PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 705 May 19, 1975REVISING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 389, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE FORESTRY REFORM CODE OF THE PHILIPPINESSection 3.Definitions.(c) Alienable and disposable lands refer to those lands of the public domain which have been the subject of the present system of classification and declared as not needed for forest purposes.(q) Forest product means timber, pulpwood, firewood, bark, tree top, resin, gum, wood, oil, honey, beeswax, nipa, rattan, or other forest growth such as grass, shrub, and flowering plant, the associated water, fish, game, scenic, historical, recreational and geologic resources in forest lands.(cc) License is a privilege granted by the State to a person to utilize forest resources as in any forest land, without any right of occupation and possession over the same, to the exclusion of others, or establish and operate a wood-processing plant, or conduct any activity involving the utilization of any forest resources.(dd) License agreement is a privilege granted by the State to a person to utilize forest resources within any forest land with the right of possession and occupation thereof to the exclusion of others, except the government, but with the corresponding obligation to develop, protect and rehabilitate the same in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in said agreement.(ee) Permit is a short-term privilege or authority granted by the State to a person to utilize any limited forest resources or undertake a limited activity with any forest land without any right of occupation and possession therein.(ff) Annual allowable cut is the volume of materials, whether of wood or other forest products, that is authorized to be cut regularly from the forest.Section 15.Topography.No land of the public domain eighteen per cent (18%) in slope or over shall be classified as alienable and disposable, nor any forest land fifty per cent (50%) in slope or over, as grazing land.Lands eighteen per cent (18%) in slope or over which have already been declared as alienable and disposable shall be reverted to the classification of forest lands by the Department Head, to form part of the forest reserves, unless they are already covered by existing titles or approved public land application, or actually occupied openly, continuously, adversely and publicly for a period of not less than thirty (30) years as of the effectivity of this Code, where the occupant is qualified for a free patent under the Public Land Act: Provided, That said lands, which are not yet part of a well-established communities, shall be kept in a vegetative condition sufficient to prevent erosion and adverse effects on the lowlands and streams: Provided, further, That when public interest so requires, steps shall be taken to expropriate, cancel defective titles, reject public land application, or eject occupants thereof.Section 16.Areas needed for forest purposes.The following lands, even if they are below eighteen per cent (18%) in slope, are needed for forest purposes, and may not, therefore, be classified as alienable and disposable land, to wit:1. Areas less than 250 hectares which are far from, or are not contiguous with, any certified alienable and disposable land;2. Isolated patches of forest of at least five (5) hectares with rocky terrain, or which protect a spring for communal use;3. Areas which have already been reforested;4. Areas within forest concessions which are timbered or have good residual stocking to support an existing, or approved to be established, wood processing plant;5. Ridge tops and plateaus regardless of size found within, or surrounded wholly or partly by, forest lands where headwaters emanate;6. Appropriately located road-rights-or-way;7. Twenty-meter strips of land along the edge of the normal high waterline of rivers and streams with channels of at least five (5) meters wide;8. Strips of mangrove or swamplands at least twenty (20) meters wide, along shorelines facing oceans, lakes, and other bodies of water, and strips of land at least twenty (20) meters wide facing lakes;9. Areas needed for other purposes, such as national parks, national historical sites, game refuges and wildlife sanctuaries, forest station sites, and others of public interest; and10. Areas previously proclaimed by the President as forest reserves, national parks, game refuge, bird sanctuaries, national shrines, national historic sites:Provided, That in case an area falling under any of the foregoing categories shall have been titled in favor of any person, steps shall be taken, if public interest so requires, to have said title cancelled or amended, or the titled area expropriated.Section 20.License agreement, license, lease or permit.No person may utilize, exploit, occupy, possess or conduct any activity within any forest land, or establish and operate any wood-processing plant, unless he has been authorized to do so under a license agreement, lease, license, or permit.Section 27.Duration of license agreement or license to harvest timber in forest lands.The duration of the privilege to harvest timber in any particular forest land under a license agreement or license shall be fixed and determined in accordance with the annual allowable cut therein, the established cutting cycle thereof, the yield capacity of harvestable timber, and the capacity of healthy residuals for a second growth.The privilege shall automatically terminate, even before the expiration of the license agreement of license, the moment the harvestable timber have been utilized without leaving any logged-over area capable of commercial utilization.The maximum period of any privilege to harvest timber is twenty-five (25) years, renewable for a period, not exceeding twenty-five (25) years, necessary to utilize all the remaining commercial quantity or harvestable timber either from the unlogged or logged-over area.It shall be a condition for the continued privilege to harvest timber under any license or license agreement that the licensee shall reforest all the areas which shall be determined by the Bureau.Section 68.Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license.Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, or remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code; Provided, That in the case of partnership, association or corporation, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering or collecting shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or forest products to cut, gathered, collected or removed, and the machinery, equipment, implements and tools used therein, and the forfeiture of his improvements in the area.The same penalty plus cancellation of his license agreement, lease, license or permit and perpetual disqualification from acquiring any such privilege shall be imposed upon any licensee, lessee, or permittee who cuts timber from the licensed or leased area of another, without prejudice to whatever civil action the latter may bring against the offender.REPUBLIC ACT No. 3571 AN ACT TO PROHIBIT THE CUTTING, DESTROYING OR INJURING OF PLANTED OR GROWING TREES, FLOWERING PLANTS AND SHRUBS OR PLANTS OF SCENIC VALUE ALONG PUBLIC ROADS, IN PLAZAS, PARKS, SCHOOL PREMISES OR IN ANY OTHER PUBLIC GROUNDSEC. 3. No cutting, destroying, or injuring of planted or growing trees, flowering plants and shrubs or plants of scenic value along public roads, in plazas parks, school premises or in any other public ground shall be permitted save when the cutting, destroying, or injuring of same is necessary for public safety, or such pruning of same is necessary to enhance its beauty and only upon the recommendation of the committee mentioned in the preceding section, and upon the approval of the Director of Parks and Wildlife. The cutting, destroying, or pruning shall be under the supervision of the committee. SEC. 4. Any person who shall cut, destroy or injure trees, flowering plants and shrubs or plants of scenic value mentioned in the preceding sections of this Act, shall be punished by prison correctional in its minimum period to prison mayor in its minimum period.ACT NO. 3572 AN ACT TO PROHIBIT THE CUTTING OF TINDALO, AKLE OR MOLAVE TREES, UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, AND TO PENALIZE VIOLATIONS THEREOFBe it enacted by the Senate and House of Representative of the Philippines in Legislature assembled and by the authority of the same:SECTION 1. The cutting in the public forests of tindalo, akle, or molave trees less than sixtycentimeters in diameters measured at a height of four feet from the ground (breast high) is hereby prohibited.SEC. 2. Any person, company or corporation violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished by a fine of not more than fifty pesos or imprisonment for not more than fifteen days, or both, and to pay, besides, two times the amount of the tax on the timber cut:Provided, That in the case of a company or corporation, the president or manager shall be directly responsible for the acts of his employeesor laborers if it proven that the latter acted with his knowledge; other wise the responsibility will extend only as far as fine is concerned:Provided, Further, That all tindalo, akle, or molave timber cutin violation of this Act shall be forfeited to the Government.SEC. 3. All acts and provisions of law inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect on its approval.Approved:26 November 1929.REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7586AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL INTEGRATED PROTECTED AREAS SYSTEM, DEFINING ITS SCOPE AND COVERAGE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSESSECTION 4. Definition of Terms For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:1. National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) is the classification and administration of all designated protected areas to maintain essential ecological processes and life-support systems, to preserve genetic diversity, to ensure sustainable use of resources found therein, and to maintain their natural conditions to the greatest extent possible;2. Protected Area refers to identified portions of land and water set aside by reason of their unique physical and biological significance, managed to enhance biological diversity and protected against destructive human exploitation;3. Buffer zones are identified areas outside the boundaries of and immediately adjacent to designated protected areas pursuant to Section 8 that need special development control in order to avoid or minimize harm to the protected area;4. Indigenous cultural community refers to a group of people sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits and who have since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized a territory;5. National park refers to a forest reservation essentially of natural wilderness character which has been withdrawn from settlement, occupancy or any form of exploitation except in conformity with approved management plan and set aside as such exclusively to conserve the area or preserve the scenery, the natural and historic objects, wild animals and plants therein and to provide enjoyment of these features in such areas;6. Natural monuments is a relatively small area focused on protection of small features to protect or preserve nationally significant natural features on account of their special interest or unique characteristics;7. Natural biotic area is an area set aside to allow the way of life of societies living in harmony with the environment to adapt to modern technology at their pace;8. Natural park is a relatively large area not materially altered by human activity where extractive resource uses are not allowed and maintained to protect outstanding natural and scenic areas of national or international significance for scientific, educational and recreational use;9. Protected landscapes/seascapes are areas of national significance which are characterized by the harmonious interaction of man and land while providing opportunities for public enjoyment through the recreation and tourism within the normal lifestyle and economic activity of these areas;10. Resource reserve is an extensive and relatively isolated and uninhabited area normally with difficult access designated as such to protect natural resources of the area for future use and prevent or contain development activities that could affect the resource pending the establishment of objectives which are based upon appropriate knowledge and planning;11. Strict nature reserve is an area possessing some outstanding ecosystem, features and/or species of flora and fauna of national scientific importance maintained to protect nature and maintain processes in an undisturbed state in order to have ecologically representative examples of the natural environment available for scientific study, environmental monitoring, education, and for the maintenance of genetic resources in a dynamic and evolutionary state;12. Tenured migrant communities are communities within protected areas which have actually and continuously occupied such areas for five (5) years before the designation of the same as protected areas in accordance with this Act and are solely dependent therein for subsistence; and13. Wildlife sanctuary comprises an area which assures the natural conditions necessary to protect nationally significant species, groups of species, biotic communities or physical features of the environment where these may require specific human manipulations for their perpetuation.SECTION 20. Prohibited Acts. Except as may be allowed by the nature of their categories and pursuant to rules and regulations governing the same, the following acts are prohibited within protected areas:a. Hunting, destroying, disturbing, or mere possession of any plants or animals or products derived therefrom without a permit from the Management Board;b. Dumping of any waste products detrimental to the protected area, or to the plants and animals or inhabitants therein;c. Use of any motorized equipment without a permit from the Management Board;d. Mutilating, defacing or destroying objects of natural beauty, or objects of interest to cultural communities (of scenic value);e. Damaging and leaving roads and trails in a damaged condition;f. Squatting, mineral locating, or otherwise occupying any land;g. Constructing or maintaining any kind of structure, fence or enclosures, conducting any business enterprise without a permit;h. Leaving in exposed or unsanitary conditions refuse or debris, or depositing in ground or in bodies of water; andi. Altering, removing destroying or defacing boundary marks or signs.REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8371AN ACT TO RECOGNIZE, PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES/INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, CREATING A NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, ESTABLISHING IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSESSECTION 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:a) Ancestral Domains Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;b) Ancestral Lands Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots;c) Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title refers to a title formally recognizing the rights of possession and ownership of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains identified and delineated in accordance with this law;d) Certificate of Ancestral Lands Title refers to a title formally recognizing the rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands;REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9147July 30, 2001AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE CONSERVATION AND PROTECTION OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES AND THEIR HABITATS, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSESSection 5.Definition of Terms. As used in the Act, the term:(a) "Bioprospecting" means the research, collection and utilization of biological and genetic resources for purposes of applying the knowledge derived there from solely for commercial purposes;Section 7.Collection of Wildlife. Collection of wildlife may be allowed in accordance with Section 6 of this Act:Provided, That in the collection of wildlife, appropriate and acceptable wildlife collection techniques with least or no detrimental effects to the existing wildlife populations and their habitats shall, likewise, be required:Provided, further, That collection of wildlife by indigenous people may be allowed for traditional use and not primarily for trade:Provided, furthermore, That collection and utilization for said purpose shall not cover threatened species:Provided, finally, That Section 23 of this Act shall govern the collection of threatened species.Section 8.Possession of Wildlife. - No person or entity shall be allowed possession of wildlife unless such person or entity can prove financial and technical capability and facility to maintain said wildlife:Provided,That the source was not obtained in violation of this Act.Section 9.Collection and/or Possession of By-Products and Derivatives. By-products and derivatives may be collected and/or possessed:Provided, That the source was not obtained in violation of this Act.Section 10.Local Transport of Wildlife, By-Products and Derivatives. - Local transport of wildlife, by-products and derivatives collected or possessed through any other means shall be authorized unless the same is prejudicial to the wildlife and public health.Section 14.Bioprospecting. - Bioprospecting shall be allowed upon execution of an undertaking by any proponent, stipulating therein its compliance with and commitment(s) to reasonable terms and conditions that may be imposed by the Secretary which are necessary to protect biological diversity.The Secretary or the authorized representative, in consultation with the concerned agencies, before granting the necessary permit, shall require that prior informed consent be obtained by the applicant from the concerned indigenous cultural communities, local communities, management board under Republic Act No. 7586 or private individual or entity. The applicant shall disclose fully the intent and scope of the bioprospecting activity in a language and process understandable to the community. The prior informed consent from the indigenous peoples shall be obtained in accordance with existing laws. The action on the bioprospecting proposal by concerned bodies shall be made within a reasonable period.Upon submission of the complete requirements, the Secretary shall act on the research proposal within a reasonable period.If the applicant is a foreign entity or individual, a local institution should be actively involved in the research, collection and, whenever applicable and appropriate in the technological development of the products derived from the biological and genetic resources.Section 15.Scientific Researches on Wildlife. Collection and utilization of biological resources for scientific research and not for commercial purposes shall be allowed upon execution of an undertaking/agreement with and issuance of a gratuitous permit by the Secretary or the authorized representative:Provided, That prior clearance from concerned bodies shall be secured before the issuance of the gratuitous permit:Provided, further, That the last paragraph of Section 14 shall likewise apply.Section 27.Illegal Acts. - Unless otherwise allowed in accordance with this Act, it shall be unlawful for any person to willfully and knowingly exploit wildlife resources and their habitats, or undertake the following acts;(a) killing and destroying wildlife species, except in the following instances;(i) when it is done as part of the religious rituals of established tribal groups or indigenous cultural communities;(ii) when the wildlife is afflicted with an incurable communicable disease;(iii) when it is deemed necessary to put an end to the misery suffered by the wildlife;(iv) when it is done to prevent an imminent danger to the life or limb of a human being; and(v) when the wildlife is killed or destroyed after it has been used in authorized research or experiments.(b) inflicting injury which cripples and/or impairs the reproductive system of wildlife species;(c) effecting any of the following acts in critical habitat(s)(i) dumping of waste products detrimental to wildlife;(ii) squatting or otherwise occupying any portion of the critical habitat;(iii) mineral exploration and/or extraction;(iv) burning;(v) logging; and(vi) quarrying(d) introduction, reintroduction or restocking of wildlife resources;(e) trading of wildlife;(f) collecting, hunting or possessing wildlife, their by-products and derivatives;(g) gathering or destroying of active nests, nest trees, host plants and the like;(h) maltreating and/or inflicting other injuries not covered by the preceding paragraph; and(i) transporting of wildlife.

CASES:G.R. No. 108619 July 31, 1997EPIFANIO LALICAN,petitioner,vs.HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 52, Puerto Princesa City and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.ROMERO,J.:The issue posed for resolution in this petition forcertiorariand prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order is whether or not a charge of illegal possession of "lumber" is excluded from the crime of illegal possession of "timber" as defined in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 (The Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines), as amended, to warrant the quashal of an information charging the former offense or a "nonexistent crime."On July 23, 1991, an information for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, was filed by the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City against petitioner Epifanio Lalican,1Ruben Benitez, Allan Pulgar and Jose Roblo before the Regional Trial Court of that city. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 9543, the information reads:That on or about the 9th day of February, 1991, at Sitio Cadiz, Barangay Bacungan, City of Puerto Princesa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without lawful authority or permit, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control 1,800 board feet of assorted species and dimensions of lumber on board two (2) passenger jeeps, with a value of Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P14,000.00), Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the amount aforestated.CONTRARY TO LAW.At their arraignment on August 9, 1991, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.On August 23, 1991, petitioner Lalican filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute an offense. Contending that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 refers to "timber and other forest products" and not to "lumber," and asserting that "timber" becomes "lumber" only after it is sawed into beams, planks or boards, petitioner alleged that said decree "does not apply to 'lumber.'" He added that the law is "vague and standardless" as it does not specify the authority or the legal documents required by existing forest laws and regulations. Hence, petitioner asserted that the information should be quashed as it violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law.2The prosecution opposed the motion to quash on the ground that it is not for the courts to determine the wisdom of the law nor to set out the policy of the legislature which deemed it proper that the word "timber" should include "lumber" which is a "product or derivative after the timber is cut." The position of the prosecution was that to hold otherwise would result in the easy circumvention of the law, for one could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution. The prosecution asserted that the issue raised by petitioner was more semantical than a question of law.3On September 24, 1991, the lower court,4guided by the principles that penal laws should be construed strictly against the state and that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, issued an order quashing the information. It held that the distinction between "timber" and "lumber" is not artificial nor a matter of semantics as the law itself distinguishes the two terms. Sec. 3(q) of P.D. No. 705 classifies "timber" as a forest product while Sec. 3(aa) thereof considers "lumber" as a finished wood product. Adding that unlicensed cutting, gathering and/or collecting of "timber" is penalized under Sec. 68 while sale of "lumber" without compliance with grading rules established by the government is prohibited by Sec. 79, the lower court categorically stated that:Logically, lumber, being a manufactured wood product, poses no more danger to forest lands by being cut, gathered, collected or removed. It is in fact, only bought and sold. Thus, Sec. 68 cannot be made to apply to lumber.The court, however, refrained from exploring the constitutional issues raised by petitioner upon a holding that the case could be resolved on some other grounds or issues.5The prosecution filed a motion for the reconsideration of this Order, pointing out that under the Primer on Illegal Logging of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR), timber is not just any piece of wood for it may consist of squared and manufactured timber or one which has been sawn to pieces to facilitate transportation or hauling. It stressed that to consider a person who had made lumber out of timber as not criminally liable is an absurd interpretation of the law.Moreover, the prosecution underscored the facts that when apprehended, the accused presented Private Land Timber Permit No. 030140 dated February 10, 1991 which had expired; that while the certificate of origin indicated Brgy. Sta. Cruz, the product actually came from Sitio Cadiz, and that the two jeeps bearing the product were not equipped with certificates of transport agreement. Added to this was the fact that, if the product were indeed lumber, then the accused could have presented a certificate of lumber origin, lumber sale invoices in case of sale, tally sheets and delivery receipts for transportation from one point to another.6Petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration contending that the DENR primer's definition of "timber" is erroneous because the law itself distinguishes "timber" from "sawn lumber." The non-inclusion of "lumber" in Sec. 68 could only mean a clear legislative intent to exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized under that section.7Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration, the Presiding Judge of Branch 49 inhibited himself from taking cognizance of Criminal Case No. 9543. The case was subsequently assigned to Branch 52.On June 10, 1992, the lower court8issued the herein questioned order setting aside the quashal Order of the previous judge. It declared that from the law itself, it is evident that what is sought to be penalized is not the possession, without the required legal documents, of timber only but also of "other forest products." It stated that even if lumber is not timber, still, lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal documents is equally prohibited by the law which includes "wood" in the definition of forest products.Petitioner sought the reconsideration of this Order but the lower court denied it. Hence, the instant petition arguing that the lower court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in setting aside the quashal order and in denying his motion for reconsideration on the ground that Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 neither specifies nor includes "lumber" in the phrase "timber or other forest products."The petition is devoid of merit.Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 which was issued on July 25, 1987 by then President Corazon C. Aquino, provides:Sec. 68. Cutting,Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority,or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code:Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied.)Punished then in this section are: (a) the cutting, gathering, collection, or removal of timber or other forest products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; or (b) possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations.In the recent case ofMustang, Lumber, Inc.v.Courtof Appeals9this Court, thru Justice Hilario Davide, held:The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of eithertimberor lumber. While the former is included inforest productsas defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant," which reads:(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials intolumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood product.This simply means thatlumberis a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the termlumberin its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary,lumberis defined,inter alia,as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market ." Simply put , lumber is aprocessedlog or timber.It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as possession oftimberwithout the required legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither should we.Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.Be that as it may, the legislative intent to include possession of lumber in Sec. 68 is clearly gleaned from the expressed reasons for enacting the law which, under Executive Order No. 277, are the following:WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines; andWHEREAS, to overcome these difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts to make our forestry laws more responsive to present situations and realities; . . .To exclude possession of "lumber" from the acts penalized in Sec. 68 would certainly emasculate the law itself. A law should not be so construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law, nor so interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create an inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the law.10After all, the phrase "forest products" is broad enough to encompass lumber which, to reiterate, is manufactured timber. Hence, to mention lumber in Sec. 68 would merely result in tautology. As the lower court said:Even should it be conceded that lumber is not timber and is thus not covered by the prohibition, still it cannot be denied that lumber is a forest product and possession thereof without legal documents is equally and, to the same extent, prohibited. Sec. 3(q) of PD 705 as amended or otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code defines forest products,viz., . . .Stress must be given to the term WOOD embodied in the definition of forest product (supra). If we are to follow the rather tangential argument by the accused that lumber is not timber, then, it will be very easy for a person to circumvent the law. He could stealthily cut timber from any forest, have it sawn into lumber and escape criminal prosecution. It is rather too narrow an interpretation. But the law also provided a plug for the loophole. If lumber is not timber, then surely, lumber is wood. . . . .If in seeking to abate the proceedings the accused also seek to imply that lumber seized in their possession were procured from lawful source, all they have to do is produce the legal documents contemplated by the law. It is not the mere cutting or possession of timber, forest products or whatever that is prohibited and penalized by the law. What is prohibited and penalized is the act of cutting or possessing of timber, wood, or other forest products without lawful authority.The Court, therefore, finds that the lower court did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the quashal of the information. The petition simply has no legal basis.Certiorarimay be issued only where it is clearly shown that there is patent and gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.11Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of power.12On the other hand,certiorarimay not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion.13Where the court has jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct, its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible bycertiorari.14As this Court said:. . . When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original civil action ofcertiorari.15In other words,certiorariwill issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions.16The unavailability of the writ ofcertiorari, and even that of prohibition, in this case is borne out of the fact that what petitioner considers as grave abuse of discretion in this case is the denial of his motion to quash the information filed against him and three others. This Court has consistently defined the proper procedure in case of denial of a motion to quash. The accused has to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.17Certiorariis not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an information is denied. That the appropriate recourse is to proceed to trial and in case of conviction, to appeal such conviction, as well as the denial of the motion to quash, is impelled by the fact that a denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory procedural aspect which cannot be appealed nor can it be the subject of a petition forcertiorari.18The remedies of appeal andcertiorariare mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.19An interlocutory order may be assailed bycertiorarior prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.20However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review bycertiorariwould not only delay the administration of justice but also would unduly burden the courts.21Petitioner may not seek refuge underFlordelis v.Himalaloan22for his contention that a denial of a motion to quash may be the subject of a petition forcertiorari. That case has an entirely different factual milieu from the one at bar. The information herein not being "patently defective" nor that the offense charged has prescribed,23this case may not be considered an exception to the rule on the proper remedy for the denial of a motion to quash.With respect to the constitutionality of Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 which petitioner would have this Court consider,24this Court has always desisted from delving on constitutional issues. Thus, even if all the requisites for judicial review of a constitutional matter are present in a case,25this Court will not pass upon a constitutional question unless it is thelis motaof the case or if the case can be disposed of on some other grounds, such as the application of the statute or general law.26The Court can well take judicial notice of the deplorable problem of deforestation in this country, considering that the deleterious effects of this problem are now imperiling our lives and properties, more specifically, by causing rampaging floods in the lowlands. While it is true that the rights of an accused must be favored in the interpretation of penal provisions of law, it is equally true that when the general welfare and interest of the people are interwoven in the prosecution of a crime, the Court must arrive at a solution only after a fair and just balancing of interests. This the Court did in arriving at the foregoing interpretation of Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Reform Code. This task, however, has not at all been a difficult one considering that, contrary to petitioner's assertion, his rights to due process and equal protection of the law have not been clearly shown to have been jeopardized.WHEREFORE, the instant petition forcertiorariand prohibition is hereby DISMISSED. The lower court is enjoined to proceed with dispatch in the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 9543. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against, petitioner.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 165711 June 30, 2006HERMOSO ARRIOLA and MELCHOR RADAN,Petitioners,vs.SANDIGANBAYAN,Respondent.D E C I S I O NYNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:For allegedly having lost the confiscated lumber entrusted to their custody, petitioners Barangay Captain Hermoso Arriola and Barangay Chief Tanod Melchor Radan of Dulangan, Magdiwang, Romblon were convicted as principal and accessory respectively by the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 of the crime of Malversation of Public Property thru Negligence or Abandonment defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, in an Information1docketed as Criminal Case No. 2064, which alleges That on, about and during the first week of May, 1996, in barangay Dulangan, municipality of Magdiwang, province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a duly appointed/elected Barangay Captain and Chief Tanod of Dulangan, Magdiwang, Romblon and as such, they have under their custody and control approximately forty four (44) pieces of illegally sawn lumbers of assorted sizes and species, with an estimated value of P17,611.20, Philippine currency, which were confiscated or recovered by the elements of the Philippine National Police and DENR personnel and thereafter turned over the same to accused Brgy. Capt. Hermoso Arriola which he acknowledged to have received the same and stockpiled at the backyard of accused Chief Tanod Melchor Radans house, and through abandonment or negligence, they permitted any other person to take the public property wholly or partially, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the sum of P17,611.20.Contrary to law.Upon arraignment, both pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. On May 3, 1998, the trial court rendered its Decision,2the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, this Court finds co-accused barangay captain HERMOSO ARRIOLA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Malversation of Public Property Thru Negligence or Abandonment and he is hereby sentenced to not less than 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 18 years, 2 months and 20 days, as maximum, with the accessories of the law, with the additional penalty of perpetual special disqualification and of a fine of P17,611.20, Philippine Currency, and to pay the sum of P13,209.20 as indemnification of consequential damages to the government.Likewise, co-accused barangay chief tanod MELCHOR RADAN is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as accessory of the crime of Malversation of Public Property Thru Negligence or Abandonment and he is sentenced to not less than 6 years, as minimum, to 8 years and 8 months, as maximum, with the accessories of the law, with the additional penalty of perpetual special disqualification and of a fine of P4,402.80, Philippine Currency, and to pay the sum of P4,402.80 as indemnification of consequential damages to the government.No subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay the fine is imposed to both accused under Article 39, paragraph 3, RPC but either accused is subsidiarily liable for the quota of either in the indemnity for consequential damages to the government (Art. 110, RPC). Both accused shall pay the costs equally.The accused are entitled to credit for preventive imprisonment under Article 29, RPC.The accused are allowed to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bonds during the period to appeal subject to the consent of the bondsmen (Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.)SO ORDERED.3Petitioners filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals which referred the same to the public respondent Sandiganbayan on a finding that the latter has jurisdiction over the case.4On June 29, 2004, the First Division of the Sandiganbayan resolved5thus Notwithstanding the referral of this case to this Court by the Court of Appeals, it appearing that no correction was made of the correct appellate court by the appellant, this Court is constrained to DISMISS the instant case pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, stating insofar as pertinent, that "(a)n appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright," and the ruling in the case of Moll vs. Buban, et al., G.R. No. 136974 promulgated on August 27, 2002, that the designation of the correct appellate court should be made within the 15-day period to appeal.Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied6by the Sandiganbayan; hence, this petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion of the Sandiganbayan in dismissing their appeal. They maintain that the trial court committed the following errors:I. IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT HERMOSO ARRIOLA IS AN ACCOUNTABLE PUBLIC OFFICER WITH RESPECT TO CONFISCATED ILLEGALLY LOGGED LUMBER, BY REASON OF THE DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE.II. IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT HERMOSO ARRIOLA MISAPPROPRIATED OR CONSENTED OR, THROUGH NEGLIGENCE OR ABANDONMENT, PERMITTED ANOTHER PERSON TO TAKE THE CONFISCATED LUMBER.III. IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT HERMOSO ARRIOLA MALICIOUSLY OR FRAUDULENTLY ATTEMPTED TO MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THE MISSING LUMBER WERE FOUND AND RECOVED (sic).IV. IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT MELCHOR RADAN IS AN ACCESSORY AFTER THE CRIME WHO SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE, TOGETHER WITH HIS CO-PETITIONER.V. IN RULING THAT THE GUILT OF BOTH ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE ESTABLISHED BY EVIDENCE OF GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.7The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:At noon on April 22, 1996 Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Forest Rangers Efren Mandia (Mandia) and Joepre Ferriol, Senior Inspector Noel Alonzo, the team leader of Task Force Kalikasan together with the Chief of Police of Magdiwang, Romblon SPO3 Agustin Ramal and some other police officers, confiscated 44 pieces of illegally sawn lumber totaling 1,174 board feet with an estimated value of P17,611.20.8Mandia scaled the lumber and made notches on most of the pieces before issuing the seizure receipt9and turning over its custody to petitioner Arriola in the presence of petitioner Radan. Arriola acknowledged receipt thereof and signed10accordingly. Mandia subsequently discovered the lumber missing on May 5, 1996.11He went back to Barangay Dulangan on May 14, 1996 accompanied by several police officers and Foresters Gerardo Sabigan and Glenn Tansiongco. They requested petitioners to turn over custody of the confiscated lumber but the latter claimed that the same were taken away without their knowledge. Subsequently, petitioners produced lumber and claimed that these were the ones they recovered. Upon closer inspection however, Mandia noted that the lumber produced by petitioners were different from those previously confiscated.The subsequent investigation conducted by Mandia together with Forester and Officer-in-Charge Gerardo Sabigan, SPO1 Jose Fabrique, Jr., and some members of the Multi-Sectoral Forest Protection Committee showed that the missing lumber was actually hauled to and used in the Magdiwang Cockpit where petitioner Arriola is a stockholder.12On June 10, 1996, a complaint was filed against petitioners before the Romblon Provincial Prosecution Office.In his defense, Arriola asserts that contrary to the finding of the trial court, he is not an accountable officer insofar as the confiscated lumber is concerned. He maintains that none of the powers, duties and functions of a Barangay Captain as enumerated in the Local Government Code13(R.A. 7160) directly or by inference suggests that as such Barangay Captain, he is an accountable officer with respect to the custody of illegally sawn lumber confiscated within his territorial jurisdiction.He insists that the confiscated lumber was placed in his custody "not by reason of the duties of his office" as Barangay Captain, thus he is not legally accountable to answer for its loss so as to make him liable for Malversation under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners claim that they did not misappropriate, abandon or neglect the confiscated lumber and insist that the same were stolen. Arriola claims he visited the stockpiled lumber regularly so the theft probably occurred at night.With respect to the replacement lumber they subsequently produced, petitioners believed in good faith that the various lumber found scattered in a nearby creek were the missing confiscated lumber left by the thieves who failed to transport them across.Before going into the merits of the case, we must first resolve the procedural issue of whether the Sandiganbayan correctly dismissed the appeal. The Sandiganbayan anchored its dismissal on this Courts pronouncement in Moll v. Buban14that the designation of the wrong court does not necessarily affect the validity of the notice of appeal. However, the designation of the proper court should be made within the 15-day period to appeal. Once made within the said period, the designation of the correct appellate court may be allowed even if the records of the case are forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Otherwise, Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court would apply, the relevant portion of which states:Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. x x x xAn appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.In this case, the records had been forwarded to the Court of Appeals which endorsed petitioners appeal to the Sandiganbayan. However, petitioners failed to designate the proper appellate court within the allowable time.We cannot fault the Sandiganbayan for dismissing the appeal outright for it was merely applying the law and existing jurisprudence on the matter. Appeal is not a vested right but a mere statutory privilege; thus, appeal must be made strictly in accordance with provisions set by law.15Section 2, Rule 50 clearly requires that the correction in designating the proper appellate court should be made within the 15-day period to appeal.However, the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense for they have been adopted to help secure not override substantial justice.16This Court has repeatedly stressed that the ends of justice would be served better when cases are determined, not on mere technicality or some procedural nicety, but on the merits after all the parties are given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses. Lest it be forgotten, dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon.17Having resolved the procedural issue, we shall now proceed to the merits of the case. The issue boils down to whether or not petitioners Arriola and Radan are accountable officers within the purview of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to the confiscated items.To find an accused guilty of malversation, the prosecution must prove the following essential elements:a.] The offender is a public officer;b.] He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;c.] The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; andd.] He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, such funds or property.An accountable officer under Article 217 is a public officer who, by reason of his office is accountable for public funds or property. Sec. 101 (1) of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines (PD No. 1455) defines accountable officer to be every officer of any government agency whose duties permit or require the possession or custody of government funds or property and who shall be accountable therefor and for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with law.18In the determination of who is an accountable officer, it is the nature of the duties which he performs and not the nomenclature or the relative importance the position held which is the controlling factor.19Is petitioner Arriola, who signed as custodian in the seizure receipt for the confiscated lumber an accountable officer with respect to its loss?Chapter IV, I-E, (4) of the DENR Primer on Illegal Logging states that:In cases where the apprehension is made by the field DENR officer, the forest products and the conveyance used shall be deposited to the nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED office, as the case may be, for safekeeping, wherever it is most convenient. If the transfer of the seized forest products to the above places is not immediately feasible, the same shall be placed under the custody of any licensed sawmill operator or the nearest local public official such as the Barangay Captain, Municipal/City Mayor, Provincial Governor or the PC/INP; at the discretion of the confiscating officer taking into account the safety of the confiscated forest products x x x. In any case, the custody of the forest products shall be duly acknowledged and receipted by the official taking custody thereof.In the case of United States v. Lafuente,20the accused was a Municipal Secretary and a member of the auction committee. A public auction for the sale of fishery privileges was held pursuant to the provisions of the Municipal Law and a municipal ordinance. When the auction was concluded, the bidders deposited the amount of their respective bids with the accused. The latter embezzled the money for his personal use. It was held that the accused is guilty of misappropriation of public funds. Although a Municipal Secretarys duties do not normally include the receipt of public funds, the accused in this case was nonetheless held accountable for the same because the money was deposited with him under authority of law. The obligation of the secretary was to safeguard the money for the Government.21In the instant case, Arriola knowingly and willingly signed the seizure receipt for the confiscated articles. By affixing his signature in said document, he undertook to safeguard the lumber on behalf of the Government. The receipt contains a provision which states that as custodian, Arriola "obliges himself to faithfully keep and protect to the best of his ability the said seized articles from defacement in any manner, destruction or loss and that he will never alter or remove said seized articles until ordered by the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources or his duly authorized representative or any court of Justice in the Philippines."Although his usual duties as Barangay Captain do not ordinarily include the receipt of confiscated articles on behalf of the Government, by virtue of the DENR Primer on Illegal Logging, which had for its basis Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705,22he may be called on to take custody thereof as the need arises. Furthermore, by affixing his signature in the seizure receipt which clearly enumerates his obligations as a custodian therein, he effectively becomes an accountable officer therefor.The records show that prior to its confiscation by the DENR officers on April 22, 1996, the lumber was previously apprehended by Arriola on April 19, 1996.23Thus, even without the seizure receipt where he signed as custodian for the said lumber, Arriola was accountable therefor because he was the one who originally took possession of it on behalf of the government.His claim that the trial court erred in holding him liable for malversation through negligence or abandonment lacks merit. The lumber curiously turned up at the Magdiwang cockpit structure where he happens to be a stockholder. Also, Arriola admitted that he already knew about the missing lumber long before the DENR officers came back to get it but he did not inform them about its loss because "somebody advised me not to report because the one who got the lumber might panic and tuluyan na ang lumber."24He even produced 44 pieces of lumber and passed it off as those missing. The evidence showed however that the species was of a cheaper quality and did not bear the markings made by the apprehending officers of the DENR. All told, his alibi and denials cannot prevail over the credible testimonies of government witnesses which corroborated each other. His defenses did not withstand the onslaught of clear and obvious physical, documentary and testimonial evidence adduced by the prosecution.With respect to petitioner Radan, the trial court erred in judging him liable as an accessory.Article 19, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code defines accessories as those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission by concealing or destroying the body of the crime or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove Radans liability as an accessory were neither clear nor convincing. His presence during the time when the DENR officers turned over the custody of the seized items to Arriola is not enough proof of complicity, nor the fact that the confiscated lumber was placed behind his fathers house. The assertion that he was responsible for the alleged transport of the confiscated articles to the cockpit in Dulangan was a mere conjecture.In all criminal cases, mere speculations cannot substitute for proof in establishing the guilt of the accused.25When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, it has been our policy of long standing that the presumption of innocence must be favored, and exoneration granted as a matter of right.26We now come to the penalty which should be imposed on petitioner Arriola. According to Article 217, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for malversation is reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than P12,000 but less than P22,000. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the maximum imposable penalty shall be within the range of 16 years, 5 months and 11 days to 18 years, 5 months and 20 days, while the minimum shall be within the range of 10 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. The trial court therefore properly imposed the penalty of imprisonment to petitioner Arriola ranging from 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 18 years, 2 months and 20 days, as maximum.Under the second paragraph of Art. 217, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled, which in this case is P17,611.20. There will be no subsidiary imprisonment because the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision correccional.27WHEREFORE, the May 3, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 in Criminal Case No. 2064 finding petitioner Hermoso Arriola guilty of Malversation of Public Property thru Negligence or Abandonment and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment to not less than 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 18 years, 2 months and 20 days, as maximum, with the accessories of the law, with the additional penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine of P17,611.20 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that the imposition of consequential damages on petitioner Hermoso Arriola is ordered DELETED for lack of legal basis. Petitioner Melchor Radan is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 120365 December 17, 1996PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.WILSON B. QUE,accused-appellantPUNO,J.:pAccused-appellant Wilson B. Que appeals from his conviction for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 7051as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) 277.2The facts show that two weeks before March 8, 1994, SPO1 Dexter Corpuz, a member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging, received an information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegally cut lumber will pass through Ilocos Norte. Acting on said information, members of the Provincial Task Force went on patrol several times within the vicinity of General Segundo Avenue in Laoag City.3On March 8, 1994, SPO1 Corpuz, together with SPO1 Zaldy Asuncion and SPO1 Elmer Patoc went on patrol around the area. At about 1:00 in the morning, they posted themselves at the corner of General Segundo Avenue and Rizal Street. Thirty minutes later, they saw a ten-wheeler truck with plate number PAD-548 pass by. They followed the truck and apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge.4There were three persons on board the truck: driver Wilfredo Cacao, accused-appellant Wilson Que, and an unnamed person. The driver identified accused- appellant as the owner of the truck and the cargo.5SPO1 Corpuz checked the cargo and found that it contained coconut slabs. When interviewed, accused-appellant told SPO1 Corpuz that there were sawn lumber inserted in between the coconut slabs.6SPO1 Corpuz asked accused-appellant for the cargo's supporting documents, specifically: (1) certificate of lumber origin, (2) certificate of transport agreement, (3) auxiliary invoice, (4) receipt from the DENR, and (5) certification from the forest ranger regarding the origin of the coconut slabs. Accused-appellant failed to present any of these documents . All he could show was a certification7from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), Sanchez Mira, Cagayan that he legally acquired the coconut slabs. The certification was issued to facilitate transport of the slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.7SPO1 Corpuz brought accused-appellant to the office of the Provincial Task Force at the provincial capitol. Again, accused-appellant admitted to the members of the Provincial Task Force that there were sawn lumber under the coconut slabs.9At 10:00 o'clock in the morning, the members of the Provincial Task Force, together with three CENRO personnel examined the cargo. The examination confirmed that the cargo consisted of coconut slabs and sawn tanguile lumber. The coconut slabs were piled at the sides of the truck, concealing the tanguile lumber.10When the CENRO personnel inventoried and scaled the seized forest products, they counted two hundred fifty eight (258) pieces of tanguile lumber with a total volume of 3,729.3 board feet (8.79 cubic meters) and total assessed value of P93,232.50.11On June 23, 1994, accused-appellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag with violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O. 277. The Information alleged:That on or about the 8th day of March, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the owner of an I(s)uzu Ten wheeler Truck bearing Plate No. PAD-548, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in possession, control and custody 258 pieces of various sizes of Forest Products chainsawn lumber (species of Tanguile) with a total volume of 3,729.3 bd. ft. or equivalent to 8.79 cubic meters valued in the total amount of P93,232.50 at P25.00/bd. ft., necessary permit, license or authority to do so from the proper authorities, thus violating the aforecited provision of the law, to the damage and prejudice of the government.CONTRARY TO LAW.12Accused-appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed that he acquired the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber from a legal source. During the trial, he presented the private land timber permits (PLTP) issued by the Departmentof Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to Enrica Cayosa13and Elpidio Sabal.14The PLTP authorizes its holder to cut, gather and dispose timber from the forest area covered by the permit. He alleged that the tanguile lumber came from the forest area covered by the PLTP's of Cayosa and Sabal and that they were given to him by Cayosa and Sabal as payment for his hauling services.15Accused-appellant also objected to the admission of the 258 pieces of lumber as evidence against him. He contended that they were fruits of an illegal search and seizure and of an uncounselled extrajudicial admission.The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him toreclusion perpetua. It also ordered the confiscation of the seized lumber and the ten-wheeler truck owned by accused-appellant. The dispositive portion of the Decision16states:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused Wilson B. Que guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty ofRECLUSION PERPETUA, plus all the accessory penalties provided by law. The bail bond filed for the provisional liberty of the accused is CANCELLED.The two hundred fifty-eight (258) pieces of lumber (tanguile specie) and the ten-wheeler truck bearing plate No. PAD-548 which was used in the commission of the crime are hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with law.Costs against the accused.SO ORDERED.17Appellant now comes before us with the following assignment oferrors:181. It was error for the Court to convict accused under Section 68, PD 705 as amended by EO 277 for possessing timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations on the ground that since it is only in EO No. 277 where for the first time mere possession of timber was criminalized, there are no existing forest laws and regulations which required certain legal documents for possession of timber and other forest products.2. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional rights of accused against unlawful searches and seizures.3. The Court erred in allowing evidence secured in violation of the constitutional rights of accused under custodial investigation.On the first assignment of error, appellant argues that he cannot be convicted for violation of Section 68 of P.D. 705 because E.O. 277 which amended Section 68 to penalize the possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents did not indicate the particular documents necessary to make the possession legal. Neither did the other forest laws and regulations existing at the time of its enactment.Appellant's argument deserves scant consideration. Section 68 of P.D. 705 provides:Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or other Forest Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code:Provided, Thatin the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (emphasis supplied).Appellant interprets the phrase "existing forest laws and regulations" to refer to those laws and regulations which were already in effect at the time of the enactment of E.O. 277. The suggested interpretation is strained and would render the law inutile. Statutory construction should not kill but give life to the law. The phrase should be construed to refer to laws and regulations existing at the time of possession of timber or other forest products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59 series of 1993 specifies the documents required for the transport of timber and other forest products. Section 3 of the Administrative Order provides:Section 3. Documents Required.Consistent with the policy stated above, the movement of logs, lumber, plywood, veneer, non-timber forest products and wood-based or nonwood-based products/commodities shall be covered with appropriateCertificates of Origin, issued by authorized DENR officials, as specified in the succeeding sections.xxx xxx xxx3.3 Lumber. Unless otherwise herein provided, the transport of lumber shall be accompanied by a CERTIFICATE OF LUMBER ORIGIN (CLO) issued by the CENRO or his duly authorized representative which has jurisdiction over the processing plant producing the said lumber or the lumber firm authorized to deal in such commodities. In order to be valid, the CLO must be supported by the company tally sheet or delivery receipt, and in case of sale, a lumber sales invoice.xxx xxx xxxWhen apprehended on March 8, 1994, accused-appellant failed to present any certificate of origin of the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber. The trial court found:xxx xxx xxx. . . When apprehended by the police officers, the accused admittedly could not present a single document to justify his possession of the subject lumber. . . .Significantly, at the time the accused was apprehended by the police offices, he readily showed documents to justify his possession of the coconut slabs. Thus, he showed a certification issued by Remigio B. Rosario, Forest Ranger, of the DENR, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan (Exhibit "E") and a xerox copy of the original certificate of title covering the parcel of land where the coconut slabs were cut.(Exhibit "F").It is worthy to note that the certification dated March 7, 1994 states:THIS IS TO CERTIFYthat the one (1) truckload of coconut slabs to be transported by Mr.Wilson Que on board truck bearing Plate No.PAD 548were derived from matured coconut palms gathered inside the private land of Miss Bonifacia Collado under OCT No. P-11614(8) located at Nagrangtayan, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan.This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. Wilson Que for the purpose of facilitating the transportation of said coconut slabs from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to San Vicente, Urdaneta, Pangasinan and is valid up to March 11, 1994 or upon discharge of its cargoes at its final destination, whichever comes first.It is crystal clear, therefore, that the accused was given permit by the DENR to transportone (1) truckload of coconut slabsonly between March 7 to 11, 1994. The accused was apprehended onMarch 8, 1994aboard his truckbearing plate number PAD-548which was loaded not only with coconut slabs but with chainsawn lumber as well. Admittedly, the lumber could not be seen from the outside. The lumber were placed in the middle and not visible unless the coconut slabs which were placed on the top, sides and rear of the truck were removed.Under these circumstances, the Court has no doubt that the accused was very much aware that he needed documents to possess and transport the lumber (b)ut could not secure one and, therefore, concealed the lumber by placing the same in such a manner that they could not be seen by police authorities by merely looking at the cargo.In this regard, the Court cannot give credence to his alleged letter dated March 3, 1994 addressed to the OIC CENRO Officer, CENRO, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan informing the CENRO that he would be transporting the subject lumber on March 7, 1994 from Sanchez Mira, Cagayan to Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur but was returned to him for the reason that he did not need a permit to transport the subject lumber. (Exhibits "8", "8-A").While it is true that the letter indicates that it was received by CENRO on March 4, 1994, the Court has doubts that this was duly filed with the concerned office. According to the accused, he filed the letter in the morning of March 4 and returned in the afternoon of the same day. He was then informed by an employee of the CENRO whom he did not identify that he did not need a permit to transport the lumber because the lumber would be for personal used (sic) and ". . . came from PLTP." (Ibid) The letter-request was returned to him.The fact that the letter-request was returned to him creates doubts on the stance of the accused. Documents or other papers,i.e., letter-request of this kind filed with a government agency are not returned. Hence, when a person files or submits any document to a government agency, the agency gets the original copy. The filer only gets a duplicate copy to show that he has filed such document with the agency. Moreover, his avoidance as regards the identity of the employee of the CENRO who allegedly returned the letter-request to him also creates doubts on his stance. Thus, on cross-examination, the accused, when asked about the identity of the employee of the CENRO who returned the letter-request to him answered that he could recognize the person ". . . but they were already reshuffled." (TSN, February 8, 1995, p. 104) At one point, the accused also said that he did not know if that person was an employee of the DENR. (Ibid, p. 105)Be that as it may, the Court finds significance in the last paragraph of this letter-request, to wit:xxx xxx xxxPlease consider this as my Certificate of Transport Agreement in view of the fact that I am hauling and transporting my own lumber for my own needs.Thus, the accused through this letter considered the same as his certificate of transport agreement. Why then, if he was telling the truth, did he not take this letter with him when he transported the lumber on March 7, 1994?All these circumstances clearly show that the letter comes from a polluted source.19xxx xxx xxxAccused-appellant's possession of the subject lumber without any documentation clearly constitutes an offense under Section 68 of P.D. 705.We also reject appellant's argument that the law only penalizes possession of illegal forest products and that the possessor cannot be held liable if he proves that the cutting, gathering, collecting or removal of such forest products is legal. There are two (2) distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit:(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any authority; and(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.In the first offense, one can raise as a defense the legality of the acts of cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest products by presenting the authorization issued by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering, collecting and removal of the forest products is legal or not. Mere possession of forest products without the proper documents consummates the crime. Whether or not the lumber comes from a legal source is immaterial because E.O 277 considers the mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents asmalum prohibitum.On the second and third assignment of error, appellant contends that the seized lumber are inadmissible in evidence for being "fruits of a poisonous tree". Appellant avers that these pieces of lumber were obtained in violation of his constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures as well as his right to counsel.We do not agree.The rule on warrantless search and seizure of a moving vehicle was summarized by this court inPeople vs.Bagista,20thus:The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no person shall be subjected to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. The basis for the rule can be found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which states:The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the aforementioned right shall, among others, "be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. (citations omitted; emphasis supplied)As in Bagista, the police officers in the case at bar had probable cause to search appellant's truck. A member of the Provincial Task Force on Illegal Logging received a reliable information that a ten-wheeler truck bearing plate number PAD-548 loaded with illegal lumber would pass through Ilocos Norte. Two weeks later, while members of the Provincial Task Force were patrolling along General Segundo Avenue, they saw the ten-wheeler truck described by the informant. When they apprehended it at the Marcos Bridge, accused-appellant, the owner of the truck and the cargo, admitted that there were sawn lumber in between the coconut slabs. When the police officers asked for the lumber's supporting documents, accused-appellant could not present any. The foregoing circumstances are sufficient to prove the existence of probable cause which justified the extensive search of appellant's truck even without a warrant. Thus, the 258 pieces of tanguile lumber were lawfully seized and were thus properly admitted as evidence to prove the guilt of accused-appellant.The foregoing disquisition renders unnecessary the issue of whether appellant's right to counsel under custodial investigation was violated. The Resolution of the issue will not affect the finding of guilt of appellant.IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.SO ORDERED.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),- versus -PAGADIAN CITY TIMBER CO., INC.,G.R. No. 159308

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xDECISIONNACHURA, J.:This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify and set aside the Decision2dated October 18, 2001 and the Resolution3dated July 24, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59194 entitled "Pagadian City Timber Co., Inc. v. Antonio Cerilles, as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Antonio Mendoza, as Regional Executive Director, DENR, Region IX."The antecedent facts are as follows:On October 14, 1994, petitioner, through the DENR, and respondent Pagadian City Timber Co., Inc. executed Industrial Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) No. R-9-0404whereby petitioner, represented by then Regional Executive Director (RED) for Region IX, Leonito C. Umali, authorized respondent, represented by its President Filomena San Juan, to develop, utilize, and manage a specified forest area covering 1,999.14 hectares located in Barangays Langapod, Cogonan, and Datagan, Municipality of Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur, for the production of timber and other forest products subject to a production-sharing scheme.Respondent later submitted the required Comprehensive Development and Management Plan (CDMP) which the DENR approved on August 17, 1995.On October 8, 1998, in response to the numerous complaints filed by members of the Subanen tribe regarding respondents alleged failure to implement the CDMP, disrespect of their rights as an indigenous people, and the constant threats and harassment by armed men employed by respondent, RED Antonio Mendoza, DENR Region IX, issued Regional Special Order No. 217 creating a regional team to evaluate and assess IFMA No. R-9-040.Thus, the DENR sent a letter dated October 22, 1998 to respondent, giving notice of the evaluation and assessment to be conducted on the area from October 22-30, 1998 covering the years 1997 and 1998. In the notice, the DENR requested any representative of the company to appear at the CENRO Office, Pagadian City, and bring with him documents and maps concerning its IFMA operations.On October 23, 1998, a DENR Evaluation Team composed of Aniceto Wenceslao (Forester, DENR, Zamboanga del Sur), Isabelo Mangaya-ay (Intern Chief, RCBF/MCO), Philidor Lluisma (Forester II, Regional Office), Chanito Paul Siton (C. Forester, CENRO-Pagadian City), Adelberto Roullo (Forester, CENRO, Pagadian City), and Francisco Martin (Carto LEP, CENRO, Pagadian City) went to the IFMA site. After a briefing conference between the Evaluation Team and respondents Operations Manager, Inocencio Santiago, actual field evaluation and assessment followed.On October 29, 1998, an exit conference and dialogue on post evaluation and assessment of IFMA R-9-04 was held between DENR officials, namely, CENR Officer Maximo O. Dichoso, IFMA Regional Team Leader, Forester Isabelo C. Mangaya-ay, and IFMA Regional Team Member, Forester Philidor O. Lluisma, and IFMA Representative and Operations Manager Inocencio Santiago at the CENRO, Pagadian City.5The exit conference was called to order at 1:30 p.m. and was concluded at 3:00 p.m. Forester Mangaya-ay presented the representative results and findings of the Evaluation Team, to wit:The presiding officer started with the mango plantation in the Noran, Langapod side. That out of the estimated number of seedlings planted of about 2,008 hills, within an equivalent area of 20 hectares, the result or finding of the inventory conducted at 100% intensity is only 98 hills of seedlings survived including the doubtful and badly deformed. The species planted along trails are Gmelina and Mahogany species. The said foot trail planted with the aforementioned species starts from the entrance of the IFMA are where the notice billboard is posted up to the only existing look-out tower. The estimated average of percent survival for Gmelina is more or less 30%. There are also portions where higher percentage of survival is recorded at 56% and lower at 14%. There are areas planted declared by Kagawad Cerning Becagas of Barangay Cogonan now covered by CSC. The areas covered by CSC, a waiver is needed to be issued by the IFMA holder.CENR Officer Maximo O. Dichoso commented that during a meeting held before, the IFMA holder was willing to give up the said areas.The presiding officer continued that on the courtesy call made to the Barangay Chairman of Barangay Cogonan, Mr. Roberto Palaran recounted the assistance extended by the IFMA holder to his barangay as Community Assistance/service which includes electric generator, handheld radio and laborers for the repair of Noburan Cogonan road and the repair of the hanging bridge at Sitio Tialaic to which the said Barangay Chairman issued a duly signed certification to this effect.With regards, the seedling stock within the nursery, there are approximately a total number of about 44,460 seedlings of Gmelina species. That the infrastructure implemented or constructed, there exist only one look-out tower of the reported 4 look-out towers constructed. Moreover, the team had also noted only 1 bunkhouse and 1 stockroom or shedhouse. There is also 1 Multi-purpose shed and 1 dilapidated or neglected notice billboard poster at the entrance trail leading to the IFMA area. That with regards the concrete monument, there are only 2 recorded. The other corners visible are those located at junctions of creeks and rivers. But the others cannot be visibly or never planted for the same cannot be pinpointed or shown to the team allegedly for lack of knowledge by the representative of the IFMA holder. Finally, the presiding officer reminded the herein IFMA representative Mr. Inocencio Santiago that per actual survey, inspection and ground verification, the team believes that the other reported areas planted are located outside the designated IFMA area particularly the Noburan and Langapod sides.6After the presentation, Mangaya-ay asked Santiago if he had comments, suggestions, or questions regarding the matter and the manner of the conduct of the evaluation and assessment by the Evaluation Team. Santiago said he had none, but requested a copy of the report of the Evaluation Team. Mangaya-ay informed him that it was only RED Mendoza who may furnish him a copy of the report.Later, the Evaluation Team submitted a report through a Memorandum7dated November 6, 1998 to the DENR-RED of Region 9, Zamboanga City, on the evaluation and assessment of respondent under IFMA No. R-9-040. The said Memorandum stated In compliance with Regional Special Order No. 217, Series of 1998, please be informed that the herein information is the result or findings of the team for the conduct of evaluation and assessment following the guidelines setforth under Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 11, Series of 1995 of Pagadian Timber Co., Inc. under IFMA No. R9-040 against their actual accomplishment as mandated under the terms and conditions of the IFMA including other applicable laws, rules and regulations of the department on the matter.At the onset, the team conducted a briefing conference and dialogue with the IFMA holder, the CENR Officer of Pagadian City and personnel concerned for the proper and orderly implementation and conduct of the evaluation and assessment (please see attached).The team was composed of the Regional Evaluating Team, the CENRO and PENRO representatives and the representatives of the IFMA holder. The team proceeded to the western portion of the area of the herein IFMA particularly Barangay Cogonan, Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur. The evaluation and assessment was then conducted on the main nursery, the established plantation, the look-out towers, the boundary of ISF and claimed or occupied areas, natural or residual forest, the IFMA boundary, monuments planted, foot trails, other improvements introduced and the billboard and signboard posted. The inspection, evaluation and assessment conducted were all undertaken in the presence of the IFMA holder, representatives, laborers and other personnel on the area. (please see attached report, tall sheets, pictorials and map).In the conduct of the same, the IFMA representatives or laborers that assisted the team could only show the subject area under evaluation but the other areas alluded to as accomplished or undertaken by the company appeared upon actual verification and inspection to be negative and non-existent thus dispelling their allegation.With regard the information and dissemination conducted by the IFMA holder including other services extended to the communities within the IFMA area and vicinities, it is noteworthy for recognition the donations made by the company. (Please see attached minutes of the dialogue with the barangay officials of Barangay Cogonan and pictorials).The evaluation conducted on the nursery operations show that the facilities and other necessary implements were generally below par. An inventory of the seedlings stock of pure Gmelina species have already lapsed its plantability or have overgrown in the seedbed with an aver