Quarterly Digest of Public Affairs News

Issue # 1 - 2012

In this issue:

Should STRATCOM ‘control’

Public Affairs? p. 2

New definition of Public

Relations p. 7

Essential media tips:

- Is the standard news release

passé? p. 9

- 5 Ways to Reinvent the

News Release with Search

Engine Optimization p. 9

The US Army Reserve’s 10

rules for social media

practitioners p.11

The Future of Influence in

Warfare p.13

International Public & Corporate

Communications

FOREWORD

This newsletter is aimed at providing Public Affairs practitioners with a short selection of recently published stories, papers, etc. which may be useful to remain abreast of new trends or to stimulate a debate on the opinion expressed by the authors. External sources are linked and any copyright remains with the authors.

edited by ComIPI www.comipi.it

Media monkeys

By engin SELKUK

Spotlight on:

e-mail is 40 years old

In 1971 Ray Tomlinson was part of a

small group of programmers who were

developing a time-sharing system

called Tenex. He was making

improvements to a local inter-user mail

program called SNDMSG. Single-

computer electronic mail had existed

since at least the early 1960's.

SNDMSG allowed a user to send a

message to other users' mailboxes. The

missing piece was that the protocol had

no provision for appending to a file; it

could just send and receive files.

It remained to provide a way to

distinguish local mail from network

mail. Roy chose to append an ‘at’ sign

and the host name to the user's (login)

name to indicate that the user was "at"

some other host rather than being local.

The next release of the protocol went

out in early 1972 and was soon

replaced with a file transfer protocol

having specific mail handling features.

A small evolution that changed our

life.

Should STRATCOM "control" PA?

By Franco Veltri

A couple of months ago an Italian colleague, Gianluca Manfredelli, started a discussion on LinkedIn. He asked a very simple question: “Do you agree that STRATCOM should "control" PA in the information campaign? STRATCOM aim at achieving an effect. PA's goal is to gain the public support through "the truth." So, what kind of credibility can STRATCOM-controlled PA obtain, then?”

I doubt Gianluca was expecting to trigger opinions from so many experts, most of whom with a very high reputation and solid experience in the PA field. Those who are on LinkedIn may wish to read the entire discussion. I will copy here part of the most significant comments in an attempt to summarize the entire thread.

It is important to note that the LinkedIn group discussing this issue is called “Military PAO.” That has confined the debate within the military environment.

That was indeed appropriate: the debate mainly applies to the military, as in the civilian world SC is a notion with a different connotation. The term ‘strategy’ has a broader meaning while in the military it is associated to decisions made at the highest levels in the hierarchy. That contributes to the problem faced in bringing the concept down to operational and tactical level.

In terms of statistics, none of the commentators directly supported the idea of SC having ‘command’ over PA (of note, there was even a debate about the acronym for Strategic Communications: should it be SC? StratCom? I chose the first, only because it is shorter). There was however a large consensus on the need to assure proper ‘coordination’ of all activities that ‘communicate,’ including actions.

Here are a few significant comments, starting with those recommending a closer coordination.

“For the COM to reach his objectives, he will need to achieve certain effects, whether it is in a

domestic environment or in an operation. Gaining/maintaining Public Support could very well be one of these effects.

PAO will contribute to this through release of information, truthfully, timely, accurately, but often have the disadvantage of having to work through the "filter" of the media (although not the case when using own internet sites or Social Media). But PAO's still have to make choices every day on what subjects to report on and when, what to make press releases for, where to send Combat Camera Teams, where (and if) to embed journalists, etc.

By making these choices consciously, PAO can indeed actively support the COM in reaching his objectives. And it would be very useful to the COM if PAO efforts are indeed coordinated with other means so it is (also) in line with the StratCom Policy. Which is where the role of StratCom comes in...”

“The point of taking action is to achieve an effect. Whether the action is delivering ordnance, denying enemy use of computer networks, releasing information to the public, moving supplies into a theater, or whatever action you desire, it all is to support the objective. If you weren't already using a process to coordinate such things before someone came up with the new moniker "SC," you weren't doing it right. If it takes calling it "SC" to make you feel like you're thinking great thoughts and aligning everything in support of the objective, then good for you. “

“Strategic communications is a command function, which the commander may choose to delegate, just as the commander delegates any other staff function. For strategic communications to function effectively, all staff functions must participate in supporting roles in which they are the experts.

PA is no different. It is not a matter of controlling PA or PA controlling strategic communications. It is the staff functioning together to effect the "commander's intent" in an orchestrated, symbiotic manner so that the end result is that the command as a whole knows what it's mission is, communicates what

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the command mission is, and conducts the mission harmoniously by coordinating, supporting, and effecting the commander's intent.”

Some criticized PA’s reluctance to be integrated into the overall communication process:

“Until the PA community can effectively recognize that it can contribute toward operational imperatives (objectives), the community will not be a fully participating function in the planning cycle. IO messages as they are called above are nothing more than attributable calls to action. If we are to be successful as global communicators, we must recognize the opportunities and challenges that lie before us. “

“…the PA community needs to quit arguing over the "inform" doctrine and hierarchy. Strategic communication is not defined by echelon, but by the alignment between communication objectives, tactics and results. Through strategic communication - even at the tactical level - the PA community will be recognized as a leading contributor to the campaign plan. By providing "communication effects," we will be invited to the table.“

Many view SC mainly as a process and a planning function at strategic level:

“STRATCOM should be a part of PA as a planning function and should not control PA. I do believe that there should be an over arching body to coordinate IO and PA but STRATCOM is not it. STRATCOM is concerned how we communicate to someone through actions, words, and images, in order to achieve a desired effect. Break that down to its basic elements and that is a planning function. “

“…it should be understood that Strategic Communication is a process. It is a process of helping subject matter experts identify a problem, then collaborating on a communication process that will inform, educate or move to action identified individuals or audiences, then sets in motion a coordinated

effort to successfully establish communication processes. StratComm should not "lead" public affairs. However, it often helps guide their efforts as it leads similar efforts across the entire staff.

More importantly, StratComm goes beyond public affairs and media. It includes communicating through plans and policies, face to face, through briefing and demonstrations and actions. StratComm is the process of strategically communicating to identified audiences...”

“I see Strategic Communications much like any Op Plan. A commander of troops in battle has a plan and part of that plan is knowing what his assets are and the most effective use of those assets against the enemy (audience if you will). If his mission is to take out a mechanized brigade, he is not going to send a rifle squad.

A strategic communication plan or strategic communications is no different. Your weapon (message) and method of employment (channel) has to be in line with your intent (mission) and target (audience).”

Finally, many advocated the absolute need to protect the credibility of PA and not to lose sight of the primary PA mission in a democratic society: to inform. These reasons by themselves would prohibit any integration with other information operational tools:

“…too often STRATCOM are confused with a genuine, "strategic use of PA". At this point, I recognize things can be blurred. But, again, the problem can be solved or avoided through a fair, clear and mutually useful “coordinated separation” between STRATCOM and PA, in the sense that PA are utterly available for the STRATCOM aims, as long as PA’s "credibility" is not jeopardized.”

“By its nature and mission, Public Affairs is open and honest communication that does not violate SAPP (Security, Accuracy, Propriety, Policy). Therefore it stands to reason that propaganda or PSYOPS has no place in PA. To try to use PA for either makes PA an ineffective tool (weapon) Page 3

and would not be smart Strategic Communications.”

“…we must admit whatever name used (PA, IO, PR, etc,), they use messages sent through a channel to a receiver to transfer meaning. The differences arises in how the functions impart knowledge, change attitudes or influence behavior (effects).

In principal, PA is restricted from direct persuasion; although, other functions use persuasion as a tool to achieve their effects. There's a thin line between conveying information and persuasion. So when we attempt to blur those lines further by combining functions, we create difficulties for publics attempting to discern the message.”

But, as Admiral Mullen stated, “Good communication runs both ways. It’s not about telling our story. We must also be better listeners.” I believe the debate touched on the core aspect when it addressed the need to look at communications as a ‘two way street.’ This is why I close this summary by citing almost in their entirety the comments made by Prof. Mark Van Dyke, who was my boss at the NATO command in Naples as Chief PIO, is an Associate Professor at the Marist College and is currently Visiting Professor of Strategic

Communication at the Center for Strategic

Leadership of the U.S. Army War College.

Mark addressed the issue in a more comprehensive way. Here is a compilation of his posts.

“First, it’s important to acknowledge that SC is an integrated, or coordinated, communication activity with many leaders. NATO defines SC as “The coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities – Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs (PA), Military Public Affairs, Information Operations (lnfo Ops), and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), as appropriate – in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO’s aims.”

The U.S. DoD defines SC as “focused United States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government

interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.” So, SC involves communication activities like public diplomacy that fall outside the responsibilities of military PA (or PI) and even the military itself. Still, the functions must be coordinated. Second, who “leads” SC? A 2010 RAND report commissioned by the French Joint Forces Centre for Concept Development, Doctrine, and Experimentation noted that the NATO “Secretary General is responsible for Strategic Communications.” Furthermore, the “Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy is responsible for Public Diplomacy activities, with the exception of the press and the media.” Finally, the “Secretary General’s spokesperson is responsible for Strategic Communications to the press and media.

The RAND report want on to report: “Strategic Communications command structure is essentially made up of three levels of responsibilities.... The first two levels are strategic while the third is operational and tactical.” Strategically, NATO HQ (NAC, SECGEN, Military Committee) determines SC policy, messaging, etc. SHAPE then develops SC concepts, objectives, expertise, and training and provides guidance to Force Commanders. The FCs then transmit and execute guidance in the form of SC operations on the ground. This means that the senior executive (NATO SECGEN or U.S. SECDEF) leads SC. There are a variety of leaders below them that plan and conduct SC.

NATO defines SC as “The coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities – Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs (PA), Military Public Affairs, Information Operations (lnfo Ops), and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), as appropriate – in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO’s aims.”

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I believe your question is focused more on the operational and tactical level, though, where IO and PA activities intersect. I’m a firm believer that the senior PA leader should report directly to the senior executive in his or her organization. IO should, through its operational chain, also report to the senior executive. Hence, the functions can remain separate but must be coordinated … without necessarily being controlled by one leader (other than the senior executive). Strategically, an example of this would be the coordination of interagency activities in the United States like public affairs/public information (in Defense) and public diplomacy (in State). These activities have their own separate leaders but both ultimately report to the Commander in Chief. Operationally and tactically, you might have cells that coordinate information activities, much like public relations, marketing, and advertising are coordinated in an integrated marketing communication department in the private sector. In these cases, I think the person with the greatest degree of knowledge, education, experience and expertise in strategic communication should lead the cell. This means that PAOs (PIOs) must begin to break out of their “stovepipe,” work more closely with IO and develop expertise in other communication functions (like Military Information Support to Operations/PsyOps) in order to lead. On my own blog, I have addressed my concerns about PA becoming a stronger leader in integrated activities like SC (and social media). I invite you to read more at http://bit.ly/naVkps and I welcome your comments.

…The information effects that you refer to are an important aspect of doctrine in SC. However, actions are only one element of information effect: words and images also create effects. For that matter, even inaction or the absence of words or images creates effects (e.g., one “cannot not communicate”). I’m reminded of this every time I land in the doghouse with my wife and she gives me the “silent treatment.” Her cold shoulder creates tangible effects! I would also add that the point of taking action is not to simply create an effect. The tactical effects created by SC are designed to support

military or national objectives at a strategic level. Therefore, we must look beyond achievement of effects and as SC experts we must be able to assess and report how these effects (and SC in a broader context) operate along all levels of the spectrum of strategy, operations, and tactics. Otherwise, focusing only on effects relegates us to a tactical level. I’m currently working on SC with Prof. Dennis Murphy (COL, USA, Ret.) and his Information in Warfare Group at the U.S. Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership. His article “The Future of Influence in Warfare” in the January 2012 Joint Force Quarterly offers a superb explanation of information effects. In the article, he explains: “First, the focus of commander-oriented doctrine must be on information effects, not IO or SC. Both are integrating processes that are often misunderstood and confused with the individual capabilities that they integrate. Adding further confusion are related processes and capabilities like the newly minted cyberspace operations. Information effects, on the other hand, are clearly understood by commanders. Effect is a doctrinally accepted term, a part of operational design. Commanders know that they must achieve information effects to enable achievement of military objectives. However, they may not understand the nuances of IO or the other related but different concepts. In general, doctrine focused on information effects must be incorporated into the currently understood areas of operational art, design, and science.”I recommend reading the entire article at http://www.ndu.edu/press/influence-in-warfare.html.

… it appears that development of the SC concept is out of control on multiple fronts with too many cooks. I'm currently engaged in a research project at the U.S. Army War College that is designed to trace the roots of SC as far back as we can go (at least hundreds of years by my estimate). We hope to create a much-needed body of knowledge that can draw upon well-established theory and practice and serve as a foundation for a more unified SC concept. As you know, SC is nothing new ... but those who are unfamilar with integrated communication are trying to reinvent the wheel. Page 5

I have seen the latest drafts of the DoD Instruction and joint doctrine for SC -- both are overly complicated (the Pub's diagrams for the SC process are mind-numbing). I agree with ADM Mike Mullen's (and John Kirby's) views of SC, expressed in a 2009 Joint Force Quarterly article. … I understand the concerns about having PA/PI (symmetrical communication) and IO (PsyOps, etc.) cohabitate. But in our current world, with so much media convergence, messages can no longer be targeted so precisely. Messages from PsyOps will often reach unintended audiences, including audiences that are supposed to receive PA/PI messages.

For me, I would rather have a chance to weigh in and coordinate messages before they are released by an organization. Otherwise, I fear I'll have to engage in damage control after ill-advised messages get out of the barn and create unintended effects.

Look at how the private sector is becoming more integrated in terms of coordination between PR, advertising, marketing, etc. -- functions that used to be tucked neatly away from each other in separate silos. No longer. I recall reading a quote from John Iawata of IBM recently: “We have a need for … people who are much more comfortable thinking in terms of integration and 360-degree communications as opposed to just thinking about marketing and PR.” The military should take note. We don't have to live together to coordinate and integrate communications.

…Back to points being made about message effects. Yes, our words, images, and actions (and how we coordinate these with our vision, mission, objectives) do cause effects. However, if you over focus on sending messages you reduce SC to merely tactics. The effects are designed to achieve a strategic goal and, as such, we must consider SC as a dialog between our organization(s) and key publics ... or two-way, symmetrical communication (meaning all actors stand to benefit from the communication; as opposed to two-way asymmetrical, which favors some actors over others). And to have a meaningful dialog, we have to use SC to establish and maintain good relationships.

Strong relationships between actors will allow sustained dialog, as opposed to one-way communication like threats and warnings. Threats and warnings can be effective in the short term (e.g., dealing with hostiles, insurgents, activists, etc.) but will disrupt relationships and the ability to dialog or achieve strategic aims in the long term. For more about this read the paper that Jim and Laurie Grunig presented at the July 1997 Bled PR Research Symposium in Slovenia: "Review of a program of research on activism: Incidence in four Countries, activist Publics, strategies of Activist Groups, and organizational responses to activism."

Jim has also written about the topic of message-based communication versus strategic communication in the most recent edition of the Central European Journal of Communication. He maintains that PR/PA is a strategic communication function, and that strategic communication "should play a major role in organizational governance and management" as well as in internal and external messaging. However, stereotypical views normally associate our field with messaging (the old press agentry or even public information models), or "much more talk about messaging, publicity, media relations, media monitoring, and marketing support than about the roles and responsibilities of public relations in organizational governance."

In the minds of most people, public

relations has become institutionalized as

a messaging activity whose purpose is to

make organizations look good in the

media or to sell products, usually

through devious means, rather than as a

management activity that improves

relationships among stakeholders and

organizations…..” James Grunig

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Instead of focusing on messaging, Jim maintained in the article that today's strategic communication professionals must be able to: * "deal with global interactions, relationships, and responsibilities" * "manage relationships among organizations and stakeholders in a global, digitalized world" * and manage activity in a way "that improves relationships among stakeholders and organizations." One last thing, the only reporting that I've seen on Jim's latest article comes from Tony Muzi, a well-respected Italian PR professional. See Tony's blog post about Jim's article on the Global Alliance for PR and Communication Management blog at http://www.stockholmaccords.org/sustainability/jim-grunig-on-the-accords-food-for-thought. “

While the ‘Military PAO’ group was debating on SC, the ‘SC’ Group on LinkedIn was discussing a very recent article that appeared on USA Today: U.S. 'info ops' programs dubious, costly. That discussion inevitably covered a core issue: the role of SC at the operational level. Here is a comment made by a German colleague. I believe it captures the practical essence of the issue:

“…The real problem is still unsolved: What's the SC role at levels below strategic? How do we organize ourselves to come to an effective coordination horizontally and vertically and how do we call the beast? The Theater Commander seems not to be at strategic level but has a need for a well coordinated communication strategy and plan, rooted in sound analysis.

So far I have seen many plans, some even called a strategy, but I haven't seen the underlying analysis. Poll's and surveys are important, also atmospherics, but presented in isolation tend to lead to shortsighted conclusions.

Only a systemic analysis of the information environment might lead to results and insights that allow to develop an integrated operation and communication plan. As we haven't seen such an effort, we can only imagine with all our

experience and lessons learned, how it could work and function.

We have started in the German Armed Forces such a project, a field experiment in North Afghanistan using systemic analysis based on a model of the information environment. The intent is to enable InfoOps and the Comms Director at Regional level to give appropriate advice to planners and the commander, to enable planning based on knowledge and linked to measures of effectiveness. In our armed forces, we have overcome the antagony of InfoOps and PSYOPS by combining the operational communication, still an ongoing project. But there is still a deep trench between the IO-world and PA and as we try to build bridges from the IO-side, they are torn down or blocked from the PA side.

It is still a long way to go until PA is accepting the need to coordinate activities in the information environment with IO and others. As we have recently seen at a SHAPE meeting with the communication SMEs of the Rapid Reaction Corps, there is still no common view on the naming convention of organizations.

As long as NATO is not specifying the implementation of SC at operational level and even below, this hassle will continue.”

A good article deepening into influence operations was written by Prof. Daniel Murphy. Suggest to read it, at the end of this digest.

I believe we have walked away from

the original intent. By organizing to it—

creating whole structures around it—

we have allowed strategic

communication to become a thing

instead of a process, an abstract

thought instead of a way of thinking. It

is now sadly something of a cottage

industry. (Adm. Mike Mullen

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009)

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A Modern Definition of Public Relations

Posted by Gerard Corbett in March 1st 2012

Following 1,447 votes, hundreds of submissions, abundant commentary and nearly a year of research, we are pleased to announce the winning modern definition of public relations. Based on a public vote, held Feb. 13–26, of three candidate definitions, the profession’s choice for the modern definition of PR is: “Public relations is a strategic communication process that builds mutually beneficial relationships between organizations and their publics.”

Listed as Definition No. 2 in the public vote, it received 671 votes, or 46.4 percent, of 1,447 total votes.

Simple and straightforward, this definition focuses on the basic concept of public relations — as a communication process, one that is strategic in nature and emphasizing “mutually beneficial relationships.” “Process” is preferable to “management function,” which can evoke ideas of control and top-down, one-way communications. “Relationships” relates to public relations’ role in helping to bring together organizations and individuals with their key stakeholders. “Publics” is preferable to “stakeholders,” as the former relates to the very “public” nature of public relations, whereas “stakeholders” has connotations of publicly-traded companies.

You can read more about this exciting announcement in Friday’s New York Times advertising column.

As promised, PRSA will adopt the winning reference definition to replace the 1982 definition of public relations.

An analysis of the public vote provides some interesting detail. The data can be found here.

Voters were unequivocal in their belief that any modern definition of public relations should not include the word “ethics.” When asked whether the word “ethics” should be included in the winning definition, 60.3 percent of those who voted said No. Furthermore, an aggregate of 57.3 percent of voters indicated “No” to including the word “ethics” in any modern definition of public relations.

While PRSA firmly believes in the value of ethical public relations practices, as espoused in our Code of Ethics and numerous advocacy initiatives, we respect the profession’s wishes that ethics not be explicitly included in a modern definition. In all likelihood, though, we will eventually include ethics in a values statement about the definition of public relations, as it relates to PRSA and our members’ values.

A review of the final word cloud from 927 definitions submitted during the initial crowdsourcing phase shows that the winning definition closely reflects the profession’s perspective of what should comprise a modern concept of public relations. Several key words found in that word cloud are included in the winning definition:

“Public”

“Organization”

“Public relations is a strategic

communication process that

builds mutually beneficial

relationships between

organizations and their

publics.”

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“Communication”

“Relationship”

“Builds”

“Mutual”

But don’t take our word for it. We’ve created a Resources page where you can review the data, along with meeting notes from each of the Definition of PR Summits that PRSA hosted and other relevant materials.

What #PRDefined Has Achieved

The “Public Relations Defined” initiative has not only modernized what many considered to be a medley of dated concepts of public relations. It has shaped an important conversation about the future of the profession and its value in the 21st-century business landscape.

The initiative motivated public relations professionals to think about their profession, talk about their profession and debate how it is they want to define their profession. That allowed us to arrive at a definition with some currency.

The definition that resulted from this effort is inclusive, in that it captures the core essence of what it is all public relations professionals do. We believe that the winning definition is true to the research, and accurately reflects the way in which the public relations professionals who participated in this process described what it is they do for a living.

For that, we thank the thousands of professionals who voted on the candidate definitions, as well as those who voiced their opinions and provided valuable feedback about the process and candidate definitions. We also owe a debt of gratitude to the 12 organizations that partnered with PRSA to make this effort a success. We appreciate the role of our collaborators in

generating a comprehensive, modern definition of public relations.

The Path Forward

This is really a beginning, not an ending. The discussion is a work in progress, and we’ve laid the groundwork for future debate. Learn how you can continue the discussion here.

It’s clear to us that the process should not stop with this announcement. For that reason, we will keep this blog up and continue to facilitate the discussion. We’ll publish and promote guest posts from anyone who has something to say on the subject; from those who have conducted their own research to those who have process suggestions to those who simply feel they have a better definition to offer.

In a perfect world, this blog will become a virtual water cooler, where we can continue to engage professionals on the definition of public relations. We’re keeping an open mind. If the definition continues to evolve through this process, and we arrive at something better, we will support it.

Like art and beauty, perhaps the definition of public relations really is in the eye of the beholder.

Gerard F. Corbett, APR, Fellow PRSA, is chair and CEO of the Public Relations Society of America.

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Is the "standard" news release format from the past passe?

http://www.linkedin.com/groups?home=&gid=8224

2&trk=anet_ug_hm DOUG Williams

I'm probably the minority voice here, but I just can't help being a contrarian. Anyway, six thoughts, in no special order: First, a release still has to be news, and news is conflict, so your lead has to identify heroes and villains, problems and solutions, good consequences and bad consequences, etc. A purely good news lead rarely works; it's not a story, it's a promotion. Second, adjectives and breathless intensifiers ("historic!" or "unprecedented!") are proven credibility killers. Avoid them in the first paragraph specifically, and throughout the piece in general. Third, think A Story and B Story. All releases generally have a lead and an off-lead -- the two main points you want to make. Identify them going in. Fourth, understand that people generally stop reading a release after the fourth paragraph. So if you want a template, try this: First paragraph, A Story; second paragraph, B Story; third paragraph, restatement of importance of A Story (saying it a different way as lead-in for your quote); fourth paragraph, quote. Fifth, make your quotes sound like a person, not a piece of wood, and have them communicate strategic messages, not facts or self-serving drivel. Sixth, and with all respect to Tom and others, don't buy into the whole "writing for SEO" thing. I have been using the straight-news, inverted pyramid style in releases for years, and they keep my client on the first page of Google -- often the first entry -- in an industry and profession where there are a million firms just like theirs.

5 Ways to Reinvent the Press Release With SEO

By Vanessa Bugasch, Cision

http://www.prnewsonline.com/free/5-Ways-to-Reinvent-the-Press-Release-With-SEO_16005.html

Social media has helped transform the press release and given it new life, a vastly larger audience and a huge role in generating traffic to your organization’s Web site. As such, search engine optimization (SEO) is important to the success of today’s press release. Optimized press releases attract consumers and influencers, as well as journalists—and pulls them into your story. To get the biggest bang out of SEO, you may need to change the way you write your release. Some basic, traditional best practices still apply, but here are five tips to keep in mind to optimize your releases: 1. Choose the Right Keywords

Search engines think like your audience. Before you begin to write, know the keywords or phrases that will drive them to the news release and motivate them to click through to pages on your Web site. Do basic keyword research on sites like Google AdWords, Wordtracker or Keyword Discovery.

2. Use Your Heads

Use one to two keywords in the headline and subhead. Search engine spiders read left to right, so take that into account as you compose your headlines and your first paragraph. Use no more than 200 characters in the summary or subhead.

3. Optimize From the Top Down

Spiders also read from the top down. Using keywords in the first two paragraphs makes a much bigger impact than using them

At the end of the day, whether releases still matter isn't the issue. They do. The issue is knowing how to write them effectively. Page 10

lower down. As you write, think in sound bites, like 140-character tweets.

4. Don’t Over-Link

As with keywords, don’t overdo anchor text, as it causes confusion and dilutes the impact of the links themselves. Offer two to three links for a 400-word press release.

5. Use Multimedia

Research shows that press releases with pictures, video and other multimedia get at least 80% more search traffic than text-only releases. They’re usually more appealing and interesting, too. You’d be surprised how easy it is to create your own video or add visuals that support your product, message or campaign. Vanessa Bugasch is senior vice president of global marketing , a provider of PR software, services and tools. You can follow her on Twitter: @vanessabugasch.

The Army Reserve’s 10 rules for social media practitioners

By Lt. Col. Andrew Morton http://www.prdaily.com/Main/Articles/The_Army_Reserves_10_rules_for_social_media_practi_10998.aspx

1. Develop a “plan on a page.” Before you sign up for Facebook , Twitter, LinkedIn or any platform, you must evaluate whom your audience is (internal and external), what your organization’s key

communications goals are, and what’s your desired “end state.” Having a Facebook page is not a social media strategy; it’s a reactionary effort to “keep up with the Jones.” Communications plans are a key part of any corporation’s strategy and social media is not immune to this step. 2. Integrate with all other media. Don’t work in a vacuum. Continually ask how you can integrate with the other media (your media team, outreach/events team, executive communications, etc). If your senior executive is doing a media interview, he should be plugging your social media sites, and if the chief of corporate policy is sending an internal communications directive she should be “asking for feedback” via your internal social media channels. Never miss an opportunity to plug and promote your sites through all your organization’s media executions and outlets. 3. Plan for success, not for failure. Ask yourself, “What happens if we are successful?” If your defined end state is an active community of followers then you must have the community management team in place before you start. By creating content that’s engaging, you’ll develop an audience that’s active. You must have a plan to sustain the needs of your community before you start. 4. Decentralize your efforts. Social Media is not an “empire,” it’s a “republic.” That means having two to three people in one room as your sole moderators, content creators and strategists is a recipe for failure—that is, it’s not sustainable. You have to train each of your departments to be capable of providing content, being able to engage when necessary, and to have an understanding of these requirements in today’s environment (for example, no three-day waiting period for HR to get back to you on a relevant question that your

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followers are asking). This decentralization requires training, trust and tact. 5. Curate content that’s “real and relevant.” If you are trying to get people to understand what it’s like to work for your organization don’t have your chief of communications tell them in a packaged piece. Get an employee to tell his or her story candidly. Whether it’s video or blogging, people want to know what it’s like from those who live it. Finding the right storytellers is easier than you may think. Once you’ve established internal channels for people to share their thoughts on work policies and practices, you will start to see many stories that are ready for use within your external audience. 6. Don’t practice Web 1.5. Don’t treat your corporate presence within social media as a direct extension of your “brand ground”—that is, your corporate website. You must foster real and responsive posts, and foster engaging dialogue (within a certain decorum of course). If you try and re-purpose that one-way dialogue that typical websites promote, you will lose credibility and stifle your growth. 7. Develop measurements and monitoring capability. You cannot manage what you don’t measure and cannot measure what you don’t monitor. There are great “out of the box” analytical tools or you can customize your own “monitoring dashboard” to identify measurable return on investment and seek out those who are talking about your brand. 8. Trust your subordinates, but train them. And have a crisis communications plan to deal with mistakes. Mistakes will be made in social media. Posts will be taken out of context. The wrong word may be used at the wrong time, or moderation may be seen as arbitrary by your audience. These things happen. First, develop a standardized

training program that gets each of your content managers proficient. Then, have a plan to react to these “mishaps,” but don’t make “hanging people that work for you from the rafters” step one. If you do, you create a zero-defects mentality and that stifles initiative. Good social media practitioners are never afraid of getting fired. 9. Develop user-engagement policies that are reasonable and enforceable. Don’t make it impossible for someone to engage on your sites with arbitrary regulations and procedures. At the same time, make sure that people understand this is not their teenage daughter’s Twitter account. Establish engagement standards; make them clearly understandable and enforceable, and don’t be too quick to moderate. If you’ve built a community of users strategically and with a solid content management plan, it will keep people in check more successfully than you, if you allow them. 10. Collaborate, borrow, copy and steal. Use every possible good idea and lesson learned. Lean on others in the space setting the standard. Look for examples of engaging content, effective moderation, and efficient platform management. When the Wizard’s curtain is pulled back, the dirty secret is that no one is an expert in every part of social media. No one. Even if someone was an industry expert so much of the medium is constantly changing. To be successful you have to look at what everyone else is doing and apply what’s going to work in your organization. In summary. Social media is not a device, a platform, or a medium. It’s a culture. Most of the mistakes people make in executing within the space are not linked to platform management (for example, how to use the newest feature on Facebook). Mistakes are made when an organization treats the Page 12

venue as if it were “theirs.” Yes, you’re absolutely responsible for your organization’s sites. However, you don’t always get to be in the driver’s seat. Embrace the ride and glean as much as you can about your brand and people’s perception of your brand by listening to what your followers are saying. Lt. Col. Andrew Morton is the chief of online and social media for the United States Army Reserve. You can find the Army Reserve on Facebook.

The Future of Influence in Warfare

By Dennis M. Murphy

http://www.ndu.edu/press/influence-in-warfare.html

ABSTRACT

Enemies realize the potency of influence and will increasingly bend information to sway both friendly and hostile publics. To prevail in future conflicts, the Nation must not only be more adroit at telling its own story but also predictive about adversary inclinations and methods of using misinformation. We have progressed since 9/11, but the need remains to more fully exploit the tools of influence, especially through focused intelligence support. General Stanley McChrystal called strategic communication vital to securing the operational center of gravity in Afghanistan, which he identified as popular support. There as elsewhere, success comes through changing behavior through influence; thus, Americans must understand the environments they operate in as well as the thinking of enemies and host populations.

Information plays a prominent role in the history of U.S. warfare. From Winfield Scott’s courting of the Catholic Church in Veracruz in 1847 to George Creel’s Committee on Public Information in World War I, military and civilian leaders have long understood that information, and the influence it produces, can significantly enable the success of military operations. That is no different today. In fact, it is apparent from both current military operations and the environment in which they occur that information and influence as applied to military success will become increasingly important while significantly more complex in the future.

Afghan National Army and Civil Order Police officers speak to Maiwand district villagers in Kandahar

Province during clearing operation in area

U.S. Army (Daniel P. Shook)

First, consider importance. It seems clear that success in Afghanistan hinges on the ability to change behavior through influence. General Stanley McChrystal’s initial assessment of the situation there, published in August 2009, stated, “Strategic Communication makes a vital contribution to the overall effort [battle of perceptions] and more specifically to the operational center of gravity: the continued support of the Afghan population.”1 The transparency of the information environment and increasing access to information through any number of means, from satellite television to the Internet, portend that Page 13

military operations will not only have the ability to shape the information environment, but also in turn risk being shaped by it.

Next, consider complexity. In a recent Small Wars Journal article, Lee Rowland and Steve Tatham, in their presentation on target audience analysis (TAA) and measures of effectiveness, make a strong case that influence operations are a complex business: “TAA— when undertaken properly—is an extremely complex process and whilst its methodology is comparatively simple, its implementation is most certainly not.”2 A discussion of the human behavior model in an article published in early 2010 in Parameters concludes the same: “A deep understanding of the human behavior model, specifically culture and how it informs emotion, is critical to obtaining behavior change that is driven by perception and attitude.”3 Noted communication researcher Steven Corman joins the chorus when he describes a shift in academic thought on influence from one of “simplistic . . . to pragmatic complexity.”4

The U.S. Government, and the military in particular, has gradually recognized the value and urgency of information to affect national security since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Significant debate since then has informed the evolution and viability of concepts such as information operations (IO), strategic communications (SC), and public diplomacy.5 In fact, the military has moved beyond the apprentice stage to what could arguably be termed journeyman status as it relates to applying information to enable achievement of its objectives. But the importance and complexity of future inf luence operations will require master status. The U.S. military will achieve such mastery by getting its doctrine right; by

building its intelligence capability to focus on enemy use of information as a weapon of choice; and, most importantly, by creating an organizational culture that embraces the criticality of using information to influence across the spectrum of future conflict.

Getting Doctrine Right

The concepts of IO and SC (the primary military influence processes) and their application have evolved in fits and starts over the past 10 years. Much debate in the midst of conflict has surrounded the meaning of these terms, the similarities and differences between them, and the responsibilities for each beyond theory and in practice.6 Add to this the recent emergence of cyberspace operations, and the confusion is understandable. Still, progress, while appearing glacial to many, is occurring. A new and clearer definition of information operations has been approved by the Department of Defense. A “Strategic Communication Capabilities Based Assessment” has been completed.7 Both of these efforts will lead to military doctrinal publications and directives that afford the opportunity to provide clarity and, more importantly, move these concepts to an understanding that enables mastery of the craft of applying information in order to influence.

An example of progress was reflected in the theme of the 2010 Worldwide Information Operations Conference: “Mainstreaming Information Operations, Normalizing Doctrine and Operations.”8

In other words, how do you take IO out of the ether, where it appears as a new, bright, shiny object, and place it squarely into the realm of routine and recurring military operations? The same challenge exists for strategic communications and cyberspace operations. The answer to that question lies squarely in getting the doctrine right. In fact, if the military does Page 14

not get the next iteration of influence-related doctrine correct over the next 2 years, the progress previously described will be significantly muted.

Doctrine is what drives the conduct of military operations. It is guidance that (as noted on the inside cover of all joint doctrine publications) “is authoritative [and] as such will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.”9 Once doctrine is written and codified, Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen read it and follow it. It becomes “truth.” Given that this is the case, defining the correct audience for the doctrine is critical since the future of information in warfare should focus on movement to mastery of the concept. One may understandably default to the influence practitioner as the obvious audience for this doctrine. But the most important audience is the commander. The progress previously described is reflective of IO or SC staffs who really understand how to achieve effects in the information environment after 10 years of practice in war. What is lacking, however, are commanders who understand the concept sufficiently to provide appropriate guidance, resources, and advocacy for those same IO staffs, which makes all the difference in the world.10

First, the focus of commander-oriented doctrine must be on information effects, not IO or SC. Both are integrating processes that are often misunderstood and confused with the individual capabilities that they integrate. Adding further confusion are related processes and capabilities like the newly minted cyberspace operations. Information effects, on the other hand, are clearly understood by commanders. Effect is a doctrinally accepted term, a part of operational design.11 Commanders know

that they must achieve information effects to enable achievement of military objectives. However, they may not understand the nuances of IO or the other related but different concepts. In general, doctrine focused on information effects must be incorporated into the currently understood areas of operational art, design, and science.

Second, IO, SC, and cyberspace operations are still terms that will be used. This proposed doctrine need not go into excruciating detail about the specific staff processes that they portend, but it must describe the relationship between them.

Some specific examples of what this doctrine should include are worthy of discussion. First, and arguably foremost, is the importance of considering influence in the development of commander’s intent. Commander’s intent drives both the planning and execution of military operations. It defines command ownership of the operation. A commander’s intent that includes a desired information endstate (a defined attitude or behavior change for critical audiences at the conclusion of the operation) will drive the military course of action development, analysis, and selection. That is, the military actions will be undertaken in a fashion to achieve the standard operational endstate in a way that also allows the desired information-effect endstate to be achieved. Branch planning should also be considered in terms of influence. Branch plans answer the question, “What if?” Given that our enemies routinely use influence to enable success, we should plan for an immediate response to their influence operations through branch planning in order to minimize our reaction time. Additionally, it is important to do a side-by-side comparison of the operational art, Page 15

design, and science aspects of kinetic operations as compared to influence operations. This should clearly point out the requirement for an information end state (the art), resources necessary for understanding the complexity of both human behavior and measuring influence effectiveness (the science), and the long-term nature of achieving influence effects (the design).

When the Joint Publication Information Effects in Joint Military Operations is available, it will go a long way toward normalizing future influence operations. It buys informed and educated commanders. That in turn makes the life of the influence staff easier since the commander can now provide appropriate guidance, resources, and advocacy. And that moves information in warfare to a level of mastery not previously seen or practiced. Still, that mastery requires an acute understanding of the enemy, who chooses to vote routinely with information effects as his asymmetric weapon of choice.

Know Thine Enemy

In the apprentice stage of employing influence operations, the commander and staff are proactive in considering the information environment and the required information effects in the planning process. Counterinsurgency, as a population-centric military operation, has driven commanders, over time, to focus on information effects during planning in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

In the journeyman stage, the commander and staff both plan to achieve their own information effects and quickly shift to being “proactively reactive” regarding unpredictable circumstances in the information environment.

That is, consideration is also given in the planning process to the fact that unforeseen situations can, and often do,

occur that have potentially adverse information effects on coalition forces. (Collateral damage, Abu Ghraib photos, and staged enemy disinformation come to mind.) Recognizing this, the commander and staff develop processes to immediately react to those instances if and when they occur. Information playbooks and battle drills are examples that are prepared to plan for the unforeseen but expected information wildcard as a result of branch planning.12

Participants at town hall meeting discuss methods for locals to practice their religion conveniently in

Kandahar Province, Afghanistan

U.S. Army (Courtney Russell)

But in order to achieve mastery in influence operations, one must move from being proactively reactive to becoming predictive. This is a critical task, and certainly not an easy one since it speaks to the complexity of the information environment. Consider the importance of being able to predict an information effect planned by the enemy versus reacting to an unanticipated information wildcard employed by the enemy. Rowland and Tatham note that “an unintended incident . . . will have an immediate information effect on [the] target audience and a much slower return to below stasis.”13 In other words, even if coalition forces are doing a good job achieving planned and intended information effects, the unexpected incident not only adversely impacts operations for the short term, but also

Page 16

never allows a return to the effects achieved before the incident. (One step forward, two steps back.)

So, how does one become predictive in order to cut the legs out from under enemy information effects? The answer lies in the often-overlooked but long-term Achilles’ heel of influence operations: intelligence support. A highly publicized report coauthored by Major General Michael T. Flynn, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization intelligence director in Afghanistan, points out current intelligence f laws: “Our intelligence apparatus still finds itself unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which we operate and the people we are trying to protect and persuade.”14 Only when the Intelligence Community develops the skill sets, a pipeline of experts, and, most importantly, organizational focus toward influence operations will coalition forces have a chance of being predictive regarding enemy use of information. The enemy has a well-established modus operandi (MO) using information as his strategic weapon of choice. In fact, American-born-turned-enemy propagandist Zachary Chesser recently made that MO rather simple to understand by laying out the 10 most effective ways to conduct enemy inf luence operations.15 That is not to say that predictive information analysis is always easy. As previously noted, intelligence based on the human behavior model, social psychology, cultural anthropology, and emotion is inherently difficult. But intelligence-gathering and analysis focused on both open sources and traditional and more complex sources will move friendly influence operations from proactively reactive and allow the possibility of being predictive and proactively disruptive before the fact.

The shifts to commander-focused information effects doctrine and intelligence focus on enemy influence operations work hand-in-hand toward forcing a change in organizational culture in support of fully integrated planning and execution of influence operations.

Organizational Culture

In 2009, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen stated, “We have allowed strategic communication to become a thing instead of a process, an abstract thought instead of a way of thinking.”16 It is this inherent “way of thinking” that defines the organizational culture of the U.S. military today, and in terms of wielding influence through SC, Admiral Mullen sees a basic f law. This is not surprising since researchers note that organizational culture changes in a fairly slow, evolutionary manner.17 What commander-centric information doctrine and intelligence support to information effects provide, however, are forcing functions to drive an organizational culture that embraces information effects as an inherent part of military planning and execution.

Army and Marine information support operations team with Afghan National Army soldier clear compound to conduct census patrol in Marjah,

Halmand Province

U.S. Marine Corps (Christopher M. Carroll)

Within military organizations, the commander sets the tone, establishes the command climate, and drives the organizational culture. A commander

Page 17

who embraces and emphasizes the value of information effects to military success will drive the unit to a similar recognition. Doctrine that focuses on and directs commanders to provide initial guidance on desired information effects will result in planning and execution reflective of organizational change. A commander who identifies an information end state in his intent implies to the staff and subordinates that information effects are important to mission success and must be considered throughout the planning, execution, and assessment processes.

Intelligence support follows this commander-driven change. With an information end state defined, the intelligence staff determines most likely and most dangerous enemy influence courses of action. The staff then war-game against these scenarios and, in doing so, increases the opportunity to both predict the enemy’s use of information and plan to prevent it from ever occurring.

Other standard military decision making processes will follow with a routine consideration of influence on mission accomplishment. Priority Intelligence Requirements will necessarily consider collecting on the environmental factors that portend enemy influence operations. The Commander’s Critical Information Requirements will raise time-sensitive influence activities to the commander’s level for action, both to exploit friendly effects and blunt enemy effects.

Commander-centric doctrine on information effects, accompanied by intelligence support enabled by appropriate resources and focus on enemy influence activities, will drive organizational culture. If and when that occurs, the military will be well on its way to mastery in planning and executing influence operations and deterring and

defeating the primary source of enemy power.

The information environment is a complex system that will become increasingly important to the success or failure of military operations in the future. Progress has been made since 9/11 to both exploit information effects to enable success and to counter enemy asymmetric use of information as a strategic weapon of choice. But the criticality of information as power in future warfare means that if the U.S. military hopes to routinely succeed, it must master influence operations across the spectrum of operations. Commander-centric doctrine will help jump-start that mastery by allowing the commander to provide the appropriate and necessary guidance, resources, and advocacy to influence operations. Intelligence support must simultaneously shift focus from kinetic order-of-battle analysis to a balanced approach that considers collection and analysis of influence-related enemy capabilities as well.

As this command-directed and -focused planning and execution evolve, they will trickle down to the individual Soldier, Sailor, Marine, and Airman. When they inherently and proactively consider any and all of their actions in light of their influence effects, inculcation of the organizational culture toward and true mastery of influence operations will be achieved. In a world where information is ubiquitous and increasingly impacts military success, that cannot happen soon enough. JFQ

Note

1. Stanley A. McChrystal, Headquarters, International Security Assistance Force Memorandum, “COMISAF’s Initial Assessment,” Kabul, Afghanistan, August 30, 2009, D−1.

2. Lee Rowland and Steve Tatham, “Strategic Communication and Inf luence Operations: Do We Really Get ‘It’?” Small Wars Journal,

August 3, 2010, available at

Page 18

<http://smallwarsjournal. com/blog/journal/docs-temp/483-tathamrowland.pdf>.

3. Dennis M. Murphy, “In Search of the Art and Science of Strategic Communication,” Parameters 34, no. 4 (Winter 2009/2010),

111. 4. Steven R. Corman, Angela Trethewey, and

Bud Goodall, “A 21st Century Model for

Communication in the Global War of Ideas,” Consortium for Strategic Communication, Report #0701, April 3, 2007, 9.

5. Information operations, strategic communications, and public diplomacy are related concepts that all in some way focus on informing, educating, and inf luencing audiences. Still, their nuanced differences remain difficult for the nonpractitioner to grasp, as evidenced by a U.S. Department of Defense front-end analysis in summer 2010, examining the lexicon and definitions of information operations and strategic communication, among others.

6. See Dennis M. Murphy, “The Trouble with Strategic Communication(s),” IOSphere

(Winter 2008) for a detailed explanation of the lexicon and comparison of the terms information operations (IO) and strategic communication (SC).

7. The new definition of IO is an outcome of the

Department of Defense front-end analysis (see note 5). The “Strategic Communication Capabilities Based Assessment” was conducted by U.S. Strategic Command during 2009–2010 and considered SC from doctrinal, personnel, and organizational perspectives, among other considerations.

8. The Worldwide Information Operations Conference is an annual event bringing together an international audience of approximately 500 IO practitioners, academics, and contractors to focus on both the progress and future of IO.

9. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3–13, Information Operations (Washington,

DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 13, 2006), i, among others.

10. The author has taught on the topics of IO and SC at the U.S. Army War College for the past 6 years. Over that period, senior military leader-students have increasingly recognized the importance of information effects to warfighting success. However, they anecdotally offer that even with successive tours of duty in combat zones, it takes an initial 4 months, on average, for commanders to put into place effective tactics, techniques, and procedures to compete in the information environment.

11. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5–0, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC:

Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), III–18.

12. Again, this should be planned using current military paradigms. In this example, branch planning is the appropriate mechanism. A branch answers the question “What if ?” in military plans. See Joint Publication 5–0, II–18.

13. Rowland and Tatham, 6. 14. Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D.

Batchelor, “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan,” Center for a New American Security Working Paper, January 4, 2010.

15. Jared Brachman, “The Internet Jihad,” Foreign Policy, available at

<www.foreignpolicy. com/articles/2010/10/11/the_internet_jihad>.

16. Michael G. Mullen, “Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics,” Joint Force Quarterly 55 (4

th Quarter 2009),

2.

17.Christine A.R. MacNulty, Transformation from the Outside In or the Inside Out

(Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership, 2008), 22.

About the Author

Professor Dennis M. Murphy serves as the Director of the Information in Warfare Group in the Center for Strategic Leadership at the U.S. Army War College

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