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Challenge to Externality: A Buddhist Perspective
Submitted By:
Manish kumar
Philosophy
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Buddhist doctrine ofpratityasamutpda holds that everything in this world
is dependently originated. Thus, there is nothing that is essentially real. There are
a number of factors which come together to give rise to something. For the
Vijnnavdins, there is a single reality called vijnapti and thus their position is
called vijnaptimtrat. According to them, all that exists is only ideas,
representations, images, imaginations, creations of the mind, to which no real
object existing outside the mind corresponds. These ideas are the only object of
any cognition. Vijnnavdins pose a strong opposition to the realist Naiyyikas for
whom what we are directly aware of in our perception is the physical reality that
exists independently of our awareness of it. Vasubandhu, in his
Vijnaptimtratsiddhi, attacks the realist position and gives arguments to refute the
same.
The paper begins with the meaning of the term externality in the present
context i.e. the ontological status of external objects in a realist school. For the
realists, our cognition of an object is same as the object itself. The object exists
independent of our perception. Following this, I bring forth the challenge to this
externality. This challenge is put forward by Vasubandhu in Vimatik, the first
part of his workVijnaptimtratsiddhi. The task taken up by Vasubandhu here is
to prove the hollowness of the claim that external objects are real. With the help of
arguments like dream experience, Vasubandhu dissolves the correspondence
between a concept and an object of experience.
However, in hisMadhyamakvatra, Candrakrti attacks the Vijnnavdin
notion ofcittamtara or consciousness-only. He criticizes the dream-illustration
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given by Vasubandhu. There is a brief discussion on the same. After going
through Vasubandhus take on realism in Vimatik, the later part of the paper is
an exposition of his theory of consciousness i.e., vijnnaparinma or
transformation of consciousness and trisvabhva or the doctrine of three natures of
consciousness.
The primary texts for my present study are: Vasubandhus
Vijnaptimtratsiddhi.
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One of the chief problems of philosophy has been regarding the nature of
reality and a number of enquiries have been done into it. Broadly, there are two
positions on this issue, one of which is realist and the other is idealist.1 As the
present paper aims to bring out challenges charged at externality, I would begin
with a brief introduction to the realist position, which advocates that the mind
apprehends an external object which exists irrespective of its being apprehended by
the mind.2
The term externality, in the present context, represents the realist position
on external objects. T.R.V. Murti rightly points out that the Nyya-Vaiesika
is the most intelligible of the Indian Realism. He says that it is nearer to common-
sense than any other realist system. There is a surprising comprehensiveness and
neatness about its tenets without loss of rigour. This is due in great measure to the
close modelling of the categories on every day speech. Hence its great hold upon
our empirical mind. Murti thinks that we are all Naiyyikas first and continue to
be so unless by a special effort we free ourselves from the empirical habits of our
mind.3 This special effort should be credited to the Buddhists who try to
deconstruct or common-sense beliefs.
For the Naiyyikas, each object has an individuality of its own. According
to Murti, the independence of the object of all subjective influence logically
implies the individuality and distinctness of each object. This is, thus, in contrast
1D.N. Shastri, Critique of Indian Realism (Agra University, 1964), 39
2Ibid., 39
3T.R.V. Murti, Studies in Indian Thought: Collected Papers of Prof. T.R.V. Murti(Motilal Banrsidass, 1996), 135
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to the idealistic tendency to subjectify the object.4 In Nyya, what we are directly
aware of in our perception is the physical reality that exists independently of our
awareness of it. This reality exists in the external world as a whole.
An object, for the Naiyyikas, is a cluster of atoms (avayavas), consisting of
properties (viesana), relations (sambandha) and a structure (viesya). The
avayavas come together to form avayavin or the whole. This individual whole has
a class, which is called the universal orsmnya. The reason why Naiyyikas
believe that there is a whole is that an object, in its atomic condition, cannot be
perceived since atoms are beyond the reach of sense-organs. Yet, we have objects
of perception in the world. There is a whole because we can hold, pull, push these
objects. Had there been no wholes, it would have been impossible to actually
experience the objects. The basic principle of Nyya-Vaiesika can be understood
as that everything is definable as well as knowable as object.
The object is real along with its properties and relations. They are as real as
the object itself. As D.N. Shastri says, the formulation of the Nyya-Vaiesika
categories is a clear-cut and sharp differentiation between properties and the
substance in which they inhere. The substance and its properties are held to be two
distinct and different entities with separate essences and separate set of causes.
Properties are subordinate to the substance only in the sense that the former are
always found only as inhering in a substance. Thus, the basic principle of the
4T.R.V. Murti, Studies in Indian Thought: Collected Papers of Prof. T.R.V. Murti, 136
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Nyya-Vaiesika metaphysics is the theory of dharma-dharmin-bheda i.e., the
differentiation in essence between the substrata and their properties.5
However, the realist theory has created a lot of unrest among the idealists,
particularly the Buddhists. Vasubandhu, in his Vijnaptimtrtsiddhi, has attacked
the realist position. It is important to understand here that the use of the term
idealists for the Yogcrins is done only with reference to their epistemology.
That is to say, Yogcrins are not denying the metaphysical reality of an object,
but they maintain that the things we believe ourselves to perceive are only the our
ideas. In short, as D.N. Shastri says, they hold that there is no objective world
independent of the perceiving mind.6 In the following section, I would discuss the
objections that Yogcrins have raised against Naiyyikas.
Vasubandhus Vijnaptimatratasiddhi is divided into two sections viz.
Vimatik and Trimik. Vimatik is basically an examination of the common-
sense view, i.e. the realist view. The fundamental principle of the Yogcra is the
non-distinction between subject and object, which is a complete anti-thesis of the
realists. Thus, the challenge that Vasubandhu advance towards the realists is based
on this issue. The Yogcrin position may be well understood as
bhyrthanyat or the denial of a real external object.
The whole idea of Yogcra thesis is contained in the opening krik of
Vimatik, which is as follows:
5D.N. Shastri, Critique of Indian Realism, 77
6Ibid., 42
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There is a mere concept, because it reflects a substantially non-existent
object, like the perception of hair and [double] moon on the part of one
afflicted with eye-disease.7
Through this krik, Vasubandhu is trying to demonstrate that to believe that
something such exists in the external world which corresponds to our concept is
due to a fault in cognition. As erroneous is the vision of a diseased-eye that sees
floating hair in the air or a double moon, so is the vision of a substantially non-
existent object. What is meant here is precisely that the outside world does not
exist in the structure we impose onto it. Structuring is the doing of the
consciousness; and if we can show that there is no correspondence between the
external object and our concept of it, we are left with the concept alone.
Commenting on this krik, Sylvan Levi explains that the possibility of such
illusory perceptions is because of the reason that they are conditioned by various
factors. Even if one is not afflicted by an eye-disease, one of the most important
factors that determine sensory experience is human disposition (samskras or
vsans). So, to assume that an object can be known without any distortion and
can be known as it is, is to claim too much. It is this over-claim of the
metaphysical realist that Vasubandhu criticizes as the non-existent object.8
7David J. Kalupahana. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology(Sri Satguru publications, 1992), 173
8Ibid., 174
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As far as Vasubandhus contention of mere concept is concerned, it can be
understood through the very name of his text, Vijnaptimtratsiddhi or as
vijnaptimtrat alone i.e., mind-only or consciousness-only. Hence
Vasubandhus position can be stated as: All that exists is only ideas,
representations, images, imaginations, creations of the mind, to which no real
object existing outside the mind corresponds. These ideas are the only object of
any cognition. The whole universe is a mental universe. It is similar to a dream, a
mirage, a magical illusion, where what we perceive are only products of our mind,
without a real external existence.9
This is also the reason that Buddhists do not approve of the realist theory of
two-staged perception. As the Naiyayikas believe, perception of an object takes
place in two stages, nirvikalpa pratyaksa or indeterminate perception and
savikalpapratyaksa or determinate perception. The first stage involves a mere
subject-object contact, while the second stage is the one where the concept of the
object is formed. Buddhists like Dignga, who has acutely criticized Nyya theory
of perception, would object here that when the conception happens, mental
associations are ascribed to the object. The object which came in contact with the
sense is no more the same when understood as having qualities, relations etc. that
are actually attributed to it by the mind.
Coming back to the meaning ofvijnaptimtrat, when Vasubandhu explains
his theory as mere concept, he certainly does not mean that a non-existent
9Fernando and Carmen Dragonetti, Being as Consciousness: Yogcra Philosophy of Buddhism (Motilal
Banarsidass Publishers, 2004), xxiii
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object is absolutely imagined or false. On the contrary, it is an experience that
involves ones depositional tendencies (samskras or vsans) and which is
communicated through a concept. Vasubandhu does not mean that truth or reality
is beyond description, but that he follows Buddhas own explanation that there are
no eternal truths apart from sense-experience and which are communicated through
concepts. As sense-experience is dispositionally conditioned and, therefore, liable
to change depending upon conditions, the concepts by means of which such
experience is communicated could not be incorruptible nor can they represent an
object that is completely independent.10
Such a take on objects creates restlessness among the realists. Their
objection to this has been expressed in krik-2 of the Vimatik:
If a concept were to be without a real object, neither the determination of
space and time, nor the non-determination of the [perceptual stream] nor
fruitful activity would be proper.11
Thomas A. Kochumuttom explains the above krik as: Normally an
experience is determined by the place where, and the time when, its object is
given; it is not however, determined with regard to the individuals enjoying it, in
the sense that anybody present at that place and time inevitably has that
experience; finally, it is also observed that a particular experience always prompts
the same sort of actions. All this is so, it is argued, because the experience
10David J. Kalupahana. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, 174-175
11Ibid., 175
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corresponds to extra-mental objects.12 However, in case this correspondence is
denied, there would be no proper determination of space, time, individuals
experiencing and actions prompted.
In response to this, Vasubandhu argues:
As in dreams, the determination of space etc., is established. Furthermore,
as in case of departed spirits, the non-determination of the [perceptual]
stream is established by the perception of the stream of puss etc., by all of
them. 13
On this, Sylvan Levi points out a very important feature of Vasubandhus
theory that he is least interested in discovering a special intuitive faculty through
which a real object, whether it is eternal or not, could be perceived. Levi saysthat instead of looking for any transcendence, he prefers to deal with the problem
of sense-experience itself. Vasubandhu questions, if the determinations of space
and time are possible in dream-experience even without the so-called real objects,
why is it necessary to posit such an object when one is called upon to explain
sense-experience?14
12Thomas A. Kochumuttom,A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience (Motilal Banarsidass, 1982), 167
13David J. Kalupahana. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, 176
14Ibid., 176
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Now the dream of certain objects occurs only at certain places and that too,
only at certain times. Thus, dream-experience, too, even though it does not
correspond to extra-mental objects, is determined by space and time. Again, all
ghosts are believed to have the same experience of pus-river etc., although the
latter are not extra-mental objects. So, experience shared by all individuals present
does not necessarily guarantee reference to extra-mental objects.15
With respect to fruitful activity, Vasubandhu argues that certain fixed
actions resulting from an experience is not an assurance that there is an external
and independent object. He says that even dream-experiences produce certain
fixed actions. For example, on seeing a lion in his dream, one wakes up out of
fear. Therefore, experience does not guarantee one-to-one correspondence
between concepts and extra-mental objects. Experience starts not with an extra-
mental object but with consciousness, which alone can supply the forms of
subjectivity and objectivity.16
However, the dream example of Vasubandhu does not stand good with the
Mdhyamikas. In hisMadhyamakvatra, Candrakrti refutes this example to be
an appropriate one. He explains that while the Cittamtrins or the Yogcrins may
sleep in a tiny room and dream about wild elephants, obviously, no elephant is
present (there is only mind, devoid of real objects). From the Mdhyamika point
of view, in the absence of external referents, consciousness cannot be produced in
15Thomas A. Kochumuttom,A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience, 168
16Ibid., 170
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the aspect of such referents. The Mdhyamikas say that there is no real cognitive
subject, just as there is no real elephant as the object.17
The Cittamtrins would say here that if while dreaming, consciousness is not
real, it follows that on waking, it would be impossible to recall one s dreams. But
as a matter of fact, one does remember them, and this shows that mind is real. To
this Mdhyamikas reply that in that case, the object of the dream should be as real
as the dreaming-consciousness. For if, having woken up, one remembers and
thinks, I dreamed about such and such a thing, this thing must have the same
degree of existence as the subject, the dreaming consciousness.18
To this, Cittamtrins would respond by arguing that since the visual sense
power is not operative during sleep, there is no corresponding visual
consciousness. Therefore, there cannot actually be any extra-mental shapes and
colours as objects of perception. The mental consciousness remains, however, and
this, altered or affected by the state of sleep, manifests in the form of outer objects.
These various aspects of the mental consciousness are taken to be extra-mental
phenomena. And what happens in the waking state, is exactly the same as what
happens in the dreaming state. Vasubandhu adds here that unless one has roused
from the sleep of ignorance, he cannot realise the unreality of the objects.19
17Candrakrt, Introduction to the Middle Way: Candrakris Madhyamakvatra with Commentary by Ju Mipham
(Shambhala Publications, 2005), 229-23018
Ibid., 23019
Ibid., 231
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Vasubandhu then goes on prove that the perceptual evidence of the objective
world cannot be trusted. In order to do this, he attacks the Nyya atom-theory:
Atom-wise, an object is neither one nor many. Neither is it a
conglomeration of them. For that reason, an atom is not established.20
In his auto-commentary, Vasubandhu explains the implications of the theory
of atoms, as it emerged in the Vaiesika school. According to him, the Vaiesikas
believed that spheres like material form (rpa), which holds one-to-one
correspondence with the concepts of material form, represent a unity in terms of a
molecule, i.e., an entity that consists of parts (avayavrpa). However, in terms of
atoms it is a plurality (aneka). Vasubandhu argues that a whole is not perceived
apart from its parts. Even so, a molecule is nowhere perceived independent of its
constituents. Similarly, the object is not a unity of atoms or parts. Neither is it
plurality, for the atoms that go to constitute a molecule are also not perceived,
either as individual units (pratyeka) or as an aggregate (samghta).21
Vasubandhu here aims to abandon the whole theory of the Naiyyikas. Levi
says that Vasubandhus realization that as a Buddhist he could not argue for an
empirical foundation of a theory of atoms, as the Vaiesikas did, compelled him to
resort to rational arguments to deny its validity. Therefore, he argues: When an
atom has to combine with six others from six directions, it has to possess six facets.
For one atom cannot occupy the space of another. However, if each atom were to
20David J. Kalupahana. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, 182
21Ibid., 183
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occupy an identical space and, by definition an atom has no magnitude, then the
aggregate itself would be a mere atom. In fact, an aggregate would not be
perceived if the parts are separate from one another.22
For an atom to aggregate, Levi explains, it should possess at least six
different facets or sides. This means that it has parts, and such an assertion would
go against the very definition of an atom. To avoid this contradiction, the Kmra
Vaibhikas insisted that atoms do not aggregate or do not touch one another. In
that case, Vasubandhu argues that samyoga or coalescence of atoms is not
possible. This is because to coalese, atoms would not just touch another but
mingle with one another completely, which is again impossible if the atoms were
to have parts. Thus, aggregation and coalescence involve two anti-nomial
processes. Without parts there could be no aggregation; with parts there could be
no coalescence.
After rejecting the realist position, Vasubandhu explains why there is a
subject-object duality. He says that it is a creation of consciousness that keeps
transforming in the universal flux of time. Conceptualization orupacra, asserts
Isshi Yamada, is inherent in our discursive thought and language. As such,
conceptualization takes place with regard both to the self (tman) and the elements
(dharmas).23 Regarding the same, Vasubandhu says in the very first krik of the
Trimik:
22David J. Kalupahana. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, 183
23Isshi Yamada, Vijnaptimatrata of Vasubandhu,Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland
(Cambridge University Press), 158-176
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Whatever, indeed, is the variety of ideas of self and elements that prevails, it
occurs in the transformation of consciousness. Such transformation is
threefold.24
Through this krik, Vasubandhu tries to explain that in our world of
experience, when ones mind is at work, it takes the form of being conscious
(vijnna) of something. This something is limited to regarding self or elements.
Our consciousness is ever-changing and the transformation (parinma) ofvijnna
is the change of ones consciousness in temporal sequence. Vijnnaparinma is
also based upon the principle of dependent-origination orpratityasamutpda. The
vijnna of the present moment is the effect of the vijnna of the past moment, and
is the cause of the vijnna of the next moment.
Vasubandhu, in the above krik, speaks of three modes of
vijnnaparinma. Let us now have a glimpse of these modes:
1) Repository-consciousness or laya-vijanna: laya-vijnna is also known asvipka or resultant. With respect to this, David J. Kalupahana explains that
laya-vijanna is not the primordial consciousness (as seems to be, when called
repository consciousness), but a resultant. It eliminates a substantialist
interpretation of consciousness and is in conformity with the Buddhas own
explanation of consciousness as being dependently arisen. The laya does not
imply a metaphysical storehouse or an unconscious process, but carries the
24David J. Kalupahana. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, 192
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same implication as laya in the Buddhas discourse where it means
anchoring or obsession. With such attachment or obsession functioning in
the consciousness, the laya-vijnna is not a passive recipient of sensory
impressions, a sort oftabula rasa.25
2) Mentation or mano-vijnna: At this stage, the ideas of self and elementsemerge. The conceptualization of an object, though based upon the experiential
flux, involves reflection. Such reflection inevitably brings about the feeling of
I (aham). This stage is represented by manas. According to Vasubandhu, the
concepts (vijnapti) of objects (vijnna) are dependent upon the manas. It is the
coordinating activity ofmanas that gives rise to the notion of a self.26
3) Object manifestation or visaya-vijnna: Here, the emphasis is on theacquisition (upalabdhih) of the object of experience unlike mano- vijnna
where the acquisition is directed at oneself. Kalupahana says that this is the
only consciousness that matters in empirical discourse. For all practical
purposes this constitutes our universe, since it includes everything whatsoever
as can be presented before the empirical consciousness.27
Isshi Yamada explains that wherever there is consciousness, it manifests itself
with the dichotomizing mental fabrication (vikalpa) inherent in our conceptualizing
discursive thought (upacra), bringing forth the notion of entity into atman and
dharma. According to Vasubandhu, however, the vijnna as gahaka and the
25David J. Kalupahana, Buddhist Thought and Ritual(Motilala Banrsidass, 2001),29
26David J. Kalupahana. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, 197
27Ibid., 199
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vijneya as grhya (both are called vijnapti) are different in their degree of
existence. Conceptualization of these two kinds takes place only in the
vijnnaparinma, but not in the real atman and dharma, since dharmas and tman
do not exist apart from the vijnnaparinma.28
However, Kalupahana wants us to understand here is that the
vijnnaparinma is not from a primordial substance like prakrtiparinma in
Smkhya. It is a transformation of consciousness involving the laya, the manas
and the visaya-vijnapti all acting together, and it is this process that gives rise to
the beliefs in self and elements. Vasubandhu maintains in Trimik, what he began
with in Vimatik:
Thus, thought involves this transformation of consciousness. For that
reason, what has thus been thought of does not exist. Therefore, all this is
mere concept.29
Through this krik, Vasubandhu wants to again clarify his position that
there is no refutation of an object here. That which is denied here is the existence
of a real object that is reflected as it is in consciousness. Kalupahana explains
this by saying that the fact that consciousness, while reflecting the object, has
passed through several transformations makes it possible for the object to be
28Isshi Yamada, Vijnaptimatrata of Vasubandhu,Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland
(Cambridge University Press), 158-176
29David J. Kalupahana. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, 203
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known as it is. For this reason, all that is available is a concept (vijnapti), not
an ultimate reality or substance, either in oneself or in the world of experience.
Richard King interprets Vasubandhus position in terms ofnyat. He says
that the imagination of the unreal is the discrimination between the duality of
grasped and grasper and emptiness is explained as "the imagination of the unreal
that is lacking in the form of being graspable or grasper." Thus, for the Yogcrin,
nyat is primarily the emptiness of grasper (i.e., subject) and grasped (i.e.,
object) (grhaka-grhya). Since our entire range of experiences is characterized by
a dichotomy between subject and object (with the possible exception of some
higher states ofsamdhi), this amounts to a universal application of 'emptiness'
(nyat). However, the Yogcrin stresses that the range of 'fictive' perceptions
that does occur, although not corresponding to an independently existing world of
subjects and objects, nevertheless does occur.30
However, without getting carried away with the termnyat here, I would
once again like to clarify Vasubandhus argument. Vasubandhu has been
maintaining that when our cognitions are influenced by our dispositions and our
sensory knowledge is carried beyond its confines, we tend to form beliefs in either
a metaphysical self or in metaphysical elements. However, this does not mean that
either knowledge (grha) and the known (grhya) or knowledge (grha) and the
knower (grhaka) have to be denied. What is denied is a knower that is
independent of knowing, a metaphysical cogito, or an object that is independent of
30Richard King, Early Yogcra and its Relationship with Madhyamaka School, Philosophy East and West
(University of Hawaii Press, 1994), 659-683
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knowing, which is implied in substantial elements. These metaphysical beliefs are
determined, not by the available experiences, but by ones dispositions.31
On the note of subject-object duality, Thomas A. Kochumuttom says
that the entire doctrine oftrisvabhva or three natures of the consciousness hinges
on the same32:
(1)Parinispanna-svabhva (the absolutely accomplished nature) is that stateof existence in which the individual is characterized neither as a subject
nor as an object;
(2)Paratantra-svabhva (the other dependent nature) is that state ofexistence in which the individual is bound to see things as distinguished
into subjects and objects of experience;
(3)Parikalpita-svabhva (the imagined nature) is that state of existence inwhich the individual is seen as an object or subject of experience.
In other words, Kochumuttom explains, every individual in his absolutely
accomplished state of existence (parinispanna-svabhva) is neither a subject nor
an object of experience, but is reality as such (tathat); then he slips into the
unfortunate situation calledsamsra, where he is led to find himself as the subject
enjoying all else as objects of experience: this state of being conditioned by the
forces of ones own past deeds and habits, is called the other-dependent
(paratantra-svabhva); the forms of subjectivity and objectivity that are projected
31David J. Kalupahana. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, 212
32Thomas A. Kochumuttom,A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience, 90
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on to the things by the individual in the other-dependent state of existence, are the
imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhva). Of the three natures, only parinispanna
and parikalpita have ontological pretensions. The former is the absolute state of
existence, while the latter is the samsric (phenomenal) state of existence. The
paratantra-svabhva, on the other hand, refers essentially to the very act of
projecting the forms of subjectivity and objectivity.33
The above discussions about the nature of Yogcrin consciousness bring
out clearly the non- existence of an ultimate reality, whether subjective or
objective. The chief characteristic of Vasubandhus theory is that it never wavers
or deviates from its focus i.e., epistemological issues. He constantly avoids the
interference of any metaphysical and mysterious something in his arguments, and
suggests us to get rid of our vsans in order to reach the world- transcending
knowledge.
In the end, I would like to sum up the paper with krik-16 ofVimatik:
Immediate knowledge is as in dream, etc. when that occurs, then that object
is not perceived. How, the, can immediacy be conceived.34
Vasubandhu, here, makes a very important point. He says that immediate
knowledge is like as in a dream. According to him, though human beings perceive
33Thomas A. Kochumuttom,A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience, 90-91
34David J. Kalupahana. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, 186
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and continue to perceive objects, at the time of perception of the object, there
certainly is no awareness that one is perceiving that object. When awareness arises
that one is perceiving an object, then at that very moment the object is no more
perceived. Vasubandhu, here, is making an extremely subtle epistemological
distinction between perceiving an object and being aware of the perceiving of
an object. For him, what is generally understood as immediate perception is the
former, nor that latter. Thus by the time the awareness of perception arises, the
object perceived is already in the past is non-existent.
This account of perception, which can be traced back to Buddha himself, is
utilized by Vasubandhu who was keen on rejecting the nave realism of the
Sarvstivdins that an object that impinges on the senses can be perceived in its
real form without distortions. Instead of assuming that one can perceive a real
object, Vasubandhu is emphasizing the variety of conditions that affects every act
of perception.35
Thus we see that Vasubandhu, with his theory ofvijnaptimtrat, attempted
to highlight the psychological factors likesamskras that have an influence on our
perception of objects. What is important to understand is that there is no denial of
an immediate experience. Throughout his analysis of realist position, Vasubandhu
has the same question - if our experience reflects a real and substantial object or
not. In fact, Vasubandhu did not present even consciousness as the Absolute
Reality, for that would be to reintroduce some aspects of the Brahmanical notion of
a self (tman).
35David J. Kalupahana. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, 186
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References:
Kalupahana, David J. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology. Sri SatguruPublications, 1992
Candrakrti, Introduction to the Middle Way: CandrakrtisMadhyamakvatra with Commentary by Ju Mipham. Shambhala
Publications, 2005
Kochumuttom, Thomas A. A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience. MotilalBanarsidass, 1982
Shastri, D.N. Critique of Indian Realism: a Study of Conflict betweenNyya-Vaiesika and Buddhist Dignga School. Agra University, 1964
Murti, T.R.V. Studies in Indian Thought: Collected Papers of Prof. T.R.V.Murti. Motilal Banarsidass, 1996
Fernando and Carmen Dragonetti. Being as Consciousness: YogacaraPhilosophy of Buddhism. Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2004
Articles:
Yamada, Isshi. Vijnaptimtrat of Vasubandhu, Journal of the RoyalAsiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. Cambridge University Press,
Date of publishing not available (Cited at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25210883)
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King, Richard. Early Yogcra and Its Relationship with the MadhyamakaSchool,Philosophy East and West. University of Hawaii Press, 1994 (Cited
athttp://www.jstor.org/stable/1399757) .)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399757http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399757http://www.jstor.org/stable/13997577/27/2019 Challenge to Externality
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