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Transcript of Grayling vs Craig
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GRAYLING VS CRAIG
CRAIG: Thank you and good evening. Im very grateful to the
Oxford Union for the privilege of debating here this evening on
this most important topic and I thank you for your warm welcome.Im also grateful as well for Professor Graylings participation
in the event this evening, and I trust that our discussion
tonight will not only be an intellectual exercise for you but
will also be a significant help in your own personal, spiritual
journey.
Now when we ask whether belief in God makes sense in light of
tsunamis, were posing in a provocative way the problem that,
traditionally, philosophers have called the problem of evil.This problem is undoubtedly the greatest obstacle to belief in
God. When we consider the depth and the extent of suffering in
the world then it makes it hard to believe in God. Maybe we
should just all become atheists.
But that would be a pretty big step to take. How can we be sure
that God does not exist? Maybe theres a reason why God permits
all the suffering in the world. Maybe it all fits in to some
grand scheme of things that we can only dimly envision, if atall. How do we know?
Well, despite the undeniable emotional impact of the problem of
evil, Im persuaded that as a strictly rational, intellectual
problem it does not constitute a disproof of the existence of
God. Let me explain why.
Traditionally, atheists have claimed that the co-existence of God
and evil is logically impossible. That is to say, there is no
possible world in which God and evil both exist. Since we know
that evil exists, the argument goes, it follows logically that
God does not exist. It is this version of the problem of evil
that professor Grayling recently defended in his debate with
Keith Ward in The Prospect.
So, according to the logical version of the problem of evil, (the
two statements on your hand-out):
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(A) an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God exists
and
(B) evil exists
... are logically incompatible.
The difficulty for the atheist, however, is that statements (A)
and (B) are not, at face value, logically inconsistent. Theres
no explicit contradiction between them. If the atheist thinks
they are implicitlycontradictory then he must be assuming some
hidden premises that would serve to bring out the contradiction
and make it explicit.
But, what are those premises? Well, the atheist seems to be
assuming two things:
(1) If God is omnipotent then he can create any world that he
desires
and
(2) If God is omnibenevolent then he prefers a world without evil
over a world with evil
The atheist reasons that: since God is omnipotent he couldcreate
a world without evil, and since he is omnibenevolent he would
prefer a world without evil, therefore if God exists, evil cannot
exist.
This version of the problem of evil has been seriously undermined
by the incisive critique of the philosopher Alvin Plantinga.
Plantinga notes that the atheist must show that both of the
critical assumptions (1) and (2) are necessarilytrue in order
for the argument to be logically valid. But, Plantinga argues, if
it is evenpossible that human beings have free will then (1) and
(2) are not necessarily true.
Take assumption (1). If free will is possible then its false
that an omnipotent God can create just any world that he desires.
Gods being omnipotent does not imply that he can do logical
impossibilities (such as, make a round square or a married
bachelor). But it is logically impossible to make someone freely
choose to do something. Thus if God grants people genuine
freedom, to choose as they like, then its impossible for him to
determine what their choices will be. All he can do is create the
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circumstances, in which a person is able to make a free choice,
and then so to speak stand back and let him make that
choice. Now what this implies is that there are worlds which are
possible, in and of themselves, but which God is incapable of
creating. Philosophers say that such worlds are not feasible for
God. So the first assumption made by the atheist, (namely, that
an omnipotent God can create any world that he desires), is not
necessarily true.
Now this is important because, for all we know, in every feasible
world where God creates free creatures some of those
creatures freely choose to do evil. Thus its possible that every
world feasible for God, which contains free creatures, is a world
with sin and evil. And, therefore, the atheists argument on
this ground alone is invalid.
But what about the second assumption? That if God is
omnibenevolent then he prefers a world without evil over a world
with evil? Again, such an assumption is not necessarily true.
The fact is that in many cases we allow suffering to occur, in a
persons life, because we have some morally sufficient reason for
permitting it. Im reminded of a remark once made by C.S. Lewis:
What do people mean when they say Im not afraid of God becauseI know that he is good? Have they never even been to the
dentist?! [some audience laughter] God may permit suffering in
our lives in order to achieve some morally sufficient,
overriding, end. Thus, even though God is omnibenevolent, he
might well have morally sufficient reasons for permitting pain
and suffering in the world. Consequently, the second assumption
of our atheist friends is also not necessarily true. The
argument is, thus, doubly invalid.
The bottom line is that atheists have not been able to show that
either of their key assumptions is necessarily true, which they
must do in order to sustain the claim, that the co-existence of
God and evil is logically impossible. The atheist who makes this
claim has unwittingly shouldered a tremendously heavy burden of
proof which no-one has been able to sustain.
Now, Plantinga argues that we can go even further than this. Not
only has the atheist failed to prove that God and evil areinconsistent, but we can on the contrary prove that God and
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evil are consistent! In order to do so, all we have to do is
provide some proposition that is compatible with Gods existence
and which entails that evil exists. And the following is such a
proposition (on your hand-outs):
(C) God could not have created a world that had so much good as
the actual world but had less evil, both in terms of quantity and
quality, and moreover God has morally sufficient reasons for
permitting the evil that exists.
So long as this proposition is evenpossible, it shows that God
and the evil in the world are logically compatible.
In summary, the atheist who champions the logical version of the
problem of evil, bears the burden of proof to show that there is
no possible world in which (A) and (B) are true. That is an
enormously heavy burden which has proved to be unsustainable.
After centuries of discussion, contemporary philosophers
including virtually all atheists and agnostics have come to admit
that the logical problem of evil has been solved. In the words of
the prominent philosopher William Alston, It is now
acknowledged, on almost all sides, that the logical argument from
evil is bankrupt.
Now perhaps Professor Grayling would retreat, at this point, to
the position that while the co-existence of God and evil are
logically possible, nonetheless, its highly improbable So,
given the evil in the world, its improbable that God exists.
This probabilistic version of the problem, however, faces
insuperable difficulties. Let me just mention three, this
evening:
Number one: were not in a position to assess, inductively, the
probability that God lacks morally sufficient reasons for
permitting the evils that occur. The atheist seems to think that
if God has morally sufficient reasons, for permitting the evils
that occur, then these reasons should be obvious to us!
But, theres absolutely no grounds for that assumption. The
transcendent God sees the end of history from its beginning and
providentially orders history so that his purposes are ultimately
achieved through human, free decisions. In order to achieve his
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ends, God may well have to put up with various evils along the
way. Evils, which appear pointless or unnecessary to us, within
our limited frame of reference may be seen to have been justly
permitted within Gods wider frame of reference. We simply have
no idea of the natural and moral evils that might be involved in
order for God to arrange the circumstances, and free agents in
them, necessary to some intended purpose; nor can we always
discern the reasons why such a provident God might have for
permitting some evil to enter ourlives.
To say this, is not is not to appeal to mystery, but rather
to point to the inherent cognitive limitations that frustrate
attempts to say, on inductive grounds, that its improbable that
God has a morally sufficient reason for permitting some
particular evil.
Ironically, in other contexts, atheists recognize these cognitive
limitations. One of the most damaging objections to utilitarian
ethical theory, which says that we should always act so as to
maximize the greatest happiness for the greatest number of
people, is that it is quite simply impossible for us to estimate
which action we might perform will ultimately lead to the
greatest amount of happiness in the world. Because of ourcognitive limitations, actions which appear disastrous, in the
short term, may redound to the greatest good; while some short
term boon may prove to issue in untold misery. Once we
contemplate Gods providence, over the whole of history, then it
becomes evident how hopeless it is for limited observers to
speculate on the probability of Gods having morally sufficient
reasons for the evils that we see. Were simply not in a good
position to assess such probabilities with any confidence.
Secondly: Christian theism entails doctrines that increase the
probability of the co-existence of God and evil. The atheist
maintains that if God exists then its improbable that the world
would contain the evil it does. But if the biblical God exists
then its not, in fact, so surprising that evil exists. Thus,
evil is not so improbable on Christian theism. For, according to
Christian theism, the chief purpose of life is not happiness but,
rather, the knowledge of God.
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One reason the problem of evil seems so difficult is that people
naturally tend to assume that if God exists then his purpose, for
human life, is happiness in this life! Gods role is to provide
a comfortable environment for his human pets.
But, on the Christian view, this is false! We are not Gods pets,
and the goal of human life is not happiness, per se, but rather
the knowledge of God which, in the end, will bring true and
everlasting human fulfillment. Many evils occur in life which may
be utterly pointless, with respect to the goal of producing human
happiness, but they may not be pointless with respect to
producing a deeper knowledge of God. Because Gods ultimate goal
for humanity is the knowledge of himself, which alone can bring
eternal happiness to people, history cannot be seen in its true
perspective apart from considerations pertinent to the kingdom of
God. It may well be the case that natural and moral evils are
part of the means God uses to draw people into his eternal
kingdom.
Moreover, Gods purpose is not restricted to this life but spills
over, beyond the grave, into eternal life. When God asks his
children to bear horrible suffering in this life, it is only with
the prospect of a heavenly joy and recompense that is beyond allcomprehension. And the longer we spend in eternity, the more the
sufferings of this life shrink, by comparison, to an
infinitesimal moment. The person in heaven looking back would
say, no matter how awful his pain, no matter what he suffered, I
would go through it a million, million times over to know this
joy! Thus, if Christian theism is true, the existence of evil is
not so improbable.
Number three: relative to the full scope of the evidence, Godsexistence is probable. Probabilities are relative to ones
background information. Thus, with a probability argument, we
always need to ask, improbable with respect to what? Now, apply
this principle to the probabilistic problem of evil: the atheist
says Gods existence is improbable..., but with respect to
what? To the evil in the world? Well, if thats all you consider,
for your background information, then I think its hardly
surprising that Gods existence would appear improbable relative
to that alone. But thats not the interesting question.
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The interesting question is whether Gods existence is improbable
relative to the full scope of the evidence. And the Christian
theist will insist that we consider not just the evil in the
world, but rather all the evidence relevant to Gods existence.
Now, obviously, I dont have time to discuss it here but, in my
published work, Ive written extensively in defense of various
arguments for the existence of God. Im convinced that even given
any improbability that evil throws upon Gods existence, Gods
existence is still quite probable on the basis of the evidence.
In any case, it would be premature to conclude that Gods
existence is improbable unless one has examined and weighed all
the relevant evidence.
In conclusion, then, neither the logical nor the probabilistic
problem of evil constitutes a justification of atheism. The
rational man is well within his rights in thinking that the
existence of God makes sense. Even in light of tsunamis.
[Applause]
[Back to Top]
Opening Statement A.C.Grayling:
Before we began our debate I said to Professor Craig that I was
prepared to concede victory this evening, to him, in the matter
of ties. Hes got a much more handsome tie than Ive got on
[audience laughter]. I wore this one because as the, as the
token, or what a theist would call an atheist because I also
dont believe in fairies and so on, I prefer to be an afairy-ist I thought Id better wear a sort of fairly sober tie on,
in order to appear to be a bit more respectable and [inaudible,
then slight audience laughter].
Im tremendously impressed, by the way, at the number of you
present here on a Friday evening, in Oxford! I think things must
have changed since I was an undergraduate here [audience
laughter] there must be fewer facilities. But at any rate Im
delighted to see you all.
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Let me just begin with a remark about the tsunami which, as you
know, killed several hundred thousand people among them small
children and elderly people a great majority of them were not
Christians they were people of other faiths and all faiths I
suppose and of no faith. So that I suppose one would need an
assumption to the effect that the, that the deity, if he she or
it caused it or countenanced it or wasnt able to stop it,
nevertheless it would have in some sense to be the same deity
for all those people, and if there is a greater good envisaged in
the event then it would have to be one that is somehow captured
in very different forms in these different faiths.
And I leave that point hanging in the air because I think its
something that we need to bring up a bit later on remembering
that there was a competition between the faiths! After all, a
Christian will tell you that the founder of that religion said I
am the way, the truth and the life, no-one comes to the Father
but by me, which seems rather bad news for very many of the
people who were swept away by that grave wave.
Still, lets begin at the beginning:
We have to wade our way through a number of, ifs before we getto the point that we need to discuss tonight: ifthere are
supernatural entities or phenomena in the universe, and by that I
mean things that dont fall into the category of frogs and clouds
and galaxies and human beings and so on subject to description
in terms of natural laws and the rest so ifthere are
supernatural entities or phenomena in the universe, and if these
supernatural phenomena are in some way active If they, if
theyre agents and lets just, for grammatical simplicity,
talk in terms of one such thing, call it (X) for the moment; if(X) is an agent that is, can do things and in some way, react
to the facts in the universe and if, further, that supernatural
entity is not merely an agent but also an intelligent one has
intelligence and if, yet again its not merely intelligent but
also interestedin this bit of the universe with we, people, in
it; then we need to ask ourselves the question, What, if
anything, can be inferred about the nature of, such an entity (if
we allow ourselves so many, ifs) from the evidence that we have
available to us?
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So if, if theres a supernatural entity which is intelligent and
interested in this bit of the universe, what can we say about
what that entity might be like, on the basis of what the world
seems like to us? And were remembering here that the evidence
includes tsunamis and childhood cancers and things like that.
And the answer would have to be something like this: at first
blush, at any rate before the theologians get to work on us
it would seem that that intelligent and interested agency, in
the universe, would have to be either malevolent or, if not
impotent, then only quasi-potent.
Okay, so malevolent we could understand: the fact that the Old
Testament is full of suggestions that if you were a Midianite orsomeone like that, then the deity might indeed be reasonably
malevolent to, towards you.
So, but if not malevolent then, then not omnipotent, because ...
constrained in some way in its power to lessen the suffering that
is experienced by the creation with which it, to which it stands
in some relation.
But the answer to that second point is to say Well, maybe it is
benevolent but its omnipotence is not exercised in a way that
would ensure a reduction of the amount of suffering that there
is, in the universe, because it has a purpose a greater purpose
that the suffering should, in some way, subserve.
Now both those points were made by Professor Craig in his
presentation and he was talking about the hidden assumptions
made, by the person who doesnt believe in fairies and so on, if,
(1) if God is omnipotent then he can create any world that he
desires and he disputed that assumption and thats the point
that Ive just raised about quasi-potence or lack of potency
and the second one about Gods benevolence, that if God is
omnibenevolent he prefers a world in which evil doesnt exist,
and he raised a point in connection with that too.
And you will notice that the points actually dont sit quite
consistently with one another because the answer, that he gave to
the first point, is so God is not quite omnipotent because there
are some things that he cant do. For example, he cant do
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logically impossible things well, we know that already because
he cant eat himself for breakfast and that kind of thing but
what he also cant do is to create a world which has free will in
it (required, incidentally, so that we can answer problems about
the existence of moral evil in the world remembering that if
there is a God who is a creator of the world, and is responsible
ultimately for everything that happens in it, then hes
responsible for murder and rape and the rest of it and so in
order to block that consequence we have to think in terms of the
creation parts of the creation, anyway, thats us having free
will). So hes not quite omnipotent is the derogation from that
point.
But, as for the omnibenevolence, well, hes willing to let
suffering occur in the world for a greater good. And that if only
we could see sub specie aeternitatis what that greater good is,
then no matter how great the suffering, say of grief, of loss, of
terror, of being faced with an unkind or cruel nature no matter
what the experience of suffering might be nevertheless it
subserves some, some greater good. And we cant see what that is
because we have finite minds. Now, I just mention in passing, to
leave to one side for discussion, the thought that invoking the
finitude of our cognitive powers our inability to see what that
great good might be is, as it seems to me, a very helpful and
convenient argument for the theologian; because once one pulls
the curtain of mystery across things then, of course, one can say
and believe anything.
But the inconsistency between the two points is this: if you
derogate somewhat from Gods omnipotence, then youre in effect
saying that he cant in a world which contains free will,
agents and so on he cant have prevented the degree of
suffering that is present in the world.
The second point: hes, nevertheless, willing to let suffering
occur for a greater good. So, if you think that suffering is
necessary for a greater good, then and you permit it to happen
then the implication seems to be that you coulddo something
about not letting it happen, but since youve got this greater
good in mind, you, do let it happen.
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beings in it and which doesnt have pain and suffering in it.
Whats the logical inconsistency there?
What the theologian has to argue, in response to that point, is
that the world could not, could not notice the strength of themodality there, that actually occurs in statement (C) that God
could not have created a world with as much good as this world
contains, unless it contained the degree of evil, of natural evil
that it has in it.
Now why should one accept that? If one accepts that God is
genuinely omnipotent, then he could create a world which
maximizes the good and minimizes or perhaps dispenses
altogether the pain and suffering. One could imagine, forexample, him creating a world which was entirely intellectual.
After all, although many of our agonies are intellectual ones I
mean, some of us are coming up to schools in four weeks time and
are being subjected, at the moment, to the most terrible
intellectual cruelties most of the suffering that people think
of in the world... lets take the form of physical suffering:
then we think about deprivation at one end and at the other end
the excruciating pain of certain kinds of illnesses; or the
terrible emotional pain of grief and loss and fear. Why is itthat those things should be centrally, or essentially, required
for a world to have as much good in it as this one does?
Or, arguably of course, this world doesnt contain as much good
in it, as there could be, given that the quantum of suffering in
the world is as it is.
Remember this also, that some of the natural evils that occur in
the world do so as a result of ouragency. For example, our
effect on the environment and our spreading of diseases one to
another and the rest. And so that there is a complex relationship
between the two kinds of evil that go on in the world: moral and
natural. And if the natural evil that exists in the world is,
somehow, ruled by a deity for a greater good, then the
instrumental action of moral evil, in the world, would have to be
willed by that deity too and wouldnt just be an artefact of
our having free will.
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So my thought is this: once you have taken the long route through
a whole series of suppositions thinking that the world might
contain a certain sort of entity and this entity, might have the
right kind of character, to understand and appreciate our
emotional and sensational lives, and might be interested in some
way in those emotions and sensations then the question, if you
really, reallywanted to accept that view then the question
arises, with great urgency, as to what kind of being that could
be, consistently with the way the world in fact is?
And its very interesting to notice that, in the development of
thinking about the relationship that individual human beings have
with their world with a world containing the possibilities of
suffering and the rest there have been dramatic, dramatically
different conceptions of that relationship. For example, in the
medieval period, Contemptus Mundi literature was, a great feature
the Da Vinci Code of the day it was the book that told you
that the world was a veil of tears and suffering, and that all we
had to do was endure and pay your tithes and you would,
eventually, get to heaven.
And what followed that period in the renaissance was a re-
discovery of the joy and the beauty of the world and thepossibility, the pleasure, in the world and a re-focusing of
attention by human beings on things that are immanent things
that are here in the world, and a desire to maximize the
pleasure and enjoyment that came from understanding that world,
from appreciating the beauties in it and from adding to them. A
world, in other words, where The Good was conceived as lying in
things that spoke to the emotions and the sensations of human
beings.
Well, according to a theory which has it that suffering is some
part of the production of the greater good, there would have to
be questions asked about the degree of consistency between the
conception that the renaissance thinkers had about The Good and
that conception about the need that the world has for there to be
suffering and pain in it. And anybody who takes the sort of
position that I do, whos very sceptical about the idea that
there are supernatural agencies intelligent enough and
interested enough in us to know about us, that we can suffer and
enjoy, that we can feel fear and that we can feel joy
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anybody... any beingwho had that conception of us, would have to
be quite conscious of the effect that its agency had in respect
of what we regard as being in our interests and for our good.
So, in that, when we pose the question is it reasonable tobelieve that there could be a deity and I think, we notice,
that our concept of God is a very capacious one which has to do
with a great number of different traditions and definitions of
what such a being could be, but when we ask that question
generally, generally speaking we think an almighty and all-
loving deity.
And can it be reasonable to think that the universe is governed
by, even contains, such a thing? And I think the answer has tobe: not.
Thank you.
[Applause]
[Back to Top]
Rebuttal William Lane Craig:
Well thank you, Professor Grayling, for those interesting remarks
in response to my opening statement. Youll remember that I
distinguished between two versions of the problem of evil: the
logical version and the probabilistic version. And I suggested
that the logical version is no longer defended today; that it has
been given up because its been recognized that the atheist
cannot sustain the enormous burden of proof this involves. But,
so far as I could understand Professor Graylings position in his
opening speech, hes sticking by the logical version of theproblem of evil despite that, hes going to maintain it.
Now he said that, Looking at the world, we would conclude the
deity must be either impotent or malevolent. But to say that is
to assume precisely those two hidden assumptions, namely that:
if God is omnipotent he can create any world that he desires,
and if hes omnibenevolent he would prefer a world without evil
over a world with evil. And so if the response is not to be
question-begging we need to see some argument on behalf of those
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two premises, and youll remember I suggested that those cannot
be proved.
First, if free will is even possible, it follows that an
omnipotent God cannot create every world that he might desire.Now Professor Grayling responded by saying, Well, Doctor Craig
youre qualifying divine omnipotence, on your view God is not
quite omnipotentand I want to protest against that and say
thats not at all accurate. Historically, divine omnipotence has
always been defined in terms of Gods ability to do whatever is
logically possible. The only philosopher that I know of, who
thought God could do logical impossibilities, was Rene Descartes.
But everyone else has always said: omnipotence means the ability
to do whatever is logically possible. But Gods inability to
make a round square or a married bachelor is not an inability on
Gods part because there is no such thing as a round square, or a
married bachelor. Those are just self-contradictory combinations
of words that have no referent. So God can do anything; anything
that is logically possible!
And, as I say, it is logically impossible to make someone freely
do something, and I dont think that Professor Grayling grasped
the difference between a possible world and a feasible world.There arepossible worlds, logically, where everyone always
chooses to do the right thing. But those worlds may not be
feasible for God because if God created the agents in them, in
the circumstances envisioned, the agents might choose differently
might go the wrong way. So that given that its logically
impossible to make someone freely choose to do something, not
every logically possible world is actualisable by God only
feasible worlds. And therefore this is no qualification of divine
omnipotence to say, there are worlds that God is incapable of
creating.
Now, if you do want to go with Descartes and say, Well, Gods
omnipotence means he can do the logically impossible, well, then
theres no problem of evil at all! Because God can bring it about
that he exists, and that evil exists, even though these are
logically incompatible with each other! [some audience laughter]
So, if you go that route, youve completely dissolved any problem
of evil.
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Now, what about the second assumption, that God prefers a world
without evil, over a worldwithevil? And I suggested that if we
have morally sufficient reasons for permitting pain and suffering
then sometimes we do allow it. Now, here, Professor Grayling
says, but a father wouldnt allow his children to suffer so
terribly. I want to say a couple of things here: first, the
father analogy is terribly misleading. We must not compare God to
a human father when it comes to moral responsibility, because
they are so different. God we have a moral obligation to
worship God, but any human father who demanded worship from his
children would be egomaniacal. So that the relationship between a
child and his human father is completely different from our moral
obligations toward God. Moreover, a human father doesnt have
certain rights vis--vis his child, that God has toward us: God
is our creator and sustainer the author and giver of life. A
human father doesnt have the right to take the life of his own
child, but if God wanted to take my life this evening, thats his
prerogative. It is in his hands when I live and when I die. So
the moral obligations between a father and his child are utterly
different from Gods relationship with us.
But, in any case, the point remains unrefuted: even the human
father will sometimes permit suffering, in the life of his child,
because of a morally sufficient overriding reason. He wouldnt
permit, perhaps, terrible suffering. But if he has a morally
sufficient reason, hell permit it. And it is possible that God
could have morally sufficient reasons for permitting horrible and
terrible suffering in this world. And as long as thats even
possible, the atheist has failed to shoulder the burden of proof
to show that this second assumption is true.
And its so important for us to remember here, its not the
theist who bears the burden of proof here. Its the atheist who
is claiming that (A) and (B) are logically incompatible. Its the
atheist who bears the burden of proof to show that these hidden
assumptions are true. All I have to do is simply undercut them by
saying, Well, its possible that theyre not true. The atheist
must prove theyre necessarily true and, until he does that, he
cant carry his case.
But remember I said we can go a step further: we can actually
prove that (A) and (B) are logically compatible with each other,
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on the basis of (C)! (C) doesnt even need to be true! As long as
its justpossiblytrue, it proves that there is a possible world
in which God and Evil co-exist, and I didnt hear any response
from Professor Grayling to that point.
In short, the Logical Problem of Evil is just not defended
anymore in the philosophical community. Peter Van Inwagen, in the
Philosophical Perspectives of 1991, writes:
It used to be widely held that evil was incompatible with the
existence of God. That no possible world contained both God and
evil. So far as I am able to tell, this thesis is no longer
defended.
So let me just simply, in the interests of debate, go on to the
probabilistic problem, even though Professor Grayling didnt
discuss it. I suggested three reasons that the probabilistic
problem of Evil faces insuperable difficulties:
First, that were not in a good position to assess these
probabilities inductively. In a very important article in
Philosophical Perspectives of 1991, William Alston in a classic
article on the evidential problem of evil lists six cognitive
limits on us that make it, in principle, impossible for us to
judge that God doesnt have not have morally sufficient
reasons for permitting the evil in the world. Let me list these:
Number one: lack of data. Our ignorance of the distant future, or
the distant past; our ignorance of the ultimate constitution of
the universe, the secrets of the human heart.
Two: complexity greater than we can handle. For example, trying
to understand different systems of natural law in which
different laws of nature operate we have no clue about what
systems are available to God.
[Three]: the difficulty of knowing what is metaphysically
possible. How do we know what logically imaginable worlds are
actually metaphysically possible?
Four: our ignorance of the full range of possibilities. We dont
know how these are restricted.
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Five: our ignorance of the full range of values. That is to say
there may be unknown goods, that God brings about, that we are
not even aware of.
And six: the limits of our capacity to make well-considered valuejudgements. That is to say, to be able to compare different
possible worlds with a view toward determining which world would
be the best.
Now, in my opening speech I gave an illustration of just one of
those cognitive limits, namely: our lack of data. And I
illustrated this from utilitarianism. We have no idea, when an
action is performed, whether it will ultimately produce great
happiness or great disaster, and therefore utilitarianism iswrong in saying that an action is right or wrong based on its
consequences because we dont knowthe ultimate consequences.
But let me give another example from current science: in chaos
theory, scientists have been able to show that certain
macroscopic systems are highly sensitive to the tiniest
perturbations. The flutter of a butterflys wing, in a jungle in
west Africa, can set in motion forces that will eventually issue
in a hurricane over the Atlantic Ocean. And yet no-one, lookingat that little butterfly, would be able even in principle to
predict such an outcome.
Another example from popular culture: in the movie Sliding Doors,
with Gwyneth Paltrow, we see how a young woman is rushing into
the underground to catch a subway train and just as she
approaches the train, the doors begin to slide shut. At that
point, the film splits in two, and one half of the film narrates
her life as it would have happened if she had made it through the
doors. The other half of the film shows what would happen to her
if the doors closed before she got there. And whats interesting,
in this film, is the one life turns into happiness, success,
everything she does is great; whereas the other life goes from
bad to worse, disaster, failure, misery... all because of this
one seemingly trivial incident of catching those sliding doors.
Moreover, whether she got through those sliding doors was based
upon whether her path was momentarily blocked, on the steps, by a
little girl playing with her dolly on the handrail. And, of
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course, what the movie doesnt show is that little girls
playing, with the dolly on the handrail, was also contingent upon
for example how many, how quickly she buttoned her blouse
when dressing for school that morning; or how much muesli her
mother put in the bowl how long it would take to eat breakfast
or whether her father had to stop to tie his shoe on the way
into the underground. You begin to see that these contingencies
result in simply unpredictable situations.
But heres the really interesting part of the film: its the
shock ending. At the end of the movie you suddenly discover
that, in the life in which everything is going hunky-dory and
just super, shes suddenly killed in a car accident and her
life comes to an end. Whereas in the miserable, unhappy life,
that life turns around and it turns out that that is the really
good life after all.
This illustrates, I think, so poignantly how were simply not in
a position to judge when things come into our life that God
does not have a morally sufficient reason for permitting it.
William Alston concludes:
We are simply not in a position to justifiably assert that Godwould have no sufficient reason for permitting evil. And if that
is right, the probabilistic argument from evil is in no better
shape than its late, lamented, logical cousin.
Second: I suggested that Christian theism increases the
probability, of God and evil in the world, because Gods purpose
in the world is not happiness, but the knowledge of himself to
bring people freely to salvation. Well, how is God doing on this
job? In 1990 some fascinating statistics were released, from the
US Centre for World Mission, plotting the number of committed
Christians in the world toward non-Christians in the world. in
the year AD 100 there were 360 non-Christians for every committed
Christian in the world; by AD 1000 there were 220 non-Christians
per committed Christian in the world; by 1900 there were 27 non-
Christians for every committed Christian in the world; by 1989
there were only 7 non-Christians for every committed Christian in
the world.
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God is building his kingdom down through history, and it is not
at all improbable that natural and moral evils are part of the
means which he uses to bring people into his kingdom and to give
them eternal life and everlasting happiness in comparison to
which, the sufferings of this life will diminish to infinitesimal
proportions.
[Applause]
[Back to Top]
Rebuttal A.C. Grayling:
Well thank you, thank you for that and, thank you to Professor
Craig too: its a very, very long time since Ive heard a sermon.
My first point is that one always finds oneself in a difficulty,
in this kind of a situation which I find myself at the moment, me
being someone who is the token atheist here. Because I say, begin
by saying: Okay, okay, just suppose that theres a profoundly
improbable, you know, idea that there is some being out there in
the universe that has these properties of being, you know,
interested in us and aware and understands our situations, so
on... just suppose that there is such a being. Then, and then you
trot out your memory and I used to have to go to chapel every
morning at the school that I went to and Ive vague memories
of Almighty God to whom all things are known, all things are
possibleand so on, and so Id think, Oh well, okay, this
supposed being is going to be omnipotent and he loves us and hes
our father, and all the rest of it.
And then I find, when I have debates with theologians, that
thats not whats meant at all! In fact, the goalpost the
divine goalpost keeps moving, every time you say anything about
this what such a being would have to be like you find that
thats not whats meant!
So, so when I say, you know, that we either create God in our
image or he is, hes created us in his image and so on, then our
best understanding of what that relationship would be with a
creator who cares about us, and all that is a fatherly
relationship (except I, as a father, tend not to drown my
children all that often and so on) you know that that attempt to
http://www.bethinking.org/suffering/bill-craig-vs-a.c.-grayling-debate-transcript.htm#Tophttp://www.bethinking.org/suffering/bill-craig-vs-a.c.-grayling-debate-transcript.htm#Top -
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try to get some grip on the moral realities here, I find, is a
misleading analogy. So, we flounder because the goalposts do
move all the time.
But, still, lets do our best:
Possible... a logically possible world may not be a feasible
world. Now, I can understand that a logically possible world
might not be a desirable world. It could be logically possible
that God could there could be a God and that God could create
free-willed beings and also that theres no natural evil in that
world. But Professor Craig said that thats not feasiblefor
God. I... (this is slightly jigsaw-puzzled because Ive got to
keep several pieces going at the same time) we have to rememberthat we dont have a great deal of knowledge about Gods nature
so bear that in mind but we know enoughto know that its not
feasiblefor Gods purposes that, although its a logically
possible world in which there is free will but no natural evil
thats not feasible for God.
But I find the distinction between logical possibility and
feasibility so fine and subtle a one, that I dont actually see
it. I can see a distinction between logical possibility anddesirability, but I dont see the difference between possibility
and feasibility.
Then, Professor Craig talked about God having morally sufficient
reasons for suffering. Thats a fine-sounding phrase: morally
sufficient reasons for suffering. And that, you know, even if we
dont know what it is and were here once again behind the veil
of ignorance nevertheless we could take, on trust, the thought
that being drowned in a tsunami, or dying painfully of cancer or
something, would be good for us in some way but we dont know
what way that is and we simply have to believe it.
But remember, that the discussion were having at the moment is
is it reasonable forus to believe that, in a world which
contains tsunamis and childhood cancers and the rest, that there
could be a being, at least, of great power, at least who
understands and has some concerns for our feelings and attitudes
and so on?Whether... whether its reasonable to believe that
there could be such a being. And I am suggesting that there is a
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kind of incoherence in the idea of a being, with anything like
the traditional attributes of God, and a world with the kind of
world that we do in fact occupy.
Professor Craig says that there are three shortcomings to theprobabilistic version of the argument from evil. And, by the way,
I should just mention that Professor Craig says that the current
authoritiesin the field say that nobody now takes the Logical
Problem of Evilseriously. Well, long before that happened,
people had stopped taking seriously the Argument from Authority,
which is as you know a logical fallacy. So the fact that
people that the theologians are not taking arguments
seriously, doesnt seem to me a refutation of it.
But, having left that one aside, the Probabilistic Problem of
Evil: Were not in the position to assess, inductively, the
probability etcetera etcetera.So this is an appeal to our
finitude and our ignorance, so we dont know what those morally
sufficient reasons would be.
Second point: Christian theism entails doctrines that increase
the probability of the co-existence of God and evil. Well, as I
say, if you look at, if youre going to look at it from aChristian perspective if youre going to look at it from the
point of view of the Canonical Gospels where we are told that
God is almighty, that he is our Father(we say Our Father in
Heavenand so on) that he can do all things, that he cares about
the least sparrow; he also says by the way also for those of
you who are about to do schools, take no thoughtfor tomorrow
(you dont have to revise and so on)! He says all these very
comforting things which give us if were going to start at a
Christian perspective, at any rate a picture of the deitywholly inconsistent with the idea of natural evil in the world
unless we accept that there is some enormouslygreater good
thats going to be subserved by some of these terrible sufferings
that are experienced in this world and well just get you to
take on trust the fact that there is that greater good, but we
dont know what it is.
And finally, Professor Craig says that relative to the full
scopeof the evidence, (not just the evidence of evil in theworld but all the evidence that there is), that Gods existence
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is probable. I would have thought that taking the full scope of
the evidence into account, about this world of ours, would have
made the probability that there is a supernatural being of some
kind, in this universe, infinitesimally... the probability
infinitesimally small.
One last thing: Professor Craig talks about, the defeater of
the utilitarian argument residing in the fact that we dont
really know what the ultimate consequences are going to be of our
actions. I can know what the, you know, medium-term consequences
are going to be: the difference between giving you an ice cream
and kicking you on the ankle I can tell that the one is going
to probably be more pleasant for you than the other! So,
generally speaking, of course, when were being utilitarian
about our actions we go by our best lights and by whats most
likely in the course of our experience, and so on.
And what one doesnt want to do is to suffer paralysis of moral
action by butterfly effect! You see, if I thought... Im just
about to do something just about to give you an ice cream and
I think to myself, God! Id better not do that, you know,
because this could cause a storm over the Atlantic, well, you
know, [audience laughter] or some dreadful... some greatdisaster will happen, and, you know, everything is so
contingent that youd best not do anything at all! Well, of
course, the fact of the matter is that, in this world of ours,
our understanding of human nature and the human condition is
pretty rich and good on the whole for all our purposes. Remember
what John Watts said in the preface to his essay, he said, The
light that is set up in us shines bright enough for all our
purposes. And generally speaking, as I say, were much more
confident that ice creams are better than kicks on the ankles!
So, from that point of view, I think our grasp of moral realities
isextendable to this idea, this debate that were having, about
whether its reasonable to think that a world such as ours might
have something that rather blurrily approximates to one or
another of the conceptions of a deity, even though... even though
its very hard to pin down just quite what that might be.
This is not intended to be a commercial break but I might justmention a recent book of mine in which I set forward an argument
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among my other arguments about these matters; where I talk
about the perfumed smokescreenwhich lies between the ordinary
believer who goes to church and is told that, God is a Father
who cares for you and he holds you in this hand and you need have
no fear and that all is for the best in this, indeed, best of
all possible worlds(as were told) and the theological
sophistication, in both senses of the term, of the arguments
which try to show us that, despite appearances, despite the
facts, despite the realities of our existence in this world and
our confrontation with how hard and harsh the world can be
nevertheless, fundamentally and ultimately, its all for our
good.
Professor Craig said that, from the point of view of Christian
theology, happiness is not the point. The point is not for you to
be happy, at least, in this life. There is a posthumous
dispensation in which you will know ultimate satisfaction and
fulfilment and joy. So there is a blank cheque: just if you can
endure if you can accept if you would keep your faith despite
the contrary evidence, then you can have a reasonable hope that
in this future dispensation you will be happy.
So happiness isthe ultimate end, although its not ourhappiness: its not a happiness of ice creams and sunshine but,
well, not quite sure what it might be... endless hymn singing or
some, some alternative, at any rate, to what we normally take to
be the happiness in this world.
But I, but I think, remember that our point is about, about
reasonableness: its not my task, as someone who doesnt
believe in the existence of supernatural agencies in the
universe, to disprove the existence of such things. Thats not mytask. Nor is it my task to prove that the universe is only a
natural realm. My task is merely to say that on any of the
traditional understandings of the notion of the deity, of such a
supernatural being even the most minimal one which just
requires of it, that if it had any degree of insight and of
appreciation of ourperspective of things is it reasonable to
believe that there could be such a being? And also that such a
being could have any influence at all on what happens to
creatures like us, in this universe. Is it reasonable to believe
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in such a being, consistently, with the facts of the world as
they are around us? And I say, I say not.
But remember that, again, to take a cue from Professor Craig
there: that, thats a point made about the existence of naturalevil in the world, but one could generalize it and say from the
point of view of the total scope of the evidence, the
reasonableness of believing such a thing diminishes to zero.
Thank you.