JIU/REP/2000/6

DELEGATION OF AUTHORITYFOR THE MANAGEMENT OF HUMAN AND FINANCIAL

RESOURCESIN THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT

Prepared by

Armando Duque GonzálezWolfgang Münch

Joint Inspection Unit

Geneva2000

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CONTENTS

Paragraph Page

ACRONYMS................................................................................ iv

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: OBJECTIVE,CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................... v

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................ 1-6 1

II. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY:A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ................................. 7-18 2

III. REFORM OF THE SECRETARIAT ANDDELEGATION OF AUTHORITY: STEPS TAKENIN RECENT YEARS ....................................................... 19-31 4

IV. A MIXED SUCCESS ....................................................... 32-49 6

V. DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVEFRAMEWORK FOR DELEGATION OFAUTHORITY, EMPOWERMENT ANDACCOUNTABILITY ....................................................... 50-93 9

A. Adopting a systematic approach ............................... 51-54 10

B. Establishing a culture of clarity, transparency andcommunication .......................................................... 55-74 11

C. Empowering and monitoring managers .................... 75-84 15

D. Measuring performances and drawing theconsequences ............................................................ 85-93 17

NOTES ........................................................................................ 19

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ACRONYMS

ACABQ Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary QuestionsACC Administrative Committee on CoordinationCCAQ Consultative Committee on Administrative QuestionsCCISUA Coordinating Committee for International Staff Unions and Associations

of the United Nations systemDESA Department of Economic and Social AffairsDM Department of ManagementECA Economic Commission for AfricaECLAC Economic Commission for Latin America and the CaribbeanFAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United NationsIMIS Integrated Management Information System (United Nations)OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and DevelopmentOHRM Office of Human Resources Management (United Nations)OIOS Office of Internal Oversight Services (United Nations)OLA Office of Legal Affairs (United Nations)OPPBA Office of Programme Planning, Budget and AccountsPAS Performance Appraisal SystemSGB Secretary-General’s BulletinST/AI Secretariat Administrative InstructionsUN United NationsUNCC United Nations Compensation CommissionUNCCD United Nations Secretariat of the Convention to Combat DesertificationUNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and DevelopmentUNDCP United Nations Drug Control ProgrammeUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNEP United Nations Environment ProgrammeUNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate ChangeUNFPA United Nations Population FundUNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for RefugeesUNICEF United Nations Children’s FundUNIDO United Nations Industrial Development OrganizationUNJSPF United Nations Joint Staff Pension FundUNOG United Nations Office at GenevaUNON United Nations Office at NairobiUNOPS United Nations Office for Project ServicesUNOV United Nations Office at ViennaUNSCOM United Nations Special CommissionWFP World Food Programme

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:OBJECTIVE, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Objective: To assess progress in the implementation of delegation of authority for the management of human and financial resources in the United Nations Secretariat and to develop criteria to be applied in the future, in particular with regard to the establishment of a framework of accountability.

CONCLUSIONS

A. Delegation of authority is not a newreality in the United Nations. It has always beenan integral part of the management andadministration of some of the United Nationsprogrammes and funds, and some measure of ithas always existed in the Secretariat itself.However, a fast evolving environment is nowcausing the latter to review the very way itoperates and to rethink its whole approach tomanagement. The Secretary-General’s proposalfor additional delegation of authority to managersis at the core of his vision for reform. However,despite the mandate received by the Secretary-General from the General Assembly foradministrative change and reform, the steps takenin the Secretariat over the last few years todelegate authority for the management of humanand financial resources do not appear verysignificant, notwithstanding a number ofnoteworthy efforts to clarify administrative rulesand to better prepare managers for the new tasksto be entrusted to them.

B. Overall, the Secretariat appeared to beengaging in the implementation of delegation ofauthority on an ad hoc basis and without a well-thought-out comprehensive strategy. In particular,measures to decentralize administrative tasks havebeen presented as delegation while, in fact,managers have in most cases not been givenadditional decision-making powers. There exists alevel of dissatisfaction among substantive officialsthat what has been described as “delegation ofauthority” has amounted merely to a “dumping” ofclerical tasks, without a concomitant shift ofresources. At the same time, managers still lackeffective guidance and support in managing the

human and financial resources entrusted to them.As a result, a good deal of confusion, suspicionand discontent prevails among Member States,managers and other staff.

C. The Inspectors were concerned to note ahigh level of laxity and lack of clarity andtransparency in respect of the formulation ofadministrative issuances and in theimplementation of policies. It is imperative, inorder to create a climate of administrativediscipline and order, that basic documents, whichin fact guide the functioning of the Secretariat,should be clear, unambiguous and current.

D. The functioning of delegation of authorityand of a transparent and effective system ofaccountability involves more than revisingregulations, rules and procedures. It requires theestablishment within the Secretariat of a culturethat recognizes that responsibility, authority andthe obligation and readiness to answer for one’sactions are interactive and inextricably linked.There is a need to change entrenched bureaucratichabits through leadership and training.

E. The authority delegated must be clearlydefined, as in a contract, and may require a specialletter or document - a delegation order - assigningformal authority and responsibilities to specificstaff members.

F. The successful implementation ofdelegation of authority will depend on theefficiency of the support provided to individualmanagers either by administrative staff assignedunder their supervision or by common services,

and the clear definition of the respectiveresponsibilities and authority of the former and thelatter. Those providing administrative servicesshould not confuse their support role with that ofdecision-making, which is a function that shouldbe exercised by the responsible substantiveofficials.

G. The central administrative units of theSecretariat (Department of Management, Officeof Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts,Office of Human Resources Management) aremandated to retain overall responsibility for thepolicies which the General Assembly prescribesrelated to the management of financial and humanresources. The exercise of this “central control”

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function requires the establishment of adequate“monitoring” capacities through which the centralunits may keep track of the implementation ofpolicies and detect possible deficiencies, with aview to providing necessary guidance in a timelymanner.

H. A system of delegation of authority shouldnot exist without the establishment of a credibleand comprehensive system of accountability andresponsibility.*

I. The Inspectors noted the expression bythe staff representatives of “dismay and concern

over the inadequacy of staff-managementconsultations” and their request that furtherdelegation of authority to programme managersbe suspended until a transparent and verifiablesystem of accountability had been established.

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* At the time of completion of the presentreport, the Inspectors were provided with thereport which the Secretary-General was presentingto the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly(A/55/270) announcing concrete actions in thisregard.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: The Secretary-Generalshould present to the General Assembly acomprehensive overall plan of action fordelegation of authority based on a systematicallydeveloped concept rather than on an ad hocapproach. Such a concept should, as a first step,define which areas of responsibility require thatauthority be retained centrally (such as majorpolicy orientation, monitoring and oversight) andthose where authority can be delegated in theinterest of a more efficient management system.As detailed in chapter V.A, such a plan of actionshould, inter alia, contain the elements spelled outin recommendations 2-11 below:

Clarity in the formulation of policies andprocedures

Recommendation 2: The Secretary-Generalshould take steps to ensure strict compliance withthe procedures for the promulgation ofadministrative issuances (ST/SGB/1997/1 and 2)so as to ensure not only clarity in the formulationof procedures and instructions, but also avoidanceof contradictions between administrativeissuances. Issues of a binding

administrative nature should be promulgatedexclusively through the prescribed means, namely,Secretary-General’s Bulletins (SGB) or SecretariatAdministrative Instructions (ST/AI).Modifications to or cancellation of administrativeissuances should only be promulgated by anotheradministrative issuance of the same or higher rank,as amendments or revisions of the originaldocument (paras. 55-61).

Updating delegation regarding administrationof Staff Regulations and Rules

Recommendation 3: The Secretary-Generalshould review the provisions of Secretary-General’s Bulletin ST/SGB/151, of 7 January1976, related to the administration of the StaffRegulations and Rules, updating it as required toreflect the current situation. Pursuant thereto, theSecretariat should promulgate one comprehensiveAdministrative Instruction on the delegation ofauthority for the administration of the StaffRegulations and Rules, so as to reflect the currentsituation in clear terms (paras. 57- 61).

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Promulgation of revised Financial Regulationsand Rules

Recommendation 4: The Secretary-Generalshould be requested as a matter of urgency topromulgate a revised version of the FinancialRegulations and Rules so as to incorporatepertinent revisions to the Regulations approvedby the General Assembly and to update the Rulesas may be required. In this context, theSecretary-General should review other issuancesthat might contain provisions which are contraryto the Financial Rules, so as to ensure overallconsistency. For the future, should it be requiredto amend a particular rule, it should be done bymeans of an amendment or revision of thedocument containing the basic text of theRegulations and Rules (paras. 62-68).

Establishing a culture of clarity, transparencyand communication

Recommendation 5: The Secretary-Generalshould be encouraged to take additional stepstowards the establishment throughout theSecretariat of a “culture” of clarity, transparencyand communication, taking into account theconsiderations described in chapter V.B of thisreport (paras. 69-70).

Promulgation of individual delegation orders

Recommendation 6: In addition to the generaldelegation that may be included in the StaffRules, the Financial Rules or the RulesGoverning Programme Planning, the ProgrammeAspects of the Budget, the Monitoring ofImplementation and the Methods of Evaluation,or in Secretary-General’s Bulletins related to theorganization of the Secretariat, the Secretary-General should institute the requirements that thedelegation of authority to individuals should beclearly defined in individual delegation orders(contracts, letters or documents) which, as aminimum, should include the following:(a) Citation of the original source of

authority;(b) Description of the authority to be

delegated with clear and consistentobjectives;

(c) Any limitation imposed, including anylimitation on sub-delegation;

(d) Citation of any previous delegations which are to be revised or rescinded, if appropriate;

(e) The date on which the delegation is tobecome effective and the duration of thedelegation;

(f) The details of the reporting duties whichgo together with the delegation, so as topermit proper monitoring (volume,frequency of reporting and other details,particularly in the relation between fieldoffices and Headquarters) (paras. 75-77).

Empowerment of managers

Recommendation 7: In addition to the generaltraining available to the Secretariat as a whole,managers to whom authority is to be delegatedshould be provided with specialized training andbriefings, and with adequate support serviceswhether under their direct supervision or through“common” services, in locations where morethan one substantive unit exists. Furthermore, theSecretary-General should direct the centraladministrative services, i.e. OHRM and OPPBA,to guarantee to managers, upon their request, theavailability of additional guidance as to thecorrect implementation and interpretation offinancial, staff and programme planningregulations, rules and administrative instructions,so as to reinforce managerial competencies andaccountability (paras. 78-79).

Access to information

Recommendation 8: The Secretary-Generalshould undertake all efforts to optimize thefunctioning of Integrated ManagementInformation System (IMIS) and the Intranet bothat Headquarters and in the field, so as to ensureconstant and immediate access by managers torelevant information for the properimplementation of delegated authority (para.81).

Monitoring

Recommendation 9: The Secretary-Generalshould ensure that the central administrativeunits retain an ongoing monitoring capacitythrough which they may gauge progress anddetect possible deficiencies in the exercise bymanagers of delegated authority. To this end, itis essential

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to develop adequate information technologiesand systems as well as cooperation with pertinentoversight mechanisms (paras. 82-84).

Measuring of performance, and establishingof a system of accountability

Recommendation 10: The Secretary-General’sefforts to develop a comprehensive system ofaccountability - without which further delegationof authority in the financial and human resourcesareas cannot proceed - should be based on thefollowing principles:

! The provision to managers of all thenecessary support, information and guidancefor the functions which they are to perform,including those relevant to their relationswith subordinates and for the resolution ofpossible disagreements;

! The existence of adequate mechanisms forthe evaluation of the performance of officialsto whom authority is delegated and thestrengthening of enforcement mechanisms todeal with cases of failure;

! Performance indicators should beaccompanied by measures to ensure thatunsatisfactory achievements and non-compliance with work programmes or theOrganization’s policies, regulations and rulesare taken into account in evaluatingmanagers, shaping their careers and decidingon the level of authority that can be delegatedto them (paras. 85-91).

Consultations with staff representatives

Recommendation 11: The Secretary-Generalshould ensure that, to the greatest extentpossible, the staff’s views and suggestions areconsidered, and that full and meaningfulconsultations with staff representatives areundertaken in the context of the improvedsystem of communication within the Secretariat(para. 92).

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. Recent years have witnessed a markedtrend in public administrations towards thecreation of a more trusting and less restrictivemanagement style through greater delegation ofauthority to line managers at headquarters and inthe field. The primary objective is to foster amore efficient use of resources and to facilitatethe emergence of more agile and responsiveorganizations. Many organizations of the UnitedNations system have attempted, to varyingdegrees, to devise and implement measures tothis effect while retaining the necessary level ofcentral coordination and control andstrengthening their monitoring of individual andprogrammatic performances. Reaching thisbalance has proved particularly difficult inentities long characterized by centralizedcommand.

2. The Joint Inspection Unit included thereport on delegation of authority in its workprogramme in view of the Secretary-General’srepeated declarations that delegation of authoritywould play a major role in the reform of theUnited Nations. Furthermore, the Unit took intoconsideration the fact that Member States havealso expressed their heightened interest in thesubject through the resolutions passed in recentyears by the General Assembly and throughdiscussions held in other bodies such as theCommittee for Programme and Coordination (theUnit has also been requested by the UnitedNations Industrial Development Organization(UNIDO) to undertake a similar study withregard to that organization).

3. The report examines the effortsundertaken by the Secretariat of the UnitedNations in the last three years to delegateauthority to managers, placing these efforts in awider historical perspective. It then carries out apreliminary assessment of their effectiveness andcoherence. In this context, some examples ofgood practices in various entities of the system,which have come to the attention of theInspectors, are highlighted in the report. Finally,

the report draws from this analysis a number oflessons, which should be taken into account infuture cases of delegation of authority. It isintended to provide Member States andSecretariat officials alike with a useful tool toreflect on progress achieved in this importantmanagerial field and to plan further reform of theOrganization.

4. Prior to the finalization of this report, theInspectors were provided with advance versionsof the Secretary-General’s reports to besubmitted to the General Assembly at its fifty-fifth session, on “Human resources managementreform” (A/55/253) and on “Accountability andresponsibility” (A/55/270). The Inspectorsobserved that a large measure of coincidenceexisted between the recommendations containedin the present report and the measuresannounced in the cited reports, although allaspects of them were not yet fully in place. TheInspectors trust that the accountabilitymechanisms described in the Secretary-General’sreport will be duly implemented and also that theobservations and recommendations contained inthis report will be taken into consideration.

5. In the context of this report, theInspectors have been cautious to differentiatebetween the concepts of delegation of authorityand decentralization. In their view, the firstmeans the delegation of decision-making powerswhile the latter is merely the distribution ofadministrative responsibilities among the unitsof the Secretariat.

6. To prepare this report, the Inspectorsinterviewed numerous officials in the UnitedNations Secretariat as well as in a number offunds and programmes, and reviewed relevantdocuments issued by legislative organs and theSecretariat. They wish to extend theirappreciation to all those who assisted them inthis exercise.

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II. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

7. While the question of increaseddelegation of authority within the United Nationshas attracted significant attention in recent yearsand generated intensive debate, it should bestressed at the outset that delegation of authorityis neither an entirely innovative concept nor anew reality. It has always reflected thenecessity, in a very large organization, to transferpart of the decision-making burden ontomanagers and to avoid an administrativeparalysis through the concentration of authorityin the hands of the chief executive officer or at asingle geographical location.

8. In fact, the very process of delegation atthe United Nations begins with the Charter,through which Member States have delegatedauthority to the Secretary-General as the ChiefAdministrative Officer of the Organization(Article 97). This authority is tempered by theCharter provision in Article 101 that the staff ofthe Secretariat is to be appointed by theSecretary-General under regulations establishedby the General Assembly, and by the authorityalso granted to the latter in Articles 10 and 17related to budgetary and other matters.

9. In general terms, administrativeauthority, i.e. authority for the management ofhuman and financial resources, within theSecretariat is delegated by the Secretary-General,in the form of Secretary General’s Bulletins tothe Under-Secretary-General for Management, tothe Assistant Secretaries-General for ProgrammePlanning, Budget and Accounts (the Controller),for Human Resources Management and forCentral Support Services. These officials may,in turn, delegate some of their authority to otherswithin the Secretariat. Substantive authority,that is, authority for the implementation of thesubstantive activities of the Secretariat, is alsodefined in the form of Secretary-General’sBulletins, which describe both the organizationand structure of the Secretariat, as well as thesubstantive activities for which eachorganizational unit is responsible.

10. A certain measure of delegation ofadministrative authority to individuals or

programmes has always existed in the UnitedNations Secretariat. In particular, delegation to“clone operations”, i.e. extension of authority toadministrative entities away from Headquarters,but under the direct authority of the pertinentDepartment of Management office atHeadquarters, has been put in place over the pastdecades and progressively refined and enlarged.Thus, the United Nations Office at Geneva(UNOG), the five regional commissions, theUnited Nations Office at Vienna (UNOV), andmore recently the United Nations Office atNairobi (UNON) have been granted variousdegrees of administrative authority in respect ofboth financial (including procurement) andhuman resources matters. This has been the casealso with peace-keeping operations and specialmissions, as well as with technical cooperationprojects for which delegation to varying degreesof administrative authority has been given to“executing agencies” such as the Department ofEconomic and Social Affairs (DESA), the UnitedNations Conference on Trade and Development(UNCTAD), the regional commissions, theOffice of the High Commissioner for HumanRights and the United Nations Drug ControlProgramme (UNDCP) for the management oftheir human and financial resources.

11. In addition to the limited delegation ofauthority which existed in the early years of theOrganization, particularly to offices and/ormissions away from Headquarters, the Secretary-General reported to the General Assembly in1974 (A/C.5/1601), that he had endorsed arecommendation of the AdministrativeManagement Service that there should be greaterdelegation of authority and responsibility todepartments and offices at Headquarters and toother established offices in selected areas ofpersonnel management in order to achieve agreater decentralization of responsibilities forpersonnel management.

12. At its 2324th meeting, on 18 December1974, the General Assembly, on therecommendation of the Fifth Committee,authorized the Secretary-General to proceed withhis proposal, “subject to the comments of the

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ACABQ, which concurred with the Secretary-General’s approach on the understanding that itwould not weaken overall central control”.1 TheSecretary-General accordingly, promulgated, inbulletin ST/SGB/151, of 7 January 1976, certainprinciples according to which authority to takedecisions under the Staff Regulations and StaffRules would be delegated to other officials of theOrganization. Detailed statements of theauthority required to take decisions under eachStaff Rule were subsequently issued in anadministrative instruction (ST/AI/234), whichhas been the object of later revisions andamendments. As far as the Inspectors have beenable to ascertain, the current valid versions areST/AI/234/Rev.1, ST/AI/234/Rev.1/Amend.1,as amended by ST/AI/1999/1.

13. These documents, however, do notnecessarily reflect the full present situation, sincedelegation of authority is also contained in otherdocuments. Some of these, such as ST/AI/388on UNDCP and ST/AI/401 on the Office ofInternal Oversight Services (OIOS), are generallyavailable. Others, such as the delegation toDESA and UNCTAD for the administration ofthe 200 series of the Staff Rules, and to theDepartment of Peace-keeping Operations inrespect both of certain functions under the 100series and all of the 300 series of the Staff Rules,are of more limited distribution, as evidenced bythe Secretary General’s note to the GeneralAssembly (A/54/257).

14. The financial administration of theOrganization is governed by FinancialRegulations approved by the General Assembly,pursuant to which the Secretary-Generalpromulgates Financial Rules. The overallresponsibility for the policies with respect to thefinancial operations of the Organization is vestedin the Controller, who is also responsible for thedesignation of the financial officers responsiblefor performing significant financial duties (Rule111.1). The Financial Rules also reflect therespective responsibilities of the Under-Secretary-General for Management, theController, the Assistant Secretary-General forHuman Resources Management and the AssistantSecretary-General for General Services in theadministration of the Rules. In addition, theydefine the responsibilities of heads of

departments or offices with regard, for instance,to the submission of programme budgetproposals, and those of certifying and approvingofficers who exercise their functions underauthority delegated to them by the Controller.

15. In general, the executive heads of UnitedNations funds and programmes have beengranted the authority to appoint and administertheir staff and manage their financial resources.They have, in turn, delegated authority tomanagers, often to a much larger extent than hasbeen done in the Secretariat. It is particularlytrue of organizations such as the United NationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP), the UnitedNations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the WorldFood Programme (WFP) and the United NationsHigh Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),which have extensive field operations and needto respond promptly to emergencies.

16. WFP, in particular, underwent in the1990s an active process of decentralization anddelegation of authority from headquarters to thefield offices, with the creation of nine regionaloffices (clusters). The decentralization wasaccompanied by greater outposting of technicalsupport staff in such areas as personnel, finance,public information, procurement and project/programme design. Country directors have beengiven the authority to approve programmeactivities and projects within the countryprogramme as set by the Executive Board. As anexample of this new authority, they may nowapprove emergency operations up to US$200,000 to cover the costs of food, transport, andnon-food items for new emergency situations.New, decentralized human resourcesmanagement responsibilities were alsodeveloped, which significantly increased theauthority of field offices to design their staffprofiles and select their non-core project staffand short-term personnel as well as consultants.2

17. UNHCR has also carried out, since 1995,a comprehensive project for the establishment ofa new Operations Management System, whichinvolves a great measure of delegation ofauthority, in the management of both financialand human resources, to managers at all levels inthe field and at headquarters. Thus, officesoutside headquarters have been delegated the full

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administration and management of locallyrecruited staff, while many of them have alsotaken over responsibility for their own accountprocessing and for retaining the supportingdocumentation. The head of each country officenow receives one or several “Letters ofInstructions” that also define the parameters ofbudgetary flexibility. Managers at headquartersand in the field now sign “Covenants” and“Accountability Agreements” with the Divisionof Resource Management outlining the scope andcontent of the authority delegated to them in thefield of human resources or accounts processing,as well as their ensuing responsibilities.

18.UNICEF, for its part, has delegated authorityfor the approval and review of countryprogrammes and budgets for country offices toits regional offices. Newly establishedprogramme and budget review committeesapprove, at the regional level, and within theoverall resource envelope, the countryprogramme management plan, including thecountry support budget, and submit it toheadquarters for consolidation purposes only. 3

III. REFORM OF THE SECRETARIAT AND DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY:STEPS TAKEN IN RECENT YEARS

19. While delegation of authority is alreadyan integral part of the management andadministration of the United Nations Secretariatand its programmes and funds, the noveltyresides in the Secretary-General’s proposal foradditional delegation of authority as an essentialelement of the Secretariat’s reform and of effortsto improve its performance and the efficient useof its resources. In his report on the reform of theUnited Nations, the Secretary-General noted thattoo often, the delivery of mandated programmeswas hampered by excessive bureaucraticprocedures and rules, with responsibility formanagement of resources in the hands ofadministrators who had no accountability forprogramme delivery.4

20. It is indeed true that, too often, personnelor finance services away from Headquarterscomplete and review part or the totality of agiven routine administrative process, only tohave this very same process reviewed andchecked again at Headquarters before any actioncan be taken. This results in a duplication ofadministrative tasks and a waste of scarceresources. To remedy this weakness of theOrganization, the Secretary-General undertook totake steps to delegate maximum authority,responsibility and full accountability to linemanagers for the management of human andfinancial resources.5

21. The Secretary-General elaborated furtheron these notions in his subsequent report onhuman resources management reform, drawingextensively on the suggestions and

recommendations presented to him by a TaskForce on Human Resources Management , whichhe constituted in January 1998. In this report, theSecretary-General described a new managementculture, which would “empower managers toadminister the full range of resources at theirdisposal”, including staff, along with managingprogrammes, financial resources, informationand change.6 Programme and line managers, hestated, would have increased authority andresponsibility for human resources managementwithin clearly defined policies. They would beexpected to communicate a clear sense ofpurpose and direction to their staff, to motivatethem, build team spirit and trust, and to manageperformance in order to achieve results. TheSecretary-General again made his pointforcefully when addressing the Fifth Committeeat the 54th session of the General Assembly,stating that ”managers must be able to manage”.7

22. From the above, it is clear that theproposal to increase delegation of authority forthe management of human and financialresources is motivated by a clear purpose,namely, to ensure a more rational and better useof the resources approved for the delivery ofmandated programmes and activities, thusimproving the quality and quantity of expectedoutputs.

23. What is advocated by the Secretary-General, therefore, is no longer the delegation ofauthority to managers for the sake of expediencythat has always existed for a number ofadministrative procedures. Rather, it is a

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complete change in mentalities and in the veryconcepts underlying the management of theSecretariat of the United Nations.

24. Member States gave a cautious initialwelcome to this initiative. The GeneralAssembly, in paragraph 6, section II, ofresolution 51/226 of 25 April 1997 on humanresources management, welcomed the intentionof the Secretary-General to streamlineadministrative procedures and eliminateduplication, in relation to human resourcesmanagement, through delegation of authority toprogramme managers. It requested him,however, “to ensure, before delegating suchauthority, that well-designed mechanisms ofaccountability, including the necessary internalmonitoring and control procedures, as well astraining, were put in place”.

25. Generally, Member States have, since theissue was first brought to their attention, stressedthe need for central control and have warnedagain and again that meaningful delegationcannot take place unless there is confidence thatmanagers will be held to account. In fact, theirinterest in the issue of the establishment of atransparent and effective system ofaccountability and responsibility, formulated inGeneral Assembly resolution 48/218 A, of 23December 1993, which endorsedrecommendations of the Committee forProgramme and Coordination, preceded theSecretary-General’s reform proposals.

26. Despite the far-reaching nature of thechanges announced in the Secretary-General’sreport on reform (A/51/950), the measuresactually taken in the Secretariat to put in place anew culture of management, characterized byincreased delegation of authority and fullaccountability, do not yet appear very significant.The most prominent, or at least the mostfrequently quoted, were those contained in a17 November 1998 memorandum from theUnder-Secretary-General for Management to allheads of departments and offices, listing anumber of measures characterized as “quickwins” in human resources management reform tobe implemented as of 1 December 1998. Some ofthese “quick wins” were subsequentlyincorporated in instruction ST/AI/1999/1 with aneffective date of 1 February 1999.

27. The issues outlined in the administrativeinstruction, for which individual departments oroffices at Headquarters or away fromHeadquarters need no longer refer to OHRM,included the extension of fixed-termappointments, the granting of special leave aswell as the approval of travel on home leave,repatriation grants and special post allowances.Not included in the instruction but mentioned inthe memorandum were: the granting of a long-service step for General Service staff members,medical clearances for recruitment andreassignment of staff, approval of the first tendays of sick leave (previously delegated todepartments at Headquarters and now extendedto all offices away from Headquarters) and theannual review of dependency benefits.8

28. A pilot project was launched in October1997 under which some degrees of authority inhuman resources management authority weredelegated to the Executive Secretary of theEconomic Commission for Latin America andthe Caribbean (ECLAC). The most importantelement in the delegation was the authority forrecruitment, placement and promotions to postsat the P-2 to P-4 level. Approval for suchappointments or promotions was to be on thebasis of unanimous recommendations of theprogramme managers and the appointmentreview bodies, and any contentious case was tobe referred to of OHRM for a decision. Otherareas of delegation included classification ofGeneral Service posts, agreed terminations andspecial post allowances. Initial plans to alsodelegate certain aspects of financial managementwere never implemented (except for the propertywrite-off for Survey Board cases) in the light ofthe concerns expressed by the General Assemblyabout possible changes in budgetary practicesand procedures.

29. In April 1999, a team from theDepartment of Management evaluated theprogress on the pilot project as satisfactory andbeneficial to both ECLAC and OHRM, andassessed that “it had no impact on budgetarypractices and procedures”. In particular, the teamfound that the process for filling posts under thepilot project was shorter than for posts approvedat Headquarters. The team also concluded thatthe Executive Secretary had exercised hisdelegated authority in a prudent and appropriate

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manner with due regard to the policies andguidelines issued with the project.9 However, theInspectors noted that the project had not led, asyet, to further delegation of authority to thesubregional offices at Mexico City and Port ofSpain, although this was included as part of the“reform of the ECLAC Management Scheme”.10

30. The Secretary-General has launchedother pilot projects, mainly in conferenceservices at Headquarters and at UNOV.According to the information provided to theAdvisory Committee on Administrative andBudgetary Questions (ACABQ) during theexamination of the proposed programme budgetfor the biennium 2000-2001, these pilot projects“have been suspended, as programme managersconcluded that they were unlikely to yield usefulresults”.11

31. Special administrative arrangementsdelegating significant authority have beenconcluded for entities established in recent years,such as the United Nations Special Commission(UNSCOM) and the United NationsCompensation Commission (UNCC), and treatyorgans including the Secretariat of the UnitedNations Framework Convention on ClimateChange (UNFCCC) or the United NationsSecretariat of the Convention to CombatDesertification (UNCCD). The Inspectors havenot gone into details as far as these special bodiesare concerned, since they are particular cases notfunded by the regular budget of the UnitedNations and they do not form part of theSecretariat.

IV. A MIXED SUCCESS

32. While it may be too early to undertake athorough assessment of the initiatives describedabove, the Inspectors believe that some generalpoints can already be made and important lessonsdrawn. They noted, in particular, that some ofthe “quick wins” heralded by the Administrationhad, in fact, already been discarded asimpractical, or deferred. The implementation ofthe delegation to individual departments ofannual review of dependency benefits, forinstance, has been indefinitely postponed, as itwas deemed that departments had neither thetime nor the specialized knowledge required toundertake this review.

33. This may actually indicate persistingconfusion as to the true nature of delegation ofauthority, as decentralizing measures, aimed atshifting clerical administrative tasks within theSecretariat from the Department of Managementto field or functional offices, have been presentedas delegation of authority. These tasks, in fact,should be carried out in a more cost-effectiveway by the common services units either atHeadquarters or elsewhere.

34. Thus, the Inspectors have noted a certainlevel of dissatisfaction among substantivedepartments that this so-called “delegation ofauthority” has sometimes resulted merely in a“dumping of clerical tasks” without a

concomitant shift of resources. Furthermore,some managers point out that the major tenet ofeffective delegation is the idea that authoritymust be delegated commensurate with theresponsibility to be exacted. They are wary ofbeing charged, under the cover of delegation ofauthority, with additional responsibilities, whilelacking the actual authority needed to carry itout.

35. In other cases, managers have beenassigned new responsibilities without theadequate tools or resources. This seems to beparticularly true of executive offices insubstantive departments at Headquarters. Whilethe functions of the executive offices have beenthe object of a section of a Secretary-General’sBulletin, the description of these functions doesnot provide a very clear distribution of tasksbetween executive offices, on the one hand, andOHRM, the Office of Programme Planning,Budget and Accounts and the Office of CentralSupport Services, on the other.12

36. The prevailing confusion had beenreported by OIOS in its fourth annual report. Inthe preface to the report, which admittedly wasissued before some of the measures outlinedabove were announced, the Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services statedthat

7

when he travels to other duty stations, he “stillhears that administrators are not clear about theextent of authority delegated to them and what isbeing retained as a New York prerogative”.13 Inthe preface to the OIOS fifth annual report, theUnder-Secretary-General reiterated his concernthat “accountability continues to be blurred andmisunderstood and that delegation of authority isyet to be effectively executed”14

37. Generally speaking, the Secretariatappeared to be engaging in this exercise for thedelegation of authority on an ad hoc basis onlyand without a well-thought-out comprehensivestrategy, which might lead to confusion andapparent contradictions. Some, in particular,have pointed to one such seeming contradictionin the goals stated in the Secretary-General’sreform of decentralizing substantive decision-making and delegating authority, on the onehand, and expanding and strengthening commonadministrative services, on the other. Onlyrecently was the point made, in a report by OIOS,that delegation of authority to programmemanagers and the decentralization of monitoringand policy functions to the United Nationsoffices at Geneva and Vienna were, in fact,crucial factors in enhancing the efficiency andtimeliness of common support services.15

However, a clear distinction has yet to be madebetween the new authority granted to programmemanagers and the heightened monitoring roleentrusted to departments providing commonsupport and administrative services away fromHeadquarters. Decision-making powers shouldbe assigned in a more transparent manner to theformer and the latter, with a view to avoidingpossible conflicts.

38. Because of the very nature of theOrganization and the administration of its humanand financial resources, a number ofadministrative actions (such as recruitment,promotion or termination of staff, disciplinaryproceedings, award of contracts, disposal ofproperty, etc.) are subject to review by advisorybodies, whose advice must be considered priorto final decisions being taken. The Inspectorsbelieve that a general reflection could be usefullyengaged as to the most efficient, effective andtimely manner to achieve the desired objectives.The reform of UNIDO described in chapterV.A (para. 52) may be considered as an

interesting example in this regard.

39. In his report on human resourcesmanagement reform, the Secretary-General haddescribed the objectives of his vision for changesin staff administration as including thedevelopment of guidelines for the comprehensivedelegation of authority to line managers (togetherwith measures for follow-up and accountability),as well as a simplification of Staff Rules and astreamlining of administrative processes.16

40. Significant efforts have indeed beenmade in the last two years to simplify and updateStaff Rules. A Task Team on Streamlining Rulesand Procedures was established in theSecretariat, which met over several days in Aprilof 1999 to conduct a systematic review of theOrganization’s personnel rules and procedures,with particular focus on those set out in multipleSecretary-General’s Bulletins, AdministrativeInstructions, Information Circulars, PersonnelDirectives, or internal memoranda. The Teamfound that 30 to 40 per cent of the currentPersonnel Manual could be eliminated byabolishing obsolete issuances, and removingunnecessary material. It also recommended thereview and consolidation of some 290 issuancesto update the rules and eliminate overlaps andduplications. Following on the Team’srecommendations, OHRM has committed itselfto simplifying personnel rules and proceduresand consolidating them into a shorter, user-friendly and electronically accessible PersonnelHandbook by the end of the year 2000.17 TheUnit has been given assurances that work isbeing actively pursued in these respects, and thatthe target date for completion remains the end of2000.

41. While reasonable progress, therefore,appears to have been achieved in realizing one ofthe objectives outlined by the Secretary-General,it is not clear yet what will be undertaken inconcrete terms to develop the guidelinesmentioned or the accountability frameworksupposed to underlie the process of delegation ofauthority. In his report on resources managementdated 4 September 1998, the Secretary-Generalannounced his intention to explore the possibilityof establishing a Management Review Panel,which would have the responsibility forreviewing specific cases of non-compliance withdelegated

8

authority, and would recommend to himappropriate sanctions to be imposed (A/53/342,para. 30).

42. While a final decision in this regard hasnot been promulgated in an administrativeissuance, the Inspectors have learned, first, froman electronic communication addressed by theAssistant Secretary-General for HumanResources Management to the staff that an“Accountability Panel” under the chairmanshipof the Deputy Secretary-General “is beingestablished to follow up on Department ofManagement monitoring reports andrecommendations of oversight bodies”.Furthermore, the Secretary-General’s report tothe fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly on“Accountability and responsibility” (A/55/270)states, in paragraph 41, that “in order tostrengthen monitoring at the most senior level, anadditional mechanism has been established in theform of the Accountability Panel . . .”. TheInspectors urge that the establishment of theAccountability Panel should be fully and clearlypromulgated and explained to the Secretariatstaff through an appropriate administrativeissuance.

43. Member States have expressed concernat this somewhat fragmented and haphazardapproach to delegation of authority. Inresolution 53/221, in particular, the GeneralAssembly expressed in strong terms its concernsthat delegation of authority in human resourcesmanagement was proceeding too fast without thenecessary buffers. While recognizing the need topromote responsibility and accountability of staffmembers at all levels, it called again on theSecretary-General to ensure that well-designedmechanisms of accountability, including thenecessary internal monitoring and controlprocedures, as well as training, are put in placebefore managers are given additional authority inthis field. The resolution also noted with concernthat some administrative instructions ondelegation of authority did not conform to theprovisions of decisions of the General Assembly,and emphasized that any delegation should be inaccordance with the Charter and regulations andrules of the Organization.

44. In its resolution A/54/249, paragraph168, of 23 December 1999 on questions relatedto the proposed programme budget for the

biennium 2000-2001, the General Assemblyagain requested the Office of Human ResourcesManagement to “be more focused on theestablishment of a proper system ofaccountability and responsibility as well as onthe improvement of an effective system ofadministration of justice, as an integral part ofthe human resources management reformprocess.”

45. These concerns have been mirrored bythose of staff representatives, who fear that theSecretary-General has already advanced furtherthan the present mechanisms for accountabilityallow and that the rights of staff under theregulations and rules may not be sufficientlyprotected against arbitrary decisions bymanagers. The Coordinating Committee forInternational Staff Unions and Associations ofthe United Nations system (CCISUA), forinstance, referring to ST/AI/1999/1 mentionedabove, expressed its deep concern that additionaldelegation of authority in the administration ofthe staff rules had been implemented “withoutestablishing adequate mechanisms ofaccountability and without staff-managementconsultations during the preparation of thisadministrative instruction”.18 It requested theSecretary-General to stop the implementation ofthe administrative instruction and defer anyfurther delegation of authority until concrete andpracticable mechanisms of accountability thatwould ensure the consistency, fairness andtransparency of the decision-making process arein place.

46. The Staff Council at United NationsHeadquarters had already voiced its “dismay andconcern at the inadequacy of staff-managementconsultations” during the preparation anddeliberation of this administrative instruction.19

It also demanded that all actions concerningfurther delegation of authority to the programmemanagers be suspended until “such time that atransparent and verifiable system ofaccountability” had been established.

47. While the Inspectors welcome most ofthe measures announced through ST/AI/1999/1as positive, if rather timid, steps in the rightdirection, they believe that communicationefforts and consultations with the staff must beundertaken on a more systematic basis in order toensure that they have a better understanding of

9

such measures and support them.

48. The Inspectors have taken note of theefforts made in this regard by OHRM (through,for instance, the publication of a bimonthlynewsletter informing the staff of major policydecisions in human resources management) andby the Deputy Secretary-General, who has inthe course of 1998 and 1999 held a series of“town-house meetings” at all major duty stationsduring which she tried at length to allay staff’sconcerns regarding delegation of authority.

49. The continued suspicions expressed bystaff representatives, however, underline the needto pursue these information endeavours, and mostof all, to develop a solid, comprehensiveframework for accountability (see chapter Vbelow). The Administration will, to the greatestextent possible, have to consider staff’s viewsand suggestions and ensure that their rights arerespected and boost their confidence. It needs toimprove the presentation of its case fordelegation through a reasoned, persuasive,participative and systematic approach.

V. DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORKFOR DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY, EMPOWERMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

50. From their analysis of efforts undertakenin the United Nations and other organizations ofthe system, the Inspectors have drawn a numberof lessons as to the prerequisites to a successfulprocess of delegation of authority. They include:

! The adoption of a systematic approach forthe identification of areas where delegation ispossible;

! The establishment of a culture of clarity,transparency and communication;

! The necessity of providing managers withresources and tools to exercise the authoritydelegated to them, including adequatesupport functions; and

! The establishment of a framework ofaccountability, including appropriatemonitoring procedures.

A. Adopting a systematic approach

51. Firstly, an overall plan of action willhave to be developed by the Secretary-General,and a policy decision taken on which areas ofresponsibility require that administrativeauthority be retained centrally, and which permitauthority to be delegated in the interest of amore efficient management system. TheInspectors believe, in particular, that suchfunctions as major policy orientation,monitoring, and oversight fall in the firstcategory. This strategy should be based on thefollowing principles:

(a) Delegation of authority andaccountability are a vertical chain. TheSecretary-General delegates responsibility and

authority to heads of departments and offices fordelivering programmes, but this does not absolvehim of ultimate accountability. They, in turn,remain accountable to the Secretary-General forthe responsibilities assigned to them, even thoughthey may delegate authority themselves.Delegation of authority and accountability aretherefore integral to every job at every level.What individuals are accountable for may varysignificantly at different levels within theOrganization: the head of a department will beaccountable for large amounts of funds andnumbers of people, and major operationalobjectives; a supervisor may only be accountablefor very few staff, and the delivery of verylimited outputs. Nevertheless, they are bothequally accountable for the timely, economicaland effective delivery of their objectives, and forthe stewardship of the resources at their disposalto accomplish them. Provided the vertical chainremains unbroken, delegation of authority can beimplemented and accountability can be enforcedbecause it can be traced through individualsdown or up through the Secretariat. The morediffuse the lines of accountability are, the moredifficult it is to delegate authority and to holdpeople to account. It therefore follows that themost effective accountability mechanisms arethose that are integral to the line managementstructure;

(b) Delegated authority should alignwith organizational assignments of responsibility,so that those with the information, knowledge,and concern for responsible outcomes have themeans to act accordingly.

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(c) Delegation of authority andaccountability must focus primarily on allowingpeople to perform, and on holding individualspersonally to account. While there may exist anumber of cases where authority is delegated“generically”, i.e. to heads of departments oroffices, responsibility and accountability foractivities and tasks can only be aligned withindividuals, not structures. As noted in para. 2 ofthe Secretary-General’s report on“Accountability and responsibility” (A/55/270),“. . . the chain of responsibility, authority andaccountability flows vertically and personallythrough the Organization from the Secretary-General to every manager and staff member”.Thus, individuals have to discharge their dutiesnot only according to their functionalassignments but also to the expectations outlinedin their work programme and those linked to thegeneral duties of international civil servants. Itshould be noted in this context that delegatedauthority is not automatically “inherited” by staffmembers when taking over responsibilities fromtheir predecessors. The Inspectors have observedcases in which financial authority was perceivedas a sort of hereditary transition in the past, andthey appreciate the corrective measures recentlytaken by the Controller in this regard. They alsonote, in paragraph 17 of the cited document, theSecretary-General’s assurance that “if necessary,the level of authority can be reduced or theauthority withdrawn altogether”.

52. The Inspectors wish to point out theefforts of the Director General of UNIDO todevelop a “Business Plan” enabling UNIDO toadapt its functions and priorities to the realitiesof the changing global economic environmentwhile reforming its organizational structure. Thenew structure of UNIDO, aligned with theUNIDO overall strategy and objectives, hasemanated from the “Business Plan” and has beenbased on:

! Redeployment of resources and professionalstaff;

! Appropriate delegation of authority andaccountability mechanisms. For example,delegation of financial authority to fieldoffices and delegation of financial authorityfor substantive activities are supported by aregulatory framework for financial

authorization based on the principle ofdecentralized financial control in which theallotment holder is personally accountable;

! Decentralization of activities, formulation ofkey functions and responsibilities of fieldoffices;

! Rationalization of committees with a view toterminating those whose mandates haveexpired or infringe on newly delegatedauthority.

53. The World Food Programme, for itspart, embarked in the last decade on an extensiveinstitutional and programmatic reform, which hasalready partially been described in chapter II ofthis report. It developed a “Mission Statement”together with a long-term financing strategy. Theimplementation of a broader delegation ofauthority to managers both at headquarters, andespecially at the field level, was assigned as astrategic objective. As a result, a new humanresources framework for the delegation ofauthority was put in place and was implementedwith a chart that detailed all the delegations withreference to the appropriate FAO/WFP manualsections and FAO Staff Rules (under whichWFP operates), as well as the names of theincumbents of the delegation. The Inspectorswere informed that the delegation chart isundergoing further review to reflect thedecentralization of the Regional Bureaux, thebudgetary delegation for recruitment and theintroduction of the new policies and proceduresfor the management of international staff at theprofessional and higher categories, following thecreation of the new indefinite appointment.

54. While these approaches by WFP andUNIDO may not be entirely applicable to theUnited Nations, their holistic character could beregarded as a best practice. The Inspectors alsorecall the thorough and very well-argueddocument prepared by the Secretariat six yearsago, which had already provided acomprehensive analysis of the prerequisites for,and components of, a transparent and effectivesystem of accountability and responsibility.20 Inparticular, the annex to that document (which inits essence is reproduced in annex II to theSecretary-General’s report on “Accountabilityand responsibility” (A/55/270), illustrates veryclearly the flow of interrelated actions linked to

11

the processes of assigning responsibilities,delegating authority and ensuring accountability.The 1994 report, as well as the examplesprovided above, highlight the need for the UnitedNations to develop an overall framework forperformance monitoring and accountability at theindividual and programme level, as requested byMember States more than six years ago. TheInspectors note from the 1994 and the mostrecent reports that the comprehensive system ofaccountability will not be restricted in itsapplication to senior officials only but should, infact, dictate the conduct of the entire staff. TheInspectors believe that steps taken in thefollowing three areas could serve as thefoundations on which such a framework could besolidly established.

(→ Recommendation 1)

B. Establishing a culture of clarity,transparency and communication

55. As noted in chapter II of this report,delegation of authority flows from the MemberStates (Charter of the United Nations) to theGeneral Assembly and the Secretary-General,who in turn delegates his authority to staffmembers within the Secretariat to fulfil hismandate. Therefore, the authority is based on acascade of acts of delegation, which should allbe systematically reviewed for clarity and forinternal consistency with current United Nationsregulations and rules, and with the policies setby the legislative bodies. Any inconsistency,contradiction, confusion or lacuna in the chain ofdelegated authority should be clarified.

56. It is evident that the guidance provided tothe Secretary-General by the General Assemblyshould itself be clear and unambiguous, so as toavoid confusion in its interpretation by theSecretariat.

57. The Secretary-General delegatesadministrative and substantive authority to otherofficials through Secretary-General's Bulletins(ST/SGB series). Bulletin ST/SGB/1997/1, of 28May 1997, entitled “Procedures for thepromulgation of administrative issuances”clearly stipulates those matters which require theissuance of Secretary-General's Bulletins, and

those which require administrative instructions(ST/AI series). The latter require approval by theUnder-Secretary-General for Management orother specifically authorized officials. It isclearly stated therein that rules, policies orprocedures intended for general application mayonly be established by duly promulgatedSecretary-General’s Bulletins and AdministrativeInstructions.

58. Among matters requiring the issuance ofa Secretary-General's Bulletin are:

(a) Promulgation of rules for theimplementation of regulations,resolutions and decisions adopted by theGeneral Assembly, including:

(i) Promulgation of financialregulations and rules, andpublication of consolidated textsthereof;

(ii) Promulgation of staff regulationsand rules, and publication ofconsolidated texts thereof;

(iii) Promulgation of regulations andrules governing programmeplanning, the programme aspectsof the budget, the monitoring ofimplementation and the methodsof evaluation, and publication ofconsolidated texts thereof;

(b) Promulgation of regulations and rules, asrequired, for the implementation ofresolutions and decisions adopted by theSecurity Council;

(c) Organization of the Secretariat.

59. Administrative instructions, on the otherhand, are meant to prescribe instructions andprocedures for the implementation of theFinancial Regulations and Rules, StaffRegulations and Rules or Secretary-General’sBulletins. A lower level of administrativeissuances, information circulars, are issued underthe authority of ST/SGB/1997/2, for the purposeof conveying general information on, orexplanations of, established rules, policies and

12

procedures, as well as isolated announcements ofone-time or temporary interest. They are not,however, to be used for promulgating new rules,policies or procedures.

60. These clear policies for the promulgationof administrative issuances are not alwaysobserved. Recognizing that the difficult task ofreviewing and “streamlining” old (prior to June1997) issuances is a time-consuming process thatis still continuing, the Inspectors have observedinstances of circulars issued after June 1997,which do not conform to the prescribedrequirements, or where binding procedures wereannounced through other than the prescribedmeans.

61. Steps must be taken to further clarify therules, and all administrative issuances, whichguide managers daily in the administration ofhuman and financial resources entrusted to them.The complex drafting of the final provisions ofST/AI/1999/1, which refer to documents notgenerally available and the interpretation ofwhich requires additional research by the user,illustrates the need for the Secretariat to issuesimple and straight forward instructions. Currentefforts to streamline procedures described inchapter IV must therefore be accelerated and, ifneed be, the Secretariat should propose to theGeneral Assembly appropriate revisions to theRegulations.

(→ Recommendations 2 and 3)

62. As regards the Financial Rules, thecurrent version is contained in documentST/SGB/Financial Rules/1/Rev. 3 (1985) and inan amendment thereto (ST/SGB/1998/15), issuedon 30 September 1998, which relates to a ruledealing with the Property Survey Board. TheInspectors have noted a number ofinconsistencies and even contradictions in thecontents of the Rules, and between some of theRules and another Secretary-General's Bulletin.

63. Specifically, under the Financial Rules, anumber of responsibilities are delegated directlyto the Controller, for instance, in the areas ofrequests for remittal of contributions andadvances by Member States and non-memberStates (rules 105.6 and 105.8), and the receipt,custody and investment of funds, including

investments of the United Nations Joint StaffPension Fund (UNJSPF). (Rules 109.1 and109.2). At the same time, in documentST/SGB/1997/11, on the organization of theDepartment of Management, responsibility forcontributions from Member States, receipt andcustody of funds and “increasing the earningspotential of funds under management” is vestedon officials directly responsible to the Under-Secretary-General for Management. UNJSPFinvestments, although not referred to in the citedSGB, are handled by an InvestmentsManagement Service directly responsible to theUnder- Secretary-General for Management.

64. Other discrepancies have been noted. Forexample, by its decision 50/472 of 23 December1995, the General Assembly decided to amendFinancial Regulations 2.1 and 11.4, related to thebudget cycle of peace-keeping operations.Neither the revised text of the Regulations, northe expected revision of rule 111.4, announced inparagraph 3 of the report of the Secretary-General on this issue (A/50/787), has beenpromulgated, as is required, in a Secretary-General’s Bulletin.

65. The same situation prevails with regardto the amendments approved by the GeneralAssembly in its resolution 52/212 B, of 31 March1998, related to the “Additional terms ofreference governing the audit of the UnitedNations”, which are an integral part of theFinancial Regulations. In this connection, it is tobe noted that in the same resolution, the GeneralAssembly also endorsed, with certain provisions,the recommendations of the Board of Auditors(A/52/753, annex, paras. 6 and 7) related to thedisclosure of office holders to be heldaccountable for the implementation ofrecommendations made by the Board, and withthe issue of sanctions to be invoked in the eventthat failure to implement the recommendation isattributable to the negligence andmismanagement of the responsible officer(s).This resolution of the General Assembly is at theheart of the issues of delegation/accountability,and its contents should be generally known to thestaff of the Secretariat, through appropriateadministrative issuances, and in particular todepartment heads/programme managers, who aredirectly affected.

13

66. The Inspectors cannot but voice theirconcern over the laxity and lack of clarity andtransparency which have existed in respect of theformulation of administrative issuances and inthe implementation of policies, as noted above.The current version of the Financial Rules datesback to 1985 and has not been revised to reflectchanges in policies and practices that haveoccurred since then. Despite the assurancecontained in the report of the Secretary-Generalof 5 August 1994 (A/C.5/49/1, para. 24) to theeffect that a review of the Financial Regulationsand Rules was then being undertaken with a viewto the submission to the General Assembly, forconsideration at its fiftieth session, of a revisedtext, this has not yet occurred. The Inspectorsnote the renewed assurances provided in theSecretary-General’s report on “Accountabilityand responsibility” (A/55/270, para. 9), that “areview of the financial regulations and rules isunder way”.

67. It seems imperative, in order to create aclimate of administrative discipline and order,that basic documents, which in fact guide thefunctioning of the Secretariat, should be clear,unambiguous and current. Permitting departuresfrom the basic texts - as well intentioned as theymay be - without promulgating appropriaterevisions, creates a climate of laxity anddisrespect for the rules, which could have seriousrepercussions.

68. Similarly, it is imperative to respect theprocedures for the promulgation ofadministrative issuances (ST/SGB/1997/1) so asto ensure not only clarity in the formulation ofthe procedures and instructions, but alsoavoidance of contradictions between differentsuch issuances. In this regard, matters of abinding administrative nature should bepromulgated exclusively through prescribedmeans, namely, Secretary-General’s Bulletins orAdministrative Instructions. Modifications to orcancellation of administrative issuances shouldonly be promulgated by another administrativeissuance of the same or higher rank.

(→ Recommendation 4)

69. Practice has shown, however, that thefunctioning of delegation of authority, and of atransparent and effective system of

accountability, involves more than revisingregulations, rules and procedures and decreeing ashift in decision-making powers. An importantelement in the development of the system is theongoing promotion of a new culture of trust andcommunication. The attributes of this newculture can be defined as follows:

! Emphasis on people: people should bechallenged, and encouraged. They should begiven the possibility to act and to use theirjudgement. It should be understood thatbetter performance is a product of peoplewho care rather than systems that constrain;

! Leadership should not be authoritarian orcoercive but participative to the extentpossible.;

! Strong output orientation as opposed toprocess or procedures orientation.21

70. The significance of this culture is that itrecognizes that responsibility, authority and theobligation and readiness to answer for one’sactions are interactive and inextricably linked;and that it is the effective interrelationship ofthese elements that will drive the Organization toachieve management excellence. To achieve thisgoal, attitudes and well-entrenched bureaucratichabits need to be changed through leadership andtraining. Negative or punitive connotations oftenassociated with the terms of authority andaccountability should be avoided and emphasisplaced instead on the positive aspects ofdelegation and responsibility including in termsof career development and empowerment.

(→ Recommendation 5)

71. A number of organizations have madeattempts to foster such a new culture. The abovementioned “business plan on the future role andfunctions of UNIDO” was supported by a newstaff career development system. TheAdministrator of UNDP, for his part, released a“UNDP 2001 Compact” whose purpose is to setout the goals of the Bureau for Planning andResource Management. The innovation consistsin defining detailed objectives aligned withUNDP strategic goals. The “UNDP 2001Compact” identifies indicators of success foreach

14

objective with relevant benchmarks. Theobjectives will then be incorporated intoindividual annual unit work plans, becoming partof individual performance plans. Thus, eachindividual can understand better his/her owncontribution to the overall mandate of theorganization. UNHCR in its broad changeinitiatives has introduced “AccountabilityAgreements”, the purpose of which is to outlinethe prerequisites and clarify the roles andresponsibilities of all concerned parties pursuantto the delegation of financial authority.

72. In the case of UNHCR, a “Covenant”was signed to establish the roles andresponsibilities of all concerned parties oncehuman resources management authority has beendelegated to line management. As an integral partof this “Covenant”, the UNHCR Division ofResources Management undertakes to provide:

! Human resources management training forUNHCR Representatives to focus on whatthe implications of delegated humanresources authority are for them as managers;

! Functional human resources training for theadministrative staff who will perform thedelegated function;

! A comprehensive Personnel Manual coveringall the delegated human resources authority.

73. Similar investments in training will beneeded in the United Nations to ensure that staffat all levels have the required skills, asempowerment through delegation of authoritydoes not come naturally. In fact, for manypeople, it is easier to manage or work in a tightlycontrolled environment than in one that givesstaff, especially managers, a certain degree offreedom.

74. The Inspectors have noted the effortsundertaken by the Secretariat of the UnitedNations over the past few years to trainsupervisors in “peoples’ management” and staffand managers alike in conflict-resolutiontechniques. Details of specific programmes fortraining supervisors and managers are describedin paragraphs 20-22 of the Secretary-General’sreport on “Accountability and responsibility”(A/55/270). The Unit is also aware that, as part

of efforts to change the organizational cultureand build human resources capacity, the UnitedNations has undertaken a participatory process todefine organizational core values and core andmanagerial competencies and that staffdevelopment programmes are being realigned,and new programmes developed, to strengthenand build these competencies. The Inspectorsbelieve it is important that these efforts should bepursued and complemented by programmesaimed at better informing staff of their rights andobligations. Such programmes should be anintegral part of any induction syllabus. Also,increased attention is to be given to managerialskills in the recruitment process. Theseinvestments in training will entail costs for whichthe Organization should budget.

C. Empowering and monitoringmanagers

75. The Inspectors agree with the premisethat what can be delegated should be delegated.However, the authority delegated must be veryclearly defined, as in a contract, and may requirea special letter or document, assigning formalauthority and responsibilities to specific staffmembers. There must be absolute clarity aboutroles and responsibilities to prevent continuedconfusion about responsibilities.

76. This is especially important, as theSecretariat is undergoing importanttransformations. Staff members should knowwithout ambiguity what needs to be done andwhat is expected of them. Each delegation ordermust at a minimum include the following:

(a) Citation of the original source ofauthority;

(b) Description of the authority to bedelegated with clear and consistentobjectives;

(c) Any limitation imposed, including anylimitation on sub-delegation;

(d) Citation of any previous delegationswhich are to be revised or rescinded, ifappropriate;

(e) the date on which the delegation is tobecome effective and statement of theduration of the delegation;

15

(f) the details of the reporting duties whichgo together with delegation of authorityso as to permit proper monitoring(volume, frequency of reporting andother details, in particular in relationsbetween the field and headquarters).

77. All instruments of delegation should bereviewed for clarity, for internal consistencywith current United Nations policies, regulationsand rules, and especially for the possibility offurther delegation. It is understood that allauthority which is delegated is subject tomodification and/or withdrawal.

(→ Recommendation 6)

78. Generally speaking, the successfulimplementation of delegation of authority tomanagers will depend to a large extent on theefficiency of the support functions (financial andhuman resources management, procurement,building management, information technology,etc.) provided to them either under their directsupervision or by “common” services in locationswhere more than one substantive unit exists. Theprovision of efficient support in terms ofadministrative services will assist the empoweredmanagers to exercise their authority in order todeliver the work plans and manage their units.At the same time, they must be able to obtain, asrequired, additional guidance as to correctimplementation and interpretation of financial,staff and programme planning regulations, rulesand administrative instructions. The Inspectorsfeel that the establishment in the Office ofHuman Resources Management of a type of“help-desk” function devoted to providing suchguidance would go a long way towardsreinforcing managerial competencies andaccountability. Similar advisory functions shouldbe provided to assist managers in dischargingtheir newly delegated financial responsibilities.In this regard, the Inspectors wish to highlight asa good practice that of UNHCR in creatingSenior Resource Manager positions to providesuch assistance.

79. It could be argued that a fair delegationof authority to programme managers would placerelated decision-making with those who areresponsible for implementing mandated work

programmes, and would minimize time-consuming bureaucratic processes. This objectiveis achievable to the extent that managers arethoroughly familiar with pertinent Organization-wide policies as defined by the GeneralAssembly. Alternatively, they need to haveaccess to such expertise through their own or“common” administrative support services,together with the guidance to be provided by thecentral administrative services.

( → Recommendation 7)

80. Indeed, as pointed out by the WFPExecutive Director, as managementaccountability increases, the role of the supportfunctions is bound to change from one which iscontrol-oriented, to that of helping managers tomanage. This is particularly important in the caseof the United Nations Secretariat, with its majoroffices away from Headquarters, where commonadministrative services to substantive units areprovided to differing degrees by a “central” (ateach location) unit. Efforts are required to attaina change in mentality so that those providingadministrative services do not confuse theirsupport role with that of decision-making, whichis a function that should be exercised by thesubstantive head of office.

81. Managers, whether at Headquarters or inthe field, must have constant and immediateaccess to relevant information. The developmentof IMIS should be very useful in this regard, oncecurrent limitations and difficulties are overcome.The implementation of IMIS has certainlyresulted in improved access to information andincreased accuracy in administrative processing.However, many offices have complained that thepoor behaviour of the system, its lengthy time ofresponse, its limited capacity to provideworkload statistics as a basis for performanceindicators, and delays in the completion of itsvarious phases have so far not allowed theefficiency savings initially expected from itsimplementation to occur. Furthermore, theInspectors believe that full advantage has not yetbeen drawn by the Secretariat from theopportunities offered by the Intranet to makegeneral information widely accessible in a user-friendly format.(→ Recommendation 8)

16

82. With reference to the issue ofmonitoring, as has been noted in paragraphs 24,43 and 44, the General Assembly has beenconsistently preoccupied, when dealing withissues of delegation of authority, with the need toensure central control for overall policiesdetermined by it with regard both to financial andhuman resources issues. It is imperative that thecentral units retain an ongoing monitoringcapability, through which they may gaugeprogress and detect possible deficiencies. Thedegree of monitoring and the related reportingobligations should be commensurate with thedegree of delegated authority.

83. Such monitoring capacity is conditionalon the availability of adequate informationtechnologies and systems, as well as thecooperation of the pertinent oversightmechanisms. As the Consultative Committee onAdministrative Questions (CCAQ) has noted inits Web page on enhanced financial procedures,accounting processes are being made moreefficient through the development of automatedsystems, incorporating validation processes tominimize input errors. Improved integratedmanagement information systems provide moretimely and accurate cost information and moreaccurate details of available funds, so thatunintentional spending beyond budgetaryallotments is avoided. Managers also havegreater authority to redeploy resources and to bemore responsive to changing requirements whilestaying within overall budgetary limits.

84. Similarly, information technology shouldfacilitate regular reporting on pertinent humanresources actions so as to guarantee OHRM thepossibility of exercising regular monitoring ofactions for which it has overall policyresponsibility.

(→ Recommendation 9)

D. Measuring performances and drawingthe consequences

85 The third basic element of theaccountability framework will be the ability ofthe Organization to actually measure theperformance of officials to whom authority isdelegated, and the extent to which it acts on thesefindings. The performance appraisal system

(PAS) introduced in 1995 is an important step inthis regard. The strengthening of enforcementmechanisms, including the increased use ofdisciplinary action against individuals engaged inwrongful activities, if it is accompanied byimprovements in the administration of justice,will also serve to underlie any accountabilitysystem which the Secretariat may put forward.

86. Mechanisms are yet to be put in place,however, to distinguish between deliberate andaccidental failure, i.e. between:

! Failure due to corruption, dishonesty anddereliction of duty, which needs to be dealtwith by disciplinary sanctions; and

! Failure due to poor judgement, ignorance orinexperience, which should be dealt with byremedies such as training or, as the lastresort, transfer to other posts.

87. For the former, there would appear toexist a sufficient body of regulations and rulesintended to constrain improper behaviour, suchas Staff Rule 112.3 (“Any staff member may berequired to reimburse the United Nations eitherpartially or in full for any financial loss sufferedby the United Nations as a result of the staffmember's negligence or of his or her havingviolated any regulation, rule or administrativeinstruction.”) and Financial Rule 114.1 (“. . . Anyofficial who takes any action contrary to theseFinancial Rules or to the administrativeinstructions issued in connection therewith, maybe held personally responsible and financiallyliable for the consequences of such action”).Evidently, in addition to the above-cited rules,any staff member whose failure is due tocorruption, dishonesty and dereliction of duty,would be subject to the provisions of chapter Xof the Staff Regulations and Rules.

88. This is particularly important in the caseof the conduct of programme managers, aswitnessed by the request addressed to theSecretary-General by the General Assembly in itsresolution 51/226, section II, paragraph 3, to“Issue specific administrative instructions toestablish clearly the responsibility andaccountability of programme managers forproper use of human resources, as well assanctions in

17

accordance with Staff Rule 112.3 for anyfinancial loss suffered by the United Nations as aresult of gross negligence, including impropermotivation, willful violation of or recklessdisregard for the Staff Regulations and Rules andestablished policies regulating recruitment,placement and promotion”.

89. The Inspectors have taken note of thereports of the Secretary-General contained indocuments A/53/849 and A/54/793 onmanagement irregularities causing financiallosses to the United Nations. In their view, thesereports are preliminary steps to comply with therequest made by the General Assemblymentioned above and urge that it should be fullyimplemented.

90. As regards cases arising from poorjudgement or inexperience, there would appear tobe a need for the Secretariat to institutemechanisms such as training specifically gearedto deal with each case (as opposed to generaltraining courses available to staff at large, on avoluntary basis). Ultimately, such cases mayreflect failings in the placement policies of theSecretariat through the assignment of staff toposts for which they may not be fully qualified orsuited. They should be addressed through a morerigorous and vigilant recruitment/placementsystem.

91. Thus, a comprehensive system ofaccountability must be based on the followingprinciples:

! The establishment of a climate of clarity andtransparency in the promulgation ofinstructions (administrative issuances) andcommunication at all levels of theSecretariat, and particularly betweenmanagers and subordinates;

! The provision to managers of all thenecessary support, information and guidancefor the functions which they are to perform,including those relevant to their relationswith subordinates, and for the resolution ofpossible discrepancies; and

! The existence of adequate mechanisms forthe evaluation of the performance of officialsto whom authority is delegated and thestrengthening of enforcement mechanisms todeal with cases of failure.

(→ Recommendation 10)92. The Inspectors would not wish toconclude this report without referring to theserious concerns of the staff, as expressedthrough the recognized representative bodies (seeparagraphs 45 and 46 above) that, in the absenceof a proper system of accountability, the rightsof staff under the regulations and rules may notbe sufficiently protected against arbitrarydecisions by managers. It is recommended thatthe Administration should consider, to thegreatest extent possible, the staff’s views andsuggestions, ensuring that their rights arerespected and that consultations with staffrepresentatives are undertaken in the context ofthe improved system of communication.

(→ Recommendation 11)

* * *

93. In summary, it can be stated that in terms of its administration, the United Nations could only havefunctioned since its inception through the application of delegation of authority. The Secretary-General, inattempting to bring to the Secretariat the features of a modernized management culture, has madeconsiderable efforts to increase the use of delegation of authority. This process has received an initial generalwelcome by the Member States, but has also been the object of expressions of concern with respect to manyof its specific details, notably with regard to the need for central control. The Inspectors believe that theprocess should proceed but, to keep it on the right track, a number of prerequisites and benchmarks, asoutlined in this report, need to be strictly adhered to.

* * * * *

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NOTES

1 A/9841 of 4 November 1974, para. 61.

2 WFP/EB.1/99/3-B of 9 December 1998. Organizational change at WFP: a status report.

3 A/53/226/Add.1 of 13 August 1998, para. 59.

4 A/51/950, of 14 July 1997. Renewing the United Nations: a programme for reform, report of theSecretary-General, chapter VI, section B, strategy 3.

5 Ibid., action 23.

6 A/53/414 of 13 October 1998, para. 10. Human Resources Management Reform.

7 Secretary-General’s statement to the Fifth Committee, 5 October 1999, press release GA/AB/3311.

8 Memorandum dated 17 November 1998 from Mr. Joseph Connor, Under-Secretary-General forManagement, to all heads of departments and offices, entitled: “Quick wins in human resourcesmanagement reform”.

9 A/53/947 of 10 May 1999.

10 LC/G.2011(SES.27/7) of 31 March 1998, chapter II A. “Reform of the ECLAC ManagementScheme: Delegation of Authority and Accountability”.

11 A/54/7, para. 124.

12 ST/SGB/1997/5 of 12 September 1997. Organization of the Secretariat of the United Nations.

13 A/53/428 of 23 September 1998.

14 A/54/393 of 23 September 1999.

15 A/54/157 of 30 June 1999, para. 15, Review of Common Services in the United Nations.

16 A/53/414, para. 26, 13 October 1998, Human Resources Management Reform.

17 Report to the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Resources Management of the Task Team onStreamlining Rules and Procedures, 28 April 1999, and OHRM Human Resources ManagementHighlights, No. 6, May/June 1999.

18 Resolution of 31 March 1999 adopted by the XIV CCISUA Assembly.

19 UN Staff Report, volume 24, No. 20, page 6.

20 A/C.5/49/1 of 5 August 1994.

21 “Performance auditing and the modernization of government”, OECD report, Public ManagementUnit, Paris, 1998.