CR12_Casarões

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By Guilherme Casares

brazils Mi istry of Exter al Relatio s, a Pillar of the natio ,Struggles Towar a democratic Foreig Policy

Itamaratys Mission

O ne of the few certainties about Brazils political landscape is the timelessquality of its foreign service. The Brazilian Ministry of External Rela-tions (also known as Itamaraty, the Modernist palace designed by OscarNiemeyer where it is housed in Braslia) often prides itself on having some of theworlds most professional diplomats. Over the past century, the ministry has beenresponsible for constructing a sound foreign policy repertoire built upon principlessuch as pacism, multilateralism, and realismwith Jos Maria da Silva Paranhos Jnior, the Baro do Rio Branco, one of Brazils national heroes, as their main inspi-ration. Some would even go as far as to claim that the evolution of Itamaraty, bothas an institution and as the centerpiece of foreign policymaking, has walked hand inhand with the formation of Brazils national identity.

In recent years, however, Brazilian foreign policy and its admirable operatorshave fallen under heavy public scrutiny. Common sense has it that it all started withthe allegedly controversial diplomatic choices made by president Luiz Incio Lulada Silva and his party, the Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, or PT) in thelast decade. Lulas foreign policy, by detaching itself from the traditional guidelinesof the countrys diplomacy, would have put our international credibility at risk bycourting leftist dictators and insisting on an ideology-driven, third-worldish ori-entation. Surprised and enraged at the attempt to break with the past, a number ofdiplomats and scholars, backed by some important business sectors and oppositionparties, have come to the fore to denounce the perils of that new global strategy.Some analysts, on the other hand, claim that debate over foreign policy is just anatural outcome of Brazils democratic maturity. Onething is certain: while public debate on foreign affairsin Brazil was no novelty, never before did it take suchsignicant proportions.

v Itamaraty Palace,Braslia, March 22, 2010. Andr Vieira


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G U I L H E R M E C A S A R E S

At rst, criticism focused only on international options, opportunities, and out-comes. The president and his close aidesForeign Minister Celso Amorim and Lulaspersonal advisor, Marco Aurlio Garciawere the ones to blame. However, rifts withinItamaraty and between diplomats, organized public and private sectors, and the generalpublic, became deeper to the point of lling pages of editorials and Op-Eds and hittingthe headlines on the countrys leading newspapers O Estado de So Paulo (OESP), Folha de So Paulo (FSP), and O Globo . What started as a purported crisis of foreignpolicy developed into a crisis within foreign policymaking. Brazilian diplomacy now,unlike any other moment in its history, is being put up against the wall. One respectedBrazilianist, Sean Burges, of the Australian National University, recently posed themost sensitive of questions: Is Itamaraty a problem for Brazilian foreign policy?

What exactly is happening to Itamaraty, and what to do about it? The extent ofthe public debate and the harm it may cause to one of Brazils most prestigious insti-tutions is yet to be assessed. What is possible to say about it so far is that it has atleast three different sourcesa triple crisis therefore. The common denominatorbetween the three is, above all, the fact that they have been identied (and amplied)in the pages of newspapers. Let us call those processes a crisis of ideological neutrality;a crisis of cognitive dissonance; and a crisis of social legitimacy. All changes are thenatural outcome of democratic processes that have intensied in the past decades andhave taken their toll on the logic of Brazils diplomatic structures. While it may posechallenges to Itamaraty and, ultimately, to Brazilian foreign policy, it also offers someopportunities for the future.

I Come to Serve BrazilThere are several reasons why diplomacy has become so central to the developmentof Brazils national characterwhich sometimes seems to be a work in progress thatdoes not coincide with independence. Diplomacy has literally shaped our borders.Modern Brazil originates from two treaties signed between Portugal and Spain underthe auspices of the Catholic Church: the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494), brokered rightafter the rst Iberian mission to the New World, and the Treaty of Madrid (1750),which acknowledged the Portuguese rights to territory at the heart of South America,based on the long-standing custom of Uti Possidetis. According to the notable thesis ofAmbassador Synsio Goes Filho, Brazil has been founded by sailors, bandeirantes (theBrazilian pioneers), and diplomats. While the rst two agents are common to manycountries in their path toward territorial consolidation, wars often replaced diplomacyin shaping modern statehood, particularly among former colonies. Brazil, on the otherhand, is a country that has been almost entirely forged by diplomacyto the extentthat our rejection of the use of force has become part of our national identity .


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I T A M A R A T Y S M I S S I O N

Diplomacy has always been the ticket to Brazils international recognition.Among the continental-sized nations of the globe, which George Kennan picturedas monster countries, Brazil has never been able to match its territorial assets withmilitary or economic might. Only by mimicking the behavior and style of traditionalEuropean diplomatic services from the earliest days of the nineteenth century wouldthe Brazilian Empire be accepted in the foreign circles in the Old World. The countrypaved its way into becoming, at the turn of that century, a champion of parliamentarydiplomacy, embodied in multilateral initiatives such as the Pan-American Conferencesand the League of Nations. As the country and its foreign policy grew in maturity,it would become a norm entrepreneur on its own, helping devise rules for globalregimes in issue-areas as diverse as free trade or environmental protection.

Finally, diplomacy has been the motor of development since the early days of indus-trialization. Most of the policies that have been played out along Brazils path towardindustry represent an intricate equation between resource allocation and internationalbargaining. Although the domestic-foreign nexus has taken many different forms, it ispossible to argue that, from Getlio Vargas in the 1930s to Ernesto Geisel in the 1970s,or even to Lula in the past decade, a great share of Brazilian development has relied onforeign strategies to build the countrys base industry, attract investments for infrastruc-ture, or boost trade globally. Economic pragmatism has been the guideline of Brazilsforeign relations, and is often regarded as one of the main assets of its diplomacy.

It therefore comes as no surprise that Itamaraty has, in many ways, become greaterthan governments themselves. More than just an element of Brazils national construc-tion, the Ministry of External Relations boldly claims to be the champion of the nationalinterest. Foreign policy, unlike many other public policies, is presented as a state policyand does not subject itself to partisan incongruities. Diplomats and scholars often quote,as the foundation stone of such claim, Baro do Rio Brancos inaugural speech upontaking ofce as foreign minister in 1902: I come not to serve a political party; I come toserve Brazil, which we all want to see united, integrated, strong, and respected.

Over the course of the twentieth century, the success of Brazils diplomacy wascherished as an island of tranquility in a sea of turbulence, given the numerous upheav-als the political system had gone through. It seemed to many as if Itamaraty remainedas the only stable institution in a nation torn by opposing social forces, having survivedseveral coups dtat and economic breakdowns, thus revealing the genuine identity ofa people struggling to make sense of its past with an eye on the future. Indeed, in thatsame speech, Rio Branco went on to say that in his past diplomatic deeds he receivedthe support of the entire Brazilian people, having completely identied with it.

That feeling apparently remained for the next hundred years. The moral author-ity of Brazilian diplomacy was kept largely unchallenged among social actors and


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political institutions. Foreign policymaking in the second half of the twentieth centurywitnessed a slow yet consistent move towards bureaucratic insulation. Congressionalactivism on foreign affairs, which helped shape international outcomes in the hecticpostwar years, was replaced by Itamaratys virtual monopoly over policymaking asthe military took over in March 1964. While it did not represent any major change ofcourseafter all, Brazilian foreign policy is known for its continuityit empowereddiplomats to dene and implement, to an unprecedented extent, what they thoughtbest suited Brazils national aspirations. By the mid-1970s, there were few doubtsamong domestic and international spectators that the countrys sound foreign policystrategy was the key for Brazil to become a global power on its own.

In spite of all the economic and political setbacks that marked Brazils entry intothe next decade (the lost decadedue to slow growth rates and escalating ination),diplomatic orientations still enjoyed a great deal of popular acceptance. The deepeningrift between the incumbent military and the civilian opposition in the early 1980s onlyrevealed the strength of Brazilian foreign policy and of diplomats, widely acclaimedfor their deeds on both sides of the political struggle. When Tancredo Neves, the rstcivilian candidate for president after a long military rule, was elected in early 1985, heis said to have decided to keep foreign policy untouched for it represented a supra-partisan consensus. While the late president-electNeves passed away even beforetaking ofce, but his diplomatic legacy remainedwas referring to unanimity aroundthe content of foreign policy, his statement reveals a second, and deeper, consensus:that Itamaraty is the backbone of foreign policymaking.

Transition to democracy did not challenge, at rst, the notion that the nationalinterest was a reality and that it would still be dened by one single group of states-people. Not even the new constitution, which was adopted in 1988 and grantedenlarged powers and duties to the congress, changed diplomats de facto monopolyover foreign affairs. To the contrary, yet another tradition was born: the diplo-matic posts which could erstwhile be lled by politiciansthose of ambassador andthe foreign minister itselfwere progressively given to career diplomats, to the pointthat no high-level foreign policy position today is out of Itamaratys domain. Oneexception is that of Ambassador Laercio Vinhas, Brazils permanent representativeto the International Atomic Energy Agency, who is a long-time public servant andrenowned scholar in the eld of nuclear energy.

Ruinous AttacksAs Brazils foreign relations became more complex, mostly thanks to growing economicinterdependence and to greater activism of organized civil society, diplomacy was facedwith numerous challenges to its traditional role. Issues relating to trade and regional


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integration were progressively scattered across several federal institutions, most notablyat the Brazilian Foreign Trade Chamber (Cmara de Comrcio Exterior, or CAMEX)within the Ministry of Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade (which incorporatedthe adjective foreign as late as 1999). Modalities of cooperation, such as technicalcooperation or cooperation for development, have become particularly intense in issuesas diverse as health, tourism, agriculture, and education, and have been carried out bytheir respective ministries. Even though the Brazilian government had already createdan ofcial cooperation agency (Agncia Brasileira de Cooperao, or ABC) under theauspices of Itamaraty in 1987, inter-ministerial coordination around the foreign policyagenda has been relatively low, irrespective of (or due to) several attempts by the foreignministry to retain its centrality in those key areas of foreign policymaking.

Moreover, the last three decades marked a watershed in state-society relations inBrazil, with the rise of social movements and organized interest groups. This has alsocaused turbulence in foreign policymaking in two different aspects.

First of all, in the wake of a new democratic regime, Itamaraty had to engage withsocietal demands at an unprecedented level, being pressured by what they understoodas a democratic circumstance. Having realized the inevitability of addressing suchdemands, the ministry took up the duty of devising new channels of dialogue. One ofthe most crucial moments in this process was the launching of a government-spon-sored cycle of seminars on the future of Brazils foreign policy in 1993, which paved theway for more intense talks between Itamaraty diplomats, businesspeople, labor unionleaders, and scholars. However, despite some concrete changessuch as the deepeningof relations between the ministry and subnational units, or the strengthening of dia-logue with business sectors through permanent committees or working groupsthedeclared goal of making foreign policy more democratic is yet to be fully attained.Surveys conducted by Professor Amaury de Souza between 2001 and 2008 with severalinterest groups (business associations, government ministries, communication media,the congress, universities, NGOs, labor unions) show that they consider that Itamaratydoes not give them enough attention.

Secondly, public debate over foreign policy in Brazil has grown considerably inrecent times. This was, in a way, propelled by the expansion of international rela-tions undergraduate courses and graduate programs (from two in 1985 to more thana hundred today). The number of specialized journals, masters theses, and doctoraldissertations in the elds of international politics and foreign policy also has risensharply in the last two decades. Yet, recent academic developments may not sufcewhen attempting to grasp the broader picture of Brazils international choices amongthe general public. Considering that the electoral impact of foreign affairs on votersand candidates is still rather low, salience in public opinion seems to be best measured


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by the growing number of editorials, Op-Eds, and analyses on foreign policy issuesin Brazils leading newspapers. Indeed, mass media has become the main battleeldof ideas regarding Brazilian diplomatic choices and orientations, not rarely opposingthe incumbent governmentand offering plenty of room for critics, from scholars tobusinesspeople to retired diplomats. However limited the agenda-setting capacity ofprint news media is, their readership is far from negligible.

Curiously enough, during most of the Lula administration, when public attacksagainst his foreign choices became commonplace, Itamaraty was spared from harshercriticism. One thing critics were cautious about was to dissociate the foreign ministryas an institution from the specic policymakers in charge of foreign affairs. In the lastfour years, however, public debate in mass media shifted from criticism against Lulasforeign policy to severe slings and arrows directed at diplomats and their century-old institution. Even though there have always been critics of Itamaraty (particularlyamong business sectors, non-governmental organizations, and scholars), the ministrywas able to shield itself against public bickering, responding to the discontent on acase by case basis and controlling the opening of channels of dialogue. The strat-egy, however, did not survive the mounting rhetorical attacks that intensied in thelast years of the Lula administration, and that have become ruinous under PresidentDilma Rousseff, leading to the triple crisis at the heart of Brazilian public service.

National Interest or Party Interest?The crisis of ideological neutrality refers to the alleged inuence of partisan interestson foreign policymaking. Partidarization, as it is often called, is associated with theLula administration and is said to represent an unprecedented rollback of Brazils for-eign policy. It contradicts, all at once, the most basic tenet of Brazilian diplomacythemonolithic unity of the national interest, and its most important characteristic, its linear-ity and continuity over time. Having initially been formulated as a mere change in toneand emphasis, it developed into a grave disruption of diplomatic tradition. When Lulatook ofce in 2003, backed by a left-wing coalition, he is said to have used foreign policyto counterbalance the orthodox macroeconomic policies he had promised to undertake.

While change, at that point, was more of rhetoric than of substance, it seems tohave deepened old cleavages within Itamaraty that became visible some years later. Ina 2007 interview with leading news magazineVeja, Roberto Abdenurwho had beensecretary-general of Itamaraty and ambassador to the United Statescharged thegovernment with promoting ideological indoctrination in the ministry. Young dip-lomats were being brainwashed and forced to read biased literature while older civilservants were promoted according to political afnities and ideologies. Itamaratyneeds to restore its professionalism free from ideological postures, intolerant attitudes,


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and partisan identication, concluded Abdenur. He was promptly seconded byformer Foreign Minister Mrio Gibson Barboza and by other senior diplomats inother leading newspapers, who attacked the political adhesion imposed by the newchiefs. Nevertheless, the thesis of partisan interferenceor the crisis of ideologicalneutralitywould be penned by former Foreign Minister Celso Lafer, who servedunder presidents Fernando Collor de Mello and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, in thepages of O Estado de So Paulo in late 2009.

His thesis ows from three logically connected arguments. The rst one suggeststhat, if the state apparatus was taken over by the Workers Partys rank and le tofulll long-term political aspirations, then the same logic would apply for Itamaraty,albeit at a slower pace. The key role played in the bureaucratic structure by openlyleft-wing diplomats, such as the then-Secretary-General Samuel Pinheiro Guimares(20032009) or Foreign Minister Amorim himself (who joined the PT in 2008) pro-vides good evidence that the diplomatic agenda was being hijacked by the incumbentpolitical group. That would break with the (otherwise unshakable) notion that dip-lomats serve the Brazilian state, not specic governments. The second argument isbuilt upon the idea that there have been consistent efforts to put Itamaraty on thesidelines of foreign policymaking in key areas, such as relations with Latin Americancountriesthe most visible of those being the appointment of Marco Aurlio Garcia,a longtime party gure, to the position of special advisor for international affairs toPresident Lula. Finally, partidarization was being noticed in preferences and out-comes of Brazils foreign agenda. In the eyes of the critics, the countrys helmsmenwere responsible for leading Brazil to an atypical position of subservience to neigh-boring caudillos such as Venezuelas Hugo Chvez or Bolivias Evo Morales. Globally,spectators were taken aback by the enthusiasm with which Lula shook hands withcontroversial leaders such as Muammar Gadha, Bashar Al-Assad, or MahmoudAhmadinejad. The natural conclusion was that from the standpoint of the conduc-tion of foreign policy, partidarization has been leading to mistakes in diplomacy.

Following Lafers Op-Ed, several versions of the same thesis were published innewspapers by high-ranked retired diplomats identied with the Cardoso adminis-tration, or by scholars who have become known by their objections to the WorkersParty. Interestingly, the discussion has not received much academic attention, nor hasit been taken seriously by members of the governmentwho, despite having beenconstantly asked about the phenomenon of partidarization in interviews withnewspapers and magazines, did not show much interest in developing on the subject. We may look at it in two different ways. If the point of the criticism is valid,then it is natural that policymakers will avoid talking about it publicly. On the otherhand, silence about partidarization may reveal that there are more important issues


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one should address when it comes to Brazils foreign policy challenges. An interviewgiven by Special Advisor Marco Aurlio Garcia to Folha de So Paulo in late 2013 isquite telling in this sense. In an attempt to dodge the question about the relationshipbetween party politics and the national interest, he afrms that the main lines of for-eign policy [in Brazil] are established by the president. Even if partisan interests arenot a problem, it seems that the traditional narrative is being challenged by actors thathad seldom taken part in foreign policy making in the past.

Diplomacy and the PresidencyThe second crisis of Brazilian diplomacy has to do with the growing divergencebetween the president and the foreign ministry. This is often attributed to the develop-ment of a phenomenon called presidential diplomacy, according to which the headof state would take on a more prominent role in foreign policymaking. While theremay be specic constitutional provisions for those roles, many of the activities con-ducted by the president take place in an informal and voluntarist fashion. Therefore,presidential diplomacy is usually identied with strong chiefs of executive, as in thepostwar United States or in the French Fifth Republic. In Brazil, it only gained forcein the early 1990s, and most of the diplomatic efforts undertaken by the presidents atthat moment were related to the need to restore international credibility by reafrm-ing our democratic credentials.

The new diplomatic reality, in which presidents are active international stakeholdersand multilateral summits take place quite often, has also transformed the relationshipbetween public opinion, the mass media, and international affairs in Brazil. As longas the presidents actions abroad naturally receive more media attention, diplomacy isforced to become more accountable, which also contributes to the political salience ofworld issues. In a nutshell, Brazilian heads of state may use the countrys global standingto boost their own popularity at home; conversely, the center of gravity of popu-lar support to international choices shifts from a vague identication with Itamaratytowards a more specic relationship with the president. In any event, for good or ill, theotherwise linear diplomatic orientation put forth by the Ministry of External Relationsbecomes more complex and intertwined with domestic forces and partisan interests.With an eye on the public, the president helps turn foreign policy into a public policy,which may endanger Brazils long-standing diplomatic orientations. At the same time,tradition should be preserved to some degree for the sake of coherence.

If coherence is something to be sought after, then the president and diplomats mustestablish a good working relationship, with the foreign minister as the link betweenthem. This has been generally true for the Cardoso and Lula administrations, andsome even claim that their success abroad was made possible by the harmony between


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the strategies forged by the presidents and the idea of national interest secured by theministry. When Dilma Rousseff was elected in 2010, many thought she would returnforeign policymaking to Itamaraty, given her apparent lack of interest in global ques-tionsexcept for the defense of human rights, which was part of the presidents ownbiography. The nomination of Ambassador Antonio Patriota as foreign minister, whohad a lower and more technical prole than his predecessor, also pointed towards arisk-averse foreign policy. In any case, expectations were high that traditional diplo-matic guidelines would be maintained, building on the achievements of previous years.

President Rousseffs relationship with the diplomatic institution, however, didnot turn out as imagined by several analysts and policymakers. It was clear, on theone hand, that she would retreat from the active presidential diplomacy of the priorheads of state. But rather than simply transfer some political prerogatives back toItamaraty, she decided to impose her own worldview on how foreign policy shouldbe made, dramatically constraining diplomats room for action. While it seeminglyhad to do with her personal traits and leadership style, with a more centralizedand straightforward touch (as opposed, for instance, to Lulas largely consensualstyle), it ended up revealing an insurmountable cognitive divergence between thepresident and the foreign ministry. Ever since President Rousseff took ofce therehave been several accounts of public and private disagreements between herself andForeign Minister Patriota; and other ministers were placed at the center of foreignpolicymaking. To one journalist, the problem was that diplomats were not able toadapt themselves to the presidents demands, which led Brazil to have weaker globalpositions. To another, quoting a senior diplomat, there is a growing sensation thatthe president deems diplomacy irrelevant and diplomats as a hindrance to herforeign policy goals. The unwanted but expected outcome is instability at the coreof foreign policymaking.

Indeed, some of Brazils major initiatives abroad in the last three years were under-taken without greater engagement, or even prior knowledge, of the foreign ministry.The ambitious Science without Borders program, aimed at sending undergraduate andgraduate students to top-notch universities in the elds of science, technology, andinnovation, was almost entirely devised and carried out by the ministries of educa-tion and of science and technologyeven though it partially changed the countrysinternational priorities. Infrastructure projects connecting Brazil and its neighbors,whose goal is to overcome some persistent economic bottlenecks, gained priority overregional political agreements that marked previous administrations. Itamaraty playeda secondary role in the diplomatic maneuver that admitted Venezuela to Mercosur,after suspending Paraguays membership due to an alleged breach of democracy. It fellto Lus Incio Adams, attorney general of the Union, not Patriota, to make a public


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case for the Brazilian government in Folha de So Paulowhich raised doubts as towhether the decision was made with the consent of diplomatic ofcers.

Finally, the most celebrated diplomatic achievement of the Rousseff administra-tionthe election of Brazilian Ambassador Roberto Azevdo as director-general ofthe World Trade Organizationwas claimed to be the fruit of the personal engage-ment in negotiations of President Rousseff and of Development, Industry and ForeignTrade Minister Fernando Pimentel. In the governments ofcial narrative, no wordhas been said about the diplomatic contacts built by Itamaraty in the previous yearsand which were key to Azevdos victory. The foreign ministry has been portrayed asunimportant even in the most central foreign policy issues. This weakens Itamaratywithin the government (already the ministry receives the second smallest budget allo-cation out of thirty-nine ministries) and undermines the prestige of diplomacy in theeyes of the public.

Occupy ItamaratyThe third crisis is the growing incompatibility between foreign policy and socialdemands. There are several reasons why foreign policy remained unchallenged overthe decades, most of which related to the notion that diplomatic orientations under-taken by Itamaraty enjoyed broad consensus along party lines. It may be arguedthat this agreement has been eroding from the moment foreign policy became adistributive issue. Democratization on the one hand and economic opening on theother, have been major forces in shaping the political process in post-authoritarianBrazil. One of the outcomes was the progressive transformation of foreign policyinto a public policy. Both international and societal demands had become morecomplex, with the potential to undermine the longtime understanding that Brazilsinternational affairs were driven by a monolithic national interest dened exclu-sively by Itamaraty. Professor Matias Spektor, who writes a fortnightly column onforeign affairs in Folha de So Paulo, has wisely pointed out that the greatest foreignpolicy challenge for the next years will be meeting the demands of the newandgrowingworking class in Brazil.

Signs of divided opinion on diplomatic paths have been quite evident ever sincePresident Cardoso took ofcethey intensied under President Lula. The interestingaspect of the struggle is that most of the criticism was red at the presidents them-selves and their foreign policy choices, leaving Itamaraty untouched. It leads us tothe necessary distinction, which is particularly critical in the Brazilian case, betweendiplomacy and foreign policy. While the former is often related to the work of diplo-mats on behalf of the foreign ministry, the latter encompasses a broader set of policieswhich are directed to foreign countries, regional blocs, or multilateral institutions. As


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already mentioned, the two concepts converged for most of the twentieth century,given Itamaratys enlarged role and prerogatives in foreign policymaking. Thanks tothe greater complexity of Brazils global agenda, diplomacy went on to become, inthe last two decades, a subset of foreign policysurely, the most important one, butstruggling to maintain its centrality in a context of rapid social, economic, and politi-cal transformations at home and abroad.

Guided by the long-standing motto the best tradition of Itamaraty is to be ableto renew itself, several institutional adaptations were undertaken within the ministryto keep up with these changes, such as increasing the number of diplomatic positions,improving recruitment mechanisms and bureaucratic structures, as well as enhancingtransparency through public diplomacy, social media, and academic publishing. Formany years, the ministrys slow but inevitable opening to democratic forces was enoughto shield diplomacy from public attack, mostly so because Itamaraty still enjoyed a greatdeal of prestige among presidents and within the public administration. Nevertheless,with the dramatic weakening of the foreign ofce in the Rousseff years, it is possible tosuggest that the ministry could not live up to the growing pressure to which it has beensubjectedirrespective of the achievements of the institutional reforms.

The symptoms were many: from high-ranked ofcers being charged with mis-conduct to allegations of unconstitutional super salaries being paid to ambassadorsoverseas, Itamaraty has been exposed like never before. In the most vehement criticismof the current state of Brazilian diplomacy, veteran journalist Fernando Rodrigues callsdiplomatic excellence a mirage, describes the ministry as a snakepit inhabited bygossipers, and claims that the foreign ministry possibly has the worst cost/benetratio for the Brazilian taxpayers. While it is not hard to dismiss the overstatements ofa long-standing foe of the diplomatic careerRodrigues published, as early as 2000,an Op-Ed entitled Privatize Itamaraty the growing number of scandals that havehit the headlines is indicative of turbulent times. Things only got worse when Justice Joaquim Barbosa declared, in an interview with O Globo in August 2013, that theforeign ministry was one of Brazils most discriminatory institutions. Barbosa, thecountrys rst black Supreme Court president, had been turned down for a diplomaticcareer because he did not t into the ideal prole supposedly due to his skin color.Although Barbosas declaration was quickly disavowed by the ministrys spokesper-son, his words were a blow to an institution that had been investing in afrmativeaction policies for more than a decade.

But perhaps the most eye-catching example of estrangement took place duringthe massive popular demonstrations all around Brazil in June 2013. In the countryscapital, protesters broke into the Itamaraty Palace and left a trace of damage alongthe buildings main faade. The palace has long been the greatest symbol of national


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diplomacy and a monument of Brazils republican virtues. The act of vandalism ledProfessor Dawisson Lopes to draw a comparison between popular discontent inBrazil and the United States. In his Op-Ed Occupy Itamaraty (in a clear parallelwith the events in Wall Street), he argues that the excessive formalism of Braziliandiplomacy is incompatible with political practices of the twenty-rst century. Hisconclusion points out to a structural problem which relates to the very nature of thediplomatic activity: in a time of instant and massive communication, in which indi-viduals, making use of their portable devices, exchange information from any pointof the planet it becomes less sensible for the taxpayer to fund public ofcers toperform apparently simple tasks such as sending ofcial telegrams or promoting cour-tesy among nations. It seems high time that a thorough public relations reform isundertaken to bring Itamaraty closer to the general public (not to mention to the keyinterest groups). Only by restoring its legitimacy and popular support will the minis-try be able to regain ground as the pillar of foreign policymaking in Brazil.

In Search of RenewalEven though the word crisis is often employed in its negative sense, one of Merriam-Websters denitions is an unstable or crucial time or state of affairs in which adecisive change is impending. There is no denying that Brazilian diplomacy is goingthrough difcult moments, and that a major transformation is being demanded frommany different sides. After all, Brazilian democracy has come of age. But it is impor-tant to assess the depth and extent of the three crises, for they do not represent equalchallenges to the future of Itamaraty and of Brazils foreign policy as we know it.While the crisis of ideological neutrality is the most commonly mentioned in thepages of newspapershaving become a staple among journalists and politiciansit isprobably the least perilous to the foreign service. Partisan interference in diplomaticaffairs is relatively low, and strategies played out by specic administrations rarelycontradict the goals and traditions set forth by Itamaraty. As long as foreign policyremains salient in the public agenda, debates over the ideological leanings of foreignpolicymakers will eventually surface. Judging by the last two decades, however, theimpact of such discussions will be triing.

The second and third crises should be of greater concern. If presidential diplomacyis not necessarily antithetical to the traditional foundations of Brazilian diplomacy, itbecomes a problem when the relationship between the chief executive and the dip-lomatic body is marked by divergent worldviews. That seems to be the case of thecurrent administration, and one of the most daunting tasks of the new foreign minister,Luiz Alberto Figueiredo, is to build stronger bridges between the president (and allpolitical imperatives that come with the ofce) and the long-standing role of Itamaraty.


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In any event, cognitive dissonance is a short-term issue; power shifts at the top ofthe executive branch may open up opportunities for new equilibria between politi-cians and diplomats. Societal demands, on the other hand, are a much stronger force,but its impacts are only felt in the long run. Apparently, given the conuence of chal-lenges the Brazilian diplomatic structure has to face, the time has arrived for a decisivechange in how Itamaraty addresses the idea of a democratic foreign policy. Withimproved accountability mechanisms and a renewed reputation among the generalpublic, the Ministry of External Relations may nd the necessary leverage to over-come the so-called crises and to live up to the challenges of this new century, whileremaining the cornerstone of our national aspirations.

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