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Hege mony Good/Bad

Heg Good – Nuclear War.........................................................................................................................................2Heg Good – Global War............................................................................................................................................3Heg Good – Global War............................................................................................................................................4Heg Good – Transition Wars....................................................................................................................................5Heg Good – Democracy............................................................................................................................................6Heg Good – Free Trade............................................................................................................................................7Heg Good – Warming...............................................................................................................................................8Heg Good – Peace....................................................................................................................................................9Heg Good – Laundry List........................................................................................................................................10Heg Good – Global Economy..................................................................................................................................11Heg Good – Global Economy..................................................................................................................................12Heg Good – Proliferation.......................................................................................................................................13Heg Good – Proliferation.......................................................................................................................................14Heg Good – Allied Proliferation..............................................................................................................................15Heg Good – Allied Proliferation..............................................................................................................................16Heg Good – Allied Proliferation..............................................................................................................................17Heg Good – A2: Multipolarity Better......................................................................................................................18Heg Good – A2: Multipolarity Solves......................................................................................................................19Heg Good – A2: Counter-Balancing........................................................................................................................20Heg Good – A2: Terrorism......................................................................................................................................21Heg Good – A2: Entanglement...............................................................................................................................22Heg Good – A2: Entanglement...............................................................................................................................23Heg Good – A2: Entanglement...............................................................................................................................24Heg Good – A2: Layne............................................................................................................................................25

Heg Bad – Entanglement........................................................................................................................................26Heg Bad – Entanglement........................................................................................................................................27Heg Bad – Offshore Balancing Good – War............................................................................................................28Heg Bad – Offshore Balancing Good – War............................................................................................................29Heg Bad – Counterbalancing..................................................................................................................................30Heg Bad – Terrorism..............................................................................................................................................31Heg Bad – Proliferation..........................................................................................................................................32Heg Bad – Blowback...............................................................................................................................................33Heg Bad – Multipolarity Good................................................................................................................................34Heg Bad – Interventionism.....................................................................................................................................35Heg Bad – A2: Transition Wars...............................................................................................................................36


Heg Good – Nuclear War

Collapse of US hegemony causes global nuclear wars.Robert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, 7-19-2007, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” RealClearPolitics, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/07/end_of_dreams_return_of_histor.html

The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying -- its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic. It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe 's stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war.

US leadership is key to prevent global nuclear war.Zalmay Khalilzad, Program director for strategy, doctrine, and force structure of RAND's Project AIR FORCE, Spring 1995, “Losing the Moment?” Washington Quarterly, p.84

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values - democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.


Heg Good – Global War

Maintaining US hegemony key to prevent global conflict and economic decline.Michael Auslin, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, 4-2-2010, “Three Strikes Against US Global Presence,” Fox News, http://www.aei.org/article/101869

For the past six decades, global stability was assured in large part by an expensive US commitment to maintain credible forces abroad, forge tight alliances with key strategic countries, and devote a significant, though not onerous, part of national treasure to sustaining a military second to none. Rarely in history has a country shouldered such burdens for so long, but the succeeding decades of growth and avoidance of systemic war proved the wisdom of the course. Are these three strikes the writing on the wall, the blueprint for how American power will decline in the world, with a whimper and an empty purse? The choice to reverse these trends will grow increasingly difficult in coming years, until we reach a point of no return, as did Great Britain and Rome. The result, unhappily, will not be a replay of the 20th century, when Washington stepped up after London's decline. It will almost certainly be the inauguration of decades, if not centuries, of global instability, increased conflict, and depressed economic growth and innovation. Such is the result of short-sighted policies that reflect political expedience, moral weakness, and a romantic belief in global fraternity. Happily for us, perhaps, is that the lessons of history still hold, and that we can chose to fight the dimming of our age if we but understand the stakes at hand.

Perceived decrease in US commitment to allies leads to a laundry list of regional and escalatory global conflictsRobert Lieber, Prof. Gov and Int’l. Affairs @ Georgetown U, 2005, The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century”, pg. 53-54

Withdrawal from foreign commitments might seem to be a means of evading hostility toward the United States, but the consequences would almost certainly be harmful both to regional stability and to U.S. national interests. Although Europe would almost certainly not see the return to competitive balancing among regional powers (i.e., competition and even military rivalry between France and Germany) of the kind that some realist scholars of international relations have predicted," elsewhere the dangers could increase. In Asia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would have strong motivation to acquire nuclear weapons – which they have the technological capacity to do quite quickly. Instability and regional competition could also escalate, not only between India and Pakistan, but also in Southeast Asia involving Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and possibly the Philippines. Risks in the Middle East would be likely to increase, with regional competition among the major countries of the Gulf region (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq) as well as Egypt, Syria, and Israel. Major regional wars, eventually involving the use of weapons of mass destruction plus human suffering on a vast scale, floods of refugees, economic disruption, and risks to oil supplies are all readily conceivable. Based on past experience, the United States would almost certainly be drawn back into these areas, whether to defend friendly states, to cope with a humanitarian catastrophe, or to prevent a hostile power from dominating an entire region. Steven Peter Rosen has thus fit-tingly observed, "If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive."2z Similarly, Niall Ferguson has added that those who dislike American predominance ought to bear in mind that the alternative may not be a world of competing great powers, but one with no hegemon at all. Ferguson's warning may be hyperbolic, but it hints at the perils that the absence of a dominant power, "apolarity," could bring "an anarchic new Dark Age of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic plunder and pillage in the world's forgotten regions; of economic stagnation and civilization's retreat into a few fortified enclaves.


Heg Good – Global War

1. U.S. leadership is strong now. A retreat from hegemony rocks the global economic systemRobert Kagan, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, August/September 2007, Policy Review, The Hoover Institution, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html, accessed 4/12/2008

Yet American predominance in the main categories of power persists as a key feature of the international system. The enormous and productive American economy remains at the center of the international economic system. American democratic principles are shared by over a hundred nations. The American military is not only the largest but the only one capable of projecting force into distant theaters. Chinese strategists, who spend a great deal of time thinking about these things, see the world not as multipolar but as characterized by “one superpower, many great powers,” and this configuration seems likely to persist into the future absent either a catastrophic blow to American power or a decision by the United States to diminish its power and international influence voluntarily.

2. US hegemony prevents global conflicts that would kill millions and go nuclearPeter Brookes, Senior Fellow at Heritage Foundation, July 4, 2006, Heritage Foundation Commentary, accessed 4/12/2008, http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed070406a.cfm

On security, the United States is the global balance of power. While it's not our preference, we are the world's "cop on the beat," providing critical stability in some of the planet's toughest neighborhoods. Without the U.S. "Globo-cop," rivals India and Pakistan might well find cause to unleash the dogs of war in South Asia - undoubtedly leading to history's first nuclear (weapons) exchange. Talk about Fourth of July fireworks . . .In Afghanistan, al Qaeda would still be an honored guest, scheming over a global caliphate stretching from Spain to Indonesia. It wouldn't be sending fighters to Iraq; instead, Osama's gang would be fighting them tooth and nail from Saudi Arabia to "Eurabia." In Asia, China would be the "Middle Kingdom," gobbling up democratic Taiwan and compelling pacifist Japan (reluctantly) to join the nuclear weapons club. The Koreas might fight another horrific war, resulting in millions of deaths. A resurgent Russia, meanwhile, would be breathing down the neck of its "near abroad" neighbors. Forget the democratic revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, Comrade! In Europe, they'd be taking orders from Paris or Berlin - if those rivals weren't at each other's throats again. In Africa, Liberia would still be under Charles Taylor's sway, and Sudan would have no peace agreement. And what other nation could or would provide freedom of the seas for commerce, including the shipment of oil and gas - all free of charge? Weapons of mass destruction would be everywhere. North Korea would be brandishing a solid nuclear arsenal. Libya would not have given up its weapons, and Pakistan's prodigious proliferator, A.Q. Khan, would still be going door to door, hawking his nuclear wares.

3. Hegemony deters great power wars throughout the globe.Bradley A. Thayer, Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, The National Interest, November 2006 - December 2006.

Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars.


Heg Good – Transition Wars

Decline of US hegemony causes a power vacuum – guarantees conflict and economic collapse.Niall Ferguson, professor of history at NYU and a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution, 6-21-2004, “The End of Power,” Wall Street Journal, http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110005244

But what if this view is wrong? What if the world is heading for a period when there is no hegemon? What if, instead of a balance of power, there is an absence of power? Such a situation is not unknown in history. Though the chroniclers of the past have long been preoccupied with the achievements of great powers--whether civilizations, empires or nation states--they have not wholly overlooked eras when power has receded. Unfortunately, the world's experience with power vacuums is hardly encouraging. Anyone who dislikes U.S. hegemony should bear in mind that, instead of a multipolar world of competing great powers, a world with no hegemon at all may be the real alternative to it. This could turn out to mean a new Dark Age of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic rapine in the world's no-go zones; of economic stagnation and a retreat by civilization into a few fortified enclaves.

There is no alternative to U.S. hegemony. A retreat from primacy leaves a more unstable worldRobert J. Lieber Professor, Government & International Affairs Department of government Georgetown University, October 10, 2007, Statement before the Committee on House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, CQ Congressional Testimony, p. np.

Effective alternatives to the role played by the United States are inadequate or absent altogether, and neither the United Nations, nor other international bodies such as the European Union, the African Union, the Arab league or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations offer an effective substitute. As Robert Kagan has observed, "American predominance does not stand in the way of progress toward a better world ... it stands in the way of regression toward a more dangerous world. In short, on the demand side, there is ample need for America's active engagement.

A Decrease in Hegemony would lead to wars and economic stagnationNiall Ferguson is Herzog professor of history at New York University's Stern School of Business and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, July 1, 2004 Foreign Policy http://www.foreignpolicy.com/users/login.php?story_id=2579&URL=http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=2579&print=1 Accessed April 18, 2009

The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy--from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai--would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemony--its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier--its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity--a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.


Heg Good – Democracy

US leadership key to global democracy – multipolarity fails.James Coady, European Union Section Director at the Henry Jackson Society, 10-20-2009, “The Bush Doctrine in Perspective,” http://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/stories.asp?id=1285

President Bush’s foreign policy was deeply unpopular. And it cannot be denied that his administration made serious mistakes in the foreign policy sphere, the lack of post-war planning in Iraq perhaps being the most obvious example. But the Bush doctrine’s aim of maintaining America’s global geopolitical superiority is one that should be welcomed. The editors of Foreign Policy succinctly summed up attitudes to US hegemony when they stated, “Either you believe that Uncle Sam is a benevolent bulwark against chaos or you see him as the all-powerful root of evil.” Those who subscribe to the latter view should consider the alternatives to assertive American global leadership. It is fashionable to label foreign policy during the Bush years as arrogant and hubristic. Yet a return to multipolarity would signify the emergence of a more volatile and dangerous international system hostile to democratic values. Resolute American leadership was invaluable in defeating the two greatest evils of the twentieth century in German National Socialism and Soviet Communism. It will be equally instrumental in managing the current and future threats of this century.

Democracy solves extinction.Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, December 1995, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/fr.htm)

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.

Unipolarity critical to democracy promotion – only way to leverage US influence.Jack Santucci, MA in Democracy and Governance Program and currently at the International Foundation for Electoral Systems , Winter 2010, “What is the Future of Democracy Promotion?” Democracy & Society, http://www.democracyandsociety.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/SantucciDemocracyPromotion7.1.pdf

With the end of superpower rivalry, the United States realized it could invest less in foreign countries and attach that investment to high moral ends. Governments in poor countries no longer could turn to the Soviets for subsidies. The Castro government in Cuba, for example, decided that the end of the Comecon necessitated a ``special period'' of national austerity. If a leader wanted foreign cash, he now had to govern the American way. Democracy promotion as we know it grew out of the unipolar moment. Sensing the untenable contradictions in state socialism, US decision-makers set up the National Endowment for Democracy and its ancillary party institutes. Francis Fukuyama declared ``the end of history,'' arguing the process of dialectical materialism had culminated in liberal democracy. With social evolution having selected out all other regime types, all that remained was to kill off the laggards. This was democracy promotion's theoretical mooring.


Heg Good – Free Trade

US hegemony key to free trade – enforces international laws and cooperation.David Brooks, co-founder of Politablog, 1-8-2010, “Realism and US Hegemony,” Politablog, http://www.politablog.com/david-brooks/realism-and-the-us-hegemony/

Realist thought has become commonplace among the policy makers in the United States. One of the central thoughts that run parallel to realist thought is hegemonic stability theory. This theory asserts that for the international system to function properly there must be a hegemon. The hegemon must be able to create and enforce international law and norms, set precedent in technological and military prowess and be willing to assume the role of world power. The world system will suffer without a hegemon because international laws cannot be enforced, trade slows down and financial centers collapse. The United States has assumed the role of hegemon since the collapse of the Soviet Union, since then there has been unprecedented economic cooperation, growth and security. With rational policy makers and sound economic policy the United States will remain the hegemon for many more years.

That’s key to prevent nuclear wars.Michael Spicer, economist and member of the British Parliament, 1996, The Challenge from the East and the Rebirth of the West, p. 121

The choice facing the West today is much the same as that which faced the Soviet bloc after World War II: between meeting head-on the challenge of world trade with the adjustments and the benefits that it will bring, or of attempting to shut out markets that are growing and where a dynamic new pace is being set for innovative production. The problem about the second approach is not simply that it won't hold: satellite technology alone will ensure that he consumers will begin to demand those goods that the East is able to provide most cheaply. More fundamentally, it will guarantee the emergence of a fragmented world in which natural fears will be fanned and inflamed. A world divided into rigid trade blocs will be a deeply troubled and unstable place in which suspicion and ultimately envy will possibly erupt into a major war. I do not say that the converse will necessarily be true, that in a free trading world there will be an absence of all strife. Such a proposition would manifestly be absurd. But to trade is to become interdependent, and that is a good step in the direction of world stability. With nuclear weapons at two a penny, stability will be at a premium in the years ahead.

Their unipolarity turns are wrong – US will use its hegemonic status to pursue multilateral institutionalism.G. John Ikenberry, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, 2005, “Power and liberal order: America’s postwar world order in transition,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, p.136

Finally, despite Washington's imperial temptation, the United States is not doomed to abandon rule-based order. This is true if only because the alternatives are ultimately unsustainable. A neo-imperial system of American rule – even the ‘hub and spoke’ version that currently holds sway in East Asia – is too costly, fraught with contradictions, and premised on an inflated accounting of American power. Likewise, there are an array of incentives and impulses that will persuade the United States to try to organize unipolarity around multilateral rules and institutions. The United States may want to renegotiate rules and institutions in some global areas, but it ultimately will want to wield its power legitimately in a world of rules and institutions. It will also have incentives to build and strengthen regional and global institutions in preparation for a future ‘after unipolarity’. The rising power of China, India, and other non-Western states presents a challenge to the old American-led order that will require new, expanded, and shared international governance arrangements.


Heg Good – Warming

1. US policies shape the global market – others will follow our lead on warmingJohn Podesta, Todd Stern, and Kit Batten, President, Managing Director for Energy and Environmental Policy, and Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, Capturing the Energy Opportunity, November 2007, Accessed May 15, 2008, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/11/pdf/energy_chapter.pdf

Second, the technologies needed to promote low-carbon economies are increasingly produced and sold in a global market. When America buys compact fluorescent lamps, most of them are made in China, so China automatically develops the manufacturing technology to use them domestically. When America requires that computers and TVs become more efficient, it affects the market in India and Africa. And conversely, when America lags in efficiency or renewable energy technology, either the rest of the world also lags or else other developed countries grab the market and control the export sales to the developing world.

2. US leadership key to Chinese and Indian action on global warmingSteve Kemper, Award-winning freelance journalist and recipient of a grant from the W. Alton Jones Foundation for environmental investigation, Environment: Yale Magazine, Fall 2007, Accessed May 14, 2008, http://environment.yale.edu/news/5510/plans-to-cap-greenhouse-gases-target-fossil/

Countries without such regulations, which currently include the United States, are the biggest international issue. Everyone agrees that action on CO2 by the United States ultimately will be irrelevant unless big up-and-coming polluters such as China and India follow suit and pass their own strict regulations. According to the National Commission on Energy Policy, China is opening a new coal-burning power plant every seven to 10 days. The International Energy Agency estimates that in 2009 – a decade ahead of previous estimates – China will surpass the United States as the world’s biggest emitter of CO2. India expects its coal consumption to triple over the next 30 to 40 years, says Repetto, who has started studying the issue. But neither China nor India is likely to do anything about CO2 unless the United States, which is responsible for the lion’s share of the accumulated greenhouse gases caused by fossil fuels, acts first.

3. US is lagging behind other nations – action is keyBryan Walsh, Environmental staff writer, Time, April 28, 2008, Accessed May 16, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/article/0,28804,1730759_1731383_1731363-1,00.html

We are now faced with a similarly momentous challenge: global warming. The steady deterioration of the very climate of our very planet is becoming a war of the first order, and by any measure, the U.S. is losing. Indeed, if we're fighting at all—and by most accounts, we're not—we're fighting on the wrong side. The U.S. produces nearly a quarter of the world's greenhouse gases each year and has stubbornly made it clear that it doesn't intend to do a whole lot about it. Although 174 nations ratified the admittedly flawed Kyoto accords to reduce carbon levels, the U.S. walked away from them. While even developing China has boosted its mileage standards to 35m.p.g., the U.S. remains the land of the Hummer. Oh, there are vague promises of manufacturing fuel from switchgrass or powering cars with hydrogen—someday. But for a country that rightly cites patriotism as one of its core values, we're taking a pass on what might be the most patriotic struggle of all. It's hard to imagine a bigger fight than one for the survival of the country's coasts and farms, the health of its people and the stability of its economy—and for those of the world at large as well.

4. US climate leadership causes other nations to fall in lineRobert N. Stavins, Professor of Business and Government at Harvard University, A US Cap-and-Trade System to Address Global Climate Change, October 2007, Accessed May 16, 2008, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/10climate_stavins/10_climate_stavins.pdf

Given these realities, a major strategic consideration in establishing U.S. climate policy should be to establish international credibility and lead other countries to take action. For this it is essential that the United States be perceived as taking on an equitable share of the burden. The proposal presented in this paper offers a way for the United States to demonstrate its commitment to an international solution while making its own real contribution to combating climate change.


Heg Good – Peace

1. History proves that US military power can prevent conflictDavid Talbot, January 3, 2002, Salon http://dir.salon.com/story/books/feature/2002/01/03/hawk/index.html, Accessed April 24, 2009

From the Gulf War on, the hawks have been on the right side in all the major debates about U.S. intervention in the world's troubles. The application of American military power -- to drive back Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, stop Slobodan Milosevic's genocidal campaigns in the Balkans, and destroy the terrorist occupation of Afghanistan -- has not just protected U.S. interests, it has demonstrably made the world safer and more civilized. Because of the U.S.-led allied victory in the Persian Gulf, Saddam -- the most blood-stained and dangerous dictator in power today -- was blocked from completing a nuclear bomb, taking control of 60 percent of the world's oil resources and using his fearsome arsenal (including biological and chemical weapons) to consolidate Iraq's position as the Middle East's reigning force. Because of the U.S.-led air war against Milosevic, the most ruthless "ethnic cleansing" program since the Holocaust was finally thwarted -- first in Bosnia and then in Kosovo -- and the repulsive tyrant is now behind bars in the Hague. And in Afghanistan, the apocalyptic master plan of the al-Qaida terror network was shattered by America's devastatingly accurate bombing campaign, along with the medieval theocracy that had thrown a cloak of darkness over the country. These demonstrations of America's awesome firepower were clearly on the right side of history. In fact, the country's greatest foreign policy disasters during this period occurred because the U.S. government failed to assert its power: when President George H. W. Bush aborted Operation Desert Storm before it could reach Baghdad and finish off Saddam (whose army had only two weeks of bullets left) and when he failed to draw a line against Milosevic's bloody plans for a greater Serbia; and when President Bill Clinton looked the other way while a genocidal rampage took the lives of a million people in Rwanda and when he failed to fully mobilize the country against terrorism after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the later attacks on American targets abroad -- a failure that extended through the first eight months of Bush II.

2. US primacy is key to prevent conflict escalationZbigniew Brezezinski, former secretary of state, Harvard International Review, 1998 http://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/sociopolitica/sociopol_chessboard.htm Accessed April 24, 2009

It is important to stress here both the fact of that indispensability and the actuality of the potential for global anarchy. The disruptive consequences of population explosion, poverty-driven migration, radicalizing urbanization, ethnic and religious hostilities, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction would become unmanageable if the existing and underlying nation-state-based framework of even rudimentary geopolitical stability were itself to fragment. Without sustained and directed American involvement, before long the forces of global disorder would come to dominate the world scene. And the possibility of such a fragmentation is inherent in the geopolitical tensions not only of today’s Eurasia but of the world more generally.

Low US Primacy results in massive power warsJoshua Muravchik, Professor of International Relations at Georgetown, Imperative of American Leadership, 1996, p. 30-31.

America is no longer small, nor is it just one power among others. Its power has largely shaped the world we know, and its decisive weight is the ballast that provides what stability the world of nations enjoys. Imagine for a moment the world of today without the United States or in which the United States withdrew into a policy of “fortress America.” We can predict that Japan would rearm, and probably, “go nuclear,” as would Germany. Russia, where everything else is going wrong, would be irresistibly tempted to compensate by exerting its chief asset, its supreme military power. Moderate Arab regimes would fall before the onslaught of Islamic radicalism, compelling Israel to puts its nuclear arsenal on a hair trigger. Competition and mutual distrust between China and Japan and between Russia and Germany would mount. Would World War III be very far from hand? What makes this scenario unlikely is the presence of America, which


gives some measure of security all around. The basis for world peace is that there is one preeminent power, and it is peaceful and non-aggrandizing.


Heg Good – Laundry List

Collapse of heg causes regional nuclear wars, massive proliferation, economic collapse and forces US reengagement. Robert J. Lieber, Professor of Government and International Affairs @ Georgetown University. The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century. 2005. Pg. 53-54.

Withdrawal from foreign commitments might seem to be a means of evading hostility toward the United States, but the consequences would almost certainly be harmful both to regional stability and to U.S. national interests. Although Europe would almost certainly not see the return to competitive balancing among regional powers (i.e., competition and even military rivalry between France and Germany) of the kind that some realist scholars of international relations have predicted,2’ elsewhere the dangers could increase. In Asia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would have strong motivation to acquire nuclear weapons — which they have the technological capacity to do quite quickly. Instability and regional competition could also escalate, not only between India and Pakistan, but also in Southeast Asia involving Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and possibly the Philippines. Risks in the Middle East would be likely to increase, with regional competi tion among the major countries of the Gulf region (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq) as well as Egypt, Syria, and Israel. Major regional wars, eventually involving the use of weapons of mass destruction plus human suffering on a vast scale, floods of refugees, economic disruption, and risks to oil supplies are all readily conceivable. Based on past experience, the United States would almost certainly be drawn back into these areas, whether to defend friendly states, to cope with a humanitarian catastrophe, or to prevent a hostile power from dominating an entire region. Steven Peter Rosen has thus fittingly observed, “If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive.”22 Similarly, Niall Ferguson has added that those who dislike American predominance ought to bear in mind that the alternative may not be a world of competing great powers, but one with no hegemon at all. Ferguson’s warning may be hyperbolic, but it hints at the perils that the absence of a dominant power, “apolarity,” could bring “an anarchic new Dark Age of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic plunder and pillage in the world’s forgotten regions; of economic stagnation and civilization’s retreat into a few fortified enclaves.”23

A weakened US would invite great transition wars.Stephen Brooks, Assistant Professor, AND William Wohlforth, Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth. Foreign Affairs, July / August 2002. “American Primacy in Perspective.”

These are not just facts about the current system; they are recognized as such by the major players involved. As a result, no global challenge to the United States is likely to emerge for the foreseeable future. No country, or group of countries, wants to maneuver itself into a situation in which it will have to contend with the focused enmity of the United States. Two of the prime causes of past great-power conflicts -- hegemonic rivalry and misperception -- are thus not currently operative in world politics. At the dawn of the twentieth century, a militarily powerful Germany challenged the United Kingdom's claim to leadership. The result was World War I. In the middle of the twentieth century, American leadership seemed under challenge by a militarily and ideologically strong Soviet Union. The result was the Cold War. U.S. dominance today militates against a comparable challenge, however, and hence against a comparable global conflict. Because the United States is too powerful to balance, moreover, there is far less danger of war emerging from the misperceptions, miscalculations, arms races, and so forth that have traditionally plagued balancing attempts. Pundits often lament the absence of a post -- Cold War Bismarck. Luckily, as long as unipolarity lasts, there is no need for one.


Heg Good – Global Economy

Hegemony is key to the global economyBradley Thayer, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, December, 2006, "In Defense of Primacy,” The National Interest, p. np

Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy.4 As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides. Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War--and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"--it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort. No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces. American generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg. THERE IS no other state, group of states or international organization that can provide these global benefits. None even comes close. The United Nations cannot because it is riven with conflicts and major cleavages that divide the international body time and again on matters great and trivial. Thus it lacks the ability to speak with one voice on salient issues and to act as a unified force once a decision is reached. The EU has similar problems. Does anyone expect Russia or China to take up these responsibilities? They may have the desire, but they do not have the capabilities. Let's face it: for the time being, American primacy remains humanity's only practical hope of solving the world's ills.


Heg Good – Global Economy

Heg prevents global economic collapseStephen Walt, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. “American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls.” Naval War College Review, Spring 2002.

By facilitating the development of a more open and liberal world economy, American primacy also fosters global prosperity. Economic interdependence is often said to be a cause of world peace, but it is more accurate to say that peace encourages interdependence-by making it easier for states to accept the potential vulnerabilities of extensive international intercourse.10 Investors are more willing to send money abroad when the danger of war is remote, and states worry less about being dependent on others when they are not concerned that these connections might be severed. When states are relatively secure, they will also be less fixated on how the gains from cooperation are distributed. In particular, they are less likely to worry that extensive cooperation will benefit others more and thereby place them at a relative disadvantage over time.11 By providing a tranquil international environment, in short, U.S. primacy has created political conditions that are conducive to expanding global trade and investment. Indeed, American primacy was a prerequisite for the creation and gradual expansion of the European Union, which is often touted as a triumph of economic self-interest over historical rivalries. Because the United States was there to protect the Europeans from the Soviet Union and from each other, they could safely ignore the balance of power within Western Europe and concentrate on expanding their overall level of economic integration. The expansion of world trade has been a major source of increased global prosperity, and U.S. primacy is one of the central pillars upon which that system rests.12 The United States also played a leading role in establishing the various institutions that regulate and manage the world economy. As a number of commentators have noted, the current era of "globalization" is itself partly an artifact of American power. As Thomas Friedman puts it, "Without America on duty, there will be no

America Online."13

Heg key to economic growth and solving povertyBradley Thayer, Associate Professor at Missouri State University, 2007, "The Case For The American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, Published by Routledge.

Economic prosperity is also a product of the American Empire. It has created a Liberal International Economic Order (LIEO)—a network of worldwide free trade and commerce, respect for intellectual property rights, mobility of capital and labor markets—to promote economic growth. The stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly states in the Third World. The American Empire has created this network not out of altruism but because it benefits the economic well-being of the United States. In 1998, the Secretary of Defense William Cohen put this well when he acknowledged that “economists and soldiers share the same interest in stability”; soldiers create the conditions in which the American economy may thrive, and “we are able to shape the environment [of international politics] in ways that are advantageous to us and that are stabilizing to the areas where we are forward deployed, thereby helping to promote investment and prosperity... business follows the flag.” Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the American Empire comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat, researcher at the World Bank, prolific author, and now a professor who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India that strongly condemned empire. He has abandoned the position of his youth and is now one of the strongest proponents of the American Empire. Lal has traveled the world and, in the course of his journeys, has witnessed great poverty and misery due to a lack of economic development. He realized that free markets were necessary for the development of poor countries, and this led him to recognize that his faith in socialism was wrong. Just as a conservative famously is said to be a liberal who has been mugged by reality, the hard “evidence and experience” that stemmed from “working and traveling in most parts of the Third World during my professional career” caused this profound change.61 Lal submits that the only way to bring relief to the desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the American Empire. Empires provide order, and this order “has been essential for the working of the benign processes of globalization, which promote prosperity .”


Heg Good – Proliferation

Unipolarity key to contain the spread of WMD.Charles Krauthammer, winner of the Pulitzer Prize for commentary and syndicated columnist for the Washington Post, Winter 2002/2003, “The Unipolar Moment Revisted,” The National Interest, p.17

The new unilateralism argues explicitly and unashamedly for maintaining unipolarity, for sustaining America’s unrivaled dominance for the foreseeable future. It could be a long future, assuming we successfully manage the single greatest threat, namely, weapons of mass destruction in the hands of rogue states. This in itself will require the aggressive and confident application of unipolar power rather than falling back, as we did in the 1990s, on paralyzing multilateralism. The future of the unipolar era hinges on whether America is governed by those who wish to retain, augment and use unipolarity to advance not just American but global ends, or whether America is governed by those who wish to give it up—either by allowing unipolarity to decay as they retreat to Fortress America, or by passing on the burden by gradually transferring power to multilateral institutions as heirs to American hegemony. The challenge to unipolarity is not from the outside but from the inside. The choice is ours. To impiously paraphrase Benjamin Franklin: History has given you an empire, if you will keep it.

Withdrawal of US forces causes quick allied and rogue proliferationStephen Peter Rosen, Professor of National Security at Harvard, Spring 2003, “An Empire if you can Keep it,” National Interest, pg. np

Rather than wrestle with such difficult and unpleasant problems, the United States could give up the imperial mission, or pretensions to it, now. This would essentially mean the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the Middle East, Europe and mainland Asia. It may be that all other peoples, without significant exception, will then turn to their own affairs and leave the United States alone. But those who are hostile to us might remain hostile, and be much less afraid of the United States after such a withdrawal. Current friends would feel less secure and, in the most probable post-imperial world, would revert to the logic of self-help in which all states do what they must to protect themselves. This would imply the relatively rapid acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Iraq and perhaps Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia and others. Constraints on the acquisition of biological weapons would be even weaker than they are today. Major regional arms races would also be very likely throughout Asia and the Middle East. This would not be a pleasant world for Americans, or anyone else. It is difficult to guess what the costs of such a world would be to the United States. They would probably not put the end of the United States in prospect, but they would not be small. If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive.


Heg Good – Proliferation

1. HARD POWER IS THE ONLY WAY TO MOTIVATE NONPROLIFERATIONCharles Krauthammer, Pulitzer Prize Winning Columnist for the Washington Post and Recipient of the 2004 Irving Kristol Award from the American Enterprise Institute, Spring 2004.“Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World”, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, Accessed May 5, 2004, http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040227_book755text.pdf.

Moral suasion? Was it moral suasion that made Qaddafi see the wisdom of giving up his weapons of mass destruction? Or Iran agree for the first time to spot nuclear inspections? It was the suasion of the bayonet. It was the ignominious fall of Saddam—and the desire of interested spectators not to be next on the list. The whole point of this treaty was to keep rogue states from developing chemical weapons. Rogue states are, by definition, impervious to moral suasion.

2. PREEMPTION BOLSTERS DETERRENCE AGAINST PROLIFERATIONDanielle Pletka, Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute, January 30, 2004.“Pre-emption is Effective Tool”, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, Accessed August 8, 2004, http://www.aei.org/news/filter.foreign,newsID.19819/news_detail.asp.

The rogues of the world are seeking or have developed WMD. Al-Qaeda has made clear repeatedly that it hopes to acquire and use WMD. These hateful regimes also firmly believe that possessing WMD would deter attacks from the United States and others. Iraq should have taught them that the reverse is true. Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi figured out that having WMD posed a greater danger to him than not having them. Bush's national security doctrine and the threat of pre-emption it contains are warnings to dictators and terrorists: WMD will not protect you. They could make you an intolerable risk to the international community.

3. DETERRENCE FAILS – PREEMPTION IS NEEDED TO PREVENT DESTRUCTIVE TERRORISMCharles Krauthammer, Pulitzer Prize Winning Columnist for the Washington Post and Recipient of the 2004 Irving Kristol Award from the American Enterprise Institute, Spring 2004.“Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World”, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, Accessed May 5, 2004, http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040227_book755text.pdf.

In a world of terrorists, terrorist states and weapons of mass destruction, the option of preemption is especially necessary. In the bipolar world of the Cold War, with a stable nonsuicidal adversary, deterrence could work. Deterrence does not work against people who ache for heaven. It does not work against undeterrables. And it does not work against undetectables: nonsuicidal enemy regimes that might attack through clandestine means—a suitcase nuke or anonymously delivered anthrax. Against both undeterrables and undetectables, preemption is the only possible strategy.

4. PREEMPTION ENHANCES DETERRENCE OF ACQUIRING WEAPONS – LIBYA PROVESCharles Krauthammer, Pulitzer Prize Winning Columnist for the Washington Post and Recipient of the 2004 Irving Kristol Award from the American Enterprise Institute, Spring 2004. “Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World”, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, Accessed May 5, 2004, http://www.aei.org/docLib/20040227_book755text.pdf.

Moreover, the doctrine of preemption against openly hostile states pursuing weapons of mass destruction is an improvement on classical deterrence. Traditionally, we deterred the use of WMDs by the threat of retaliation after we’d been attacked—and that’s too late; the point of preemption is to deter the very acquisition of WMDs in the first place. Whether or not Iraq had large stockpiles of WMDs, the very fact that the United States overthrew a hostile regime that repeatedly refused to come clean on its weapons has had precisely this deterrent effect.


Heg Good – Allied Proliferation

Perceptions of US strategic reliability is the most important factor security calculation for allied proliferationKurt Campbell, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 20

Perhaps the most important ingredient in a new international calculation of the attractiveness-or perceived necessity-of acquiring nuclear weapons is the questions of the future direction of U.S. foreign and security policy. For decades U.S. friends and allies-such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Germany, Egypt, and others- have come to depend on several aspects of American policy when making calculations about their own security and the question of forswearing nuclear weapons. These aspects include the stability of the American nuclear deterrent and U.S. security guarantees; U.S. rhetorical commitment to, active pursuit of, and participation in global non-proliferation policies and regimes; Amer- ican restraint in publicly contemplating the use of nuclear weapons, particularly against a state that does not possess weapons of mass destruction; and U.S. commitments not to decouple U.S. security from that of its allies through the development of defensive systems. A number of recent developments may suggest directional changes in some of these areas. And indeed, it is precisely the anxieties associated with such new directions in American security policy that potentially could spur some serious reconsideration of formerly forsworn nuclear options.

Credibility and reliability of US security guarantees are keyPaul Brown, Colonel in the US Army, 2008, U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENCE POLICY: DO WE HAVE IT RIGHT?, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA481521

The NPR introduces four defense policy goals (ends) to our nuclear strategy. Those objectives are first, to assure our friends and allies that the U.S. nuclear capability is a deterrence measure for their security as well as ours. The desire of this goal is to reduce incentives for our non-nuclear allies to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. The credibility and reliability of U.S. nuclear assurances are necessary to keep countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey from reconsidering their decisions to be non-nuclear states. The second goal is to deter aggressors from attacking the U.S. or our allies with WMD. The third goal is to dissuade competitors from acquiring WMD, and the fourth goal is to defeat our enemies decisively. The 2006 National Military Strategy to Combat WMD (NMS-WMD) gives additional indication as to our nuclear weapons strategy. It states that we may use both conventional and nuclear responses to deter or defeat a WMD threat or subsequent use of WMD. The objective in the NMS-WMD expands the NPR by stating that the Military Strategic Objectives are to Defeat, Deter – Protect, Respond, Recover – Defend, Dissuade, Deny – Reduce, Destroy, and Reverse. It adds goals to respond and recover from attacks and includes objectives to prevent enemies from gaining materials to acquire WMD.

Even small changes are widely perceived and incorporated into proliferation decisionsKurt Campbell, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 23

Certainly, the United States is not the only factor in the calculations countries make about their own security, but it is a major one. The policies and actions of the most powerful and influential country in the world affect every nation and have an impact on everything from global and regional security to economic stability, international norms and practices, and the sustainability of whatever global consensus exists. Much like the brilliant (or simply martinet) professor whose students write down his every sneeze or cough lest they miss something that will be on the final exam, U .S. actions are closely observed, noted, and inter- preted by states around the world. American policy can, sometimes inadvertently, increase or decrease confidence substantially -a key component in any country's evaluation of whether--or when-a nuclear capability is required.



Perceived decrease in US deterrence credibility causes fast proliferation in multiple hotspots – no risk of a turn from rogue proliferationKurt Campbell, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security and Robert Einhorn, senior adviser in the CSIS International Security Program, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 321

Given the unprecedented power and influence of the United States today, what it says and does will have a significant impact on the nuclear behavior of individual countries. For example, although a severe new security threat (especially a new nuclear threat) would strongly motivate a country to reconsider its nuclear renunciation, such a threat probably would not be sufficient to elicit this reaction if the country has an American security guarantee that is not perceived to be weakening . Thus as long as the U.S. nuclear umbrella remains credible and U.S. relations with Japan and South Korea remain strong, even a nuclear-armed North Korea would not necessarily lead these two countries to decide to acquire nuclear capabilities of their own. The case studies suggest that the perceived reliability of U.S. security assurances will be a critical factor, if not the critical factor, in whether such countries as Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey reconsider their nuclear options. It is noteworthy that both Taiwan and South Korea became most interested in pursuing nuclear weapons programs in the mid-to-late 1970s, a time when the United States appeared to have adopted a pot icy of security disengagement or detachment from East Asia following the huml1iation of the Vietnam War. (Germany, which currently does not face a serious threat to its security, has the luxury of having both a U.S. nuclear guarantee and dose ties with other nuclear weapons states through NATO and the EU.)

Decreased US commitments triggers quick and widespread proliferationMarc Dean Millot, Senior Social Scientist @ RAND, 1994, “Facing the Emerging Reality of Regional Nuclear Adversaries,” Washington Quarterly, pg. np

If the allies of the United States come to believe that it no longer shares their view of regional security, is no longer automatically committed to their defense, can no longer be counted as prudent, and may suffer from a paralytic fear of nuclear conflict, the burden of proof in any debate over national security in any allied capital will shift to those who argue for continuing to rely on U.S. security guarantees. Decisions to pursue national nuclear weapons programs may not be far behind. The Disintegration of U.S. Alliances Will Exacerbate Regional Military Instability The lack of credible security assurances will push allies of the United States toward nuclear arsenals of their own to restore the military equilibrium upset by their local nuclear adversaries or by more general regional nuclear instabilities. These allies may well see a realization of their virtual nuclear arsenal as the only alternative to losing all influence over their own national security. This development, however, would lead down a worrisome path, with dangerous implications for regional stability and ultimately for the security of the United States itself.



Perception of US isolationism encourages allied proliferationZalmay Khalilzad, Former Professor of Political Science at Columbia and Director of Project Air Force at RAND, Current US Ambassador to Iraq, Spring 1995, “Losing the Moment?,” Washington Quarterly, pg. np

Maintaining the zone of peace requires, first and foremost, avoiding conditions that can lead to renationalization of security policies in key allied countries such as Japan and Germany. The members of the zone of peace are in basic agreement and prefer not to compete with each other in realpolitik terms. But this general agreement still requires U.S. leadership. At present there is greater nervousness in Japan than in Germany about future ties with Washington, but U.S. credibility remains strong in both countries. The credibility of U.S. alliances can be undermined if key allies such as Germany and Japan believe that the current arrangements do not deal adequately with threats to their security. It could also be undermined if, over an extended period, the United States is perceived as either lacking the will or the capability to lead in protecting their interests.

Perceptions of US security decline encourages allied proliferationMichael Swaine, et al, Senior Associate and Co-Director of the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century, 1998, pg. 54-55

The third vital interest is to ensure the survival of American allies— critical for a number of reasons. The first and most obvious reason is that the United States has treaty obligations to two important Asian states, Japan and South Korea. While meeting these obligations is necessary to maintain the credibility of the United States in the international arena, it is consequential for directly substantive reasons as well. In both instances, the assurance of U.S. protection has resulted in implicit bargains that are indispensable to the American conception of stable international order. Thanks to American security guarantees, South Korea and Japan have both enjoyed the luxury of eschewing nuclear weapons as guarantors of security. Should American protective pledges be seen as weakening, the temptation on the part of both states to resurrect the nuclear option will increase—to the consequent detriment of America’s global antiproliferation policy. Equally significant, however, is that Japan, and possibly South Korea as well, would of necessity have to embark on a significant conventional build-up, especially of maritime and air forces. The resulting force posture would in practice be indistinguishable from a longrange power-projection capability possessing offensive orientation. Even if such forces are developed primarily for defensive purposes, they will certainly give rise to new security dilemmas regionwide that in turn would lead to intensive arms-racing, growing suspicions, and possibly war.

Unpredictable change in policy freaks out our allies – causes proliferationKurt Campbell, PhD, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of the Center for a New American Security, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point, pg. 22

It is worth pointing out that perceived U.S. unilateralismn could cut both ways. If U.S. actions are seen as necessary to cope with perceived lnterna.tlonal security threats, Such efforts could allay Concerns of friends and allies and demonstrate that the U.S. is willing to tackle tough security problems. Strong action against North Korea for example will reassure Asian .friends, most notably Japan and South Korea. Still, 'predictability over time is key-you never know when the unilateralism will break for or against you. So the United States must be careful to balance a tough stance with international norms; even subtle changes in nuclear doctrine and deployments can have dramatic unintended consequences among U.S. allies and friends.


Heg Good – A2: Multipolarity Better

Multipolarity comparatively increases conflict – history proves.William C. Wohlforth, Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, January 2009, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics, p.56

The evidence suggests that narrow and asymmetrical capabilities gaps foster status competition even among states relatively confident of their basic territorial security for the reasons identified in social identity theory and theories of status competition. Broad patterns of evidence are consistent with this expectation, suggesting that unipolarity shapes strategies of identity maintenance in ways that dampen status conflict. The implication is that unipolarity helps explain low levels of military competition and conflict among major powers after 1991 and that a return to bipolarity or multipolarity would increase the likelihood of such conflict.

Unipolarity key to reduce great power competition and conflict.William C. Wohlforth, Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, January 2009, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics, p.52

As Figure 1 in the introduction to this issue illustrates, the great power subsystem is currently stratified at the top to a degree not seen since the modern international system took shape in the seventeenth century. The foregoing analysis suggests a plausible answer to the question of unipolarity’s implications for great power conflict: that a symmetrically top-heavy distribution of capabilities will dampen status competition, reducing or removing important preconditions for militarized rivalry and war. A unipole will provide a salient out-group comparison for elites in other major powers, but its symmetrical material preponderance will induce them to select strategies for identity maintenance that do not foster overt status conflict. And because its material dominance makes its status as number one relatively secure, the unipole itself has the option to adopt policies that seek to ameliorate status dissonance on the part of second-tier powers.

Unipolarity is comparatively less conflict-prone – no incentive for costly competition.William C. Wohlforth, Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, January 2009, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics, p.30

Unipolarity thus generates far fewer incentives than either bipolarity or multipolarity for direct great power positional competition over status. Elites in the other major powers continue to prefer higher status, but in a unipolar system they face comparatively weak incentives to translate that preference into costly action. And the absence of such incentives matters because social status is a positional good—something whose value depends on how much one has in relation to others. “If everyone has high status,” Randall Schweller notes, “no one does.” While one actor might increase its status, all cannot simultaneously do so. High status is thus inherently scarce, and competitions for status tend to be zero sum.


Heg Good – A2: Multipolarity Solves

Nuclear weapons make multipolarity uniquely likely to cause massive nuclear wars. James Wirtz, Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval Post-graduate School, “Beyond Bipolarity: Prospects for Nuclear Stability After the Cold War,” The Absolute Weapon Revisited, ed. Paul, Harknett, and Wirtz, 1998, p. 151-153

Nuclear multipolarity suggests that in the future, nuclear alliances might be formed by several nuclear powers to advance their interests or to increase their overall nuclear capability. These political relationships also might emerge if smaller nuclear powers attempt to link their arsenals to one of the nuclear great powers. If this occurred, nuclear weapons might take on an increasingly important role in global affairs; monitoring and adjusting the nuclear balance could become more salient to policymakers. And politics, especially alliance politics, could cast a long shadow in a multipolar nuclear world. Balance of power politics would be transformed into nuclear balance of power politics. During the Cold War, alliances, at least from the superpower perspective, mattered little in the strategic nuclear balance, but nuclear alliances would matter in a future situation characterized by a growing number of relatively small nuclear powers. In other words, because nuclear arsenals would be less robust, changes brought about by shifting alliances would have a greater impact on the survivability or adequacy (an ability to cover an expanding target set) of nuclear forces. Moreover, politicians and officers might be forced to monitor a changing nuclear landscape not by calculating the nuclear forces that might be deployed by an opponent in the distant future, but by assessing the possibility that opposing coalitions could quickly form. Thus, there is a distinct possibil ity that nuclear multipolarity would be extremely crisis-unstable: literally overnight, a coalition could form that possesses a first-strike capability against a smaller coalition or a single state. Under these circumstances, the weaker party might consider starting a preventive war before the larger coalition could launch a coordinated attack.

Multipolarity causes great power conflict, regional arms races, economic collapse, resource conflict, and global warming.Christopher Layne, prof at Texas A&M, Summer, 2009, “The Waning of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security, p. np

What will multipolarity mean? The NIC's answer is equivocal. Although it predicts that, along with Europe, new great powers will oppose a continuation of a U.S.-dominated unipolar system, Global Trends 2025 does not anticipate that the emerging great powers will seek to radically alter the international system as Germany and Japan did in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (p. 84). 20 Still, there are factors that could lead to a more fraught international environment, including: the declining credibility of U.S. extended deterrence security guarantees, which could fuel new regional arms races (p. 97); competition for control of natural resources--especially energy--which could drive great power competitions (pp. 63-66) 21; and fallout from the financial and economic crisis, which could cause the international economic system to become more mercantilist (pp. 93-94). Finally, in a multipolar world, established international institutions may not be able to deal with the challenges posed by economic and financial turmoil, energy scarcity, and global climate change. In such a world, a nonhegemonic United States will lack the capability to revitalize them (p. 81). Although no one can be certain how events will unfold in coming decades, Global Trends 2025 makes a strong argument that a multipolar world will be fundamentally different than the post-Cold War era of U.S. preeminence.

Offshore balancing impossible – public opposition.Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Professor of Political Science at Tufts University. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, vol.31:2 summer 2007. “Hegemonic Delusions: Power, Liberal Imperialism, and the Bush Doctrine.” http://fletcher.tufts.edu/forum/archives/pdfs/31-2pdfs/Taliaferro.pdf

Second, many of Layne’s arguments about the feasibility of an offshore balancing strategy today seem disconnected from political reality. He devotes only five pages in a 290-page book to a discussion of how the United States ought to go about implementing his preferred strategy. He never grapples with the tremendous sunk costs of U.S. forward deployment in Europe and East Asia, nor does he consider the lack of support for such a radically different grand strategy among officials in Washington or the American people. It is also difficult to imagine Washington’s allies in the Persian Gulf, East Asia, and even Western Europe openly advocating the withdrawal of all U.S. forces in the near future, if for no other reason than that the American military presence dampens the security dilemma in those three regions.


Heg Good – A2: Counter-Balancing

No evidence for counter-balancing – even soft-balancing is overblown.Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, Assistant Professor and Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, Summer 2005, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing,” International Security, http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govt/docs/BrooksWohlforth-2005-IS%20article.pdf

We conclude that although states do periodically undertake actions that end up constraining the United Sates, the soft-balancing argument does not help to explain this behavior. There is no empirical basis for concluding that U.S. power, and the security threat that potentially inheres in it, has influenced recent constraint actions undertaken by the other major powers. Our examination therefore provides further confirmation of the need for analysts to move beyond the familiar but misleading precepts of balance of power theory. Instead, new theorizing is needed that is more appropriate for understanding security relations in today’s unipolar era.

US hegemony not causing balancing – decreased US power will causes other states to build up capabilities.Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, Assistant Professor and Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, Summer 2005, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing,” International Security, http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govt/docs/BrooksWohlforth-2005-IS%20article.pdf

Although this incentive for enhancing capabilities concerns security and is directly connected to U.S. policy, it has nothing to do with balancing. Balancing, whether hard or soft, is about protection from the security threat emanating directly from a potential hegemon. If it means anything, the soft balancing argument must predict that less U.S. power and lower involvement will reduce incentives for other states to gain relative power. If bargaining rather than balancing is in play, however, then there is no reason to believe that shrinking either U.S. power or the level of its global engagement would reduce other states’ incentives to build up their capabilities. On the contrary, a precipitous U.S. withdrawal from the world—as neo-isolationists are now calling for—could generate new security dynamics that produce much greater incentives for other powers to increase their capabilities.

Unipolarity solves the impact to counter-balancing – US will de-escalate conflicts.William C. Wohlforth, Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, January 2009, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics, pp.53-54

Given its material dominance and activist foreign policy, the United States is a salient factor in the identity politics of all major powers, and it plays a role in most regional hierarchies. Yet there is scant evidence in U.S. foreign policy discourse of concerns analogous to late cold war perceptions of a Soviet “thrust to global preeminence” or mid-nineteenth century British apprehensions about Tsar Nicholas’s “pretensions to be the arbiter of Europe.” Even when rhetoric emanating from the other powers suggests dissatisfaction with the U.S. role, diplomatic episodes rich with potential for such perceptions were resolved by bargaining relatively free from positional concerns: tension in the Taiwan Strait and the 2001 spy plane incident with China, for example, or numerous tense incidents with Russia from Bosnia to Kosovo to more recent regional disputes in post-Soviet Eurasia. On the contrary, under unipolarity U.S. diplomats have frequently adopted policies to enhance the security of the identities of Russia, China, Japan, and India as great (though second-tier) powers, with an emphasis on their regional roles. U.S. officials have urged China to manage the six-party talks on North Korea while welcoming it as a “responsible stakeholder” in the system; they have urged a much larger regional role for Japan; and they have deliberately fostered India’s status as a “responsible” nuclear power. Russia, the country whose elite has arguably confronted the most threats to its identity, has been the object of what appear to be elaborate U.S. status-management policies that included invitations to form a partnership with NATO, play a prominent role in Middle East diplomacy (from which Washington had striven to exclude Moscow for four decades), and to join the rich countries’ club, the G7 (when Russia clearly lacked the economic requisites). Status management policies on this scale appear to be enabled by a unipolar structure that fosters confidence in the security of the United States’ identity as number one. The United States is free to buttress the status of these states as second-tier great


powers and key regional players precisely because it faces no serious competition for overall system leadership.


Heg Good – A2: Terrorism

Unipolarity best solves terrorism – transition won’t solve, leadership key to effective solutions.Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, Assistant Professor and Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, July-August 2002, “American Primacy in Perspective,” Foreign Affairs, p.30

Some might question the worth of being at the top of a unipolar system if that means serving as a lightning rod for the world's malcontents. When there was a Soviet Union, after all, it bore the brunt of Osama bin Laden's anger, and only after its collapse did he shift his focus to the United States (an indicator of the demise of bipolarity that was ignored at the time but looms larger in retrospect). But terrorism has been a perennial problem in history, and multipolarity did not save the leaders of several great powers from assassination by anarchists around the turn of the twentieth century. In fact, a slide back toward multipolarity would actually be the worst of all worlds for the United States. In such a scenario it would continue to lead the pack and serve as a focal point for resentment and hatred by both state and nonstate actors, but it would have fewer carrots and sticks to use in dealing with the situation. The threats would remain, but the possibility of effective and coordinated action against them would be reduced.

Reducing hegemony won’t prevent terrorism.Joseph S. Nye Jr., Professor of International Relations at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2002, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go it Alone, p.x-xi

Some Americans are tempted to believe that we could reduce these hatreds and our vulnerability if we would withdraw our troops, curtail our alliances, and follow a more isolationist foreign policy. But isolationism would not remove our vulnerability. Not only are the terrorists who struck on September 11 dedicated to reducing American power, but in the words of Jordan’s King Abdallah, “they want to break down the fabric of the U.S. They want to break down what America stands for.” Even if we had a weaker foreign policy, such groups would resent the power of the American economy, which would still reach well beyond our shores. American corporations and citizens represent global capitalism, which is anathema to some.

Hegemony doesn’t discourage cooperation against terrorism.Stephen Walt, professor of international affairs at Harvard University, January 2009, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” World Politics, p.114

Last but not least, the heightened fear of international terrorism in the wake of September 11 provides smaller states with yet another incentive for close collaboration with the world’s most powerful country. Whatever their other differences may be, most governments are understandably hostile to nonstate movements whose avowed aim is to overthrow existing regimes and foment international conflict and whose preferred tactic is mass violence against innocent civilians. Cooperation against al-Qaeda or its affiliates may fall well short of full alignment, but the shared fear of terrorism does provide another reason for states to overlook their concerns about U.S. power and their reservations about U.S. policies and instead to collaborate with Washington against the shared terrorist danger


Heg Good – A2: Entanglement

Draw-in means you can’t solve entanglement – only Heg prevents it from escalatingMichael Hirsch, Senior Editor of the Washington Bureau, 2003, At War With Ourselves, P. 10-11

Yes, it is possible. But first we must cross a psychological threshold ourselves. We need to grasp what many other nations already understand: the meaning of America in today’s world. Despite a century of intense global engagement, America is still something of a colossus with an infant’s brain, unaware of the havoc its tentative, giant-sized baby steps can cause. We still have some growing up to do as a nation. One of my favorite movies has always been It’s a Wonderful Life. Like everyone, I’m a sucker for the sentiment. But I also though the conceit was ingenious: What if we could all be granted, like Jimmy Stewart’s George Bailey, a look at the world without us? I think it’s useful to apply the same conceit to the one uberpower world. Suppose, with the end of the Soviet Union, America had mysteriously disappeared as well or, more realistically, had retreated to within its borders, as it had wanted to do ever since the end of World War II. What would a Jeffersonian America, withdrawn behind its oceans, likely see unfolding overseas? Probably a restoration of the old power jostle that has sent mankind back to war for many millennia. One possible scenario: Japan would have reacquired a full-scale military and nuclear weapons , and would have bid for regional hegemony with China. Europe would have had no counterbalance to yet another descent into intraregional competition and, lacking the annealing structure of the postwar Atlantic alliance, may never have achieved monetary union. Russia would have bid for Eurasian dominance as it has throughout its modern history. Most important of all, the global trading system, which the United States virtually reinvented after World War II (with some help from John Maynard Keynes and others), would almost certainly have broken down amid all these renewed rivalries , killing globalization before it even got started. That in turn would have accelerated many of the above developments. A war of some kind would have been extremely likely. And given the evidence of the last century, which shows that America has been increasingly drawn into global conflicts, the U.S. president would be pulled in again – but this time in a high-tech, nuclearized, and very lethal age of warfare.

Deterrence solves escalation better – presence is keyStephen Walt, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, Spring 2002, “American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls.” Naval War College Review.

A second consequence of U.S. primacy is a decreased danger of great-power rivalry and a higher level of overall international tranquility. Ironically, those who argue that primacy is no longer important, because the danger of war is slight, overlook the fact that the extent of American primacy is one of the main reasons why the risk of great-power war is as low as it is. For most of the past four centuries, relations among the major powers have been intensely competitive, often punctuated by major wars and occasionally by all-out struggles for hegemony. In the first half of the twentieth century, for example, great-power wars killed over eighty million people. Today, however, the dominant position of the United States places significant limits on the possibility of great-power competition, for at least two reasons. One reason is that because the United States is currently so far ahead, other major powers are not inclined to challenge its dominant position. Not only is there no possibility of a "hegemonic war" (because there is no potential hegemon to mount a challenge), but the risk of war via miscalculation is reduced by the overwhelming gap between the United States and the other major powers. Miscalculation is more likely to lead to war when the balance of power is fairly even, because in this situation both sides can convince themselves that they might be able to win. When the balance of power is heavily skewed, however, the leading state does not need to go to war and weaker states dare not try.8 The second reason is that the continued deployment of roughly two hundred thousand troops in Europe and in Asia provides a further barrier to conflict in each region. So long as U.S. troops are committed abroad, regional powers know that launching a war is likely to lead to a confrontation with the United States. Thus, states within these regions do not worry as much about each other, because the U.S. presence effectively prevents regional conflicts from breaking out. What Joseph Joffe has termed the "American pacifier" is not the only barrier to conflict in Europe and Asia, but it is an important one. This tranquilizing effect is not lost on America's allies in Europe and Asia. They resent U.S. dominance and dislike playing host to American troops, but they also do not want "Uncle Sam" to leave.9 Thus, U.S. primacy is of benefit to the United States, and to other countries as well, because it dampens the overall level of international insecurity. World politics might be more interesting if the United States were weaker and if other states were forced to compete with each other more actively, but a more exciting world is not necessarily a better one. A comparatively boring era may provide few opportunities for genuine heroism, but it is probably a good deal more pleasant to live in than "interesting" decades like the 1930s or 1940s.



Engagement prevents entanglement and solves great power wars and regional conflicts. Stephen Walt, Professor of International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. “American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls.” Naval War College Review, Spring 2002.

A second consequence of U.S. primacy is a decreased danger of great-power rivalry and a higher level of overall international tranquility. Ironically, those who argue that primacy is no longer important, because the danger of war is slight, overlook the fact that the extent of American primacy is one of the main reasons why the risk of great-power war is as low as it is. For most of the past four centuries, relations among the major powers have been intensely competitive, often punctuated by major wars and occasionally by all-out struggles for hegemony. In the first half of the twentieth century, for example, great-power wars killed over eighty million people. Today, however, the dominant position of the United States places significant limits on the possibility of great-power competition, for at least two reasons. One reason is that because the United States is currently so far ahead, other major powers are not inclined to challenge its dominant position. Not only is there no possibility of a "hegemonic war" (because there is no potential hegemon to mount a challenge), but the risk of war via miscalculation is reduced by the overwhelming gap between the United States and the other major powers. Miscalculation is more likely to lead to war when the balance of power is fairly even, because in this situation both sides can convince themselves that they might be able to win. When the balance of power is heavily skewed, however, the leading state does not need to go to war and weaker states dare not try.8 The second reason is that the continued deployment of roughly two hundred thousand troops in Europe and in Asia provides a further barrier to conflict in each region. So long as U.S. troops are committed abroad, regional powers know that launching a war is likely to lead to a confrontation with the United States. Thus, states within these regions do not worry as much about each other, because the U.S. presence effectively prevents regional conflicts from breaking out. What Joseph Joffe has termed the "American pacifier" is not the only barrier to conflict in Europe and Asia, but it is an important one. This tranquilizing effect is not lost on America's allies in Europe and Asia. They resent U.S. dominance and dislike playing host to American troops, but they also do not want "Uncle Sam" to leave.9 Thus, U.S. primacy is of benefit to the United States, and to other countries as well, because it dampens the overall level of international insecurity. World politics might be more interesting if the United States were weaker and if other states were forced to compete with each other more actively, but a more exciting world is not necessarily a better one. A comparatively boring era may provide few opportunities for genuine heroism, but it is probably a good deal more pleasant to live in than "interesting" decades like the 1930s or 1940s.

Entanglement inevitable – withdraw causes economic collapse and nuclear war. Michael Hirsch, Senior Editor of the Washington Bureau. 2003. At War With Ourselves. Pg. 10-11.

Yes, it is possible. But first we must cross a psychological threshold ourselves. We need to grasp what many other nations already understand: the meaning of America in today’s world. Despite a century of intense global engagement, America is still something of a colossus with an infant’s brain, unaware of the havoc its tentative, giant-sized baby steps can cause. We still have some growing up to do as a nation. One of my favorite movies has always been It’s a Wonderful Life. Like everyone, I’m a sucker for the sentiment. But I also though the conceit was ingenious: What if we could all be granted, like Jimmy Stewart’s George Bailey, a look at the world without us? I think it’s useful to apply the same conceit to the one uberpower world. Suppose, with the end of the Soviet Union, America had mysteriously disappeared as well or, more realistically, had retreated to within its borders, as it had wanted to do ever since the end of World War II. What would a Jeffersonian America, withdrawn behind its oceans, likely see unfolding overseas? Probably a restoration of the old power jostle that has sent mankind back to war for many millennia. One possible scenario: Japan would have reacquired a full-scale military and nuclear weapons , and would have bid for regional hegemony with China. Europe would have had no counterbalance to yet another descent into intraregional competition and, lacking the annealing structure of the postwar Atlantic alliance, may never have achieved monetary union. Russia would have bid for Eurasian dominance as it has throughout its modern history. Most important of all, the global trading system, which the United States virtually reinvented after World War II (with some help from John Maynard Keynes and others), would almost certainly have broken down amid all these renewed rivalries , killing globalization before it even got started. That in turn would have accelerated many of the above developments. A war of some kind would have been extremely likely. And given the evidence of the last century, which shows that America has been increasingly drawn into global conflicts, the U.S. president would be pulled in again – but this time in a high-tech, nuclearized, and very lethal age of warfare.



The conflicts sparked by isolation are worse than those created by entanglement. William Wohlforth, Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown. International Security, Summer 1999. “The Stability of a Unipolar World.”

Second, doing too little is a greater danger than doing too much. Critics note that the United States is far more interventionist than any previous system leader. But given the distribution of power, the U.S. impulse toward interventionism is understandable. In many cases, U.S. involvement has been demand driven, as one would expect in a system with one clear leader. Rhetoric aside, U.S. engagement seems to most other elites to be necessary for the proper functioning of the system. In each region, cobbled-together security arrangements that require an American role seem preferable to the available alternatives. The more efficiently the United States performs this role, the more durable the system. If, on the other hand, the United States fails to translate its potential into the capabilities necessary to provide order, then great power struggles for power and security will reappear sooner. Local powers will then face incentives to provide security, sparking local counterbalancing and security competition. As the world becomes more dangerous, more second-tier states will enhance their military capabilities. In time, the result could be an earlier structural shift to bi- or multipolarity and a quicker reemergence of conflict over the leadership of the international system.


Heg Good – A2: Layne

Layne is wrong – his arguments are based on gross misunderstandings of historyJack Snyder, Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science and Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, July/August 2006,“The Crusade of Illusions,” Foreign Affairs, New York: Jul/Aug 2006, Vol. 85, Iss. 4, P. 183.

His account, however, is far too one-sided to convince, and Layne is wrong on many key issues. In his historical overview, he ignores the fact that the U.S. decision to withdraw from active participation in balancing power in Eurasia in the 1930s was a disaster, and that the U.S. victory in the Cold War came cheap compared to other historic contests for hegemony. Moreover, Stalin would never have accepted a deal to set up a truly independent Germany, because he rightly feared a rerun of World War II. And NATO was created because the Europeans pushed for it; if anyone was ambivalent about it, it was the U.S. Congress, which was reluctant to fund ongoing troop deployments abroad. More generally, Layne is right to worry that U.S. dominance may provoke resistance. But he overlooks the critical fact that during the Cold War, most states balanced against the weaker but more threatening Soviet Union, rather than against the stronger but more attractive United States. The result of such skewed historical judgments is that Layne unfairly dismisses the possibility that a consensual international order based on prudent, liberal American leadership could emerge.

Layne’s version of counter-balancing is under-theorized and guaranteed to failGary J. Schmitt, Director of the Program on Advanced Strategic Studies, 3-12-2007, American Enterprise Institute Online: “Pax Americana.” http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25706,filter.all/pub_detail.asp

An additional problem, perhaps tied to the way the book is structured, is that Layne spends the vast majority of his time criticizing the argument for primacy, without giving the reader much of a handle on his own preferred strategy's particulars. As a result, we don't know whether his model of "off-shore balancing" is more British in style--that is, fairly active in playing the decisive power broker among the other competing states--or more passive in content--a la the United States in the 1920s and '30s. If the former, a key problem with the strategy is that it requires a far more calculating style of statecraft than the United States has ever engaged in before. And even if we had Henry Kissinger upon Henry Kissinger to carry it out, would the American public really be willing to let its government play this version of international politics--shifting partners based on power relations--rather than the character of the states themselves? Surely, the disappearance of the United States as security guarantor is likely to lead to more competition among states and the creation of a more chaotic and fluid international environment. Britain had a hard enough time playing this role in its day, and found itself in numerous conflicts in any case. If the latter, the passive "off-shore balancing" approach leads to the question of whether such a strategy results in the United States addressing a security problem at a time when it may be far more difficult to deal with. Layne's bet, at least in the case of Iran and China today, is that if the United States would only get out of the way, other powers would naturally begin to meet their challenge. Possibly. But doing so might create an even more destabilizing competition among neighbors, or lead those same neighbors to accept China or Iran's new hegemony, fueling their ambitions rather than lessening them. The history of international relations suggests that most great crises are the result of not addressing more minor ones initially. As Thayer argues, it is probably less costly to deal with these issues when one is in a better position to do so than to wait for them to become full-blown security problems.

http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25706,filter.all/pub_detail.asp


Heg Bad – Entanglement

US alliance commitments ensure entanglement warsTed Galen Carpenter, VP Foreign Policy @ Cato, 9-3-2008, “The Limits of Deterrence,” http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9622

The importance of those states to Washington is simply not comparable to Western Europe's importance to America during the Cold War. Conversely, Russia's quarrels with several countries on its borders involve an array of potent ethnic, economic, and strategic considerations. To be blunt, the NATO commitment to small, vulnerable countries in Russia's immediate neighborhood looks like a bluff — and not a very credible one at that. U.S. policymakers have to hope that Putin or some future Russian leader doesn't decide to call that bluff. If Moscow ever challenges Washington's commitment, the United States will be left with a choice between a bad outcome and a worse one. The bad outcome is that U.S. leaders face the reality that it would be reckless to risk a major war to protect a client that is of little strategic or economic relevance to America — even though a retreat would raise serious questions about the credibility of other U.S. commitments. The worse outcome would be to actually try to fulfill the security pledge and risk a war with nuclear implications. The conflict in Georgia torpedoed the arrogant assumption that mere expressions of U.S. support for client states would deter other major powers. Washington suffered a blow to its pride and prestige, but the episode may have been a blessing in disguise. U.S. leaders need to understand that they have made a host of security promises that America probably cannot redeem. In essence, U.S. leaders have written security checks on a bank account with insufficient funds. They ought to rescind such unwise and unsustainable commitments before the next foreign policy train wreck.

Hegemony doesn’t deter regional conflicts – but ensures the US gets sucked inChristopher Layne, Prof @ Naval Postgrad, Summer 1998, “Rethinking American grand strategy,” World Policy Journal, v. 15, iss. 2, p. np

Notwithstanding its perceived complexities, it appears that extended deterrence "worked" in Europe during the Cold War and was easier to execute successfully than generally was thought. One should not assume, however, that extended deterrence will work similarly well in the early twenty-first century. If extended deterrence indeed worked during the Cold War, it was because of a set of unique conditions that are unlikely to be replicated in the future: bipolarity; a clearly defined, and accepted, geopolitical status quo; the intrinsic value to the United States of the protected region; and the permanent forward deployment by the United States of significant military forces in Western Europe. The number of great powers in the system affects extended deterrence's efficacy. During the Cold War, the bipolar nature of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry in Europe stabilized the superpower relationship by demarcating the continent into U.S. and Soviet spheres of influence that delineated the vital interests of both superpowers. Each knew it courted disaster if it challenged the other's sphere. Also, during the Cold War, the superpowers were able to exercise control over their major allies to minimize the risk of unwillingly being dragged into a conflict by them. In the early twenty-first century, however, the international system will be multipolar and, arguably, less stable and more conflict-prone than a bipolar international system. Spheres of influence will not be delineated clearly. And because other states will have more latitude to pursue their own foreign and security policy agendas than they did during the Cold War, the risk will be much greater that the United States could be dragged into a conflict because of a protected state's irresponsible behavior. Extended deterrence is bolstered by a clearly delineated geopolitical status quo and undermined by the absence of clearly defined spheres of influence. The resolution of the 1948-49 Berlin crisis formalized Europe's de facto postwar partition. After 1949, the very existence of a clear status quo in Europe itself bolstered deterrence. In deterrence situations of this type, the defender enjoys two advantages: the potential attacker must bear the onus (and risk) of moving first and the defender's interests generally outweigh the challenger's (hence the defender is usually willing to run greater risks to defend the status quo than the challenger is to change it). In the post-Cold War world, however, the number of political and territorial flash points where the status quo is hotly contested--the Senkaku Islands, the Spratly Islands, Taiwan, Tokdo/Takeshima, and in a host of potential disputes in East Central and Eastern Europe, and in Central Asia--is on the rise.


Heg Bad – Entanglement

Hegemony can’t prevent prolif in the long term – regional security concerns outweigh, which means it can only raise the risk of great power entanglement warsChristopher Layne, CATO, 1999, “Adjusting to Nuclear Proliferation,” Handbook for 106th Congress, http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb106/hb106-52.pdf

In addition, because other countries will have more latitude to pursue their own foreign and security policy agendas than they did during the Cold War, there will be a greater risk that the United States could be dragged into a conflict because of a protected country’s irresponsible behavior. Moreover, a crucial factor in weighing the credibility of a defender’s commitment is the degree of its interest in the protected area. Had the Soviets seriously contemplated an attack on Western Europe, they almost certainly would have drawn back from the brink. In a bipolar setting, Western Europe’s security was a matter of considerable importance to the United States for both strategic and credibility reasons. In the early 21st century, however, the intrinsic value of many of the regions to which the United States may wish to extend deterrence will be doubtful. Indeed, as political scientist Robert Jervis observes, in the post–Cold War world, ‘‘few imaginable disputes will engage vital U.S. interests.’’ It thus will be difficult to convince a potential attacker that U.S. deterrence commitments are credible. It is doubtful, for example, that the United States could deter a Russian invasion of the Baltic republics or Ukraine or, several decades hence, a Chinese assault on Taiwan. To engage in such actions, Moscow or Beijing would have to be highly motivated; conversely, the objects of possible attack are unimportant strategically to the United States, which would cause the challenger to discount U.S. credibility. The spring 1996 crisis between China and Taiwan suggests the difficulties U.S. extended deterrence strategy will face in coming decades. During the crisis, a Chinese official said that China could use force against Taiwan without fear of U.S. intervention because American decisionmakers ‘‘care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan.’’ Although empty today, as China becomes more powerful militarily and economically in coming decades, threats of this nature from Beijing will be more potent.


Heg Bad – Offshore Balancing Good – War

Maintaining predominance ensures great power wars – moving towards offshore balancing can ensure peaceful transitionChristopher Layne, Prof @ Naval Postgrad, Summer 1998, “Rethinking American grand strategy,” World Policy Journal v. 15, iss. 2, p. pq

The strategy of preponderance incorporates contradictory assumptions about the importance of relative power. On the one hand, the strategy seeks to maximize America's military power by perpetuating its role as the predominant great power in the international system. Yet, the strategy's economic dimension is curiously indifferent to the security implications of the redistribution of power in the international political system resulting from economic interdependence. Nor does the strategy resolve the following conundrum: given that economic power is the foundation of military strength, how will the United States be able to retain its hegemonic position in the international political system if its relative economic power continues to decline? In purely economic terms, an open international economic system may have positive effects. But economics does not take place in a political vacuum. Strategically, economic openness has adverse consequences: it contributes to, and accelerates, a redistribution of relative power among states in the international system (allowing rising competitors to catch up to the United States more quickly than they otherwise would). This leads to the emergence of new great powers. The resulting "power transition," which occurs as a dominant power declines and new challengers arise, usually climaxes in great power wars. 24 Because great power emergence is driven by uneven growth rates (that is, some states are growing faster economically than others), there is little, short of preventive war, that the United States can do to prevent the rise of new great powers. But U.S. grand strategy, to some extent, can affect both the pace and the magnitude of America's relative power decline. A crucial relationship exists between America's relative power and its strategic commitments. The historian Paul Kennedy and the political economist Robert Gilpin have explained how strategic overcommitment leads first to "imperial overstretch," and then to relative decline. 25 Gilpin has outlined succinctly the causal logic supporting this conclusion. As he points out, the overhead costs of empire are high: "In order to maintain its dominant position, a state must expend its resources on military forces, the financing of allies, foreign aid, and the costs associated with maintaining the international economy. These protection and related costs are not productive investments; they constitute an economic drain on the economy of the dominant state." 26 Ultimately, the decline in its relative power leaves a waning hegemon less well placed to fend off the challenges to its system-wide strategic interests.


Heg Bad – Offshore Balancing Good – War

Offshore balancing is better at keeping the US out of nuclear conflictsChristopher Layne, Prof @ Naval Postgrad, Summer 1998, “Rethinking American grand strategy,” World Policy Journal v. 15, iss. 2, p. np

In short, the historical record does not support the claim that European and Asian wars invariably compel the United States to intervene. Wars are not a force of nature that magnetically draws states into conflict. States, that is policymakers, have volition; they decide whether to go to war. The insurance argument advanced by proponents of the strategy of preponderance is also problematic. Great power war is rare because it is always an uncertain undertaking: war is, therefore, to some extent its own deterrent. It is, however, an imperfect deterrent: great power wars do happen and they will happen in the future. Although the likelihood of U.S. involvement in future great-power conflict may be small, in a world where nuclear weapons exist the consequences of U.S. involvement in such a conflict could be enormous. The strategy of preponderance purports to ensure the United States against the risk of war. If extended deterrence fails, however, the strategy actually ensures that America will be involved in war at its onset. As Californians know, there are some risks (earthquakes, for example) for which insurance is either prohibitively expensive or not available at any price because, although the probability of the event may be small, if it occurs, the cost to the insurer is catastrophic. Offshore balancing has the considerable advantage of giving the United States a high degree of strategic choice and, unlike the strategy of preponderance, a substantial measure of control over its fate.

Failure to shift to offshore balancing makes war inevitableChristopher Layne, Prof @ Texas AM, Fall 2006, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited,” International Security, v. 31, no. 2

If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint, it probably will, at some point, have to fight to uphold its primacy, which is a potentially dangerous strategy. Maintaining U.S. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle, especially given that U.S. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. Paradoxically, attempting to sustain U.S. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States, thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power. Rather than risking these outcomes, the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. Unilateral offshore balancing, indeed, is America’s next grand strategy.

Attempts to prolong US hegemony only spur backlash – moves towards offshore balancing are key.Christopher Layne, associate professor in the School of International Studies at the University of Miami, Spring 2002, “Offshore Balancing Revisited,” Washington Quarterly, p.247

Notwithstanding the events of September 11, U.S. hegemony is the salient fact that defines the U.S. role in international politics. The articles in "Through the Looking Glass" reflect a deep mistrust of U.S. power that the temporary convergence of interests brought about by the war on terrorism will not wash away. Indeed, the reverse is true. In attaining victory in the war's opening round, the United States underlined its dominant role in the international system, and talk of a "new U.S. empire" echoes inside the beltway. Underscoring the paradox of U.S. power is the paradox of victory. Flushed with triumph and the awesome display of U.S. might, U.S. policymakers may succumb to hubris and overreach strategically in the false belief that U.S. hegemony is an unchallengeable fact of international life. Other states, however, will draw the opposite conclusion: that the United States is too powerful and that its hegemony must be resisted. Now, more than ever, having a great debate about future U.S. grand strategy is imperative. As that debate unfolds, offshore balancing will become the obvious successor strategy to primacy because it is a grand strategic escape hatch by which the United States can avoid the fate that has befallen previous hegemons in modern international history.


Heg Bad – Counterbalancing

Unipolarity increases conflict – attempts at hegemony spur counter-balancing and prevent conflict resolution.Ronald Grigor Suny, Professor of Social and Political History at the University of Michigan, 2010, “The Pawn of Great Powers: The East–West Competition for Caucasia,” Journal of Eurasian Studies, p.14

But unipolarity has its problems. The unipower may be the only state that can project its power globally, that is unconstrained by the desires of others, but it is not a universal empire (controlling every aspect of the domestic and foreign policy of every other country if it so desires) nor actually a global hegemon (controlling foreign policies of other states). Those theorists who expected that unipolarity would lead to peace must now be very disappointed, for in the last two decades in which the USA has achieved unipolar dominance, conflict in the world has been rife. While battle deaths since the end of the Cold War have declined, the United States has been involved in wars with Iraq (1992, 2002–present), Somalia (1993), Bosnia (1995), Serbia and Kosovo (1999), and Afghanistan (2001–present)Lacina & Geditsch, 2005). Conflict develops because of the tension between the superpower’s ability to project its power everywhere but its inability to become a truly global hegemon or world empire.4 Unipolarity encourages imperial over-reach, stimulates other states to develop nuclear weapons to stand up against the superpower, and discourages building an international system of rules and institutions to govern international relations and prevent wars. A few countries, very few, are willing to confront US hegemony (among them, Russia, Iran, Venezuela, and North Korea), but they pay a cost for that – as Russia is likely to discover.

Their escalation arguments are backwards – unipolarity prevents effective means to channel competition – increases international security risks.Steven Weber et al, professor of political science and director of the Institute of International Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, January-February 2007, “How Globalization Went Bad,” Foreign Policy, http://iis.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/how_globalization_went_bad.pdf

Axiom 3 is a story about the preferred strategies of the weak. It’s a basic insight of international relations that states try to balance power. They protect themselves by joining groups that can hold a hegemonic threat at bay. But what if there is no viable group to join? In today’s unipolar world, every nation from Venezuela to North Korea is looking for a way to constrain American power. But in the unipolar world, it’s harder for states to join together to do that. So they turn to other means. They play a different game. Hamas, Iran, Somalia, North Korea, and Venezuela are not going to become allies anytime soon. Each is better off finding other ways to make life more difficult for Washington. Going nuclear is one way. Counterfeiting U.S. currency is another. Raising uncertainty about oil supplies is perhaps the most obvious method of all. Here’s the important downside of unipolar globalization. In a world with multiple great powers, many of these threats would be less troublesome. The relatively weak states would have a choice among potential partners with which to ally, enhancing their influence. Without that more attractive choice, facilitating the dark side of globalization becomes the most effective means of constraining American power.


Heg Bad – Terrorism

US hegemony causes terrorism – Al Qaeda proves.Christopher Layne, associate professor in the School of International Studies at the University of Miami, Spring 2002, “Offshore Balancing Revisited,” Washington Quarterly, p.241

The terrorism of Osama bin Laden results in part from this cultural chasm, as well as from more traditional geopolitical grievances. In a real sense, bin Laden's brand of terrorism--the most dramatic illustration of U.S. vulnerability to the kind of "asymmetric warfare" of which some defense experts have warned--is the counterhegemonic balancing of the very weak. For all of these reasons, the hegemonic role that the strategy of preponderance assigns to the United States as the Gulf's stabilizer was bound to provoke a multilayered backlash against U.S. predominance in the region. Indeed, as Richard K. Betts, an acknowledged expert on strategy, presciently observed several years ago, "It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the United States had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel, the shah of Iran, and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault on Islam." (Betts was referring to the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center.)

Only way to solve terrorism is to reduce US hegemony – power projection is the root cause.Ivan Eland, director of defense policy studies at the Cato Institute, Fall 1998, “Preserving Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism,” Issues in Science and Technology, http://www.issues.org/15.1/eland.htm

The best way to lessen the chances of an attack that could cause hundreds of thousands or even millions of casualties is to eliminate the motive for such an attack. Terrorists attack U.S. targets because they perceive that the United States is a hegemonic superpower that often intervenes in the affairs of other nations and groups. Both President Clinton and the Defense Science Board admit that there is a correlation between U.S. involvement in international situations and acts of terrorism directed against the United States. The board also noted that the spread of WMD technology and the increased willingness of terrorists to inflict mass casualties have made such an attack more likely. Yet even with the demise of its major worldwide adversary the Soviet Union the United States has continued to intervene anywhere and everywhere around the world. Getting involved in ethnic conflicts, such as those in Bosnia and Somalia, in perpetually volatile regions of the world that have no strategic value actually undermines U.S. security. After the Cold War, extending the U.S. defense perimeter far forward is no longer necessary and may be counterproductive in a changed strategic environment where the weakest actors in the international system-terrorists-can effectively attack the homeland of a superpower. To paraphrase Frederick the Great, defending everything is defending nothing.

Multipolarity solves terrorism – undermines ability of groups to organize in opposition to US power.Steven Weber et al, professor of political science and director of the Institute of International Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, January-February 2007, “How Globalization Went Bad,” Foreign Policy, http://iis.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/how_globalization_went_bad.pdf

If there were rival great powers with different cultural and ideological leanings, globalization’s darkest problem of all—terrorism—would also likely look quite different. The pundits are partly right: Today’s international terrorism owes something to globalization. Al Qaeda uses the Internet to transmit messages, it uses credit cards and modern banking to move money, and it uses cell phones and laptops to plot attacks. But it’s not globalization that turned Osama bin Laden from a small-time Saudi dissident into the symbolic head of a radical global movement. What created Osama bin Laden was the predominance of American power. A terrorist organization needs a story to attract resources and recruits. Oftentimes, mere frustration over political, economic, or religious conditions is not enough. Al Qaeda understands that, and, for that reason, it weaves a narrative of global jihad against a “modernization,” “Westernization,” and a “Judeo-Christian” threat. There is really just one country that both spearheads and represents that threat: the United States. And so the most efficient way for a terrorist to gain a reputation is to attack the United States. The logic is the same for all monopolies. A few years ago, every computer hacker in the


world wanted to bring down Microsoft, just as every aspiring terrorist wants to create a spectacle of destruction akin to the September 11 attacks inside the United States.


Heg Bad – Proliferation

US attempts to prolong hegemony speed up proliferation.Matthew Yglesias, Fellow at the Center for American Progress Action Fund, 10-13-2009, “Decline: It’s Not Really a Choice,” http://yglesias.thinkprogress.org/archives/2009/10/decline-its-not-really-a-choice.php?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+matthewyglesias+%28Matthew+Yglesias%29

Krauthammer’s central conceit ever since the end of the Cold War has been that bold acts of will can prolong the “unipolar moment” indefinitely. And he’s just wrong. He’s always been wrong, he continues to be wrong, and this interpretation of world affairs will always be wrong. It’s a remarkably elementary mistake that seems to evince no understanding of how the United States came to be the dominant global player in the first place. As if he thinks we’re top dog and nobody cares about Australia or Finland is because we just have more of a bad-ass attitude. Those are, however, actually some pretty bad-ass countries. They’re just, you know, small so nobody cares. If China and India were richer, we’d look small to them! The main practical consequence of Krauthammer-style policies for international relations is to speed the spread of nuclear weapons. Having us behave in an alarming manner increases the desire of regional powers to acquire nuclear weapons and decreases the extent to which other great powers are inclined to collaborate with us on preventing nuclear proliferation.

Hegemony is the key driving force for nuclear proliferation.Steven Weber et al, professor of political science and director of the Institute of International Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, January-February 2007, “How Globalization Went Bad,” Foreign Policy, http://iis.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/how_globalization_went_bad.pdf

The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity, and the United States is bearing most of the burden. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. There’s effectively a market out there for proliferation, with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand, to the detriment of U.S. national security. It has become fashionable, in the wake of the Iraq war, to comment on the limits of conventional military force. But much of this analysis is overblown. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. But that doesn’t matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. In Tehran, Pyongyang, and many other capitals, including Beijing, the bottom line is simple: The U.S. military could, with conventional force, end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so. No country in the world can dream of challenging U.S. conventional military power. But they can certainly hope to deter America from using it. And the best deterrent yet invented is the threat of nuclear retaliation. Before 1989, states that felt threatened by the United States could turn to the Soviet Union’s nuclear umbrella for protection. Now, they turn to people like A.Q. Khan. Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury. Today, it is fast becoming a necessity.

Multipolarity solves proliferation – incentives for other powers to prevent acquisition.Steven Weber et al, professor of political science and director of the Institute of International Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, January-February 2007, “How Globalization Went Bad,” Foreign Policy, http://iis.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/how_globalization_went_bad.pdf

How would things be different in a multipolar world? For starters, great powers could split the job of policing proliferation, and even collaborate on some particularly hard cases. It’s often forgotten now that, during the Cold War, the only state with a tougher nonproliferation policy than the United States was the Soviet Union. Not a single country that had a formal alliance with Moscow ever became a nuclear power. The Eastern bloc was full of countries with advanced technological capabilities in every area except one— nuclear weapons. Moscow simply wouldn’t permit it. But today we see the uneven and inadequate level of effort that non-superpowers devote to stopping proliferation. The Europeans dangle carrots at Iran, but they are unwilling to consider serious sticks. The Chinese refuse to admit that there is a problem. And the Russians are aiding Iran’s nuclear ambitions. When push comes to shove, nonproliferation today is almost entirely America’s burden.


Heg Bad – Blowback

1. US HEGEMONY INSPIRES BLOWBACKKrishnadev Calamur, NQA, July 15, 2003. United Press International.

Johnson, of the Japan policy Research Institute, argues the price of maintaining this empire outweighs its benefits, saying the policy will have unintended consequences in the future. "World politics in the 21st century will in all likelihood be driven primarily by blowback from the second half of the 20th century -- that is, from the unintended consequences of the Cold War and the crucial American decision to maintain a Cold War posture in a post-Cold War world," he said in his speech. "The United States likes to think of itself as the winner of the Cold War. In all probability, to those looking back a blowback century hence, neither side will appear to have won, particularly if the United States maintains its present imperial course."

2. US HEGEMONY INSPIRES FEAR AND PROLIFERATIONShibley Telhami, Professor for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland and a Fellow at Brookings, 2003. Conversations with History,accessed 11/6/03, http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people/Telhami/telhami03-con5.html

If I were an aspiring and frightened third world country, if I thought I might be next, I would accelerate my weapons of mass destruction program, so as to deter the possibility of preemption. If you look at North Korea, they did precisely that. They had every reason to think that they may be next after Iraq, given the rhetoric in Washington, and given the doctrine of preemption. And they have exploited the situation -- the U.S. is engaged in the Iraq issue -- to make clear that they're going to produce enough weapons to be able to deter an attack. I'd expect Iran to do the same thing. And I'd expect the tendency across the international community to be similar. So the very strategy to prevent something is creating incentives for it to happen, at least to acquire nuclear weapons.

3. HEGEMONY CAUSES ROGUE STATE BACKLASH Taymaz Rastin, Economics and Political Science at Simon Fraser University, June 24, 2003. “Respect Iran's sovereignty,” Payvand's Iran News, Accessed May 4, 2004, http://www.payvand.com/news/03/jun/1135.html

These pillars support two classes of sovereignty: American sovereignty, which takes precedence over international treaties; and the sovereignty of all other states, which is subject to the Bush doctrine. This is reminiscent of George Orwell's Animal Farm: all animals are equal but some are more equal than others. Mr. President, we believe that in order to best prevent future terrorist attacks against America, you should work with sovereign governments instead of threatening to destroy them. The propagation of “American values” around the world is not bad if it respects the integrity of sovereign governments. However, when your administration is threatening to use “all options at the table” against Iran, even though Iran has not been in breach of the non-proliferation treaty, that country’s sovereign integrity is being threatened. We believe that in fact, the aggression of your administration strengthens the rationale that Iran needs nuclear weapons as a deterrent from attack. If you then decide to intervene militarily, your country will pay a high price, because not only will the Iranian people resist, world opinion will be further mobilized against you.

4. US hegemony destroys international institutions which keep the peaceStaff Writer, People’s Daily, September 27, 2002. Accessed 11/5/03, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200209/27/eng20020927_104010.shtml

"Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United States," Bush said so. By announcing that, the U.S. sets one rule for itself and another for the rest of the world, the editorial said. "Bush's security policy paper is remarkably consistent with hisattitude toward the international community. He derided the Kyoto environmental accord, refused to attend the UN sustainable development summit and declared that US citizens will not be boundby the International Criminal Court," it noted. "Such a policy suggests that America is repeating the mistakes of all history's imperialists-- that of confusing its own foreign policy objective with the global good," said the editorial. "Bush says America can no longer rely on multilateral organizations like the United Nations to protect its security and the safety of its citizens. This is a dangerous notion because


unless nation states are willing to subordinate some sovereignty for higher global values, military conflict is inevitable," it said. "Rather than contributing to the world order, American unilateralism will severely destabilize it," concluded the editorial.


Heg Bad – Multipolarity Good

Multipolarity solves all their impacts – competition increases incentives for great powers to manage conflict.Steven Weber et al, professor of political science and director of the Institute of International Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, January-February 2007, “How Globalization Went Bad,” Foreign Policy, http://iis.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/how_globalization_went_bad.pdf

That may already be happening to the United States today, on issues ranging from oil dependency and The world is paying a heavy price for the instability nuclear proliferation to pandemics and global warming. What Axiom 1 tells you is that more U.S. power is not the answer; it’s actually part of the problem. A multipolar world would almost certainly manage the globe’s pressing problems more effectively. The larger the number of great powers in the global system, the greater the chance that at least one of them would exercise some control over a given combination of space, other actors, and problems. Such reasoning doesn’t rest on hopeful notions that the great powers will work together. They might do so. But even if they don’t, the result is distributed governance, where some great power is interested in most every part of the world through productive competition.

Multipolarity is the best possible alternative – key to solve backlash and great power war– unipolarity inevitably fails.Christopher Layne, associate professor in the School of International Studies at the University of Miami, Spring 2002, “Offshore Balancing Revisited,” Washington Quarterly, pp.246-247

Second, although a competitive component to U.S. relations with the other great powers in a multipolar world would be inescapable, multipolar politics have historically engendered periods of great-power cooperation. On the cooperative side, an offshore balancing strategy would be coupled with a policy of spheres of influence, which have always been an important item in the toolbox of great-power policymakers. By recognizing each other's paramount interests in certain regions, great powers can avoid the kinds of misunderstandings that could trigger conflict. Moreover, the mere act of signaling that one country understands another's larger security stake in a particular region, a stake that it will respect by noninterference, allows states to communicate a nonthreatening posture to one another. By recognizing the legitimacy of other interests, a great power also signals that it accepts them as equals. An offshore balancing strategy would immunize the United States against a post-war-on-terrorism backlash against U.S. hegemony in one other way. By accepting the emergence of new great powers and simultaneously pulling back from its primacy-driven military posture, the United States would reduce perception of a "U.S. threat," thereby lowering the chances that others will view it as an overpowerful hegemon. In this sense, offshore balancing is a strategy of restraint that would allow the United States to minimize the risks of open confrontation with the new great powers. Being Panglossian about the reemergence of multipolarity in international politics would be silly. Multipolarity is not the best outcome imaginable. The best outcome would be a world in which every other state willingly accepted U.S. hegemony--an outcome about which some may dream, but one that will never be realized in the real world. That outcome, however, is much better than the predictable outcome if the United States continues to follow a grand strategy of primacy. The outcome of that strategy will be really bad: not only will new great powers rise, they will also coalesce against what they perceive to be a U.S. threat.


Heg Bad – Interventionism

US ability to intervene only creates incentives for conflict – which turns their escalation arguments.Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow at the CATO Institute, 2-10-2007, “Gambling on Humanitarian Intervention,” Antiwar.com, http://original.antiwar.com/doug-bandow/2007/02/09/gambling-on-humanitarian-intervention/

The wreck of the Bush crusade to democratize Iraq – let alone the Mideast, let alone the world! – has effectively discredited what had been a growing demand for humanitarian intervention around the globe. The appeal of waging war to save lives is obvious. In practice, however, conflicts begun for allegedly humanitarian reasons rarely have humanitarian outcomes. Indeed, such interventions, as illustrated by the bloody debacle in Iraq, ultimately can generate as much evil as that which originally was used to justify outside action. This is a good enough reason to say never again. If an exception comes along, an unlikely case in which the U.S. really can easily and costlessly intervene, save multitudes of lives, and leave expeditiously, without having to stick around to fix a devastated society or rebuild a mangled state, then Americans can tread cautiously and treat it as the exception that it truly is. However, there’s another potential problem with humanitarian intervention that advocates of warmongering for good rarely acknowledge: threatening to intervene to settle bitter internal conflicts creates an incentive for weaker parties to foment such conflicts. For many rebellious groups, outside intervention is the only hope for success; thus, triggering involvement by a neighboring nation, regional power, or the globe’s superpower becomes an overriding objective. In economic-speak this is the problem of “moral hazard.” It’s a highly plausible thesis backed by anecdotal evidence. When I visited Kosovo in the summer of 1998, for instance, local ethnic Albanians were openly pressing for American and European action. Alush Gashi, then active in the resistance against Serb rule, told me that the prospect of outside intervention “depends on how we look on CNN. People need to see victims in their living rooms.”


Heg Bad – A2: Transition Wars

Globalization prevents great power warsStephen Brooks, Prof of Gov at Dartmouth College, 2005, “Producing Security,” Princeton University Press, p. 214-7.

The point is that even if a risk-acceptant or blundering leader of a great power does not face or overruns these constraints on war, waiting in reserve would be a constraint that no leader or country can disregard or circumvent: the globalization of production has shifted the scales against great power revisionism. By making it structurally harder for any great power revisionist to succeed, the globalization of production now serves as a powerful "reserve stabilizer." Of course, the peace between the great powers in the decades after World War II itself created a favorable environment for the globalization of production to emerge. The key point is that now that the globalization of production exists, it presents states with a structural fact on the ground-one that independently reinforces great power stability in a positive feedback loop. Individual states can isolate themselves from the globalization of production, but they cannot summarily end it on their own. Moreover, great powers that isolate themselves still will find it just as difficult to run the tables-indeed, it will be harder because they will be less strong militarily. Of course, the largest most advanced states arguably have the most to gain from participation in geographic dispersion of MNC production, and hence it is unlikely that any of them would, in fact, seek to take this self-isolation route. Pursuing independence is simply no longer an attractive option. The globalization of production is consequential not only because it cannot be abruptly shut down or ignored by a revisionist great power. Also significant is that great power leaders do not have to understand the geographic dispersion of MNC production, or how it changes the prospects for revisionism, for it to have a stabilizing effect on great power security relations.

Global production shift discourages great power transition warsStephen Brooks, Prof of Gov at Dartmouth College, 2005, “Producing Security,” Princeton University Press, p. 214-7.

Leaders also need not calculate costs and benefits in a rational manner, or have a particular set of preferences, for this global production shift to act as a stabilizer. As long as the globalization of production exists, it will be harder for a great power to run the tables no matter how leaders understand the global economy, how they make decisions, or what ideas they have. For the foreseeable future, nothing will change this. Ultimately, therefore, the globalization of production is a structural constraint on great power revisionism different from, say, nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons do not necessarily operate as a stabilizer since not all great powers have them, they are subject to potential accidents, and they also may be controlled by leaders who do not make decisions using standard conceptions of rationality.'' In addition, if nuclear deterrence fails, the negative consequences would be enormous; the globalization of production carries with it no such risks. The bottom line is that this global production shift is very consequential. Had the globalization of production existed at the time of World War II, Germany would have been much less successful since it would not have been able to effectively seize resources from the advanced societies it conquered while also being able to produce competitive military technology under a cutoff of supplies.

Heg makes transition wars more likelyChristopher Layne, Professor in the School of International Studies at the University of Miami. World Policy Journal. New York: Summer 1998. Vol. 15, Iss. 2; pg. 8, 21 pgs. “Rethinking American grand strategy: Hegemony or balance of power in the twenty-first century?”

In purely economic terms, an open international economic system may have positive effects. But economics does not take place in a political vacuum. Strategically, economic openness has adverse consequences: it contributes to, and accelerates, a redistribution of relative power among states in the international system (allowing rising competitors to catch up to the United States more quickly than they otherwise would). This leads to the emergence of new great powers. The resulting "power transition," which occurs as a dominant power declines and new challengers arise, usually climaxes in great power wars. 24 Because great power emergence is driven by uneven growth rates (that is, some states are growing faster economically than others), there is little, short of preventive war, that the United States can do to prevent the rise of new great powers. But U.S. grand strategy, to some extent, can affect both the pace and the magnitude of America's relative power decline.

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