Chapter 8 Compensating Wage Differentials. What affects occupational choice? wages non-pecuniary...
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Transcript of Chapter 8 Compensating Wage Differentials. What affects occupational choice? wages non-pecuniary...
What affects occupational choice?
• wages
• non-pecuniary characteristics
• since jobs have both of these attributes, people face tradeoffs between them
Compare two jobs - - Both pay $7.50/hour
• Firm X is offering an office job as a file clerk
• Firm Y is an asphalt company who needs workers to help pave roads
• Which firm will attract more applicants at a wage of $7.50?
• What will have to happen at Firm Y to attract more workers?
The extra wage that is paid to attract workers into paving roads is called the compensating wage
differential• workers require "combat pay" for undesirable
working conditions
• on the other hand, the pleasant atmosphere of desirable jobs must be bought by the workers through lower pay
Compensating Wage Differentials
• the price at which various qualitative job characteristics are bought and sold
• “BADS” result in positive differentials (higher wages)
• “GOODS” result in negative differentials (lower wages)
Holding worker characteristics constant, employees in “bad”
jobs receive higher wages than those working under more
pleasant conditions.
What are these worker characteristics?
• skill• age• sex• race• marital status• education• geographic region• union status
We will assume:
• workers maximize utility
• workers have perfect information about their jobs
• workers have mobility
Utility Maximization
• if we used income maximization, the worker would take the highest paying job regardless of attributes
• this is likely not the case with most workers
Perfect Information
• workers are aware of the job characteristics and the wages paid
• this may not always be true
• for example, workers did not use to know the adverse effect of asbestos
Worker Mobility
• workers have a range of jobs to choose from and can look for a new job while working
• median job tenure in the U.S. is 3.5 years
When graphing worker preferences for wages vs. job characteristics, we
use indifference curves• we will put the wage on the y-axis
• we will put the risk of injury on the x-axis
• since risk is a “bad”, these indifference curves will have an unusual shape
• the indifference curves will be upward-sloping and convex
The indifference curves will be upward-sloping
• to accept more risk, an individual will require a higher wage to remain equally satisfied
• this is because the worker’s utility is lowered if they incur an injury
Risk
Wage
R0
w0
R1
U1
Suppose a person is currently at point A. If the risk of the job rises to R1, the person will only remain equally satisfied if...
A
The indifference curves will be convex
• at low risk of injury, the person is not as willing to accept a lower wage for an additional decrease in risk, relative to when risks are high
.
Risk
Wage
R0
W0
Given that risks are low, the worker requires only a small increase in wage to accept additional risk
U1
Risk
Wage
R1
W1
When risk is higher, the worker will require a larger increase in wage to accept additional risk
U1
Risk
Wage
Joe Tom
The steeper the curve, the more risk averse the worker. Joe is more risk averse than Tom.
Risk
Wage
Joe Tom
R0
w0
w1T
R1
w1J
Joe is willing to accept a much lower wage than Tom to have risk reduced from R0 to R1
Isoprofit Curves
• are different across employers
• reflect the combinations of risk and wage that result in the same level of profit for the firm
• are upward-sloping and concave
Isoprofit curves are upward-sloping
• since reducing risk is costly to the firm, it will be willing to pay higher wages as jobs become more risky
• thus, there should be a positive relationship between risk and wage reflected in the isoprofit curve
Risk
Wage
0
w0
R0
w1
R1
A
B
A firm is equally profitable at A or B. Note that higher risk allows the
firm to pay higher wages.
Isoprofit curves are concave
• this is due to diminishing marginal returns to reducing risk
• at first, firms will use safety measures that can be done so most easily and inexpensively
• the more safety measures employed by a firm, the more expensive and difficult additional measures will be
Risk
Wage
1w0
R0
w1
R1
2
w2
To reduce risk from R0 to R1 and keep profit constant, Firm 1 would have to lower wages only to w1 while Firm 2 would have tolower wages to w2. Thus, Firm 1can reduce the risk at lowerrelative cost.
Equilibrium
• occurs where the isoprofit curve is tangent to the indifference curve
• this means that the slope of the isoprofit curve is equal to the slope of the indifference curve
• the rate at which the firm is able to trade wages for risk is equal to the rate at which workers are willing to trade wages for risk
Given isoprofit and indifference curves, we can show that:
• more risk averse workers will work at less risky jobs that pay lower wages
• firms with higher costs of reducing risks will pay higher wages
Wages Rise With Risk
• workers with strong preferences for safety are willing to accept lower wages
• workers with strong preferences for safety will take jobs where safety can be generated at a lower cost
How do government programs controlling risk affect workers’
utility?The federal government
set safety standards for many occupations
through OSHA (Occupational Safety
and Health Administration)
Suppose a firm is threatened with large fines by the government if they do not comply to safety standards. If the firm
complies with the standards, are the workers better off?
• not if the workers know the risks
• the workers may be better off if they are unaware of the risks
• we can use our model to show this
Risk
Wage
w0
R0
U0
0
R*
Suppose that R* is the minimum acceptable amount of risk allowable by government standards
Risk
Wage
w0
R0
U0
0
R*
The firm will only offer a wage of w* (any higher wage would reduce profit)
w*
What happens when the worker does not know the true level of
risk?
In this case, government intervention can make the worker better off
Unknown Risk
• Suppose a worker receives a wage of w0 and thinks that the risk level is R0
• the worker thinks that his utility level is U0
• but, if the actual risk is Ra, the actual utility level is Ua
Government intervention can help in this case
• if the government sets the allowable risk level between Ra and Rb,workers will actually end up on a higher indifference curve.
• the workers may perceive that they are worse off (because their wage will be lower) when in fact they have been made better off (because the level of risk has been reduced)
Risk
Wage
w0
R0
U0
Ra
Ua
Rb R*
Suppose the government chooses R* as the minimum amount of risk that is acceptable
0