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LETTER FROM THE EDITORS

What does modern war entail? The end of the Cold War signalled a shiftat leasttemporarilyaway from territorial conflicts between large states and towards smaller,messier forms of warfare. US counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan typifiesone emergent model of conflictsmall wars fought at the cutting edge of politics,culture and law. Ethnic conflicts in Rwanda, Darfur, and the Democratic Republic of

the Congo may come to represent another common form. But is the old model dead? Nuclear weapons,

rather than being disassembled, are being developed in a number of rogue states. NATO is still operating,and its reach is wider than ever. In this symposium, we search for a new paradigm for war. As new threatsarise and old antagonisms persist, how will international actors accommodate themselves to the emergingrealities of conflict?

We begin our symposium with a discussion of US defense spending. Ted Bromund debunks prevailingarguments for reducing US military spending, arguing that the level of US spending is appropriate givenits security concerns. Joseph Cirincione examines necessary strategies Obamas regime must take to repairthe damage done to the nonproliferation regime. He concludes with optimism that the new administra-tion seems to be making progress toward disarmament. We then discuss the nature of the transatlanticagenda on the eve of NATOs 60th anniversary. James Goldgeier explores how NATO can broaden itsties to non-western democracies in order to successfully meet the challenges of the new century. WilliamRosenau examines the growing role of counterinsurgency efforts in US military strategy. Madeline Mor-ris addresses the lack of provisions in international law that govern the detention of private actors, and

proposes a legislative framework for counterterrorism detention. Finally, Michael N. Schmitt closes ourFeatures section by analyzing how the climate of warfare influences attitudes toward the law of war, andargues that international humanitarian law is undergoing a 21st century revitalization.

In our Perspectives section, we tackle the dismal reality of human trafficking and slavery in the mod-ern age. Kevin Bales describes the global epidemic of slave labor and concludes that eradicating slavery ispossible through the concerted commitment of governments and international institutions. Seth Kaplanargues that religionin both its spiritual and institutional formplays a critical role in shaping policyworldwide. Former Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga discusses the potential of the European Coun-cils Reflection Group to craft constructive policy recommendations for Europes future in the midst of aglobal financial crisis.

Our Spotlight section presents analyses from Freedom House and Duke University. Arch Puddington ofFreedom House highlights the threats posed to civil liberties by the emergence of influential authoritarian

states. Vivek Wadhwa of Duke University addresses the alarming rise of nativism in the United States andits adverse effect of creating a reverse brain drainthe exodus of highly skilled and educated immigrantworkers from the country.

In his review ofThe End of Reciprocity by Mark Osiel, Seumas Miller examines a number of ethical andmoral dilemmas confronting United States as it continues its conter-terrorism efforts. In our Interviewsection, Pakistans former Ambassador to the United States Maleeha Lodhi discusses the future of US-Pakistan relations and Pakistans potential as a stabilizing force in the Muslim world. Finally, Gustavo de lasCasas closes with an Endpaper that draws an unexpectedyet startlingly appropriateparallel betweenthefinancial crisis of today and a crisis of more than 150 years ago. Look for a lengthier piece from de las Casason our websitehttp://hir.harvard.edu.

Armed conflict seems to be an enduring facet of human society. While we recognize the unfortunatepermanence of war itself, we also hope to shed light on the urgent need for the reevaluation of the normsthat govern it.

To peaceful times,

Owen Barron and Natasa KovacevicEditors-in-Chief

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the Uited States speds too much o deese. I doatems, the US deese budget is ideed age. Fo 2008,Pesidet Geoge W. Bush equested US$482 biio o

the Depatmet o Deese (DOD), pus a additioaUS$188 biio i emegecy ad suppemeta udig,o a tota equest o US$670 biio.

This tota does ot icude o-DOD costs ohomead secuity (US$36.4 biio) o the budget o theVeteas Admiistatio (US$84.4 biio). But eithe othese costs beog i the deese budget: much homeadsecuity is the esposibiity o aw eocemet, ot theamed oces, ad the Veteas Admiistatios obiga-tios ae the esut o pevious commitmets ad have ocoectio to todays deese budget. Citics occasioay

teD r. BromunD

The most seious impedimets to a seiousdiscussio o deese spedig ae the mythsthat suoud it. Uti these myths aeceaed away, o atioa debate egadigwhat the Uited States ad its aies aoud

the wod shoud do to secue thei iteests is possibe.The most uget eed, theeoe, is o poiticias adthe pubic to kow how much the Uited States ad othepowes sped, to pace these expeditues ad thei tedsi histoica cotext, to weigh the dages o both excessivead isuciet deese spedig, to udestad why the

US ad the wods democacies maitai amed oces,ad why the Uited States speds so much eative to itspotetia advesaies. Abset this kowedge, the poiticapocess that shapes deese spedig i democacies wiot wok eectivey, ad thei deese wi sue.

The Current Level of US Defense SpendingThe st myth is the beie that the cuet eve o

US deese spedig cosumes a ukowabe but sizabepat o its GDP. I Mach 2007, a Gaup po showedthat a puaity o Ameicas (43 pecet) beieves that

teD r. BroMUnD h Maa thah- s rah fllw a h Hafuda. H wa h Aa D-

iaal suy sud a Yal,m 1999 2008.

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aege that US deese spedig is systemicay maipu-ated to hide expeditues. This is a paaoid cospiacytheoy that makes debate impossibe.

The US deese budget, stated i doa tems,eeds to be paced i cotext. The vaue o the doahas decied ove time, so tota spedig is highe today,

i pat, because each doa buys ess tha it used to. TheUited States aso has a age ecoomy today tha it did ageeatio ago, ad the amout it speds o a goods hasecessaiy gow as a esut. Citics who ague that theUited States shoud sped the same amout o deeseeve as the ecoomy ad the popuatio gow shoud askthemseves i they woud make the same agumet ospedig o iastuctue. I a ecoomy that ifatesad expads ove time, eezig spedig o aythigwoud mea buyig steadiy ess o it.

Because compaig doa gues ove time is de-ceptive, ad because aaysts ote wat to compae USdeese expeditues with those o othe states, the com-

moy used measue is to assess US deese spedig as apecetage o its Goss Domestic Poduct, the tota o agoods ad sevices poduced i the atio. By this mea-sue, thee is o seious disageemet betwee esposibeauthoities about how much the Uited States speds odeese. nATO auay pubishes a aaysis o spedigby its membes ad by russia: o the caeda yea 2008,its peimiay estimate is that the Uited States spet 3.9pecet o its GDP o deese. Aaysts at the HeitageFoudatio pace the gue at 4.0 pecet. Fo sca 2007,the Cogessioa Budget Oce has cocuded it was4.0 pecet. Agumets about what expeditues shoudbe couted as pat o the deese budget ae o magiaimpotace compaed to this ovewhemig cosesus.

The Declining Level of US Defense SpendingThe secod myth is the beie that the cuet eve

o US deese spedig is upecedetedy high. Theact that the Uited States today speds 4 pecet o itsGDP o deese is as meaigess, stated i isoatio, asthe size o the Petagos budget. Ceay, moey thatis spet o deese caot be spet by the govemeto othe wothy (o ess wothy) causes. I deese weecosumig a substatia ad gowig potio o oveaspedig, this coud be a egitimate souce o coce.But it is ot doig so.

I 2006, accodig to the Oce o Maagemet ad

Budget, deese spedig cosumed 19.6 pecet o totaedea outays. I 1991, at the ed o the Cod Wa, it was24.1 pecet. I 1962, ea the height o the Cod Wa, itwas 49.2 pecet. I act, as a pecetage o spedig ithe post-Wod Wa II ea, deese has oy bee owetha it is today om 1994 though 2003: it eached itsow o 16.2 pecet i 1999. By cotast, Socia Secuityad meas-tested etitemets have iceased om 27.4pecet i 1962 to 34.1 pecet i 1991, to 42.5 peceti 2006. The stoy o US deese spedig is oe o isigdoa gues, but aso o a steadiy deceasig cotibutio

to the ovea size o the edea budget.The same is tue o US deese spedig as a shae

o the ecoomy. The 4 pecet o GDP that the UitedStates spet o deese i 2007 paes i compaiso to the6.3 pecet it aveaged, accodig to nATO, om 1985-1989, o the 6.5 pecet om 1970-1974. The iceases

sice the adi o 1999 have ot come cose to puttig theUited States back to whee it was i 1991, et aoe backto ay poit om 1950 to the ed o the Cod Wa.

The questio histoias wi ask i a cetuy is othow the Uited States was abe to be the wods eadigpowe whie spedig as much as 4 pecet o its GDPo deese. It is how the Uited States was abe to be thewods eadig powe whie oy spedig 4 pecet oits GDP o deese. Yet this achievemet is ot uique.Betwee 1830 ad 1914, Geat Bitai spet o aveageabout 2.5 pecet o its GDP o deese. That was a eao upaaeed peace ad pospeity, ad the ea i whichBitai was the wods eadig powe.

Sice weapos o mass destuctio, itecotie-ta baistic missies, ad mass teoism had ot beeiveted by 1914, it is hady supisig that the UitedStates speds moe tha Bitai did. But histoy oes ojusticatio o the beie that a ibea, capitaist ecoomycaot aod to sped the modest shae o the atioaicome that the Uited States cuety devotes to itsdeese. Ideed, the Uited States spet a substatiayage shae o GDP o deese i the oty yeas ateWod Wa II, a ea o upecedeted pospeity i theee wod. The empie sueig om ovestetch i that

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impecise oe: it is ooish to at-tempt to achieve moe pecisioi a subject tha that subject iscapabe o.

rathe tha seekig atea umbe, it is bette to ook at

histoy. I 1943, at the heighto Wod Wa II, Bitai spetabout 55 pecet o its GDP oits amed oces. It wi evebe possibe to kow exactyhow much the USSr spet odeese, because i a ecoomy without pices the cocept oGDP oses much o its mea-ig, but it was ceay a sizabeamout. Ad the Bitish adSoviet ecoomiesike that othe Uited States duig Wod

Wa IIhad somethig i com-mo: they pacticed atioig.I Bitai ad the Uited States,this was doe omay, ad oyduig wa-time, by atio cads.

I the USSr, it was doe iomay, i both peace adwa, by aiig to eiaby poduce civiia goods. But ia cases, the state coud oy sustai high eves o deesespedig by chokig o the suppy o goods, moey, adabo to civiia poductio.

That does ot make the Bitish expeditues i WodWa II excessive; the wa had to be wo. But it does im-py that, uess the state is egaged i activey ghtig atota wa, deese spedig is excessive i it ca oy be

cotiued by atioig, whethe omay o iomay.Ioma atioig occus i states ike the USSr, wheeexcessive deese spedig is utimatey oy a mio pato a aied ad dictatoia system.

That is ceay the case i noth Koea today, oistace, with its widey epoted amies. O the othehad, this agumet om histoy has o appicatio what-soeve to todays democacies, whee civiia poductiois ot esticted by the state o the sake o deese. nodoes it have ay eevace at a to the Ameica expei-ece duig the Cod Wa, whe Ameica cosumesociety fouished, o to the Bitish expeiece om 1830to 1914, a ea that saw the bith o the mode cosume

ecoomy.

Why Democracies Maintain Armed ForcesThe Bitish exampe o 1914 is douby istuctive.

Fo what destoyed Bitish supemacy was ot thei wodwide commitmets, o thei deese spedig; it was the Gemas. nothig is moe impotat o thewods geatest powe tha to stop the ext big wa omhappeig because that powe by deitio has the mostto ose, eative to othe powes, om such a wa. Thewost thig that ca be said about Bitish deese spedig

ea was ot the Uited States; it was the USSr, whichwas devotig at east twice as much o its a ess dyamicecoomy to deese.

Yet the USSr did ot a because it spet too mucho deese. It coapsed because its ecoomic mode didot wok. Its deese spedig did cosume scace e-souces, but sice the USSr was, o exampe, uabe togow eough ood to eed its peope, its pobems ceaybega with the iabiity o its ecoomy to poduce eough

goods i the st pace. The expeiece o the USSr, how-eve, does suggest how to assess whe deese spedig isgeuiey substatia, ad possiby excessive.

Oe appoach to this pobem is to detemie a cetaipecetage o deese spedig that is cosideed exces-sive. The pobem with this appoach is that thee is ocea way to dee what excessive meas. Ote, exces-sive ees to spedig moe tha is supposedy eededto meet a stategic chaege. I othe cases, it ees tospedig to the poit that the atios ecoomy sues.But i both cases, the supposedy excessive spedig maybe ecessay, eithe because the stategic chaege hasbee udeestimated, o because victoy is moe impotat

tha avoidig ay damage to the ecoomy.Schoas have sought to povide ough guideies to

dee excessive deese spedig. Fo exampe, Yaehistoia Pau Keedy, i his 1987 best-see The risead Fa o the Geat Powes, agued that the histoicaecod suggest that i a paticua atio is aocatig ovethe og tem moe tha 10 pecet (ad i some caseswhee it is stuctuay weakmoe tha 5 pecet) oGnP to amamets, that is ikey to imit its gowth ate.Keedys ovea agumet has bee itesey citicized,but he was wise to make his estimate a heaviy quaied ad

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beoe 1914 is ot that it was excessive; it is that it was otage eough to dete the Gemas om beievig thatthey coud ivade Begium ad Face without acig e-ective Bitish esistace.

The questio o deteece cuts to the heat o thepobem. The thid myth that shapes the debate about

deese spedig is that democacies maitai amedoces simpy to deeat thei advesaies i wa. Ove theog hau, it is i act bettebeig ess costy i ives admoeyto pevet was om happeig i the st pace.Thus, the essece o the oe o amed oce i a democacyis ot just victoy; it is deteece. Because o oe casaey pedict the utue o wa, ad because dieet kidso oces ae essetia o deteig ad deeatig dieetkids o advesaies, democacies eed a boad age ocapabiities. Suppotes o deteece, though, ace thedoube bude o opposig those who simpy euse toaccept the cocept, ad those who beieve that ay giveeve o expeditue, o ay paticua weapos system, is

excessive to deteeces eeds. That is the situatio thatadvocates o sustaiig US deese spedig at its cuetshae o GDP ace today.

The agumet o those who do ot beieve i dete-ece is that othes ae hostie oy because the UitedStates povokes them. The Soviets wee adept at depoyigthis agumet, which ests, as Hey Kissige obseved,o the iexhaustibe masochism o Ameica iteectuaswho took it as a atice o aith that evey dicuty i US-Soviet eatios had to be caused by Ameica stupidity oitasigece. The popuaity o this agumet, especiayi Euope, caot cocea the aogace o its impicatiosthat o oe ese has ay beies o goas o thei ow, adthat thei behavio is simpy a espose to US actios.

The othe, sighty moe seious case is that the UitedStates is spedig too much to achieve deteece, adto esue victoy i deteece ais. The diemma is thatthee is o pecise way o detemiig the coect eveo spedig. I pactice, theeoe, the agumet that theUited States is spedig too much to achieve deteeceeads back to the decade beoe 9/11, whe, without aobvious theat o the hoizo, the US ad its aies took apeace divided om the ed o the Cod Wa. It aso eadsback to Bitish poicy beoe 1914, to the Wests beatedespose to the ise o the nazis, ad to US disamametate 1945 i the ace o Soviet powe.

The udameta aiue o the democacies i the

twetieth cetuy, i act, was thei uwiigess to spedeough moey o thei amed oces to dete eemiesbeoe the shootig stated. The cause o that aiue was,i pat, a ideoogica objectio to deese, ad, moeecety, the expasio o the weae state, which i ib-ea democacies has cosumed a steadiy-isig shae oatioa icome. Ideed, the oy easo to ea that thecuet eve o deese spedig i the Uited States, isusustaiabe is because, by 2052, etitemet spedig,accodig to the Heitage Foudatio, aoe wi cosumethe etie edea budget at cuet tax eves. log be-

oe the, the Uited States wi be oced to aise taxessubstatiay, to eom its etitemet pogams, o todasticay educe its spedig o deese.

Too Much? Determining US Defense SpendingThe outh myth is that the Uited States is spedig

too much o deese. I the ed, deese spedig is otdetemied by objective assessmets o what is eeded todete ad wi, though such assessmets do pay a oe ithe poitica pocess that shapes the edea budget. His-toy oes some guidace about what that pocess wipoduce. I 2000, whe deese spedig was at 3 peceto GDP, both the Democatic omiee A Goe ad therepubica omiee Geoge W. Bush agued it was tooow. By eay 2001, 41 pecet o the Ameica peopeageed, the highest popotio sice 1981.

Cadidates Goe ad Bush, ad the US peope, weecoect. The US miitay, i it is to be pepaed to detead wi, eeds to maitai a baaced oce stuctue. O

the wods oceas, it must be abe to potect oce secuey

ove geat distaces. I the ai, it must maitai supeio-ity, ad use that supeioity to shape combat o the goud.

O ad, it must maitai the capabiity to ght ad wi amajo ad wa, whie aso simutaeousy possessig theabiity to ght a successu coute-isugecy. It musthave a baaced ucea asea, ad has a pessig eedto cotiue the successu deveopmet o missie deese.I a o these aeas, ad i a egios, it has immese e-quiemets o stategic it capacity, which moves ocesom whee they ae to whee they ae eeded. noe othese capabiities ae supus, ad a have bee used iwas sice the Fist Gu Wa i 1991. Togethe, as theexpeiece o the ate 1990s ad the post 9/11 eviometshowed, they cost as much as the Uited States is cuetyspedig: 4 pecet o GDP. Ideed, its eed to possess

a these capabiities is pecisey why the Uited States isspedig that amout ow.

Theeoe, the evidece om US histoy sice 1945is that whie the Uited States ca aod to sped moetha 4 pecet i it eeds to, it does ot wat to. That acko wi is ot cuety a pobem, but, i cicumstaceswose, it coud become so. O the othe had, the bipa-tisa cosesus o 2000 , ad the Ameica expeiece ate9/11, impies that 3 pecet o deese is too ow. Givethe eed to esist the eve-peset agumet that just asma cut wi do o damage, ad the act that the cuet

nothig is moe impotat o

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oce stuctue was buit to meet eeds that wee beigegected i the 1990s, the cuet eve o 4 pecet iseasoabe o acia, stategic, ad poitica gouds.

Disproportionate US Defense Spending Thee emais the questio o how this eve o

spedig ca be justied whe the Uited States, by someestimates, is esposibe o ha o the wods miitayexpeditues. Thus, the th ad a myth is that theUS shae o deese spedig is gobay dispopotioate.Fist, by oe measue, the Uited States gets a poo bago the buck om its spedig; despite the vast dispaitiesbetwee US deese spedig ad A Qaeda spedig, o9/11, A Qaeda was sti abe to ifict biios o doas odamage o the Uited States. The Uited States, wisey,is pusuig its eduig stategy o spedig moe moeyas a way to avoid takig highe casuaties. A Qaeda woudaso gady sped moe i it coud: the act that it caotdoes ot educe its maevoece.

Secod, with the exceptio o the Uited States, thewod is divided betwee those that have the wi to spedmoe but ack the meas, ad those that have the measbut ack the wi. I the ome categoy sits russia, whichhas made agey uavaiig eots to ecove om its post-Cod Wa coapse. The Peopes repubic o Chia hasdoe a bette, ad is pusuig a compehesive tas-omatio om a mass amy desiged o potacted waso attitio o its teitoy to oe capabe o ghtig adwiig shot duatio, high itesity coficts aog itspeiphey agaist high-tech advesaies. But Chia, ikerussia, emais a eativey poo state. Chia does have thegeatest og-tem potetia to compete miitaiy with theUited States, but o ow, its abiity to sustai miitay

powe at a distace emais imited, accodig to the USDepatmet o Deese Aua repot to Cogess oMiitay Powe o the Peopes repubic o Chia. TheUS shae o goba deese spedig is theeoe, i pat,a esut o the tempoay, ad i Chias case dimiishig,weakess o its two agest potetia advesaies.

The othe categoy, those with the meas but ot thewi, is popuated by US aies i Euope ad Asia. Thus,the thid easo why US spedig is pedomiat is be-cause it is povidig secuity o the wods democacies.The Uited States has made epeated ad agey usuc-cessu eots to emedy this situatio by ecouagigJapa to pay a moe active secuity oe, ad by pessig

its nATO aies to sped moe o deese. It is tue thatthe dispaity betwee US ad Euopea spedig is, ipat, a esut o the act that the Uited States is a ich,age couty, wheeas Euope is somewhat ess ich ad iscomposed o may smae states. Takig both actos itoaccout, the Uited States speds about twice as much byshae o GDP as Euope. That is sti a sizeabe gap.

This gap is ot, though, age eough to aect theecoomic we-beig o the Uited States. The ate othe Ameica ad Euopea ecoomies wi deped oto thei deese spedig but o the extet to which they

peseve ecoomic eedom. Ideed, ew states i thewod today ook ikey to coapse because o excessivemiitay spedig. The oy states that ace this pei aedictatoships such as noth Koea ad Ia, states that aeot oy miitaistic but asoad moe vitaydeepypoiticay ad ecoomicay iibea.

Conclusion

I shot, o todays democacies, deese spedig isot a ecoomic pobem. It is a secuity pobem. TheUited States is vueabe to attack om o backmaiwith WMD-equipped baistic missies om states such asnoth Koea ad Iathe ea o ee secuity povidedby the oceas eded decades ago, but Ameicas ae stiuwiig uy to ackowedge the impicatios o that act.The wiigess o the Uited States to deed Euopeests, i pat, o its wiigess to deed itse: pesistetegect o deese by Euope must educe the wiigesso the Uited States to bea pat o thei bude. Mostseiousy, the decie o deese i Euope ad Japa isboth a efectio ad a dive o a boade cutua shit:

weakess pomotes a eteat to the sot isoatioism o theweae state, ad the sca demads o that state ceateuthe weakess.

The udameta chaege acig deese spedig ithe Uited States, as i othe democacies, is ot to ebuta seious agumet that spedig 4 pecet o GDP odeese imposes a uacceptabe bude o the atiosecoomy. It is to esist the agumet that deese as suchis eithe a uxuy o a povocatio. That is a dageousaacy: a peope who ack the wi to pay wi evetuay dthey ae a taget o those who have the wi to ght.

L tibl, Fc x-gi cl bi,i vild h f i. ep iliy pdig h GDP i b hl h h uid s.

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any candidat has r carrid into th Whit Hous. Aslaboratd during his campaign and dscribd on th prsi-

dnts wb sit, it is a plan to st a goal o a world withoutnuclar wapons and pursu it. Obama has promisd tothwart nuclar trrorism by scuring all loos nuclarmatrials in th world within our yars; to rduc nuclarthrats by cutting US, Russian and othr stats nuclarand missil arsnals; and to prnt any nw nuclar wap-ons, nw nuclar xplosi tsts and nw production ossil matrial or wapons. Can h do it?

Wll, ys, h can. Th ailur o th Bush Doctrin,th intnsication o nuclar thrats, and th dlopingbipartisan, transnational consnsus or dp rductions

Joseph CirinCione

It is otn said that th world is at a nuclar tippingpoint. By this, analysts man that th policy choicsw mak or th nxt w yars may dtrmin iw tip or into nuclar catastroph or pull backrom th arious brinks on which w now ttr.

Thos who thought talk o nuclar disastrs was a thingo th past, that th nd o th Cold War ndd nuclarthrats, might want to pay attntion to this dbat.

Today, thr is dp, growing concrn about ourcatgoris o nuclar thrats. Th rst is th possibilityo a trrorist group gtting a nuclar wapon and dto-

nating it in a major city. Th scond is th dangr o anaccidntal, unauthorizd or intntional us o on o thxisting 25,000 nuclar wapons hld by nin nations to-day. Third is th mrgnc o nw nuclar-armd nations:North Kora today, prhaps Iran tomorrow, and othrs toollow. Last is th possibl collaps o th Nuclar Non-Proliration Traty rgim, th intrlocking ntwork otratis and controls that has ctily slowd, i notaltogthr prntd, th sprad o nuclar wapons.

US Prsidnt Barack Obama has th most dtaild,comprhnsi, and transormati nuclar policy agnda

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US Nuclear PolicyTh Opn Window or Transormation

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in nuclar arsnals crat a uniqu conrgnt momntin which Obama could raliz his dsird transormationo global nuclar policy. Obamas plan to scur, rduc,and prnt dmonstrats his commitmnt to siz thisopportunity, but thos wddd to th nuclar status quothratn to dlay or dny ral progrss towards nuclar

thrat rduction and disarmamnt.

Nuclear DangersTh Obama plan rcognizs that todays thrats ar

intrrlatd. Dlopmnts in on ara act othr aras.For xampl, a wakning o xport controls and tratyrstraints incrass th probability o additional statsdloping nuclar wapons, which incrass th numbro sits rom which trrorists might acquir thos wapons. Th rrs is also tru. Dramatic dcrass in globalnuclar arsnals could hlp gnrat th intrnationalcoopration ndd to scur and liminat stocks onuclar wapons matrials, making it lss likly trrorists

could stal or build a bomb.Currntly, ach o ths thrats is growing. I un-chckd, on or mor nuclar nightmars ar likly tob ralizd: Pakistan, a nation with nough matrial orprhaps 100 nuclar wapons and strong Islamic unda-mntalist infuncs in its military and intllignc srics,could dstabiliz. I it dos, al Qada, now scurly basdin Pakistan, could gain control o nuclar matrials or abomb or th wapons thmsls. Pakistan could go roma major non-NATO ally to our worst nuclar nightmarornight.

On or mor o th approximatly 3,000 nuclar war-hads Russia and th Unitd Stats maintain on high-alrtstatus, rady to launch within 15 minuts, could b rd

through accidnt, miscalcula-tion, or unauthorizd us. Lastyar, th US Air Forc lost tracko 6 nuclar waponsach tntims th siz o th Hiroshimabombor 36 hours as thy fwacross country on a bombr noon ralizd had li waponsaboard. This yar, a British anda Frnch submarin collidd inth middl o th scond largstocan on arth; togthr thycarrid 100 warhads. I this loss

o control is occurring in th na-tions with th bst command andcontrol mchanisms, what mighthappn in th countris with thworst? I w ha had accidntswith plans and subs, is it unra-sonabl to xpct accidnts withmissils?

Or th past thr yars, adozn Middl east nations hadclard thir intrst in starting

ciilian nuclar powr or rsarch programs. Bhind thstatd dsir or nw nrgy lis a darkr moti: a nuclarhdg against Iran. It is not Irans nuclar ractor thatworris nighboring stats, but rathr its rush to constructa uranium nrichmnt plant and a plutonium rprocss-ing plant. Both can b usd to mak ulor wapons.

egypt, Turky, Saudi Arabia, and othrs ar now startingth dcads-long procss o acquiring thir own nuclartchnological bas. Th rsults could b a Middl eastwith not on nuclar-armd stat, Isral, but our or .This is a rcip or nuclar war.

Th Unitd Stats and Russia in th 1960s ld thngotiations or th Nuclar Nonproliration Tratyth backbon o th intrnational nuclar nonprolira-tion rgim. Th traty workd. From th 20 or so statsxploring nuclar wapons programs thn, only nin hawapons today. But th tratys cor is shaky. Stats halost condnc that th two nuclar giants who togthrhold 96 prcnt o all nuclar wapons will r ulll

thir pldg to liminat ths arsnals. Th commitmntto disarmamnt has waknd in this dcad, as progrsshas slowd and, ctily, no riabl arms rductiontraty has bn ratid sinc 1992. Manwhil, th pos-sibility o nw nuclar stats in Asia challngs th aluo th traty or many non-wapons stats. I both trndscontinu, th traty will collaps, triggring a cascad oproliration, as a high-ll xprt panl warnd th UNScrtary Gnral in 2004.

The Collapse of the Old and the Rise of the New Th urgncy o ths thrats combins with thr

othr trndsth ailur o past policy, th dlopmnto a stratgic altrnati, and th nar simultanous mr-

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gnc o nw ladrs in th major nationsthat togthrcrat a rar policy momnt in which dramatic globalshitssuch as that nisiond by Prsidnt Obamaarnot just possibl, but probabl.

Th rst trnd is th widsprad rcognition thatth Bush Doctrin aild. Th policis o th last US

administration not only did not mak th Unitd Statssar, but thy mad th worlds nuclar thrats wors.Th Bush policy positd that th gratst dangr camrom th nxus o trrorists, outlaw stats and waponso mass dstruction. Th solution was said to li in dirctmilitary action to orthrow rogu rgims. Iraq was thrst implmntation o th policy. Th wars architctsxpctd rgim chang in Iraq to lad to rgim changin Syria, Iran, North Kora, and othr stats.

Th opposit occurrd. North Kora and Iran ac-clratd thir nuclar programs, making mor progrssin th past yars than thy had in th prious tn.US lgitimacy and crdibility in th world waknd as

political, nancial, and human rsourcs draind into th

Iraq and Aghanistan wars. Manwhil, rlations withRussia, whos coopration is ncssary or rsolution omany o ths issus, dtrioratd. Whil th trroristthrat incrasd, programs to scur global stockpils o

nuclar wapon matrials languishd. Sing this rcordo rsults, many nations and th US public rjctd thpolicy and th policy-makrs. This stratgic collaps lta policy acuum.

Into th brach stppd th our statsmn, unliklyhros carrying a bold stratgic altrnati: th compltlimination o nuclar wapons. Rpublicans GorgShultz and Hnry Kissingr and Dmocrats William Prryand Sam Nunn promotd this onc utopian dram in abipartisan appal in two Wall Strt Journal op-ds orA World Fr o Nuclar Wapons. This is th scondtrnd. Thir call ld to an organizd campaign and won thndorsmnt o two-thirds o th liing ormr national

scurity adisors and scrtaris o stat and dns, in-cluding Jams Bakr, Colin Powll, Mlin Laird, FrankCarlucci, Warrn Christophr, and Madlin Albright.Th group dtaild a sris o practical stps that can ladtowards this goal, including dp, ngotiatd rductions inUS and Russian orcs, th US ratication o th nuclartst ban traty, and an nd to global production o nuclarwapon ssil matrial.

Thr is growing domstic and intrnational supportor this agnda across idological lins. Public opinion

polls show that 84 prcnt o Amricans would lsar knowing that no countryincluding th UnitdStatshad nuclar wapons. Th europan Union hasproposd a dtaild non-proliration agnda, prsntdby consrati Frnch Prsidnt Nicholas Sarkozy, whocalld it an ambitious program that is truly capabl o

achiing concrt progrss on th path o disarmamnt.Labor Party Prim Ministr Gordon Brown has pldgdthat th Unitd Kingdom will b at th orront oth intrnational campaign to acclrat disarmamntamongst possssor stats, to prnt proliration to nwstats, and to ultimatly achi a world that is r romnuclar wapons.

Similarly, UK Forign Ministr Daid Milliband saidin Dcmbr 2008: I bli th momnt is now right towork with th nw US administration and our partnrs ora rnwd dri: to stop proliration, raliz th bntso nuclar nrgy, and radically acclrat progrss on sixky stps ncssary to mo th world towards th aboli-

tion o nuclar wapons.

Th chancs that this policy could b adoptd habn incrasd by th nal trnd: a narly simultanouschang in xcuti ladrship in most o th worlds majorpowrs. Th ladrs o th G8 nations in 2008 includd

only on, Canadian Prim Ministr Stphn Harpr, whowas in oc in 2006.

Othr ky nations, including Isral, Pakistan and In-dia also ha nw ladrs, and Irans 2009 lctions mayrplac its prsidnt as wll. All ar lss tid to th policiso th past; all look or nw dirctions that can hlp thmmak thir mark on th world stag. A bold, nw nuclarpolicy might t th bill.

The Current DebateTh policy shit, o cours, is not guarantd. Th

dbat today is split into roughly two camps, ach withits own actions. Th adantag still lis with th camp

aoring th status quo. This is composd o th nuclarburaucracis in arious countris (including th nuclarlaboratoris and sctions o th military whos carrsdpnd on continuing currnt nuclar wapons programs),consrati analysts loyal to th stratgis dlopd dur-ing th Cold War, and political gurs sking to us thissu to th adantag o thir party.

Th Nuclar Prmannc Camp has two main ac-tions. Th consrati wing liks things just th way thyar and has contmpt or thos sking dramatic chang.

Th policis o th last US administration not only did

not mak th Unitd Stats sar, but thy mad th

worlds nuclar thrats wors.

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Formr Scrtary o Dns Jams Schlsingr saysonly rligious zalots want th limination o nuclarwapons. Th bomb is with us to stay. It is, atr all, thultimat guardian o our saty, said Guy Robrts, whorprsntd th Unitd Stats on nuclar policy to NATOduring th Bush administration. H told a europan

Parliamnt conrnc in Nombr: Th pac andstability which nuclar dtrrnc proids is immasur-abl. In this uncrtain and incrasingly dangrous worldwhr proliration is a gin act, it is th bstalbit notprctanswr to th qustion o how w continu tonsur th saty and scurity o our nations, our popl,our rdoms.

Th libral prmannc action aors rductions inxisting US and Russian arsnals, prhaps down to 1,000 warhads ach, but would hold th lin about thr.Formr Scrtary o Dns Harold Brown wrot in thWashington Quartrly in lat 2007: Th assrtion thatw intnd to abolish nuclar wapons is likly to gain lss

in goodwill and coopration in nonproliration programsrom othrs than it will los whn it bcoms clar thatthr is no bliabl program or prospct o doing so.

On th othr sid is th Nuclar Chang Camp. Itincluds ormr military and ciilian ocials who hlpdcrat th nuclar ordr thy now bli obsolt, po-litical gurs including Prsidnt Barack Obama andsom mmbrs o his cabint, intrnational ladrs suchas thos idntid abo, non-gornmnt groups andphilanthropic oundations. All support th goal o thlimination o nuclar wapons; all support practical stpstowards that goal.

Som in th Chang Camp tnd to s nuclar dis-armamnt as a distant goal and mphasis progrss on th

stps. Th Nuclar Thrat Initiati, ld by ormr Sna-tor Sam Nunn and CNN oundr Td Turnr, ocussmuch o its orts on achiing nar-trm ictoris onth stps, such as rapidly scuring and liminating nuclarmatrials around th glob, prnt-ing th sprad o nuclar tchnolo-gis, and liminating ciilian us ohighly-nrichd uranium. Th groupis working to build consnsus arounda nuclar bas camp on th way toclimbing th still dicult to s sum-mit o nuclar limination.

Th othr wing mphasizs th

attainmnt o th nuclar-r ision.Global Zro, or xampl, is a nw,intrnational allianc working or acomprhnsi agrmnt to limi-nat all nuclar wapons throughphasd and riabl rductions. Ithas garnrd th support o a widrang o ladrs including QunNoor o Jordan, virgin Group CeORichard Branson, ormr Prsidnt Jimmy Cartr and his national s-

curity adisor Zbigniw Brzzinski, ormr Ragan stra-tgic arms ngotiator Richard Burt, and ormr NATOSuprm Allid Commandr Jack Shhan. Thr ardozns o organizations and gornmnts working onsimilar orts. A crati tnsion xists btwn th twowings as thy i or infunc. Som liminationists

bli a ocus on nar-trm stps will drain momntuminto a swamp o arms control ngotiations; som in thstp-by-stp wing bli strssing limination discrditsorts to mak ral rductions now.

British Prim Ministr Gordon Brown artully m-bracd both wings whn h dclard in a March 17 spch,I know rom Prsidnt Obama and th nw US adminis-tration that Amrica shars with us th ultimat ambitiono a world r rom nuclar wapons. But lt m b clarthis will b a dicult path that will b crossd in stps -not in on lap. H promisd a Road to 2010 plan inprparation or th 2010 NPT Riw Conrnc, thatwould includ dtaild proposal on ciil nuclar powr,

disarmamnt and non-proliration. This plan wouldlad to multi-latral nuclar disarmamnt, h said, Withach stp w must aim to build condnc, condncthat action to prnt proliration is working and thatstats with wapons ar making strids to li up to thircommitmnts.

The New Administrations New PolicyWhil Prsidnt Obama has mbracd th goal o

limination o nuclar wapons, his administration hasocials in both wings, plus som who aor minor ad-justmnts to th status quo. Th most dtaild outlin oits still dloping nuclar policy cam rom Scrtary oStat Hillary Clintons opning statmnt at hr conr-

mation haring.Scrtary Clinton statd that, Th grast thrat that

Amrica acs is th dangr that wapons o mass dstruc-tion will all into th hands o trrorists. To nsur our

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utur scurity, w musttak th lad in working withothrs to rduc currnt nuclar stockpils and prnt thdlopmnt and us o dangrous nw waponry.

To prnt th sprad o nuclar wapons and dndagainst nuclar trrorism, Scrtary Clinton laid out apolicy that [gts] Amrica back in th businss o ngagingothr nations to rduc stockpils o nuclar wapons.Sh said th Unitd Stats will act with urgncy to pr-

nt proliration in North Kora and Iran, scur loosnuclar wapons and matrials, and shut down th marktor slling thm.

Laying out th agnda on ngagmnt with Russia,Clinton said that th administration will work with Rus-sia to scur thir agrmnt to xtnd th STARTTraty, sk agrmnts or urthr rductions innuclar wapons, and tak US and Russian missils ohair-triggr alrt.

Supporting th nonproliration rgim, Clinton m-phasizd th importanc o th Nonproliration Traty,stating, Th Unitd Stats must xrcis th ladrshipndd to shor up th rgim. Sh thn said that th ad-

ministration will work with th Snat towards raticationo th Comprhnsi Tst Ban Traty and bgin ngotia-tions on a riabl Fissil Matrial Cuto Traty.

This stratgy o scur, rduc and prnt is still inpolicy and budgtary dlopmnt. Thr will b a naturaltnsion btwn thos who aor a transormation o USnuclar policy and thos who sk incrmntal chang.Io DaaldrObamas nomin or US ambassador toNATOand ormr dns dpartmnt nuclar policyocial Jan Lodal wrot in Forign Aairs in lat 2008,that th prsidnt will ha th opportunity to mak th

limination o all nuclar wapons th organizing prin-cipl o US nuclar policy. Thy and othr xprts aora prsidntial dclaration that th only purpos o USnuclar wapons is to prnt th us o nuclar waponsby othrs, and ngotiations to rapidly rduc US and Rus-sian arsnals to 1,000 or wr total warhads ach. Othrs

in th administration, such as Scrtary o Dns RobrtGats, aor ngotiations but may not want to rduc asmuch, aor th dlopmnt o nw nuclar waponsand s ths wapons as ital to US and NATO scurityn against stats that ha no nuclar wapons. Gatsand othrs may want to rsr th right to us nuclarwapons n against non-nuclar targts.

Th administration is on th mo n as it rns itsapproach. Four days into oc, Prsidnt Obama stab-lishd a nw oc o th coordinator or th prntionso proliration and trrorism in th National ScurityCouncil (scur). H soon snt ocials or priat talksin Moscow to xplor nw agrmnts to cut nuclar arms

and dirctd his tam to cut unding or th troubld anti-missil programs (rduc). H also liminatd unds ornw nuclar wapons aord by th Bush administrationand signald his intntion to win Snat ratication o atraty banning all nuclar xplosi tsts and to ngoti-at a traty banning th production o nuclar waponmatrials (prnt).

As th administration crats its policy, it will nd torpair th damag don to th nonproliration rgimor th last ight yars, as dtaild in th discussion oth collaps o th Bush Doctrin, abo. H will ha towork with clos allis, such as Prim Ministr Brown, todlop a concrt plan or achiing th stratgic objc-tis dtaild by Scrtary Clinton. Th prsidnt can, in

this procss, tak adantags o succssul policis still inplac. Working with othr gornmnts, th Unitd Statshas th capability through thrat rduction programs toscur global nuclar assts within th nxt our yars;through intrnational agrmnts to rduc and dismantlxcss US and Russian nuclar wapons; through intrna-tional diplomacy to coninc othr stats to incras thbarrirs to and pnaltis or proliration.

As with th nancial crisis, Prsidnt Obama apparsto s th ailur o past nuclar policy and th dangrsit cratd as a window o opportunity to draw upon pastsuccsss and currnt institutions, inspir and mobilizgornmnts and citizns, and mold a nw policy. Sizing

this opportunity, th Obama administration sms to bcrating a nuclar policy that dirctly addrsss th thrats,dmphasizs th rol o nuclar wapons in intrnationalscurity, and maks irrrsibl strids towards nuclardisarmamnt.

His tim is short. As surly as th nuclar policywindow has opnd, it will clos. Hsitation, timidity andambialnc will squandr th momnt. Prsidnt Obamahas th ability to b bold whn boldnss is th only way tocut this nuclar Gordian knot. Not only is that th rightpolicy or th momnt, but it is rathr long ordu.

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iance has ony a handu o members wiing and abe toengage in miitary operations in paces such as Aghanistan,and cajoing by the Secretary-Genera and others about

the need or the rest to do more has had itte impact.Second, its reations with Russia remain rocky een as anew US administration has promised to push the resetbutton with the Kremin. Finay, some NATO membershae understood the aiance must deeop coser ties tonon-European democracies in a gobaizing word, butthe majority o members ear a diution o the aiancestransatantic character i NATO goes goba.

NATO After 11/9When the Berin Wa e and the Cod War ended,

jaMes gOLDgeIer

NATO has much to ceebrate in the year o its60th anniersary. In the twenty years sincethe a o the Berin Wa on Noember9, 1989, NATO has incorporated mucho Centra and Eastern Europe into its

membership. It responded to the threat that emerged onSeptember 11, 2001 and sent troops ar rom home tocombat the Taiban and a-Qaeda and to hep reconstructa war-torn country. And the French decision to rejoinNATOs integrated miitary command ater a our decadeabsence wi enabe deeper cooperation both across the

Atantic and within Europe. But whie NATO has gone arin adapting to the word ater the earth-shattering eentso 11/9 and 9/11, it continues to conront the existentiaquestion it has aced since the end o the Cod War: is anaiance o transatantic democracies buit to counter apossibe Soiet attack the best instrument or combatingthe threats o the 21st century?

NATO members hae aunched a process to articuatea new strategic concept in the coming year that wi de-ne their purpose going orward. In doing so, they mustrespond to at east three critica chaenges. First, the a-

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, -auh Ama Bw h Wa:m 11/9 9/11.

NATOs FutureFacing Od Diisions and New Threats

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there seemed itte reason to expect NATO to remain inbusiness. Ater a, history suggests that aiances ormagainst threats; when those threats disappear, so do theaiances. The United States, Great Britain and the SoietUnion ormed the Grand Aiance to deeat Nazi Germany.That aiance did not ong surie the end o Word War II.

But whie NATO was ormed primariy to deend againsta Soiet attack, that was not its ony rationae. NATOSecretary-Genera lord Ismay amousy decared thatNATO was necessary not just to keep the Russians out,but to keep the Americans in and the Germans down. Itthus aways had a stabiizing mission in Western Europe: asong as the United States stayed engaged on the continentand heped ensure that no miitary riaries emerged in theWest as they had beore Word War II, countries coud beassured o security and stabiity.

With the coapse o communism, NATOs main roesoon became to reach out to the ormer Warsaw Pact na-tions to extend that zone o security and stabiity. George

H.W. Bush decared in May 1989 that the United Statesgoa was to hep oster a Europe Whoe and Free, and hisadministrationas did the administrations that oowedsaw NATO as centra to that task. First by estabishingpartnerships with Centra and Eastern European miitar-ies, and ater by hoding out the prospect or membershipin the aiance, NATO became essentia to ostering poiti-ca, economic, and miitary reorm.

In Bi Cintons rst term, two other poicies emergedas part o the United States NATO poicy. In 1995, NATOused air power to bring the Serbs to the negotiating tabe;the Dayton accords signed in Noember o that year putan end to Europes boodiest confict since Word WarII. NATO aso reached out to Russiaincuding it in the

Partnership or Peace, bringing the Wests ormer ader-sary into the Impementation Force that kept the peace inthe Bakans, and creating the NATO-Russia PermanentJoint Counci.

Utimatey, NATOs actions in the Bakans (whichcuminated in the 1999 war against Serbia to deendKosoo) and its enargement into Centra and EasternEurope hindered the eort to reach out to Russia. Manyin the West taked about the need to export stabiity so asnot to end up importing instabiity. The Russians iewedthe poicy dierenty: they saw US and NATO actions asdesigned to increase the Western sphere o infuence attheir expense and hae reacted angriy to NATOs post-

Cod War eoution. Ten years ago, in the run-up to NATOs 50th an-

niersary summit hed in Washington in the midst o theKosoo war (NATOs rst), the United States tried togain aied support or the notion that NATO woud nowas a matter o course need to go out o area to combatthreats. But most o the United States European aieswere reuctant to see Kosoo as anything but an excep-tion to the rue that NATO was designed or coectiedeense rather than or missions abroad. It woud take theterrorist attacks o 9/11 or NATO members to reaize that

coectie deense had a new meaning in a word in whichthreats came rom non-state networked actors operatingrom territories such as Aghanistan.

NATO After 9/11The core o the aiance is Artice v, which decares

that an attack on one member is to be considered an attackon a. During the Cod War, members expected an Articev contingency woud see the United States coming to thedeense o the West Europeans in the ace o a Warsaw Pactonsaught. But Artice v was neer used during those years;rather it was inoked or the rst time in the atermath othe September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks by US aies insupport o the United States.

But as the United States prepared to go to waragainst Osama bin ladens organization and the Taibanin Aghanistan, it decided not to conduct the operationthrough NATO as it had during the Kosoo campaigna ew years beore. Deciding that the process o gaining

aied consensus was too cumbersome, the Bush admin-istration chose instead to put together a coaition o thewiing, thereby signaing that the aiances useuness tothe United States was imited.

As the United States became bogged down in the warin Iraq, it turned to NATO to take oer the UN-mandatedInternationa Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and estab-ish a peacekeeping operation in Kabu. In the oowingyears, ISAF expanded its roe, rst to the North and Westo the country, and ater to the more dangerous areas inthe South and East.

Oer time, as the insurgency grew stronger in A-

Ph cuy ru

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ghanistan, more US and NATO combat operations wereneeded. The United States maintains the argest contin-gent by ar, and in February 2009, President Barack Obamaannounced that he was sending an additiona 17,000 UStroops to Aghanistan; in March, he decided that 4,000more US miitary personne woud be needed to train

Aghani security and poice orces.The chaenge or NATO in Aghanistan is that ew

nations are abe to send their troops into dangerous areas.Part o the probem is that many member states hae notinested sucienty in their miitaries. But a major cha-enge is poitica wi: a number o states, incuding Ger-many, cannot gain the pubic and pariamentary supportnecessary to send troops to ght the Taiban and A Qaeda.Many Europeans iewed both Iraq and Aghanistan as warsconcocted by President George W. Bush and did not seethe need to conront the threat emanating rom pacesike Kandahar. Whie the Germans and others are doingimportant reconstruction work in areas ar rom combat,

they are imited in where they can depoy. In February2009 in Munich, US Secretary o Deense Robert Gatescompained openy about the danger o a two-tiered a-iance o those who are wiing to ght and those who arenot. Ony a ew members (namey Canada, the UnitedKingdom, the Netherands, Denmark and nonmemberAustraia) are engaging in miitary operations to hepthe United States deeat the insurgency. The rest haeimposed caeats on where and when their troops can

operate, typicay conning them to their bases i theymight be in danger. That is hardy indicatie o a robustmiitary aiance.

NATO Going ForwardIn the atermath o 11/9, NATO successuy ostered

stabiity aong its European periphery. Athough workremains to be done in paces ike Ukraine, George and theBakans, the eort to buid a Europe at peace is argeycompete. Thus NATO members must ask whether thisaiance o transatantic democracies is the best ehiceor ensuring security against 21st century threats arisingoutside o Europe. Shoud the United States, or exampe,continue to emphasize the need or a orma aiance orshoud it instead work through coaitions o the wiing(particuary since NATO in Aghanistan resembes a coai-tion o the wiing anyway)? I so, shoud it be conned todemocracies, or shoud it reach out to major authoritar-ian states such as China and Russia? And i an aiance o

democracies is the right answer, shoud NATOs characterremain soey transatantic?The adantage NATO has oer ad hoc coaitions is

that the aiances emphasis on common standards andinteroperabiity as we as its abiity to conduct joint train-ing and exercises means that partners are not starting romscratch with each mission. A orma aiance aso gies eachmember a stake in maintaining strong soidarity across theAtantic. Those NATO eatures are among the reasons

that Russia has re-mained earu othe aiance twen-ty years ater the

end o the Cod War.

Whie there wereoccasiona musingsregarding potentiaRussian member-ship in NATO inthe 1990s, as Russiabecame more au-thoritarian, that ideaaded. But NATOand Russia hae amutua interest inessening the ten-sions o recent years

and cooperat ingwhere they hae mu-tua interests.

And as NATOoperates ar romEurope, the aiancehas begun to recog-nize that it needs toengage with Chinaas we. Coser tieswith both Russia andnh Aa tay oaza, 2009 *W gmay d 1955 ad ea gmay up ufa 1990

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China, such as joint exercises to train or counterterrorismmissions or anti-piracy operations (which hae begun withRussia in the past ew years), shoud be urther deeoped.But membership or a non-democracy such as Russiawoud undermine the aiances abiity to act. Shared aueshep the organization respond to certain goba chaenges

in ways that it coud not i countries such as Russia (orChina) joined. The reason that the United States andNATO did not work through the United Nations in 1999is that China and Russia woud hae etoed any opera-tion designed to protect the popuation in Kosoo. Botho those countries eared that a UN mandate to protecta unerabe popuation coud be used against them inregions such as Tibet and Chechnya.

NATO caimed the egitimacy to act in Kosoo be-cause the war was ought in Europe and nineteen Westerndemocracies were acting to uphod European norms.Whie the Aghanistan confict is being ought under UN

auspices, as Kosoo showed, it is not aways possibe to gainUN approa to combat threats. The NATO Secretary-Genera recognized the need or broader egitimacy in2006 when he caed on the aiance to deeop reationswith democracies rom other parts o the word, particu-ary Asian and Pacic democracies such as Japan, South

Korea, Austraia and New Zeaand. The United Statesand the United Kingdom hoped to deeop this idea byestabishing a more orma institutiona or these non-European countries participation at NATO, but they wereopposed by a number o European countries, especiayFrance, whose then-president, Jacques Chirac, eared adiminishing roe or the United Nations.

NATOs outreach to these non-NATO democracies(and others such as Sweden and Finand) has proceeded ints and starts. And certainy those countries woud hae todesire a coser partnership or reations to deepen. Japan,or exampe, began to engage the aiance under PrimeMinister Shinzo Abe, but Abes successors hae not been

as interested in deeoping coser ties. In deeoping itsnew strategic concept, NATO wi hae to cariy thereationship it seeks with these other nations.

ConclusionIn the atermath o the 60th anniersary ceebration,

NATO sti aces nagging questions about its purpose. Isit primariy a coectie deense organization whose job isto deend the territory o its members? I so, how wideywi it dene the threats the member states ace? Is it asosti needed to ensure stabiity on the European continent?

I so, can it not oer time cede that job to the EuropeanUnion? Or is it, as President George W. Bush argued atthe 2008 NATO summit, an expeditionary aiance that issending its orces across the word to hep secure a utureo reedom and peace or miions?

To ensure pubic support, NATO must continue to

rearm that Artice v, the coectie deense proision,remains centra and that protecting the members o theaiance is the core mission. But to be successu in whatwe now ca homeand security, NATO wi hae to acegoba threats, and thus it needs the capabiity to depoy arrom home. Inesting in these capabiities is hard enoughunder ordinary circumstances and wi be een harder ormany members in the midst o the nancia crisis.

Whie NATO sti has an important roe to pay inensuring stabiity across Europe, or exampe in assistingUkraine and Georgia in their reorm eorts, the EuropeanUnion wi hae to take on the major responsibiity or the

deeopment o democracy and economic prosperity inEastern Europe. With Frances return as a uy integratedNATO member, the two organizations shoud be betterabe to coaborate.

NATO has aready crossed the threshod o actingas an expeditionary aiance. And now that it has gone

goba in its missions, it shoud be wiing to expandbeyond its transatantic character in order to gain moreegitimacy and to become more dynamic. Certainy theWest is sti an important concept. Especiay gien therise o authoritarian powers such as China, Russia andIran, a community o nations buit on the aues o theEnightenmentstressing indiidua reedom and humanrightsis critica to our we being. In 1949, there werentthat any democracies outside the North Atantic area. Butthat is no onger true. NATO today does not account su-cienty or the reaities o todays word, which eaturesboth a robust group o democracies across the gobe anda networked threat that can operate ar rom Europe.

I NATO recognizes those reaities and deepens its tiesto non-European democracies, then it can go rom beingan aiance successuy constructed or the probems o the20th century and reashion itse to manage the networko goba chaenges acing its members in the 21st. I itmerey muddes through, uncertain whether it shoud actoutside o Europe and drien to increased nger-pointingat those aies not puing their weight, then the organi-zation wi become nothing more than a dipomatic takshop, ceding the rea action to coaitions o states that arecapabe o action.

The West is sti an important concept. Gien the rise o au-

thoritarian powers, a community o nations buit on the aues

o the Enightenment is critica to our we being.

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Cops couteisugecy ield maual, published i2006, is widely see as the most coheet ad isightulstatemet o the subject sice the Maie Cops Small

Was maual o 1940. Seio atioal secuity ocialsae deeply committed to the otio that iegula wa-ae, athe tha coetioal cofict betwee states, hasbecome a majo secuity challege to the Uited States.Ideed, iegula waae is as stategically impotatas taditioal waae, accodig to a Decembe 2008Petago diectie.

This gowig attetio is ot coed to the ui-omed seices. Ciilia agecies such as the Depatmeto State, the Agecy o Iteatioal Deelopmet, adthe CIA, which hae o decades cosideed coutei-

William rosenau

Beoe the US iteetios i Aghaistaad Iaq, ad the subsequet outbeako isugecies i those cout ies,couteisugecy was a badly eglectedpat o the US deese establishmets secuity

epetoie. Duig the 1990s, ciilia leades, academicspecialists, ad the oce cops coiced themselesthat isugecy was essetially a Cold Wa pheomeo.Istead o udestadig it as eduig political-militaystategy, they peceied isugecy as a opeatioalizedom o Maxism-Leiism (ad Maoism, i paticula)

made ieleat by the declie o the Soiet ad Chiesecommuist pojects.

Today, the US amed oces ae occupied with cou-teisugecy to a degee usee sice the 1960s. Thecampaigs i Iaq (Opeatio Iaqi Feedom) ad Aghai-sta (Opeatio Eduig Feedom) ae shapig a etiegeeatio o militay leades. The poessioal militayliteatue is awash with aticles o couteisugecy adelated (ad oelappig) topics such as iegula waaead stability opeatios. This heighteed iteest is alsoefected i ecet doctie. The joit Amy-Maie

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sugecy a distactio, backwate, o wose, hae owembaced itot with the eo o the Depatmet oDeese, pehaps, but cetaily to a itesity ot pesetsice the Keedy admiistatio. The US GoemetCouteisugecy Guide, published i Jauay 2009,efects Washigtos commitmet to a whole o goe-

met appoach to couteisugecy that icludes majooles o depatmets ad agecies beyod the Petago.Ciilia ocials, militay oces, ad policy specialistshae aleady gleaed impotat lessos om Iaq adAghaista, such as the eed to keep the applicatio oUS combat powe to a miimum; the equiemet to u-destad the local peculiaities o the cofict milieu; adthe impotace o ciilia agecies ad ogoemetalogaizatios i pomotig stability ad deelopmet.These lessos ae all quite sesible ad pudet. How-ee, as the Obama admiistatio cats its policies adstategies o ad wagig iegula wa, othe impotataspects o cotempoay isugecy ad coespodig

couteisugecy must be cosideed.

Counterinsurgencys Learning CurveEectie couteisugecy always etails a po-

tacted ad sometimes paiul peiod o istitutioalleaig. Fo the Bitish, log cosideed the pe-emietpactitioes o impeial policig,the st e yeas othe emegecy i Malaya wee maked by a laboious,hit-o-miss appoach that yielded ew opeatioal ostategic successes. It was ot util the late 1960s, moetha a decade ate the Uited States bega its eots toesue the suial o South vietam, that US militayoces, deelopmet o-icials, ad itelligece

oces bega to wi theso-called othe wa byootig out the vietcogiastuctue ad paci-yig the coutyside.

no ae paiullyacquied lessos alwaystaseed to late cou-teisugecy campaigs.I nothe Ielad du-ig the ealy 1970s, theBitish amy, despite de-cades o couteisuge-

cy expeiece, waged aclumsy, butal, ad lage-ly ieectie campaig tosuppess the PoisioalIish republica Amy.The US militay, despiteelatiely uambiguouscouteisugecy suc-cesses i vietam du-ig the late 1960s ad iEl Salado duig the

1980s, ailed to tase had-wo skills ad lessos toIaq o Aghaista i a appopiate mae.

It is also essetial o militay oces ad ciilia o-cials to be alet to the dages o oeleaig lessosom the campaigs i Iaq ad Aghaista. Althoughtheoists ad pactitioes stess that all isugecies

ae uiquead thus, equie tailoed esposestheeis a possibility that Opeatio Eduig Feedom adOpeatio Iaqi Feedom will exet udue ifuece oou thikig about isugecy ad couteisugecy.Those campaigs hae ioled lage-scale US combatopeatios, a extesie eot to ebuild the state ad ciilsociety, ad a gigatic logistical ootpit. Howee, thismaximalist appoach is ot the oly model. US assistaceto the Philippies, which aces seeal omidable isu-gecies, epesets what might be temed a miimalistappoach. US suppot has ioled low-key, small oot-pit taiig, adice, ad suppot to Filipio ai, goud,ad aal oces athe tha the diect applicatio o US

combat powe o a coetioal battleeld. This does otimply that a miimalist stategy is ecessaily supeio.rathe, it simply suggests that we must aoid the pitallso seeig all ucoetioal coficts though the leseso Iaq ad Aghaista.

The Insurgent Black BoxThe equiemet o couteisugets to udestad

the iteal dyamics o the amed oppositio would seemsel-eidet. But emakably little aalytical attetio hasbee deoted to questios o isuget motiatio, ecuit-met, moale, ad leadeship. I Aghaista, ad to a

Ph cy r

Above:a Bth d pt p tw agh chd th dwy h m Q. Opposite: a us d td gd t w wth th iq tg Bghdd.

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lesse degee i Iaq, the isugecies ae black boxeswhose ogaizatioal stuctues emai lagely obscued,at least to US eyes. Although aluable lessos hae beeleaed om past militay expeieces, the US study ocouteisugecy emai cuiously iwad-diected,coceed moe with peectig the miutiae o tactics,

techiques, ad pocedues tha with gaspig whatmight be temed the homeostatics o iolet udegoudgoups. Without a pooud udestadig o the political,ecoomic, social, ad psychological motiatios behidthose who paticipate i isuget goups, ad the oga-izatioal dyamics iside those ogaizatios, ou abilityto deise eectie couteisugecy policy is obiouslylimited. This is i maked cotast with the US appoachduig the vietam Wa, whe the Petago iestedcosideable esouces i udestadig the motiatioad moale o eemy combatatsa eot that paid ohadsomely i opeatioal ad stategic diideds.

Despite the agumets o etwa theoists who

emphasize decetalizatio, capable isugecies equie

stuctue ad ogaizatio--without them, isugets cado little moe tha see as tactical iitats. Ideed, AlQaeda i Iaq oly achieed its deadly eleace whe iteached a highe ad moe bueaucatic leel o ogaiza-

tioal coheece. I cotast with vietam, whee attemptswee made to map the vietcog iastuctue, little e-ot has bee made i Aghaista, Iaq, o othe theateso cofict to udestad the isuget udegoud. Thecosequet gaps o kowledge ae substatial, o as thesecuity aalyst Michael Ies oted i 2007, we kowlittle o the cladestie wold o amed goups beyodwhat its deizes choose to eeal to us.

Similaly, o systematic attetio has bee paid to thekey subject o subesio by isuget goups ad theisuppot etwoks. Duig the Cold Wa, the US goe-met ad its allies deoted cosideable eot to ude-stadig how isugets iltated goemet agecies,

secuity oces, ad political paties; how they establishedot goups; ad how they coducted stikes,iots, adidustial sabotage. Today, despite ample eidece osubesio i both Iaq ad Aghaista, the US goe-met emais lagely uiteested i the pheomeo,its eolutio sice the Cold Wa, ad ways to couteits ifuece. no has the US militay o itelligececommuity set aside ay seious aalytical esouces oudestadig isuget itelligece opeatios, despitethe act that all high peomace amed goups, omthe vietcog to Al Qaeda, ceate sophisticated stuctues

o the pupose o spyig o thei adesaies ad ootigout suspected taitos. Gie ou ow belie i the poweo itelligece, ad its oce-multiplyig eects, it ispaticulaly ioic that the subject o isuget itelligeceis so lagely igoed. I lackig a substatie compehe-sio o how isugets gathe ad pocess itelligece, we

ad ou allies emai uleable to isuget espioage.Ad lackig ay eal awaeess, we ae let without ayeal coutemeasues.

The Perils of Statebuilding The al issue is moe theoetical, but also moe

udametal. Sice the 1960s, US couteisugecypolicy ad stategy has bee eletlessly state-cetic,ad i some espects couteisugecy has bee ituallysyoymous with statebuildig. Ude the US appoach,buildig capacity ad iastuctue, esuig the poi-sio o public seices, ad pomotig good goemetae all essetial tools i a boade quest to bolste the

legitimacy o a embattled host atios goemet.

Isugecies ae see ist ad oemost as cotestsoe legitimacy, with both the amed militats ad theicumbet powe stugglig to wi popula allegiace.Accodig to the statebuildig appoach, a stog state

ca gathe ad distibute esouces, thus wiig heatsad mids. Moeoe, a poweul state will, by deitio,establish a political pesece, ad though the deelopmeto a ciil seice, police oces, ad militay uits is ableto exted its each dow to the lowest leels o society. ALeiatha-like state will theeoe be moe able to idetiyad emoe isugets ad othe amed oppoets whichtheate its goeace.

But couteisugecy-as-statebuildig is a deeplypoblematic stategy i applied to all cases. As a pacticalmatte, ebuildig (o moe ote, simply buildig) a West-e-style statethe oly kid we ca easoably claim tokow how to ceateis a omidable ad pehaps isu-

moutable challege, paticulaly ude the coditioso a ull-blow isugecy. Iaq ad Aghaista ae themost ecet examples o the ailues o couteisugecy-elated statebuildig. South vietamaely cosideedi the statebuildig liteatueis aothe. Fashioig aWeste-style state om the uis o a post-cofict polityalso pesets a dautig set o challeges o outside do-os. Moeoe, gie the ecet global ecoomic cisisad the wa-weaiess iduced by Iaq ad Aghaista,it seems ulikely that the Uited States will seek out eshstatebuildig esposibilities i the ea utue.

rebuildig a Weste-style state [...] is a omidable ad

pehaps isumoutable challege, paticulaly ude the

coditios o a ull-blow isugecy.

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Howee, the ecessity o couteig isugecies willemaicetaily o the theateed egimes themseles,but o the Uited States ad its allies as well. rathetha embak o massie eots to shoe up embattledicumbetsa maximalist appoachthe Uited Statesshould coside adoptig (o a case-by-case basis, o

couse) a miimalist stategy. At the coe o such a stategyis the decouplig o couteisugecy ad statebuildig.The mode wold, the athopologist Paul richadsobseed i 2005, has a loe aai with the cocept othe soeeig state. But acoss the global south, wheemay o the wolds iolet iteal coficts occu, thetaditioal cocept o the state is i eteat, iceasiglyhollowed out by oces aboe (e.g., globalizatio), adoces below (eg, ampat, almost idustial-scale cimi-ality ad couptio). The Uited States ad the esto the iteatioal commuity cotiues to maitaithe ctio that mee legal etities, like the Democaticrepublic o the Cogo, the Philippies, ad Pakista, ae

actual, uctioig states. Stog states, capable o liigup to the Webeia ideals o moopolizig iolece adexecisig cotol oe the etiety o thei atioal te-itoy, should be ecogized as epesetig a aspiatioathe tha a o-egotiable policy objectie.

What would such a ealizatio mea o the eolutioo US couteisugecy policy? While deelopig ayUS espose to isugecy, militay ad ciilia plaesmight coside whethe it would make sese to bypassstate stuctues (such as they ae), ad ocus istead oeal ad existig idigeous istitutios that could playa sigicat ole i couteig amed goups that ae iiolet oppositio to the state. Ude this ew appoach,goemet secuity oces would ot ecessaily hae

sole esposibility o op-posig amed goups whichopeate agaist the state.I some istaces, it maymake sese to delegatesome (o most) o this e-sposibility to what scholashae temed o-statutoyamed goups. I much othe deelopig wold, thestate is both uable aduwillig to esue publicsaety to ay meaigul

degee. Police oces, iplaces whee they exist, aetypically souces o iolece,couptio, ad isecuity,udecuttig ay claim othei cedibility as lawul,eectie istitutios. Filligthis public-saety acuumis a ich aay o eighbo-hood watch goups, ethicmilitias, igilates, amed

wigs o political paties, ad sometimes isugets. Ocouse, i some cases these o-statutoy amed goupsae themseles souces o isecuity. But i may istaces,these homegow, sel-help measues hae a geate le-gitimacy ad capacity tha state oces hae o ca expectto achiee.

A key task o couteisugecy plaes will beto detemie which goups ca ad should be egaged,ude which cicumstaces, o what puposes, ad atwhat pice. Agai, such decisios will hae to be made oa case-by-case basis, as thee ae sigicat costs, politicalad othewise, associated with the act o bypassig thestate. Suppotig ad leeagig o-state amed goupswill ieitably eode aleady low leels o state authoity,legitimacy, ad capacity. Moeoe, the suppot o amedgoups always caies with it the possibility o exacebat-ig cofict ad complicatig disamamet, demobiliza-tio, ad eitegatio eots. I some cicumstaces,the Uited States might judge these costs to be too high.

Whe such istaces occu, US suppot o ocial secuitystuctues o the kid adocated by the cuet DeeseDepatmet leadeship will be a bette couse o actio.

Ultimately, thee is othig teibly oel abouticopoatig the suppot o o-state oces ito cou-teisugecy. All o the majo couteisugecy pacti-tioes o the ieteeth ad twetieth cetuy ogaized,taied, ad equipped militias, tibal iegulas, adpaamilitay oces that opeated ude ayig degeeso state cotol. The histoy o US couteisugecy iseplete with such istaces. I vietam, o example, USSpecial Foces ogaized highlad ethic mioities itoa Ciilia Iegula Deese Goup to combat com-muist gueillas.

iq c cy g t cy t h th hdv ab pvc us t iq ct. a ptt cpt th g pcfct h bth us gvt dc t y p s tb t fght a Qd c.

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Counterinsurgency for the 21st CenturyI both Iaq ad Aghaista, thee hae bee idica-

tios that pagmatism has begu to tump ay ligeigHegelia eeece o the state. US militay oces, acedwith extemely iolet isugecies ad weak ad ecklesscetal goemets, hae looked to tibal oces as secu-

ity poides. As pat o the Awakeig moemet i Iaqamog the Sui tibal leades, the US militay assisted theSos o Iaq, a bottom-up ogoemetal secuity ocedesiged to combat Al Qaeda i Iaq. Ad i Aghaista,the militay wats to ally with tibes to ght the Talibaad to big law ad ode to the ast aeas o the cou-ty beyod the goemets authoity, accodig to aOctobe 2008 epot i the Chistia Sciece Moito.Although the Awakeig has geeally bee cosideeda success, it is a too soo to judge the tibal stategy iAghaista. While ocial US couteisugecy policyemais state-cetic, these appoaches ae impotat sigsthat a tasomatio may be ude way.

As suggested aboe, US couteisugecy stategyad policy should place a moe emphasis o demystiyigthe isuget udegoud. Without cladestiity, com-petet ad coheet amed esistace is impossible. Udea miimalist appoach, US assistace would ocus lesso buildig elaboate state stuctues that meet Westestadads ad moe o deelopig the meas to stip awayisuget sececy. To be sue, this may equie some state-buildig, gie the logical ole that police ad itelligeceagecies could play by iestigatig ad potetially il-tatig isuget black boxes. Howee, this is a ihe-etly moe modest etepise tha buildig o ebuildigthe boad age o state capacity taditioal US cou-teisugecy has etailed. Moeoe, the ole o expos-ig the udegoudshould ot alwaysbe coed to statesecuity oces. Isome istaces, o-state actos, such aseighbohood watchgoups, could play akey ole i idetiy-ig the cotous othe udegoud.

To hae ay ealeleace ad im-

pact, such assistacemust be based o amoe pooud u-destadig o howisuget goupsecuit, ogaize,ad opeate. Themult iple , highly aiegated ioletmilitat moemets

i places like Aghaista, Iaq, the Philippies, nigeia,ad Somalia emid us o the ich aay o idiidual adgoup motiatios, leadeship, ad opeatioal appoaches which chaacteize cotempoay isugecies. Moeudametally, we eed to deelop a deepe appeciatioo the isugets metal uiese. Beoe we ca poide

suppot, we eed to deote much moe cosideatio tothe questio o why, how, ad ude what cicumstacesidiiduals ete the udegoud, ad what happes tothem withi the coet wold. The emoal o sube-sio om its Cold-Wa ea aalytical mothballs, ad thedeotio o moe eegy to udestadig isuget itel-ligece opeatios, should be pat o a moe sophisticatedappoach to the isuget udegoud.

As a political-militay stategy, isugecy has edu-ig equiemets, such as the eed to ecuit, geeateesouces, ad acquie sae haes. But as with ay othehuma pheomeo, isugecy cotiues to eole. Audametal challege is to idetiy chages ad coti-

uities i cotempoay isugecy. To take just a ewexamples o the questios that eed to be exploed: Towhat extet does state suppota majo aspect o Cold-Wa ea isugecycotiue to exist, ad i what om?Does cimial actiity allow cotempoay isugecies tobecome sel-sustaiig? I opeatioal ad ogaizatioaltems, do Islamist isugecies die sigicatly om i-sugecies led by Maxist-Leiists? Is the mode city thegaeyad o eolutio, as Fidel Casto oce claimed,o is it essetial to ictoy i the amed stuggle? I thePetago is coect i its assessmet o the impotace oiegula waae, the aswes to these questios ae likelyto hae pooud opeatioal ad stategic eleace toutue militay stategy.

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nithr ar nor crim, aon or in combination, pro-ids an adquat concptua or ga mod or rspondingto th thrat currnty posd by a Qada and its aiats.

Th ooing sctions idntiy th scop and imits oth crimina a and th a o ar or ths purposs,and thn prsnt a ga ramork or countrtrrorismdtntion that both intgrats and suppmnts th to.

The Merits and Limits o Counterterrorism LawCrimina justic is th appropriat ga hic or

handing th buk o trrorist actiity. Th crimina ais not, hor, th appropriat mchanism or prnt-ing th most srious orms o trrorist attack, thos thatthratn catacysmic harm. A grounding prmis o th

Madeline Morris, Frances eberhard, and Michael watsula

On Sptmbr 11, 2001, A Qada opratisattackd ciiian and miitary targts onUS trritory, causing thousands o dathsand biions o doars in conomic oss.On Sptmbr 12, th Unitd Nations

Scurity Counci unanimousy adoptd Rsoution 1368charactrizing th attack by A Qada as a thrat tointrnationa pac and scurity and ritrating thright o stats to us armd orc in s-dns. NATO,or th rst tim in its history, inokd th obigationo cocti s-dns undr Artic 5 o th NATO

Traty. On Sptmbr 14, th US Congrss passd thAuthorization or th Us o Miitary Forc, authorizingth prsidnt to us a ncssary and appropriat orcagainst thos nations, organizations, or prsons hdtrmins pannd, authorizd, committd, or aidd thtrrorist attacks. Trrorism, concid unti thn as crim,as rconcidas ar.

Much o th dbat on US countrtrrorism poicyhas cntrd on th appropriat ros o th a o ar andth crimina a in th dtntion o indiiduas ngagd inarmd attacks against th Unitd Stats. In act, hor,

Madeline Morris P lw t

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On LibertyDtntion in N Forms o Armd Confict

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crimina a is that a socity can torat som rat osrious crim. Thr is, hor, no torab rat oth most srious orms o trrorism, hich may incudcatastrophic nucar, bioogica, or chmica attack, ora concrtd sris o conntiona attacks that is cumu-atiy catastrophic. Countrtrrorism dirctd to th

prntion o high-magnitud trrorist attacks rsts ona st o assumptions criticay dirnt rom thos o thcrimina a. Th qustion is on o th grounding prm-iss o th ntrpris. whi a Justic Dpartmnt ociamight spak proudy o th o rat o crim ast yar,h oud not spak proudy o th o rat o nucarattackunss it r zro.

w knon idntiary and procdura probmsimit th au o proscution or countrtrrorism. But thmost undamnta probmunpasant to articuatis th standard o proo. Crimina coniction rquirsproo byond a rasonab doubt. That standard shoudnot b rodd. Nor, hor, shoud it b appid to th

prntion o high-magnitud trrorism. Is it ray smartto ras an indiidua shon by car and conincingidnc (th standard, on stp bo rasonabdoubt usd in cii cass) to ha attmptd a nucarattack or a ras o smapox irus? I th ansr isno, thn crimina a is not th right too or prntingcatastrophic trrorism. This incompatibiity shoud not btakn to man that crimina justic is an inappropriat tooor countrtrrorism. Trrorism is not monoithic. Onyits most irunt orms arrant a dparturan initabycosty dparturrom th baanc struck, and th sa-guards aordd, by th crimina justic systm.

Private ActorsTh a o ar cannot

rscu us hr. la o aris comprisd o jus ad b-um, gorning rsort toth us o orc, and jus inbo, gorning conductin th us o orc. Jus adbellum cary prmits thus o orc by a stat in r-sponding to armd attack bya transnationa, priat actorsuch as A Qada. Butjus inbello ors no dnition o

th catgory o indiiduassubjct to such dtntion,and spcis no procdursor thir idntiication. Aschmatic xamination oth a o ar dmonstratshoand hyit is sintconcrning th standardsor idntiying th priatactors subjct to dtntionin an armd conict ith

a transnationa priat ntity. Thjus ad bellum right todtain priat actors is pain. Th UN Chartr stats:Nothing in th prsnt Chartr sha impair th inhrntright o . . . s-dnc i an armd attack occurs againsta Mmbr o th Unitd Nations. Consisting in a statsinhrnt right to dnd its rom attack, th right to

us orc in s-dns is not dpndnt on th sourc oth thrat but, rathr, appis quay to attack by a stator a transnationa priat actor. Forc is comprisd o thdua prongs o ionc and dtntion. Dtntion is notony an inhrnt incidnt o th us o orc, as rfctdin both US a and th intrnationa a o armd confict,but it is, in som circumstancs, an obigatory atrnatito kiing. But jus in bello, dsignd or intrstat armdconficts and (to a ssr xtnt) or cii ars ithin stats,is irtuay doid o contnt concrning th us o orcbtn a stat and a transnationa priat ntity. Jus inbello is composd o to parts: minimum standards o hu-man tratmnt appicab in a instancs o us o orc,

and a st o additiona and mor spcic rus appicabin armd conficts btn stats. Th ormrminimumstandards o human tratmntar basd on moraprincips hos binding natur is not conditiond uponrciproca conduct by th adrsary. Thos humanitarianstandards constitut aturs o customary intrnationaa that ar mbodid in Common Artic 3 o th GnaConntions o 1949 and aboratd in subsqunt tra-tis. By contrast, th spcic rus gorning intr-statconficts, mbodid in th ntirty o th Gna Conn-tions o 1949 (o hich ony Common Artic 3 appis tonon-intrnationa armd conficts), ar basd on rcip-roca agrmnts ntrd into by stats or thir mutuabnt. Thos rus xtnd byond undamnta mora

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subchaPter i

General ProVisionsSection 101. Defnitions

In this Act:(A) Catastrophic armd attack mans any attack, orsris o attacks, incuding cybr attacks, orsabyrsuting, singy or as a sris, in th dath o, or gri-ous bodiy injury to, N prsons or in th dstruction oproprty in xcss o C doars.(B) A prson ngaging in catastrophic armd attackmans an indiidua ho:

(1) prptrats or proids substantia support to thprptration o such catastrophic armd attack;(2) pans or attmpts or conspirs to prptrat orto proid substantia support to th prptration osuch catastrophic armd attack; or(3) manags, dircts, or supriss an organizationngaging in such catastrophic armd attack.

(C) Against th Unitd Stats mans against:(1) a targt ithin th trritory o th UnitdStats;(2) a aciity ond or opratd by th Unitd Statsgornmnt outsid th trritory o th UnitdStats; or(3) a nationa o th Unitd Stats.

subchaPter iiPersons subJect to

detention

Section 201. Persons Subject to Detentionunder This Act(A) A prson ngaging in catastrophic armd attackagainst th Unitd Stats sha b subjct to dtntionin accordanc ith this Act.(B) An indiidua dtaind by th Unitd Stats in mii-tary oprations outsid th trritory o th Unitd Stats,

in a thatr o ar in hich US miitary prsonn aractiy ngagd in hostiitis and in hich thr xistUS miitary dtntion or intrnmnt aciitis, sha bsubjct to dtntion or intrnmnt in such aciitis orth duration o thos hostiitis, in accordanc ith thproisions o Tit 10 U.S.C. and rguations promu-gatd thrundr, incuding [AR 190-8].

(1) I th commanding ocr o such miitary d-tntion or intrnmnt aciity has rason to bithat an indiidua dtaind in such aciity is a prson

ngaging in catastrophic armd attack against thUnitd Stats, as dnd in this Act, h sha conn

a Priminary Dtrmination Tribuna to dtrminhthr thr is probab caus to bi that thindiidua is a prson ngaging in catastrophicarmd attack against th Unitd Stats, as dndin this Act.(a) A Priminary Dtrmination Tribuna undr thisSubchaptr sha b conductd in accordanc ithArmy Rguation 190-8 xcpt that:

(i) th so dtrmination to b mad by thPriminary Dtrmination Tribuna sha b hthr thr is probaby caus to bithat th indiidua is a prson ngaging incatastrophic attack against th Unitd Stats,

as dnd in this Act; and(ii) th prsonn composing a PriminaryDtrmination Tribuna sha ha top scrtscurity caranc.

(b) I a Priminary Dtrmination Tribunaissus a nding o probab caus to bithat an indiidua is a prson ngagingin catastrophic armd attack against thUnitd Stats, that indiidua may b trans-portd to th trritory o th Unitd Statsand, thrupon, sha b subjct to criminaproscution or to dtntion in accordancith th proisions o this Act.

(C) An indiidua brought into th custody o th UnitdStats outsid th trritory o th Unitd Stats, undrcircumstancs othr than thos spcid in subsction(B) o this Subchaptr, ho is suspctd o commissiono a trrorist ons subjct to th crimina jurisdictiono th Unitd Stats or o bing a prson ngaging incatastrophic armd attack against th Unitd Stats, shab transportd, ithin T days, to th Unitd Stats and,thrupon, sha b subjct to crimina proscution or todtntion in accordanc ith th proisions o this Act.

subchaPter iiideterMinations

Section 301. Jurisdiction(A) Th district courts o th Unitd Stats sha haorigina jurisdiction or procdings undr this Sub-chaptr.

Section 302. Probable Cause Determination(A) Appication by th Attorny Gnra. Th Attorny

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Gnra o th Unitd Stats may mak appication to thcourt or a dtrmination o probab caus to bi thatth namd indiidua is a prson ngagd in catastrophicattack against th Unitd Stats.

Section 303. Provisional Detention(A) Upon issuanc o a dtrmination o probab causundr sction 302 o this Subchaptr, th namd indi-idua sha b proisionay dtaind pnding a dtntionharing undr sction 304 o this Subchaptr.

Section 304. Detention Hearing(A) expditious haring. A dtntion haring sha bconductd undr this sction ithin X days o th dat onhich th indiidua as proisionay dtaind pursuantto sction 303 o this Subchaptr.(B) Standard o Proo. Th burdn sha b upon thgornmnt to pro, by car and conincing idnc,

that th namd indiidua is a prson ngaging in cata-strophic attack against th Unitd Stats.(C) Rus o Procdur. Th dtntion haring shab conductd in accordanc ith th Fdra Rus oCii Procdur, xcpt as proidd in Sction 309 othis Subchaptr.(D) Rus o eidnc. Th d