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Transcript of Dharmakirti on
Dharmakrti on pratyaka -Translations (summarized by S.S. Liu/ Oct. 1 12 )
PV 3 : 1-7, 123-133 (Singh 1984: 142-144)
PV 3 : 1-10, 194-224 (Dunne 2004: 391-411)
The Heart of Buddhist PhilosophyDinnaga and Dharmakrti: Appendix IV
Dharmakrti on Sensation (pratyaka) (Amar Singh, 1984:142-4)
Singh, Amar. (1984) The Heart of Buddhist PhilosophyDinnaga and
Dharmakrti. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers
Japanese translations are available in:
(1979): p. 55-68, 202-214.
Tosaki, Hiromasa Bukky-ninshikiron no kenky, vol.1: p. 55-68, 202-214)
For detail available translations check on: EAST -Epistemology and Argumentation in
South Asia and Tibet http://east.uni-hd.de/buddh/ind/7/16/
mna dvividha meyadvaividhyt aktyaaktita |
arthakriyy kedir nrtho 'narthdhimokata || (PV 3.1)
[Singh] The means of knowledge is of two kinds, because there are two
kinds of objects, as there is or is not a capacity for action towards an
object. Hair and such things are not objects, because there is no reliance
on them of the kind that occurs towards objects.
[Dunne] Instrumental cognitions are of two kinds because there are two
kinds of objects. There are two kinds of objects because some objects
are capable of telic function while others are not. [Illusions such as] the
hairs [that appear in the visual perceptions of a person with cataracts]
are not objects (arthas) because they are not considered to be objects
sadsadatvc ca viayviayatvata |
abdasynyanimittn bhve dh sadasattvata || (PV 3.2)
[S] And (also) because of similarity and non-similarity, because of
being and not being within the scope of language, and because,
when other signs (than the object) are present, intellect occurs
with respect to one but not with respect to the other.
[D] There are two objects because some are similar across instances and
others are not similar; because some are the objects of words and others
are not the objects of words; and because the cognition of some occurs
when there are causes other than the object, and the cognition of others
does not occur when there are causes other than the object.
arthakriysamartha yat tad atra paramrthasat |
anyat samvtisat prokta te svasmnyalakae || (PV 3.3)
[S] That object with respect to which (purposeful) action is possible
is called the ultimate real, whereas the other is the conventionally
real. These are respectively the unique particular and the universal.
[D] In this context, that which is capable of telic function is said to be
ultimately real. The other one is said to be conventionally real. They
are, respectively, the particular arid the universal.
aakta savam iti cet bjder akurdiu |
d akti mat s cet samvtystu yath tath || (PV 3.4)
[S] If it is argued that nothing has a causal capacity, (we point out
that) the causal capacity of seeds, etc. towards sprouts, etc.,
you may argue that the capacity is regarded to be merely conventional.
So be it.
[D] "But nothing is capable of telic function."
We observe that things such as seeds have a capacity for telic function
in the case of sprouts, and so on. "Such things are considered to have
such a capacity conventionally, not ultimately." Let it be so in the way
as you have said.
ssti sarvatra ced buddher nnvayavyatirekayo |
smnyalakae 'da cakurpdibuddhivat || (PV 3.5)
[S] If it is argued everything has causal capacity, we reply that there
is none in universals, because of the not seeing of the cognition
of logical agreement and non-agreement like the cognition of a
visible object through the eye.*
[D] "That capacity for telic function is found in all objects."
It is not found in universals, which are not observed to have either
positive concomitance [in which a universal necessarily exists when
there is a cognition of a universal] or negative concomitance [in
which such a cognition exists in the presence only and merely of a
universal] with the cognition of a universal. An example in which
these relations do occur is that of the eye faculty and the form
perceived in relation to the cognition of that form.
*Text with Prajnakaragupta reads: It is not seen of the cognition of
agreement and non-agreement in the universal characteristic like the
cognition of a visible object through the eye.
etena samaybhogdyantaragnurodhata |
ghaotkepaasmnyasakhydiu dhiyo gat || (PV 3.6)
[S] By this (absence of causal capacity in the universal, its effect
being mere knowledge) the notions of such things as a pot, up-
ward motion, general characteristic and number are explained
due to conformity with such things of the mind as convention,
[D] The fact that a universal is not invariably concomitant with the
cognition of a universal explains cognitions of supposedly extra-mental
entities, such as substantial wholes-i.e., a water-jug-projections,
universals, numbers, etc. They are also not invariably concomitant with
their cognitions because, like universals, the cognition of them follows
from the presence of other factors, such as signs and mental effort.
kedayo na smnyam anarthbhiniveata |
jeyatvena grhd doo nbhveu prasajyate || (PV 3.7)
[S] Hair, etc. are not universal, because there is no desire for
them of the kind that occurs towards real objects. In the case of
absent things, there is no fault (of their having the features of
a universal), because they are grasped as knowables.
[D] Things such as the hairs [that appear to a person with cataracts] are
not universals because they are not considered to be objects [by persons
who act upon them]. This fault does not ensue for absences because
they are apprehended as knowable.
tem api tathbhve'pratiedht sphubhat |
jnarpatayrthatvt kedti mati puna || 3.8 ||
[D] The fault also does not ensue for those hair-like appearances when
they are apprehended in that fashion [i.e., as objects by some other
awareness]. This is so because there is no reason to deny that they are
apprehended as knowable objects. The clarity of the appearance of hairs
in cognition is due to the fact that they are objects [i.e., particulars] in
that they are of the nature of awareness.
smnyaviay keapratibhsam anarthaka |
jnarpatayrthatve smnye cet prasajyate || 3.9 ||
[D] However, thoughts such as "These are hairs" have universals as their
objects; but the appearance of hairs does not have any object.
tatheatvd adoa artharpatvena samnat |
sarvatra samarpatvt tadvyvttisamrayt || 3.10 ||
[D] "If a universal is also a [real] object in terms of having the nature of
awareness, then you would have to conclude that it is a particular."
Since we do indeed assert that a universal is a particular/ your statement
poses no problem for us. But in terms of having the nature of other
objects, it is a universal in that it has the same form for all [the objects
that it seems to qualify]. It has that same form because it is based upon
their exclusion [from other objects that do not have the expected causal
* PV3: 123-133 Singh
pratyaka kalpanpoha pratyakeaiva sidhyati |
pratytmavedya sarve vikalpo nmasaraya ||123||
123. Sensation, which is free of conceptualization (imagining), is
established only by means of sensation itself. The conceptualization
(imagining) of all (beings), which is cognized individually
(subjectively) is dependent on names.
sahtya sarvata cint stimitenntartman |
sthito 'pi caku rpam kate skaj mati ||124||
124. One who remains with a tranquil mind, having withdrawn his
thought from all (concepts), looks at a visible object with his
eye: that thought is born of sensation.
punar vikalpayan kicid sd vo kalpaned |
iti vetti na prvoktvasthym indriyd gatau ||125||
125. Then, forming a judgment he knows There was something like
my (present) imagining . There is no access of the sense-organ
to the situation just stated.
ekatra do bhedo hi kvacin nnyatra dyate |
na tasmd bhinnam asty anyat smnya buddhyabhedata ||126||
126. For a particular observed in one place is never seen elsewhere.
Therefore, it is not the case that owing to a non-difference in
cognitions there exists another, a universal which is separate
(from the particular).
tasmd vieaviay sarvaivendriyaj mati |
na vieeu abdn pravtter asti sambhava ||127||
127. Therefore, every thought born of sensation has a particular as
its object. There is no possibility of the functioning of words
with respect to particulars.
ananvayd vie saketasypravttita |
viayo ya ca abdn sayojyata sa eva tai ||128||
128. Particulars have no agreement (with words) because no convention
functions: and the object of words may be connected with
them (with words, not with particulars),
asyedam iti sambandhe yv arthau pratibhsinau |
tayor eva hi sambandho na tadendriyagocara ||129||
129 For when there is a relationship of the form this (expression)
is of that (object) , the relationship is