Eni S.p.A. Energy Company: An Industry and Company Analysis

William DuncanTodd Bailey

1

Table of Contents:

Brief History & Introduction…………………………………………………………………………….......3

External Analysis:

Industry Overview…………………………………………………………………….………………4

General Environment……………………………………………………………………………..4-5

The Industry Environment: Porter’s Five Forces………………..….………………...5-6

Strategic Groups………...…………………………………………………………………….…….6-7

Internal Analysis:

Financial Analysis……………………………………………………………………...…………...7-8

Tangible & Intangible Resources…………………………………………………….….....8-10

Core Competencies……………………………………………………………………………….…10

SWOT Analysis………………………………………………………………………...…………10-12

Eni S.p.A.’s Current Strategies……...…………………………….……………………..…12-13

Major Problems…………………………………………………………………..…………………..13

Future Strategies………………..…………………………………………..…………………..13-14

Appendix 1……………………………………………………………………………………………...........15-17

Appendix 2……………………………………………………………………………………………….......18-19

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………………..............20

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Brief History & Introduction:Eni S.p.A

The Italian energy and chemical company, Eni S.p.A. has a long, storied

history dating back to 1926. For this case, we will review the history from 1998 to

2012.

Vittorio Mincato, a former veteran line worker, took the reins of Eni in 1998

and set in a four-year plan in 1999 featured, “on one side, an aggressive growth

option in upstream activities and, on the other, a customer-oriented approach in the

energy market” (Grant, 582). By the time of his retirement, Mincato was highly

regarded for his work with Eni, winning “plaudits from investors and industry

leaders both for the clarity of Eni’s strategy and the effectiveness of its execution”

(Grant, 582). Mincato let Eni to the extension of its exploration activities in

countries like Kazakhstan, West Africa, Iran, and the Gulf of Mexico as well as major

projects including, “the Blue Stream pipeline to move gas from Russia to Turkey

under the Black Sea and the Greenstream pipeline from Libya to Italy” (Grant, 583).

Mincato continued to focus on expanding Eni’s upstream and downstream as well as

horizontally as a major point of his strategy.

The departure of Mincato in 2005 led to skepticism and doubt about the

success of new CEO, Paolo Scaroni. However, “early skepticism was allayed by

Scaroni’s effectiveness as a communicator, especially with the investment

community, and as an international dealmaker. From the outset, Scaroni make it

clear that he would not deviate substantially from Mincato’s ‘disciplined growth’

strategy” (Grant, 583). Under Scaroni, capital investments more than doubled,

including initiatives that were both failures and successes. These initiatives included

Eni’s Kashagan oilfield, where “technical, geological, and logistical complexities”

caused a joint operating company to replace Eni in 2009. Also, Scaroni build on the

company’s relationship with Russia, negotiated a pivotal agreement Congo, built on

its status in Libya, and extended exploration into new areas. Scaroni and Eni were

known for its “capacity to build cordial relations in countries that were

conventionally viewed as difficult places to do business” (Grant, 584).

3

External AnalysisIndustry Overview

Due to Eni’s vast horizontal integration in the fields of Petroleum and LNG

(Natural Gas), and chemicals, we will classify the company to be in both industries.

Since the strategies for companies in said industries differ by such a degree (refer to

Strategic Groups, p. 8), it is not appropriate to classify Eni in such a broad industrial

category such as “Energy.” Therefore, we will include a brief overview of each

industry.

The last four years for the oil and gas industry have shown promising

growth, but buyer beware: one must be aware of constant threats to the industry

including alternative energy, government regulations, and environmentalist groups.

As of 2012, revenue for the world oil and gas industry reached $1,247,490, up 1.5%

from 2011. (Appendix 1.1)(World Gas and Oil Industry Revenue 2013 | Statistic.)

Demand for crude oil worldwide has shown to settle between 85.3 million of barrels

per day in 2006 and 89.8 million in 2012. (Appendix 1.2)(Daily Global Crude Oil

Demand 2006-2015 | Statistic.).

The global chemical industry has continued to show growth, omitting the

obvious dip as was predicted with the recession of 2008. Total revenues for the

industry have increased by an average of 11.2% per year. (Appendix 1.3)(Global

Chemical Industry Revenue 2002-2014 | Statistic.)

The General EnvironmentEconomic:

Omitting February, 2009, when the price of crude oil dropped almost $100

per barrel from the peak in June, 2008, crude oil prices have shown general growth.

At years end in 2012, crude oil prices per barrel reached $93.80. (Crude Oil Price

History Chart | MacroTrends.)

Political/Legal:

4

“Eni’s ownership of domestic gas transportation had long been under attack

from the European Commission. In 2012, the new Italian government under Mario

Monti make it clear that Eni would have to relinquish its 52% ownership of Snam

Rete Gas, the gas network owner. The European Commission had also pressured Eni

to sell its ownership stakes in several international pipelines on the basis that it had

limited competition in the Italian gas market by restricting third-party access”

(Grant, 579).

Socio-cultural:

With environmental awareness becoming much more important among the

social issues, Eni came under attack by environmental groups for “the company’s

lack of investment in renewable energy sources and concerned over the

environmental consequences of individual projects – most notably Eni’s tar sand

project in Congo” (Grant, 580).

The Industry Environment: Porter’s Five Forces

Bargaining Power of Buyers:

The bargaining power of buyers for firms in the petroleum, LNG, oil, and

chemical industries is very low. There is a high demand for energy and chemical

products to accommodate transportation, power, and agricultural needs, to name a

few. These buyers are completely dependent on energy and chemical suppliers

unless they can supply the means to produce energy on their own.

Bargaining Power of Suppliers:

For firms like Eni who are very vertically integrated, the bargaining power of

suppliers is low since vertically integrated firms can supply the means for

production and distribution on their own.

For firms that rely on outside companies to supply drills, distribution, or

other necessities, the bargaining power is high, which increases the rationale to

invest in upstream and downstream integration.

5

Threat of New Entrants:

Due to the extremely high capital expenditure needed to enter the industry,

the treat of new entrants is extremely low. Also, there are multiple international

firms with high brand awareness and well-established manufacturing, distribution,

and logistic channels that come with years of experience.

“Expanding upstream production was becoming increasingly challenging:

exploration was moving to technically challenging frontier regions such as the Artic

and ocean floors, resource nationalism and political instability was a constant threat

in producer countries, and competition in the upstream continued to grow” (Grant,

579).

Threat from Substitutes:

The threat from substitutes in the industry is relatively high. Firms in these

industries must constantly be aware of trends and advancing technology that could

take advantage of current and alternative energy resources as social-cultural trends

continue to shift towards environmental consciousness. Electricity and solar power

sources are being developed and utilized in more and more places.

Rivalry from Existing Players:

Rivalry from existing players is extremely high. While there are expensive

and high barriers to entry, the existing players in the industry are very powerful and

established. There are at least 25 companies who market capitalization is at least $1

billion. The top firms have extensive and elaborate research and E&P divisions to

stay technologically ahead with sufficient assets.

Strategic Groups Due to the extremely high capital expenditure needed for entry into the oil

and gas as well as chemical industry, many firms like Eni choose to reduce costs by

increasing upstream and downstream integration. By owning or partnering in as

many parts of the E&P, manufacturing, transportation, and distribution cycle as

possible, these companies reduce the bargaining power of suppliers as well as costs.

These companies, for example, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), all

focus first on the importance of vertical integration in this industry. The difference

6

comes in the effectiveness of the company’s vertical integration and the scope of

their horizontal integration. Eni and CNPC both have oil and gas, chemical, and in

CNPC’s case, plastics, subsidiaries.

Some companies only focus on the refinery of petroleum. Hindustan

Petroleum Corporation (HPC), partners with other Indian state owned corporations

to “dominate the petroleum sector in India” (Borini, Felipe Mendes, 8)

As shown in Appendix 1.4, there tend to be three clusters in the oil and gas

sector. The “top companies are the elite or traditional first movers (Exxon Mobil,

Royal Dutch Shell and British Petroleum), and form the first cluster” (Borini, Felipe

Mendes, 10).

Another difference in between companies like BP and those in the BRIC

(Brazil, Russia, India, China) include where the company acts. BP, Eni, and Exxon

Mobil all choose to act internationally, compared to companies in the BRIC, who

choose to act regionally, as depicted in Appendix 1.5 (Borini, Felipe Mendes, 12)

Finally, shown in Appendix 1.6 is a list of major competitors for some of the major

players in the oil and gas industry. (Borini, Felipe Mendes, 12)

Internal Analysis

Financial AnalysisThe financial analysis of Eni allows us to determine where it stands by

comparing profitability ratios against rival companies. In Eni’s 2011 annual report,

it reported its financial performance with an “adjusted net profit of €6.97 billion; an

increase of 1.5% from 2010, driven by a robust performance delivered by the

Exploration & Production Division (up 15.8%) and, to a lesser extent, by the

Engineering & Construction Division (up 8.8%)” (www.eni.com). Its performance in

the Exploration and Production Division reported an operating profit of €16.1

billion that was driven by high crude oil prices. Its performance in the Gas and

Power Division registered a sharp decline in operating profit, down by 37.6%. In the

Refining and Marketing Division, Eni reported an adjusted operating loss at €535

7

million because it suffered from unprofitable refining margins and lower demand. In

addition to the operating loss in the Refining and Marketing Division, the

Petrochemical Division reported an operating loss of €276 million because of falling

cracker margins and a large decrease in sales of commodities. Lastly, Eni reported

that Saipem recorded an operating profit at €1.44 billion (www.eni.com). In

addition to the financial performance in Eni’s 2011 annual report, we used stock-

analysis.net to compare profitability ratios against Eni’s top competitors. The return

on sales and return on investment ratios can be seen in Appendix 2 below.

Tangible & Intangible ResourcesWhen analyzing the Eni SpA case, the internal analysis part required that we

distinguish between the company’s tangible and intangible resources. Our first step

was to determine its major tangible resources: property, plant, and equipment.

Since 2000, Eni had grown its petroleum outputs and reserves by more than most of

the other major companies (Grant, 630). Under CEO Paolo Scaroni’s strategy from

2005-2012, he more than doubled Eni’s capital expenditure. Eni operates in 85

countries around the world with around 79,000 employees (www.eni.com). Under

Scaroni, Eni’s biggest upstream project consisted of its giant Kashagan oilfield in

Kazakhstan with consisted of upward of 15 billion barrels of oil, the world’s biggest

oil finds in 30 years. Its operation in Russia was built on its relationship as one of

the biggest customers of Soviet gas, and Eni was involved in acquiring equity stakes

in four Russian oil companies and projects in the Samburgskoye and Urengoskoye

fields in order to broaden its relationship with Gazprom. In Congo, Eni was involved

in investing $3 billion in projects such as onshore and offshore oil and gas

exploration and production (E&P) projects. Additionally, Eni would build two power

plants, including distribution infrastructure and providing 80% of Congo’s

electricity needs. Lastly in Congo, Eni would develop a palm oil plantation to

produce biofuels. Its operation in Libya solidified Eni as Libya’s longest partner in

oil production and biggest buyer of Libyan oil. Eni extended E&P activities in new

areas through acquisitions: Maurel and Prom’s assets in Congo, a Gulf of Mexico

8

oilfield from Dominican Resources, Burren Energy PLC with its gas fields in

Turkmenistan, and First Calgary Petroleum Ltd with upstream assets in Algeria.

Eni’s discovery of two major gas fields off Mozambique was a huge find because the

size of the fields was estimated between 47 and 52 trillion cubic feet of gas

(equivalent to 8.1 to 9.0 billion barrels of oil), and Eni was planning a LNG plant to

exploit the gas fields discovered off Mozambique (Grant, 635-36). By the end of

2011, Eni’s operating performance is as followed: proved hydrocarbon reserves was

7,086 million of barrels of oil equivalent, hydrocarbon production was 1,581

thousand of barrels of oil equivalent, worldwide gas sales was 96.76 billion cubic

meters, electricity sold was 40.28 terawatt-hour, refinery capacity was 767

thousand barrels/day, and its number of service stations was 6,287.Lastly, inn

Appendix 3 on page 653, we were able to compare the top 40- Oil and Gas

Companies among the Forbes Global 2000, and we were able to compare the top

companies sales, assets, and market value. For Eni, it ranked 29 th with $143.2 billion

in sales, $178.7 billion in assets, and it had a market value of $97.6 billion (Grant,

653). Its tangible resources help create value and generate opportunities to

continue its growth.

The next step in our internal analysis of Eni SpA was to determine the

intangible resources: technology, culture, and reputation. Eni’s technology and

knowledge management is fundamental for the petroleum business because the

critical driver of competitive advantage was the ability to learn from experience and

transfer it throughout the company. Many new knowledge management systems

relied mainly on web-based technology, distributed computing, and digital wireless

communication in order to enhance the speed and quality of decision making

(Grant, 644). Its technological strength would make it a preferred partner for

producer companies and allow Eni to increasingly focus its attention on large oil and

gas fields (Grant, 649). Its culture is rooted in the key theme of “Eni’s Way” where

they embraced its originality, spirit of adventure, and social and environmental

responsibility (Grant, 635). In addition to the intangible resources, Eni’s reputation

is deeply rooted in its brand. Eni’s ability to make deals with autocratic and

unrepresentative governments helps promote their brand image because “Eni’s

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flexible, innovative approach to relationships with producer countries was

acceptance of the fact that the balance of power has shifted in favor of the producer

countries” (Grant, 638). It ranked 29th for the top-40 Oil and Gas Companies among

the Forbes Global 2000, and it is one of the leaders in European gas markets with its

upstream E&P division, downstream in distribution, and wide portfolio of sourcing

of gas (Grant, 638).

Core CompetenciesEni SpA’s core competencies are fundamental towards their success and how

they promote their business and gain competitive advantages over their rivals.

Their first core competence is there brand image. It ranked 29 th for the top-40 Oil

and Gas Companies among the Forbes Global 2000, and it is one of the leaders in

European gas markets (Grant, 638). They were one of the leaders in the European

market for gas, with the ability to leverage themselves. Its strong position in the

market allows Eni’s vertical integration to be a key competitive advantage (Grant,

638). Its upstream growth is another core competence as its capital expenditure

more than doubled under Scaroni. For example, its giant Kashagan oilfield was the

world’s biggest oilfield find in 30 years (Grant, 635). Its close relationship with

Saipem provided it with in-house technical capabilities that other oil majors could

not match. Its technical strengths and operating capabilities allowed Eni to increase

its focus on large oil and gas fields. Lastly, its implementation of its strategies in

explaining how it was positioning itself within its markets to build competitive

advantages based upon its assets and capabilities help gain competitive advantages

over rivals (Grant, 649).

SWOT AnalysisStrengths:

10

Eni SpA’s strengths are fundamental in its success as a company. One main

strength Eni has is its strong market position within the European market for

natural gas. It has strong R&D capabilities such as its in-house technical capabilities

from oilfield service companies like Saipem (Grant, 648-49). It operates in wide

range of businesses worldwide, and it operates in about 85 countries worldwide.

Additionally, it has strong retail operations in Europe that helps gain a competitive

advantage over rival competitors.

Weaknesses:

Weaknesses of Eni are places where it should focus on improving because

they allow other companies to outperform them. For instance, a major weakness is

its petrochemical sector because it is “intensely competitive, with low-margin

business but also Eni lacked scale and distinctive technological advantages” (Grant,

649). Another weakness Eni faces is that its board of directors and its 13-person top

management team were both comprised of Italians, and this is a weakness when it

operates internationally and wants to promote international growth (Grant, 651).

Opportunities:

Opportunities for Eni help give them a chance to exploit the and gain a

competitive advantage over rivals. One opportunity they have is the increasing

demand for LNG. Another opportunity for the company would be to increase its

portfolio, and it has the opportunities to continue production and exploration

expansion. They have an opportunity to move to more environmental friendly

sources of energy such as solar energy, if the wish to move into that type of market.

Threats:

Threats that can affect Eni and the industry need to be carefully analyzed

because they can cause a huge financial downturn. Such threats are environmental

regulations which can cause a huge problem within the industry. “Expanding

upstream production was becoming increasingly challenging: exploration was

moving to technically challenging frontier region such as the Artic and ocean floors,

resource nationalism and political instability was a constant threat in producer

countries, and competition in the upstream sector continues to grow” (Grant, 631).

The increase of competition and political instability both provide threats for a

11

company like Eni. Another threat Eni faces is that they have been under attack from

the European Commission about their ownership of domestic gas transportations,

and the new Italian government made it clear that Eni would have to relinquish its

52% ownership of Snam Rete Gas, the gas net-work owner, in 2012. Lastly, its

strategy of vertical integration in gas pose a threat by shareholder activism because

its share price had been at a discount to its peers, and some shareholders believed

that the best way for Eni to release value would be to spin off its downstream gas

business (Grant, 631).

Eni S.p.A.’s Current StrategiesThe strategy Paolo Scaroni adopted when he became the CEO of Eni was

much the same as his predecessor, Vittorio Mincato. Scaroni adopted two major

thrusts from Mincato’s strategy: “a commitment to organic growth strategy with a

particular emphasis on oil and gas exploration and production (E&P); [and] a

vertically integrated approach to Eni’s natural gas business through linking Eni’s gas

fields in north and west Africa and gas supplied from its alliance partner, Gazprom,

to its downstream gas business in Europe by pipelines (and, more recently, liquefied

natural gas)” (Grant, 630). Scaroni took an approach most companies did not take

which was “doing business with the autocratic and unrepresentative governments

of Libya, Algeria, Nigeria, Kazakhstan, and Russia” (Grant, 638). Eni stressed that

they do business with countries that have gas so the unprincipled and opportunistic

approach the company took seemed to be a successful one. Scaroni’s approach to

the downstream gas business was that he wanted to maintain a strong position in

the European market because he believed its vertical integration offered a key

competitive advantage. They key competitive advantage is that Eni is both upstream

with its E&P division, and downstream in distribution, transport and sales. 35% of

Eni’s equity gas is sold through the Gas & Power Division, so they believe that are

already where most of their competitors in the midstream and downstream

business would be. Lastly, they have a competitive advantage because of their wide

portfolio of countries’ sourcing of gas: Algeria, Libya, Poland, Norway, and Russia

12

(Grant, 638). Its downstream oil business differed from its downstream gas

business. The refining and marketing of oil products was a minor part of Eni’s

downstream business. Eni continued to shrink its refining capacity, reduce its

number of retail outlets, and narrow its geographical scope since Eni’s refining and

marketing sector loss money in 2009-2011. Their strategy is to continue

international expansion in both upstream and downstream gas. Eni’s cornerstone

for its upstream strategy is its “commitment to close, collaborative relationships

with the governments and NOCs of producer countries and its own technical

excellence” (Grant, 648). In Eni’s petrochemical sector, where it has been a loss

maker for Eni for many years, Scaroni announced a turnaround strategy based upon

“Regaining competitiveness within the chemicals business through refocusing the

chemicals portfolio on added-value products, expansion outside of Europe through

licensing, alliances, and joint-ventures, and efficiency improvements to reduce

costs” (Grant, 649). Its successful implementation of this strategy depends on

several factors that can cause problems for Eni in the future.

Major ProblemThe major problem Eni faces in the near future is the growing trend towards

environmental friendly energy sources and non-toxic chemicals. With the presence

of global warming emerging, people are moving towards more environmental

friendly sources of energy. Another major problem we identified is the fact that they

have to relinquish its 52% ownership of Snam Rete Gas, the gas network owner, and

several other international pipelines, which pipelines played a critical role in linking

gas production to consumers (Grant, 640). Lastly, they face a problem with

international expansion because its board of directors and its 13-person top

management team are both comprised of Italians which can hurt with strategic

moves and alliances with other international companies.

Future Strategies

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After analyzing the case, we have some recommendations for Eni as they

continue to strive as a major integrated energy company. We recommend they

continue with strategy presentation that they presented on March 15, 2012 which

states: “During 2012-2015, capital investment would rise to €15 billion annually, of

which 75% would go to E&P. The target was for petroleum production to grow by

more than 3% each year during 2012-2015. Eni would continue to grow its natural

gas business. The majority of Eni’s increased petroleum output would be natural

gas; downstream, Eni would grow its sales of gas to European business and retail

customers by 18% and 28% respectively; Eni would continue to invest in pipelines,

including the proposed South Stream pipeline (a joint venture with Gazprom, EDF,

and Wintershall) from Russia to Austria and Italy” (Grant, 630). We believe this is

the right direction for Eni because they need to continue investment in pipelines

since they are going to have to relinquish their ownership with Snam Rete Gas and

because pipelines play a critical role in linking gas production to consumers. We are

wary about their chemical division as it has been a loss maker for many years, but

Eni’s turnaround strategy provides a clear strategic move such as its agreement

with Novamont SpA to convert Eni’s Porto Torres chemical plant into a bio-based

chemical complex to produce products from vegetable raw materials (Grant, 649).

Other recommendations we have would be for the company to move into more

environmental friendly sources of energy such as solar energy and non-toxic

chemicals. Additionally, we recommend Eni hire non-Italian board members from

established subsidiaries or other major companies to provide a more diverse group,

which can help with strategic moves and alliances in other countries.

Appendix 1

14

1.

2009 2010 2011 20120

200000

400000

600000

800000

1000000

1200000

1400000

760859.5

969500.5

1228992.4 1247490.2

Revenue for the World Oil and Gas In-dustry

Revenue in US Dollars

2.

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 201281

82

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

Daily Demand for Crude Oil

Daily Demand in Millions of Barrels p/ Day

15

3.

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 20120

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

Total Revenue of the Global Chemical Industry

Total Revenue in Millions of US Dollars

4.

16

5.

6.

17

Appendix 2ENI S.p.A., Operating Profit Margin

Dec 31, 2011 Dec 31, 2010Selected Financial Data (USD $ in millions, translated from EUR €)Operating profit 22,619 21,379Net sales from operations 142,176 130,736RatioOperating profit margin 15.91% 16.35%BenchmarksOperating Profit Margin, CompetitorsAnadarko Petroleum Corp. -13.47% 16.32%Apache Corp. 48.62% 45.36%Chevron Corp. 15.67% –ConocoPhillips 7.17% 6.24%EOG Resources Inc. 20.87% –Exxon Mobil Corp. 11.58% –Occidental Petroleum Corp. 44.18% 38.66%Phillips 66 1.06% -0.47%Operating Profit Margin, SectorOil & Gas Producers 10.77% –Operating Profit Margin, IndustryOil & Gas 11.25% –Source: Based on data from ENI S.p.A. Annual Reports

ENI S.p.A., Net Profit Margin

Dec 31, 2011 Dec 31, 2010Selected Financial Data (USD $ in millions, translated from EUR €)Net profit for the year attributable to Eni 8,900 8,384Net sales from operations 142,176 130,736RatioNet profit margin 6.26% 6.41%BenchmarksNet Profit Margin, CompetitorsAnadarko Petroleum Corp. -19.08% 7.02%Apache Corp. 27.27% 24.89%Chevron Corp. 11.01% –ConocoPhillips 5.08% 6.00%EOG Resources Inc. 10.78% –Exxon Mobil Corp. 8.79% –Occidental Petroleum Corp. 28.28% 23.79%Phillips 66 2.44% 0.50%Net Profit Margin, SectorOil & Gas Producers 7.80% –Net Profit Margin, IndustryOil & Gas 8.08% –Source: Based on data from ENI S.p.A. Annual Reports

Source: www.stock-analysis-on.netCopyright © 2016 Stock Analysis on Net

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ENI S.p.A., Return on Equity (ROE)

Dec 31, 2011 Dec 31, 2010Selected Financial Data (USD $ in millions, translated from EUR €)Net profit for the year attributable to Eni 8,900 8,384Total Eni shareholders' equity 71,967 67,949RatioROE 12.37% 12.34%BenchmarksROE, CompetitorsAnadarko Petroleum Corp. -14.63% 3.68%Apache Corp. 15.81% 12.44%Chevron Corp. 22.16% –ConocoPhillips 19.07% 16.57%EOG Resources Inc. 8.63% –Exxon Mobil Corp. 26.59% –Occidental Petroleum Corp. 18.00% 13.95%Phillips 66 20.53% 2.83%ROE, SectorOil & Gas Producers 20.57% –ROE, IndustryOil & Gas 20.00% –Source: Based on data from ENI S.p.A. Annual Reports

Source: www.stock-analysis-on.netCopyright © 2016 Stock Analysis on Net

ENI S.p.A., Return on Assets (ROA)

Dec 31, 2011 Dec 31, 2010Selected Financial Data (USD $ in millions, translated from EUR €)Net profit for the year attributable to Eni 8,900 8,384Total assets 185,450 174,973RatioROA 4.80% 4.79%BenchmarksROA, CompetitorsAnadarko Petroleum Corp. -5.12% 1.48%Apache Corp. 8.81% 6.98%Chevron Corp. 12.84% –ConocoPhillips 8.12% 7.27%EOG Resources Inc. 4.39% –Exxon Mobil Corp. 12.40% –Occidental Petroleum Corp. 11.28% 8.64%Phillips 66 11.05% 1.63%ROA, SectorOil & Gas Producers 10.26% –ROA, IndustryOil & Gas 9.93% –Source: Based on data from ENI S.p.A. Annual Reports

Source: www.stock-analysis-on.netCopyright © 2016 Stock Analysis on Net

19

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