Czech Foreign Policy since 1990

From the Euro-Atlantic consensus to a deep identity crisis?

David Král, EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy

Budapest, May 2010

The two phases of the Czech foreign policy after 1990

Phase 1: The Euro-Atlantic consensus

Accession to NATO and the EU primary (and probably the only) foreign policy objectives

In fact it was consensus -1: the Communist party always disputed integration to EU and NATO, but ultimately more opposed to NATO

Right (ODS) preferred NATO, while Left (CSSD) the EU- this structural cleavage intensified after 2004

Relations with neighbours arguably more important than today

Phase 2: We are in, what’s next?

Post accession fatigue/inertia/indifference:

Lack of vision on part of political representation, polarisation across political spectrum

Desperate search for “added value”, “niche”

Lack of a strategic concept (foreign policy priorities only for 2003-2006, national security strategy not amended since 2003)

The only “boost” of foreign policy thinking: the Czech EU presidency

Characteristics of the Czech foreign policy today

Lack of salience

Lack of consensus among stakeholders

Lack of coherence

Lack of strategic concept

Exploitation of foreign policy issues for domestic purposes

Lack of salience

FP only a secondary issue

Fostered by a relative indifference of public opinion (shifting perception of security threats)

Lack of expertise among the politicians and political parties’ ranks

Linking foreign policy issues to domestic ones (debate on the Czech missions and healthcare fees, shooting down the government during the EU presidency…)

Lack of consensus

No inter-party debate nor expert nor public debate on the foreign policy priorities

Diverging views on important issues:Transatlantic relationsRussiaChina Security arrangements (radar, role of NATO vs. EU,

participation in missions abroad, NATO strategic concept)

Middle East

Areas where there is relative consensus

EU Enlargement:All political parties support in principleAll political parties except KDU-CSL support Turkish

accessionWestern Balkans considered an overarching priority

Eastern partnership: in principle, but lack of vision on the contents and possible involvement of Russia

Reality always does not match rhetoric (Czech EU presidency, visa issues)

Lack of coherence

Multitude of stakeholders: Political parties Government (often a coalition) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, line ministries Parliament President Businesses and NGOs (third sector)

Often sending different or even contradictory messages (strike against Yugoslavia 1999, Iraq, Kosovo, Russian-Georgian conflict…)

This results in a relative lack of credibility vis-à-vis the main partners (EU and NATO), limits the negotiating weight

Stakeholders – political parties

Left – right cleavage clearly visible

Diverging attitudes to international relations at large:Atlanticists (ODS, largely also TOP 09)Europeanists (CSSD) Internationalists (KDU-CSL, Greens) Isolationists (Communist Party)

Stakeholders – government and parliament

Governments are often coalitions

This results in accepting the “lowest denominator” position (Iraq, ESDP)

Foreign policy issues are often not consensual even within the government (Iraq, Kosovo)

Stances often reactive than pro-active (resulting from the lack of strategy)

Parliament: generally very apathetic, doesn’t discuss foreign policy, except for visible issues (missions)

Stakeholders - president

Much more important role than one would constitutionally assume

Havel: high international reputation, close links especially to Clinton administration – “Euro-Atlanticist” president

Klaus: autonomous foreign policy discourse, often goes against the official governmental position (“sovereignist president”)

Government – President co-habitation in foreign policy extremely complex – creates negative precedents

Stakeholders – Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The bearer of continuity in foreign policy

Strong expertise but not sufficient political backing

Open to co-operation with NGO sector, even cross-fertilisation (legacy of dissidents)

Diplomatic representation still relatively big compared to the size of the country – legacy of active Czechoslovak diplomacy?

NGOs and businesses

NGOs: humanitarian and human rights NGOs relatively big influence on the MFA and political representation – more reflected during Right-wing governments

Businesses: important stakeholders especially in energy sector and industry economic diplomacy relatively strong, supported by CzechTrade and CzechInvest – the two go often against each other, not clear which one prevails

So which issues are important in terms of Czech FP?

Difficult to determine due to the lack of consensus and lack of strategic debate after EU accession

Selected on an ad-hoc basis, without broader political consultations among different actors

External relations priorities of the Czech presidency could serve as a guidance, but picture might look different if there was Left-wing government

Transatlantic relations

More important for Right wing parties

Paradoxically, the change of US administration aggravated relations with the Czech Republic:Withdrawal from missile defence shieldDifferent ideas of tackling economic crisis (“road to

hell”)Reluctance to accept Guantanamo prisonersDiverging attitudes towards climate change (Obama

more open) Feeling of “loss of interest” in Central Europe, Czech

Republic not considered a crucial ally anymore

EU enlargement

More rhetoric than reality

Bombastic plans of the Czech presidency did not materialize (Thessaloniki II in Hluboká nad Vltavou, no breakthrough on Croatia and Turkey, visa liberalisation only during II/2009)

But: initiation of the “Friends of the Enlargement” group within the Council

Visa policy: Czech Republic supports visa liberalisation, but in reality one of the main troublemakers

The only visible success: Czechs got the EU enlargement/ENP commissioner

Eastern Partnership

Czechs consider it to be “their baby”

Not clear about how it should work in practice

Rather unsuccessful in pushing it in the first phase: turned into the flagship during the EU presidency

The issue of the role and desirable involvement of Russia still highly controversial

Pragmatic approach: economic integration, good governance, democracy, energy – but where are the carrots? (not so much interested in visas)

The long-term goal of EU accession on the table, but not spoken of openly

Democracy and transformation assistance

Flagship of Czech foreign policy after 2004

Very well marketed, but in reality?

Level of financial support relatively small

Advantage: clear separation and different programming from the

general development aidFocuses exclusively on civil society support

Recently more pragmatic approach prevailing (trade off of Cuba for Eastern partnership)

Who are the Czech allies?

Visegrad countries: high degree of alignment in foreign policy, natural forum for discussion

Other new member states, like-minded countries

Germany (on level of administration – politically not very spoken of)

United States

Otherwise no concept of strategic partnership building, very pragmatic approach, ad-hoc coalitions, explicable by reactivity of foreign policy after 2004

Conclusions

The Czech foreign policy after 2004 has created a more positive image than reflects reality

This is largely due to the EU Presidency and good marketing

However, this is not underpinned by brought domestic consensus and truly strategic thinking among political actors

MFA remains the main driver, but does not have sufficient political backing

Thank you! Any questions and

comments welcome!