IMCA M119 Fires in Machinery Spaces for DP Vessel (Jul 2003)

8/16/2019 IMCA M119 Fires in Machinery Spaces for DP Vessel (Jul 2003)

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A B The International Marine

Contractors Association

Fires in Machinery Spaces

on DP Vessels

www.imca-int.com IMCA M 119 Rev. 1

July 2003


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A B The International Marine Contractors Association

(IMCA) is the international trade associationrepresenting offshore, marine and underwater

engineering companies.

IMCA promotes improvements in quality, health, safety,

environmental and technical standards through the publication

of information notes, codes of practice and by other

appropriate means.

Members are self-regulating through the adoption of IMCA

guidelines as appropriate. They commit to act as responsible

members by following relevant guidelines and being willing to beaudited against compliance with them by their clients.

There are two core committees that relate to all members:

Safety, Environment & Legislation

Training, Certification & Personnel Competence

The Association is organised through four distinct divisions,

each covering a specific area of members’ interests: Diving,

Marine, Offshore Survey, Remote Systems & ROV.

There are also four regional sections which facilitate work onissues affecting members in their local geographic area –

Americas Deepwater, Asia-Pacific, Europe & Africa and Middle

East & India.

IMCA M 119 Rev. 1

The original DPVOA document “Engine Room Fires on DP

Vessels” (119 DPVOA), prepared by Global Maritime and

published in 1994, outlined the key elements in engine room fire

prevention, containment and fire fighting. It highlights areas

where relatively simple improvements can greatly help the fire

containment and fire fighting responses. The report mostly

draws on experience from fires on DP vessels and investigative

work.

The report strongly recommended that the chief engineer

together with the ECR watchkeeping engineers work out a fire

alarm response procedure for all operational situationsparticularly if this response is to be different when working onDP.

This new document was prepared for IMCA, under the

direction of its Marine Division Management Committee, by

Wavespec to review the issues raised in that report, and

relevant parts of it have been incorporated into the new

document.

This document supersedes 119 DPVOA, which is now

withdrawn.

www.imca-int.com/marine

The information contained herein is given for guidance only and endeavours to

reflect best industry practice. For the avoidance of doubt no legal liability shall

attach to any guidance and/or recommendation and/or statement herein contained.


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Fires in Machinery Spaces on DP Vessels Contents

CONTENTS

1 Background..........................................................................................................1

2 Introduction .........................................................................................................2

3 Regulations and Guidance..................................................................................3

4 Likelihood and Risk of Engine Room Fires ......................................................4

5 Engine Room Fire Case Studies .........................................................................6

5.1 Case Study 1........................................................................................................ 6 5.2 Case Study 2........................................................................................................ 6 5.3 Case Study 3........................................................................................................ 7 5.4 Case Study 4........................................................................................................ 7 5.5 Case Study 5........................................................................................................ 8 5.6 Case Study 6........................................................................................................ 8 5.7 Case Study 7........................................................................................................ 8

6 Methods of Preventing Fires...............................................................................9

7 Methods of Detecting Fires ...............................................................................11

7.1 Fire Detection Systems ..................................................................................... 11 7.2 Machinery Space Oil Mist Monitoring ............................................................. 12 7.3 Crankcase Oil Mist Detection ........................................................................... 13

8 Methods of Extinguishing Fires .......................................................................14

8.1 CO2 Systems...................................................................................................... 16 8.2 Situation regarding the use of Halon................................................................. 16 8.3 Portable Fire Extinguishers ............................................................................... 17 8.4 Fixed Water Based Fire Extinguishing Systems ............................................... 17 8.5 Fixed Aerosol Fire Extinguishing Systems....................................................... 18 8.6 Local Fire Fighting Systems ............................................................................. 18 8.7 Shore Based Fire Fighting Resources ............................................................... 18

9 Personnel Experience and Training.................................................................19

9.1 Experience......................................................................................................... 19

9.2 Training............................................................................................................. 20

10 Experience and Viewpoints of IMCA Members.............................................21

11 Lessons Learned ................................................................................................22

11.1 Fuel Oil Piping ................................................................................................. 22 11.2 Checking the Fire Alarm................................................................................... 22 11.3 Ventilation Shut Down...................................................................................... 23 11.4 Cable Routes ..................................................................................................... 23 11.5 Progress of the Fire ........................................................................................... 23 11.6 Summary of recommendations ........................................................................ 24

12 Useful Sources of Information..........................................................................26

IMCA M 119 Rev. 1 Page i


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Fires in Machinery Spaces on DP Vessels Introduction

2 INTRODUCTION

In reality, a DP vessel is no different from any other ship in terms of fire prevention and

fire fighting, except where DP Class 3 is concerned. The protection of all ships is

covered by the regulations of the International Maritime Organization (IMO)

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (SOLAS) and subsequentamendments which are in force when the ship is built. SOLAS regulations are usually

updated at four year intervals, and the later additions are normally only applied to new

ships.

DP Class 3 vessels are different from most other commercial ships because the ship’s

structure and the systems related to dynamic positioning are designed and installed so as

to permit any one compartment or space to be put out of action by fire or flooding

without affecting the ability of the ship to hold station. However, in practice this is not

likely to alter the extent of fire protection provided, and the regulations are applied in

exactly the same way as those for other vessels.

It is not intended in this document to go into the detail of the fire regulations, as it is

assumed that readers have access to IMO publications and other documents. The ISM

code requires that each ship be provided with a safety management system (SMS) that

includes procedures for response to emergency situations. IMCA members who

responded to a questionnaire on this subject indicated that they all included an engine

room fire situation in their Emergency Response Procedures.

In his recent and definitive book on Fire Safety at Sea1, which the reader of this

document is recommended to consult, Dr Cowley states that “machinery spaces are, by

their very nature, the most susceptible of all shipboard compartments to serious fires.”

Although few people are normally present in engine rooms, and therefore consequencesmay be less serious in terms of loss of life than fires in passenger or crew

accommodation, there have been many instances of fires occurring on ships under repair

“where very large numbers of workers may be involved.”

Dr Cowley points out that the protection of machinery spaces, including engine rooms,

is based on safe operating practices resulting from a combination of regulations and

industry recommendations. Since these are being constantly updated and new

regulations are constantly introduced, the prudent ship operator should keep abreast of

all the relevant documentation on a regular basis.

A recent report by the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) into a fireonboard the high speed ferry Stena Explorer in 2001 demonstrates the old maxim that

“prevention is better than cure”. The fire resulted from the ignition of oil leaking from a

failed compression pipe fitting on a generator engine in an unmanned machinery space

(see Case Study 4). At the time of writing the UK has submitted a paper to the IMO

proposing guidance on the installation of oil mist detection systems in machinery spaces

on ships. Those ships where such systems are fitted would hope not to have to rely on

fire detection systems to alert their crews to the disastrous consequences of a fuel oil

leak.

We recommend that IMCA members distribute this document to their ships, to stimulate

debate and to allow the ships’ management teams to review their procedures.

1 Fire Safety at Sea, MEP Series, Vol 1 Pt 5, Dr James Cowley, IMarEST 2002

IMCA M 119 Rev. 1 Page 2


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Fires in Machinery Spaces on DP Vessels Regulations and Guidance

3 REGULATIONS AND GUIDANCE

All ships are subject to the regulations and rules established by the International

Maritime Organization (IMO) and enforced by the ship’s registration flag state and the

classification society under whose rules the ship was constructed and classed.

In addition, ships and their crew are able to take advantage of guidance issued by IMO,classification societies, P&I clubs, other non-government organisations (NGOs) and

industry bodies.

The dominant source of such legislation and guidance relating to fires on ships is the

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of the IMO, and its requirements are contained in

SOLAS (Safety Of Life At Sea) as currently amended. Other guidance is contained in

IMO Resolutions and MSC Circulars, which are issued at frequent intervals to clarify

the requirements and to update them as necessary. Once IMO resolutions have been

ratified by the members of IMO they are normally codified by Flag State governments

into statutes that are imposed on ships under their jurisdiction.

All SOLAS requirements that relate to the prevention and extinguishing of fires in

engine rooms are included in Chapter II-2 of the SOLAS document, and the flag state

laws and classification society rules normally conform to these requirements. In this

document the SOLAS requirements are quoted or referred to as appropriate under the

various headings. The IMO resolutions are also referred to where they add to an

understanding and interpretation of the relevant rules.

Machinery spaces are classified in SOLAS Chapter II-2 as being Category A, (see

Regulation 3.30, 3.31) and these include spaces which contain oil-fired equipment other

than boilers, such as inert gas generators and incinerators.

The final ratified form of the revised SOLAS 74 Chapter II-2 came into force on 1st July

2002, as a result of IMO resolutions MSC 99(73) and MSC 98(73). The revised chapter

is in seven parts covering general requirements and definitions, requirements for

prevention, fire fighting, escape and operation, alternative designs and specific rules.

Each regulation has been divided into subsections applicable to different onboard areas,

in which the requirements for all types of vessel are set out: with further paragraphs

specifying any additional requirements for particular vessel types. Each regulation

applies to all types of vessel, unless it is explicitly excluded.

Fire protection in the new Chapter II-2 is based primarily on the risks likely to be

encountered in the different areas, for example, engine rooms. The new Chapter II-2 issupported by the Fire Safety System (FSS) Code, which details the specifications

required for all the fire protection systems and equipment. These are performance based

and allow for alternative or equivalent solutions to be put forward, which was not the

case with the previous regulations.



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Fires in Machinery Spaces on DP Vessels Likelihood and Risk

4 LIKELIHOOD AND RISK OF ENGINE ROOM FIRES

Two relevant reviews of fires on board ships, one by the classification society DNV and

the other by the P&I mutual Swedish Club, give some statistics on the probability of

occurrence of fires in engine rooms and of their consequences.

The Swedish Club states that over the period between 1988 and 1996 its members made

25 claims for engine room fires, at an average cost of USD 2 million for each incident.

This may not sound many, considering the Club covers over 1,000 ships, but relates

specifically to serious fires; as minor fires would not have resulted in a claim. The most

common cause was leakage of oil under pressure from fatigue cracking of pipes, fittings

and valves, combined with the oil coming into contact with hot surfaces. Oil leakage

can also result from using non-approved or non-metallic pipes and hoses, opening filters

without de-pressurising the system or overflows from bunker tank filling.

Exhaust gas piping and turbochargers are the most common sources of hot surface

ignition, and should always be lagged. Lagging should always be replaced after repairsand maintenance, or when a leak has caused saturation of the lagging with oil. Quick

closing fuel oil valves have been found not to operate correctly in some cases, and must

be properly maintained. In addition, switchboard fires are often a result of overheated

contactors or cable connections.

The Swedish Club’s website includes an Engine Room Fire Prevention Checklist

(www.swedishclub.com/lossprevention/fires/checklist.htm) that can be used by the crew

to assist them in carrying out a regular check of fire safety on board.

Similarly, a DNV brochure on the subject of “Engine room fires can be avoided”

(available at www.dnv.com/maritime/shipclassification/newbuilding/fire_safety) claimsthat over 60% of fires on ships start in the engine room, that the direct cost of a fire can

be upwards of USD 1 million, and that a shipowner operating 20 vessels can expect a

major engine room fire every 10 years. DNV classify over 5,000 ships, comprising

16% of the world’s tonnage. Their statistics, which are based on a survey of 165 fires

on DNV classed ships between 1992 and 1997, show that a combination of oil leakages

and hot surfaces causes 56% of engine room fires, while the other causes are boiler

incidents (14%), component failures (14%), electrical (9%) and hotwork (7%).

One of the generalities which can be deduced from a study of engine room fires is that

the tidiness, or otherwise, of the space will affect the ability of a fire to spread and the

effectiveness of the fire fighting capability. A clean engine room, including one inwhich oil residues are not allowed to accumulate, is less likely to spread a fire and will

make access to the source of the fire easier for firefighters. Naturally, this tidiness

applies to hidden areas, such as bilges, as well as open areas of the engine room.

Once a fire has started and cannot be locally extinguished within an engine room then

the procedure is generally to stop the supply of oxygen (air) and fuel, and then to

attempt boundary cooling and flooding the space with a fire fighting gas, such as CO2.

There are several hazards that can prevent the success of these operations:

The air receivers for start air and working air are frequently placed in the engine

room, and it has been noted that on some vessels the relief valves can vent directly

into the machinery space. In the event of a fire these relief valves will open due tothe heat expansion of the receiver contents. If the relief valve does not reset, a

large volume of air will be released into the space. In addition, some receivers

♦



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Fires in Machinery Spaces on DP Vessels Likelihood and Risk

have fusible plugs that are designed to fail at high temperature and there may be

compressed air leaks anywhere in the engine room.

In accordance with class requirements quick closing valves (QCVs) are installed

with remote actuation facilities on all service and setting tanks. However, it has

been noted that, on vessels which have fuel systems for both IFO and diesel fuel,

it is possible that fuel continues to feed the fire after shutting the QCVs from thehead and volume in the degassing units, which have no quick-close valve fitted.

♦

♦

♦

As pointed out above, spread of a fire is assisted by "bad house-keeping", i.e.

oily bilges, accumulated rubbish and oil impregnated pipe lagging. In general, DP

vessels that are inspected frequently do not have large rubbish accumulations, but

there are reservoirs of oil, cleaning fluids and paint from maintenance and

cleaning work carried out in port. Sometimes these are not cleared out at

remobilisation.

Shutting down ventilation systems is always a problem. The design of the

ventilation shut down is invariably a mixture of automatic, remote shut down and

manual local closure of vents. With a single engine room it is quite obvious thatall have to be closed. With a redundant DP vessel, with two or more machinery

spaces, only the correct ones should be closed and in the stress of the moment it is

easy to shut down a healthy engine room.



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Fires in Machinery Spaces on DP Vessels Case Studies

5 ENGINE ROOM FIRE CASE STUDIES

The following case studies concerning engine room fires are taken from research data

gathered during the preparation of this document, and mostly relate to incidents

occurring or investigated during a short period of a few months. They involve many

different types of ship, only one an offshore vessel and not with DP, but the incidentsthey describe could just as easily happen in any ship’s engine room.

5.1 Case Study 1

DNV’s Classification News No. 3/2001 describes an incident where a serious

engine room fire was caused on a 1996 built products tanker through the

bursting of a fuel injection pipe on the main engine. The oil sprayed onto a hot

exhaust manifold and ignited, but was not immediately alarmed due to

ventilation directing the smoke away from the fire detector. The engine room

was evacuated and the CO2 system released within 11 minutes of the fire alarm,

and the fire was confirmed as extinguished after half an hour. There had been an

earlier fuel pipe failure shortly before this incident, after which the fuel pipe

protective covers had not been replaced, so the cause of the fire was a

combination of factors – partly operational. DNV’s advice on the lessons to be

learned from this are:

Special safety procedures should be applied when doing repairs or

maintenance affecting fire safety;

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦ ♦

♦

Fitting bolts for fuel injection pipes should be regularly checked for

tightness;

Fuel pipes should be regularly inspected and replaced as necessary;

Fire detectors should be properly located and confirmed to work properly

in normal ventilation conditions.

5.2 Case Study 2

A Fishing Vessel Safety Alert issued by the USCG describes an engine room

fire caused by a loose fitting which sprayed lube oil onto a hot engine

turbocharger, in which the crew had to abandon their boat. While the

circumstances of the spread of the fire and the lack of extinguishing facilities

would not be pertinent to the DP vessels of IMCA members, the list of

recommendations issued by the USCG is true for all engine room situations: andmany are mandatory requirements for seagoing vessels. These are:

Isolate fuel, hydraulic and lube oil lines from heat sources (e.g.

turbochargers);

If lines burst or fittings work loose, spray shields or sleeves can prevent

flammable liquids hitting hot surfaces;

Routinely inspect fuel lines for tightness, wear or corrosion and change if

necessary;

Minimise or avoid using external gauges for fuel tanks;

Ensure engine room fuel line and ventilation shutdowns are operational;Do not store oily cardboard, rags or waste in the engine room;

Do not hang clothes or other gear to dry in the engine room.



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5.3 Case Study 3

Following a fishing trawler fire in 2000, the Maritime Safety Authority of New

Zealand issued a Ship Notice2 in which it analysed the results of 130 engine

from fires since 1993, and found that over 40 of these were the direct result of

fuel oil spraying onto the main engine exhaust or turbocharger. As a result itissued the following guidance:

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦

Inspect high pressure fuel lines regularly for signs of wear or damage;

All securing points for high pressure fuel lines should be checked for

tightness at least every 500 operating hours;

Replacement pipework must be fitted in accordance with manufacturers

instructions;

Check the engine room for all possible ignition sources of leaking fuel,

such as exhausts, and where practicable guard these with fire retardant

material;

Ensure that remote shutoff valves and trip wires for fuel tanks and forced

draught fans are regularly checked and overhauled;

Keep at least one portable extinguisher as close as possible to the engine

room entrance;

Regularly test all fire fighting equipment and ensure the crew is trained

in its use;

Display up to date muster lists so all crew are aware of their position and

duty in the event of an emergency;

Hold regular emergency drills and record in the log book.

5.4 Case Study 4

As stated in the Introduction, in February 2003 the UK’s Marine Accident

Investigation Branch (MAIB) issued the results of its study3 into a fire onboard a

high speed ferry that occurred in 2001 while the ferry was entering port at low

speed with 551 passengers and 56 crew onboard. The fire alarm sounded

indicating a fire in the port auxiliary engine room, which was unmanned, and 30

seconds later the ship’s entire CCTV system failed. The significance of the

second event is that the ship was in the process of docking and normally relied

on the CCTV to give overall visibility on the bridge of the ship’s approach to the berth. The water mist fire extinguishing system was activated, although the port

pontoon engine rooms were not shutdown due to the berthing operation: the

water mist continued to be applied until after the vessel had berthed and the fire

brigade had arrived, when they confirmed the fire was out.

The MAIB stated that “the fire was caused by the failure of a compression fitting

on an element of the fuel piping of the aft generator in the port pontoon. The

failure allowed gas oil to be pumped out over the running engine, where it came

into contact with the exposed hot surface of the engine’s turbocharger unit, and

2 Maritime Safety Authority of New Zealand Ship Notice – 04/2000 December “Engine Room FiresCaused by Leaking Fuel Oil Lines”3 Report on the investigation of the fire on board HSS Stena Explorer entering Holyhead 20 September2001, MAIB Report No. 5/2003, February 2003



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was ignited. The accident highlights the dangers associated with the continued

use of compression fittings in the fuel systems of diesel engines.” Their

recommendations include:

Reminder to all owners and operators to review risk assessments

regarding hot surfaces and the screening of fuel fittings where

compression fittings are used;

♦

♦

♦

Request the IMO to consider a ban on the use of compression fittings in

fuel lines on diesel engines;

Advising the diesel engine manufacturer to supply a gauge to its agents,

fitters and customers, for checking the correct installation of the “pig-tail”

pipe fittings.

5.5 Case Study 5

In November 2002 a tanker was reported to have suffered total engine power

loss as a result of activating the CO2 system to extinguish a fire in its engineroom, caused by overheated cabling to its emergency generator. No doubt the

original incident was relatively minor and should have been detected, but the age

of the cabling and fire detection systems (the ship was 24 years old) would have

contributed to the reason for the fire, and the consequences of the incident were

major.

5.6 Case Study 6

In November 2002 a well founded and operated LPG vessel was reported ablaze

off Hong Kong after a burst oil pipe apparently sprayed oil on the engine

exhaust system and burnt out of control. This fire somehow spread outside the

engine room and, at one point, threatened to ignite the cargo. The local marine

department stated that the ship’s “staff failed to deal with the emergency

successfully and made some mistakes operating the fire extinguishing system,

allowing the fire to get out of control.” Fortunately, the fire burnt itself out with

some assistance from salvors.

5.7 Case Study 7

In December 2002 a modern seismic survey vessel sank off Trinidad after a fire

broke out in the engine room. The ship’s owner stated at the time that the“accidental fire” was so strong they could not stop it, but no further details have

been published to date. If a fully crewed modern seismic vessel, in full

compliance with IMO regulations, can fall victim to such a sudden engine room

fire it should serve as a cautionary tale to all ship crews.



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Fires in Machinery Spaces on DP Vessels Methods of Preventing Fires

6 METHODS OF PREVENTING FIRES

In a well designed ship all machinery spaces should be fire resistant. In 1996 the

Helsinki University of Technology’s Ship Laboratory published a study4 into methods

and means of improving the level of fire resistance in engine rooms. Although the

report is in Finnish, Pentii Hakkinen presented a paper in London in 1997 in which hestated that “fire safety in engine rooms is the result of both good design and correct

crew operations.”

He went on to point out that, whenever either of the above factors is missing or

deficient, the risk of fire increases. The Helsinki University study concentrated on

analysing many fires and identifying where improvements can be obtained without

significant cost increase. The following sequential criteria apply to the general

principles of fire safety:

1 Fire ignition must be prevented. However, where this is not achieved and a firestarts, an alarm must be generated immediately.

2 As well as alerting the crew, the alarm should also initiate further action (i.e.automatic extinguishing or shutdown.

3 Fire suppression should be rapid, appropriate and effective.

4 Personnel must be safely evacuated from the danger area.

5 The fire should be confined to its ignition compartment and prevented fromspreading.

These criteria are supported and regulated by the requirements of SOLAS Chapter II-2

and the rules of the Classification Societies.

The results of the Helsinki University study identified, not unexpectedly, that high risk

situations frequently occur in engine rooms and the risks are highest when maintenance

is taking place.

In their brochure on engine room fires, DNV state that while removing all potential oil

leaks is difficult, it is relatively easy to identify and remove hot surfaces. Most fuel,

hydraulic or lubrication oils have an auto-ignition point above 250ºC and if a liquid hits

a surface that is hotter than its auto-ignition point it may ignite spontaneously.

Therefore, the latest class and SOLAS regulations require that all surfaces above 220ºC

should be shielded or insulated. Particular note should be taken that this protection

often degrades in service or may not be replaced properly after maintenance, with theresult that regular checks should be made both visually and using temperature

measuring tools.

Statistics show that fuel oil leakage in engine rooms can occur as the result of any of a

number of causes from flexible hoses, couplings, clogged filters and fractured pipes.

Sharp bends should be avoided in flexible pipes.

Paragraphs 2.9 to 2.11 in SOLAS Chapter II-2, Regulation 15 apply to ships built after

1st July 1998, and also to all ships from the 1st July 2003. These specify the

requirement for jacketed (double) pipes for high pressure fuel oil lines, the insulation of

all surfaces with temperatures above 220ºC that are at risk of fuel impingement after a

4 Fire Resistant Engine Room - project report, Pentti Hakkinen et al., Helsinki University of TechnologyShip Laboratory, publication M-215 (in Finnish), Espoo 1996



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Fires in Machinery Spaces on DP Vessels Methods of Preventing Fires

failure, and the screening of oil fuel lines to prevent spraying of oil onto hot surfaces,

etc. An exemption is given for jacketed high pressure fuel pipes on engines of 375 kW

or less, where fuel injector pipes supply more than one injector, as long as a suitable

enclosure is provided.



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Fires in Machinery Spaces on DP Vessels Methods of Detecting Fires

7 METHODS OF DETECTING FIRES

Regulation 7 in Chapter II-2 of SOLAS 74, which came into force in July 2002 states

that its purpose is “to detect a fire in the space of origin and to provide for alarm for safe

escape and firefighting activity.” It specifies that a fixed fire detection and fire alarm

system shall be installed in periodically unattended machinery spaces, as well as thosewhere main and auxiliary propulsion and electrical generators are provided with

automatic or remote control. The fire alarm should be heard and observed on the bridge

and by a responsible engineer officer.

The 1994 issue of this document drew attention to specific problems that might affect

DP vessels as:

♦ The Unmanned Engine Room class notation (EO, UMS, etc) was not designed forDP vessels, but for foreign going vessels that would spend many nights at sea on

passage. DP vessels are classed this way for two reasons – firstly because they will

be on passage from time to time, and secondly the notation ensures extensive alarm

facilities are fitted to the ship.

♦ Sometimes, watchkeepers are only aware of a fire due to activation of a "global"fire alarm, and location of the activated alarm has to be relayed to the ECR by the

bridge officer. This can cause loss of vital seconds in clarifying if there is a fire or a

false alarm. On many DP vessels the DP bridge is not the navigation bridge and

there is some distance between them. In addition, when hot work is being carried

out, fire (smoke) alarms may be frequent and this can delay the response time.

♦ Another area which causes concern is the location and number of detector heads.It is essential that smoke detectors are placed where smoke will be detected. If they

are placed near ventilation inlets smoke will never be detected because as the fire progress more clear air will be drawn into the space across the sensor.

♦ If the watchkeeper has to leave the ECR to investigate an alarm this leads to delaywhich could be life threatening. For example, the access door to the engine room

can be down a steep flight of stairs, heavy to open and without a window to see the

other side. In a fire situation, opening the door could be the worst possible action

for the watchkeeping engineer to take. In some vessels high risk areas are

monitored by CCTV, so that in the event of an alarm the offending space can be

viewed quickly and without danger to personnel.

♦ With a single engine roomed DP vessel it is likely that there will be one man in or

near the engine room and he will be the best smoke detector and can quicklyconfirm to the ECR if a fire alarm is true. With a multi engine roomed DP vessel

there will almost always be one engine room with nobody in it and the ECR can be

quite remote from one or more of the engine rooms. It is in these circumstances that

CCTV is most useful.

7.1 Fire Detection Systems

The latest technology used in the detection of fires is reviewed in a paper 5 read

to the Institute of Marine Engineers (now the Institute of Marine Engineering

Science and Technology) in November 2000. As well as the traditional

5 Fire Detection Systems for the Millennium, Brian S. Rodricks of Thorn Security Ltd, paper read to theIMarE, November 2000



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detection methods of ionisation chamber and optical scatter smoke detectors,

these include the development of:

♦

♦

♦

♦

CO (carbon monoxide) detectors (which can give early warning of

smouldering fires),

high performance optical detectors (which include rate of temperature

rise to adjust the sensitivity of the optical head, and give a similar performance to smoke detectors without the radiation hazard),

triple wavelength infra red flame detectors (less liable to false alarms and

obscuration than UV detectors), and

multi-sensor detectors (similar to the above high performance detectors,

but giving separate smoke and heat outputs to a trend analyser).

Problems in the past with high numbers of false alarms from optical detectors

have been largely solved by improved design of the heads, which reduces their

sensitivity to dust while permitting earlier detection of smoke from smouldering

fires and overheating cables than is the case with ionisation chamber detectors.Guidance on the use of alternatives to conventional smoke detectors, including

using CO detectors, is covered by IMO MSC Circular 1035 issued in 20026.

The Helsinki University study into the fire resistance of machinery spaces

(referred to earlier) concluded that fire detection systems should include both

smoke and flame detectors and stated that mixing ionisation and optical

detectors should ensure early detection of fires. However, the continual

technology advances in this field of instrumentation mean that better solutions

are always being introduced.

A CCTV based smoke and flame detection system is now available, whichautomatically analyses the video signals from a standard CCTV installation

every second and will generate an alarm in the event of a pre-set smoke

obscuration threshold. It can also potentially be used to alarm in the event of oil

mists, oil spray and steam leaks.

Advances in display systems and processing power means that the operator

interfaces fitted to fire detection systems are now more sophisticated, and can

give the operator more relevant and useful information from the latest detector

heads. They can also allow information on risk management to be programmed

into the system which can also reduce the number of false alarms generated.

Self checking functions can be included to reduce the labour intensive systemtesting required by SOLAS, and warn when a detector head is contaminated or

needs cleaning. As with many modern electronic control systems, the

manufacturer can offer a remote diagnostic facility, allowing him to access the

control system via ship-shore communications.

7.2 Machinery Space Oil Mist Monitoring

A number of shipping companies have been installing oil mist monitoring and

detection systems in critical unmanned engine room areas and machinery spaces

for many years, and have found that they give excellent early warning of oil

6 MSC Circular 1035 “Guidelines for the Use and Installation of Detectors Equivalent to SmokeDetectors”, 28 May 2002.



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leaks and fine aerosol sprays. Typically, they are installed in the vicinity of high

pressure fuel, lubricating and hydraulic oil pipes on engine cylinder heads,

boilers, incinerators and hydraulic power packs.

The original systems were derived from other land-based industry applications

and comprised a sampling system similar to that used for explosive gas

atmosphere monitoring. A network of plastic tubing fed a multiplexed bank ofsolenoid valves, a suction fan and an analyser. Correct siting of the ends of the

tubes is important as they can otherwise draw in dust or similar contamination

which could give rise to false alarms. Nevertheless, the system was shown to be

remarkably effective at detecting the early signs of leakage, before ignition

occurred.

The latest systems are based on solid state sensors distributed about the engine

room in the critical locations and monitored by an electronic control system,

resulting in a more reliable and less complex installation.

7.3 Crankcase Oil Mist Detection

Over the years there have been many serious cases of explosions in engine room

crankcases, which are well documented in other publications. Apart from the

hazard of the explosion, the consequences can often lead to a fire in the engine

room. In 1947 a bearing failure in one of the main engines on the passenger ship

Reina del Pacifico led to a crankcase explosion and subsequent engine room

conflagration which left 28 people dead.

Nowadays, most main propulsion engines are protected by oil mist detectors

(OMD) or bearing temperature sensors, through mandatory requirements, which

are very effective in warning of the event and shutting down the engine before

an explosion occurs or mechanical damage is done to the engine. The latest

OMD technology does not rely on the older crankcase atmosphere sampling

technique, but uses LED infra red light scatter detectors mounted in each

cylinder and electronic processing to monitor all spaces continuously and

display any alarm conditions automatically and remotely.



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Fires in Machinery Spaces on DP Vessels Methods of Extinguishing Fires

8 METHODS OF EXTINGUISHING FIRES

These can be divided into fixed and portable systems. Fixed systems are required by

IMO regulations for all machinery spaces that contain oil burning equipment, internal

combustion machinery or steam machinery (the last if periodically unattended).

Regulations 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of SOLAS Chapter II-2 cover fire extinguishing

arrangements in machinery spaces, including engine rooms. The IMO issued MSC

Circular 847 in 19987 to assist in the interpretation of certain vague clauses and

definitions in the regulation. This should help to clarify where the extent and

installation of equipment does not always meet the intent of the regulations or their

application by surveyors.

Fixed fire extinguishing systems were traditionally met by fitting steam smothering or

carbon dioxide (CO2) systems. In the 1980s halon was introduced as a replacement for

CO2, and was rapidly adopted as the industry standard – because it had the major

advantage of extinguishing fire in concentrations that would still support human life.Although halon systems were more expensive to fit and replenish, CO2 systems for new

ships almost disappeared until the global warming debate resulted in banning all

fluorocarbons. Since then a number of alternatives have been developed, without

greenhouse gas characteristics, but CO2 systems have also made a major recovery. The

systems now being used on ships include:

♦

♦

♦

♦ ♦

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦

Water spray systems

CO2 systems

High expansion foam systems

Water mist systemsAlternative gas systems

Inside air high expansion foam systems

The 1994 issue of this document drew attention to specific problems that might affect

DP vessels as:

With DP vessels, the problems of fire fighting and engine room shutdown

depend on the type of operation the vessel is employed on at the time of an

incident. Pipe laying, gangway connected accommodation support, diving and

heavy lifting operations all require different times to reach a safe situation.

For DP Class 3 vessels, where the complete shut down of one engine room

should always be possible without any loss of position, time should not be a

problem and the preset procedure should be put into action.

If the engine room is not sealed smoke will reach many other areas of the vessel

and there could be multiple fire alarms that will waste time and occupy various

personnel in checking them. It is also certain that all work will be terminated, as

if it was a red alert, even if only one engine room was on fire on a Class 3 vessel.

If there is only one engine room, but split support systems such as fuel oil and

cooling water, it may not be easy to determine which engines should be shut

7 MSC Circular 847 “Interpretations of Vague Expressions and Other Vague Wording in SOLAS ChapterII-2”, 12 June 1998.



18/29


down; indeed it could be better to leave all engines running and operate the quick

closing valves. In these circumstances the generators will continue to consume

the fuel in the lines, but, of course, they will also continue to add heat to the

engine room. Shutting down generators first will be a natural reaction for some

engine control room operators. This may not be the best action because it reduces

the power available for pulling away from the work location. It also does not stop

the motor driven pumps, which are pressurising the fuel oil lines on the low pressure side of the system.

♦

♦

♦

♦

−

−

−

−

−

−

−

♦

Fuel oil pumps that are motor driven are frequently duplicated with standby start

facilities between the two. The power for these pumps is usually from separate

switchboards and the complete shutdown of pumps takes a comprehensive

knowledge of the system. Pumps are numbered for each engine room, but it is

possible to trip the wrong pump motors and risk healthy engines or engine rooms;

particularly if they are powered from port and starboard 440V boards.

While the shutdown of engines and the fuel oil supplies is instinctive to all

engineers it was found that the shut down of lube oil and fuel oil purifiers andtransfer pumps is not always considered. Similarly, the shut down of compressors

is often forgotten and these can prevent fire containment. Compressed air leaks

can be significant when fire smothering is attempted.

A60 standard insulation is frequently used between engine rooms and the ECR

and switchboard rooms. It is essential for attention to be given to the top of

engine rooms and the materials stored above, as this area should be well defined,

kept clear of combustible materials and accessible for boundary cooling.

Boundary cooling can also be used on accessible engine rooms bulkheads,

although if they are also insulated the effect of cooling is limited.

Ventilation shutdown is well understood as being essential and there are usually

well marked switches to shut down engine room fans and fire dampers. However,

the majority of vessels also have vents on deck that need to be closed prior to

smothering the engine room with gas. It was found that:

Going round the vents can take 2 minutes or more;

The marking of vents is poor under fire conditions as they usually have small

labels and there could be a mistake in identification;

The handles for manual operation are located close to the vents, so the

operator may not be able to close them because of the smoke;

Some need to be approached from above which could be difficult;

Others operate from below but the cover has to be lifted and dogged at the

top;

The speed of closing the vents can be improved with frequent drills, with

personnel assigned to operate and become familiarised with doing so;

If the easiest manual vents are closed first then the last vent will probably be

inaccessible without breathing apparatus, because the smoke will be so dense.

All the above do not make vent closing impossible but they make the time

interval between alarm and the release of smothering gas longer and risk

premature gas release.

If the engine room that is on fire is well sealed then smoke might be prevented

from entering other spaces. However the exhaust vents of one space can be



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positioned close to the intakes of other spaces which results in smoke in all

machinery spaces and perhaps the accommodation. While this smoke is less

dense than in the burning engine room most personnel will be are unable to make

this comparison, and general confusion is likely as to the extent of the fire.

8.1 CO2 Systems

As with any gas based system CO2 cannot be released until the engine room is

sealed to prevent air ingress and gas egress. If the gas is released too soon then

the correct concentration throughout the engine room volume, which is crucial to

the extinguishing process, will be diluted and may not be effective. This process

inevitably takes time. Furthermore, the concentration of CO2 needed to put out

any fire will also kill anybody left in the space, so more time is normally needed

to ensure all personnel have left before activating the gas release. This is the

main reason that halon was adopted so readily when it first became available.

Despite these inherent disadvantages, CO2 is a very effective fire extinguishing

medium which is readily available worldwide and it is still the first choice for

many ship owners and operators. Shipyards prefer it because it is simple and

cheap to install.

8.2 Situation regarding the use of Halon

In 1994 IMO prohibited the installation of new halon systems on ships. IMO’s

Fire Protection (FP) sub-committee has issued FP Circular 25 in 20038 on the

availability of halon banking and reception facilities at various ports in the

world. However, the actual situation regarding the use or replacement of

existing halon fire fighting installations is confused and accurate guidance isdifficult to find. The rules and regulations will undoubtedly change as time

passes and will vary from country to country.

Under European Union (EU) regulations existing fixed halon systems were

allowed to be used and refilled until the end of 2002 or 2003, depending on

whom you read, and some flag states have concluded that systems must be

decommissioned and the halon gas recovered in accordance with EC Regulation

No. 2037/2000. This latter regulation only applies to EU and European Free

Trade Association (EFTA) member flagged vessels, but DNV advises that halon

can no longer be used for fire fighting on ships with the St Vincent &

Grenadines flag (with South Africa said to follow). Also, portable halonextinguishers should be decommissioned on EU and EFTA member flagged

vessels by the end of 2003.

DNV’s advice on the state of regulations regarding halon for engine room fire

extinguishing systems is that the EU regulations are being revised to include a

new phase out programme, starting with older vessels from 2005 and all vessels

by the end of 2008. Members are advised to contact their Flag State directly to

clarify their own situation, and to discuss any issues related to disposing of

redundant halon gas. IMCA has issued guidance on the alternatives to halon in

publication S&L 006 “Halon and the Alternative Fire Suppression Gases”.

8 FP Circular 25 “Halon Banking and Reception Facilities”, 6 January 2003.`



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The results of the questionnaire circulated to IMCA contractor members during

the preparation of this document showed that six of the members who replied

have ships with halon fire extinguishing systems onboard. One member

volunteered that he had already replaced halon with halotron (a blend of gases as

described in section 5.3 of IMCA S&L 006). Two of the members with halon

systems indicated they did not intend to replace them at present, and two are

studying the best alternative system to use: of the other two members with halonsystems, one is planning to change to CO2 and one to FM200 (an alternative fire

suppression system using a colourless, odourless gas containing carbon,

hydrogen and fluorine).

8.3 Portable Fire Extinguishers

Portable fire extinguishers can be filled with water, foam, powder or CO2,

depending on the class of fire likely to be encountered. Most ships and

machinery spaces will have a mixture of different types and capacities, which

are shown on the Safety Plan. They should all be inspected and serviced asnecessary on an annual basis, and hydraulically pressure tested every ten years.

According to the latest advice portable halon extinguishers should be

decommissioned on EU and EFTA member flagged vessels by the end of 2003.

8.4 Fixed Water Based Fire Extinguishing Systems

On many types of ship with low ceiling engine rooms, such as offshore and

many DP vessels, a number of high and low pressure water spray and atomising

fire fighting systems were introduced during the 1990s as alternatives to CO2

and halon. To standardise the approval process and testing of these IMO issuedMSC Circular 914 in 19999. The guidance contained in this circular covers

manually activated systems and automatically activated systems of the wet pipe,

dry pipe, preaction or deluge types.

In the questionnaire sent to IMCA contractor members only one DP vessel

operator advised that he had water fog or mist systems on board, and these were

fitted to 5 ships.

The latest technology available from the manufacturers of water based systems

claims that water mist can be suitable for engine rooms of more than 3,000m2

and ceiling heights up to 11m. Of course, water based systems can usually bedeployed very rapidly, as soon as a fire is detected, as it is not hazardous to

human life: nor does the engine room have to be sealed before deployment.

They also have a rapid cooling effect on the atmosphere and the hot surfaces,

which itself reduces the spread of fire and the likelihood of re-ignition.

9

MSC Circular 914 “Guidelines for the Approval of Alternative Fixed Water-Based Fire-FightingSystems for Special Category Spaces”, 4 June 1999.



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8.5 Fixed Aerosol Fire Extinguishing Systems

The IMO issued MSC Circular 1007 in 200110 which addressed the introduction

of alternatives to halon in the form of a chemical agent that extinguishes a fire

by interrupting the process of the fire. These include both foam generating

systems and inert gases or halocarbon agents. Circular 1007 goes into

considerable detail as to the types of chemical agents that are permitted and howthey should be installed and tested. Although any effective and proven system

can be introduced as a fixed fire fighting method, it is notable that all such

systems must be non harmful to personnel and any gases must be in

concentrations that do not exceed the No Observed Adverse Effect Level

(NOAEL) limit. One advantage is that they do not necessarily need extensive

pipework installations.

8.6 Local Fire Fighting Systems

Local fire fighting systems are often installed in areas where a high risk of an oilfire is present. New vessels built after July 2002 have to comply with SOLAS

requirements for local application fire fighting systems and protect the following

equipment:

♦

♦

♦

♦

Tops of engines (only cylinder covers and fuel oil lines, unless a

combination of hot surfaces and oil lines occurs at a lower level)

Oil burners on boilers

Oil burners on incinerators

Gas turbines

These water based systems require power and pumps in most cases, although

some have stored pressure systems with limited output flow. In 1999 the IMO

Marine Safety Committee approved guidelines for approving water based fixed

systems and issued MSC Circular 91311 to set standards for manufacture and

testing of them.

8.7 Shore Based Fire Fighting Resources

On ships which are within reach of land it is the responsibility nowadays of

professional firefighters to respond to ship borne fires when alerted to them.

Regular training courses are held in a number of countries to prepare fire brigades to deal with incidents in marine environments, but this is very much a

developing area of expertise and one which still has quite a long way to go.

More information can be obtained from the UK’s Chief and Assistant Chief Fire

Officers Association website at www.fire-uk.org/offshore.htm (this is UK-based,

but with links to international sites).

10

MSC Circular 1007 “Guidelines for the Approval of Fixed Aerosol Fire-Extinguishing SystemsEquivalent to Fixed Gas Fire-Extinguishing Systems, as Referred to in SOLAS 74, for MachinerySpaces”, 26 June 2001.11 MSC Circular 913 “Guidelines for the Approval of Fixed Water-Based Local Application Fire-FightingSystems for Use in Category A Machinery Spaces”, 4 June 1999.



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Fires in Machinery Spaces on DP Vessels Personnel Experience and Training

9 PERSONNEL EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING

9.1 Experience

Only a few engineers will experience an engine room fire, but engineers who

have served on vessels for a few years recognise the circumstances where aserious fire could start. There is a difference between vessel crews that have

experienced a fire and those that have not. On those that have, the risk is seen as

being much more likely. This is a natural response. The objective must be to

pass on some of this first hand experience to other engineers and vessels, so that

the general level of awareness increases and the frequency of engine room fires

decreases. One of the purposes of the original report was to assist with this

awareness. The matters raised will probably be familiar to engineers who have

experienced an engine room fire. They should add their own comments and

promote the report to others because it is possible to learn from the mistakes of

others.

♦

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−

−

−

♦

The classic operator errors that can easily be made even by the most

competent and experienced engineers are as follows:

Paying little immediate attention to a fire alarm because there have

been a number of recent false alarms;

Leaving oil leaks until a later time because of other matters to see to;

Leaving, temporarily, materials in the engine room that should not be

left there;

Not knowing exactly which breakers are for which pumps (perhaps

considering this to be an electrician’s job);Shutting down the wrong generator, pumps or vent fan;

Confusion and hesitation with quick closing valves because wording

and labels are not clear enough to allow for the urgency of a real fire;

Forgetting exactly which vents are for which space;

Releasing the extinguishing gas before definite confirmation has been

received that the engine room is empty;

Delay because of uncertainty about the priority of the action required;

Leaving engine room fire doors open or only partly closed;

Leaving the ECR unattended.

The other source of experience must come from fire fighting courses and drills

on board the vessel. The offshore survival fire training course is useful, but

more than this is required if a vessel is to have a fire fighting team capable

of entering an engine room and performing a rescue. There are courses

available, which include the use of breathing apparatus and, particularly,

working with it under various fire and smoke situations, but this is not the

focus of this report. The experience that is vital is the performance of the

recognised sequence of actions that would need to be instigated if a fire is

detected in the engine room.



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Fires in Machinery Spaces on DP Vessels Experience and Viewpoints of IMCA Members

10 EXPERIENCE AND VIEWPOINTS OF IMCA MEMBERS

As part of the preparation and background for this document, IMCA contractor

members were asked to report on any experiences they had had with major and minor

fires over the previous 5 years (1998 to 2002), and also on the types of machinery space

fire fighting systems they use on their ships. Nine members replied, operating a total of54 offshore vessels, who reported only one major fire (which occurred in drydock) and

seven minor fires in that period. Ten of the ships are classified as DP Class 3, where

any fire should not affect the ability of the ship to remain on DP.

When comparing the frequency of fires on members’ ships with industry statistics given

earlier in this document, the absence of major fires during at-sea operations reflects well

on the operational standards and attention to engine room housekeeping by the

companies involved.

The members were also asked about fire fighting training courses for personnel, which

obviously includes fire fighting outside as well as inside the engine room. Roughly halfthe respondents make use of additional training courses over and above those required

to meet STCW regulations (see the latest version of the STCW Convention, as

published by IMO). One of the major DP vessel operators offered the opinion that more

shore based training could be beneficial to improve the response to engine room fires,

i.e. practising fire fighting in simulated machinery space environments so as to be in a

position to take the correct actions.



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Fires in Machinery Spaces on DP Vessels Lessons Learned

11 LESSONS LEARNED

Most of the good housekeeping practices and precautions, that were included in the

original version of this document, are equally relevant today. We have therefore

included them in the following sections.

11.1 Fuel Oil Piping

As a result of the recent legislation in SOLAS 74 Chapter II-2 (Regulation 4,

2.2.5.2), most engines that do not have double high pressure fuel piping must be

converted, and there are companies that are specialised in this work.

The low pressure side of the fuel oil system has proved to be a hazard. Concern

has been expressed because, if there is a injector fault, it is sometimes possible

to get injection pressures partially transmitted back to the low pressure side.

Diesel engines are manufactured for many uses, including stand-alone use withlocal starting and operation. For this duty the engine requires local gauges and

indicators for lube oil and fuel oil. These facilities are also important when the

engine is tested prior to leaving the manufacturers. It should be noted, however,

that each additional pipe, valve, union, flange and gauge provides another

potential source of leakage.

Other bad practices that have been noted include:

i) Storage tank overflows located so that an overflow from a refillingerror could cause oil to fall on or near hot engine surfaces.

ii) The use of drip cans to catch oil from leaks that have not been fixed (anoverflowing drip can was given as one of the causes of a ferry fire)

iii) No quick closing valve on large degassing columns.

The location of the remote operation for fuel quick closing valves is generally

well known by engineers on board, but shipyards still provide small neat labels

and on multi-engined vessels the order and logic of their relative positioning

does not help their identification when the engineer is under pressure. They

should be grouped per engine room and marked in large letters with the words

that are in common use on board (which can be different to that used by the

shipyard).

There must be no risk of the wrong engine room being shut down.

11.2 Checking the Fire Alarm

Fire alarm repeater displays should be installed in engine control rooms, so that

the watchkeeping engineer when on DP can know at the same time as the bridge

that a detector has been activated in a machinery space. Addressabledetector

systems mean that it is also possible to know exactly which sensor is activated,

and not just the zone.

To prevent the risk and time loss of physically checking the alarm, CCTVs have

been installed in engine rooms so that the watchkeeper does not have to go to the

engine room. While this is not particularly expensive, a cheaper solution has



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been implemented on several vessels. This is to install a window in the door

into the engine room so that the engineer does not have to open it to see if the

space is on fire and unsafe to enter. The glass has to be compatible with the

subdivision and strength requirements of the door.

11.3

Ventilation Shut Down

As with the fuel quick closing valves, better marking has been used on some

vessels, together with colours for the different engine rooms. The most

significant improvement however is to locate the lever well clear of the vent and

in such a position that access to it without breathing apparatus is possible.

On one vessel the vent that would probably be the last to be closed was a large

mushroom type that was difficult to reach and would need somebody to get right

next to in order to close it. Modifications resulted, but the vessel should not

have been built in this way. Perhaps the worst example is a vessel where the

funnel has to be partially climbed and an engine room vent accessed from above.

11.4 Cable Routes

If a vessel has been constructed without strict cable route design and supervision

it is almost impossible later to determine the route of every cable. The large

high voltage cables are generally easy to trace as are many of the 440V cables:

they are generally more robust and if they fail either the protection will operate

or they will provide an obvious open circuit. The cables that are the most

difficult to trace are the control cables on existing vessels. With hard wired

digital and analogue signals, a fire can cause a multitude of alarms and false

signals that can cause healthy thrusters and generators to trip because of logicfailures.

Examples of these consequences are the “pitch not at zero” signal, which

prevents re-start of a thruster, and inadvertent activation of the emergency stops,

that would also prevent a re-start. These emergency stop circuits could be

routed through exposed areas of the vessel. For example, cables have been

routed so that they are near to survival craft launch stations, to provide the

facility of an emergency stop close to those stations, such that unnecessary

thruster operation could be closed down from there if necessary. There are no

regulations regarding emergency stops being located near survival craft, and

such extended routing of cables exposes them to danger of localised damage and possible shut down of thrusters. Also, any extra emergency stop is a hazard in

itself, regardless of what safeguards may be in place to prevent misuse.

Irrespective of whatever guidance that might be taken from classification

standards or regulations, it is clear that cable routing needs careful consideration

to avoid creation of serious hazards to safety.

11.5 Progress of the Fire

Once an engine room has been shut down and sealed and the relevant

fire-fighting gas has been released the vessel has little feedback on whether the

action has been successful. All involved, clients, local and national emergency



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services and perhaps most of all, where applicable, divers in saturation will be

wanting to know if the fire is out.

With boundary cooling in progress and important areas getting water damaged

or even flooded there will be an increasing need to stop the hoses. Sooner or

later this decision will be made and, if there is no information about the gas

flooded space, it is likely that it could be made prematurely. There is a remote possibility that CCTV is still working. Information can be obtained with a

temperature probe. Some vessels have now installed these so that they can give

the temperature in one or more likely hot locations within the engine room. It is

essential that these are placed in the best position for their purpose to provide the

space temperature after the fire has been smothered by gas. If the sensor is at

the top of the engine room it must be placed so that it is not influenced by any

cooling.

Given that the temperature sensor(s) might not withstand an engine room fire it

might be better to install a facility for lowering a sensor into the space from

above so that the cooling of the space can then be more accurately measured sothat re-entry is not premature. Naturally good advice is to never re-enter a space

until you are sure the fire is out. The problem is how to be sure and quell the

natural eagerness to feel safe.

11.6 Summary of recommendations

Causes of engine room fire alluded to in this report continue to occur (although

they are not reportedly frequent in DP engine rooms), despite most of those

causes being well known. Some might have been prevented if there had been

attention to the following:

11.6.1 Actions

Lagging should be replaced after repairs and maintenance, or

after oil leaks onto lagging;

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦

Proper maintenance of quick closing fuel valves;

Good housekeeping – rags in bilges removed, etc.;

Proper maintenance of ventilation shut down systems, fire

dampers, lube oil and fuel oil purifiers, transfer pumps,

compressors and relevant associated control systems, etc.;

Clear labelling of control gear avoiding possibilities of ambiguity

or confusion;

Regular checks of fitting bolts on fuel injection pipes;

Regular inspection of fuel pipes and proper replacement where

necessary;

Avoidance of sharp bends in flexible fuel piping;

Checks that fuel, hydraulic and lube oil lines are isolated from

heat sources, e.g. location of storage tank overflows;

Provision of spray shields/sleeves for emergency situations;

Minimal use of external gauges for fuel tanks;



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Keeping at least one portable extinguisher close to the engine

room entrance;

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♦

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♦

♦

Proper location of fire, smoke and oil mist detectors and

confirmation of correct operation;

Immediate activation of fire alarms on ignition of a fire;

Ease of access to ventilators and shutdown controls.

11.6.2 Drills

Crew familiarisation drills in closing ventilators;

Crew familiarisation drills in closing appropriate breakers;

Frequent exercises to deal with problems that could arise from

fire fighting, not necessarily only within formal drills;

Regular tests of fire fighting equipment and fire fighting

exercises.

11.6.3 Risk Assessments/Other Preventive Measures

Regular review of risk assessments regarding hot surfaces and

screening of fuel fittings especially, for example, if compression

joints have been used in oil lines;

Application of special safety procedures when doing repairs or

maintenance affecting fire safety;

Reviews of all procedures initiated by a fire fighting situation;

Consideration of different types and amounts of detectors, e.g.

carbon monoxide, high performance optical detectors, infra redand multi sensor detectors;

Review of how and where alarms are sounded and how the

location of a fire can be quickly identified;

Consideration of what automatic fire fighting action could be

initiated by the activation of the alarm;

Consideration as to provision and deployment of CCTV.



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Fires in Machinery Spaces on DP Vessels Useful Sources of Information

12 USEFUL SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The website of the Swedish Club (www.swedishclub.com/lossprevention/fires/) has a

knowledge quiz on the subject of fires on board ship, which can help the ship’s crew to

gain a realistic feel for the serious nature of engine room fires, and it is possible to

download an Engine Room Fire Prevention Checklist to assist in assessing both the stateof the engine room and the crew’s ability to fight a fire in it.

The classification society DNV has a comprehensive list of documents and information

circulars on the subject of engine room fires, which can be downloaded from their

website (www.dnv.com). These include technical papers on:

Hot Surfaces in Engine Rooms (Paper No. 2000-P025)♦

♦

♦

Phase Out of Halon 1301 – Regulations and Alternative Fire Fighting Systems

(Paper No. 2001-P002)

Local Application Fire Fighting Systems – DNV Interpretations and Advice for

Owner’s Specification (Paper No. 2001-P013)

IMCA has issued guidance on the alternatives to halon in publication IMCA S&L 006

“Halon and the Alternative Fire Suppression Gases”.

We suggest that you use the space below to make a note of any additional sources of

information and guidance documents on engine room fires.

IMCA M119 Fires in Machinery Spaces for DP Vessel (Jul 2003)

Documents

Transcript of IMCA M119 Fires in Machinery Spaces for DP Vessel (Jul 2003)