Goldstein - The Unconscious Indianization of ‘Western’ Conservatism

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The unconscious Indianization of

‘Western’ conservatism – is Indian

conservatism a universal model?Björn Goldstein

a

a Institute of Political Science, WWU Münster, Münster, Germany

Published online: 01 Oct 2014.

To cite this article: Björn Goldstein (2015) The unconscious Indianization of ‘Western’conservatism – is Indian conservatism a universal model?, Global Discourse: An Interdisciplinary

Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought, 5:1, 44-65, DOI:

10.1080/23269995.2014.946315

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RESEARCH ARTICLE

The unconscious Indianization of ‘Western’ conservatism – is Indianconservatism a universal model?

Björn Goldstein*

Institute of Political Science, WWU Münster, Münster, Germany

According to Max Horkheimer, the core dilemma of capitalist ideology is that it promotes egoism and contempt for egoism at the same time. This basic contradictiontranslates into belief in an organically structured society consisting of needs satisfyingindividuals and groups. This can be made out as a principle that prevails across allconservative schools and psychological differences. Conservative parties in the ‘West ’have started to adopt an unprecedented openness to the diversity of contemporary

pluralistic societies. In doing so, they do what conservatives always did – they conformto actual social conditions. Conservatism is far from being anti-diversity, as long as thecore belief remains untouched. The transformation of ‘Western’ conservatism wewitness today is moulding conservatism into a form that has since long been estab-lished in India, where plurality and multiculturality have never been absent. This newdevelopment brings to the fore the key elements of a universal conservatism indepen-dent of cultural contexts.

Keywords: ambiguity; BJP; conservatism; critical theory; diversity; Horkheimer;

India; IUML; psychology; Tamil Nadu; tolerance

instead of deploring our lack of homogeneity we should glory in it. Instead of regarding Indiaas a failed or deformed nation-state we should see it as a new political form, perhaps even asa forerunner of the future. We are in some ways where Europe wants to be.

Dharma Kumar

Universal conservatism

Conservatism is usually taken to refer to values from traditions that are bound to certainhistories of localities. It is embedded in different settings and therefore differs from

locality to locality, but still conservatives share assumptions that are not mutually exclu-

sive despite their basis in different cultural roots. Social harmony is a core tenet of

conservative thought all around the world and always implies the acceptance of human

inequality in this world. In conservative thinking, difference is the condition for harmony,

because from a conservative point of view harmony of equals is neither easily imaginable

nor affective in a systemic sense, just like the differentiated functions in an organism. In

the conservative idyll differences of humans as economic units and as individual con-

temporaries make mutual gains possible and interesting. Equality is only accepted in a

metaphysical sense, as it is with universal love, for instance, but it is nothing to be

expected in this world. In this respect, contemporary conservatism is a peculiar

*Email: [email protected]

Global Discourse, 2015

Vol. 5, No. 1, 44 – 65, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23269995.2014.946315

© 2014 Taylor & Francis



ideological expression of the coexistence of egoism and anti-egoism as the core dilemma

of bourgeois ideology described by Max Horkheimer (1988). In this article, I will argue

that this feature is central to conservatism in general and explains the prevalence of

conservatism today within parties that for many observers have lost their ‘conservative’

qualities. The history of conservatism shows that it is highly flexible and adaptable to

changing situations and from a psychological perspective not at all opposed to plurality

and diversity.

Conservatism in India is well adapted to the pluralist Indian context, and it has

features that are applicable to many countries in the world where a complex social

diversification is a comparatively recent phenomenon. The non-traditionalist attempt t o

incorporate diversity and pluralism into conservative party programmes in the ‘West ’1

indicates that unknowingly Indian-style conservatism has become universal conservatism.

The basic feature of what conservatism across community boundaries is comes to the fore

when references to any kind of homogeneity disappear.

In the following sections, I will outline the peculiarities of Indian conservatism. After

that, I will give a description of conservatism inspired by Max Horkheimer ’s analysis of the ideological core contradiction of capitalism. The following sections illustrate through

historical analysis of the American and the German examples the flexibility of conserva-

tism to adapt to new situations. In the next step, findings concerning conservatism from

political psychology will be outlined to highlight the absence of any general hindrance to

a conservative acceptance of diversity. Finally, generalizing conclusions for the possibility

of a universal conservatism will be drawn.

Conservatism in India

In the early 1970s, Roland Girtler (1973) located conservatism in India only within atraditionalist wing of the Indian National Congress (INC). This wing was represented by

the Gandhian opposition to the British rule that was backed by a consciousness derived

from the nineteenth-century Hindu revival. According to Girtler, even the slogan ‘socialist

pattern of society’ of the INC party convention from 1954 was a conservative strategy

within the Congress to undermine the influence of communists and socialists (106). When

Girtler analysed Indian conservatism, right-wing parties and organizations actually did not

play a role in national elections. A couple of years later, India was ruled by the Janata

coalition, which consisted also of Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), the then-political arm of

the extreme right-wing Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS – National

Volunteers Organisation). Still, also in this time, when a government coalition held power

that contained politicians who more obviously could be labelled ‘conservative’, Erdman

(1978) highlighted Gandhism as the major representative of Indian conservatism. At the

latest, since the 1990s victories of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) over Congress in

national and regional elections and accordingly the steep rise in political importance of

other Sangh Parivar 2 organizations in India, conservatism also has to be located within

sections of this large right-wing movement. BJP stands for a ‘cultural nationalism’ that

highlights the exceptionality of Indian culture, and its leadership comes from the para-

military RSS. Similarly, organizations from political Islam that represent the religious

minority side of the right-wing element in Indian society are to different degrees open to

views ranging from centre-right conservatism to extremist political positions. The major

difference of the Muslim political organizations compared to the Hindutva organizationsis their numerical inferiority in mem bers and lack of an organization that could consoli-

date the diversity of ‘ideological’3 tendencies. The concept of conservatism used by

Global Discourse 45



Erdman and Girtler resembles strongly the common-sense equation of (social) conserva-

tism with an attitude that gives (political) priority to cultural traditions. This kind of

conservatism in India is both very easy to find on a surface level and very hard to grasp

theoretically.

It is especially difficult to put the concept of conservatism on a solid historical and

reasonable base when referring it to any concept of Hinduism. On the one hand, Gandhian

conservatism is strongly influenced by Gandhi’s ‘Western’ reading of Hinduism, namely

his theosophical influence (Bevir 2003). On the other hand, the advocates of Hindutva

strongly refer to a homogenized version of Hinduism arising from the Hindu revival

movement of the nineteenth century. This movement obviously adopted the British and

Christian understandings of religion in order to be more forceful in its nationalist struggle.

Both these Hindu traditionalist conservatisms in India refer to a Hindu tradition that is

hard to describe, because the tradition is (1) very often a ‘Western’ reading of Hinduism

and (2) not a ‘Hindu tradition’, but basically a Brahmin tradition. Hinduism as an entity

on its own has been a construct of British census authorities, and the various traditions

summarized within this concept are not represented equally. It has been argued that thedominance of the Brahmin tradition in conceptualizing Hinduism is the result of European

Indologists who simply took the texts given to them by Brahmins as basic foundations of

a Hindu religion, neglecting all other religious practices (Zachariah 2008). Thus, Hindu

conservatives cannot be sure that they really conserve Hindu traditions. More likely, they

reproduce a version of Hinduism that is non-traditional and mediated by European

academic inferences.

It may be true for all (religious and political) traditions around the world that the past a

tradition is referring to is always not the ‘real’ historical past, but a (useful) construct of

the past by its modern advocates. But this problem is even weightier for any sort of a

Hindu tradition because of a lack of a major narrative. (3) The term Hindutva (Hinduness)was coined by Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883 – 1966) who was an agnostic and

rationalist, strongly influenced by ‘Western’ philosophers. He rejected Hindu mysticism

as a hindrance to political action and only made strategic use of religion (Wolf 2010). For

him, Hinduism contrary to Hindutva meant disunity hampering his purely nationalist

mission. What was holy for him was the Indian nation (Savarkar 1932). Therefore, today’s

Hindu religious right of India refers in large part to a non-religious and mixed cultural

tradition. In order to avoid some of the problems for a Hindu-Indian identity construction

deriving from that, advocates of Indian cultural and religious peculiarity like the con-

servative Indian-American researcher Rajiv Malhotra (2013) refer to a Dharmic tradition

that includes Hindus, Jains, Sikhs and Buddhists – in short, all religions originated on

Indian territory. This has been the common Hindu Rashtra assumption since it was

formulated by the first Hindu nationalist party Hindu Mahasabha at the beginning of

the last century. Followers of this right-wing tradition still consider as un-Indian those

religious traditions that did not originate on Indian territory like – in historical order of

appearance on the subcontinent – Judaism, Christianity, Zoroastrianism, Islam and the

‘secular religion’ communism. On the side of Islamic conservatives, it is more adequate to

understand it as a desire to conserve certain Islamic traditions. But for all these religious

political currents in India, it is important to be aware that its contemporary expressions,

teachings and developments cannot be understood independent of external, basically

European influences.

Thomas Bauer (2011) has argued that Islam and its scholars have been far moretolerant of ambiguity before the influence of European scientific rigidity introduced the

need for clear definitions of ‘right ’ and ‘wrong’. A similar study on European influence on

46 B. Goldstein



ambiguity in Hinduism would probably point in a similar direction. Rajiv Malhotra sees in

tolerance of ambiguity a core feature of behaviour, thinking and psychological condition

of people coming from a Dharmic tradition. Being aware of the risk of reproducing

uncritically the old Indian genius thesis, 4 it has to be acknowledged that this tolerance of

ambiguity has indeed a base in what we are used to call Hinduism.

Hinduism is, or Hindu culture consists of, a complex multitude of divergent beliefs,

philosophies, scriptures and practices (for a perceptive introduction to doubt and disagree-

ment in Hinduism, see Sen 2005). The terms Hinduism or Hinduisms are contested and a

dogmatic interpretation of Hinduism is impossible. For practical reasons, Gantke (2013)

categorizes the Hindu traditions as (a) mystic religion(s) where the idea of or the belief in

a unity of all things, of all beings, of divine and worldly affairs, of reality is a predominant

feature. The distinctive coexistence of large numbers of different holy scriptures and

divine incarnations, and the rejection of taking any single historical event as central to

Hindu traditions, makes this ‘system’ of beliefs a cultural background of tolerance per se.

Gantke sees this mystical thought of union as the base for the preponderance of changing

and multiple identities in India. Of course, the discrepancy between idealized ethical principles and ‘real-life’ practice is always apparent, but it is particularly glaring in the

case of Hinduism. Even though mystic Hinduism is characterized by an inclusive under-

standing of tolerance, the contrast to social reality, most visible in the caste order, is

obvious. From a Hindu philosophical point of view, social contradictions are just another

indicator for the imperfection, the dualism of this-worldly affairs compared to the absolute

where union is reality. On an abstract level, we find conservative ‘ideology’ openly

expressed in this line of thinking.

It is striking that the otherness of these Dharmic traditions compared to the Abrahamic

traditions is sometimes highlighted in a fashion attempting to conserve ‘real’ India.

Malhotra for example aims at a recovery of Dharmic ways from its Muslim andEuropean distortions. This conservatism on the other hand is not always reflected by

voters and members of BJP and its affiliated organizations. Advocates of Sangh Parivar

and voters of the BJP are basically anxious middle-class and high-caste people – as we

will see internationally and transculturally the traditional proponents of conservatism –

prone to insecurity about their privileged social positions. According to concepts of

authoritarianism and conservatism in the ‘West ’ individuals displaying these character-

istics are typical voters of right-wing and conservative parties. However, Malhotra claims

that the lack of tolerance of ambiguity is not at all an Indian feature, but rather the

psychological pattern of people from messianic traditions. Extrapolating Malhotra’s

claims, it can be concluded that Hindutva’s rigidity of separating right from wrong can

be understood as another aspect of its strong ‘Western’ influence. As Ashish Nandy noted

in Nandy (1991):

Speaking pessimistically, Hindutva will be the end of Hinduism. Hinduism is the faith bywhich a majority of Indians still live. Hindutva is the ideology of a part of the upper-caste,lower-middle class Indians, though it has now spread to large parts of the urban middleclasses. The ideology is an attack on Hinduism and an attempt to protect the flanks of aminority consciousness which the democratic process is threatening to corner. […] Hinduism,I repeat, is a faith and a way of life. Hindutva is an ideology for those whose Hinduism hasworn off. Hindutva is built on the tenets of re-formed Hinduism of the nineteenth century.Reformed according to the reading of those who saw Hinduism as inferior to the Semitic

creeds, in turn seen as well-bounded, monolithic, well-organized, masculine, and capable of sustaining the ideology of an imperial state. […] Hindutva at this plane is Western imperi-alism’s last frenzied kick at Hinduism. It is an ideology meant for the super-market of global

Global Discourse 47



mass culture where all religions are available in their consumable forms, neatly packaged for the buyers. […] To those who live in Hinduism Hindutva is one of those pathologies which

periodically afflict a faith or a way of life, Hinduism has, over the centuries, handled manysuch pathologies; it still retains the capacity to handle one more. After all, has not theHinduism coped for more than a century with the modern civilization, which Gandhi, usedto call satanic? Hinduism, the argument goes, will eat up Hindutva once a sizable section of the semimodernized Hindus gives up as a lost cause the pathetic search for a psychologicaldefense against the encroaching forces of the market, the national security state, and theurban-industrial vision and, instead, confront the reality of these forces directly.

In India, the 1990s post-cold-war situation consisted of three national election victories for

the BJP, the party that represented this allegedly lost cause mentioned by Nandy, accom-

panied by strong efforts for economic liberalization. It was defeated in 2004 and 2009, but

the victory in the 2014 national elections was overwhelming. Pradeep Chhibber (1997)

explained BJP’s success since 1991 ‘lay not in mobilizing only the “religious” but in its

ability to put together a viable coalition between religious Hindus and those disaffected by

excessive political intervention in the economy’ (631). With the exception of the short-lived Janata coalition, Indian politics have been a synonym for Congress politics. This

dominance failed to meet the interests of the urban middle-classes that gained influence

during the 1980s and 1990s. The Hindutva-inspired propaganda against Congress is

always directed against its secularism that allegedly favours religious minorities and its

state interventions that accordingly are allegedly directed against free entrepreneurship

and the ‘Hindu’ way of life. While the BJP presents itself and is mostly understood by

(especially ‘Western’) commentators as driven by normative ethics based on Hindutva

ideology, the middle-class voters of the BJP seemed to feel attracted by its liberal

economic programme, at least until recently. After the 2014 general elections that gave

BJP an absolute majority, more evidence exists that both BJP’s economics and religiosityappeal to many Indian voters today. Most first-time voters supported the BJP, and the

party could enlarge massively its social voting base. While the typical BJP voters before

this election have been ‘urban dwellers, upper castes, middle classes and the educated’

(Chhibber and Verma 2014) this time also large portions of people from the lower and

lowest strata of the Indian society supported BJP, namely Other backward classes,

scheduled tribes and dalits (Chhibber and Verma 2014).

Most analysts of the elections agree that BJP’s prime ministerial candidate Narendra

Modi won the elections due to his personality and personal history as a man in the street,

as well as the economic policies in the state of Gujarat where he served as chief minister.

During the election campaign, Gujarat was presented as an outstanding development

model and has also been highlighted as such by many foreign analysts and governments

all over the world. Voices mentioning that Gujarat is one of the states with the worst social

indicators have largely been ignored (Müller 2014). Classical Hindutva themes emphasiz-

ing Hinduism-based identity and nationalist issues have dominated the appearance of the

BJP in the past but stood back this time behind economic issues. The uplifting of the

downtrodden people by policies for a robust economic growth and by being firm against

corruption have been the major topics during BJP’s election campaign. ‘Sabka saath,

sabka vikas’, meaning ‘ participation of all, development for all’, has been Modi’s recent

slogan. Chhibber and Verma even claim that it was Modi who won the elections and not

BJP because in a survey every fourth BJP voter said s/he would not have voted BJP under

a different candidate for prime minister. Added to the disappointing performance of Congress in office, this is probably the reason for the emergence of non-traditional BJP

voters. According to Chhibber and Verma, economic liberalization, the issue the BJP

48 B. Goldstein



promoted during the 1990s, is generally not supported by BJP voters (Müller 2014).

Therefore, it must be assumed that the pro-growth propaganda was successful only

because many voters for some reason trusted in Modi’s religiosity – in the programme

of a man who has been accused of being jointly responsible for the Gujarat massacre in

2002 and of being a Hindu nationalist hardliner. They trusted him probably because he

and his party stand for a different India that claims to represent the ‘real’ India, an India

unspoiled by foreign distortions and powerful in its own traditions. That a man who in the

past made his living by selling tea on railway platforms competed for being the new prime

minister made him for many at the same time more authentically ‘Indian’ and a symbol of

hope.

While secularism has been one of the core tenets of a Congress which has shaped

India since independence, it has been challenged by BJP’s propaganda of a ‘real secular-

ism’. Congress’ and leftists’ versions of secularism, they argue, is not secularism in a real

sense, because it protects religious minorities and guarantees special jurisdiction for them,

while the vast Hindu majority of India does not have any privileges. To the contrary, the

argument goes, unorganized Hinduism and Hindu culture are endangered because theyhave no means to protect themselves against organized religious minorities that keep on

converting Hindus to Christianity or Islam. Congress-style secularism was intended to

produce harmony, but in fact it created disharmony, a situation BJP with its own Hindu

culture-based politics of harmony can probably exploit. In his victory speech on 20 May

2014 at the Central Hall of Parliament, Modi made it clear that his guiding principles are

derived from Hindutva ideas: ‘The coming year 2015 – 2016 is important to us all, it will

be Pandit Deendayal Updhyaya’s centenary year, chairaveti, chairevetimantra was given

by him and this led to establishing a system of sacrifice and hard work. We have to think

about how to fulfill his dreams and work and strive to fulfill them’ (The Hindu, May 21,

2014). Deendayal Updhyaya (1916 – 1968) was a politician of the BJS, the forerunner organization of BJP and the mentor of ‘Integral Humanism’, the official ideology of the

BJP and mandatory belief for BJP members.5 Integral Humanism rejects concepts deriv-

ing from ‘Western’ political thought like individualism, socialism and capitalism because

of its underlying materialism and non-Indian origins. It promotes an idea of social

harmony that is derived from Hindu thought, with an emphasis on social communion,

and is ‘integral’ insofar as it is a holistic approach that wants politics to serve human

needs on all levels of human existence (body, mind, intelligence and soul) (Updhyaya

1965). In this respect, the ‘ideology’ of the ruling party of the world’s largest democracy

is at the same time conservative and anti-Western. The conservatism of BJP is in some

respect an integral version of conservatism that conservatives in the ‘West ’ might envy.

The Hindu mythological background does not require a theoretical split into metaphysical

and evolutionary conservatism that troubles, for instance, American conservative intellec-

tuals like Larry Arnhart (2010).

Everywhere, conservatism is a political force that tries to combine the struggle for the

interests of (mostly privileged) groups with a concept of society promoting an ahistorical

understanding of it as an organic order or harmony, respectively. In Indian conservatism,

this idea is most obvious and can very openly refer to Indian religious traditions.

Conservatism in a capitalist society can be distinguished from liberalism insofar as the

latter sees the free individual as a starting point and purpose, while conservatism puts

organic sub-state units like families, castes et cetera at the core of its assumptions, or more

precisely at the top of a hierarchy of purposes. Within this frame, different conservatisms basically differ in their tendencies to emphasize egoism or contempt for egoism, the two

sides of the ideological dilemma of capitalism outlined by Max Horkheimer.

Global Discourse 49



Egoism and harmony – conservatism and ideology

In Egoism and Freedom Movement , one of the founding documents of the Frankfurt

School, Max Horkheimer (1988) presented an analysis of the opposition between egoism

(pleasure) and anti-egoism (altruism) as a constitutive part of bourgeois ideology.

Horkheimer sees the same moral base in the Machiavellian anthropological conceptionthat attempts to domesticate an egoistic human nature for a higher good as much as in

Thomas More’s Utopia where altruistic people deliberately condemn egoism due to their

good nature. Both assumptions about human nature – also represented by Hobbes vs.

Rousseau – point to a basic contradiction within capitalist civil society: the contradiction

between a theoretical aversion to egoism and a highly egoistic practice. This fact is far

from mysterious because the balance or imbalance between interest and common goals is

at the bottom of all political thought. While this holds true for much non-bourgeois

political thought as well, it is the conscious condemnation of individual pleasure seeking

that, according to Horkheimer, is peculiar for the epoch. For Horkheimer, this situation

stabilizes a capitalist society, because group interests are constrained or even immunized

in order to serve the leadership of the capitalist state. If we exchange the Marxian term of

the capitalist state with the conservative terms organic society, ordered liberty or social

harmony, we can get an idea about how much this core contradiction is reflected in

conservative thought.6

In order to give an illustration of how this basic contradiction translates into con-

servative thought, let me start with an exam ple of a conservative interpretation of the

‘ pleasure suppression’ problem. John Gray’s7 book Straw Dogs contains a chapter where

he explains why drug use is a common human phenomenon and at the same time banned.

He writes that humans, being conscious animals, try to escape the suffering which

accompanies consciousness by using drugs. In his anti-progressivist approach, he argues

that the more infected states or societies are by the delusion of rationality and progress, theharsher governments oppress drug users (2002). His argument contains some persuasive

parts, especially where he points out that pleasure seeking, here by drug use, is natural and

policies against it are directed against this nature.8 For Gray, the only way to explain the

suppression of drug use (pleasure) is to blame humanist believers in the improvement of

the human condition for imposing their (finally Christian) delusional ideas on others.

Particularly interesting in this argument is the conservative interpretation of the problem.

Gray sees the individual human animal deprived of its harmonious oneness with nature

and prevented from satisfying its pleasure drives by groups within society that follow their

narrow-minded egoistic beliefs. These beliefs are harmful because they are dominant and

do not integrate into a larger harmony, they promote a sameness that is consideredunnatural. The idea that the suppression of pleasure itself might be a condition for

civilization/society in general, according to Freud (2010), or late-capitalist societies in

particular, according to the Frankfurt School (especially Marcuse 1974), is alien for Gray.

That the suppression of pleasure and, at the same time, the advocacy of pleasure is part of

the same phenomenon is incomprehensible to conservative thinking, not because con-

servatives are not smart enough for dialectics, but because of their conviction that social

harmony is the result of a functional fit of its different constitutive parts. That it is the

functioning of social harmony which requires pleasure suppression at the individual level

is concealed. Conservatism, a strand of bourgeois ideology, cannot take into account the

underlying socio-economic and psychological logics of capitalism, because it rejects these

as manifestations of hostile (Marxist) ‘ideology’, and can only imagine the existence of

disapproved practices (for Gray, the ban on drugs) as the result of ‘ideological’ currents

50 B. Goldstein



that do not submit to the great harmony. Additionally for Gray, the desire for drugs results

from a defect of human nature, namely consciousness. By that, the ideological character

of conservatism unfolds. The apparent problem that individuals are deprived of experien-

cing pleasure while the happiness for the whole community is propagated is interpreted in

a conservative fashion. In Gray’s interpretation, the problem is conditioned by nature

(inaccessible to human intervention) and progressivist ‘ideology’.

Ideology in the Frankfurt School’s approach is understood as a consciousness that is

necessary and wrong at the same time. For Adorno (1966; Horkheimer and Adorno 2003),

ideology is the combination of truth and falsehood at any historical state; only in post-

liberal late-capitalism and fascism, ideology becomes obsolete because the social actuality

becomes its ideology itself. Conservatism persists within the sphere of ideology in the

former sense, because the relationship between today’s actual social reality and modern

conservatism can be interpreted as a reflection of social actuality that is partly true and

false. From Louis Althusser (1995), we learn that ideology not only is an immaterial

superstructure resulting from a certain material base, the state of development of produc-

tive forces, but also has a material side itself, namely its practical realization. According tohim, ideological state apparatuses – social, religious and academic practices included –

reaffirm the very mode of production these practices originated from without being

conscious. From Adorno (1969) and more recently from Slavoj Žižek (1995), we have

regularly been informed that ideology is inescapable. From this perspective conservative

philosophy – even when it puts on an anti-philosophical attitude like Gray’s does – can be

nothing more than an unconscious practical affirmation of the existing socio-economic

order.

Of course, Horkheimer ’s ‘ bourgeois ideology’ refers to capitalist ideology, and this

par excellence is liberalism. It is conservatism that made the dilemma identified by

Horkheimer a system of belief itself. The protestant working ethic that came alongwith the capitalist mode of production (Weber 2010) shows how liberalism on an

abstract level can acknowledge egoistic drives for finally serving the society (‘the

invisible hand’) and at the same time condemn the pleasure-seeking drive of egoistic

acting. Conservatism is in a way more straightforward than liberalism in enduring the

constitutive contradiction of capitalist ideology, because it provides a holistic perspec-

tive on society that acknowledges economic inequality without the moral need for

more equality due to assumptions about a natural defectiveness of human individuals

and groups (mostly families) and a harmonic understanding of society. Conservatives

across all cultural backgrounds share the belief in need satisfaction seeking unequal

individuals and groups (egoism) that together form an organic society (anti-egoism).

Different strands of conservative thought come together in their advocacy of this kind

of holistic harmony. Psychologically, there may be large differences between ‘status

quo’ conservatives and ‘laissez-faire’ conservatives (Stenner 2009), but a commonality

on the level of conservative political thought exists. The idea of society as an organic

entity, where a functional differentiation of segments of the society – ‘to each his own’

– generates harmony, is a basic assumption of conservatism. It does not matter if an

author like Honderich (1990) describes any conservative claim for being concerned

with the common well-being of a society as a mere hypocrisy or if it is presented as a

sincere conviction (Schmitz 2009), or if conservatives deny the existence of divine

ordering principles (Arnhart 2010). The existence of a core assumption for all con-

servatisms is the reason why a large variety of offshoots of conservative schools andsects still carry the same label of being conservative. That these ‘enhancements’ are

far from being a recent development, but – contrary to the prejudice – a constant

Global Discourse 51



principle of conservatism’s adaptability to changing socio-economic conditions, will

be illustrated by the brief history of the flexibility of conservative thought in the

following sections.

The flexibility of conservatism

When 25 years ago Brian Girvin (1988) saw in the merging of conservatism with

liberalism a new transformation of conservatism taking place, he was already wrong.

Though they existed next to each other and represented quite distinct groups within

capitalist societies in the nineteenth century, liberalism and conservatism are not mutually

exclusive.

For a long time, the way capitalism and civic society developed in the British Empire

and North America was taken as the normal, liberal way capitalism has to develop.

However, a type of capitalism developed that historically had its most radical expression

in the German path of development, the so-called German Sonderweg (special route).

While the former is often described as the ideal means by which liberal values and ideaslike the juridical freedom of the individual and freedom of enterprise are advanced, the

latter is often depicted as a distortion of the ‘healthy’ path of development in which

capitalism and the state are joined and entrepreneurialism pursued under conditions of

authoritarianism. After the Second World War within the post-fascist Federal Republic of

Germany, some remnants of this peculiar tradition survived – like the conservative

emphasis of community – but today Germany is largely recognized as another example

of a ‘normal’ ‘Western’ market economy and not an odd case of capitalism. If today

‘special paths’ of authoritarian capitalist development are discussed in international

political science and public media, they usually deal with the People’s Republic of

China or Russia. In the historical case of Germany, very often a conservative resistanceand counter-revolution against the liberal bourgeoisie, or a violent occupation of the levers

of power by the members of the ancient regime, is used to explain the special German

development. This view is challenged by the actual behaviour of the German liberals

during the respective period. Understanding this behaviour is essential to understanding

the character of conservatism.

While in Europe conservative parties for a long time were loyal to the crown, in the

United States the loyalist Tories had to cope with the absence of a ‘native’ American

nobility and monarchy. In lieu of the King, conservatives adopted the constitution as a

point of focus. ‘American advocates of inequality have usually fallen back upon the

institution of private property as a bulwark against egalitarianism. The American con-

servative has found in the doctrine of liberty a defense against equality’ (Shannon 1962,

14). Nevertheless the ‘Declaration of Independence leaned toward liberty, but the farmers

of the Constitution were motivated by a desire to create stability and security, especially

the security of property’ (15). Shannon comments on the aversion of American conserva-

tives against the state:

Governments were regarded as inherently evil. Were it not for the evil nature of man,government would not exist at all. The fact that the governments complained of wheremonarchical or autocratic was glossed over, and all government was categorized as bad.The notion of government as a referee, primarily a restraint upon violence, is deeplyembedded in the American tradition. The fact that this ideology was a by-product of anagrarian, self-sufficient society is ignored’. (1962, 16)

52 B. Goldstein



The socio-economic strata of American conservatism did not differ much from its

‘strange’ German counterpart – landowners, high officials in military, state and church.

But German liberals had to cope with their country’s status as a latecomer to the world

economy, namely the economy of colonialism. Most likely, this was the reason for the

state-friendly development of capitalist ideology in Germany. Michael Gugel (1975)

argues that, for the German liberal bourgeoisie, the coming together with the traditional

elites and the government as an executive force was a rational attempt to prosper on the

world stage. The explanation that the divide between economic progress and political

underdevelopment in German history was the result of oppression by reactionary groups

is not sufficient, because the bourgeoisie in Germany did not advocate emancipatory

actions, but shared many political aims with the still powerful nobility. On the other hand,

the feudal elites realized that policies against the capitalist economy where unpromising.

The shared prior aim of both classes was the development of a strong state to foster

national power and economic expansion. The desire for a naval fleet were as much

symbols of this attitude as the attempts for national homogenization during the

Kulturkampf (Bismarck ’s culture struggle) and the strategic mobilization of Germanminorities living outside of Germany (Nele 1995; Gugel 1975; Thörner 2008).

These short summaries of the ideal types of diverging developments in capitalism call

to mind that capitalist ideologies differ according to historical conditions. Conservatism in

the United States is strongly linked with a liberal minimal state attitude, because the state

traditionally is associated with a potential risk to private property. In Germany, the state

was the bulwark of feudal elites and the new bourgeoisie to organize and exercise

international competitiveness. According to Gugel (1975) and Nele (1995), the notion

that conservatism in Germany until 1918 was only the ideology of the former feudal class

and a hindrance to capitalist development is wrong. The conservatism of the traditional

elites was rather modern in its adaption to the new social and economic conditions, andthe conservative outfit of the German bourgeoisie was to large parts strategic.

Conservative ideology’s combination of egoism with a notion of an organic communal

order of society was applicable to both historical and geographical conditions. In the

United States, conservatism tended strongly to the side of (family) egoism, while in

Germany it emphasized (national) community. Of course, other traditions and experiences

enforced these different developments, like the history of self-sufficiency as well as

religious backgrounds of the American settlers, or the influential tradition of anti-indivi-

dualist thought and organic romanticism in Germany’s nation-building process. But

beyond experience-based cultural differences and actual economic and political require-

ments of particular historic situations, both trends can be embraced as conservative.

Conservatism is a liberal ideology that includes an illiberal disregard of the individual

and its civic rights to the advantage of groups. While families have priority in all

conservative variants, socio-historic conditions determine how these interests are pro-

moted. And, as the German case has shown, it happens that the requirements of entre-

preneurship make the bourgeoisie adopt conservative ideas, propaganda and political

decisions. Flexibility, and not a general resistance to change, are characteristic of con-

servative politics and policies. The only unchangeable elements are core assumptions

about human inequality and an organic understanding of social harmony.

Until today and across national and cultural boundaries, conservatism is basically a

middle-class phenomenon. The fact that modern conservative parties are able to mobilize

other social spheres for their aims is partly a result of religious-based moral convictionsoutside the traditional conservative socio-economic strata that coincide with values

propagated by conservatives. This is partly because many people vote according to

Global Discourse 53



economic concerns and have no fixed party affiliation and partly because authoritarian/

conservative dispositions within individuals exist across all social strata. In most democ-

racies, conservative parties cannot rely on their traditional class base alone, and therefore

during election campaigns they regularly reach out to other sectors of the society. The

hypothesis that conservatives tend to adapt to different situations by adopting different

values in public is also sustained by the middle-class voting behaviour that historically

supported two opposing political tendencies: authoritarianism and liberalism. In Germany,

for example, the middle class has been the voting base for the Nazi-Party, but after the

Second World War it has become the base for (economic) liberalism. An explanation for

this flickering behaviour may be found in the anxiety of social descent, of which the

lower-middle class suffers regularly, as well as in rationally calculating the costs and

benefits in supporting a political trend. In his description of US conservatism, Shannon

writes that

No conservative, however, has undertaken to defend government aid to agriculture as a means

of preserving the economic base for rugged individualism. Conservatives rather support thetechnological revolution, which is destroying the very people and institutions they profess toadmire. (1962, 18)

While anxiety and stubbornness are depictions of the classic image of a change-resistant

conservative, they actually very often show highly flexible attitudes and behaviour. In

an interview I conducted with the Indian politician L. Ganesan of the BJP, he expressed

his party’s strong opposition to a ‘Western’ lifestyle that, according to his understand-

ing, comes along with an erosion of traditional gender relations in India and propaganda

for harmful sexual liberties. At the same time, he stressed that the inferior role of women

within the Indian society was a result of Muslim and British occupation that infected

India first with Islamic rigidity against women and then with Victorian sexual morals.

Flexibility in highlighting certain aspects within the pool of conservative attitudes is a

recurrent feature of conservatives. As the example of L. Ganesan illustrates, conserva-

tive attitudes to gender roles can vary according to actual conditions. Also, ‘Western’

conservatives who might favour a woman’s role according to traditional ‘female

domains’ (children, kitchen and church) can strongly disagree with the traditional

subordination of women in other ‘cultures’. This changeability of mind alludes to either

a hierarchy of values, when for example a desire for ‘cultural’ homogeneity scores

higher than for the dominance of men over women, or a rational evaluation of how to

better sustain one’s egoistic interests, by allying with one’s ‘own’ women against

‘aliens’, or the other way around. Here again, we find the conservatives’ tendency toact egoistically while believing that doing so is necessary for a higher purpose. It can

also be mere political calculation. Erdman (1978) described the strategic use of non-

conservative liberal language for conservative aims in India as a necessity for conser-

vatives to be attractive in public.

The conservative psyche

If egoism is one driving force for conservatism’s ends, we also have to assume

rationality as a basic assumption for conservative thought. Understanding conservatism

as mere class propaganda that serves the justification of amoral egoistic behaviour, likeHonderich (1990) does, implies an assumption of a full rational capacity among its

54 B. Goldstein



proponents. Understood like that, values propagated by conservatives would be a mere

‘ideological’ tool for the deception of people, and for consciously fulfilling the interests

of an amoral section of the bourgeoisie. For different reasons, this assumption can be

challenged.

Besides the fact that ideology does not deserve this name when it is only a fully

conscious programme to trick other people, the research from psychological perspectives

on conservatism (and authoritarianism) suggests that conservative thinking is limited to

certain ways by disposition. If character and trait to a large extent determine conservative

or non-conservative attitudes and behaviour, rationality can be applied by both groups, but

only within the limits of their psychological condition.

The psychological literature on conservatism often confirms common-sense knowl-

edge about conservatism. For example, while compared to liberals, the judgments and

decision-making processes of conservatives are better structured and more continuous.

While conservatives have difficulties in adjusting their response patterns to new condi-

tions, liberals on the other hand show higher tolerance of ambiguity and complexity and

are more open to novelty (Amodio et al. 2007). Conservatives have a higher need for cognitive closure, are more competitive and are more coercive and aggressive against out-

groups if these are perceived as a threat to the in-group (De Zavala, Aleksandra Cislak,

and Wesolowska 2010).

Another body of literature that deals with conservatism from a psychological perspec-

tive overlaps with large parts of the psychological research on authoritarianism. Because

conservative movements have always been the precursors of right-wing authoritarian

regimes, this association makes sense from a non-psychological perspective.

Nevertheless, conservatives might consider this association as disrespectful due to the

fact that economic liberalism plays such an important role in today ’s conservative parties

in the ‘West ’, and also because of the conservative post-fascist and post-socialist self-imagination as anti-totalitarian political forces. A tangible example of what the psycho-

logical concept of authoritarianism/conservatism is about comes from Hetherington and

Weiler (2009). They conclude that people voting for George W. Bush tended to be the

same people who favoured corporal disciplining of children. Correlations between voting

behaviour and education styles point to the fact that political decisions do not only emerge

in the political sphere, but correlate with pre-political attitudes.

The body of literature on the topic is vast, so for the purpose of this article it shall be

sufficient to outline some of the best established theories and findings in psychological

authoritarianism and conservatism research. In general, individuals described as author-

itarians have fixed stereotype assumptions about the social reality, are resistant to counter-

evidence, idealize authorities, adore conformity and are aggressive towards nonconfor-

mists (Altemeyer 1996, 2006). According to Robert Altemeyer ’s findings, authoritarian

characteristics appear if anxiety and self-righteousness come together (2006). A strong

correlation between authoritarianism and the belief in a dangerous world had been found

by Altemeyer, which brings together the aspects of anxiety and threat perception as

possible indicators for authoritarianism or conservatism.9 Both aspects are closely related,

but the predominance of one has opposite effects on human behaviour than the other.

Anxiety can lead to higher risk-averse behaviour, while the perception of threat creates

willingness for an aggressive response (Huddy et al. 2005). Nevertheless conservatives

tend to show both. The Right-Wing-Authoritarianism (RWA) scale developed by

Altemeyer is the longest established instrument in the field, but continues to be criticizedfor several reasons. In particular, the implicit equation of authoritarianism with conserva-

tism is problematic. Feldman (2003) sees ‘no evidence whatsoever that conservatism

Global Discourse 55



contributes to the dynamics of authoritarianism’ (67). Nevertheless, he agrees on a strong

correlation between conservatism and social conformity. One point rejected regularly in

Altemeyer ’s research is that the RWA scale contains many items that refer to classical

conservative attitudes. Therefore, it is hard to distinguish if somebody is really an

authoritarian or a conservative if s/he scores high on the scale (2003).

For a clearer distinction between authoritarianism and conservatism, Karen Stenner

(2005) advances the notion that conservatives are basically concerned with maintaining an

established status quo that is sanctioned by authorities, while authoritarians are basically

concerned with the establishment of uniformity. In other words, conservatives put stability

first even if the established stable society is diverse, while authoritarians are willing to

change the order they live in, because they have a prevailing urge for homogeneity.

Furthermore, she states that personality traits are activated, become visible and are

practised only if normative threat to the social and value order they wish to preserve is

experienced. The last of Stenner ’s assumptions is theoretically supported by the affective

intelligence model of Marcus, Russell Neuman, and Mackuen (2000), which claims that

changes in political behaviour depend strongly on the personal experience of threateningchange.10 On the other hand, the reaction to search security in strong institutions that

might protect one is a common human behaviour in exceptional situations, even though

the ability to cope with these situations independently differs according to one ’s education

(Oesterreich 1997). For the argument outlined here, yet another interesting correlation is

found between beliefs in a just world (‘everybody finally gets what one deserves’) and a

tendency to see justice in the current social order and a negative attitude against victims of

illness, social and economic discrimination or crime. (For an overview of just world belief

research, see Hafer and Bègue 2005.) Rubin and Peplau (1975) have conducted several

surveys which show that people who believe in a just world are more conservative, more

religious, greater advocates of hard work (they used the Protestant Ethic Scale of Mirrelsand Garret) and more authoritarian. Just world belief is a psychological expression that

reflects in a rather unveiled form conservatives’ understanding of social harmony.

At first sight, it is puzzling that versions of conservatism exist that seemingly go

beyond the framework of conservatism. Namely, the conservative tendencies towards

intolerance of ambiguity and intolerance of diversity have to be re-evaluated. With

Karen Stenner ’s work, we have to acknowledge that diversity does not necessarily arouse

a conservative’s emotions or create cognitive dissonance. Still a conservative’s tolerance is

limited due to their strong insistence on stability, order and conformism, as well as their

comparatively clear distinctions between ‘right ’ and ‘wrong’ – even where these distinc-

tions are in contradiction.

According to Stenner ’s research (2009), conservatives also differ psychologically

whether they are status quo or laissez-faire conservatives. Lacking reliable data, it is

hard to say if this holds true for all conservative milieus of the world. As we have seen,

Indian conservatism seems to blur this distinction when we look at its peculiar under-

standing of organic harmony. In the following sections, I try to support this account of

blurring further.

Two Indian conservatives, one conservatism

In February 2013, I conducted interviews with several politicians in the South Indian state

of Tamil Nadu. Next to asking questions about their opinions on the ‘West ’s’ impact onIndia and Tamil Nadu, I asked them to complete the RWA scale test. To limit and

contextualize the scope of my findings, one has to be aware that politics in Tamil Nadu

56 B. Goldstein



is particular and hasty generalizations for all of India must be avoided. Tamil Nadu’s

political party landscape is dominated by parties that emerged from the Dravidian

Movement, which represented politically the linguistic South Indians and, later, basically

the Tamil population in decisive distinction to North India, Brahmin dominance and Hindi

language. The Dravidian Movement stands theoretically for a secularist, largely anti-

religious programme, social equality on all levels (gender, caste, class) and an ethno-

nationalist Tamil agenda. The movement had already been a social movement for more

than half a decade, when Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) came to power in 1967.

Since then, Dravidian parties have ruled the Legislative Assembly of the State. The

policies of the currently ruling All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK

or ADMK) have moved far from the original Dravidian agenda, but the Dravidian

Movement ’s ideas still prevail in large parts of the population and the symbolism of the

party. This ideational ground led to a situation where right-wing agitation in the Hindutva

tradition still has a hard time to take root.

For the purpose of this article, I present from my sample some findings from inter-

views with two conservative politicians from Tamil Nadu. One of my interviewees was L.Ganesan,11 the national executive member of the BJP in Tamil Nadu. Due to the special

conditions mentioned above, the BJP plays a minor role in Tamil Nadu politics. Another

interviewee was Prof. Kader Mohideen, the national general secretary and president of the

state unit for Tamil Nadu of the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML). The IUML is an

all-Indian moderate Muslim party with a stronghold in Kerala. In the past, it had been a

coalition partner of several leftist parties, including INC, DMK, ADMK, Communist

Party of India and Communist Party of India/Marxist, which again indicates the pragma-

tism of conservatives.

Both interview partners emphasized that they considered traditions to be very impor-

tant and to be defended, especially those traditions that circled around the family and therelationship between the generations. Interestingly, they both referred to the Tamil saying

‘the whole world is my village and all folks are my kinsmen’ and explained to me that

they were proud of this heritage. For L. Ganesan, it was important to stress that this is not

a Tamil traditional view of the world, but an Indian one. He also put an emphasis on the

protection of Indian culture and the country itself as well as a traditional respect for

women. He pointed out that, for him, more important than the way any Indian worships

god is the fact that s/he is Indian and shares the Indian culture. For him, the term

‘tradition’ was only applicable to countries, but not to religions. The major attack on

these traditions he saw as coming from the ‘West ’. Kader Mohideen was concerned about

the loss of certain Muslim traditions due to attempts within the Muslim community itself

or the spread of un-Islamic ‘Western’ lifestyles through global media, the exhibition of

private acts (kissing) in public, gay marriages and gun-culture in particular. He understood

tradition first as Muslim tradition and second as Tamil tradition. Asked what they perceive

as the major threat for the world, India and Tamil Nadu, L. Ganesan said the conversion of

Hindus to Islam or Christianity, while Kader Mohideen stated political extremism (Hindu

nationalism, Naxalites and Islamist terrorism). Nevertheless, L. Ganesan and Kader

Mohideen both expressed the opinion that they are not at all opposed to everything

‘foreign’ or ‘Western’, especially in the field of technology. Both interviewees expressed

the typical conservative focus on the interests of one’s own ethnic and/or religious group,

while seeing this not as contradictory to an overall harmony and peace. Concerning

international relations, L. Ganesan said that no other country can be trusted and Kader Mohideen that no county exists that can be considered not trustworthy. They both saw the

stability of a good traditional social order at risk: for L. Ganesan, the traditional Indian

Global Discourse 57



ways (in a Hindutva sense); for Kader Mohideen, the religious Muslim life within a

diverse India. They were both typically conservative in stating that they had never

changed their ideas during their lifetime.

The conservatism expressed by these representatives of these two parties that are

strongly opposed in actual political struggle is to large parts typical. The BJP representa-

tive stands mainly for an Indian nationalism based on the assumption of the supremacy of

Indian/Hindu culture, while the IUML representative depicts a Muslim religious conser-

vatism that is at the same time proud of Tamil culture and Indian diversity. Kader

Mohideen expressed his gratitude to the anti-religious Dravidian Movement that both

makes life easier for Muslims and helps to avoid extremism in the Muslim community in

Tamil Nadu. On the other hand, L. Ganesan described the Dravidian Movement as being

against everything good. Both representatives are examples for the highly context-sensi-

tive and flexible character of conservatives. Both interviewees scored high on the RWA

scale – L. Ganesan a little bit less so than Kader Mohideen. Even though the scales are

invented for the investigation of large groups, it provided an orientation for the evaluation

of my interviews. According to the scale’s standards – not developed for the Indiancontext – both must be taken as (moderate) authoritarians.12

What is striking in the context of the above attempt to conceptualize conservatism are

statements from both interviews that support Karen Stenner ’s assertion that conservatives

are not against diversity in general. What they oppose is novelty in norms. L. Ganesan

laments the decline of traditional Indian broad-mindedness and the introduction of intol-

erance due to ‘westernization’, while Kader Mohideen was unhappy about the rigidity that

some groups within the Ummah try to impose on all Muslims.

To my surprise, L. Ganesan very strongly agreed with the statement ‘There is no

“ONE right way” to live life; everybody has to create their own way’ (RWA scale

question 20), while Kader Mohideen strongly agreed . Had they not given this evaluation,they would have scored even higher on the RWA scale. It suggests itself that the scale has

to be reviewed for universal use in the light of the Indian experience, because this

statement does not at all oppose conservative thought in India.

Is Indian conservatism universal?

To complete our idea of what conservatism might be, the situation becomes complicated if

we conceive of conservatism as an elaborate cluster of a large variety of fixed attitudes,

but it is easily applicable to the empiricism of global conservatism if we reduce these

fixed attitudes to belief in an organic social order consisting of unequal groups and

individuals. It is highly flexible and multiply realisable, just according to particular

temporal or permanent constellations of interests. Indian conservative thinking is striking,

because some of its currents differ vastly from the prototype image of old-style conserva-

tives in the ‘West ’. These were characterized by intolerance of ambiguity and intolerance

of nonconformity. As we have seen, these traits exist among those Indian conservatives

who understand being Indian in a highly exclusive way. This type of Hindutva conser-

vatism is very similar to many conservatisms and authoritarianisms in the ‘West ’. But we

have also seen that intellectual and spiritual conservatism in India can be inclusive and

tolerant of ambiguity and diversity. We have seen with the case of Kader Mohideen that

advocates from Abrahamic traditions can share these qualities if raised in a respective

context, too.Malhotra (2013, 193) writes: ‘Dharma is critical to the maintenance of social stability

and harmony and is the ethic governing the pursuit of wealth and pleasure. [ …] The

58 B. Goldstein



contextual nature goes hand in hand with the spirit of openness to multiple answers to

complex ethical questions’. According to the commonly held opinions, historical varia-

tions of conservatism and the conservative psyche of the ‘West ’, this statement would be

unlikely to pass as a conservative one. How can a conservative advocate a world view

where something (Dharma) is adored, that is critical to social stability and (organic)

harmony and where at the same time no clear distinction between ‘right ’ and ‘wrong’

exists? As we have seen, the non-dualistic concept of Dharma is unlimitedly inclusive and

embraces diversity as a divine play (lila), a mutually advancing movement within the

cosmic totality where no absolute distinction between ‘good’ and ‘ bad’ exists. A con-

servative adhering to Dharmic ideas has simply a broader concept of the order to be

preserved than those societies with strong foundations in the – from this perspective

narrow-minded – dualistic Abrahamic and Greek traditions. Of course s/he does not

assume the possibility of a breakdown of Dharma – the kind of breakdown that according

to Stenner triggers conservative’s authoritarianism, but s/he would like her/his ‘own kind’

to follow ‘the traditional ways’ that are sanctioned by established authorities.

Additionally, the assumption of having inherited a superior vision of reality and truthwhere other religions and spiritual tradition are only seen as parts of the actual unity can

lead to an arrogant attitude that reflects the same exclusionist behaviour patterns in other

traditions. Much of Hindutva apologetic writing confirms that this risk exists, but it is far

from proven that a Dharmic perspective necessarily has this consequence.

The Indianization of conservatism

As long as their core belief remains untouched, conservatives are able to acclimatize to

different conditions. Social change can threaten people and trigger both conservative and

authoritarian reactions, possibly making people re-evaluate formerly held opinions.Conservatives will seek protection from normative change provided by established autho-

rities, while authoritarians are generally seeking (ethnic and religious) homogeneity. How

can we apply these findings to the current change of ‘Western’ conservative parties? Let ’s

have a look at the recent developments in the European Union.

With the exception of Greece, countries with a comparatively low unemployment rate

have experienced significant successes for right-wing parties in the elections for the

European Parliament in 2014. One may conclude from this observation that voters appeal

mostly to the anti-immigrant programmes of these parties when they are in a state of fear

of losing their jobs and privileges, and not if they are already unemployed and in

otherwise socially and economic desperate conditions. This is exactly how Erich

Fromm (1994) and Wilhelm Reich (1980) explained National Socialism’s appeal to the

middle class in 1930s Germany and corresponds to contemporary understandings of the

conservative and the authoritarian psyches. The fear of socio-economic decline does not

necessarily have to make someone a racist or anti-Semite, but a portion of the population

that show high levels of ‘anxiety and all righteousness’ (Altemeyer 2006) will ‘flight into

security’ (Oesterreich 2005) under the umbrella of an authority that is believed to be

capable of defending one and also engaging in aggressive actions against nonconformists

believed to be responsible for one’s plight – a phenomenon known as ‘conformist

rebellion’ when directed against groups considered influential (‘imagined authorities’).

However , according to Stenner, these people are authoritarians, not conservatives.

If we look at these new developments in EU voting behaviour, we can assume that, asa tendency, decisively xenophobic political forces get support from authoritarians who

belong to the in-groups of the respective parties, while those conservative parties that

Global Discourse 59



started to embrace multiethnicity and plurality of lifestyles are supported by (psychologi-

cal) conservatives. The conservative aim of preserving belief in an organic structure of

society, the individual’s and group’s inequalities and desires for need satisfaction does not

depend on any kind of homogeneity within a society. Therefore, John Gray’s assumption

that (British-style) liberal conservatism depended on a pre-pluralist society, meaning that

contemporary conservatism is moribund, has to be challenged (Burns 1999). His inclina-

tion to a post-humanist conservatism that limits organic harmony not to society or a

peculiar Christian transcendental order, but preserves this conviction in an atheist under-

standing of a law of nature is far from being randomly inspired from ‘Eastern’ traditions.

He expresses universal conservative ideals that are not bound by culture in a time when

this is the most adequate conservative adaption possible. The development of many

conservative parties more than 10 years after Gray’s decision to engage with New

Labor – where he expected to find a more adequate dealing with the challenges of the

diversification of the society while conserving certain established values – shows that they

seem to have learned the lesson. Today, it is possible to remain conservative, in the sense

of this article, if it follows the example of India, where conservatism since its inceptionhad to cope with a situation of multiculturalism and diversity. That India is sometimes

described as a world by itself helps to illustrate the argument. In a globalized world, a

large number of conservatives see the importance of national identity in decline, just as

conservative nationalists in India give little importance to regional identities. The needs of

humanity have increasingly been highlighted for reasons other than propaganda.13 The

belief in a cosmological whole so appealing to conservatives has been elevated from its

old national romanticism to become part of cosmopolitan conservatism. Nevertheless,

contemporary Indian conservatism shows how an appeal to the good of all humans (or

even all beings) can be entangled with an agenda of national pride and self-esteem and

even national chauvinism. This large range is the guarantee that conservatives will be ableto be an attractive electoral proposition for a wide range of people.

While adherence to market policies is not a new feature of conservatism, it is the new

openness of many conservative parties (in the ‘West ’) that is new. It seems like the typical

right-wing aspects of conservatism, like ethnocentrism, sexism, homophobia and religious

intolerance, have become weaker among many ‘Western’ conservative parties. From a

materialistic point of view, these new developments can be understood as the ideological

reflections within conservatism of new conditions within the post-cold-war material

reality: the massive impact of new information technologies on culture and economics,

the increase in economic insecurity, the new options and risks for global entrepreneurship,

the rising importance of the third sector and its impact on governance, the pluralization of

lifestyles, the increasing importance of ethnicity and religion within class struggle and the

reality of violent conflict and forced migration as well as new means of representation in a

globalized media.

The overall picture of today’s political reality has in many respects become much

more diverse within the last two decades. For the ‘Western’ mind, plurality and diversity

are much more a social reality today than 20 years ago. Next to real-life experiences, the

common awareness of this plurality and diversity has been made possible by global

media. On top of that, the diverse work of social activists of all kinds accelerated by

new media options has had an impact on moral evolution among conservatives as well.

‘Western’ conservatives have to provide answers to pressing questions, within this con-

text. Plurality and diversity in various areas that have long has been a social reality inIndia and a core assumption of mystic Hinduism are becoming a global reality due to the

current state of world capitalism. ‘Western’ conservatism adapts to this situation by

60 B. Goldstein



allowing more inclusive assumptions about what is ‘right ’ and what is ‘wrong’, who

belongs to us and who does not. That does not mean that conservatives finally cease to be

conservatives, it just means they have adopted a more adequate strategy to achieve their

unchanging goals. And they do it in a fashion that resembles Indian conservatism.

From that perspective, Indian conservatism serves as an example that is worth

following if conservatives want to cope with the challenges of today in order to secure

their privileges. This is not to be understood as a conscious imitation of Indian conser-

vatism by ‘Western’ conservatives, but as an acclimatization to new conditions. Once

again, ideology comes along with actual practice and vice versa. For conservative parties,

this is a challenge, because psychologically conservatives oppose change of norm orders.

Therefore, it is an intricate task to define in front of the voters what is a conservative norm

and what is not. David Cameron’s ‘I support gay marriages, because I am conservative’ is

illustrative of these practical difficulties. Conservative parties can manage this adjustment

much more slowly than liberal, social-democratic and socialist parties. That for conserva-

tives it ’s the established authorities that define what is ‘right ’ and ‘wrong’ may help them,

but the authoritarian element of the electorate can only keep if they, like BJP, allow veryright-wing factions under its umbrella. Otherwise, they will lose these voters to the new

radical right-wing parties.

Conclusions for an understanding of contemporary conservatism

F.A. Hayek wrote in (von Hayek 1960): ‘Personally, I find that the most objectionable

feature of the conservative attitude is its propensity to reject well-substantiated new

knowledge because it dislikes some of the consequences which seem to follow from it

– or, to put it bluntly, its obscurantism’ (526). Hayek ’s critique of conservatism is outdated

because conservative parties today try to cope with the ‘well-substantiated new knowl-edge’. But it was also not fully true in 1960, because conservatism has throughout its

history been very adaptable to new conditions. It is the new right-wing challengers of the

established conservative parties, those who appeal to psychological authoritarians and

only to some extent to conservatives that match Hayek ’s description.

The traditional orientalist discourse in the sense of Edward Said very often equated

mystic Hinduism and obscurantism while contrasting it with the rationalistic ‘West ’.

Ironically, the qualities of conservatism from ‘obscure’ India are the newest turn of

‘Western’ conservatism to pragmatically pursue its goals.

As we have seen, it is hard to claim a general intolerance of plurality and diversity to

be a foundational aspect of conservatism. Central to a definition of conservatism that

includes the Indian version is Karen Stenner ’s distinctive classification of conservatism

compared to authoritarianism mentioned above. According to Stenner ’s model of an

authoritarian dynamic, (1) conservatives differ from authoritarians conceptually because

conservatives are primarily preoccupied with societal change, while authoritarians’ fore-

most concern is their aversion against difference within societies and (2) that authoritar-

ianism and intolerance of world views is strongly correlated, although this is not true for a

variety of conservatisms. Conservatives are simply happy with the ways they perceive as

the status quo. This situation is increasingly rare in an ever-changing world. It is proble-

matic that conservatives can choose quite freely what they take as the period of the ‘good

old times’. We see, even though the psychological attempts to define conservatism are

very helpful in showing the boundaries of the concept, that in understanding the phenom-enon precisely we are always drawn back to the basic conservative interest of securing

(inherited) privileges as a consequence of the conservative understanding of social

Global Discourse 61



harmony. Conservatism in the meaning proposed in this article – having a tendency to

both egoism and organic community – survives by opening up to a larger reality. Without

that strategy, the large reality of today would devour conservatism soon. As we know

from India, embracing plurality and diversity is not necessarily a successful means to

guarantee stability and peace. The notion of society as an organic community and the

politics of safeguarding group privileges are also pre-modern desires, potentially endan-

gering the rule of law. We should remember the fact that the term used in South Asia for

violence among religious groups is communal violence. International conservatism’s new

coping strategy is more inclusive, but it has not definitively tamed conservatives from

potentially engaging in misanthropic thoughts and actions.

Notes

1. ‘West ’ will be put into quotation marks because without it would suggest that ‘the West ’ is asocial, political and psychological fact. The facticity of an entity called ‘West ’ is more than

doubtful, and its continuous use is just a continuation of a certain partisan perspective onhumanity I try to avoid.

2. Sangh Parivar, the family of organizations, is the umbrella term for the Hindu nationalist organizations. It was introduced by RSS members and contains today several bigger andsmaller organizations, including the BJP.

3. ‘Ideology’ and ‘ideological’ in quotation marks stands for a world view or a school of thought,while these terms without quotation marks refer to the Marxian and critical theory use of it.

4. By ‘Indian genius thesis’, I understand the notion of India as a superior cultural entity in someof the admiring ‘non-Indian’ receptions of spiritual authorities like for example SwamiVivekananda or Sri Aurobindo. The thesis romanticizes India as the good ‘other ’ comparedto the ‘West ’.

5. Pledge made by BJP aspirants when joining the party:

I believe in Integral Humanism which is the basic philosophy of Bharatiya Janata Party.

I am committed to Nationalism and National Integration, Democracy, GandhianSocialism, Positive Secularism (Sarva Dharma Samabhava) and value-based politics.

I subscribe to the concept of a Secular State and Nation not based on religion.

I firmly believe that this task can be achieved by peaceful means alone.

I do not observe or recognize untouchability in any shape or form.

I am not a member of any other political party.

I undertake to abide by the Constitution, Rules and Discipline of the Party. (Elst 1997)

6. In Horkheimer ’s argument, reverberations of Sigmund Freud’s understanding shows throughthat society and culture necessarily require the suppression of the individual pleasure-seekingdrives for its very constitution (Freud 2010). Besides one’s attitude on psychoanalysis or if someone ‘ believes’ in psycho-dynamics below the surface of political thought or not, I wouldlike to invite the reader to accept Horkheimer ’s description of the (ideological) core contra-diction in capitalism for a while to develop my argument.

7. John Gray turned from a liberal conservative to a supporter of Blair ’s New Labour because hesaw the latter to be better equipped to meet his (conservative) convictions while facing thechallenges of contemporary ‘Western’ societies (Burns 1999). A couple of years later, hisconservatism prevailed in his leaning to ideas from deep ecology and an anti-mystic reading of Taoist classics. As we will see later, Gray’s conservatism is of the psychological kind

described by Karen Stenner with tremendous openness for traditions not derived from an in-group narrative, even an open contempt for the ‘millennialist ’ ‘West ’ (Gray 2007). For anillustration of my argument, he represents a conservative who similar to Indian conservativesembraces diversity and tolerance of ambiguity.

62 B. Goldstein



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Goldstein - The Unconscious Indianization of ‘Western’ Conservatism

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