Conservatism in India

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Conservatism in IndiaAuthor(s): Howard L. ErdmanSource: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 13, No. 4, A Century of Conservatism (Oct.,1978), pp. 791-802Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/260084.

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Howard L. ErdmanConservatism in India

It is often found surprisingthat Indianconservatism,as an organizedpolitical force, appears very weak, despite the country's ancient andwell-rooted traditions. For example, in the 1930s a self-declared con-servative, the Maharajahof Rewa, remarked: 'it must seem strange... that in a country whose ways of life are so dominated by customand tradition as India, there should be no political party which callsitself conservative.' Nothing has come of his prediction that withemancipation from British tutelage 'a strong party of experiencedand responsiblepoliticians will emerge, which will call itself the Con-servative Party.' Well after independence two leading students ofIndian affairs wrote thatIt is one of the paradoxes of Indian politics that India's ancien regime, surely oneof the oldest and most deeply-rootedin the world, producedno reaction ... Only afew minor local parties today stand for a full return to the rule of BrahminsandKshatryasaccording to the preceptsof dharma or traditionalduty and they are in-effectual.2

Nehru, somewhat differently, addressed himself to the sameissue: 'Who says that opposition forces are weak in India? The op-position we have to fight is obscurantism and inertia of the people'.Thus, according to the then Prime Minister, although the parties ofthe right might not have had impressiveelectoralrecordsthere was apassive conservatism at work. Another observer, though missingNehru's point, underlined the question, when he commented: 'ThePrime Minister had in mind mass lethargy and ignorance; but therecord of both the religious and secularrightistparties is a sad com-mentaryon this maxim'. Tinker, with others, looked for an electoralimpact which Nehru's observation did not imply, but it is clear thatJournal of ContemporaryHistory (SAGE, London and Beverly Hills),Vol 13 (1978), 791-802

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


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Journal of Contemporary Historyhe, too, found Indian conservatism feeble or worse. Joining in thechorus was one of India's leading journals of opinion, which an-nounced, after the first two general elections, that the country waswitness to 'the almost complete political eclipse of our so-calledrightist parties.'3While later elections saw their modest resurgence,the basic proposition would still be valid; and even though the in-cumbent government is most assuredly right of centre, its formalprogramme is not. In sum, it is indisputably true that India has notproduced an electorally significant party with an explicitly conser-vative ideology. The question is, what happened to Indian conser-vatism?

According to one view, albeit a minor one, India in generaland Hin-duism in particularhave been characterizedby openness, flexibility,mutual accommodation, tolerance, etc., so that sharpconfrontationbetween status quo and challenging forces has been unnecessary.Taken at face value, this would mean that such clashes never occur,or, if they are found (and they certainly are), they are the result ofoutside influences. An example of this is the conflict between Hindusand Muslims which resulted in partition: had it not been for theBritish policy of divide and rule, it is said, the Indians themselveswould have worked things out harmoniously.Hinduism has undoubtedly proved to be adaptiveboth doctrinallyand structurally, but such a theory can scarcely be accepted. Indiahas known and continues to know sharp confrontations and not allof them can be laid at the feet of outside elements. The Rudolphs,for example, who have written extensively on the adaptabilityof thecaste system and on opportunities for upward mobility within it,have also recorded that over the decades upwardly mobile casteshave met with stern resistance in various forms, including intimida-tion and murder.4The press and the government of India (especiallythrough its commissioner for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes)regularly report cases of harassment, assaults, and murders, ashigher caste reprisalsagainst untouchables who refuse to know theirplace. This is only to say for the moment that there have been andare social conflicts in which status quo forces have resistedchallengers. This would not be a particularly notable propositionwere it not for the fact that in diluted form the genius-of-India argu-ment recursin the literature.

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Erdman: Conservatism in IndiaAccording to another thesis, that of no-challenge-no-response, theapparent weakness of Indian conservatism is explained by theabsence of a significantchallengeto established beliefs and practices:no clear and present dangerto vested interests, no need for a conser-vative response. Proponents of this view, especially from the left, im-plicitly deny the genius-of-India thesis and contend that wheneverthere has been a significant challenge, there has been a conservativeresponse. The rebellion of 1857, the aristocratic suppression ofmovements toward democracy in princely India, and the attacks onuntouchables are cases in point. But the contention remains that inbroad terms no vested interests have 'really' been drivento the wall.For the post-independence period in India this thesis holds, firstly,that despite its political hegemony and increasinglysocialist rhetoric,the ruling Congress party did not attack India's vested interests;andsecondly, that the have-nots have failed to generate a challenge oftheir own, even when leftist political parties (among others) havetried to mobilize them. There is considerable merit in both proposi-tions.

Take the latter first. There have been valiant efforts to see arevolutionary upsurge in the rebellion of 1857, in the Quit Indiamovement of the early 1940s, in Ambedkar's efforts to mobilize theuntouchables, or in less dramatic and conspicuous struggles. Never-theless it remains true, as Moore for one contends,5that India hasnot experienced any real revolution - certainly not one of India's'have-nots' versus her own 'haves'. Recent efforts, such as those ofthe Naxalites, to mobilize the rural landless and poor, have beenstrictly local and severely suppressed, in some cases by stateministries which included communists. Estimates vary concerningthe potential for a revolutionary upsurge;Moore is quite pessimistic,Jannuzi, at least for one Indian state, somewhat more optimistic;6but both would agreethat, despite their best efforts, they have foundno revolution.The contention that, despite its hegemony and socialist rhetoric,the Congress party failed to generate a strong challenge from abovealso has considerable merit. A corollary of this is that even legisla-tion which appears to have such an aim either contains manyloopholes, has been subvertedin implementation or else has remain-ed unimplemented through lack of commitment or administrativecapability. This is obviously an indictment of Nehru's 'revolutionwithout fear' and also of his successors' political stewardship.Such 'slippage', which is by no means confined to India, can be

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Journal of Contemporary Historyfound in almost every policy area. For example, in the 1940s and1950s, the so-called Hindu code legislation sought to systematizeandliberalize Hindu law on marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc. Itgenerated some very acrimonious debate, demonstrations, and otherpublic protests, and a number of explicitly conservative ad hocgroups emerged to oppose the bills. Some concessions were made,and were no doubt instrumental in the fading away of the organizedopposition. But two other factors partly account for the lack of abroad opposition front: the debate took place mainly in urbanareas,with very little penetration of the countryside; and even those whowere aware of what was going on knew also that even if the will werethere, the administrative machinery to implement the legislation inthe hundreds of thousands of India's villages was not.7In two critical areas for India's poor, land reform and the aboli-tion of untouchability, legislation abounds. While the impact hasbeen enormously wide of the officially stated target, some changeshave occurred. Still, in stating her emergency-periodaims, Mrs Gan-dhi reiterated her desire to abolish bonded labour and to implementexisting land reform legislation - promises which had been givenmany, many times before. Jannuzi, for example, documents the longdelays, the circumvention and non-implementation of the much-softened legislation, which will serve to illustrate the moderate im-pact of land reform on the relativelywell-to-do landholders.Other cases of slipppage could be adduced both in land reformand other policy areas, including the effort to abolish untouch-ability; but even so, the no-challenge-no-response thesis cannot beaccepted without qualification, especially in respect of the oldaristocracy. To be sure, the Rajahs and Maharajahswerenot packedoff to the Andaman Islands let alone led to the firing squad. Many ofthem have managedto fare quite well. But for them and others, therewere genuine reverses, genuine grievances and in many cases bitterresentmentagainst the regimewhich passed the offending legislation.And from time to time they did expressexplicitly conservativeviews.For example, the ruling Congress party was rejected as one 'run bytradesmen who were not born to rule.' The intensity of feeling is evi-dent in the assertion 'When a eunuch is able to serve a woman, thenthis government will be able to rule with authority, and not before.'8But these were intermittent outburstsrather than part of a broad pat-tern of response to the Congress party challenge. The fact that vir-tually every aristocrat who contested for public office after in-dependence won easily suggests that had they come together

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Erdman: Conservatism in Indiaon a conservative programme, the Maharajah of Rewa's predictionmight have come true.Another explanation, which may be called the time-is-out-of-jointthesis, considers that events in India, as part of a world-wideprocess,have rendered conservatism, even on the part of the genuinely ag-grieved, an exercise in futility.9 One variant on this theme is par-ticularly important in the Indian case: the use of non-conservativerhetoric by conservatives, because of the perceived compulsions ofthe political arena.In the debates on the Hindu code bills, many opponents argued,interalia, that the governmenthad no electoralmandate to introducesuch sweeping changes in Hindu private law; the restriction of thecode to Hindus violated constitutional provisions on equality beforethe law; the provisions allowing women to inherit property equallywith men would further fragment landholdings, and make pro-gressive agriculturemore difficult. In Morris-Jones' terms these arearguments from the 'modern' language of politics, which, he says,predominates at the national level, the more traditional language in-creasing as we approach the grass roots.'? True enough, but in thisparticularcase, many who used the 'modern' idiom at the centre didso not out of commitment but out of expediency: it was, even at thecentre, the traditional language which mattered, but was not foundopportune for use in that particularcontext.A comparable, and more easily documented case, concerns thenow virtually defunct Swatantra(Freedom) party, founded in 1959.Its most distinguished promoter, C. Rajagopalachari(Rajaji), quiteexplicitly viewed it as a conservative party. For example, he wrotethat

everychangemustnecessarily roducedislocation,disturbance nddistress ..thepain nvolved.. mustbetaken ntoaccountn anyorderly dvance.A partyof the right,as it is called,gives expressiono thesedistresses nddisturbances,whicharenot lessrealor importanthanthe need forchangeandprogress.Because in his view 'the Congress party has swung to the left, what isneeded is not an ultra- or outer-left, but a strong and articulateright.' Referring to the conservative elements within the Congressitself, Rajaji wanted a party which would 'operate not privatelyandbehind the closed doors of the party meetings, but openly andperiodically through the electorate.'

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Journal of ContemporaryHistoryTo giveexpressiono thesebeliefs,Rajajiwantedhisnewparty o

be calledthe Conservative arty,and his own draftof basicprin-ciples includedspecific references o aspectsof traditionalIndiawhichshouldbepreserved.ntheevent,however,hewaspersuadedthathis preferred amewouldbe a liability n the prevailing ondi-tions;andthe fundamental rinciples, s finallyadopted,wereover-whelmingly lassical-liberaln tone, with one generalprovision all-ing for the retentionof whateverwasgood in the old culture. ForRajajiandmanyof thosewho joinedhim, the partywas to playaconservative ole, whatever ts formal name and basic principles.Here,as in theHinducodecase,manyconservativesound t conve-nient or necessaryo use non-conservativeerminology.Of otherpartiesand formaldoctrinal tatements few commentsmay be made. First, as Rajajiobserved,the previously-dominantCongresspartymoved ncreasinglyn a leftistdirectiondeologicallyand to some degree n policy,whileeveryoneknewthat the partycontainedmanyconservative lements.Secondly,the most discip-linedandaggressive artyof the right,the Bharatiya anSangh-the Indian People's party, now allegedlymerged nto the rulingJanata coalition - also contains many conservativeelements,although its formal ideology is right-radical some terming itfascistic).Thirdly,Gandhism,nsofaras it emphasizeshevirtuesofa simplevillage-basedife, in which consensusand harmonyarepreferredo conflictualrelationships ndin whichvirtuesareto befoundin followinga traditionalcaste-based)ccupation,hasservedas a respectabledeology for many conservativeswho are by nomeansconvinced,aswasGandhi, hat theexisting uralorderhastobe purified n important espects.Gandhism tresses hetrusteeshipof the rich,the wise, andthe well-born or thosewho areless for-tunate; t prefersmoralsuasionrather hancoercion andin someGandhianeyes, legislation s a form of coercion)as the meansofpurification.Obviously, herefore, t is not verythreateningo en-trenchedinterests.This point is especiallyimportant,given therenewedemphasison Gandhismby the presentPrime Minister,MorarjiDesai.

Implicit n manycommentson the time-is-out-of-jointhesis is thefactthat(perceived) owerrelationshipsmonggroupsarecentral oany analysisof the problem.As one studentof developing ocietiesput it, it may safely be assumed that 'groups which have

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Erdman: Conservatism in Indiawould like to keep what they have', but that before this can betranslated into meaningful political terms, it must also be clear 'whatthey think they will permit themselves to do toward that end .. .how much real power they have relative to other groups . . ., and theactual state of the competitive situation in which they findthemselves.'12There have been and still are circumstances n which the 'haves' ofIndia have allowed themselves to do a greatdeal to protect theirposi-tions: aggrieved secular and religious elites took to the battlefield inthe rebellion of 1857, a demonstrablyconservativeresponseto the in-roads made by Britishreformers and their Indian supporters.Highercaste Hindus who murder untouchables who do not 'know theirplace' in contemporary India fall into the same general category,whether this behaviour is matched by a formal conservativeideologyor not. Up to independence and for a short time thereafter, somearistocrats insisted that they would resist by force any effort todiminish their position further, although only a handful did so. Itmay safely be assumed that, if any government sets out to effect amassive change in rural India across a broad front, conservativebehaviour, if not ideology, will not be difficult to find. No im-aginable ruling group in India is likely to possess the capability -even if it had the will - to intimidate or otherwisecurbopponents ofsuch a major transformation. But there is no great likelihood of anysuch attempt.Some additional observations on India's aristocracy may help toclarify the situation. Having relied heavily on the British to protectthem, and having, by this, offended even conservative elements inthe nationalist movement (not to mention their suppression of na-tionalist efforts in princely India), the aristocrats found themselvessubstantiallyisolated from those who inheritedpower in 1947. Someceremonial positions for leading maharajahsmight be in order, con-cessions might be made, but no one of any consequence in the Con-gress elite could countenance the preservation of over 500 largelyautonomous princes whose recent record was one of conspicuousconsumption and a stubborn determination to widen theirautonomy. For a Congressmanlike SardarPatel - the 'BismarckofIndia' - and for militant Hindu nationalists - the Jan Sangh andkindredelements - India had to be united if it were to do anything,and princely autonomy stood in the way. Even the quite restrainedRajaji, who could see some virtue in ceremonial roles for themaharajahs, insisted that this did not mean that 'you should have

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Journal of Contemporary History560 princes to confuse matters.' Patel, Rajaji and others felt that theold aristocracycould contribute to stability in the face of radical ef-forts, but, considerations of caste outlook apart, they would not ac-cept the aristocraticviewpoint. Indeed, after independence, the Con-gress rapidly penetratedprincely India and sought to underminefur-ther the obvious influence of the aristocracyin those areas. This, andsimilar developments, virtually debarred any rapprochement be-tween the aristocrats and conservative Congressmen at a later junc-ture when more radical programmes might seem to threaten both.To illustrate further, it need only be pointed out that in the initialsettlement with the maharajahs (and with the landed gentry) thegovernment of the day controlled a variety of carrots and sticks.Most notable among the concessions and perquisiteswas the annual'privy purse' which allowed most princes to maintain somesemblance of aristocraticrespectability,even if they had to convert apalace or two into a luxury hotel to make ends meet. Ambassador-ships and other enticements kept some happy. But the other side ofthe coin was the threat that, although constitutionally guaranteed,the privy purse could easily be terminated if the maharajahsmisbehaved - a threat which was used with monotonous regularitywhenever too many showed signs of fighting the ruling party.In a well-known analysis of the 1960s Indian situation, Kotharipresents a view of the Congress 'system' in which the ruling partydominates the political spectrum, including many significantelements well to the left and right of centre.'3Part of his argumentholds that because of its pre-eminent position and pragmaticcharacterCongress could shift, in terms of personnel, policy, etc., toundercut challenges from any non-Congress body (cf. the genius-of-India thesis). What is not clearly stated in Kothari's argument,however, is the coercive dimension which servedto inhibit expressionof explicitly rightist positions. And it should be further noted thatNehru and (Indira) Gandhi were far more severe in criticizing theright than the left, a further disadvantage for India's conservatives.Some of the latter were obviously intimidated, and did not enter thepublic arenaat all; others who did weremost circumspect,some bor-ing away from within the Congress, others allying themselves withparties of the right, which, by and large, eschewed formal conser-vative ideologies.

The condition of Indian conservatism cannot be explained fully by

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Erdman: Conservatism in Indiareference to the combination of factors cited above. Part of thefailure is surely attributableto the inability of aggrieved elements tosubmerge differences in the interests of generating a commonpolitical front.Well before independence, for example, India's aristocracy -even when the writing was on the wall - were in disarray. The so-called Chamber of Princes, establishedby the Britishas something ofa forum for the aristocratic point of view, was ignored by many ofthe leading maharajahs as beneath their dignity; and hundreds ofpetty princelings felt ignored and embittered because they weredenied any form of representation in the Chamber. At later stages,when the integration of the princely states and abolition of certainforms of landlordism came to the fore, the disunity was astounding.The power relationships were not so obviously inimical to the in-terests of conservatives that a big push must necessarilyhave failed.The big push never came, however, and while other factors played apart, the segmentation of Indian society, with caste and relatedstatus considerations as a major component, was a key element. If'big' aristocrats would not consort with 'little' ones; if a Rajputprince would not readily consort with a non-Rajput prince whomight be his political and economic equal (or superior, for that mat-ter), anyone who attempted to fashion a consequential party of theright would have rough going, indeed. To include non-aristocraticconservatives in a coalition would be more difficult still (except in-sofar as aristocrats could effectively mobilize the common people,which they did with astounding success in former princely India butwhich they could not do elsewhere). And it should be rememberedthat the maharajahshad been displaced by the Britishin about 60 percent of India, introducingan element of discontinuity in social struc-ture which also played a part.An effort at mobilization was, in fact, made.The Swatantraparty(formed in 1959), while it rejectedthe label 'conservative' and an ex-plicitly conservative ideology, did seek to establish a broad, right-of-centre coalition to oppose the Congress. The old aristocracy wereunashamedly recruited, as were aggrievedindustrialists who played amajor role in forming the party in the first place. In addition, follow-ing the Congress party's resolution in favour of 'joint co-operativefarming', the Swatantra leadership sought to portray this as the ad-vent of collectivized agriculture in India and to recruit the 'kulaks'on this basis.It did not succeed. Facing enormous political odds, the Swatantra

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Journal of Contemporary Historyparty, despite its willingness to serve as a broad umbrella fordisparatedisaffected groups, could not rally the potential faithful. Itwas largely eclipsed in the parliamentary(and some state assembly)elections of 1971, was furtherbatteredin the state assembly electionsof 1972, and very nearly wrote itself off, well before its formalmerger with other anti-Indira Gandhi forces to form the Janata(Peoples) party in 1977. Deaths and defections - crucial in a partyheavily dependent on local notables - played a part, as did themanoeuveringsof the ruling Congresspartyand its 'system'. But it isimpossible to escape the conclusion that the unwillingness to com-promise, to create a broad front, also played a major role in thisfailure. Those to whom the party sought to appeal neveraccepted thenotion that they faced a 'clear and present danger', that they hadbetter hang together, lest they all hang separately. I believe that theycould have escaped reprisals.

The ruling Janata party, which at least nominally incorporates theso-called 'old' Congress, the Jan Sangh, Swatantra, and otherpolitical formations, is most assuredly a 'right-of-centre coalition',as the Rudolphs have argued.14 Hastily engineered when IndiraGandhi called elections early in 1977, it brought together groupswhose association was sought much earlier (and it included some,like the Socialist party, which did not bulk large in earlierright wingmanoeuverings). Would-be partybuildersof the rightlong aspiredtounite the Congress 'right' with some elements, at least, of the JanSangh and Swatantra, and this for the time being has been achieved.But the questions remain: why, and to what effect? Obviously In-dira's emergency played a major role: here was a clear and presentdangerthat many people could recognize. But the Janataparty is notsimply a rassemblement of the rightist forces in India. It benefitedfrom many grievances among deprived groups, including un-touchables and Muslims (for whom over-aggressivebirth control andslum-clearanceprogrammeswere anathema); and many trade unionelements - rightly identified by Mrs Gandhi as privilegedin Indianterms - who were denied wage increases, cost-of-living allowances,bonuses and the right to strike under the 1975-1977emergency, alsorallied to the cause of Janata. Had its success depended solely on theconspicuously privileged in Indian society, it would not be in powertoday; and this, in turn, imposes some limitations on its policyoptions.

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Erdman: Conservatism in IndiaThe Janata government's first instinct is simply to ease the

pressureimposed by Mrs Gandhi, so that it will allow more 'businessas usual' throughout Indian society, and this will benefit conser-vative elements. A village-India focus, small scale projects to helpthe common man, destitution to be abolished in a decade, etc., arepart of the avowed approach of the new regime. No doubt manyconservatives will find this renewal of Gandhism a safe refuge,especially if the lot of the common man is to be improved without'dislocation, disturbances and distress' to the relativelyprivileged,orif improvement is to be sought by moral suasion, emphasis on'trusteeship', and kindredGandhiannotions. Everythingconsidered,this may be the best for which India's conservativescould hope and,given the historical record, they may fare very well beneath the at-tractive veneer of Gandhian solicitude for the common man. Weshould not, therefore, expect to find a political partywith an explicit-ly conservative ideology in India's immediate future. However, thisis far from saying that India's conservatives have abandoned thefield to others.

Notes1. Quoted in H. Erdman, TheSwatantraParty and Indian Conservatism(Cam-bridge, Mass. 1967), 10-11.2. L. and S. Rudolph quoted in ibid., 10.3. Ibid., 10.4. L.I. and S.H. Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition(Chicago 1967), Part I.5. B. Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston 1966), ch.VI.6. F.T. Jannuzi, Agrarian Crisis in India (Austin, Texas, 1974), especiallychs. 8and 9.7. G. Overstreet, 'The Hindu Code Bill', in L. Pye, ed., Cases in ComlparativePolitics: Asia (Boston 1970), 161-88.8. Erdman, op. cit., 27.9. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, III, 292, states that'political conservatism is a posture, whetheradopted by individuals,classes, or parties,that is increasinglydifficult to maintain in the twentieth century.'10. Government and Politics of India (London 1971), ch.2.11. See Erdman, op. cit., chs. 4, 5, and 8.12. K. Silvert, quoted in Erdman, op. cit., 313. R. Kothari, 'The Congress System in India' in Asian Survey, IV, 12(December 1964).14. R. and S. Rudolph, 'India's Election: Backing Into the Future' in Foreign Af-fairs, 55, 4 (July 1977).

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802 Journal of Contemporary HistoryHoward L. Erdman

Professor of Government at Dartmouth College,Hanover, NH, is the author of The SwatantraParty and Indian Conservatism(1967), PoliticalAttitudes of Indian Industry (1971) and Politicsand Economic Development in India (1973). Heis at present working on a study of conservativepolitics in the 'third world' and a study of theevolution of industrial policy in India, focusingon the fertilizer industry.

Conservatism in India

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