Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial evidence rule." A finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that the respondent has committed acts stated in the complaint or formal charge. As defined, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion.48As recounted by the IPO Director General in his decision, there is more than enough substantial evidence to support his finding that respondents are guilty of unfair competition.With such finding, the award of damages in favor of petitioner is but proper. This is in accordance with Section 168.4 of the Intellectual Property Code, which provides that the remedies under Sections 156, 157 and 161 for infringement shall applymutatis mutandisto unfair competition. The remedies provided under Section 156 include the right to damages, to be computed in the following manner:Section 156. Actions, and Damages and Injunction for Infringement.156.1 The owner of a registered mark may recover damages from any person who infringes his rights, and the measure of the damages suffered shall be either the reasonable profit which the complaining party would have made, had the defendant not infringed his rights, or the profit which the defendant actually made out of the infringement, or in the event such measure of damages cannot be readily ascertained with reasonable certainty, then the court may award as damages a reasonable percentage based upon the amount of gross sales of the defendant or the value of the services in connection with which the mark or trade name was used in the infringement of the rights of the complaining party.In the present case, the Court deems it just and fair that the IPO Director General computed the damages due to petitioner by applying the reasonable percentage of 30% to the respondents gross sales, and then doubling the amount thereof on account of respondents actual intent to mislead the public or defraud the petitioner,49thus, arriving at the amount of actual damages ofP212,574.28.Taking into account the deliberate intent of respondents to engage in unfair competition, it is only proper that petitioner be awarded exemplary damages. Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that such damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, such as the enhancement of the protection accorded to intellectual property and the prevention of similar acts of unfair competition. However, exemplary damages are not meant to enrich one party or to impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious action.50While there is no hard and fast rule in determining the fair amount of exemplary damages, the award of exemplary damages should be commensurate with the actual loss or injury suffered.51Thus, exemplary damages ofP500,000.00 should be reduced toP250,000.00 which more closely approximates the actual damages awarded.In accordance with Article 2208(1) of the Civil Code, attorneys fees may likewise be awarded to petitioner since exemplary damages are awarded to it. Petitioner was compelled to protect its rights over the disputed mark. The amount ofP500,000.00 is more than reasonable, given the fact that the case has dragged on for more than seven years, despite the respondents failure to present countervailing evidence. Considering moreover the reputation of petitioners counsel, the actual attorneys fees paid by petitioner would far exceed the amount that was awarded to it.52IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition isGRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92785, promulgated on 18 July 2006, isREVERSED. The Decision of the IPO Director General, dated 23 December 2005, is herebyREINSTATED IN PART, with the modification that the amount of exemplary damages awarded be reduced toP250,000.00.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 167715 November 17, 2010PHIL PHARMAWEALTH, INC.,Petitioner,vs.PFIZER, INC. and PFIZER (PHIL.) INC.,Respondents.D E C I S I O NPERALTA,J.:Before the Court is a petition for review oncertiorariseeking to annul and set aside the Resolutions dated January 18, 20051and April 11, 20052by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 82734.The instant case arose from a Complaint3for patent infringement filed against petitioner Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. by respondent companies, Pfizer, Inc. and Pfizer (Phil.), Inc., with the Bureau of Legal Affairs of the Intellectual Property Office (BLA-IPO). The Complaint alleged as follows:x x x x6. Pfizer is the registered owner of Philippine Letters Patent No. 21116 (the "Patent") which was issued by this Honorable Office on July 16, 1987. The patent is valid until July 16, 2004. The claims of this Patent are directed to "a method of increasing the effectiveness of a beta-lactam antibiotic in a mammalian subject, which comprises co-administering to said subject a beta-lactam antibiotic effectiveness increasing amount of a compound of the formula IA." The scope of the claims of the Patent extends to a combination of penicillin such as ampicillin sodium and beta-lactam antibiotic like sulbactam sodium.7. Patent No. 21116 thus covers ampicillin sodium/sulbactam sodium (hereafter "Sulbactam Ampicillin"). Ampicillin sodium is a specific example of the broad beta-lactam antibiotic disclosed and claimed in the Patent. It is the compound which efficacy is being enhanced by co-administering the same with sulbactam sodium. Sulbactam sodium, on the other hand, is a specific compound of the formula IA disclosed and claimed in the Patent.8. Pfizer is marketing Sulbactam Ampicillin under the brand name "Unasyn." Pfizer's "Unasyn" products, which come in oral and IV formulas, are covered by Certificates of Product Registration ("CPR") issued by the Bureau of Food and Drugs ("BFAD") under the name of complainants. The sole and exclusive distributor of "Unasyn" products in the Philippines is Zuellig Pharma Corporation, pursuant to a Distribution Services Agreement it executed with Pfizer Phils. on January 23, 2001.9. Sometime in January and February 2003, complainants came to know that respondent [herein petitioner] submitted bids for the supply of Sulbactam Ampicillin to several hospitals without the consent of complainants and in violation of the complainants' intellectual property rights. x x xx x x x10. Complainants thus wrote the above hospitals and demanded that the latter immediately cease and desist from accepting bids for the supply [of] Sulbactam Ampicillin or awarding the same to entities other than complainants. Complainants, in the same letters sent through undersigned counsel, also demanded that respondent immediately withdraw its bids to supply Sulbactam Ampicillin.11. In gross and evident bad faith, respondent and the hospitals named in paragraph 9 hereof, willfully ignored complainants' just, plain and valid demands, refused to comply therewith and continued to infringe the Patent, all to the damage and prejudice of complainants. As registered owner of the Patent, Pfizer is entitled to protection under Section 76 of the IP Code.x x x x4Respondents prayed for permanent injunction, damages and the forfeiture and impounding of the alleged infringing products. They also asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction that would prevent herein petitioner, its agents, representatives and assigns, from importing, distributing, selling or offering the subject product for sale to any entity in the Philippines.In an Order5dated July 15, 2003 the BLA-IPO issued a preliminary injunction which was effective for ninety days from petitioner's receipt of the said Order.Prior to the expiration of the ninety-day period, respondents filed a Motion for Extension of Writ of Preliminary Injunction6which, however, was denied by the BLA-IPO in an Order7dated October 15, 2003.Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was also denied by the BLA-IPO in a Resolution8dated January 23, 2004.Respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing the October 15, 2003 and January 23, 2004 Resolutions of the BLA-IPO. Respondents also prayed for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction for the reinstatement and extension of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the BLA-IPO.While the case was pending before the CA, respondents filed a Complaint9with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City for infringement and unfair competition with damages against herein petitioner. In said case, respondents prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to prevent herein petitioner from importing, distributing, selling or offering for sale sulbactam ampicillin products to any entity in the Philippines. Respondents asked the trial court that, after trial, judgment be rendered awarding damages in their favor and making the injunction permanent.On August 24, 2004, the RTC of Makati City issued an Order10directing the issuance of a temporary restraining order conditioned upon respondents' filing of a bond.In a subsequent Order11dated April 6, 2005, the same RTC directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction "prohibiting and restraining [petitioner], its agents, representatives and assigns from importing, distributing or selling Sulbactam Ampicillin products to any entity in the Philippines."Meanwhile, on November 16, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss12the petition filed with the CA on the ground of forum shopping, contending that the case filed with the RTC has the same objective as the petition filed with the CA, which is to obtain an injunction prohibiting petitioner from importing, distributing and selling Sulbactam Ampicillin products.On January 18, 2005, the CA issued its questioned Resolution13approving the bond posted by respondents pursuant to the Resolution issued by the appellate court on March 23, 2004 which directed the issuance of a temporary restraining order conditioned upon the filing of a bond. On even date, the CA issued a temporary restraining order14which prohibited petitioner "from importing, distributing, selling or offering for sale Sulbactam Ampicillin products to any hospital or to any other entity in the Philippines, or from infringing Pfizer Inc.'s Philippine Patent No. 21116 and impounding all the sales invoices and other documents evidencing sales by [petitioner] of Sulbactam Ampicillin products."On February 7, 2005, petitioner again filed a Motion to Dismiss15the case for being moot and academic, contending that respondents' patent had already lapsed. In the same manner, petitioner also moved for the reconsideration of the temporary restraining order issued by the CA on the same basis that the patent right sought to be protected has been extinguished due to the lapse of the patent license and on the ground that the CA has no jurisdiction to review the order of the BLA-IPO as said jurisdiction is vested by law in the Office of the Director General of the IPO.On April 11, 2005, the CA rendered its presently assailed Resolution denying the Motion to Dismiss, dated November 16, 2004, and the motion for reconsideration, as well as Motion to Dismiss, both dated February 7, 2005.Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:a) Can an injunctive relief be issued based on an action of patent infringement when the patent allegedly infringed has already lapsed?b) What tribunal has jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Director of Legal Affairs of the Intellectual Property Office?c) Is there forum shopping when a party files two actions with two seemingly different causes of action and yet pray for the same relief?16In the first issue raised, petitioner argues that respondents' exclusive right to monopolize the subject matter of the patent exists only within the term of the patent. Petitioner claims that since respondents' patent expired on July 16, 2004, the latter no longer possess any right of monopoly and, as such, there is no more basis for the issuance of a restraining order or injunction against petitioner insofar as the disputed patent is concerned.The Court agrees.Section 37 of Republic Act No. (RA) 165,17which was the governing law at the time of the issuance of respondents' patent, provides:Section 37. Rights of patentees. A patentee shall have the exclusive right to make, use and sell the patented machine, article or product, and to use the patented process for the purpose of industry or commerce, throughout the territory of the Philippinesfor the term of the patent; and such making, using, or selling by any person without the authorization of the patentee constitutes infringement of the patent.18It is clear from the above-quoted provision of law that the exclusive right of a patentee to make, use and sell a patented product, article or process exists only during the term of the patent. In the instant case, Philippine Letters Patent No. 21116, which was the basis of respondents in filing their complaint with the BLA-IPO, was issued on July 16, 1987. This fact was admitted by respondents themselves in their complaint. They also admitted that the validity of the said patent is until July 16, 2004, which is in conformity with Section 21 of RA 165, providing that the term of a patent shall be seventeen (17) years from the date of issuance thereof. Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof and that the admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. In the present case, there is no dispute as to respondents' admission that the term of their patent expired on July 16, 2004. Neither is there evidence to show that their admission was made through palpable mistake. Hence, contrary to the pronouncement of the CA, there is no longer any need to present evidence on the issue of expiration of respondents' patent.On the basis of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioner that after July 16, 2004, respondents no longer possess the exclusive right to make, use and sell the articles or products covered by Philippine Letters Patent No. 21116.Section 3, Rule 58, of the Rules of Court lays down the requirements for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, viz:(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or(c) That a party, court, or agency or a person is doing, threatening, or attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.In this connection, pertinent portions of Section 5, Rule 58 of the same Rules provide that if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, a temporary restraining order may be issuedex parte.From the foregoing, it can be inferred that two requisites must exist to warrant the issuance of an injunctive relief, namely: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.19In the instant case, it is clear that when the CA issued its January 18, 2005 Resolution approving the bond filed by respondents, the latter no longer had a right that must be protected, considering that Philippine Letters Patent No. 21116 which was issued to them already expired on July 16, 2004. Hence, the issuance by the CA of a temporary restraining order in favor of the respondents is not proper.In fact, the CA should have granted petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for certiorari filed before it as the only issue raised therein is the propriety of extending the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the BLA-IPO. Since the patent which was the basis for issuing the injunction, was no longer valid, any issue as to the propriety of extending the life of the injunction was already rendered moot and academic.As to the second issue raised, the Court, is not persuaded by petitioner's argument that, pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the Director General of the IPO and not the CA has jurisdiction to review the questioned Orders of the Director of the BLA-IPO.It is true that under Section 7(b) of RA 8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, which is the presently prevailing law, the Director General of the IPO exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all decisions rendered by the Director of the BLA-IPO. However, what is being questioned before the CA is not a decision, but an interlocutory order of the BLA-IPO denying respondents' motion to extend the life of the preliminary injunction issued in their favor.RA 8293 is silent with respect to any remedy available to litigants who intend to question an interlocutory order issued by the BLA-IPO. Moreover, Section 1(c), Rule 14 of the Rules and Regulations on Administrative Complaints for Violation of Laws Involving Intellectual Property Rights simply provides that interlocutory orders shall not be appealable. The said Rules and Regulations do not prescribe a procedure within the administrative machinery to be followed in assailing orders issued by the BLA-IPO pending final resolution of a case filed with them. Hence, in the absence of such a remedy, the provisions of the Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory manner, as provided under Section 3, Rule 1 of the same Rules and Regulations. Hence, in the present case, respondents correctly resorted to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari with the CA to question the assailed Orders of the BLA-IPO, as they cannot appeal therefrom and they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This is consistent with Sections 120and 4,21Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended.In the first place, respondents' act of filing their complaint originally with the BLA-IPO is already in consonance with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.This Court has held that:[i]n cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence in observance of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The Court has ratiocinated that it cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. It applies where the claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.22Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that respondents' initial filing of their complaint with the BLA-IPO, instead of the regular courts, is in keeping with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction owing to the fact that the determination of the basic issue of whether petitioner violated respondents' patent rights requires the exercise by the IPO of sound administrative discretion which is based on the agency's special competence, knowledge and experience.However, the propriety of extending the life of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the BLA-IPO in the exercise of its quasi-judicial power is no longer a matter that falls within the jurisdiction of the said administrative agency, particularly that of its Director General. The resolution of this issue which was raised before the CA does not demand the exercise by the IPO of sound administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience and services in determining technical and intricate matters of fact. It is settled that one of the exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice.23This is the case with respect to the issue raised in the petition filed with the CA.Moreover, as discussed earlier, RA 8293 and its implementing rules and regulations do not provide for a procedural remedy to question interlocutory orders issued by the BLA-IPO. In this regard, it bears to reiterate that the judicial power of the courts, as provided for under the Constitution, includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments.24Judicial power also includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.25Hence, the CA, and not the IPO Director General, has jurisdiction to determine whether the BLA-IPO committed grave abuse of discretion in denying respondents' motion to extend the effectivity of the writ of preliminary injunction which the said office earlier issued.Lastly, petitioner avers that respondents are guilty of forum shopping for having filed separate actions before the IPO and the RTC praying for the same relief.The Court agrees.Forum shopping is defined as the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another forum (other than by appeal or the special civil action ofcertiorari), or the institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.26The elements of forum shopping are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties that represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; (c) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.27There is no question as to the identity of parties in the complaints filed with the IPO and the RTC.Respondents argue that they cannot be held guilty of forum shopping because their complaints are based on different causes of action as shown by the fact that the said complaints are founded on violations of different patents.The Court is not persuaded.Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. In the instant case, respondents' cause of action in their complaint filed with the IPO is the alleged act of petitioner in importing, distributing, selling or offering for sale Sulbactam Ampicillin products, acts that are supposedly violative of respondents' right to the exclusive sale of the said products which are covered by the latter's patent. However, a careful reading of the complaint filed with the RTC of Makati City would show that respondents have the same cause of action as in their complaint filed with the IPO. They claim that they have the exclusive right to make, use and sell Sulbactam Ampicillin products and that petitioner violated this right. Thus, it does not matter that the patents upon which the complaints were based are different. The fact remains that in both complaints the rights violated and the acts violative of such rights are identical.In fact, respondents seek substantially the same reliefs in their separate complaints with the IPO and the RTC for the purpose of accomplishing the same objective.It is settled by this Court in several cases that the filing by a party of two apparently different actions but with the same objective constitutes forum shopping.28The Court discussed this species of forum shopping as follows:Very simply stated, the original complaint in the court a quo which gave rise to the instant petition was filed by the buyer (herein private respondent and his predecessors-in-interest) against the seller (herein petitioners) to enforce the alleged perfected sale of real estate. On the other hand, the complaint in the Second Case seeks to declare such purported sale involving the same real property "as unenforceable as against the Bank," which is the petitioner herein. In other words, in the Second Case, the majority stockholders, in representation of the Bank, are seeking to accomplish what the Bank itself failed to do in the original case in the trial court. In brief, the objective or the relief being sought, though worded differently, is the same, namely, to enable the petitioner Bank to escape from the obligation to sell the property to respondent.29In Danville Maritime, Inc. v. Commission on Audit,30the Court ruled as follows:In the attempt to make the two actions appear to be different, petitioner impleaded different respondents therein PNOC in the case before the lower court and the COA in the case before this Court and sought what seems to be different reliefs. Petitioner asks this Court to set aside the questioned letter-directive of the COA dated October 10, 1988 and to direct said body to approve the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by and between the PNOC and petitioner, while in the complaint before the lower court petitioner seeks to enjoin the PNOC from conducting a rebidding and from selling to other parties the vessel "T/T Andres Bonifacio," and for an extension of time for it to comply with the paragraph 1 of the memorandum of agreement and damages. One can see that although the relief prayed for in the two (2) actions are ostensibly different, the ultimate objective in both actions is the same, that is, the approval of the sale of vessel in favor of petitioner, and to overturn the letter directive of the COA of October 10, 1988 disapproving the sale.31In the instant case, the prayer of respondents in their complaint filed with the IPO is as follows:A. Immediately upon the filing of this action, issue an ex parte order (a) temporarily restraining respondent, its agents, representatives and assigns from importing, distributing, selling or offering for sale Sulbactam Ampicillin products to the hospitals named in paragraph 9 of this Complaint or to any other entity in the Philippines, or from otherwise infringing Pfizer Inc.'s Philippine Patent No. 21116; and (b) impounding all the sales invoices and other documents evidencing sales by respondent of Sulbactam Ampicillin products.B. After hearing, issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent, its agents, representatives and assigns from importing, distributing, selling or offering for sale Sulbactam Ampicillin products to the hospitals named in paragraph 9 of the Complaint or to any other entity in the Philippines, or from otherwise infringing Pfizer Inc.'s Philippine Patent No. 21116; andC. After trial, render judgment:(i) declaring that respondent has infringed Pfizer Inc.'s Philippine Patent No. 21116 and that respondent has no right whatsoever over complainant's patent;(ii) ordering respondent to pay complainants the following amounts:(a) at leastP1,000,000.00 as actual damages;(b)P700,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses;(d)P1,000,000.00 as exemplary damages; and(d) costs of this suit.(iii) ordering the condemnation, seizure or forfeiture of respondent's infringing goods or products, wherever they may be found, including the materials and implements used in the commission of infringement, to be disposed of in such manner as may be deemed appropriate by this Honorable Office; and(iv) making the injunction permanent.32In an almost identical manner, respondents prayed for the following in their complaint filed with the RTC:(a) Immediately upon the filing of this action, issue an ex parte order:(1) temporarily restraining Pharmawealth, its agents, representatives and assigns from importing, distributing, selling or offering for sale infringing sulbactam ampicillin products to various government and private hospitals or to any other entity in the Philippines, or from otherwise infringing Pfizer Inc.'s Philippine Patent No. 26810.(2) impounding all the sales invoices and other documents evidencing sales by pharmawealth of sulbactam ampicillin products; and(3) disposing of the infringing goods outside the channels of commerce.(b) After hearing, issue a writ of preliminary injunction:(1) enjoining Pharmawealth, its agents, representatives and assigns from importing, distributing, selling or offering for sale infringing sulbactam ampicillin products to various government hospitals or to any other entity in the Philippines, or from otherwise infringing Patent No. 26810;(2) impounding all the sales invoices and other documents evidencing sales by Pharmawealth of sulbactam ampicillin products; and(3) disposing of the infringing goods outside the channels of commerce.(c) After trial, render judgment:(1) finding Pharmawealth to have infringed Patent No. 26810 and declaring Pharmawealth to have no right whatsoever over plaintiff's patent;(2) ordering Pharmawealth to pay plaintiffs the following amounts:(i) at leastP3,000,000.00 as actual damages;(ii)P500,000.00 as attorney's fees andP1,000,000.00 as litigation expenses;(iii)P3,000,000.00 as exemplary damages; and(iv) costs of this suit.(3) ordering the condemnation, seizure or forfeiture of Pharmawealth's infringing goods or products, wherever they may be found, including the materials and implements used in the commission of infringement, to be disposed of in such manner as may be deemed appropriate by this Honorable Court; and(4) making the injunction permanent.33It is clear from the foregoing that the ultimate objective which respondents seek to achieve in their separate complaints filed with the RTC and the IPO, is to ask for damages for the alleged violation of their right to exclusively sell Sulbactam Ampicillin products and to permanently prevent or prohibit petitioner from selling said products to any entity. Owing to the substantial identity of parties, reliefs and issues in the IPO and RTC cases, a decision in one case will necessarily amount tores judicatain the other action.It bears to reiterate that what is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigant by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issue.341avvphi1Thus, the Court agrees with petitioner that respondents are indeed guilty of forum shopping.Jurisprudence holds that if the forum shopping is not considered willful and deliberate, the subsequent case shall be dismissed without prejudice, on the ground of either litis pendentia or res judicata.35However, if the forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions shall be dismissed with prejudice.36In the present case, the Court finds that respondents did not deliberately violate the rule on non-forum shopping. Respondents may not be totally blamed for erroneously believing that they can file separate actions simply on the basis of different patents. Moreover, in the suit filed with the RTC of Makati City, respondents were candid enough to inform the trial court of the pendency of the complaint filed with the BLA-IPO as well as the petition for certiorari filed with the CA. On these bases, only Civil Case No. 04-754 should be dismissed on the ground oflitis pendentia.WHEREFORE, the petition isPARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated January 18, 2005 and April 11, 2005, in CA-G.R. No. 82734, areREVERSEDandSET ASIDE. The petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals isDISMISSEDfor being moot and academic.Civil Case No. 04-754, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138, is likewiseDISMISSEDon the ground oflitis pendentia.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. Nos. 160054-55 July 21, 2004MANOLO P. SAMSON,petitioner,vs.HON. REYNALDO B. DAWAY, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CATERPILLAR, INC.,respondents.D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:Assailed in this petition forcertiorariis the March 26, 2003 Order1of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, which denied petitioners (1) motion to quash the information; and (2) motion for reconsideration of the August 9, 2002 Order denying his motion to suspend the arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44. Petitioner also questioned its August 5, 2003 Order2which denied his motion for reconsideration.The undisputed facts show that on March 7, 2002, two informations for unfair competition under Section 168.3 (a), in relation to Section 170, of the Intellectual Property Code (Republic Act No. 8293), similarly worded save for the dates and places of commission, were filed against petitioner Manolo P. Samson, the registered owner of ITTI Shoes. The accusatory portion of said informations read:That on or about the first week of November 1999 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, owner/proprietor of ITTI Shoes/Mano Shoes Manufactuirng Corporation located at Robinsons Galleria, EDSA corner Ortigas Avenue, Quezon City, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously distribute, sell and/or offer for sale CATERPILLAR products such as footwear, garments, clothing, bags, accessories and paraphernalia which are closely identical to and/or colorable imitations of the authentic Caterpillar products and likewise using trademarks, symbols and/or designs as would cause confusion, mistake or deception on the part of the buying public to the damage and prejudice of CATERPILLAR, INC., the prior adopter, user and owner of the following internationally: "CATERPILLAR", "CAT", "CATERPILLAR & DESIGN", "CAT AND DESIGN", "WALKING MACHINES" and "TRACK-TYPE TRACTOR & DESIGN."CONTRARY TO LAW.3On April 19, 2002, petitioner filed a motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings in view of the existence of an alleged prejudicial question involved in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 for unfair competition pending with the same branch; and also in view of the pendency of a petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice assailing the Chief State Prosecutors resolution finding probable cause to charge petitioner with unfair competition. In an Order dated August 9, 2002, the trial court denied the motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings.On August 20, 2002, petitioner filed a twin motion to quash the informations and motion for reconsideration of the order denying motion to suspend, this time challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense charged. He contended that since under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, the penalty4of imprisonment for unfair competition does not exceed six years, the offense is cognizable by the Municipal Trial Courts and not by the Regional Trial Court, per R.A. No. 7691.In its assailed March 26, 2003 Order, the trial court denied petitioners twin motions.6A motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied on August 5, 2003.Hence, the instant petition alleging that respondent Judge gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed orders.The issues posed for resolution are (1) Which court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for violation of intellectual property rights? (2) Did the respondent Judge gravely abuse his discretion in refusing to suspend the arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44 on the ground of (a) the existence of a prejudicial question; and (b) the pendency of a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice on the finding of probable cause for unfair competition?Under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, which took effect on January 1, 1998, the criminal penalty for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description or representation, is imprisonment from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from Fifty Thousand Pesos to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, to wit:SEC. 170.Penalties. Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed by law, a criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00), shall be imposed on any person who is found guilty of committing any of the acts mentioned in Section 155 [Infringement], Section 168 [Unfair Competition] and Section 169.1 [False Designation of Origin and False Description or Representation].Corollarily, Section 163 of the same Code states that actions (including criminal and civil) under Sections 150, 155, 164, 166, 167, 168 and 169 shall be brought before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws, thus SEC. 163.Jurisdiction of Court. All actions under Sections 150, 155, 164 and 166 to 169 shall be brought before theproper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws. (Emphasis supplied)The existing law referred to in the foregoing provision is Section 27 of R.A. No. 166 (The Trademark Law) which provides that jurisdiction over cases for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description or representation, is lodged with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) SEC. 27.Jurisdiction of Court of First Instance. All actions under this Chapter [V Infringement] and Chapters VI [Unfair Competition] and VII [False Designation of Origin and False Description or Representation], hereof shall be brought before the Court of First Instance.We find no merit in the claim of petitioner that R.A. No. 166 was expressly repealed by R.A. No. 8293. The repealing clause of R.A. No. 8293, reads SEC. 239.Repeals. 239.1. All Acts andparts of Actsinconsistent herewith, more particularly Republic Act No. 165, as amended;Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code; Presidential Decree No. 49, including Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended, are hereby repealed. (Emphasis added)Notably, the aforequoted clause did not expressly repeal R.A. No. 166 in its entirety, otherwise, it would not have used the phrases "parts of Acts"and "inconsistent herewith;" and it would have simply stated "Republic Act No. 165, as amended; Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code; Presidential Decree No. 49, including Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended are hereby repealed." It would have removed all doubts that said specific laws had been rendered without force and effect. The use of the phrases "parts of Acts"and "inconsistent herewith" only means that the repeal pertains only to provisions which are repugnant or not susceptible of harmonization with R.A. No. 8293.6Section 27 of R.A. No. 166, however, is consistent and in harmony with Section 163 of R.A. No. 8293. Had R.A. No. 8293 intended to vest jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property rights with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, it would have expressly stated so under Section 163 thereof.Moreover, the settled rule in statutory construction is that in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law to Regional Trial Courts must prevail over that granted by a general law to Municipal Trial Courts.7In the case at bar, R.A. No. 8293 and R.A. No. 166 are special laws8conferring jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property rights to the Regional Trial Court. They should therefore prevail over R.A. No. 7691, which is a general law.9Hence, jurisdiction over the instant criminal case for unfair competition is properly lodged with the Regional Trial Court even if the penalty therefor is imprisonment of less than 6 years, or from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from P50,000.00 to P200,000.00.In fact, to implement and ensure the speedy disposition of cases involving violations of intellectual property rights under R.A. No. 8293, the Court issued A.M. No. 02-1-11-SC dated February 19, 2002 designating certain Regional Trial Courts as Intellectual P