Vadanyaya of Dharmakirti. the Logic of Debate.(Crit. Ed. and Tr....

Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica SeriesSunil Gupta, Editor

Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica Series No. 126

V D A N Y Y A

O F

D H A R M A K I R T I

T h e L o g i c o f D e b a t e

Critically edited and translatedwith Introduct ion and Notes

byPradeep P. Gokhale

S r i S a t g u r u P u b l i c a t i o n sA Division of

I n d i a n B o o k s C e n t r eShakt i N a g a r , D e l h i

INDIA

Published by:Sri Satguru Publications

Indological and Oriental PublishersA Division of

Indian Books Centre40/5, ShaktiNagar,

Delhi-110007(INDIA)

First Edition: Delhi, 1993

ISBN 81-7030-380-X

No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any mannerwhatsoever without written permission except in the case of

brief quotations embodied in critical articlesand reviews.

PRINTED IN INDIA

P r e f a c e

I am happy to present a translation of Dharmakirt i 'sVdanyya before the students and readers of Indology andIndian philosophy. When I read the text for the purpose oftranslation, I found that the text is still in need of criticaledition because it contains some corrupt readings. So I haveedited the text in the light of the editions of RahulSankrityayan and of Dvarikadas Shastri and also in t h e lightof Sntaraksita's commentary Vipancitrih.

In my translation of the text I have tried to be neither tooliteral nor too liberal. The former, because I wanted to makeDharmakir t i ' s Vdanyya intelligible to those Englishreaders who do not unders tand Sanskrit. And the latter,because I wanted to be useful to those who would like toread the text with the help of a translation. I have alsoincluded explanatory notes at the end of this work in orderto facilitate a clearer unders tanding of the text and thetranslation.

The central theme of Vdanyya is the nature andclassification of nigrahasthnas. I had written on this topic inthe context of Nyya and Buddhist theories of inference andfallacies, as a small par t of my Ph.D. dissertation. Aroundthe same time my colleague Dr. Mangala Chinchore hadtaken u p the theme as the central topic of her Ph. D.

vi VDANY YA OF DHARMAKIRTI

dissertation. (Coindic ident ly both the dissertations havebeen published in the Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica series ofIndian Books Cent re) . Dr. Chinchore has discussed thetheme with a great length and depth in her work. But whilereading her work I found that my approach to Vdanyya isbasically different from her approach . In my Int roduct ionto this work, therefore, I took an oppor tuni ty to express myapproach as clearly as possible and also to discuss one of thecrucial points made by Dr. Chinchore in her book. Thanksto Dr. Chinchore ' s writing which provoked me to do so.

I am grateful to Shri Sunil Gupta who asked me totranslate Vdanyya for Indian Books Centre andencouraged m e from time to t ime. I am also grateful to myparents, wife, colleagues and friends who gave meencouragement and moral suppor t when it was needed .

Pradeep P. Gokhale

November 15,1992

C o n t e n t s

Preface vAbbreviations xiIntroduction xiii

Parti

(Definition of Occassion of Defeat) 3-63Section Nos.

1. T h e definition and classification ofnigrahasthna; the first type of 'asdhannga-vacana.'

2-7 T h e justification of a consti tuent of proof inthe case of self-nature as reason.

8 T h e justification of a consti tuent of proof inthe case of effect as reason.

9 Justification of a consti tutent of proof in thecase of non-apprehension as reason,(cont inued up to section 29).

10-12 What kind of non-apprehension proves thepractice of non-existence?

13-18 Do all cognitions and verbal usages (andidentities and differences amongst them)

viii VDANY YA OF DHARMAKl RTI

prove existence of objects (and identitiesand differences amongst them)?

19 Does pragmatic function prove existence?Do identities a n d differences amongstpragmatic functions prove identities anddifferences amongst the objects?

20 T h e na ture of non-apprehens ion as reason.21-26 Refutation of the Siikhya view that no th ing

can be said to be non-existent.27-28 Refutation of Satkryavda of Sankhya.

29 Conclusion of the discussion on non-apprehens ion .

30 Second type of asdhanngavacana.31 Th i rd type of asdhanngavacana. In what

way are Declaration etc. non-consti tuents ofproof?

32 Four th type of asdhanngavacana.33-35 Fifth type of asdhanngavacana.

36 T h e first type of adosodbhvana37 Condemna t ion of cheat ing practices

(qubbl ing etc.) in the course of debate .38 Second type of adosodbhvana.

Part II

(Refutation of the NyayarVicw) 65-149

39-41 Criticism of Pratijnhni as nigrahasthna.42-45 Criticism of Pratijnntara.46-58 Cri ticism of Pratijnvirodha

59 Criticism of Pratijnsamnysa.60 Criticism of Hetvantara.

CONTENTS

61626364

65-68

6970

71-7475-7879-80

8182-84

8586-8789-91

9293

IX

On Arthntara.Criticism of Nirarthaka.Criticism of Avijntrtha.Criticism ofAprthaka.Cri ticism of Aprptakla.Do incorrect words make sense viathe recollection of correct words?Criticism of NynaOn Adhika.On Punarukta.Criticism of Ananubhsana.Criticism ofAjnna.On Aprtibh.Criticism of Viksepa.Criticism of MatnujnCriticism of Niranuyojynuyoga.Criticism of ApasiddhntaOn Hetvbhsa as nigrahasthna.Epilogue.Notes 151-181Glossary 183

A b b r e v i a t i o n s

D(D)Lit.NBhNSNVR

(R)V

(V)VN

Dvarikadas Shastri 's edit ion of Vdanyya.Reading accepted in D.LiterallyNyyabhsya of VtsyyanaNyyastra of GautamaNyyavrtika of UdyotakaraRahul Sankrityayan's edition of VdanyyaReading accepted in RVipandtrth, the Santaraksita's commentaryof Vdanyya as inc luded in D.Reading of Vdanyya as accepted in V.Vdanyya as inc luded in this work.

I n t r o d u c t i o n

Vdanyya is an impor tant work by Dharmaklrti , theBuddhist phi losopher and logician of seventh century A.D..T h e work is devoted to the rules of victory and defeat indebate . T h e term 'Vdanyya! means the logic of debate inthe broad sense of the term 'logic1. 'Logic' in its restrictedsense means a formal discipline which systematises the rulesgoverning validity of valid arguments or logical t ruth of thelogically t rue propositions. But logic in its broad sense couldmean a discipline which deals with the questions ofTightness and wrongness from a rational point of view (thatis, where ' r ight ' stands for rational or reasonable and'wrong' stands for irrational or unreasonable) in thecontext of any given enquiry. When, for instance, a debatetakes place between two persons it is a legitimate question asto whose stand in the debate is rational and whoseirrational. Winning and losing in a debate would begoverned by the consideration of Tightness or wrongness inthis sense, if one has to look at 'debate ' as a rationalenterprise. Naturally the discipline which deals with therules governing rationality of winning or losing a debatecould be called the logic of debate. Vdanyya is a work inthe logic of debate in this broad sense.

xiv VDANY YA OF DHARMAKIRTI

The concept of nigrahasthnaDharmakirt i 's construction of the logic of debate can be

better unders tood on the background of Nyya discussionof debate. Dharmakir t i has used the Nyya account ofdebate, not only as a puruapaksa, a position to be refuted,but also, at least partly, as a raw material for reconstruct ion.His criticism of Nyya is not purely destructive but it has aconstructive aspect also. Gautama in his Nyyastra(hereafter, NS) states the rules regarding winning andlosing a debate in terms of the not ion of nigrahasthna.Gautama presents the not ion of nigrahasthna ( ' the point ofdefeat') in his work in two places. First he gives the generalconcept of nigrahasthna as vipratipatti and apratipatti(Misapprehension and non-apprehens ion) in A 1.2.19 andin the latter par t of his work he gives an elaborateclassification of nigrahasthnas. Dharmakir t i seems todevelop over the general concept of nigrahasthna given inNS. His line of approach could be spelt ou t as follows:Dharmakirt i suggested that nigrahasthnas of the disputant(Vdin) a n d those of the o p p o n e n t (prativdin) are not thesame. T h e j o b of the disputant (as disputant) is to present agood a rgument for proving his position a n d to justify it,whereas the j o b of the o p p o n e n t as o p p o n e n t is to poin t outthe faults in the a rgument . They would be failing in theirjobs it they suffer from non-apprehens ion or falseapprehension relevant to their respective jobs . T h e non-ipprehension that the disputant has consists in his failure to)resent or justify a sound a rgumen t a n d the falseipprehension he has consists in his presentat ion ofallacious arguments or irrelevant or r e d u n d a n t statements.Jl these types seem to be c lubbed by Dharmakir t i into oneirm -'asdhanhgavacanc?. Similarly the non-apprehens ionlat the o p p o n e n t has consists in his inability to find ou t the*nuine fault in the faulty a rgumen t advanced by thesputant . T h e false apprehens ion he has consists in his)inting out a non-fault as fault. Both these types seem to

INTRODUCTION xv

be clubbed by Dharmakir t i in one term - * adosodbhvana\ Inthis way it is possible to argue that Dharmaklrt i 's account ofnigrahasthna is no t radically opposed to the Nyyadefinition of nigrahasthna bu t it is a development over it.Tha t is why, it seems, Dharmakirt i does not criticise thegeneral definition of nigrahasthna though he criticiseso ther aspects of the Nyya account of nigrahasthna. Twosuch aspects come to the foreground-

(1) T h e Nyya concept ion of debate in the context ofwhich the question of nigrahasthnas becomesrelevant.

(2) T h e elaborate classification of nigrahasthna given inNS.

Dharmakirt i on the Nyaya-concept of debateDharmaklr t i ' s account of the nature of debate differs

significantly from the Nyya account. T h e first poin t ofdifference is that of terminology. What Naiyyikas call Vdais no t the same as what Dharmakirt i calls Vda. Naiyyikasclassify kath (discussion) into three kinds: vda, jalpa a n dvitand. 'Vda! roughly stands for a friendly discussionbetween a teacher and his disciple or between two co-disciples where the question of victory or defeat does notarise, 'jalpa' stands for a debate between two parties whereboth the parties try to justify their own positions againsteach other . In jalpa the question of victory and defeat ismost relevant. 'Vitand' stands for a debate similar to jalpa,the difference being that in Vitand one of the parties doesnot present any position of its own, but it only at tempts torefute the position of the o ther party.

What Naiyyikas call vda resembles what Dharmakirt icalls prapancakath or vistarakath (see, for instance, sections70, 72, 73). Prapancakath is a diffuse discussion which is notgoverned by any rules concerning defeat or victory. Butunlike vda it is no t restricted to the discussion between

xvi VDANY YA OF DHARMAKIRTI

teacher a n d his disciple or between two co-disciples. It cantake place between any two persons interested in a subject.

What Naiyyikas call jalpa resembles what Dharmakir t icalls vda. Vda of Dharmakir t i (let us call it vda (D)) is adebate between two parties trying to argue ou t their owncases and refute the cases of each other . T h e quest ion ofvictory and defeat does arise in the case of vda (D) . Butvda (D) may be dist inguished from jalpa .in at least twoimpor tant ways -

(1) T h e purpose beh ind jalpa is the protect ion ofone ' s own philosophical de terminat ion (4

.2.50). In fact Naiyyikas associated theirconcepts of victory a n d defeat with this goal of self-protect ion. Jalpa a n d vitand are the weapons to b used fordefending oneself a n d for defeating others . T h e purposebeh ind vda(D), on the o ther hand , is to pe r suade theo ther debater rationally, to help him achieve the knowledgeof t ruth and to remove his misconceptions. Dharmakir t iassociates his concepts of victory and defeat with this goal ofvda

f ^ f t ^H yfci

INTRODUCTION xvii

disapproved totally by Dharmaklrti. (nc$

xviii VDANY YA OF DHARMAKlRTI

[For the types N x t o N7 based on different derivations ofthe terms asdhanngavacana a n d adosodbhavana> seesections 1, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36 and 38 respectively]

This amounts to a seven-fold classification. If weunders tand this classification, then we can unders tand thepoint in Dharmaklr t i ' s criticism of Nyya -classification alsoin a better light. Dharmaklrt i is not very critical, forinstance, about two Nyya - nigrahasthnas - Apratibh (Non-imagination) and Hetvbhsa (Fallacies of probans) . (Ofcourse Dharmaklr t i would differ with the Nyya concept ionand classification of hetvbhsas in their details, bu t not withthe basic concept of hetvbhsa). It is no t surprising becauseDharmaklr t i has inc luded them in his own classification insome form or the o ther . Apartibh, takes the form of N^ N2or N 6 i n Dharmaklr t i ' s classification and Hetvbhsas areincluded in N4. In fact Dharmaklr t i in one place goes to theextent to say that the two nigrahasthnas viz. Hetvbhsa a n dApratibh cover all the nigrahasthnas. (^ T

fd, VN, Section 80) .'j'

Dharmaklr t i accepts the Nyya nigrahasthna Punarukta(See sections 71-73) with some qualifications andmodifications. It is natural because Punarukta in itsmodified form implies N s of Dharmaklr t i . He clearly accepts'Arthntara* of Nyya (see section 61) which implies his N5.

In general we can say that when Dharmaklr t i is criticalabout the Nyya classification, he is no t opposed to eachand every type of nigrahasthna of Nyya. H e is ready toaccept those Nyya nigrahasthnas, which are formallymatching to his classification which is m o r e systematic. Stillhe is critical about the Nyya classification to a large extentfor the following reasons-

(1) The Nyya classification is not mutually exclusive: Manynigrahasthnas which are men t ioned separately in the Nyya

INTRODUCTION

list due to minor differences, could be clubbed into a few ofthem. For example Pratijnvirodha in its refined andcorrected form could be included in Hetvbhsa.

Section 53) Arthntara, Nirarihaka and Aprthaka insofar asthey are genuine nigrahasthnas are different kinds ofirrelevant talks; so they could be clubbed into one .Ananubhsana> Ajnna and Apratibh need not bedistinguished from each other insofar as their essence isconcerned. In this way there is a great scope for economy inNyya classification.

(2) Nor is the Nyya - classification collectively exhaustive:Because, if one allows invention of new types on the basis ofminor differences, then any number of types can beinvented, which are not there presently in the Nyya list.(See section 80).

(3) DharmakTrti is critical about the Nyya framework ofanumna: When Naiyyikas were no t clear about theconstitutive elements of a sound probans, Dharmakiriin t roduced the scheme of three constitutive elements.Correspondingly he po in ted out three basic fallacies ofprobans : Asiddha, Viruddha and Anaikntika. This was asystematic counter-thesis to the Nyya scheme of fiveHetvbhsas, Naiyyikas talked of five elements {avayavas) ofinferential s tatement. Dharmakirt i systematically criticisedthis view and po in ted out that only two elements (thestatements of paksadharmat and vypti) are necessary andsufficient and also that the order between these twoelements is of n o importance.1 Whereas the Nyya scheme ofnigrahasthnas presupposes the Nyya framework ofanumna, Dharmaklr tPs criticism of the former reflects hiscriticism of the latter. So Aprptakla is no more anigrahasthna because it presupposes the specific order ofthe elements of the inferential s tatement . If an inferentials ta tement lacks Pratijn or Nigamana then the occasion of

XX VDANY YA OF DHARMAKIRTI

defeat called Nyna occurs according to Nyya. Dharmakirt irejects this possibility because, Pratijn and Nigamana ase lements of inferential s ta tements are r e d u n d a n t accordingto him. And if Pratijn itself is no t necessary in anyinferential s tatement, then many nigrahasthnas such asPratijnntara, Pratijnhniy Pratijnsamnysa lose theirsignificance.

(4) Other defects: Apart from the above defects in theNyya account, there are o ther defects. The re are manyplaces where Naiyyikas are incorrect or vague or confusedin their account . Sometimes they present implausible casesas the instances of nigrahasthna. (For instance, see section44) . They unduly ex tend the scope of Pratijnavirodha andmix u p Drstntavirodha with it. They treat some of theunnecessary conventions regarding debate as the essentialrules (see section 78). Dharmakir t i points ou t many suchcases into the details of which we need not go he re .

A problem: Is hetvbhsa a nigrahasthna?I have po in ted out that Dharmakir t i in his classification

of nigrahasthnas includes Hetvbhsa as o n e of thederivations of the term asdhanngavacana. (It is N 4 i n hisclassification tabulated above) . But this view is notacceptable to all. Dr. Mangala Chinchore in her thorough-going account of Vdanyya repeatedly claims thathetvbhsa is not a nigrahasthna according to Dharmaklrti.*As a matter of fact there are many statements of Dharmakir t ihimself which are clearly contrary to her claim.3 But there isone passage which apparent ly supports Dr. Chinchore ' sview.

:lM (Section No. 36).

INTRODUCTION xxi

Here Dharmaklrt i is point ing out that commission of aHetvbhsahy the disputant does not by itself result into hisdefeat. He will be defeated if the fallacy of probans has beenpoin ted out by the opponen t . Nor would it be correct to say:T h e commission of Hetvbhsa, if it remains undiscovered bythe opponen t , would result in to the disputant 's victory,because his position stands proved insofar as it is notdisproved. T h e disputant does not win because due to hisfallacious argument , he fails to persuade his opponen trationally (^c^rfcfT^^Mc^ - Literally - there is no realisationof t ruth (by the o p p o n e n t ) ) .

Now the question is: If hetvbhsa is an occasion of defeataccording to Dharmaklrt i why does the commission ofHetvbhsa does not necessarily result into defeat accordingto him?

Dr. Chinchore ' s answer seems to be: Since commission ofa Hetvbhsa does no t necessarily result into defeat,Hetvbhsa must not be a nigrahasthna according to him.But is this approach satisfactory?

T h e fact is: Where Dharmaklrt i calls Hetvbhsa anigrahasthnay he does so literally and vividly.4 But thepassage which apparently supports Dr. Chinchore ' sinterpretat ion, does not contain the word *nigrahasthna'at all. (Dr. Chinchore has apparently overlooked the directand clear evidences unfavourable to her thesis, but tried toexploit unclear and indirect evidences apparentlyfavourable to her.) If the two evidences are put together, wehave the following picture: Hetvbhsa is a nigrahasthna butcommission of Hetvbhsa does not necessarily cause thedefeat.

This is interesting. If Dharmaklrt i is consistent in this,then his not ion of nigrahasthna is in need of furtherclarification. I suggest the following clarification.

xxii t VDANY YA OF DHARMAKlRTI

Nigrahasthna, i.e., an occasion of defeat or a g round ofdefeat is so called because when it is commit ted by adisputant or an o p p o n e n t in the debate situation, it cancause the defeat (subject to its discovery by the o therdebater) . But nigrahasthna is not always the sufficientcondition of defeat (i.e. it need not necessarily lead to one ' sdefeat); it is possible that a nigrahasthna is commit ted butthe actual defeat does not occur.5 Hetvbhsa is anigrahasthna according to Dharmaklr t i in this restrictedsense. In fact this situation is no t peculiar to hetvbhsa, itcould be general ised and applied to o ther nigrahasthnas aswell. In general , one could say, it could be applied toasdhanngavacana and adosodbhvana. (We will consider aproblem with this proposal a little later.)

Dharmaklrt i in this way realises a gap between winningand losing - a situation where n o n e of the debaters is to bedeclared as defeated though one of them is certainly atfault, and though a nigrahasthna has been commit ted . Whydoes Dharmaklr t i take this stand? He himself gives theanswer-

T h e debater who commits a fallacy bu t whose fallacyremains unde tec t ed by the opponen t , is no t defeated,because winning and losing is de te rmined relative to the actof surpassing each o ther ' s s t rength that takes place amongthe two debaters . Tha t one debater loses a poin t or fails toscore a poin t is insufficient. Whether the o the r debaterscores a po in t by surpassing him is equally impor tant . If thedisputant commits a fallacy, he has lost a point , bu t if theo p p o n e n t does not discover the fallacy, he is equally a loser,he will score a po in t over the disputant, if h e points ou t thefallacy commit ted by h im. Commit t ing a nigrahasthnaamounts to losing a point , bu t it will no t be translated intoactual defeat unless that is complemen ted by the o therdebater by scoring a point. Here Dharmaklr t i is insisting

INTRODUCTION xxiii

that result of a debate should not be based on a one-sidedjudgement, but it should always be made in the light ofreciprocal or competitive character of the debate. Thiscontention in no way affects Dharmaklrti's view thatHetvbhsa is a nigrahasthna.

But if the judge cannot declare the disputant as defeatedin the situation described above, what else can he do? It ispossible to claim that the judge may declare the disputant asthe winner. Because if the judge has discovered a fault in thedisputant's argument which the opponent has not, but ifthe judge is partial to the disputant, then he could takeadvantage of the situation and tell the opponent, "See, thedisputant has presented an argument which you are not in aposition to refute. So you have lost; the disputant has won."Dharmakirti condemns this possibility because it would be acase of cheating the opponent on the part of the judge. Andno cheating practice is in order in a philosophical enquiry.

: | Section 36).This approach of Dharmakirti is important as a response

to Nyya approach also. Naiyyikas do not talk of any gapbetween occurrence of a nigrahasthna and actual defeat.This sometimes may generate a paradoxical situation.Consider, for instance, the two Nyaya-nigrahasthanas -Hetvbhsa and Paryanuyojyopeksana. Suppose a disputantcommits a fallacy of probans and the opponent fails todiscover it. Then the disputant has committed the formernigrahasthna whereas the opponent has committed thelatter. According to Nyaya, both will have to be declared asdefeated. Dharmakirti tries to avoid this paradox by creatinga gap between occurrence of nigrahasthna and declarationof defeat.

But the problem reappears in a different form inDharmakirti's framework also. Consider the first type ofadosodbhvana (N6), according to which the disputant is

xxiv VDANYYA OF DHARMAKIRTI

faulty, but the o p p o n e n t fails to discover the fault. This is anoccasion of the o p p o n e n t ' s defeat. But the disputant hasalready commit ted a fault (which the o p p o n e n t fails todiscover), so it is an occasion of disputant 's defeat as well. Sothere is an occasion (or two occasions at the same time) ofthe defeat of both disputant and opponen t . But n o n e ofthem is to be declared as defeated! What will happen now?Adosodbhvana c anno t culminate into the actual defeat ofthe o p p o n e n t unless this incapasity of the o p p o n e n t (todiscover the disputant ' s fault) has been po in ted out by thedisputant himself. (Because, an incapasity of a debatercannot by itself lead to his defeat! This is by the same tokenas in the case of Hetvbhsas.) But if the disputant points outthe opponen t ' s incapasity to discover the disputant 's ownfault, then he in a way acknowledges the real faultcommit ted by himself. In discovering o p p o n e n t ' s incapasityhe is discovering his own fault.6 H e is acknowledgingasdhanngavacana commit ted by himself andadosodbhvana commit ted by the opponen t . Again aparadoxical situation! Dharmakir t i may perhaps say: Such asituation of indecision is welcome, because occurrence of anigrahasthna does no t by itself play a decisive role! But stillthe question is: Why did Dharmakir t i in t roduceadosodbhvana of the first type (i.e.. N6) as the occasion ofthe o p p o n e n t ' s defeat, which never leads to the actualdefeat of the opponen t?

On the present edition of the textThe Sanskrit text of Vdanyya was first edi ted by Rahul

Sankrityayan a n d was publ ished by Mahabodhi Society ofSarnath in 1936. It was further edi ted by Swami DvarikadasShastri in the light of Sntaraksita 's commentaryVipancitrth a n d publ ished by Buddha-bhratI of Varanasiin 1972. This latter edition is certainly an improvement overRahulji's version a n d is closer to the original text. Yet itcontains many cor rup t readings a n d leaves r o o m for further

INTRODUCTION xxv

improvement.7 The present edition is an attemptedimprovement over Dvarikadas Shastri's edition ofVdanyya.

While editing, I have considered Dvarikadas Shastri'sedition (hereafter, D) as the point of departure. Generally, Ihave accepted the alternative readings suggested in D in thelight of Vipancitrih (hereafter, V). But in some places Ifound that the readings in Rahul Sanskrityayan's edition(hereafter, R) are more consistent than the readings in D.Generally, I have benefited from V while improving upon D.However, since V is not a word to word commentary andleaves many words and sentences unmentioned andunexplained, it cannot come to our rescue while improvingupon many corrupt readings in the available text. I havesuggested alternative readings in some such cases,considering mainly the question of semantic consistency ofthe text.

Since D is my starting point, I have given editorial foot-notes only where I had to deviate from D. When thealternative readings suggested by me are based on R or V, Ihave altered the text accordingly and explained the sourcein the footnotes. But when the source of alternative readingis not R or V, but my imagination, I have introduced mysuggestions in the text by placing them into brackets, andhave prefixed or suffixed a question mark to them.

The main drawback of my version of Vdanyya is that it,like R and D, does not take into account any Tibetan versionof the text. My humble request to the scholars of Tibetanwould be to verify the alternative readings suggested by mein the light of Tibetan versions of Vdanyya. In spite of thisdrawback, I would like to claim humbly that my version iscloser than R or D to the original, though it still containsmany doubtful places.

xxvi VDANYYA OF DHARMAKIRTI

Lastly I would like to inform that the division of the text(and the translation) into sections and the assignment ofsection-numbers has been done by me for the convenienceof the readers. These sections or section numbers are notthere in the original text.

Notes and References

1. For Dharmakirti's framework of anumna and the way itdiffers from Nyya framework, see Chapters II, III and V ofInference and Fallacies Discussed in Ancient Indian Logic byPradeep P. Gokhale, Sri Satguru Publications (IndianBooks Centre), Delhi, 1992.

2. Dr. Man gala Chinchore makes this claim vividly on pp. 83-84 of her work Vdanyya: A Glimpse of Nyya-Buddhistcontroversy ( Sri Satguru Publications, Indian Books Centre,Delhi, 1988) Elsewhere in her work she makes the point indifferent form such as - "Nigrahasthnatva andHetvbhsatva should not be confused with each other.None of the two determines the other." She attributes thisview to Dharmakirti. But I think that, that Hetvbhsatva is adeterminer of Nigrahasthnatva would be acceptable toDharmakirti if that amounts to saying that commission ofHetvbhsa is a nigrahasthna because it is what it is. This isso because commission of Hetvbhsa is nothing butasdhanngavacana in one of the senses of the latter (Seesection 32) and asdhanngavacanatva is definitely adeterminer of nigrahasthnatva.

3. (i) 'f (VN,

Sec. 32).(ii) ^

i1 (VN, Sec. 80).(iii) 4%c^ P7Rn# *T*TRlFf Piy^wiifnfa, ^niq i^^ fMKfnfci' (VN,Sec. 92).

4. See Note 3 above.

INTRODUCTION xxvii

5. Dr. Chinchore observes that the Nyya concept ofNigrahasthna was different from Dharmakirti's conceptshe points out that Udyotakara uses the term Parjayavastu(the point of defeat) where as Dharmakirti uses the termParjaydhikarana (the ground of defeat). This is animportant observation indeed. But Dr. Chinchore does notuse it while considering the question whether Hetvbhsa isa nigrahasthna. She could have said: Hetvbhsa is anigrahasthna in Dharmakirti's sense. It is a ground ofdefeat, which may or may not result into actual defeat. Butit is not a nigrahasthna in Naiyyikas' sense. It is not ofpoint of defeat (Parjayavastu) which indicates actualdefeat

6. This situation is similar to Matnujn in Nyya terms.7. Prof. Hajime Nakamura, in his foreword to Wf^JFf: W%

Hindi work by Prof. Ramachandra Pandeya, Dr.Raghavendra Pandeya and Dr. Manju, congratulates theauthors of the work for editing the Sanskrit text ofVdanyya successfully. But the Sanskrit text which theauthors include in their work as its second appendix isnothing but a word to word (and error to error)reproduction of Dvarikadas Shastri's edition (with thedeletion of his editorial footnotes, but without the deletionof footnote numbers in the text). The authors do not careto acknowledge Svami Dvarikadas Shastri anywhere in thework.

V D A N Y Y A

P a r t i

D e f i n i t i o n o f

' O c c a s i o n o f D e f e a t ' 1

ftfe f^T^ FTH^ cTR PH4C?*H,

1. T h e wicked persons defeat in debates by employingimproper methods 2 (Lit. Systems) even the one who arguesrationally. We start this (work on the logic of debate) forrepudiat ing them.

Asdhanngavacana and adosodbhvand'are the occasionsof defeat of the two (debaters, i.e. the disputant and theopponen t respectively). Any other occasion of defeat,however, is no t just; hence we do not accept it.

4 VDANYYA OF DHARMAKIRTI

Sdhana means proof of the matter4 i n t ended (to beproved by the disputant) . Its anga means what constitutes it.Its non-statement, i.-eiPnoh-utierance o f tha t consti tuent (ofproof), is the occasion of defeat of the disputant; (thisoccurs) either because the disputant keeps m u m because ofNon-imagination after he proposes (to prove the matter) orbecause he does not justify the const i tuent of proof (whichhe states).5

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^

2. [Justification of the constituent of proof in the caseof self-nature as reason.]

Because, th ree kinds of isfqren'tial. sign (= probans)constitute the proof of an unperceived object: self-nature,effect and non-apprehens ion . Its justification (i.e.justification of probans) means no th ing but proving itsexistence in the property-bearer (= subject of the thesis),after proving its pervasion with the p r o b a n d u m (= predicateof the thesis). For example - "All that is real or is a p roduc t isimpermanent , like the things such as pot. And sound is realor a product ."

t t

SZRT 1331 " w -

\. TNs and other subtitles given in brackets have been introduced first inD. They are not in R.

DEFINITION OF 'OCCASION OFDEFEAT' 5

3. In this there is no rule about the order (ofpremises)1 because the two cases make no difference as tothe establishment of the in tended matter. Because,pervasion can certainly be demonstra ted afterwards, afterproving the existence (of the probans) in the property-bearer. For example - "Sound is real or a product . Andwhatever is of this kind is all impermanent , like the thingssuch as pot." (This also is a legitimate proof) .

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4. Here proving pervasion means demonstrat ing anevidence1 (= pramna) which falsifies ( the existence ofprobans) where there is absence (of p robandum) . 2 (It is asfollows.) If all that is real or a product is not subject todestruction at every moment , then the definingcharacteristic (of the real) viz. 'capacity to function' getsexcluded from it. Because a non-momentary object cannothave any function (= artha-kriya) either in succession or insimultaneity. Hence it (= the non-monetary object) will beunreal . Because the entity, which by definition is destitute ofall the descriptions in term of capacity,lis indescribable (asreal etc.).

If the evidence, which falsifies the existence of probans inthe absence of p robandum, is not shown in this way, it (=

6 VDANYYA OF DHARMAKlRTI

the possibility that probans may exist in the absence ofp robandum) is not contradicted (by any means ofknowledge). And hence when it (= probans) is not seen toexist in the absence (of p r o b a n d u m ) , there is no suspensionof the doub t that the sound may be real or a p roduc t and yetpermanen t .

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5. Not every (kind of) non-apprehens ion falsifies theexistence of an object. In the given case capasity of an objectis established as pervaded by ' the association with successionor lack of succession1, because there is n o o ther mode .Therefore (in this case) the non-apprehens ion of pervadingcharacteristic (viz. 'succession or no succession') falsifiesthe capasity in the case of the non-momentary object.1Because the pervasion of the 'non-association withsuccession or simultaneity* with the absence of capacity isproved, there is no occurrence of infinite regress.2

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DEFINITION OF 'OCCASION OF DEFEAT

6. [An Objection-]"But he re non-apprehension is not the means to

knowledge because the pervasion of the non-associationwith succession or simultaneity with the absence of capasityis itself not proved.1 Hence there is no pervasion of theearlier probans ( 'realness') (with the p robandum'momentar iness ' ) . If you proceed to accept (another)probans for (proving) this (second pervasion), then therewill be the danger of infinite regress."

[Answer] Tha t is not correct. Because you have not denied(successfully) the non-apprehension as themeans to prove absence.(Which kind of non-apprehension is called thefalsifying evidence in this case?) Tha t non-apprehension, which proves the absence ofprobans in the case in which there is absence ofp robandum, is called the falsifying evidencebecause it establishes the opposite of that (=existence of probans in the absence ofp r o b a n d u m ) .In this way the probans will be proved as absentfrom the case in which p r o b a n d u m is absent, if it(= its existence) is falsified by the authoritativecontrary evidence. Otherwise if the evidencefalsifying it (= the existence of probans) in that (=the absence of p robandum) is not established,

VDANY YA OF DH ARMAKIRTI

then the doubt ( that the probans may existwithout p r o b a n d u m ) is inevitable.In that case there will be a fallacy of p robanscalled ' Inconclusive' because of the doubtfulnessof negative concomitance .

Nor is the exclusion (of probans from the case ofthe absence of p r o b a n d u m ) proved merely onthe basis of non-apprehens ion . Because in thecase of r emote objects non-apprehens ion doesnot prove their absence to a non-omniscientbeing; and because a person with downwordvision2 does not perceive some objects a l thoughthey are real.

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t T^ f^ HS

7. T h e falsifying evidence, however, is (expressed asfollows)1: Anything which lacks association with successionand simultaneity does not have capacity to do anything. Andthe non-momentary object has this character (that it lacksassociation with succession a n d simultaneity). T h e falsifyingevidence which goes onwards in this way entails (Lit.attracts) 4the absence of capacity' which is the defining

DEFINITION OF 'OCCASION OF DEFEAT 9

characteristic of 'unreal ' . By that (the pervasion-) 'what isreal or a product is definitely impermanent ' is proved.

By this (justification) the positive concomitance ofthe whole2 probans-characteristic with the probandum-characteristic is proved.

In this way the consti tuent of proof becomes justified inthe arguments based on self-nature as reason. Not justifyingit is non-statement of a consti tuent of proof. It is anoccasion of defeat of the disputant because it amounts tonon-fulfilment of the purpose under taken (by thedisputant) . Because, the soundness of the reason has notbeen brought out (by the disputant) there, al though in facta sound reason has been employed.

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L.

f? ci

10 VDANYYA OF DHARMAKlRTI

8. [Justification of the constituent of proof in the caseof effect as reason.]

In the case of effect-as-reason too, a const i tuent of proofneeds justification. (The nature of this justification is asfollows:) It is the establishment of cause-effect-relation(between probans and p robandum) where the effect is usedas p robans for proving the cause. This is d o n e by giving twokinds of evidences (= pramnas), one establishing existence(i.e. positive concomitance) and the o the r non-existence(i.e. negative concomitance) such as T h i s (= smoke etc.)occurs (only) when this (= fire etc.) exists' and 'In spite ofthe presence of o ther powerful causal conditions,1 this(= smoke etc.) does not occur in the absence of this (= fireetc .) ' .

In this way the fact that this (= smoke etc.) is the effect ofthis cause (= fire etc.) (and not of any o ther thing) becomesjustified indubitally. Otherwise if (while establishing thenegative concomitance) only this much is demonstra ted,that T h i s does not occur in the absence of this, ' then the(causal) efficacy of it (= of the alleged cause) will bedoubted , if o ther things are also absent there (when theeffect is absent) . T h e doubt will be as follows: 'Some otherthing is efficient in producing it (= the effect), and it (= theeffect) did not occur because of the absence of that (otherthing) ' . 2

'Absence of this while that is absent ' amount s toaccidental coincidence. For example the fact that marriagewith one ' s own mother is granted in a particular place isrelated with the generat ion of date-trees in that place andthe fact that there is absence of date-trees in o ther placeswhere marriage with one ' s own mother is no t granted, is a

DEFINITION OF 'OCCASION OF DEFEAT' 11

matter of mere coincidence. Thus the effect is proved ifjustified properly.

When any real thing is proved, it proves the generat ion ofits cause through its own generat ion. Because the effect hasinvariable relation with the cause. There is the common law(of causation) in so far as the invariable relation of all effectswith their causes is concerned.

(Like in the case of self-nature as reason:) In the case ofeffect as reason too, not justifying (the casue-effect-relation)in this way is 'non-statement of a consti tuent of p roo f and isthe occasion of the disputant 's defeat.

Because when it (= the cause-effect-relation) is notjustified, the proposed thesis remains unproved, becausethe effect-hood of the effect is unproved, as there is no ruleby which something (Lit. that) exists when some otherobject which has no binding relation with it, exists; becausea l though effect (as reason) is employed as a matter of fact,its effecthood is not proved.

t i t

. (V); dl^l^li xii^ qcri^ - (R);

12 VDANYYAOF DHARMAKIRTI

9. [The justification of a constituent of proof in thecase of non-apprehension (as reason)]

In the case on non-apprehens ion (as reason) too,(justification of a const i tuent of proof means) proving non-apprehens ion of the object fulfilling the condit ion of'apprehensibility1 by the knower.2 Because it is only by thiskind of non-apprehens ion that the practice of non-existence3 is proved.

If the object does not fulfil the condit ion ofapprehensibility, then its absence is not proved even if it isnot a p p r e h e n d e d perceptually by the knower.

H e r e 'fulfilling the condi t ion of apprehensibili ty ' means(1) the specific nature (of the object) and (2) the aggregateof all the remain ing condit ions (of apprehens ion) . T h especific na tu re of the object means that the object is no tremote (from senses) due to (any of the) three kinds ofremoteness.4 It is the na ture which appears in the perceptualappearance to the knower, in contradist inction with theappearance of something o ther than self-nature. When theobject is not a p p r e h e n d e d in spite of the presence of o thercondi t ions of the apprehens ion of such an object, the non-a p p r e h e n d e d object is the object of the practice of non-existence. Otherwise there arises a doub t (about non-existence) in spite of (non-apprehens ion as) the reason.

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cTPT


10. T h e pervasion here is of the form, "Everything ofthis kind is the object of the practice of non-existence;because (for instance) the same characteristic (viz. non-apprehens ion associated with fulfilment of the condition ofapprehensibility) commonly exists in the accepted case ofsome non-existent object."

Because unless non-existence of the object of this kind isaccepted, non-existence will no t be obtainable in othercases. Because if the object of this kind exists and the o thercondit ions of apprehens ion are present, , then there will notbe non-apprehension. If on the other hand the object ofthis kind is not apprehended , then i t .does not exist. Thismuch is the (sufficient) condit ion of the practice of non-existence, because there is no other condition.

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^ yolfti:, 3PFFT

11. A possible objection:"Exclusion of all capasities (from the object) is the

condit ion (of non-existence)"[Answer] Tha t is right. But the experience of the non-

existent object, which (as, you say,) excludes allcapasities, takes place in this way (i.e. in the wayexplained by us), because there is no o thermeans to its experience. And when the non-existent object is exper ienced in this way, it ispractised as non-existent. Tha t is why we call thisas its condit ion.

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3?PT

12. A possible objection: "The practice of existence (ofan object) originates from cognition, verbal usage andpragmatic function (of the object) whereas the practice ofnon-existence originates from the absence of them."

[Answer] (Yes) T h e practice of existence originates fromthe cognition, the appearance of which takesplace as has been stated above.1 And the practiceof non-existence originates from its opposite. Butwhen the object is no t the object of perception,the practice of existence could originate from aninferential cognition.

But the practice of non-existence is uncertain(= inconclusive) in the case of absence of it(= perceptual cognit ion) (i.e. in the case of non-perceptual object). Because in the case of aremote object a l though the knower 's percept ionor some other means to knowledge becomesinoperative, the doub t ( that the object may beexistent) , remains.

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DEFINITION OF 'OCCASION OF DEFEAT1 15

Trafst,

13. It is also not the case that all cognitions andlinguistic usages or the distinctions or identities amongstthem prove the existence of things or the existence ofdistinctions or identities amongst the things. Because thereare cognitions and linguistic usages to indicate theexistence of objects which are non-existent somehow,because they belong ei ther to past or future or the objectswhich have multiple or singular functions; (similarly) thereare (cognitions or linguistic usages with) multiple orsingular form, a l though the objects (indicated by them)lack multiplicity or singularity (respectively). (For example)- (i) (Past object-) The king Mahsammata, the originator ofthe monastry. (ii) (Future object-) The emperor Sankhawould elevate the sacrificial post established byMahsammata. (iii) (Unreal object-) The horn of a hare (iv)(Singular object with multiple functions-) colour that isperceptual and restrictive (v) (composite object with asingular function-) Pot.1

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:?] "

(V); ^-(R)and(D).(V); ^ fRP^T^ ti^ r^ PT - (R) and (D).

16 VDANY YA OF DHARMAKJRTI

14. In this the words like p e r c e p t u a l ' ('sanidarsana')(which are used for describing colour) do no t designatemany objects because they consolidate in one object.

[A possible objection by Vaisesikas:] "Many descriptions,al though they cor respond to many objects, consolidate inone object because the objects causing them (= thosedescriptions) are related by Inherence {samavya) with therespective (single) object."[Answer] T h e poor fellow object (such as colour-object) has

fallen into a bu rdensome task, because it directsmany words from many related factors towardsitself, when it favours a multi- termed relation(called I n h e r e n c e ) 1 ! Why does no t the object(colour) stimulate different words, with respectto the same different capasities, th rough which itfavours the multi- terned relat ion (calledInherence)? By this the strain of following(endless) series* can be avoided by it (= by theobject such as colour) .If (according to you, the Vaisesika,)3one and thesame object cannot stimulate different words,then let it not favour the mult i- termed relation aswell. And if it does not favour it, t hen it (= theobject) canno t be proved to be related with them(= many terms of the re la t ion) . Similarly manyentities such as colour etc. which have one(collective) pragmatic function may be named by


a singular word namely 'pot ' . What is the use ofimagining a different entity (pot, over and abovecolour etc.)? Many entities can have onepragmatic function, like (the entities such as) eyeetc. (which have perceptual cognition as theircollective funct ion) . So we think it p roper that asingle word may be applied to many entities toindicate the single capasity (that they have).

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15. Moreover, people do not apply words for objectswithout any purpose. What will be the harm if for manyobjects which serve a single purpose either collectively ordistributively, a single word is used for indicating that theobjects are like that (i.e. that they serve common purpose)?Similarly there is no contradiction in using a group-word(for many entities) in singular, when it is used for indicating

Suggested in R; ctftc^ - mentioned in R; cfM - (D); Grammatically

18 VDANY YA OF DHARMAKJRTI

their common pragmatic function, because they have thatsingle efficacy collectively and no t distributively.

So the group-word is used in singular, when it denotes asingle g roup of objects, as the word 'pot ' .

But in the case of class-words, the objects (belonging tothe same class) may have single ( common) capasity eitherindividually or collectively or they may have many differentcapasities or the same capasity. Hence the class-word can beused either in plural or in singular, according to one ' sdesire, if one in tends to talk of many capasities or onecapasity (respectively). For example one may use the word' t rees ' or ' t ree ' (according to one ' s in ten t ion) .

While (according to you) it is the rule that plural form isused only when objects are many (i.e. m o r e than two innumber ) and singular form is used when the object is one ,our view is that the two (kinds of words) are used byconvention in their conventional senses. So it (= what youare saying) is only an (undue) adherence (on your par t ) .

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s. (R); *iH^tll - (D).


y\*i W l H : , Sift c^f^IRT

:; eft"

16. [A possible objection by Vaisesikas:]"(The characteristics of the pot viz.) colour etc., which

are plural in n u m b e r cannot stimulate a single word."

[Answer:] Do the objects themselves stimulate the wordsirrespective of the intent ion of the person (i.e.the speaker) or it is the persons who use thewords for objects, in order to conduct practises?Because the question whether the objects havereal capasity or no capasity can be thought aboutonly if objects themselves give rise (to words). Butthis (position) is not reasonable. T h e n what isyour censure, when you say that if the words areapplied by persons, then they will be applied bythem at will (i.e. without any rule)?We have already told the efficient cause of theapplication of words.

Moreover, if colour etc. (being many) do nothave relation with a single word, then how canthey (= colour etc.) have any relation with thesingle substance which is regarded as thesubstratum of them?1 Therefore this is nothingbut the ghost of falsehood2 possessing you.

- (R) and (D).

20 VDANYYA OF DHARMAK1RTI

[The Opponent Vaisesika says:] "We do not in tend to saythat one word should not be used for many objects as theyare opposed to any relation with a single object. But we saythat colour etc., when they are non-different (i.e. one andthe same) in pots, blankets etc., are opposed to differentialpragmatic functions and to ( the use of) different words.Hence when they (= colour etc.) are one and the same innature , they will no t have the pragmatic function whichother collections of objects cannot have.3 Therefore , inorder to indicate it (i.e. the sameness of colour in spite ofdiversity of collections which share it) the colour etc. can bemen t ioned by a single word."4

[Answer:] O n e could have an inclination to say, "colour etc.would be the same th rough all the collections."(here we ask) Does the perceptual knowledge ofthe mutually distinct appearances of colour setaside this inclination?5 Moreover, this view (of ouropponen ts ) is no t desirable because colour etc.are accepted to be different in na tu re from onecollection to another .

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vs. (V); fcld


17. [The opponent asks:] "What (wrong) will happen ifpo t would be distinct from colour etc.?"

[Answer] All right. What then is the obstacle1 that obstructsthe appearance of the real perceptible thing (likepo t ) , which is not of the form of colour etc., in itsown form distinct from them (= colour etc.), inour cognition?2

T h e perceptible objects such as odour and tasteare seen to appear distinctly even when they donot have separate location (i.e. even when theybelong to the same thing) . And the objects suchas the touch of the wind and the touch of sun 'sheat are seen to appear distinctly even if they aresensible by the same sense organ.3

This is what makes percept ion a perception,namely, the submission of object's own nature, asdistinct from the na ture of what it is not, to thecognit ion. But this thing such as pot (asconceived by you) is a free-of-cost-purchaser,4who does not exhibit its own (distinct) nature,but wants to appropr ia te (distinct) perceptibility.

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cR^T^HRf

WL:

22 VDANY YA OF DHARMAKIRTI

18. This (= above explanat ion) also explains the(distinct) cognition, the (distinct) word (i.e. verbal usage)etc., if it desired (by the opponen t ) to prove k (= distinctexistence of the po t etc.) on the basis of them.1

Moreover, it is not correct to say that the colour is notidentified (distinctly) when the percept ion (of thecomposite object such as pot) is not domina ted (by someother object), in which case (i.e. only if the colour is notidentified distinctly,) a p robans will be stated for proving it(= the distinct composi te object such as pot) .*

When it (= the composite object) is no t perceptible , it isnot p roper to assert the existence of a thing, for theknowledge of which there is n o authoritative means.Therefore pot is not different from colour etc.

In this way one canno t talk of existence jus t on the basisof cognit ion and verbal usage, nor can o n e talk ofdistinctness or identity of existence (on the basis of t hem) .

For the same reason the obsence cannot be establishedon the basis of the absence of t hem (= cognit ion, verbalusage etc.).3

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, Claris

:, cT^TT

19. O n e can talk of existence on the basis of pragmaticfunction, b u t one cannot talk of distinctness or identity ofexistences on the basis of it. Because a single object is seento have many pragmatic functions. For example a lamp hasthe following functions: (helping) cognition, transfor-mation of the wick and producing another flame.(Distinctness or identity of existences cannot be establishedon the basis of pragmatic functions.) Because, (forexample) a l though eye and the other (causal) factors aremany in number , they are seen to have a single function viz.(perceptual) cognition.

[The opponent says:] "We are no t saying that distinctnessof existences is established merely on the basis ofdistinctness of pragmatic functions. But (it can be soestablished) on the basis of distinctness of some unseenpragmatic function. T h e pragmatic function which is notseen in one thing (at one point of time) but is seen thereagain, establishes distinctness of existence. For example thefunction of carrying water which is not seen in m u d is seenin the ear then pot and the function of covering body whichis not seen in threads is seen in the cloth. In this way there isthe distinctness of existences."

[Answer:] In this way ( the existence of) some other objectmay be established, but the composite whole (=ayayavi) is not establihsed. The difference in

- (R)and(D).


pragmatic function (in the cases cited by you) isdue to the difference of nature (= svabhva)which occurs in a series of modifications inaccordance with its causal conditions.1 Forexample, when the fire is in the stage of rubbingof the fire-producing sticks, the pragmaticfunction of fire differs due to whether it isp roduced in thick cow-dung or in grass or inwood. In the same way different pragmaticfunction can be found in threads etc. because thenature of a thing differs in accordance with thedifference in causal condit ions.

This explains the distinctness and identity ofcognitions and verbal usages (as the allegedevidences of distinctness and identity ofexistences).2

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ifcf;


20. [Objection:] "But it has been said (by you yourself)that the (linguistic) practice of existence is proved on thebasis of pragmatic function and its (i.e. former's) absence isproved on the basis of its (i.e. latter 's) absence."[Answer:] Tha t is right. But that absence is not proved in

the case of those objects which do not fulfil thecondit ion of apprehensibility.

So one has to accept even against one 's will: T h a tis the object of the practice of non-existence, thecapasity of which fulfils the condition ofapprehensibility and yet is not apprehended .Because capasity is the mark of existence.'

But what does this s tatement score over theearlier one? Because, capasity is not a differentobject from self-nature. So the non-apprehensionof the capasity fulfilling the condition ofapprehensibility is noth ing but the non-apprehens ion of the self-nature of the object. Sothis non-apprehension is the same as the earlierone.1

Therefore the one who accepts the practice ofnon-existence of something in some place,should accept it on the basis of this (kind of)non-apprehension.

This (non^apprehension) is common to othersimilar cases.2So let them be like that (i.e. let theother cases be equally the cases of non-existence). Or let it be (i.e. let non-existence beproved) in no case, because there is no difference(amongst these cases insofar as non-apprehens ion is concerned) . The pervasion(here is as follows): Every thing which is of thiskind (i.e. which fulfils the condit ion of


apprehensibility) and is no t a p p r e h e n d e d is theobject of the practice of 'non-existence.> s

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21. [A possible objection by a Sahkhya opponent1]"Nothing is an object of the practice of 'non-existence*whatever it may be and wherever and in whatever way it mayremain non-apprehended . "

[Answer:] In that case everything will be applicable every-' where all the time, because every form of

everything will remain incessant all the time.

Moreover, the following (situations) will notoccur - T h i s (is) ou t of this;' T h i s (is) not out ofthis; ' T h i s (is) he re ' ; T h i s (is ) no t here ' ; T h i s(exists) now'; T h i s (does) no t (exist) now'; T h i s


(is) of this kind' ; T h i s (is) not of this kind*.Because there will not be any distinct cause of any(particular) form of an object in any way,anywhere, any time. T h e universe will be withoutco-existences and co-absences because there willnot be any distinction.

[A possible objection:] "There will be order (in theuniverse) on the basis of the distinctions betweendisappearance and appearance of states (= avasth) (ofthings)".[Answer:] These distinctions themselves are not possible in

your system on the basis of which there will beorder; because the practice of non-existence ofanything is untenable (according to you) .2

If you accept the linguistic practice of non-existence in the case of some objects, then youwill have to tell how that is tenable. Because thereis no probans proving non-existence except non-apprehens ion . When non-existence is provedeither on the basis of positive evidences ornegative evidences3, non-apprehension is alwaysthe probans .

If one accepts the thesis that it (= the practice ofnon-existence) is on the basis of non-apprehens ion only, then one has to say thateverything is the object of the practice of non-existence, wherever that (= non-apprehension) isthere . Because there is no difference amongthese cases (in so far as they are the cases of non-apprehens ion) .

t t

28 VDANY YA OF DHARMAKlRTI

33.JE

22. [Another opponent says:] "Non-apprehensionmeans cessation (i.e. inapplicability) of all the means ofknowledge. We regard someth ing as an object of thepractice of non-existence if it is not a p p r e h e n d e d in thissense."

[Answer:] Oh! You the beloved of gods have so delicateintelligence that you cannot tolerate the exert ionof thinking about means of knowledge. Tha t iswhy you did no t pay serious a t tent ion to it.

(V); yHiuiP^ -dioqc(5K - (R) and (D).(V); d


Because, the cessation of inference etc. does notlead us to the knowledge of absence becausethere is variability of relation (= vyabhicra)(between, say, non-inferability and absence).1 Nordoes / t he cessation of percept ion by all (beings) 'lead us to the knowledge of absence, because that(= the cessation of percept ion by all beings) isunproved.2

Even the absolute (= avisesa) cessation of thepercept ion by oneself cannot (lead to theknowledge of the absence of objects), when theobjects are remote .Therefore the cessation of only that means ofknowledge can prove the practice of non-existence (of an object), on the basis of which thespecific nature of the object is invariably calledexistent. Because the existence of the (specific)nature is expected to be proved by the existenceof the (specific) means to knowledge.3

Nor is it the case that if the object which reachesthe condit ion of apprehensibility is notperceived,4 then its apprehens ion will be ofdifferent nature (i.e. o ther than percept ion) , inthe case of which its apprehens ion could bethrough inference! Nor can an object (which isthere and perceptible) remain unperceived,unless the nature of the object has undergonetransformation. But in the case of transformationthe object will not remain the same.Moreover, wherefrom has the fellow (i.e. theSnkhya opponent ) learnt this magic-without-chanting-and-medicine? Because (according tothe Snkhya opponent ) the same object issometimes the object of percept ion, sometimes


not, in which case its apprehens ion is sometimesthe same as inference; sometimes it is percept ion,sometimes knowledge by verbal testimony! Andthis happens even though no excess in the na tureof objet is genera ted or destroyed; the object isnot ei ther concealed or remote and the person(= the observer) is the same with the sense-organsetc. in the same condi t ion as before!

Because when the object is o n e and the samewithout any excess, these characteristics (viz.sometimes perceptible , somet imes notperceptible, bu t inferable etc.) are incompatible .

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23. [Another opponent says:] "The object is no t withoutan excess. Because the objects assume different (linguistic)practices (such as the practice of existence and the practiceof non-existence) on account of cessation'of one excess andgenerat ion of another."1

[Answer:] If the excess in the object is identical with theobject itself, and it ceases to exist and comes intoexistence without continuity,2 then how does itno t entail diversity in the nature of the object? -For example pleasure and pain (lack continuityand are diverse in na ture) .O n the other h a n d if the thing has continuity,then what is (its) generat ion or cessation andwhat is it the generat ion or cessation of? So this(=your a rgument ) is insignificant.Or if you yourself accept generat ion or cessationof a certain self-nature (of the object), then whydono t you approve of the same thing when it isstated by your opponent?

[The Shkhya opponent may say:] "That is because he (=our opponen t , i.e. the Buddhist) accepts generat ion anddestruction destitute of any continuity."

[The author asks:] What is this Continuity* (= anvaya)?[Opponent answers:] "It is the capasity of a thing to get

genera ted and destroyed. It exists even beforethe generat ion and after the destruction.


Therefore this (= Continuity* or 'cont inuouscapasity1) is not such that it did not exist beforebut gets genera ted all the way or it existed beforebut gets destroyed."

[The author asks:] If that capasity does not undergo anychange (Lit. excess) at any time, then what does undergothe change due to which there ifc the distinction betweenthe (linguistic) practices?3

[The opponent may say:] "It is the states (= avasih) (andnot the capasities) that unde rgo change ."

[The author asks:] Are the states a n d the capasity oneand the same thing, or are they different?

[The opponent may answer:] "One and the same thing."[The author asks:] Now, how can you apply mutually

contradictory predicates such as genera t ion , destruction;cessation, non-cessation; oneness, manyness; perceptibility,imperceptibility; having pragmatic function and not havingit, to one and the same uniform object, without relativisingthem to different modalities (= nisparyyam)?

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24. [The Opponent may answer:] "There is a (considera-tion of) modality, namely state and capasity (are the twomodalities) /The re fo re there is no contradiction."

*. (R);


[The author says:] You, the beloved of gods, are forgetful,as you are not noticing the context. What a contradict ionyou have made , as you have said that capasity and state areone and the same thing without any distinction!

Even if there is a distinction between them (= state andcapasity), there is n o contradict ion (by itself), but then itonly would no t be the case that genera t ion a n d destructionof a thing are qualified by (its) continuity.

Therefore the thing which has continuity, does not havegenerat ion or destruction and the thing which has thelatter, does riot have continuity.

[The opponent may say:] "There is n o fault (in ourargument) because there is no difference between them."[Answer:] T h e respectable fellow (i.e. the Sftkhya

opponen t ) is being rushed into a crowd of faultsdue to his a t tachment to his own view; yet he isno t making himself aware (of i t ) . Because non-difference means oneness. But referr ing to themas ' they two' (= tau) is the genu ine (linguistic)practice based on (their) difference. T h e r e is alsothe definition of manyness (difference), "If thething lacks cessation and originat ion inspite ofthe (other thing undergo ing) cessation andorigination, if it lacks staticity inspite of thestaticity (of the other thing) etc. ( then that thingis different from the o ther th ing . ) " How is (all)this co-tenable?

[The opponent might say:] "The difference amongstthings and the absence of such a difference, that is, non-differences (= abheda) are (exemplified) as follows -pleasure, (pa in) , etc. (are different from each other and)capasity a n d state of one a n d the same th ing (are non-different from each o the r ) . If we d o n ' t accept this, then,due to the absence of distinctive marks of difference and


non-difference, there will be disorder between differenceand non-difference everywhere.

"So (we accept the distinctive marks of difference andnon-difference as follows)- arising in a thing-itself is non-difference; to the contrary is difference. For example potarises in mud-itself, so it is non-different from mud . Butthere is difference if the case is to the contrary; (forinstance) pleasure and pain (do not arise from each other,so there is difference between t hem) . These are thedistinctive marks of difference and non-difference. Hencethere is no contradiction."

[Answer:] T h e pot does not arise in the mud-itself. Butsome mud-itself is called pot. Because the nature(= tm) of m u d is not the same everywhere inthe universe. T h e difference between reflectivecognitions (prativijnapti) (of a thing) andbetween appearances (of it) are due to thedifference between the natures of things. That ishow it is possible for him (= the Srikhyaopponen t ) also to know that pleasure, (pain,)etc. (are different) and consciousnesses (i.e.pursusas according to Snkhya) are different.2

If that is so, then there will be difference(between pot and the whole m u d etc.)

[The opponent might say:] "It (= The non-differencebetween po t and m u d etc.) is the case inspite of this(difference), because of the continuity of some (part of the)nature ."

[Answer:] T h e same consequence will follow in the case ofpleasure etc. and also in the case ofconsciousnesses.

Even in the case of pot etc. there is no continuity(of m u d etc.) in all respects. Because (otherwise)the following difficulties will result -


(i) (avavarpya -) The re cannot be ( thegenera t ion of) all the forms (if the whole mudhas continuity with a pot only).(ii) {sahotpati-) The re will be s imultaneousproduc t ion (of different states of a thing)- and o ther difficulties.

Moreover, nobody observes the pot a n d its mud-na ture distinctly, in the case of which it wouldhave been possible (to say:) 'this (pot) has arisenin this ( m u d ) ' .Because, it does not become possible when thesubstratum a n d the superstratum are notobserved distinctly.

Moreover, it is no t the case that a capasity arisesin the locus (lit. self, nature) of the capasity.3Therefore there will no t be non-differencebetween capacity and its locus.

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25. T h e same (argument) answers (the doctrine of)transformation (parinma). Because whosoever imaginesVhatever is a transformation of something is non-differentfrom it' is like that (i.e., is liable to the above criticism).Because, the capacity of a thing is not (the same as) itstransformation.

Moreover, it happens to be said (by Siikhyas):"Transformation (of a substance) is cessation of someproperty of the subsisting substance. Transformation is alsothe arisal of a different property in that substance."

(Now we ask:) Is that particular property which ceases orarises, the same as the subsisting substance or it is differentfrom it.? Because there is no other alternative.

If it (= arising or ceasing property) is the same as that (=substance), then, because the substance subsists, there will

38 VADAATKAKAOFDHARMAKIRTI

not be cessation or arisal (of any of its proper t ies) . So tell us,to whom do they (= cessation and arisal) belong?

Nor can it be proved that the subsistent thing has gotanother property (which arises or ceases), because the thingitself cannot be ano the r proper ty of itself, unless it is(at tr ibuted to the thing) depend ing u p o n a differentenquiry.1

If (on the contrary) a property is a different object fromthe substance, then the cessation and arisal of that proper tydo n o t constitute the transformation of the substance.Because cessation and arisal of one object cannot a m o u n t totransformation of ano ther object. Because (by the sametoken) , it (= transformation) will have to be accepted in thecase of consciousness also.2

Moreover, the linguistic expression ' the property of asubstance ' cannot be justified because there is no relation(between substance and proper ty) . Because, there is no realrelation except cause-effect-relation.

And there is no cause-effect relation between them (=substance and proper ty) , because (according to you) athing which itself is no t of the same na ture as that (= effect)is not the cause of that, and because a proper ty is a differentobject from a substance.

If (you say that) something could be a cause of itsproper ty even if it is different (from tha t ) , then this willa m o u n t to your admission that the substance hasu n d e r g o n e transformation by way of p roduc ing the effectwhich is a different object (from tha t ) . (But this isimprope r ) . Because your o p p o n e n t (= Buddhist) would alsoaccept the linguistic practice "The mud-substance istransformed (into a p o t ) " regarding the cause-effect-seriescalled mud-substance when from the earlier substancenamely the lump of mud, which is the cause, the later pot-substance, which is the effect, is produced. 3


Nor is there any (third) alternative position of a propertywith respect to a substance apart from sameness andotherness, so that transformation would be justified in anyof the two cases.4

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26. [The Snkhya opponent might object:]"It is no t t rue to say that the undifferentiated1 (=

nirviveka) substance is itself the property. Nor is theproperty a different object from the substance. What is aproperty then? It is an a r rangement of the substance, i.e., adifferent state of it. For example, fist of fingers (is anar rangement or a different state of fingers). The fingersthemselves without differentiation do not make a fist,because (, for instance,) the spread fingers do not make afist.

Nor is it (= a fist) a different object from that (= fingers),because it is n o t observed as distinct in nature.**2

[Answer] No . Because, fist is fingers in particular form.Certain fingers are themselves a fist, bu t no t allfingers make a fist. Because (for instance) spreadfingers in undifferentiated na ture are not thefingers in the form of a fist. Otherwise one will beforced to accept the exper ience of both (theforms of fingers) in both the states.Because, when differentiation (i.e. the specificqualification) is the very nature of the thing, thesame becomes a mark of distinction of the thing,like pleasure and pain.

If (on the o ther hand) the specific qualification(= viveka) (of fingers) arises as alien (fromt h e m ) , then the fingers will be a p p r e h e n d e d asspread only. Because the object which does notitself deviate from its own na ture , is nota p p r e h e n d e d as different (from itself) (even)when some o ther object is p roduced , as that (=claiming that it is a p p r e h e n d e d as different)would a m o u n t to transgression (of reason) .

[The Opponent says:] "But we have said that a state (of asubstance) is (nei ther) the substance itself withoutdifferentiation, nor an object o ther than the substance."*


[Answer:] You have said this but what you have said is notcorrect. Because there is no (third) possibilityapart from thatness and otherness in the case ofany real thing. Because thatness and othernessstay in a real object by excluding each o theressentially. Therefore abandoning one of them isinvariably concomitant with accepting the other .

Arid fingers being subject to destruction everymoment , the spread fingers are different and thefist is different.

Here the words like 'fist' have the particulars astheir objects; the word 'fingers' has the universalas its object. For example the words like seed,sprout (apply to the particular states of rice) andthe words like rice (are general terms). Thereforethe spread fingers are not the same as the fist.

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c. (V);

42 VHZ)AAraKAOFDHARMAKIRTI

27. [The opponent asks:] "So if the effect is not pre-existent in the cause, why is not everything p roduced fromeverything? Because there is no difference (between variouscases) in so far as (previous) non-existence (of the effect) isconcerned."

[Answer] Even if (one concedes that) the effect has(previous) existence in all the cases (ofcausat ion), the same fault is there . Because therewould be no difference (between various cases)in so far as (previous) existence (of the effect) isconcerned. 1 and if there is difference (betweendifferent cases because anything canno t bep roduced from everything) then that realdifference (i.e., the specific characteristic of aneffect) will be distinct from the three strands (=gunas, of prakrti). Because in spite of theexistence of t hem (= the th ree stands of prakrti)(in all the effects), the specific characteristic ofan effect does n o t extend (to o ther cases).And what is p roduced from a thing which isexistent in absolute sense of the term (=sarvtman), like something which is in theaccomplished state?2 Moreover, (if the effect ispre-existent in the cause,) the means (to theproduct ion of the effect) will be futile, because(according to you) there is no th ing to be broughtabout .

[The opponent might say:] "Some special characteristic(Lit., excess) which was non-existent there somehow, could,be produced ."

[Answer] How could that special characteristic which wasnot existent there , be produced? And if it couldbe produced , then every-thing (which was non-existent) could be p roduced from everything.


T h e objection is common (to your position andmine) .

[The opponent might say:] "The special characteristic isno t totally absent, because something can come intoexistence only if it is (already) existent in some form."[Answer] (Though existent in some form, the

characteristic was non-existent in some otherform. Now the question is:) How can thecharacteristic be p roduced in the form in which itwas non-existent?

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28. We have said hat if a thing exists in absolute sense ofthe term (= sarvath) t hen there is no point in itsgenera t ion . Even in the case of the product ion of the non-existent effect, there is a law that the effect is p roduced onlyfrom that thing which has a natural tendency to p roducethat effect, no t from any other thing.

Again that causal factor is p roduced only from its owncause and not anything else. This is the law of nature . In thisway the (causal) law of na ture is beginningless.


Moreover, if the pot exists in the l ump of mud , why is it (=pot) not a p p r e h e n d e d in that state (i.e. mud-state) as it isa p p r e h e n d e d later? Or why is its pragmatic function notpresent in that state, as it is present later?

[The opponent might say:] "That is because the particularmanifestation (vyakti) has not arisen so far."[Answer] How can you say that the po t exists (in the lump-

of-mud-state)? Because that particular mani-festation along with the pragmat ic function etc.constitutes the pot a n d that form of the pot wasnot existent previously.

Nor is it p roper to regard (two) things as onewhen there is a difference in their apparentforms. Because, that amoun t s to transgression (ofreason) .

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29. [Conclusion:] Therefore the object, the nature ofwhich is not app rehended but which fulfills the condition ofapprehensibility is not there at all. Because, the non-apprehension is no t justified when the thing exists alongwith that na ture . Its no t being (in that nature) means its notbeing the same thing (as itself). For example1 pleasure andpain are mutually like tha,t. In this way the non-apprehens ion of specific nature is pervaded by (= vypti) thedeterminat ion of the (linguistic) practice of non-existence.Hence the one who is proving the non-existence(= vyavaccheda) of something on the basis of non-apprehens ion has to show that the object (underconsideration) by its nature fulfils the condit ion ofapprehensibility as stated above.

Having demonst ra ted ' the non-justification of theindication of non-apprehension (as reason) ' in the case of'non-apprehens ion of self-nature',2 the justification in thecase of "non-apprehension of the pervader ' may beexplained as proving pervaded-pervader-relation betweentwo propert ies and then showing the non-existence of thepervader.

In the case of non-apprehension of cause alsojustification (of probans) means proving cause-effect-relation and then showing the non-existence of the cause.

In the cases of ' apprehens ion of the contrary' too thejustification (of probans) means showing the existence ofone contrary (= incompatible) object out of the two(mutually) contrary objects.

In this way non-justification of a consti tuent of proof inthe case of non-apprehension is 'non-s ta tement of aconsti tuent of p r o o f (= sdhanngvacana). This is an


occasion of disputant 's defeat. Because, in the absence of(such a) justification, the 'pervaded* (i.e.. reason orprobans) does not get proved.

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30. [Second meaning of asadhanangavacana]Or sdhana (a rgument) means ' that by which the object

not exper ienced by others is established', that is, ' the set ofstatements stating the probans with triple charac te r / T h eanga (= consti tuent) of that sdhana is ' the s tatement thatthe probans is a characteristic (= dharma) of the thesis-case(= paksaY etc. Not stating any one of t hem (= the threecharacteristics) is 'asdhanngavacand! (= non-statement ofa const i tuent of the a rgumen t ) . Tha t too is an occasion ofdisputant 's defeat. Because not stating sdhannga (=const i tuent of a rgument ) (in this sense) is 'no t stating acharacteristic of p robans ' and if it (= a characteristic ofprobans) is not stated then there is no proof of the thesis.

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31. [Declaration etc. are non-constituents of proof!][Third meaning of asdhanrigavacana]Or asdhanrigavacana means employing asdhanhga,

i.e., a s ta tement which is not a p roper consti tuent of thatproof, in the s ta tement of proof. (For instance) Declaration(= pratijna), Application (of instance to the thesis-case) (=upanaya), conclusion (= nigamana) etc. (are non-constituents of proof) . It is an occasion of disputant 'sdefeat, because it is a case of unnecessary statement.

Or since the conclusion is proved by the expression ofany one s tatement ou t of the s ta tement of positiveconcomitance and that of negative concomitance in theargument containing similarity or dissimilarity(respectively), the statement of the other kind (ofconcomitance) , (when one concomitance is stated), has nosignificant role. Hence the other statement, which is not aproper consti tuent of proof, is an occasion of defeat for thesame reason namely unnecessary statement.


[The opponent, Naiyayika, says:] "But it is necessary toemploy the s ta tement of Declaration in order to indicatethe object (of enquiry) even if it is not a p rope r consti tuentof proof."

[Answer] No, because it is unnecessary. Because thein tended object does get proved from theinferential s ta tement as expressed above, even ifthe Declaration is not made . Hence employmentof it (= Declaration) is without any significance.

[The opponent asks:] "Even if the (inferential)exper ience can be p roduced without indicat ing the object(of inference) , how is no t the Declaration a const i tuent ofproof?1 Because ' t he s ta tement that the p robanscharacterises the thesis-case' (= paksadharmavacana) doesnot have any o ther purpose in proof apart from causing the(inferential) exper ience . And the same purpose lies beh indthe Declaration also. How is (= Declaration) not the (partof) proof then?"[The Buddhist might answer:] "Declaration alone is not

capable (of proving the p r o b a n d u m ) and hencedoes no t consti tute the proof."

[The opponent responds:] "The case is c o m m o n with thes ta tement of p robans characterising thesis case. So thats ta tement too would be a non-consti tuent of proof. Becausethe (inferential) cognit ion cannot be p r o d u c e d merelyfrom the s ta tement of p robans characterising thesis-case."

[The author's answer:] (The s ta tement of p robanscharacterising thesis-case a long with thes ta tement of pervasion constitutes the proof. Butthat is no t the case with the Declaration.Declarat ion along with the s ta tement ofpervasion does not consti tute the proof.)2 Thisanswers the arisal of doub t (in the case ofDeclarat ion) , because the doub t (about the


p robandum) can arise from the mere statementof probans characterising the thesis case, whenthe relation (of pervasion) is not shown.

Therefore the employment of the s tatement ofDeclaration is definitely unnecessary and is the occasion ofdisputant 's defeat.

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32. [Fourth meaning of asdhanhgavacana]Or asdhanhgavacana means the statement of what is not

the const i tuent of sdhana, i.e., proof. For instance thefallacious probans such as Unproved, Contrary orInconclusive probans (is like that ) . This too is the occasionof disputant 's defeat, because it amounts to theemployment of something incapable (of proving thep r o b a n d u m ) .

Likewise, a s tatement of a fallacious instance, which is nota consti tuent of proof, is also an occasion of disputant 'sdefeat. For example, * (Positive) instance lackingprobandum-proper ty ' etc.; * (Positive) instance withoutpositive concomitance ' , /(Positive) instance without theindication of the positive concomitance ' etc. They areoccasions of defeat for the same reason, viz., that theya m o u n t to employment of something incapable (of provingthe p r o b a n d u m ) . Because such fallacious instances cannot


demonst ra te the relation of probans (with the p r o b a n d u m ) ;and because they do no t demonst ra te ( the relat ion), theyare incapable (of playing their role in the proof) .

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33. (Fifth meaning of asadbanangavacana)O r sdhana means proof. And sdhannga means the

object which has the proof as its anga meaningcharacteristic. Tha t is, the object which is the basis (or root)of the debate , ( that is,) which causes the proposal of debateis called sdhannga. So asdhannga also means expressinga n d announc ing some special subject different from


sdhannga, not enqui red by the opponent , unde r thepretext of claiming that he (= the opponen t ) is notfollowing the discipline (= sstra). This is done with theintent ion of confusing the o p p o n e n t and impeding hispower to repeat ( the s ta tement made by the disputant) etc.This too is asdhanngavacana and is the occasion ofdisputant 's defeat, because it amounts to irrelevantstatement .

Such occurrences do a m o u n t to breaking the discussion.Because the object as qualified by that special characteristicwas not enquired by the opponen t . If there is an enquiry(about it) then there is no fault. That the characteristic isenqu i red means that it is enqu i red by the o p p o n e n t and byenquirers (= arbitrators) who know logic,1 by drawing aseries of implications.

O n the occurrence of them (= such irrelevant statements)the discussion should be b roken . Because (otherwise)no th ing is inapplicable in some made-up context. T h eupho lde r of No-self-doctrine, for instance, while proving hisdoctr ine could even dance and sing (and that will have to beregarded as relevant)!

It could happen as follows: O n e will make a Declarationand perform as follows - "There is no self." We theBuddhists say this. Who are the Buddhists? Those are theBuddhists who take recourse to the teaching of the LordBuddha . Who is the Lord Buddha? Lord Buddha is the one,on following whose teaching the Buddhist Asvaghosabecame a monk. Who is the Buddhist Asvaghosa? Theauthor of the play called 'Rstrapla*. What sort of a play is'Rstrapla? By creating an occasion (in this way) thedisputant should read "After the Prologue enters theDirector" and then should dance and sing. T h e opponen tbeing incapable of imitating the whole performance will bedefeated. What a courteous way of philosphising followed bythe well-recognised savants!2


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34. T h e p roposed topic cannot get conc luded in thisway because determinat ion (of t ruth) is the (proper) resultof a debate . But (here) there is no beginning of the debateat all. How are victory and defeat possible in this way?Because the o p p o n e n t himself too can give ano therperformance u n d e r the pretext of repeat ing the disputant 'sperformance and create a situation of *Non-reproduction'of this kind.1 Secondly there will be no de terminat ion (oftruth) in this situation.

Therefore stating the Declaration itself is no t reasonable.What to say of open ing some special topics which are not

(V); T*% - (D).


enquired? And what to say of the futile chattering under thepretext of explaining that topic?

This whole (unreasonable) way has been in t roduced bymalignant and deceitful persons incapable of stating thingswith the strength of logic.

For example one first makes the Declaration: "Body,earth, instruments etc. are preceded by excellence of a Self*and then announces the whole of Vaisesika discipline unde rthe pretext of explaining the terms 'body', ' instruments1

and ' ear th ' .

Or in the debate over the question whether sound isp e r m a n e n t or impermanent , one makes a Declaration: "Potis coupled with either of the two things viz. sound and pot,out of which sound is the locus of ' pe rmanence ' , which is acategory declared by Jaimini , who was the author of thediscipline, which illuminates the explanation of twelvedefinitions." And then one goes on explaining the twelvedefinitions etc.

All this is a device used by malignant people for hidingtheir incapability. It is not accompanied by truths. Because(for instance), the practices such as offering fruits etc. andapplication of rods etc. are improper in a criticalexaminat ion of Truth.2

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35. [Th

Vadanyaya of Dharmakirti. the Logic of Debate.(Crit. Ed. and Tr....

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