Challenge to Externality

7/27/2019 Challenge to Externality

1/24

Challenge to Externality: A Buddhist Perspective

Submitted By:

Manish kumar

Philosophy


2/24

Buddhist doctrine ofpratityasamutpda holds that everything in this world

is dependently originated. Thus, there is nothing that is essentially real. There are

a number of factors which come together to give rise to something. For the

Vijnnavdins, there is a single reality called vijnapti and thus their position is

called vijnaptimtrat. According to them, all that exists is only ideas,

representations, images, imaginations, creations of the mind, to which no real

object existing outside the mind corresponds. These ideas are the only object of

any cognition. Vijnnavdins pose a strong opposition to the realist Naiyyikas for

whom what we are directly aware of in our perception is the physical reality that

exists independently of our awareness of it. Vasubandhu, in his

Vijnaptimtratsiddhi, attacks the realist position and gives arguments to refute the

same.

The paper begins with the meaning of the term externality in the present

context i.e. the ontological status of external objects in a realist school. For the

realists, our cognition of an object is same as the object itself. The object exists

independent of our perception. Following this, I bring forth the challenge to this

externality. This challenge is put forward by Vasubandhu in Vimatik, the first

part of his workVijnaptimtratsiddhi. The task taken up by Vasubandhu here is

to prove the hollowness of the claim that external objects are real. With the help of

arguments like dream experience, Vasubandhu dissolves the correspondence

between a concept and an object of experience.

However, in hisMadhyamakvatra, Candrakrti attacks the Vijnnavdin

notion ofcittamtara or consciousness-only. He criticizes the dream-illustration


3/24

given by Vasubandhu. There is a brief discussion on the same. After going

through Vasubandhus take on realism in Vimatik, the later part of the paper is

an exposition of his theory of consciousness i.e., vijnnaparinma or

transformation of consciousness and trisvabhva or the doctrine of three natures of

consciousness.

The primary texts for my present study are: Vasubandhus

Vijnaptimtratsiddhi.


4/24

One of the chief problems of philosophy has been regarding the nature of

reality and a number of enquiries have been done into it. Broadly, there are two

positions on this issue, one of which is realist and the other is idealist.1 As the

present paper aims to bring out challenges charged at externality, I would begin

with a brief introduction to the realist position, which advocates that the mind

apprehends an external object which exists irrespective of its being apprehended by

the mind.2

The term externality, in the present context, represents the realist position

on external objects. T.R.V. Murti rightly points out that the Nyya-Vaiesika

is the most intelligible of the Indian Realism. He says that it is nearer to common-

sense than any other realist system. There is a surprising comprehensiveness and

neatness about its tenets without loss of rigour. This is due in great measure to the

close modelling of the categories on every day speech. Hence its great hold upon

our empirical mind. Murti thinks that we are all Naiyyikas first and continue to

be so unless by a special effort we free ourselves from the empirical habits of our

mind.3 This special effort should be credited to the Buddhists who try to

deconstruct or common-sense beliefs.

For the Naiyyikas, each object has an individuality of its own. According

to Murti, the independence of the object of all subjective influence logically

implies the individuality and distinctness of each object. This is, thus, in contrast

1D.N. Shastri, Critique of Indian Realism (Agra University, 1964), 39

2Ibid., 39

3T.R.V. Murti, Studies in Indian Thought: Collected Papers of Prof. T.R.V. Murti(Motilal Banrsidass, 1996), 135


5/24

to the idealistic tendency to subjectify the object.4 In Nyya, what we are directly

aware of in our perception is the physical reality that exists independently of our

awareness of it. This reality exists in the external world as a whole.

An object, for the Naiyyikas, is a cluster of atoms (avayavas), consisting of

properties (viesana), relations (sambandha) and a structure (viesya). The

avayavas come together to form avayavin or the whole. This individual whole has

a class, which is called the universal orsmnya. The reason why Naiyyikas

believe that there is a whole is that an object, in its atomic condition, cannot be

perceived since atoms are beyond the reach of sense-organs. Yet, we have objects

of perception in the world. There is a whole because we can hold, pull, push these

objects. Had there been no wholes, it would have been impossible to actually

experience the objects. The basic principle of Nyya-Vaiesika can be understood

as that everything is definable as well as knowable as object.

The object is real along with its properties and relations. They are as real as

the object itself. As D.N. Shastri says, the formulation of the Nyya-Vaiesika

categories is a clear-cut and sharp differentiation between properties and the

substance in which they inhere. The substance and its properties are held to be two

distinct and different entities with separate essences and separate set of causes.

Properties are subordinate to the substance only in the sense that the former are

always found only as inhering in a substance. Thus, the basic principle of the

4T.R.V. Murti, Studies in Indian Thought: Collected Papers of Prof. T.R.V. Murti, 136


6/24

Nyya-Vaiesika metaphysics is the theory of dharma-dharmin-bheda i.e., the

differentiation in essence between the substrata and their properties.5

However, the realist theory has created a lot of unrest among the idealists,

particularly the Buddhists. Vasubandhu, in his Vijnaptimtrtsiddhi, has attacked

the realist position. It is important to understand here that the use of the term

idealists for the Yogcrins is done only with reference to their epistemology.

That is to say, Yogcrins are not denying the metaphysical reality of an object,

but they maintain that the things we believe ourselves to perceive are only the our

ideas. In short, as D.N. Shastri says, they hold that there is no objective world

independent of the perceiving mind.6 In the following section, I would discuss the

objections that Yogcrins have raised against Naiyyikas.

Vasubandhus Vijnaptimatratasiddhi is divided into two sections viz.

Vimatik and Trimik. Vimatik is basically an examination of the common-

sense view, i.e. the realist view. The fundamental principle of the Yogcra is the

non-distinction between subject and object, which is a complete anti-thesis of the

realists. Thus, the challenge that Vasubandhu advance towards the realists is based

on this issue. The Yogcrin position may be well understood as

bhyrthanyat or the denial of a real external object.

The whole idea of Yogcra thesis is contained in the opening krik of

Vimatik, which is as follows:

5D.N. Shastri, Critique of Indian Realism, 77

6Ibid., 42


7/24

There is a mere concept, because it reflects a substantially non-existent

object, like the perception of hair and [double] moon on the part of one

afflicted with eye-disease.7

Through this krik, Vasubandhu is trying to demonstrate that to believe that

something such exists in the external world which corresponds to our concept is

due to a fault in cognition. As erroneous is the vision of a diseased-eye that sees

floating hair in the air or a double moon, so is the vision of a substantially non-

existent object. What is meant here is precisely that the outside world does not

exist in the structure we impose onto it. Structuring is the doing of the

consciousness; and if we can show that there is no correspondence between the

external object and our concept of it, we are left with the concept alone.

Commenting on this krik, Sylvan Levi explains that the possibility of such

illusory perceptions is because of the reason that they are conditioned by various

factors. Even if one is not afflicted by an eye-disease, one of the most important

factors that determine sensory experience is human disposition (samskras or

vsans). So, to assume that an object can be known without any distortion and

can be known as it is, is to claim too much. It is this over-claim of the

metaphysical realist that Vasubandhu criticizes as the non-existent object.8

7David J. Kalupahana. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology(Sri Satguru publications, 1992), 173

8Ibid., 174


8/24

As far as Vasubandhus contention of mere concept is concerned, it can be

understood through the very name of his text, Vijnaptimtratsiddhi or as

vijnaptimtrat alone i.e., mind-only or consciousness-only. Hence

Vasubandhus position can be stated as: All that exists is only ideas,

representations, images, imaginations, creations of the mind, to which no real

object existing outside the mind corresponds. These ideas are the only object of

any cognition. The whole universe is a mental universe. It is similar to a dream, a

mirage, a magical illusion, where what we perceive are only products of our mind,

without a real external existence.9

This is also the reason that Buddhists do not approve of the realist theory of

two-staged perception. As the Naiyayikas believe, perception of an object takes

place in two stages, nirvikalpa pratyaksa or indeterminate perception and

savikalpapratyaksa or determinate perception. The first stage involves a mere

subject-object contact, while the second stage is the one where the concept of the

object is formed. Buddhists like Dignga, who has acutely criticized Nyya theory

of perception, would object here that when the conception happens, mental

associations are ascribed to the object. The object which came in contact with the

sense is no more the same when understood as having qualities, relations etc. that

are actually attributed to it by the mind.

Coming back to the meaning ofvijnaptimtrat, when Vasubandhu explains

his theory as mere concept, he certainly does not mean that a non-existent

9Fernando and Carmen Dragonetti, Being as Consciousness: Yogcra Philosophy of Buddhism (Motilal

Banarsidass Publishers, 2004), xxiii


9/24

object is absolutely imagined or false. On the contrary, it is an experience that

involves ones depositional tendencies (samskras or vsans) and which is

communicated through a concept. Vasubandhu does not mean that truth or reality

is beyond description, but that he follows Buddhas own explanation that there are

no eternal truths apart from sense-experience and which are communicated through

concepts. As sense-experience is dispositionally conditioned and, therefore, liable

to change depending upon conditions, the concepts by means of which such

experience is communicated could not be incorruptible nor can they represent an

object that is completely independent.10

Such a take on objects creates restlessness among the realists. Their

objection to this has been expressed in krik-2 of the Vimatik:

If a concept were to be without a real object, neither the determination of

space and time, nor the non-determination of the [perceptual stream] nor

fruitful activity would be proper.11

Thomas A. Kochumuttom explains the above krik as: Normally an

experience is determined by the place where, and the time when, its object is

given; it is not however, determined with regard to the individuals enjoying it, in

the sense that anybody present at that place and time inevitably has that

experience; finally, it is also observed that a particular experience always prompts

the same sort of actions. All this is so, it is argued, because the experience

10David J. Kalupahana. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, 174-175

11Ibid., 175


10/24

corresponds to extra-mental objects.12 However, in case this correspondence is

denied, there would be no proper determination of space, time, individuals

experiencing and actions prompted.

In response to this, Vasubandhu argues:

As in dreams, the determination of space etc., is established. Furthermore,

as in case of departed spirits, the non-determination of the [perceptual]

stream is established by the perception of the stream of puss etc., by all of

them. 13

On this, Sylvan Levi points out a very important feature of Vasubandhus

theory that he is least interested in discovering a special intuitive faculty through

which a real object, whether it is eternal or not, could be perceived. Levi saysthat instead of looking for any transcendence, he prefers to deal with the problem

of sense-experience itself. Vasubandhu questions, if the determinations of space

and time are possible in dream-experience even without the so-called real objects,

why is it necessary to posit such an object when one is called upon to explain

sense-experience?14

12Thomas A. Kochumuttom,A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience (Motilal Banarsidass, 1982), 167

13David J. Kalupahana. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, 176

14Ibid., 176


11/24

Now the dream of certain objects occurs only at certain places and that too,

only at certain times. Thus, dream-experience, too, even though it does not

correspond to extra-mental objects, is determined by space and time. Again, all

ghosts are believed to have the same experience of pus-river etc., although the

latter are not extra-mental objects. So, experience shared by all individuals present

does not necessarily guarantee reference to extra-mental objects.15

With respect to fruitful activity, Vasubandhu argues that certain fixed

actions resulting from an experience is not an assurance that there is an external

and independent object. He says that even dream-experiences produce certain

fixed actions. For example, on seeing a lion in his dream, one wakes up out of

fear. Therefore, experience does not guarantee one-to-one correspondence

between concepts and extra-mental objects. Experience starts not with an extra-

mental object but with consciousness, which alone can supply the forms of

subjectivity and objectivity.16

However, the dream example of Vasubandhu does not stand good with the

Mdhyamikas. In hisMadhyamakvatra, Candrakrti refutes this example to be

an appropriate one. He explains that while the Cittamtrins or the Yogcrins may

sleep in a tiny room and dream about wild elephants, obviously, no elephant is

present (there is only mind, devoid of real objects). From the Mdhyamika point

of view, in the absence of external referents, consciousness cannot be produced in

15Thomas A. Kochumuttom,A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience, 168

16Ibid., 170


12/24

the aspect of such referents. The Mdhyamikas say that there is no real cognitive

subject, just as there is no real elephant as the object.17

The Cittamtrins would say here that if while dreaming, consciousness is not

real, it follows that on waking, it would be impossible to recall one s dreams. But

as a matter of fact, one does remember them, and this shows that mind is real. To

this Mdhyamikas reply that in that case, the object of the dream should be as real

as the dreaming-consciousness. For if, having woken up, one remembers and

thinks, I dreamed about such and such a thing, this thing must have the same

degree of existence as the subject, the dreaming consciousness.18

To this, Cittamtrins would respond by arguing that since the visual sense

power is not operative during sleep, there is no corresponding visual

consciousness. Therefore, there cannot actually be any extra-mental shapes and

colours as objects of perception. The mental consciousness remains, however, and

this, altered or affected by the state of sleep, manifests in the form of outer objects.

These various aspects of the mental consciousness are taken to be extra-mental

phenomena. And what happens in the waking state, is exactly the same as what

happens in the dreaming state. Vasubandhu adds here that unless one has roused

from the sleep of ignorance, he cannot realise the unreality of the objects.19

17Candrakrt, Introduction to the Middle Way: Candrakris Madhyamakvatra with Commentary by Ju Mipham

(Shambhala Publications, 2005), 229-23018

Ibid., 23019

Ibid., 231


13/24

Vasubandhu then goes on prove that the perceptual evidence of the objective

world cannot be trusted. In order to do this, he attacks the Nyya atom-theory:

Atom-wise, an object is neither one nor many. Neither is it a

conglomeration of them. For that reason, an atom is not established.20

In his auto-commentary, Vasubandhu explains the implications of the theory

of atoms, as it emerged in the Vaiesika school. According to him, the Vaiesikas

believed that spheres like material form (rpa), which holds one-to-one

correspondence with the concepts of material form, represent a unity in terms of a

molecule, i.e., an entity that consists of parts (avayavrpa). However, in terms of

atoms it is a plurality (aneka). Vasubandhu argues that a whole is not perceived

apart from its parts. Even so, a molecule is nowhere perceived independent of its

constituents. Similarly, the object is not a unity of atoms or parts. Neither is it

plurality, for the atoms that go to constitute a molecule are also not perceived,

either as individual units (pratyeka) or as an aggregate (samghta).21

Vasubandhu here aims to abandon the whole theory of the Naiyyikas. Levi

says that Vasubandhus realization that as a Buddhist he could not argue for an

empirical foundation of a theory of atoms, as the Vaiesikas did, compelled him to

resort to rational arguments to deny its validity. Therefore, he argues: When an

atom has to combine with six others from six directions, it has to possess six facets.

For one atom cannot occupy the space of another. However, if each atom were to


21Ibid., 183


14/24

occupy an identical space and, by definition an atom has no magnitude, then the

aggregate itself would be a mere atom. In fact, an aggregate would not be

perceived if the parts are separate from one another.22

For an atom to aggregate, Levi explains, it should possess at least six

different facets or sides. This means that it has parts, and such an assertion would

go against the very definition of an atom. To avoid this contradiction, the Kmra

Vaibhikas insisted that atoms do not aggregate or do not touch one another. In

that case, Vasubandhu argues that samyoga or coalescence of atoms is not

possible. This is because to coalese, atoms would not just touch another but

mingle with one another completely, which is again impossible if the atoms were

to have parts. Thus, aggregation and coalescence involve two anti-nomial

processes. Without parts there could be no aggregation; with parts there could be

no coalescence.

After rejecting the realist position, Vasubandhu explains why there is a

subject-object duality. He says that it is a creation of consciousness that keeps

transforming in the universal flux of time. Conceptualization orupacra, asserts

Isshi Yamada, is inherent in our discursive thought and language. As such,

conceptualization takes place with regard both to the self (tman) and the elements

(dharmas).23 Regarding the same, Vasubandhu says in the very first krik of the

Trimik:


23Isshi Yamada, Vijnaptimatrata of Vasubandhu,Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland

(Cambridge University Press), 158-176


15/24

Whatever, indeed, is the variety of ideas of self and elements that prevails, it

occurs in the transformation of consciousness. Such transformation is

threefold.24

Through this krik, Vasubandhu tries to explain that in our world of

experience, when ones mind is at work, it takes the form of being conscious

(vijnna) of something. This something is limited to regarding self or elements.

Our consciousness is ever-changing and the transformation (parinma) ofvijnna

is the change of ones consciousness in temporal sequence. Vijnnaparinma is

also based upon the principle of dependent-origination orpratityasamutpda. The

vijnna of the present moment is the effect of the vijnna of the past moment, and

is the cause of the vijnna of the next moment.

Vasubandhu, in the above krik, speaks of three modes of

vijnnaparinma. Let us now have a glimpse of these modes:

1) Repository-consciousness or laya-vijanna: laya-vijnna is also known asvipka or resultant. With respect to this, David J. Kalupahana explains that

laya-vijanna is not the primordial consciousness (as seems to be, when called

repository consciousness), but a resultant. It eliminates a substantialist

interpretation of consciousness and is in conformity with the Buddhas own

explanation of consciousness as being dependently arisen. The laya does not

imply a metaphysical storehouse or an unconscious process, but carries the



16/24

same implication as laya in the Buddhas discourse where it means

anchoring or obsession. With such attachment or obsession functioning in

the consciousness, the laya-vijnna is not a passive recipient of sensory

impressions, a sort oftabula rasa.25

2) Mentation or mano-vijnna: At this stage, the ideas of self and elementsemerge. The conceptualization of an object, though based upon the experiential

flux, involves reflection. Such reflection inevitably brings about the feeling of

I (aham). This stage is represented by manas. According to Vasubandhu, the

concepts (vijnapti) of objects (vijnna) are dependent upon the manas. It is the

coordinating activity ofmanas that gives rise to the notion of a self.26

3) Object manifestation or visaya-vijnna: Here, the emphasis is on theacquisition (upalabdhih) of the object of experience unlike mano- vijnna

where the acquisition is directed at oneself. Kalupahana says that this is the

only consciousness that matters in empirical discourse. For all practical

purposes this constitutes our universe, since it includes everything whatsoever

as can be presented before the empirical consciousness.27

Isshi Yamada explains that wherever there is consciousness, it manifests itself

with the dichotomizing mental fabrication (vikalpa) inherent in our conceptualizing

discursive thought (upacra), bringing forth the notion of entity into atman and

dharma. According to Vasubandhu, however, the vijnna as gahaka and the

25David J. Kalupahana, Buddhist Thought and Ritual(Motilala Banrsidass, 2001),29


27Ibid., 199


17/24

vijneya as grhya (both are called vijnapti) are different in their degree of

existence. Conceptualization of these two kinds takes place only in the

vijnnaparinma, but not in the real atman and dharma, since dharmas and tman

do not exist apart from the vijnnaparinma.28

However, Kalupahana wants us to understand here is that the

vijnnaparinma is not from a primordial substance like prakrtiparinma in

Smkhya. It is a transformation of consciousness involving the laya, the manas

and the visaya-vijnapti all acting together, and it is this process that gives rise to

the beliefs in self and elements. Vasubandhu maintains in Trimik, what he began

with in Vimatik:

Thus, thought involves this transformation of consciousness. For that

reason, what has thus been thought of does not exist. Therefore, all this is

mere concept.29

Through this krik, Vasubandhu wants to again clarify his position that

there is no refutation of an object here. That which is denied here is the existence

of a real object that is reflected as it is in consciousness. Kalupahana explains

this by saying that the fact that consciousness, while reflecting the object, has

passed through several transformations makes it possible for the object to be

28Isshi Yamada, Vijnaptimatrata of Vasubandhu,Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland

(Cambridge University Press), 158-176



18/24

known as it is. For this reason, all that is available is a concept (vijnapti), not

an ultimate reality or substance, either in oneself or in the world of experience.

Richard King interprets Vasubandhus position in terms ofnyat. He says

that the imagination of the unreal is the discrimination between the duality of

grasped and grasper and emptiness is explained as "the imagination of the unreal

that is lacking in the form of being graspable or grasper." Thus, for the Yogcrin,

nyat is primarily the emptiness of grasper (i.e., subject) and grasped (i.e.,

object) (grhaka-grhya). Since our entire range of experiences is characterized by

a dichotomy between subject and object (with the possible exception of some

higher states ofsamdhi), this amounts to a universal application of 'emptiness'

(nyat). However, the Yogcrin stresses that the range of 'fictive' perceptions

that does occur, although not corresponding to an independently existing world of

subjects and objects, nevertheless does occur.30

However, without getting carried away with the termnyat here, I would

once again like to clarify Vasubandhus argument. Vasubandhu has been

maintaining that when our cognitions are influenced by our dispositions and our

sensory knowledge is carried beyond its confines, we tend to form beliefs in either

a metaphysical self or in metaphysical elements. However, this does not mean that

either knowledge (grha) and the known (grhya) or knowledge (grha) and the

knower (grhaka) have to be denied. What is denied is a knower that is

independent of knowing, a metaphysical cogito, or an object that is independent of

30Richard King, Early Yogcra and its Relationship with Madhyamaka School, Philosophy East and West

(University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 659-683


19/24

knowing, which is implied in substantial elements. These metaphysical beliefs are

determined, not by the available experiences, but by ones dispositions.31

On the note of subject-object duality, Thomas A. Kochumuttom says

that the entire doctrine oftrisvabhva or three natures of the consciousness hinges

on the same32:

(1)Parinispanna-svabhva (the absolutely accomplished nature) is that stateof existence in which the individual is characterized neither as a subject

nor as an object;

(2)Paratantra-svabhva (the other dependent nature) is that state ofexistence in which the individual is bound to see things as distinguished

into subjects and objects of experience;

(3)Parikalpita-svabhva (the imagined nature) is that state of existence inwhich the individual is seen as an object or subject of experience.

In other words, Kochumuttom explains, every individual in his absolutely

accomplished state of existence (parinispanna-svabhva) is neither a subject nor

an object of experience, but is reality as such (tathat); then he slips into the

unfortunate situation calledsamsra, where he is led to find himself as the subject

enjoying all else as objects of experience: this state of being conditioned by the

forces of ones own past deeds and habits, is called the other-dependent

(paratantra-svabhva); the forms of subjectivity and objectivity that are projected


32Thomas A. Kochumuttom,A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience, 90


20/24

on to the things by the individual in the other-dependent state of existence, are the

imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhva). Of the three natures, only parinispanna

and parikalpita have ontological pretensions. The former is the absolute state of

existence, while the latter is the samsric (phenomenal) state of existence. The

paratantra-svabhva, on the other hand, refers essentially to the very act of

projecting the forms of subjectivity and objectivity.33

The above discussions about the nature of Yogcrin consciousness bring

out clearly the non- existence of an ultimate reality, whether subjective or

objective. The chief characteristic of Vasubandhus theory is that it never wavers

or deviates from its focus i.e., epistemological issues. He constantly avoids the

interference of any metaphysical and mysterious something in his arguments, and

suggests us to get rid of our vsans in order to reach the world- transcending

knowledge.

In the end, I would like to sum up the paper with krik-16 ofVimatik:

Immediate knowledge is as in dream, etc. when that occurs, then that object

is not perceived. How, the, can immediacy be conceived.34

Vasubandhu, here, makes a very important point. He says that immediate

knowledge is like as in a dream. According to him, though human beings perceive

33Thomas A. Kochumuttom,A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience, 90-91



21/24

and continue to perceive objects, at the time of perception of the object, there

certainly is no awareness that one is perceiving that object. When awareness arises

that one is perceiving an object, then at that very moment the object is no more

perceived. Vasubandhu, here, is making an extremely subtle epistemological

distinction between perceiving an object and being aware of the perceiving of

an object. For him, what is generally understood as immediate perception is the

former, nor that latter. Thus by the time the awareness of perception arises, the

object perceived is already in the past is non-existent.

This account of perception, which can be traced back to Buddha himself, is

utilized by Vasubandhu who was keen on rejecting the nave realism of the

Sarvstivdins that an object that impinges on the senses can be perceived in its

real form without distortions. Instead of assuming that one can perceive a real

object, Vasubandhu is emphasizing the variety of conditions that affects every act

of perception.35

Thus we see that Vasubandhu, with his theory ofvijnaptimtrat, attempted

to highlight the psychological factors likesamskras that have an influence on our

perception of objects. What is important to understand is that there is no denial of

an immediate experience. Throughout his analysis of realist position, Vasubandhu

has the same question - if our experience reflects a real and substantial object or

not. In fact, Vasubandhu did not present even consciousness as the Absolute

Reality, for that would be to reintroduce some aspects of the Brahmanical notion of

a self (tman).



22/24

References:

Kalupahana, David J. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology. Sri SatguruPublications, 1992

Candrakrti, Introduction to the Middle Way: CandrakrtisMadhyamakvatra with Commentary by Ju Mipham. Shambhala

Publications, 2005

Kochumuttom, Thomas A. A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience. MotilalBanarsidass, 1982

Shastri, D.N. Critique of Indian Realism: a Study of Conflict betweenNyya-Vaiesika and Buddhist Dignga School. Agra University, 1964

Murti, T.R.V. Studies in Indian Thought: Collected Papers of Prof. T.R.V.Murti. Motilal Banarsidass, 1996

Fernando and Carmen Dragonetti. Being as Consciousness: YogacaraPhilosophy of Buddhism. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2004

Articles:

Yamada, Isshi. Vijnaptimtrat of Vasubandhu, Journal of the RoyalAsiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. Cambridge University Press,

Date of publishing not available (Cited at

http://www.jstor.org/stable/25210883)


23/24

King, Richard. Early Yogcra and Its Relationship with the MadhyamakaSchool,Philosophy East and West. University of Hawaii Press, 1994 (Cited

athttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1399757) .)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399757http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399757http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399757


24/24

Challenge to Externality

Documents

Transcript of Challenge to Externality