Caesar 28 - Soviet Military Thought on Future War

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DATE: JU N 26;07-1

3 APRIL 1W2

OCI No . 1192/62

C U R R E N T

. . N T E L L I G E N C E.I

STAFF

STUDY

REFERENCE

TITLE

CAESAR

XIV- 62

OFFICE

. OF

CURRENT

INTELLIGENCE

C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E

HR70- 14(U )

N C E A G E N C Y



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SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT ON FUTURE W A R

(Doct r ine and Debate Since 1960)

T h i s is a working pape r , a pre l imina ry and uncoord ina t ed

O t h e r p a p e r s on S o v i e t m i l i t a r y

examina t i on o f t h e p redi cament of S o v i e t m i l i t a r y t ho ug ht ont h e q u e s t i o n of g e n e r a l w a r , p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h regard t o g u e s -t i o n s of s t r a t e g i c i m po rt an ce .d o c t r i n e and p o l i c y w i l l f o l l o w .

T h i s p a p e r is b a s e d m t irely on open Sovie t material-s,

p r i n c i p a l l y t h e t h e o r e t i c a l m i l i t a r y j o u r n a l s a nd t” 6F tb So kson m i l i t a r y s c i e nc e addressed t o audiences of p r o f e s s i o n a l s .These m ate r i a l s t aken by themselves are n o t , of course, a s u r egu ide t o S o v ie t s t r a t e g y , as t h e y are i n p a r t d e si g ne d t o s e r v ef o r e i g n p o l i c y a nd p r op ag an d a o b j e c t i v e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h emater ials c o n t a i n v e r y u s ef u l i n d i c a t i o n s of S o v i e t m i l i t a r yt h i n k i n g o n f u t u r e w a r , i n c l u d i n g areas of u n c e r t a i n t y , a n x i e t y ,and confus ion . We t h i n k t h a t w e c a n d i s t i n g u i s h b etw ee n a r t i -c l e s of d o c t r i n e which a r e unques t ioned and those which a res u b j e c t t o d i s p u t e , and t h a t w e c a n i d e n t i f y t h e s c h o o l s oft h ou g ht among m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s .

The w r i t e r has had encouragement and as s i s t an ce f romHoward Stoertz of ONE and from Matthew G a l l a g h e r of OO/FBID:

t h e l a t t e r wrote o u r l a s t examina t ion of S o v ie t m i l i t a r y t h i n k -i n g , CAESAR XI-60 of Janua ry 1960. N e i t h e r Mr. Stoer tz n o rMr. G a l l a g h e r is r e s p o n s i b l e , h ow ev er , f o r t h e c o n c l u s i o n sof t h i s paper , which are c o n t r o v e r s i a l .

The Sino -S ov iet S tu d ie s Group would welcome comment ont h i s p a p e r , a d d r e s s e d t o I rwin Pe t e r Ha lpe rn , who wrote t h epape r , or t o t h e c o o r d i n at o r of t h e SSSG, 1

1 1

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SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT ON FUTURE W A R

(Doct r ine and Debate Since 1960) ,,

SUMMARY and CONCLUSIONS....................................

1. THE MAKING OF MILITARY DOCTRINE I N THE USSR.. .........1

A.

B.C .D.

E.

M i l i t a r y S c ie n c e Under S t a l i n i n t h e P o s t-War P e r i o d ...................................,....lM i l i t a r y Thought Under Khrushchev.................

The Contending Schools of Thought .................9

Mi l i t a ry Thought S ince January 1960...............The Sea rch f o r a S i n g l e M i l i t a r y Doctrine.. ...... 8

11. STRATEGIC DOCTRINE FOR THE FIRST ATTACK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6

A.B . V i e w s on t h e I mp or ta nc e o f F i r s t S t r i k e .......... 8 C .D. Conc lus ions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7

S u r p r i s e As a L i k e l y T r i g g e r o f War ............... 6

S t r a t e g y F o r the I n i t i a l S t ag e of War . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

DOCTRINE FOR W A R AFTER THE FIRST ATTACK .............. 9 11.

. . . . . . .. . .

............

A.

B .

C.

C h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s of F u t u r e War ..................291. Dura t i on of War ..............................292. Weapons of War ...............................323. The R o l e o f . l a n i n War ..,.....................334 . The Scope of War .............................355 . Dec i s ive Cha rac t e r o f War ....................36A l t e r n a t i v e S t r a t e g i e s :D e s t r u c t i o n......................................37

1. Ground Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 32 . Naval Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 53.

M a x i m u m or Limi t ed

S t r a t e g i c P l an n i ng f o r T h e a t e r Wa rf ar e ........... 2

Avia t ion and A i r Defense ..................... 48

IV . APPENDIX: THE STATUS OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINEON THE EVE OF WORLD W A R I1...........................51



SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT ON FUTURE W A R(Doctr ine and Debate Since 1960)

Summary and Conclusions

S o v i e t m i l i t a r y t h o u g h t o n a g e n e r a l w a r of t h e f u t u r e ,as r e v e a l e d i n t h e open discourse, has been i n a f l u i d s t a t ei n re c e n t y e a r s . Faced w i th t h e v a s t d e s t r u c t i v e p o t e n t i a lof thermonuclear weapons and an a cc el er a t in g weapons techn ologyi n bot h camps, many So vi et l eade r s have found i t no . longerp o s s i b l e t o fo rmula te modern s t r a t egy and t a c t i c s s imply byapp ly ing t ime-tested p r i n c i p l e s of warfare.shchev, who appears t o ou tpace m o s t of h i s exper ts i n t h e o r iz -i n g , some m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s h ave b ee n t r y i n g t o break o lddo c t r i na l molds and then t o genera te new concep t s and f r e shi n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of e x i s t i n g o ne s. In a number of places, how-e v e r ? t h e s e p i on e e ri n g t h e o r i s t s have m e t w i t h r e s i s t a n c e,from t h e i r more c o n se r v a t i v e col leagues .

Far f rom congea l ing mi l i t a ry though t , Khrushchev ' sp r e s e n t a t i o n i n J a n ua ry 1960 of h i s o u t l i n e of a f u t u r e warand h i s "New S t r a t e g y " f o r winning i t s t i m u l a t e d debate

among t h e m i l i t a r y on the c h a r a c t e r of f u t u r e w a r and thes t r a t e g i c as w e l l as t a c t i c a l c on c ep ti o ns r e l a t i n g t o i t .For one th i ng , an impor tant segment of m i l i t a r y o p i n io n l a c k-e d c on fi de n ce i n c e r t a i n a s p e c ts of Khrushchev ' s p resen ta t ion ,and i n any case d i d n o t r e g a r d it as t he comple te o r f i n a lword on t h e s u b j e c t .

s h c he v 's d o c t r i n e , m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s q u i c k l y added impor tantq u a l i f i c a t i o n s t o it.

on nuclear / rocket weapons t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t K hru sh ch ev hadimpl ied , b u t r equ i r ed d i v e r s i f i e d m i l i t a r y forces t o copew i t h t h e v a r i e d a n d com ple x s i t u a t i o n s of a f u t u r e w a r . Khru-

... . I . sh ch e v h i m se l f , i n sp e ec h e s i n 1961, modif ied his e a r l i e r

p o s i t i o n s t o some e x t e n t a l on g t h e l i n e s of t h e p r e v a i l i n gm i l i t a r y views. H i s newly vo iced apprec ia t ion of t he needf o r a l l types of fo rces , bomber av ia t ion , and a large s t and-i n g army, among o the r th ings, may have been inf luenced byS o v i e t m i l i t a r y a r gu m en t at i on as w e l l as b y e x t e r n a l c i r c u m -s t a n c e s .

I n c i t e d by Khru-

While r e a f f i r m i n g t h e m a i n l i n e s of Khru-

In t h e i r v i e w , t h e USSR c o ul d n o t r e l y

In e l a b o r a t i n g a t h e o r y of f u t u r e war, t h e m i l i t a r y h ave

had only l i m i t e d success i n re ac hi ng agreement among thems elves .Over the p as t t w o y ea rs , t h e l i t e r a t u r e h a s ca r r i ed a m u l t i p l i c i t y



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of views o n f u t u r e w a r , p l a c i n g cheek b y j o w l c o n t r a d i c t o r ya ns we rs t o s t r a t e g i c a nd t a c t i c a l q u e s t io n s , " T r a d i t i o n a l i s t s I 1

secure i n t h e t h ou gh t t h a t f u t u r e war w i l l i n many re s pe c t sresemble World War 11, h av e be en p i t t e d a g a i n s t " p r o g r e s s iv e s ,who p r e d i c t t h a t f u t u r e war w i l l be c o m p le t el y d i f f e r e n t f ro mp a s t wars.t i o n s as t h e ro l e of conv en t ion a l i o r ce s and weapons , t h en a t u r e of combat, t h e d u r a t i o n o f t h e w a r , t h e e f f e c t s o f t h ef i r s t n u c l e a r a t t a c k , a n d a h o s t o f s u b s t r a t e g i c m a t t er s s u c has p o s i t i o n a l warfare and s t a b l e d e f e n s e . M i l i t a r y t h o u gh t ,i n s h o r t , i s i n a ddlemma: whi l e encourag in g widespread de-b a t e a n d d i s c u s s i o n t o i mp ro ve an d r e f i n e d o c t r i n e , t h e m i l i -t a r y l eade r s l ament t h e f a c t t h a t m i l i t a r y o p in io n is s e r i o u s l y

d i v d ed .

D i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n s h a v e b e e n t a k e n o v e r s u c h q u e s -

On t h e S t a r t of War: Tha t a new general war w i l l prob-a b l y s t a r t w i t h a s u r p r i s e a t t a c k i s not d i s pu t ed . Emphasi si s p l ac e d , o f c o u r se , on t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a W es te rn s u r p r i s eb l o w a g a i n s t t h e USSR. Although Sovie t l eade r s have p re sen t edc o n f l i c t i n g v i ew s o n t h e p o s s i b le e f f e c t s of a s u r p r i s e a t t a c k ,m i l i t a r y l eaders h av e te n de d i n c r e a s i n g l y t o stress t h e g r av edanger t o t h e USSR of a W estern f i r s t s t r i k e . T he se s t a t em e n t shave re f l e c t e d much l e s s c o n f i d e n c e i n a S o v i e t . a b i l i t y t oa b s o r b s u c h a s t r i k e t ha n e x p re s se d by Khrushchev i n 1960.Such statements may be a p p l i c a b l e , i n S o v i e t m i l i t a r y th i n k i n g ,t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s as w e l l as t o t h e USSR. In t h i s connec t i on ,a l t hough Moscow has di savowed both a "preven t ive" and a "pre-

empt ive" s t r a t e gy , impor t an t Sov i e t spokesmen , i nc lud ing DefenseM i n i s t e r Malinovsky , have h i n t ed s t ro ng ly a t t h e n e e d f o r a

p r e - e m p t i v e s t r a t e g y . Such s t a t e m e n t s , i f n ot r e f l e c t i n g ac ha ng e i n p o l i c y , may be a r g u j n g f o r o n e. T h i s c o n ce p t o fpre-empt ion, i n ou r view, w o u l d not mean a clumsy l a s t - m i n u t ee f f o r t t o u n lo ad a t t a c k weapons, b u t r a t h e r t h e de l ibe ra t eassemblage of a m i l i t a r y f o r c e c a p ab l e of d e l i v e r i n g a n e f -f e c t i v e f o r e s t a l l i n g blow. I n t h i s c o nn e ct io n , S o v ie t s t a t e -ments, w h i l e n o t s u g g es t i n g a n a b i l i t y t o d e s t r o y l o ng - ra n gea t t a c k f o r c e s based i n t e r r i t o r i a l Uni ted S t a t e s , do s u g g e s ta be l i e f t h a t a s u b s t a n t i a l b lu n t in g o f US a t t a c k forces c o u l dbe achieved by a S ov ie t f i r s t s t r i k z .

among So vi et spokesmen on some pr o po si t i on s as t o how w a r mightWar After t h e F i r s t A t ta ck : T he re i s gene ra l agreement

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deve lop a f t e r t h e f i r s t a t t a c k . Basic is t h e d o c t ri n e t h a tt h e w a r w i l l i n e v i t a b l y i n v o lv e t h e w id es pr ea d u s e o f n u c l e a rweapons.weapons I n f u t u r e g e n e r a l war, ho wev er , t h e m i l i t a r y d i f f e ramong themselves over the ro le t h a t c o n v e n t i o n a l forces andweapons w i l l p l a y i n i t .t h e importance of co nven t iona l weapons whi le "p rogr ess iv es"minimize it.)

i n scope and involve l a r g e c o a l i t i o n s of s t a t e s ; whole cou-t i n e n t s w i l l become t h e a t e r s of w a r ; and t h e r e w i l l be nob o r d e r l i n e b et we en f r o n t and r ea r a reas . "Mass , m u 1t m i l l o n

armies" w i l l t a k e p a r t i n t h e c o n f l i c t . The w a r w i l l becharacterized by t h e "extreme d e c i s i v e n e s s o f t h e p o l i t i c a la n d m i l i t a r y goals of t h e comba tan t s i des" ; it w i l l be wagedf e r o c i o u s l y a n d w i l l impose seve re de s t ru c t i on on a l l warr ipgp a r t i e s . (Boasts o f S o v i et v i c t o r y i n f u t u r e w a r are o f f s e tby near-admiss ions of the p o s s i b i l i t y of defea t .)

if p o s s i b l e t o "prevent ," and a t t h e l e a s t t o r e p u l s e , a nenemv su rp r i se a t t a c k , and t o d e l i v e r a "crushing" counter-

(While acknowledging t h e primacy of n u c l e a r / r o c k e t

' l T r a d i t i o n a l i s t s " t e n d t u e mp ha si ze

I t i s a l so t h e g e n e r a l v iew t h a t w a r w i l l be g loba l

The immediate s t r a t e g i c a i m s of t h e USSR in war are

blow:are more d i f f i c u l t t o a s c e r t a i n . T h e " f u l l d e f e a t " of t h e

SoGiet s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s f o r t h e war as a whole

enemy is des i red , b u t t h e meaning of t h i s t e r m is l e f t ambig-. u o u s . The pr imary ob j e c t i ve s of s t r a t e g i c s t r i k e s are s a i d

t o be both g roup ings of enemy forces i n t h e a t e r s o f o p e r a t i o n sa n d t h e d i s r u p t i o n of t h e enemy's r ea r area. The completesmashing of the enemy's armed forces is s t ressed a t l e a s t i nt r a d i t i o n a l i s t q u a r t er s ; b u t it is not clear whethe r m a x i m u mo r l i m i t e d d e s t r u c t i o n of W e st er n c o u n t r i e s is planned on.

Confronted wi th divided opinion among i ts o f f i c e r s ont h e problem of conduc t ing war after t h e f i r s t a t t a c k , t h eDefense Minis t ry appears t o hedge i n i t s m i l i t a r y p o l i c y , w i t h -o u t commitment t o e i t h e r s i d e . On t h e one hand, Def ense Min-i s t e r Malinovsky acknowledges t he p o s s i b i l i t y of a s h o r t w a ra n d h i n t s of a "count ry-bus t ing" miss ion f o r S o vi et s t r a t e g i croc ke t s . On t h e other hand, he makes i t c l ea r t h a t S o v i e tp l ann ing for t h e a t e r warfa re is p r e d i c a t e d on t he a s sumpt ionst h a t war w i l l be more t han a missi le d u e l , w i l l be fought on

an important s c a l e a f t e r t h e f i r s t n u c l e a r blows have beens t r u c k , a n d w i l l requi re t h e coordinated employment of varioust y p e s o f forces . I t is a c a u t i o u s , i f somewhat ambiguousa pp ro ac h, a p p a r e n tl y i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r a ny e v e n t u a l i t y .

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The above-mentioned elements of d o c t r in e t h a t are f i r m l yd e f i n e d i n t h e o pen discourse s u g g e s t t h a t t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r yl e a d e r s h i p h a s a c hi ev e d a g r e a t e r f l e x i b i l i t y f o r m i l i t a r y re-sponse t han w c u l d h av e be en p o s s i b l e h ad K h ru s hc he v 's s t r a t e g i cpronouncements of 1 96 0 b een t r a n s l a t e d i n t o d o c t r i n e w i t h o u tq u a l i f i c a t i o n .s t r a t e g i c p o s t u r e t h a n was e v i d e n t e a r l i e r , s a y i n 1 9 5 P e nt h e th en Defense Min is t e r Marsha l Zhukov l e f t o p e n t h e p o s s i -b i l i t y ( i n h i s p u bl i c s ta te m en ts ) t h a t a' f u t u r e war might be

f o u g h t e n t i r e l y w i t h convent iona l weapons .

The elements of u n c e r t a i n t y , d i v i s i o n and a n x i e t y t h a tw e have detec ted i n d i s c u s s io n s on f u t u r e war o v er t h e p a s t

two y e a r s i n t h em s e lv e s h av e i m p l i c a t i o n s for pol i cy . Unablet o a g r e e i n a number of impor t an t r e s pe c t s on wha t shape af u t u r e war w i l l t ake , S o v i e t m i l i t a r y leaders probably havehad s e r i o u s d o u b t s a n d . d i f f e r e n c e s about what measures t o t a k enow i n reg ar d t o t r o o p t r a i n i n g and force s t r u c t u r e .f e r m en t i n m i l i t a r y t h i n k i n g , m o re ov er , c o u l d ha ve b ee n c au s -a l l y r e l a t ed t o t h e ann ou nced m i l i t a r y p o l i c y c h a ng es in 1961and may foreshadow more c ha ng es , i n t h a t c e r t a i n e xp r es s edm i l i t a r y viewpoints may become i n co r po r at ed i n s t r a t e g i cd o c t r i n e .

B u t t h e l e a d e r s h i p h a s a d op t ed a more r i g i d

The

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I . THE MAKING OF MILITARY DOCTRINE I N THE USSR

A. Mi l i t a ry Sc ience Under S t a l i n i n t he Post-War Per io d

B ot h t h e c p n t e n t of S o v i e t m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e a nd

. . of m i l i t a r y t h o u g h t . Then, S t a l i n i s t p ro no un ce me nt s on t h e

t h e a tmosphere i n which i t is formed h a v e c h a n g e d d r a s t i c a l l ys i nc e th e days when S t a l in ' s heavy hand checked t h e growth

winning of the ' Seco nd World W a r were decreed immutable l a w s .In an order promulga ted i n February 1946, S ta l i n declaredt h a t " t h e s k i l l f u l m as te ri ng of t h e e x p er i e nc e of t h e r e c e n tw a r " was t o be t h e s i n g l e b a s i s f o r the development of m i l i -

t a r y s c ie n ce i n t h e f u t u r e . In a S t a l i n i s t world, no cogniz-ance cou ld be t a k e n of t h e n ee d t o a l t e r p r i n c i p l e s o f wart o f i t advances in weapons technology. Mass d e s t r u c t i o n wea-pons , t he n possessed on ly by th e Uni t ed Sta t es b u t under de-

velopment in t h e USSR, were miracu lous ly obscured i n S o v i e tm i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e . S o vi et o f f i c e r s were ordered to p r e p a r et h e i r s t r a t e g i c a n a l y se s on t h e s t r e n g t h of a simple assump-t i o n :s u p e r i o r i n " t h e permanen t ly opera t ing fac tors" which deter-

mine the outcome of war. These were s o l i d i t y of t h e r e a r ,moral s p i r i t of t h e a rmy, number and q u a l i t y o f d iv i s io ns ,armaments, and o r g a n iz a t i o na l a b i l i t y of t h e " le a di ng s t a f f l l

In t h e S t a l i n i s t view, t h e USSR was endowed w i t h s u p e r i o r i t yin each of these f a c t o r s .

v i c t o r y in w a r would always be assured t o t h e s i d e

Commenting on t h i s p e r i o d , a RE D STAR e d i t o r i a lon 21 January 1962 r e l a t e d i n a s c o r n f u l t on e t h a t S t a l i n hadr egarded h imse l f a s t h e "on ly exper t " on m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s andmi l - i t a ry theory . Even h i s " e r r o n e o u s p o s i t i o n s " on m i l i t a r ys c i e n c e , t h e e d i t o r i a l s a i d , were p o s t u l a t e d as "gen ius - l iked i s c o v e r i e s " a n d he was p i ct u re d i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e as t h e"d i rec t o r g a n i z e r a n d leader" of a l l s t r a t e g i c o p e r a t i o n s o fthe Sov ie t a rmy . If m i l i t a r y s c i e n c e moved ahead i n S t a l i n ' st i m e , t h e e d i t o r i a l s a i d , i t was i n s p i t e of him--and owingt o t h e e f f o r t s of c o u r a g e o u s m i l i t a r y leaders and lower-rank-i n g p a r t y o f f i c i a l s . M i l i t ar y o f f i c e r s i n suc h an a tmosphere ,

as Marshal Grechko reca l led i n t h e MILITARY-HISTORIC& JOURNALof February 1961, were a f r a i d t o exp res s t h e i r own v iews andwere c o n t e n t t o mouth "s tandard phrases and fol low r i g i d l y

pa t t e rned schemes .

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L



B. M il i t a r y Thought Under Khrushchev, 1953-60

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. .. ,. ., , .

. . . ., . . ,. .

Upon th e dea t h of th e d ic t a to r , t h e m i l i t a r y e s t a b-J i sh m e n t was among t h e f i r s t e le me nt s o f S o vi e t s o c i e t y t of e e l t h e thaw of t h e l o n g S t a l i a i s t w i nt e r. In t h e secondh a l f o f 1 9 5 3 , i so l a t ed v o i c e s b eg an t o q u e s t i o n bas ic m i l i t a r y '

d o c t r in e i n p u b l i c fo r t h e f i r s t t i m e i n decades. The nascentr e f o r m e r s worried p a r t i c u l a r l y a b ou t t h e nee d to o v e r h a u lS o vi et s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e i n order to take f u l l a cc ou nt of

t h e U.S. c a p a b i l i t y t o d e l i v e r ( w i t h i m p u n i t y t o t h e ' b e r i c a nc o n t i n e n t ) a n u cl e ar s u r p r i s e a t t a c k a g a i n s t t h e USSR. Thoughthe a tmosphere had become f r e e r , most m i l i t a r y l eaders , t r a i n -e d t o o p e r a t e a c co rd in g t o f i x e d l l s c i e n t i f i c " p r i n c i p l e s o f

war, were l o a t h t o abandon cher i shed maxims o f t h e p a s t . A l lt h e same, S o v i e t m i l i t a r y t h o ug h t h ad a t l a s t embarked on t h et o r t u o u s r o a d o f m o d er n iz a ti o n and a d j u st m en t t o t h e s w i f tdevelopments i n weapons technology . And t h e n e w p o l i t i c a ll e a d e r s h i p would allow no t u r n i n g b a c k :s c i e n c e m u s t be moved ahead i n ev ery p os si b l e way," Khrushchevt o l d m i l i t a r y academy gradu ate s i n November 1957.

" S o v i e t m i l i t a r y

In t h e p r o c e s s of t h e t r a ns f o rm a t i on , S t a l i n ' s " pe r-m a n en t ly o p e r a t i n g f actors" of w a r were de-emphasized and re-c a s t i n a d i f f e r e n t f o r m , b u t were not expunged f r o m S o v i e tm i l i t a r y s c i e n c e . M i l it ary spokesmen con t inue d t o acknowledget h e g r e a t im po rta nc e o f t h e s t a b i l i t y of t h e r ear area, t h emorale o f t h e army, t h e number an d q u a l i t y of d i v i s i o n s , a r m a -

ments, and th e competence of commanders i n t h e conduct of war.B u t t h e y no l o n g e r a t t r i b u t e d d i s c o v e r y of t h e s e f a c t o r s t oS t a l i n ; r a t h e r , t h e y s a i d , t h e s e "basic" f a c t o r s were w e l lknown t o s u c h o u ts t a n d i n g m i l i t a r y l eader s of o l d , R u s s i a asPeter I , Suvorov, and Kutuzov. Moreover , t h e re fo rm er s de-c l a r e d t h a t these were only some of t h e f a c t o r s t h a t may in-f l u e n c e t h e course and outcome of war i n t h e p r e s e nt era--ass t r a t e g i c s u r p r i s e , s c i e n c e , an d t e ch n ol o gy may also e x e r ta " d e c i s i v e " i n f l u e n c e o n t h e w a r as a whole.

More impor tan t is t h e b e l i e f now t h a t s u p e r i o r i t yi n t h e so-called d e c i s i v e f a c t o r s (which t h e S o v i e t s t e n d t oclaim f o r t h e USSR) does n o t a u t o m a t i c a ll y b r i n g v i c t o r y ; t h e

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f a c t o r s o n ly p ro v id e " p o s s i b i l i t i e s " f o r vi c t o r y . * These pos-s i b i l i t i e s c a n o n l y be rea l ized by "much or ga ni za t i on al andc r e a t i v e work by peop le" - -the t o t a1 e f f o r t s of commanders,s o l d i e r s o f t h e l i n e , and c i v i l i a n w ork ers i n t h e rea r areas .(Maj. Gen. M.V. Smirnov, et. a l . , "On S o v i e t M i l i t a r y S c ie n c e ,"USSR M i n i s t r y of Defense: Moscow, 1960 . )

. ... . . ,.. .

,_.. . . ,

. , .......I.

. .

As r e g a r d s t h e bas ic r e v i s i o n s in S o v ie t m i l i t a r yd o c t r i n e t h a t have been made, the years 1953-55 and 1957-60s t a n d o u t as major w at er sh ed s- -t he f i r s t p e r i o d r e g i s t e r i n gt h e impact of t h e n uc l ea r and the rmonuc lea r weapon on S o v i e ts t r a t e g i c and t a c t i c a l c o n c e p t s , a nd t h e s e c o n d t h e o r g a n i z a -

t i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n of t h e b a l l i s t i c missi le i n t o t h e S o vi etforce s t r u c t u r e . I n n e i t h e r p e r i o d w a s t h e r e a f u l l disc lo-s u r e of t h e s c op e of d o c t r i n a l c h a ng e i n v ol v e d , a l t h o u g h su c he v i d e n c e as w a s made a v a i l a b l e i n d i c a t ed t h a t t h e t a c t i c a land s t r a t e g i c c on c ep t io n s o f S o v ie t m i l i t a r y p l a n n e r s werenow ke ep ing p ac e w i t h t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of t e c h n o l o g i c a l p ro -g r e s s an d p o l i t i c a l c ha ng e. M ore ov er, w i t h t h e adven t o f t heICBM i n 1957, i m p o rt a n t d i f f e r e n c e s i n v ie w became a p p a r e n tamong t h e m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s , on the one hand , and between the

o f f i c e r s a nd K hru shc hev, on t h e o t h e r , o v e r t h e s t r a t e g i cs i g n i f i c a n c e of th e new long-range r oc ke ts and t h e i r i mp li ca -

t i o n s f o r S o vi e t m i l i t a r y d o c t r i ne and f o r c e s t r u c t u r e . M i l i -

t a r y t h e o r i s t s e x ch an ge d c o n t r a r y v ie ws o n s u c h a c r i t i c a lq u e s t i o n as s t r a t e g i c s u r p r i s e , wh i l e Khrushchev and t h e m i l i -

t a r y d i c k e r e d ( w i t h o u t d i r e c t l y c o n f r o n t i n g o ne a n o t he r ) o v e r

t h e r e l a t i v e i m p o r t a n c e of c o n v en t io n a l f o r c e s and s t r a t e g i cnuc lea r / rocke t weapons .

S o v ie t m i l i t a r y d o c t r i ne , a s it emerged from th et h e o r e t i c a l r e a s se s sm e n t s t h a t a cc om pa ni ed t h e d ev el op me nto f t h e ICBM, w a s sk etc hed ou t by Khrushchev i n h i s Ja n u a r y1960 sp e e c h . I n t h a t p r e s e n t a t i o n , h e d e f i n e d t h e s t r a t e g i cc o n c ep t i on s u n d e r l y i n g h i s d e c i s i o n t o r e du c e b y o ne t h i r dt h e s i z e of t h e S o v i e t armed f or c es - -a j u s t i f i c a t i o n whichu n d e rsc o r ed t h e new r o l e a s s i g n e d t h e n u c l e a r / r o c k e t weapon

*Thus, t h e y s a y , s u p e r i o r i t y i n f i r e p o w e r (armament) ise s s e n t i a l f o r v i c t o r y i n combat on a t a c t i c a l o r s t r a t e g i cs c a l e , b u t does n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y or n e c e s s a r i l y l e a d t ov i c t o r y . L t . Col. Popov, RED STAR, 18 J u l y 1961.

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I



, . .. ....

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, ... ..

i n t h e Sovie t Union ' s f u t u r e p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y .S u p e r i o r i t y i n " t o t a l f i r e p o w e r " was d e f i n e d as t h e c r i t e r i o nof m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h ; t h e b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e w a s d e s i g n a t e das t h e p r i n c i p a l i ns t ru m en t of So vie t " f i repower" ; and th e,newly formed l lr oc ke t t r oo ps " were named t h e "main type" off o r ce i n t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y e s t q b l i s h m e nt .

The p o l i t i c a l c o n ce p t u nd e rl y in g t h e "new st ra tegy, Ifit was impl i ed , w a s an es t imate t h a t t h e Western s t a t e s c o u l dbe deterred f r o m l au n c h i n g g e n e r a l w a r by t h e f e a r o f m a ss iv er e t a l i a t i o n . K hr ushc he v' s im age of t h e charac te r of a f u t u r ewar, i n t h e e v e n t t h a t d e t e r r e n c e f a i l e d , w a s m o r e d i f f i c u l tt o deduce from h i s speech. Khrushchev drew a p i c t u r e of a

r ap id exchange o f mass ive s t r a t e g i c b lows be tween t h e majora n t a g o n i s t s d u r i ng t h e f i r s t hours of a f u t u r e w a r , b u t hes a i d n o t h i n g a b o ut su b se q ue n t s t a g e s o f w a r or t h e r o l e ofc o n v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s i n it. R a th er , h e l e f t t h e impressiont h a t t h e r e would be o n l y t h e f i r s t stage--which would taket h e form of a n u c l e a r / m i s s i l e d u e l ; and t h a t one of t h e war r ings i d e s would t h e n c a p i t u l a t e .

The f a c t t h a t a m a j o r r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e armedforces accompanied the Khrushchev s t a t ement s seems to i n d i -c a t e t h a t t h e S o v i e t l e ade r ' s p i c t u r e of f u t u r e war w a s drawnfrom a sober m i l i t a r y es t imate .even assu red h i s l i s t e n e r s t h a t he ha d c o n su l t e d t h e G e n e r alS t a f f beforehand.)

however, w a s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y g e ar e d t o 1960, t h e y e ar of t h espeech , b u t might have been r e l a t ed t o a f u t u r e t i m e whent h e USSR would possess t h e r o c k e t wea pons n e c e s sa r y t o f u l -f i l l t h e i r p r o j e c t e d s t r a t e g i c t a s k s . F u r th e rm o r e, K hr ushc he v' sJ a n ua r y 1 96 0 p ro no un ce me nt s on s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n a l matterswere t a k e n by a number of m i l i t a r y spokesmen a t t h e t i m e asa " ge nu in e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o S o v i e t m i l i t a r y s c i e n c e " and h av es i n c e be en s i m i l a r l y a pp l au d ed by some o f t h e m i l i t a r y t h e o r -is ts and l eade r s .

(During h i s spe ech Khrushchev

The estimate on which t h e speech w a s based ,

I

C. Mi l i t a ry Thought S ince January 1960

One might have expected a " d e f i n i t i v e " p r e s e n ta t o n

such a s K hr ushc he v' s t o ha ve s i g n a l l e d t h e end of c o n t e n t i o ni n t h e m i l i t a r y l i t e r a t u r e about t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f n u c l e ar /

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rocket weapons f o r s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e . B u t as i t t u r n e d o u t ,K h ru sh ch ev 's c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f f u t u r e w a r a n d d o c t r i n e wasn e i t h e r t h e comple te nor t h e f i n a l word o n t h e sub jec t .t a r y o f f i c e r s s pe ak in g or w r i t i n g d u r i n g t h e n e x t f e w monthsr e a f f i r m e d t h e m a i n l i n e s of Khrushchev ' s doc t r i ne , bu t addedq u a l i f i c a t i o n s an d p e r s o n a l t ou c h es t h a t t e n de d t o i n v e s tt h a t d o c t r i n e w i th g r e a t e r p r o f e s si o n a l s o p h i s t i c a t i o n . A l lacknowledged th e new primac y of rocket weapons in t h e S o v i e tm i l i t a r y a r s e n a l , and some asser ted t h a t t h e i n i t i a l p er io d

L .L of a f u t u r e n u c l e a r w a r would be of ove r r i d ing impor t ance .But a long w i t h t h i s , m a n y of t h e m i l i t a r y s po kesmen p r o f e s s e dundiminished devot ion t o some of t h e c lass i ca l p r i n c i p l e s ofm i l i t a r y t h e o r y s i g n i f i c a n t l y i g n o re d by Kh ru sh ch ev . Most

notably, many s t ressed t h e c o n t i n u i n g v a l i d i t y of t h e combin-ed-forces d o c tr i n e- - th e v ie w t h a t v i c t o r y i n w a r requi res t h e, c o o r d i n at e d a c t i o n of a l l arms of s e r v i c e . I n mak in g t h i sp o i n t , t h e mi l i t a ry spokesmen may have been concerned merelyw i t h i n s u r i n g a r o l e f o r t h e i r own i n d i v i d u a l s e r v i c e s i n ap e r i o d of r a p i d r e o r g a n i z a t i o n . B ut t h e y were also e x p r e ss i n g a b a s i c m i l i t a r y est imate: t h a t t h e S o v i e t armed forcescould n o t r e l y on a s i n g l e weapon sys tem t o d e a l e f f e c t i v e l yw i t h the complex and var ied war s i t u a t i o n s which t he y mightbe ca l led upon t o f ace . As p r o f e s si o n a l s p e c i a l i s t s t h e yseemed t o be r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t howeve r e f fec t i ve it might be

as a p o l i t i c a l s t r a t e g y , K hr us hc hev 's d o c t r i n e of massiver e t a l i a t i o n d i d n o t o f f e r a c o m p l e t e b l u e p r i n t f o r t h e con-s t r u c t i o n of a modern a nd d i v e r s i f i e d m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t .

M i l i -

Even a f t e r t h e amendments and qua l f i c a t o n s t oK h ru sh ch ev 's o u t l i n e o f s t r a t e g y an d f u t u r e w a r were p r o f f e r -e d i n t h e m on th s f o l l o w i n g h i s s p e e ch , one could not say t h a tt h e major d i s p u t e d i s sues were r e s o l v e d . On t h e c o n t r a ry ,o v e r t h e p a s t t w o y e a r s , t h e m i l i t a r y l i t e r a t u r e h as burgeonedt o an unprecedented degree w i t h d i f f e r i n g v i ew p o in t s o n f u t u r ew a r a n d e x p r e s s i o n s of u n c e r t a i n t y abou t e x i s t i n g d o c t r in e son t h e whole spec t rum of i s s u e s which Khrushchev had os tens iblyi roned o u t i n Jan uar y 1960. The whole body of S ov iet m i l i -t a r y d o c t r i n e h a s i n f a c t been undergoing close review ast o i t s adequacy f o r f u t u r e war c o n d i t i o n s . T h i s p r o c e s s h a sbeen fos te red by t h e m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s h i p , w h i c h has e n j o i n e dt h e e n t i r e o f f i c e r c o r p s t o h e l p d e v e l o p , t e s t , a n d r e f i n et h e c o nc ep t s t h a t w i l l govern t h e conduct of a t h i r d world

war a n d t h e p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r i t .



, .

M i l i t a r y wri te r s have s t ressed t he need t o re-exam-i n e t h e s u b s t a n c e of "cer t a in concept s" which are "now firmlyi n t eg r a te d " i n m i l i t a r y and nava l doc t r i ne , bu t w h i ch haven o t y e t r e c e i v e d "a new s c i e n t i f i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i n connec-t i o n w i t h c h an ge s i n t h e c o n d i t i o n s i n which m i l i t a r y o p e ra -t i o n s are conducted. '' (Rear-Admiral V . s. Sysoev, NAVAL JOUR-NAL, No.4, Ap ri l 1961) They stress t h e n e e d t o "support andc nc ou ra ge o r i g i n a l , i nd ep e nd en t d e c i s i o n s , b o ld s t r i v i n g stoward new methods of combat commensurate with contemporaryweapons." And shunn ing t h e a l te r n a t i v e of e x c l u s i v e ly p r i -v a t e d e b a t e a n d. r ev i ew , t h e y ha ve i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e problemcan e f f e c t i ve l y be t ack l ed on l y by d raw ing upon t h e " w i d e s t

c i r c l e " of o f f i c e r s . ( C o l . Sushko, e t a l . , KOMMUNIST O F THEANUIED FORCES, No. 18, September 1961) I n s h o r t , d e b a t e madep u b l i c i n m i l i t a r y j o u r n a l s h a s become an accepted method ofd e ve lo p in g m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e as w e l l as of educa t i ng t h e t r o o p s .

Addi t iona l ev idence of ferment i n S o vi e t m i l i t a r ythought i s s e e n i n t h e e x t e n t t o which Khrushchev h im s e l f hasd e v i a t e d f r om h i s ea r l i e r s t a t em en t s on war, i n t h e courseof e x p l a i n i n g t h e c ha ng es i n f o r c e s t r u c t u r e t h a t t oo k p la c e"as a r e s u l t " of t h e U.S. a r m s bui ld-up and t h e B e r l i n c r i s i si n 1961 . For example , i n speech es made l a s t s u m m e r Khrushchevacknowledged t h e need for a l a r g e s t a n d i n g S o v i e t army d e s p i t ehis ea r l i e r claims t h a t i n cr e me n ts i n S o v i e t f i r ep o w e r madet h i s u n ne c es sa ry r e g a r d l e s s of t h e s i z e of a r m i e s i n t h e West.

H e acknowledged t h e need f o r a l l t y p e s of s e r v i c e s t o f u l f i l lt h e c o u n t r y ' s d e f e n se r eq u i r em e n t s, a l t ho u g h p r e v i o u s l y hewas c o n t e n t t o r e l y almost e n t i r e l y o n nu c l e ar / r o ck e t fo rces .H e c a l l e d f o r t h e fu r t he r devel opment of m i l i t a r y a v i a t i o n ,whereas he had e a r l i e r sought i ts demise. H e admi t t ed t h ep o s s i b i l i t y t h a t a g e n e r a l war w o u l d b eg in a l o ng t h e f r o n t i e r s

' i n Germany, al t ho ug h he w a s t h e a u t h o r of t h e f o r m u l a t h a tw a r w o u l d beg i n w i t h s t r a t e g i c s t r i k e s a g ai ns t t h e r ea r areasof t h e a n t a go n i st s .

Taken t o g e t h e r , these changes add up t o a s h i f t i nKhmshchev ' s t h ink ing : a s t e p i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e commonlyhe l d v i ew po i n t s of S o d i e t m i l i t a r y l eade rs . Again, Khrush-chev 's change of mind amounts t o p l a i n e v i d e n c e t h a t an import-

an t segment of m i l i t a r y o p in i o n la c k e d co n f i de n c e i n h i s m i l i -t a r y es t imate of ear ly 1960. The Sov iet ch ie f himsel f waspersuaded i n 1961--probably through t h e give-and-take of argu-ment among t h e m i l i t a r y as w e l l as b y e x t e r n a l circumstances--t o modify h i s own s t r a t e g i c ou t l ook .

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. ..



-r

I t s h o u l d n o t b e i n f e r r e d f r o m t h e a b o v e d i s c u s s io n ,however, t h a t Khrushchev ha s done a comple te tu rnabou t f romh i s e a r l i e r p o s i t i o n s .more l i k e h i s m i l i t a r y l i e u te n a n t s in a number of importantr e s p e c t s , b u t , as r e c e n t evidence r e v e a l s , h e h a s n o t c em en te da l l t h e f i s s u r e s b e t w e e n h i s a nd t h e i r c o nc e pt i o ns of f u t u r e

L w a r . There is a t l e a s t a bas ic p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i f f e r e n c e --which may have imp li ca ti on s f o r policy--between Khrushchevand t h e mi l i ta ry . Whereas he is i n c l i n e d t o stress weaponsan d t o b e l i t t l e t h e r o l e t r o o ps w i l l p l a y i n f u t u r e w a r , t h em i l i t a r y stress t h e r o l e of m a n as w e l l as weapons i n w a r . *(Alban ian p ress o rgans on 22 February 1962 made a p o i n t oft h i s d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h some a cc ur ac y i n a t t a c k i n g t h e i r ba ten o i r e :revisionist v iew s i n h i s ap pr ec ia t i on of men and tec hni que

Khrushchev may have begun t o t h i n k

!

"What d is gu st and aver s i on is aroused by Khrushchev ' s

-k

*Thus, i n a recen t message t o Pres ident Kennedy on t h eproblem of disarmament Khrushchev said:

I n t h e nuclear rocket weapons age--and w e have en-te red t h i s age--the n um e ri ca l s t r e n g t h of t h e f o r c e sdoes no t by a lon g way have the importance it had i nWorld W a r s I and 11. War now w o u l d a t once becomet o t a l , worldwide; and i t s outcome w o u l d depend not

. on t h e a c t i o n s of t r o o p s s t a t i o n e d a l o n g t h e l i n ed i v i d i n g t h e c om ba ta nt s b u t on t h e u s e o f n u c l e a rrocket weapons,with whom t h e d e c i s i v e blow c a n bes t r u c k ev en b e f o r e v a s t armies can be mabil izedand thrown in to b a t t l e . (TASS, 23 February 1962)

L

A c o n t r a r y p i c t u r e of t h e i m p or ta nc e of t r o o p s i n f u t u r e w a rwas p a i n t e d in an e d i t o r i a l i n t h e MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, f o r December 1961 :

r\... i n a l v i c t o r y o v e r t h e a g gr e s so r c an be a t t a i n e do n l y as a r e s u l t o f j o i n t o p er a t i o ns of a l l t y p e s ofarmed f o r c e s . F u t u r e war, i f u n l ea s h ed by t h e imper i -a l i s t s , w i l l be waged by mult imil l ion mass armies.

I ts course and outcome w i l l be t o a d e c i s i v e e x t e n tdependent on armies and t h e p e o p l e a l i k e , on t h e f i r m -n e s s of communications between front and r e a r , on t h ea b i l i t y of t h e S o v i e t s y s te m it0 pour a l l fo rces andmeans i n t o t h e s t r u g g l e w i t h t h e enemy.

- 7 --i l

__ - - _ _1 -

-__ _ __ ~- - -



......... .

' . . .... . .. .. ...

. . ... ,

......".. ........ .. .. .

d u r i n g war. W i t h undue emphasis on t h e t e c h n i c a l s i d e , hem in im izes t h e de c i s i ve r o l e of man, of t h e s o l d i e r on t h ef i e l d of b a t t l e , and he makes a wrong evaluat ion of t h e r o l eof t h e v a r i o u s e l e m en t s on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . " )

D. The Search for a S i n g l e M i l i t a r y D o ct r in e

S o v i e t m i l i t a r y t h ou g ht as r evea l ed i n open sourcesis i n a dilemma. On t h e one hand, t h e m i l i t a r y leaders en-courage widespread debate and d i scuss ion on d o c t r i n a l matters ;on t h e o t h e r ha nd , t h e y f i n d t h e f a c t t h a t m i l i t a r y o p i ni on s

have not been able t o congea l i n t o a s i n g l e m i l i t a r y d o c t r i nev e r y d i s q u i e t i n g .W r i t i n g i n t h e May 1961 i s s u e of t h e MILITARY-HIS-

TORICAL JOURNAL, of which he is an e d i t o r , Major Genera l P.Z hi l i n l am en t ed t h e absence of agreement on a s i n g l e m i l i t a r yd o c t r i n e . H e wrote t h a t i n c o nt r a s t t o t h e "exhaust ive"p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e p o l i t i c a l aspect of m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e - -be t r ay i ng h i s conse rva t i ve co l o r s , he r e lega ted Khrushchev's14 January 1960 speech on w a r a n d s t r a t e g y to t h i s category--the re are s t i l l "many d i s p u t a b l e and vague pro pos i t io ns int h e e l a b o r a t i o n of t h e m i l i t a r y - t e c h n i c a l p a r t o f t h e d o c t r i n e ."Evidence of t h i s , h e s a i d , c o u l d be s e e n i n t h e f a c t t h a td e s p i t e n umerous d i s c u s s i o n s i n t h e m i l i t a r y p r e s s and w i t h i n

t he G ene ra l S t a f f and Frunze academies, ''a u n i t y of views h a snot been achieved" on t h e rtlaws'l and " r e g u l a r i t i e s " of m i l i -t a r y s c i e n c e . I t has been necessary , he s a i d , t o rev iew t h efundam en t a l pos t u l a t e s of S o v i e t m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e o w i n g t ot h e p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y ch an ge s t h a t have t aken p l ac e i nt h e world. B u t he implored t h a t i t i s a l so "necessary, nowas never before , t o have a u n i t y of views on a l l of t h e mosti m por t an t ques t i ons of m i l i t a r y a r t and t h e employment oft r o o p s in war." This un i t y of views, he added, m u s t beach i eved no t on l y i n t h e USSR armed f o r c e s , b u t also i n t h earmed forces of a l l m e m b e r c o u n t r i e s of t h e W a r s a w Pact .

U nder l y i ng Z h i l i n ' s conce rn is t h e b e l i e f , widelyi n e v i d e nc e i n S o v i e t l i t e r a t u r e on m i l i t a r y s c i e n c e , t h a t

a f u l l y d e ve lo pe d m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e is a s i n e q u a non f o rt h e s u c c e s s f u l conduct of armed s t r u g g l e . M i l i t a r y s c i e n c et ex t books pub l i shed by t he USSR Defense Minist ry declare t h a tt h e success of m i l i t a ry ope r a t i ons "on any scale" depends

---

- 8 -



g r e a t l y on how c o r r e c t l y m i l i t a r y t h e o r y h a s been elaboratedi n peace t ime and mastered i n t r o o p t r a i n i n g . (E.g. , Maj. Gen.Smirnov, e t a l . , "On S ov ie t Mi l i t a ry Sc ience , "-0.) M i l i -

t a r y l eade rs frrace p a r t i c u l a r e m p h a s i s on t h e n ee d t o p e r f e c ta d o c t r i n e t h a t w o u l d d e f i n e t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r s t r a t e g i cas w e l l as o t h e r forces a t t h e s t a r t of a f u t u r e war. In h i sspeech a t the 22nd CPSU C o n g r e s s t October , Marshal Malinov-s k y i nvoked t h e h i g he s t p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i t y on t h i s v e ry p o i n t :

The Presidium of t h e C e n t r a l Committee oft h e p a r t y and the Soviet Government havedemanded and do demand t h a t w e d e v o tes p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n t o t h e i n i t i a l p e r i o dof a p o s s i b l e war.

~.

Moreover, t h e p e n a l t y f o r not having a fu l ly -deve lop -ed t h e o r y a n d a v i a b l e , u p -t o- da te d o c t r i n e f o r t h e conductof w a r once t h e f r a c a s b e g in s h a s b ee n i n s c r i b e d i n b o l d l e t -t e r s i n r e c e n t S o v i e t m i l i t a r y h i s t o r i og r a ph y . A number of mili taryh i s t o r i a n s - - i n c l u d i n g t h e c o l l e c t i v e t h a t p repa red t h e l a t e s to f f i c i a l m ul ti -v ol um e h i s t o r y o f World War 11--have come t oa t t r i b u t e t h e ca lami tous de fea t s of t h e S o v ie t s i n t h e e a r l yp a r t of t h e l a s t w a r mainly t o t h e inadequacy of prewar m i l i -

t a r y d o c t r i n e . *

* .

. .

E. The Contending Schools of Thought

M i l i t a r y spokesmen ge ne ra l l y acknowledge t h a t , owingt o t h e p r e s e n c e of s t o c k p i l e s o f modern weapons i n t h e a r s e n a l sof E a s t and West, a w a r of t h e f u t u r e w i l l be waged d i f f e r e n t l ythan any war of t h e p a s t . Sh ar p d i f f e r e n c e s i n v ie w h av e b ee nr e g i s t e r e d , h ow ev er , o ve r t h e degree t o which a f u t u r e war w i l ld i f f e r from World War 11. As w e have no ted above , con t ra ryp o s i t i o n s are t a k e n on s u c h q u e s t i o n s as t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y ofe x p e r i e n c e of p a s t wars t o a f u t u r e w a r , t h e v i a b i l i t y of l o n g

* T h i s has been a h o t l y d i s p u t e d i s s u e i n t h e h i s t o r i c a ll i t e r a t u r e . Because of i t s r e l e v a n c e t o t h e p ro bl em of m i l i -t a r y though t on f u t u r e w a r , a d i s c u s s i o n of t h e debate isappended t o t h i s r e p o r t .

- 9 -



. .s : , .

. .. . .

. I

e s t a b l i s h e d m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e s o n s t r a t e g y and t a c t i c s , andt h e ro l e of conven t i ona l t ypes of weapons.

Among t h e th e o r i s t s , t h e r e appear t o be b a s i c a l l yt w o schools of t hought as t o t h e bes t avenue of approach t ot h e p rob lem of t h e o r y and do c t r i ne on f u t u r e . w a r . One school-l e t u s c a l l it t h e t r a d i t i o n a l i s t - - t e n d s t o b e c o n s e r v a t i v e ,r e l u c t a n t t o m a k e r a d i c a l changes i n t ime-tested concep t s andp r a c t i c e s , a n d r e l i e s h e a v i l y o n t h e l e s s o n s of t h e past --p a r t i c u l a r l y those o f World War 11--in working o u t problemsof m i l i t a r y s c i e n c e . The t h e o r i s t s of t h i s school do n o tr u l e o u t b u t s o f t - p e d a l t h e u s e of prognos i s and non-h i s tor i -c a l t heo ry . They t end t o b e l i e v e t h a t f u t u r e w a r i n manyi m p o r t a n t r e s p e c t s w i l l resemble World War 11. Such l ead ingm i l i t a r y f i g u r e s as Marshals Grechko and Rotmistrov* and ArmyGeneral Kurochkin appear t o belong t o t h i s school . The MILI-TARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, a s o p h i s t i c a t e d h i s t o r i c a l m o n t h l yof t h e M i n i s t r y of Defense , t ends t o be i t s p r i n c i p a l p u b l i cforum.

The at tachment of t h e " t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s " t o . t h ep a s t a t once apparen t i n t h e i r w r i t i n g s o n f u t u r e w a r .Thus, i n an a r t i c l e i n t h e h i s t o r i c a l j o u rn a l s t r e s s i n g t h ec l ose r e l a t i o n s h i p between m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y and m i l i t a r ytheory and doct r ine, Marshal Grechko dec la red :

Only those whoa re

i gno ran t o f Marx i s td i a l e c t i c s mainta in t h a t the new h i s t o r i -c a l p e r i o d wipes o u t t h e p a s t i n t h e f i e l dof m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s a nd m i l i t a r y t ho u gh t.

D e s p i t e t h e f ac t t h a t a f u t u r e war.. . w i l l beconducted w i t h new, unprec edented ly powerf ulmeans of de s t r uc t io n , e l ement s of m i l i t a r ya r t known from t h e expe r i ence o f t h e p a s t warw i l l never the less remain /xn u s e 7 .ing now a l l e n e r g i e s on t E e s t u a y o f t h enew and s t r i v i n g t o l o o k i n t o t h e f u t u r e , it

i s neces sa ry a l ong w i t h t h i s t o c o n t i n u e

Concent ra t -

I .. .

*Marshal Rotmist rov, a doctor of m i l i t a r y s c i e n c e, w a si r o n i c a l l y o n e o f t h e most p ro min en t r e v i s i o n i s t s i n 1955.

- .10 -



m as t e r i ng t h e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e SecondWorld W a r w i t h t h e a i m of us i ng eve ry -t h i n g t h a t h a s n ot l o s t s i g n i f i c a n c e f o rcontemporary co nd i t io ns . (Marshal Grechko,MILITARY-KISTORXCAL JOURNAL, N o . 2, Febru-a r y 1962)

I n a s i m i l a r vein Marsha l Rotmis t rov expressed theview t h a t a mastery of World War I1 expe r i ence is e s s e n t i a li n w r k i n g o u t doc t r i na l p rob l em s of f u t u r e war:

S u c c e s s f u l s o l u t i o n of t h e problems con-

nec t ed w i t h determin ing the methods ofconducting modern b a t t l e , o p e r a t i o n s a n dw a r as a whole i s imposs ib le w i t h o u ts k i l l f u l t h e o r e t i c a l s t ud y and t h e u s e oft h e p a s t , e s p e c i a l l y e x pe r ie n ce of t h eGrea t F a t h e r l a n d War. (Rotmistrov, MILI-

1961)TA RY -H IS TO RICA L JOURNAL, NO. 8 , A u g u s t

.. . . . . .

N o one advoca tes a r e t u r n t o t h e S t a l i n i s t p e r io d .Even t h e m o s t s t a l w a r t conservat ives--who expect t o f i g h tf u t u r e w a r i n m u c h t h e same manner as i n World War II--deplorea r e t u r n t o Sta l in i sm. Thus Marshal Grechko, i n h i s a r t i c l es t r e s s i n g t h e u s ef u ln e ss of m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y i n d e ve l op i ng a

t h e o r y of f u t u r e war, t o o k p a i n s t o s e p a r a t e h im se lf from t h es l a v i s h , u n c r ea t iv e t r a d i t i o n of m i l i t a r y and t h e o r e t i c a lw r i t i n g u nd er S t a l i n . H e c a l l e d f o r t h e s e r i o u s s t u d y o f So-v i e t m i l i t a r y f a i l u r e s as w e l l as successes, f o r t h e s t ud yof t h e m i l i t a r y e x p e r i e n c e of t h e c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r ie s i nWorld War I1 as w e l l as t h a t of t h e So vie t s , and emphasizedt h a t , a b o v e a l l , research i n t o m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y m u s t be con-d u c te d o b j e c t i v e l y . I n h i s o p i n i o n m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y is tooc l o se l y t i e d t o t h e problem of drawing up a dynamic mi l i t a ryd o c t r i n e t o permi t t h e "mouthing of s t a n d a r d p h r a s e s a nd draw-i n g of s t e reo typed schemes" t h a t character ized t h e S t a l i nperiod--when b o th m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y a nd d o c t r i n e were u t t e r l ys t a g n a n t . (MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, N o . 2, February 1961)

The second school of t hough t - - l e t us c a l l i t t h eprogress ive one- - t ends t o shun o r , a t t h e v e r y l e a s t t o de-emphasize, t h e h i s t o r i c a l approach t o working o u t a t h e o r yof f u t u r e w a r , contending t h a t i t w i l l be c o m p l e t e l y d i f f e r e n t

- 11 -.. ... . -



._ ...... . . . .

.. . . . ,'... .. ...( >. ,.. , .. . . . . . .

... . .,. .. . ..

from t h e p a s t . T h i s school r e a s o n s t h a t i n t h e a bs en ce ofexpe r i ence i n nuc l ea r / m i s s i l e warfare, one m u s t no t l ook t ot h e p a s t b u t p e e r i n t o t h e fu t u re - - to f o r e s e e a nd f o r e t e l lt h e p r o s p e ct s f o r t h e development of armed combat o n ~ eb a s i s of profound l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s a n d t r o o p exercises unders imula ted c o n d i t i o n s of n u c l e a r warfare. The a r t i c u l a t e ad-'h e r e n t s of t h i s s c h o ol a p pe ar t o be mainly lower-ranking of-f icers - -such as Colonel s P. Sidorov and S. Kozlov--who haveb e e n p r i n c i p a l s i n t h e movement t o r e v i s e S o vi et m i l i t a r yd o c t r i n e s i n c e 1 9 5 5 . Among t h e s e n i o r o f f i c e r s , MarshalsMoskalenko and Yeremenko seem t o s h a r e t h e ou t l ook of t h i ss c h o o l . The o f f i c i a l v ie w of t h e USSR Defense Ministry--re-v e a l e d i n t h e pronouncements of Marshal Malinovsky and i nRED STAR e d i t o r i a l s - - i s i n c l i n e d t o sym pa t h i ze w i t h t h i sschool . The t h e o r e t i c a l j o u r n a l , KOMMUNIST O F THE ARMEDFORCES, is p er ha ps t h e p r i n c i p a l f o r u m f o r e x p r e s s i o n of' t h eprog re s s i ve v i ew po i n t .

The progress ives teach t h a t o n e m u s t t h e o r i z eabout t h e c h a r a c t e r of f u t u r e war t hr ou gh " s c i e n t i f i c p r e-d i c t i o n " based o n " t h e o r e t i c a l s t ud y " (as opposed t o h i s -t o r i c a l s t udy ) of t h e t endenc i e s of development of s o c i a lC ond it i ons and m i l i t a r y t echn i que . ( C o l . Sushko, e t a1 .KOMMUNIST O F THE ARBdED FORCES, N o . 18, September 1961)-Theschool ' s emphas i s on prognos i s is summed up i n t h e follow-i ng pas sages :

The s i g n i f i c a n c e o f p r e d i c t i o n i n m i l i t a r ya f f a i r s h a s grown unusually g re a t under con-t emporary cond i t ions . Over t h e expanse of al o n g p e r io d o f h i s t o r y , m i l i t a r y t h e o r y w a sl i m i t e d t o t h e g e n e r a l iz i n g of p a s t e x p e r i -ence of armed s t ru gg l e . The absence of s u f -f i c i e n t p r o gn o s ti c a ti o n i n t o t h e f u t u r e w a sno t ve ry much r e f l ec t ed i n i t s s e r v i c e r o l e .S i n c e t h e development of m i l i t a r y a f f a i r sproceeded s lowly and t h e t e c h n i c a l base andt h e f i r m mater ia l c o n d i t i o n s of armed s t r u g -g l e c ha ng ed g r a d u a l ly , t h e g e n e r a l i z e d e x p e r i -ence of t h e p a s t wars cou l d be used o v e r al o n g p e r i o d .

For t h i s r ea son , b i g m i s t a k e s i n t h e p a s ti n e v a l u a t i n g p r o s p e c t i ve w a r f r e q u e n t l ywere corrected dur i ng i t s course. A

- 1 2 -



. ., .

. ... ,

, .. . .. . .. .

. . . .

. .

c om pl et el y d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t i o n h a s t a k enp l a c e a t t h e p r e s en t t i m e . The main powerso f t h e world have created and cont inue t oa c c u m u l a t e and modernize weapons which m u s tp l a y an enormous r o l e r i g h t i n t h e b e g i n n in gpe r i od . o f w a r , T h er e fo r e, m i l i t a r y s c i e n c er i g h t now m u s t work o u t methods of apply-i n g new supe rpow er fu l and supe r l ong rangeweapons , desp i t e t h e f a c t t h a t t hese weaponsneve r were used, exce pt in g Hi rosh ima andNagasaki .

The t ask of working out new methods of strug-g l e c an be r e s o l v e d o n l y by s c i e n t i f i c , m i l i -

t a r y - t h e o r e t i c a l t ho ug ht r e l y i n g on a l l a-r ou nd p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n ce o f t h e t r o o p s a ndt h e g e n e r a l i z in g of i t . (Col. Sushko, e t a l .,KOMM"IST OF THE ARMED FORCES, N o . 18, E p G m -ber 1961)

The philosophy of t h e p r o g r e s s i v e s c h o o l h e nc e p u t sl i t t l e s t o r e by p a s t expe r i ence and takes f e w t ime-honoredconcep t s a t face v a l u e .

W e can no longer be s a t i s f i e d i n any sensewi t h tho se methods of combat or ga ni za t io n

which were c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h e p e ri od o f 't h e G r e a t F a t h e r l a n d War, i n c l u d i n g e ve n i t sf i n a l p e r io d s. (RED STAR e d i t o r i a l , 8 June1960)

How s h a r p l y d i f f e r e n t t h i s a pp ro ac h may be fromt h e h i s t o r i c a l Method is i l l u s t r a t e d by t h e fol lowing, some-what extreme, s t a t e m e n t by a "progressive" spokesman.

Rocket tec hn iqu e remolds a l l prev ious con-c e p t s of t h e charac te r of w a r : i n p a r t i cu l a r ,o f s n i t i a l p er io d , o f b a t t l e s and opera-t i o n s , of t h e f r o n t a nd t h e r e a r , of t h e u s e .of space and t i m e , of t h e character of t h i s

o r t h a t t h e a t e r of o p e r a t i o n s , a nd o f o t h e rproblems of m i l i t a r y a r t . Khrushchev hasspoken in d e t a i l a b o u t t h i s . ...( o l . P.Sidorov , KOMMUNIST O F THE ARMED FORCES, No.12, June 1961 . )

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. .(. . . .. . ....... . . . .

. . . .

.....

, .... .

. :

The d i s t i n c t i o n betw een t h i s s choo l o f t hough tand t h a t of t h e t r a d i t i o n a l i s t s is a l s o s h a r p l y drawn i n t h es t a t ement (by a l ess extreme p r o g r e s s i v e t h a n S i do r ov ) t h a tt h e method of approach t o r e a l i t y f r o m s t u d y of t h e p a s tr e p r e s e n t s " t h e main d an ge r f o r m i l i t a r y t h e o r y i n t h e c u r -r e n t s t a g e of i t s development." ( C o l . s. Kozlov, KOMMUNISTO F THE ARMED FORCES, N o . 11, June 1961) According t o t h i sw r i t e r , "adherence t o t h e p a s t a lw ay s e n t a i l s an underest ima-t i o n of t h e new and.. . a h o s t i l e a t t i t u d e toward it. T h i si s t h e main danger of dogmatism." CoL Kozlov sees b a t t l i n gwi th "dogmat i s m " and overcomi ng s t ag na t i on and rou t i n e i nm i l i t a r y a f f a i r s , a s i n sepa rab l y connect ed t o t h e p r im a ryt a s k of r e v e a l i n g t h e new i n m i l i t a r y s c i e n c e . B u t a t t h e

same t i m e , he d e p l o r e s e xt re me p o s i t i o n s : " S ov i et m i l i t a r ys c i e n c e a l s o has t o " s t rugg le w i t h extremes engendered byt h e t u r b u l e n t growth o f . t e c h n i q u e s , w i t h e x a g g e r a t i o n s of a l l*;ypes, w i t h unfounded conj ec t ur es and pr o je c t i on , and ana l i e n a t i o n from r e a l i t y . " F i n a l l y , h e condemns those who," n i h i l i s t i c a l l y r e j e c t expe r i ence of t h e p a s t , I' thoughwarning again, t h a t it has ve ry l i m i t e d value .

The schools of t h o u g h t d i s c u s s e d here a re of coursenot mutual ly exclusi ve-- the y undoubtedly do n o t embrace a l lm i l i t a r y v i ew po i n t s , and i nd i v i dua l m i l i t a r y l eader s i n ane f f o r t t o be openminded may sometimes fav or an oppone nt ' s ap-proach, depending on t h e s p e c i f i c i s s u e a t hand. Also, with-i n t h e schoo l s , as w i t h i n i n d i v i d u a l j o u r n a l s , t h e r e may bea s h a r p d i f f e r e n c e of o p i ni o n e x p re s s e d o v e r v a r i o u s d o c t r i n a lmat ters .

A case i n p o in t i s t h e debate car r i ed on i n t h epages of t h e MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL between October 1959and Ju ly 1961. The debate w a s e s p e c i a l l y r em a rk ab le f o r t h ev i g o r a n d d i r e c t n e s s of i t s d i s p u t e s a n d i t s g e n e r a l l y in-c o n c lu s i ve , p r o t r a c t e d c h a r a c t e r . I t a f f o r d s r e v e a l i n g i n-s i g h t s i n t o t h e atmosphere of t h e S o vi e t g e ne r al s t a f f . Thedeba t e os t ens i b l y cen t e red on p rob l em s of World War I1 h i s -t o r i og raphy , b u t t h e purpose of t h e debate i n r a k i n g o v er t h el e s s o n s of World War I1 was adm i t t ed l y t o h e l p work o u t a

- 1 4 -

.. . . -



.. ., . .. . . . ,

..... .... . .

t h e o r y of t h e i n i t i a l p e r io d of f u t u r e war.*d i s ag r e em e n t o f t e n exceeded i n number t h e areas of agreement.And such qu es ti on s of c r i t i c a l d o c t r i n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e as t h ec h a r a c t e r of t h e f i r s t phase of war, t h e ro le of weapons andhigh command, t h a t were a i r e d in t h e d e b a t e were n o t r e s o lv e d .

The poin ts of

U n f o r tu na t e ly , t h e op en materials do n o t c a r r yenough evidence of t h e k i nd r e q u i r e d t o p i n a p r o g r e s s i v e o rt r , a d i t i o n a l i s t t a g on most o f t h e s e n i o r So v ie t m i l i t a r y l ead-

e r s . Recent policy statements by Marshal Malinovsky, however,do r e v e a l t h a t t h e p r o g r e s s iv e a p pr oa ch c u r r e n t l y h a s a n i m-p o r t a n t edge o ve r t h e t r a d i t i o n a l i s t out look in So v ie t o f f i a l -

dom. This is se en i n Malinovsky's pronouncement of l a s t Octoberon t h e new s t u d y y e a r . (PRAVDA, 24 October 1961) The s t a t e -ment emphasizes t h e working o u t of a t h e o r y of f u t u r e w a r ont h e basis of maneuvers and t r a i n i ng under s imu l a ted cond i t io nsof n u c l e a r w a r - - p a rt i c u l a r ly i t s i n i t i a l phase--but makes nomention of t h e u s e f u l n e s s of s t u d y i n g t h e l e s s o n s of pas tw a r s . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e r e c e n t l y s te pp ed -u p o f f i c i a l a t t acksa g a i ns t S t a l i n , f o r i n h ib i t i n g t h e d e v e lo p m e n t of S a v i e t m i l i -t a r y s c i e n c e , u n do u bte dly h a s be en g r i s t f o r t h e m i l l of t h ep r o g r e s s i v e s i n t h e i r e f f o r t s to d i s c r e d i t t h e views of t h e i rmore c o n s e r v a t i v e colleagues. As r e c e n t l y a s 21 January 1962t h e Defense Min is t ry , i n a RED STAR e d i t o r i a l , urged conserva-t i v e - t h i n k i n g m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s t o keep pace w i t h t h e main-stream of deve lopm ents : "Much rem ain s t o be done i n l i q u i d a t -

ing the consequences of t h e c u l t of p e r s o n a l i t y i n t h e s p h er eof m i l i t a r y t h e o ry , c o n s t r u c t i o n an d h i s t o ry . "

. .. ., . . ..'.

....... ,,.. ,. ... ,. .

.. . . ... .*An . a r t i c l e by Maj'. Gen. I . Rukhle and pub l i shed i n the

October 1959 i s s u e of t h e j o u r n a l s e r v e d as a c a t a l y s t . Av ig o r o u s d i s c u s s io n of t h e a r t i c l e w a s h e l d i n t h e M i l i t a ryHis tor ica l S e c t i o n of t h e Mi l i t a r y -Sc i e n c e So c i e ty of t h eMi l i t a ry -His to r ica l Depar tmen t of t h e G e ne ra l S t a f f on 18December 1959, according t o a r e p o r t p u bl i s he d i n t h e A p r i l1960 i s s u e of t h e MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL. A liumber ofa r t i c l e s addressed t o t h e s u b j e c t were t h e n p u b l i s h e d i nsucceeding i ssues of t h e JOURNAL, c u lm in a ti n g i n a n a r t i c l e ,in t h e J u l y 1961 i s s u e , by the ch i e f of t h e G e n e r a l S t a f fhimself , Marshal Zakharov.

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. . .._... . . .

. ... .._.,. . .. .. . .

11. STRATEGIC DOCTRINE FOR THE FIRST ATTACK

How w a r w i l l begi n and what t h e consequences ol. h ef i r s t n u c le ar s t r i k e s w i l l be f o r t h e w a r r in g s i d e s are ques-t i o n s of g r e a t e s t c on ce rn t o S o vi e t m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s . S i n c ea t l e a s t 1 9 5 5 , t h i s matter has commanded t h e m o s t a t t e n t i o nin' heore. t ica1 d i s c u s s i on s o f f u t u r e war. Judging f rom re-c e n t e v i d en c e , t h e heavy emphasis on t h e importance of t h ei n i t i a l p ha se of w a r has b ee n s u s t a i n e d i f n o t i n c r e a s e d .And th e conce rn vo iced by Sov i e t mi l i t a ry l eader s o v e r t h ep o s s i b l e e f f e c t s of a W es te rn s u r p r i s e a t t a c k a g a i n s t t h eUSSR would appear t o h av e i m p or t an t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r S o v i e tm i l i t a r y p l an n in g .

A. S u r p r i s e As a L i k e l y T r i g g e r o f War

Entang led as it is i n a whole s e r i e s of p o l i t i c a la n d m i l i t a r y i s s u e s , t h e q u e st i o n of i n i t i a t i o n of war isb ou nd t o b e h a nd l e d i n So v i e t discourse i n a manner tha t w o u l db e s t s e r v e p o l i c y o r p r o p a g a n d i s t i c aims. I t w o u l d of c o u r s ebe f o l l y t o take s u ch s t a t e m e n t s a t f a c e v a l u e . Y e t i t w o u l dbe u s e f u l t o i d e n t i f y t h e e x p r e s s e d . So v i e t v i ew s on t h i s q u e s -t i o n , in order t o r e l a t e them l a t e r i n t h i s s t u d y t o o th e rc o n c e p t i o n s of f u t u r e war and t o probe t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s f o rS o v i e t m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y .

p e c t a t i o n t h a t a d e c l a r a t i o n o f w a r w o u l d p r e c e d e t h e outbreako f h o s t i l i t i e s b et we en t h e m aj or p ow er s. R a t h er , m i l i t a r ydiscourse h a s r e p e a t e d l y stressed t h e l i k e l i h o o d t h a t a f u t u r eg e n e r a l w a r w o u l d beg in w i t h a s u r p r i s e a t t a c k w i th m a s s

de s t ru c t io n weapons by th e West a g a in s t t h e So v i e t camp. I nan a r t i c l e i n t h e A p r i l 19 61 MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL,Major General M. Cherednichenko cas t t h i s view i n terms ofa r i g i d f o r m u l a :

To b e g in w i t h , no Soviet spokesman h a s vo iced ex -

I t is becoming a d e f i n i t e l a w f u l r e g u l a r i t yt h a t w a r s in the contemporary epoch are b e i n gun leashed by i m p e r i a l i s t a g g re s s or s by s u r -p r i s e , w i t h o u t d e c l a r a t i o n , d r a w i n g i n t o t h ec o n f l i c t e n o r m o u s forces from t h e v e r y f i r s tdays of t h e war f o r t h e at ta inment of t h em ost d e c i s i v e o b j e c t i v e s .

- 1 6 -



.... . . . . . , .

' . . .

. ..,. . . :. .

W r it in g i n t h e A u g u s t 1960 i s s u e of t h e same j o u r -nal , however , t w o o t h e r m i l i t a r y writers l e f t open t h e p o s s i -b i l i t y t h a t e i t h e r s i d e might launch a s u r p r i s e a t ta c k : 'Asshown by past experience, wars most of ten a re s t a r t e d by s u r -p r i s e a t t a c k by one of t h e s i d e s . .. ..?

w o u l d w i l l f u l l y f o r e w a r n i t s 'opponent of a d e f i n i t e i n t e n t i ont o a t t a c k , t h e Sov i e t s have cons i de red t h a t a t h r e a t pe r i odcould precede t h e f i r s t n u c l e a r s a l v o , if t h e c o u n t r i e s werei n t h e m i d s t of a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s i s . (A compla in t heardd u r in g t h e B e r l i n cr is is i n 1961 w a s t h a t t h e USSR is confron t -

ed w i t h " t h e p r o s p e c t of war o n l y because i t wishes t o s i g na peace t r e a t y w i t h Germany.")

t h i r d world war c o u l d begin under any of t h e f o l l o w i n g c i r -cumstances:

\ W h i l e r u l i n g o u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t a major power

Sov ie t m i l i t a r y spokesmen have a l so s a i d t h a t a

1. Local w a r (small-scale w a r between s t a t e s ) whichi n c e r t a in cases w o u l d " i nev i t ab l y" and i n o t h e r s w o u l d "tendt o " d e v e l o p i n t o a g e n e r a l w a r . Soviet spokesmen agree t h a ta ny armed c o n f l i c t w i l l i n e v i t a b l y d e ve lo p i n t o a globa l nu-c l e a r / r o c k e t w a r s h o u l d t h e nuclear powers become i nvolvedi n i t . (Marshal Malinovsky, speech a t t h e 22nd CPSU Congress,23 October 1961)

2. A t t ack aga i n s t a s a t e l l i t e of t he Sovie t Union ."The armed forces of t he Sovie t Union , '' Marshal Mal inovskydeclared in,PRAVDA on 24 January 1962, "are a l w a y s r eady t or e t a l i a t e w i t h a crush ing b low a t t h e aggressor and w e s h a l lsmash th os e who at t a c k u s or o u r a l l i e s . " ( I n o t h e r r e c e n t

Malinovsky--have e x h i b i t e d some r e l u c t a n c e t o pledge t o de-fend a l l s a t e l l i t e s i n d i s c r i mi n a t e l y . I n t h e h e a t o f t h epolemic w i t h the Albanians and Chinese, f o r example, Sovietl e a de r s e a r l y t h i s yea r spoke o f de fend i ng t h e " s o c i a l i s tcoun t r i e s w h i ch are o u r f r i e n d s . I ) )

f e c t i v e rada rs or by " t he ' a cc i de n t a l ' appea rance of a f o r e i g na i r c r a f t and t h e ' a cc i den t a l ' d ropp i ng of a bomb." (Khrushchev,PRAVDA, 1 5 March 1958)

. . s t a t em en t s of t h i s na tur e , however, So vie t l eaders - - inc lud in g

3." Accidenta l war, which c o u l d be se t o f f by de-

- 17 -



Each o f t h e s e p o s s i b i l i t i e s i s invoked i n t he p ropa-ganda from t i m e t o time i n o r d e r t o i n h i b i t W es tern m i l i t a r ya c t i v i t i e s d e t r im e nt a l t o S o vi e t i n t e r e s t s . T h i s is not t os a y t h a t t h e v a r i o u s notions on how f u t u r e war might beginare w i th ou t s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r S o v i et m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e . Thef a c t t h a t S o v i e t m i l i t a r y discourse focuses mainly on t h eproblem of s u r p r i s e a t t a c k ( or f i r s t s t r i k e ) a g a in s t t h eUSSR is i n i t s e l f s i g n i f i c a n t from a m i l i t a r y s t a nd p o in t .T h is s i g n i f i c a n c e w i l l be brought o u t i n t h e e n s u i ng d i s c u s -s i o n o f o t h e r d im en s io n s of the p rob lem of s u r p r i s e a t t a c k .

B. V i e w s On t h e ImDortance of F i r s t S t r i k e

During t h e pas t two y e a r s Soviet spokesmen havep r e se n t e d c o n f l i c t i n g vi ew s on t h e p o s s ib l e im p a c t of a s u r -p r i s e a t t a c k on t h e USSR.

On t h e one hand, i n h i s speech announc ing th e t r oo pc u t in January 1960, Khrushchev had d e n i e d t h a t "any country"w o u l d d e r i v e d e c i s i v e a dv an ta ge b y l a u n c h in g a s u r p r i s e a t t a c ka g a i n s t a n o t h e r n u c l e a r power: "The s t a t e s u b j e c t e d t o a s u d -d en a t t a c k - - i f , o f course , t h e s t a t e i n q u e st i o n is a s u f f i c i -e n t l y b ig o n e- -w i ll always be ab le t o g i v e a p o w e r f u l r e b u f ft o t h e aggressor . Khrushchev c lear ly had p o l i t i c a l r ea so ns

f o r s a yi n g t h i s . A major o b j e c t i v e of h i s speech w a s t o assureh i s l i s t e n e r s - - b o t h domestic and fo re ign - - tha t th e p roposedt r o o p c u t w o u l d i n no way a f f e c t t h e c a p a b i l i t y of t h e S o v i e tUnion t o defend i t s e l f . In denying t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of s u r -p r i s e a t t a c k , he was b u t t r e s s i n g t h e image of an a ssu redS o vi e t c a p a b i l i t y t o r e t a l i a t e i n f o r c e , e ve n u nd er t h e worstp o s s i b l e c o n d i t i o n s . I n s u p po r t o f h i s argument t h a t t h e USSRhad a g u a r a n t e e d c a p a b i l i t y t o s t r i k e s ec on d w i t h i t s n u c l e a r /ro ck et weapons, Khrushchev s a i d t h a t S ov ie t t e r r i t o r y wasimmense and t h a t S o v i e t m i s s i l e f a c i l i t i e s ( t h r e a t e n e d b yNATO bases a l o n g t h e p e r i p h e r y of t h e USSR) were l o c a t e d i ns u c h a way a s t o i n s ur e d u p l i c a ti o n and t r i p l i c a t i o n as w e l las adequa te d i spe rs ion and camouf lage . L a t e r , i n t h e wakeof t h e U-2 i n c i d e n t , Khrushchev ag ai n s o u g h t t o assure t h e

West as w e l l as bloc l eaders a t the June 1960 Conference ofCommunist p a r t i e s i n Bucharest t h a t t h e USSR c o u l d s t r i k esecond even i f t h e Un it ed S t a t e s d i s co v e r ed t h e l o c a t i o n ofS o v i et r o c k e t bases: " I t is n o t p o s s i b l e t o p u t a r o c k e t baseo u t of commission by one, t w o , or s e v e r a l a t t a c k s ; r o c ke t

- l a - ,



. . ...

:, ,

, t:

.... '. .

t e c h n i q u e i n s u r e s a c o u n t e r a t t a c k i n e v e r y i n s t a n c e . " Inn e i t h e r i n s t a n c e i n whic h he e v a l u a t e d t h e s t r a t e g i c s i g n i -f i c a n c e o f s t r i k i n g f i r s t d i d Khrushchev seem t o vouch fort h e c a p a b i l i t y of t h e West's s t r a t e g i c fo r c e s t o s u r v i v e as u r p r i s e a t t a c k by Sovie t m i s s i l e s , a l t h o u g h t h i s p o s s i b i l i t ycannot be r u l e d o u t . *

' e f f e c t of s u r p r i s e a t t ack w a s con t r i bu t ed by L i eu t enan t G ene ra lK r a s i l n i k o v in RED STAR of 18 November 1960:

A nother a u t ho r i t a t i v e d i spa ragem ent of t h e u l t i m a t e

S o vi e t m i l i t a r y s c i e n ce a f f i r m s t h e fo l l ow i ng :R ega rd l e s s o f t he f a c t t h a t a sudden a t t a c kc a n cause v e r y g r e a t harm, it s t i l l cannot be-come a d e c i s i v e f a c t o r i n t h e course and o u t -come of t h e w a r .

This s t a t eme nt too , when examined i n cont ex t , seems designedt o emphasize t h e S o v i e t U ni on 's a b i l i t y t o r e t a l i a t e , r a t h e rt h a n t h e West's. F or t h e p r e c e d i ng s e n t e n c e s were: "By meansof a massed sudden a t t ack t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s dream of i n f l i c t -i n g blows on the s o c i a l i s t coun t r i e s w h i ch would immediatelydec ide t h e war i n t h e i r f a v o r . W cannot a f f o r d t o i gno res u c h i n t e n t o n s of t h e enemies of s o c i a l s m . "

St a t em en t s su c h as t h e s e , i n s h o r t , i m p l i e d t h a tt h e S o v i e t l eade rs had a h i g h c o n f i d e n c e i n a S o v i e t ( b u t n o tne ces sa r i l y West ern) s t r i ke - second c a p a b i l i t y . But n e i t h e rm i l i t a r y spokesmen nor Khrushchev have b e l i t t l e d t h e import -a nc e o f s u r p r i s e a t t a c k o r boas ted of an assured S o v i e t s t r i k e -second c a p a b i l i t y i n p u b l i c s i n c e 1960. The prolonged r e t i -cenceon s u c h a c r i t i c a l i s s u e as t h i s c o u ld m ean t ha t t he Sov i e t

*For obvious reasons , Sovie t spokesmen do no t d i rec t ly andopenly d i R c u s s t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e p o s s ib l e e f f e c t s of a --o v i e tf i r s t s t r i k e a g ai n st the U . S . The marshals g i ve a s su rancesthat t h e USSR " w i l l never s t r i k e t h e f i r s t blow." They havemade sweeping

t h r e a t si n t h e

masspropaganda, such

asMalinov-

s k y ' s boast i n PRAVDA on 24 January 1962 t h a t t h e USSR coulddes t roy " any t a r g e t , a l l p o l i t cal-admin i s t r a t v e c e n t e r s oft h e US " w i t h a s i n g l e n u cl e ar / ro c k et a t t a c k . Bu t t hey haven o t s p e c i f i e d t h a t s u c h a n a t t a c k w o u l d be launched under con-d i t i o n s of a f i r s t s t r i k e o r s u r p r i s e a t t a c k .

- 1 9 -0



. . ., , ..

. . .

. . ,

.. . .. .. . .

. . , . .

.::I:, '. ,\

. . .. .

l e a d e r s are l e s s c e r t a i n now th a n t h e y were i n 1960 aboutt h e S ov ie t a b i l i t y t o w i th s t a n d a f i r s t n u cl e ar s t r i k e byt h e West.

I n t h i s r ega rd , i t is a l so s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t s i n c et h e Khrushchev speech of January 1960, and i n s u b t l e r e j e c t i o nof it, a number of m il i t a r y spokesmen have s t r essed t h e pos-s i b l e d ec i si v e e f f e c t t h a t a s u r p r i s e a t t a c k mi gh t h av e ont h e war as a whole . Sta tements t o t h i s po in t made i n 1961

by t w o r a n k i n g m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s s t a n d o u t as most im p o r t a n t .

In an a r t i c l e summing up a l e n g t h y d e b a t e on t h ei n i t i a l p er io d of war, deve loped i n consecu t ive i s s u e s o f t h e

MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, t h e C h ie f of t h e Genera l S t a f fendorsed t h e view t h a t s t r a t e g i c s u r p r i s e c o u l d be of over-r i d i n g i m p or ta nc e i n a f u t u r e w a r . I n t h e J u l y 1961 issueOT t h e journal , Marshal Zakharov focused on t h e danger t o t h eUSSR ( w i t h p o s s i b l e r e f e r e n c e t o t h e West as w e l l ) of a s u c -c e s s f u l s u r p r i s e a t t a c k :

The nu cl ea r- ro ck et weapon, ha ving enormousd e s t r u c t i v e f o r c e and p r a c t i c a l l y u n l i m i t edi n i t s r a d i u s of o p e r a t i o n s , o p e n s before t h eaggressor wide p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r d e l i v e r i n ga s u r p r i s e blow of enormous f o r c e . N u c l e a rweapons perm it i n t h e v er y f i r s t hours oft h e war t h e d e l i v e r y of s u c h blows as can

t u r n o u t t o be d e c is i v e f o r t h e c o u r s e o ft h e war. In these c o n d i t i o n s , l a c k ofm i l i t a r y prepa redness fo r r e s i s t a n c e a g a i n s ta n ag g r e ss o r a t t a c k c an e n t a i l far h e a v i e rconsequences than was t h e case / i n t h e USSR7i n 1 94 1. Of highes t importance-here ist h e a t t a in m e n t of h ig h v ig i l a n c e a n d c o n s t a n tp r e p a r e d n e s s of armed forces t o p r e v e n t as u r p r i s e blow.

Marshal Malinovsky, i n h i s s p e e c h t o t h e 22nd CPSUCongress on 23 October has p rov ided t h e m o s t a u t h o r i t a t i v eop in ion on s t r a t e g i c s u r p r i s e t o da t e . H i s view of t h e i s s u ew a s c o n s i s t en t w i t h t h e m i l i t a r y l i t e r a t u r e s t r e s s i n g t h e

d e c i s i v e r o l e of s t r a t e g i c s u r p r i s e i n a f u t u r e w a r b u t , l i k eZakharov ' s , w a s out of s t e p w i t h K h r u s h c h e v ' s p r e s e n t a t i o nof Janu ary 1960. Malinovsky seemed a t p a i n s t o g e t acrosst h e idea t h a t t h e p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s h i p w e r e now

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f u l l y i n a c co rd i n t h e i r estimate of t h e i mp or ta nc e o f s u r p r i s e .Thus he took the r a r e s t e p of i n v o k i n g t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h eCPSU Pres id ium in emphas iz ing the need t o s tu d y t h e p ro bl emof t h e i n i t i a l pe ri od i n a war:

The Presidium of t h e C e n t r a l Committee o fthe par ty and the Sovie t Government havedemanded and do demand of u s t h a t w e devo tes p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n t o t h e i n i t i a l p e r io d ofa p o s s ib l e war. The importance of t h i sp e r i o d l i e s i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e v er y f i r s tm a s s n u c l e a r s t r i k e s are capab le , t o a vaste x t e n t , of prede te rmin ing the who le subsequen t

course o f t h e war and c o u ld l e a d t o s u c hl o s s e s i n th e re a r and among th e t ro ops aswould pu t t he peop le and th e coun t ry i n ane x c e p t i o n a l l y d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n .

I n s t r e s s i n g t h e grave danger . t o t h e USSR shou ldt h e West s uc ce ed i n s t r i k i n g t h e USSR T i r s t , t h e s e n i o r m i l i -t a r y l e a d e r s b e t r a y t h e i r d ou bt s and f e a r s a b u t t h e a b i l i t yof t h e i r c o u n t r y to withs tand a massed nuc lea r a t t ack . A tt h e v e r y l e a s t , t h e i r s t at e m en t s r e f l e c t much l e s s conf idencei n . t h e USSR's a b i l i t y t o absor b nu cl ea r b lows and t o s t r i k eback e f f e c t i ve l y than Khrushchev and Genera l Kras i ln ikov hade x p r e s s ed i n 1 96 0. A t t h e same t i m e , t h e s t a t e m e n t s on t h ep o s s i b l e d e c i s i v e n e s s o f s t r a t e g i c su rp r i se may bea r on t he

a b i l i t y of t h e U ni te d S t a t e s t o w i th s t a n d s u c h a n a t t a c k .Were t h i s t h e case , t h e s t a t e m e n t s c o u ld be u s ed i n s u p p or tof an argument f o r a S ov ie t s t r i k e - f i r s t s t r a t e g y and f o rt h e USSR's a c q u i r i n g a weapons ca p a b i l i t y commensurate wit ht h a t t a s k .

More w i l l be s a id s h o r t l y on t h e p r o b a b l e im p l ic a -t i o n s of t h e h e ig h t e n ed So v i e t c o n c er n o v er t h e q u e s t i o n o fs u r p r i s e f o r S o v i et s t r a t e g i c p la n n in g . Su f f i c e i t t o no tehe re , t h a t t h e e v i d e n t S o v i e t u n c e r t a i n t i e s about t h e e f f e c t

of t h e f i r s t a t t a c k h a s p r ob a bl y c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e d i s a r r a yi n m i l i t a r y t h i n k in g on s u c h ques t icms a s t h e d u r a t i o n of t h ef u t u r e war, t h e k i n d o f r o l e t h e o l de r component fo rc es w i l lp l a y, t h e r e l a t i v e i mp or ta nc e of conve nt io nal weapons, t h e

sca le of w a r t i m e economic pro duc tio n, and a v a r i e t y of r e l a t e dq u e s t i o n s .

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. .

.. .._..

. . . .... ...

, . . . .

C . S t r a t e g y F or t h e I n i t i a l S t ag e of War

A s r e v e a l e d i n t h e open sources , t h e So v ie t s e n -v i s a g e f i g h t i n g a "de fens ive" war i n t h e p o l i t i c a l s en se b u tan "o f fens ive" war i n a m i l i t a r y s e n s e . They g iv e n o i n d i -c a ti o n i n t h e i r w r i t in g s o r pronouncements of p la n n in g f o ra "p reven t ive" war-that i s , a d e l i b e ra t e , unprovoked a t tacka g a i n s t t h e West. The f a c t t h a t t h e y p l an t o f i g h t a "defe::-s i v e " war, however, does not r u l e o u t t h e i r s t r i k i n g a no th erpower f i r s t , by s u r p r i s e , s h o u ld t h e y deem t h i s i mp or ta nt t ot h e i r s e c u r i t y . A USSR Defense Minis t ry book, "War a n d P o l i t i c s "

( s igned t o p r e s s i n December 19591, - t h u s r a t i o n a l i z e da

f i r s t -s t r i k e s t r a t e g y fo r t h e USSR with in the f ramework of a 'defen-s i v e " w a r i n a p o l i t i c a l Sense:

Contemporary methods of conduc t ing wars haveg r e a t l y i n cr e as e d n ot o n l y t h e s i g n i f i c a n c eof s u r p r i s e b u t also t h e r o l e of a t t a c k - -which is t h e bas ic and most important way ofc o n d u c t i n g w a r , and of p r o v id in g f o r t h ed e c i s i v e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e fo rces of t h eenemy and th e p r ese rva t io n of one's ownf o r c e s . A tt ac k i n t h e m i l i t a r y s e n se ofs t r a t e g y by no means c o n t r a d i c t s t h e d e f e n-s i v e c h a ra c t er of w a r i n d e f e n s e of t h es o c i a l i s t f a t h e r l a n d from t h e p o l i t i c a lp o i n t of view.

Marx and Engels c o n s t a n t l y adv is ed commun-is ts t h a t a . . . j u s t war, d e f e n s i v e i n c h ar -a c t e r , does no t p rec lude s t r a t e g i c a t t a c ko p e r a t i o n s b u t on t h e c o n t r a r y p r e s u p p o s e sthem.

According t o numerous Soviet m i l i t a r y s t a t e m e n t s ,p reven t ing , and a t t h e l e a s t , repuls ing an enemy s t r a t e g i ca t t a c k , a nd d e l i v e r i n g a c rush ing coun te rb low, w i l l b e t h em o s t impor tan t o f t h e immediate s t r a t e g i c aims of S o v i e tforces i n a f u t u r e war. From o th e r s ta temen ts on how t h ew a r w i l l d e v e lo p i n i t s i n i t i a l p hase, i t is c l e a r t h a ts e i z i n g t h e s t r a t e g i c i n i t i a t i v e and c r e a t i n g f a vo r a bl e con-d i ti o ns - -t h ro u gh s t r a t e g i c n u c le a r s t r i k e s - - f o r t h e f u r t h e rdevelopment of o p e r a t i o n s are included among t h e immediateo b j e c t i v e s .

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. . .. .. .

.

T o preven t an enemy su rp r i s e a t t a ck , shou l d deter-r e n c e f a i l , m e a n s t o d e s t r o y t h e e ne my's n u c le a r s t r i k i n gforce--or as much of i t as poss i b l e - - i n good t i m e . The bes tand perhaps only way t o ach i eve t h i s is b y s t r i k i n g t h e enemyf i r s t . Such was t h e t h i n k i n g of a g r ou p o f S o v i e t m i l i t a r yt h e o r i s t s who, i n 1955, advanced the view t h a t a s u r p r i s ea t t a c k could be f r u s t r a t e d i f t h e enemy were h i m s e l f s u r p r i s e das h e i p r e p a r e d t o s t r i k e .

admit i n p u b l i c t h e adopt ion of a pre-empt ive s t r a t e gy . Ont h e c o n t r a r y , on a number of o c c a s i o n s s i n c e 1955 Soviet spolres-men have e x p l i c i t l y disavowed i t .* N e v e rt h e le s s , i n t h e p e r io dunder review, t he re have been some c r y s t a l c l ea r a l l u s i o n st o t h e need f o r t h e USSR t o be in a p o s i t i o n t o s t r i k e t h ef i r s t nuclear b low, s h o u l d war become in e vi ta bl e . Thus, ina deba te I n t h e m i l i t a r y h i s t o r i c a l s e c t i o n of t h e GeneralS t a f f ( r e p o r t e d i n t h e A p r i l 19 60 i s s u e of t h e MILITARY-HISTORICAL J O U R N A L ) , a Colonel Nazarov made t h e fo l l ow i ngs t a t em en t about t h e "new prob lems" i n t h e p repa ra t i o n f o rw a r and t h e conduct of armed s t r u g g l e i n i t s i n i t i a l p e r i o d :

I t has not been t h e p o l i c y of t h e Soviet Union t o

The f i r s t p rob lem is i n s u r i n g f o r o n e s e l ft he advan t ages f o r t h e s u c c e s s f u l r e a l i z a -t i o n of a s u r p r i s e f i r s t blow o r t h e pre-vent ion (predotvarshchenie) of s u c h a blowon t h e p a r t of a pro bab le enemy. Th is prob-l e m , as h i s t o r y has shown, h a s become t h ec e n t r a l one i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of c o u n t r i e sf o r w a r and in t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of armedfo rces and of t h e m i l i t a ry h igh command.

In an a r t i c l e i n t h e March 1961 i ssue of t h e MIZITARY-HIST ORICAL JOURNAL, Army General Kurasov hinted, though i nmore caut ious language, a t t h e need f o r t h e USSR t o s t r i k ef i r s t i n t h e e v en t o f war. He quoted Lenin t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t

*The above-ment ioned book,"War

and P o l i t i c s, f o r

example,s a i d : " I t is w e l l known t h a t , un l i ke t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s , m i l i -t a r y a n d p o l i t i c a l l e ade r s of t h e Soviet Union have many t i m e ss t a t e d t h a t t h e USSR w i l l never s t a r t w a r s . They have alwaysdenied t h e s t r a t e g y of 'pre-emptive b low ' . "

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. . . . ,

.. . .... . ... .

.. .. ,.. .. . ,. . . ......_. . .

i t would be "stupid and c r im ina l " no t t o a t t a c k an enemy "act-i n g a g a i n s t us." H e recal led t h a t L en in wrote (Works, V o l .26, p . 152) t h a t "one m u s t t r y t o c a t c h t h e e n e m m d i s a r r a y ,. to s t r i k e a t t h e moment when h i s t ro o ps are assembled." Andhe n o t e d L o n i n ' s a da ge t h a t " i n w a r you do not communicate

. t o t h e enemy when you are go i ng t o a t t a c k . "

V o i c i ng conce rn i n h i s 22nd CPSU Congress speechl a s t October about t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a West e rn su rp r i s ea t t a c k a g a i n s t t h e USSR, Marshal Malinovsky not only ca l l edf o r p r e p a r e d n e s s t o repe l s u c h an a t tack , b u t h i n t e d s t r o n g l ya t a p r e - e m p t i v e s t r a t e g y . H e s a i d t h a t i n 1 96 1 t h e armedforces were c a l l e d on t o work o u t means of "exploding" t h ea g g r e s s o r ' s p l a n b y a " t i m e l y and deva s t a t i n g blow ag a i n s thim'' :

...., ::;

. .

In r e a l i s t i c a l l y a pp ra is in g t h e s i t u a t i o n ,one m u s t ho l d t h a t it is p r e c i s e l y a s u r -p r i s e n u cl e ar a t tack on t h e Soviet Unionand o t h e r s o c i a l i s t c o u n tr i e s t h a t t h e i m -

p e r i a l i s t s are p r e p a r i n g . T h i s i s whyS o v i et m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e r e g a r d s as t h emost important , t h e pr i n c i pa l , and p r i m aryt a s k s of t h e armed f o r c e s t o be i n c o n s t a n tr e a d in e s s t o r e p u ls e r e l i a b l y a s u r p r i s ea t t a c k of t h e enemy and t o thw ar t h i s c r i m i -n a l p l a n s . The p o i n t a t i s s u e is t h a t , i ncontemporary con di t ion s , any armed c o n i1 c tw i l l i n e v i t a b l y d ev el op i n t o a u n i v e r s a lnuc lear - rocke t war, sho uld t h e nuclear pow-e r s be i nvo l ved i n i t . Thus w e are f o r c e dt o p r e p a r e o u r armed f o r c e s , t h e c o u n tr y ,and a l l t h e p eo pl e p r i m a r i ly f o r a s t r u g g l ea g a i n s t t h e a g g r e ss o r , m a in ly i n t h e c on di -t i o n s of n u c l e a r w a r f a r e. . .The main common t a s k posed fo r a l l o u r armedfo r c e s i n m i l i t a r y t r a i n i n g f i n 1 96 17 wast h e s t u d y and working ou t of-the means ofr e l i a b l y r e p u ls i n g a s u dd en n u c l e a r a t t a c k

by t h e agg res so r and a l s o t h e means of ex-p l o d in g h i s a g g r es s i ve p l a n s by a t i m e l ya n d d e v a s t a t i n g blow a g a i n s t h i m .

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. .

.: .. . '

.

. : . . I

. ._... . . ..:.. ,. . ... ...

There are t w o i m por t an t d i f f e rences be t w een t hep r e s e n t a n d p a s t t r e a t m e n t of t h e p re -e mp ti ve q u e s t i o n i n t h eop en d i s c o u r s e . F i r s t , a lt h ou g h a l l u s i o n s t o a pre-emptives t r a t e g y h av e b ee n car r i ed i n l e s s a u t h o r i t a t i v e sources i nt h e p a s t , o n l y r e c e n t l y h a s t h e c on ce pt of pre-empt ive ac t ionb ee n i n c o r p o r a te d i n t h e s t a t e d miss ion of t h e USSR armedforces.* Second, t h e s t r i d en t con f i dence exp re s sed by somem i l i t a ry spokesm en p r i o r t o 1960 i n h av in g ample warning ofan impending enemy attack has n o t a pp ea re d i n r e c e n t m i l i t a r ydiscourse. Rather , emphasis has been on v i g i l a n c e a nd s p l i t -s ec on d r e a c t i o n i n t h e e x p e c t a ti o n t h a t t h e r e w i l l be l i t t l eadvance war ning . The spokesmen g iv e as t h e main reason f o r

t h i s t h e t h r e a t posed b y American overseas bases . "The pres-ence of numerous m i l i t a r y bases of i m p e r i a l i s t s t a t e s aroundt h e TJSSR and o t h e r c o u n t r i e s of t h e s o c i a l i s t camp determinest h a t t h e t i m e f o r b r i n g i n g o u t fo rces t o immediate combatprepa redness m u s t be measured n o t i n d a ys o r even in hours ,b u t i n a se r i es of cases l i t e r a l l y i n m i nu te s a nd s ec on ds ."(Major General N. Kiryaev, KORlMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES,No. 1 7 , September 1961)

American overseas bases, moreover, are g i v e n f i r s tpr i o r i t y am ong t h e prominent ly announced t a rge t s of a S o v i e tcoun t e r - s t r i ke . T he whole system of bases r i n g i n g t h e S o v i e tcamp, they boast , c a n r a p i d l y be knocked o u t of commission.B u t t he Sov i e t s have obse rved a c u r i o u s r e t i c e n c e w i t h r e s p e c t

t o SAC and m i s s i l e bases located w i t h i n t h e U ni te d S t a t e s .A t t h e m o s t , t hey speak of a t t ac k i n g "ve ry i m port an t targets ' 'w i t hi n t h e U n i te d S t a t e s o r imply a c a p a b i l i t y t o d e s t r o ythem by drawing on au t h o r i t a t i ve A mer ican s t a t e m en t s bea r i ng

. . . :. .

*Thus i n Febru ary 19 61, Malinovsky s a i d o n ly t h a t t h e So-v i e t armed f o r c e s w o u l d ' ' r e p el t h e a t t a c k of t h e enemy anddea l him immediately a c r u s h i n g ; r e t a l i a t o r y Blow.""

.

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\

...



o n S ov i et s t r a t e g i c a t t a c k f o r ce s .* More common i n m i l i t a r ydiscourse are r e f e r e n c e s t o s t r i k e s a g a i n s t s u c h rear areat a r g e t s as " i n d u s t r i a l and v i t a l c e n t e r s , "co mm un ic ation sJ u n c t i o n s , 'I " p o l i t i c a l - a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c e n t e r s , " na va l b a s e s , ''and " e v e r yt h i ng t h a t f e e d s war . I 1

The f a c t t h a t t h e r e is l i t t l e i f any s p e c i f i c mea-t i o n of h i t t i n g lo ng -r an ge a t t a c k el e me n ts located w i t h i n theUnited St a t e s canno t be expla ined s imply by a r e l u c t a n c e t obroach a s u b j e c t t h a t impinges on a s t r i k e - f i r s t s t r a t e g y ,f o r S o v i e t s po kes me n f o r t h r i g h t l y s p e a k of a c o u n t e r f o r c es t r a t egy - - i m p l y i ng f i r s t s t r i k e - - w i t h r e s p e c t t o Americanrocket and SAC bases o v e r s e a s .

There are s e v e r a l p o s s i b l e e x p l a n a t i on s f o r S o v i e tr e t i c e n c e o n t h e s u b j e c t of mainland U.S. m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s .It cou l d , f o r example, r e f l e c t a m i l i t a r y es t imate t h a t U.S.ove r seas bases, be i ng m a i n ly roc ke t bases, r e p r e s e n t t h e p r i -mary t h r e a t t o t h e S o v i e t camp; whereas t h e l ong -range a t t a ckfo rces based w i t h i n t h e United St a t e s are s t i l l mainly a i r -c r a f t , a p a r t of which are on a i r a l e r t , and can be d e a l t w i t hby e x i s t i n g S o v i e t a i r defens e for ce s (whose r o l e is h e a v i l ys t ressed i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e ) , A second poss i b l e exp l ana t i onis t h a t S o v ie t m i l i t a r y p l a n n e r s l a c k c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e i ra b i l i t y t o s t r i k e a t ICBM s i t e s and SA C bases w i t h i n t h e U n i t e dStates--or a t l e a s t i n good tim e- -w it h e x i s t i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s .S t i l l a t h i r d p o s s i b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n is t h a t t h e S o v i e t l ead-

e r s , d e s i r i n g t o g iv e s t a b i l i t y t o m u t u a l d e t e r r e n c e , f i n dit i n t h e i r i n t e r e s t t o maintain American confidence in SAC'Sr e t a l i a t o r y c a p a b i l i t y t o de te r t h e USSR--but a t a l e v e l l o wenough t o d i sc o ur a ge an A m er i can su rp r i s e a t t ack aga i n s t t h eUSSR. **

*' 'The s t rength of o u r rocket weapons is a l s o acknowledgedabroad. For example, commander of U S SA C General Thomas Powerdeclared open l y t h a t under p re sen t con d i t i o ns any t a rg e t canbe des t roye d w i t h an accu racy of up t o 95%, even i f t h i s t a r -g e t i s a t a d i s t a n c e of 8 t o 10 thousand ki l om ete rs . Powerdraws t h e c o n c lu s i o n: ' I n e f f e c t a l l t h e S o v i e t s need t o p u t

o u r atomic weapons o u t of commission a re 300 r o c k e t s . A l l t h i si n some t h i r t y minutes ." ' (Marshal Moskalenko, RED STAR, 13

September 1961)

American confidence in i t s a b i l i t y t o d e t e r t h e USSR i s t h ep r a c t i c e of p u b l i c i z i n g e x p e ct a t io n of t h e v a s t d e s t r u c t i o nt h a t t h e USSR w o u l d s u f f e r i n t h e e v e n t of a new w a r .

**Another method t h e Sovie t s have used i n m a i n t a i n i n g

- 26 -



. . . . . . . . .

I). Conclus ions

:

What i s most s t r i k i n g a b ou t S o v ie t s t a t e m e n s on t h e,problem of t h e i n i t i a l s t a g e of w a r is t h e u n c er t a in t y t h a tund e r l i e s them . The f e a r s of Sov i e t l eaders r e g a r d i n g t h ee f f e c t s of a s u r p r i s e a t tack ca r r i ed o u t a g a i n s t t h e USSR havea l r e a d y been ment ioned. We a l s o e n c o un t e r e v i d e nc e of un-c e r t a in t y i n t h e f a c t t h a t some o f f i c e r s have vo i ced doub t so v e r whethe r s t r a t e g i c d e c is i on s t ak en by t h e m i l i t a r y leader-s h i p ca n c o n t r o l e v e n ts i n t h e f i r s t phase of a f u t u r e war.*

That s u c h f e a r s and u n c e r t a i n t i e s are i n e v i de n c eu nd ou bt ed ly h as i m p or t a nt i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r S o v i e t s t r a t e g i cp l ann i ng . T h i s has been made c l e a r i n a l l u s i o n s by t o p m i l i -t a r y l eader s t o a pre -em pt i ve s t r a t egy . If n o t r e f l e c t i n ga change i n po l i cy , t h e i r s t a t em ent s may be a r g ui n g f o r o ne .For they seem t o compel t h e p r a c t i c a l d o c t r i n a l c on cl us io nt h a t t h e Soviet Union ought e i t h e r t o p r e pa r e t o a cc ep t a s u r -p r i s e n u c l ea r a t t a c k b y t h e United S t a t e s or t o l a u n c h on ei t s e l f .

The Sov i e t s do no t , of c o u r s e , s p e l l o u t f o r u st he m eaning o f p re-empt ive a c t i o n . In Sov i e t t h i nk i ng , t h e

. . . . ..... .

*In 1960, a s h a r p c o n t ro v e rs y to o k p l a c e i n t h e m i l i t a r y -h i s t o r i c a l d e p a r t m e n t of t h e G e n e r a l S t a f f , as reported ont h e p ag es of t h e MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, o v e r t h e r e l a -t i v e i mp or ta nc e of t h e d e c i s i o n s of t h e m i l i t a r y h igh commandon t h e one hand, and tec hni que (armaments) on t h e o t h e r , i nforming t h e i n i t i a l p hase of war. Some of f i c e r s contendedt h a t t h e m i l i t a r y h i gh command can i n peacetime prede te rminet h e c h a r a c t er of t h e i n i t i a l p er io d of w a r ; opponents of t h i sv ie wp oi nt ar gu ed t h a t t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e i n i t i a l pe r i o d ofwar is above a l l determined by methods and weapons--that i s ,by f a c t o r s i ndependent of t h e w i l l of i n d i v i d u a l p e r s on s .Marshal Zakharov, who summed up t h e debate i n a n a r t i c l e i nt h e J u l y 1 9 61 i s s u e of t h e MILITARY HISTORICAL JOURNAL, s i d e -

s t e p p e dt h i s

c o n t e n t i o n , l e a v i n g t h e quest ion among a numberof o t h e r s u n r e s o l v e d . H e was c o n t e n t t o say t h a t t h e charac te rof armed s t r u g gl e i n t h e i n i t i a l pe rio d o f w a r is determinedby "many condit ions, '' in cl ud in g pl an s and armament.

- 27 -



concep t of pre-empt ion may no t nece ss a r i l y e n t a i l a s t r a t e g yon which m i l i t a r y p lann ing is based . I t may have no bearingon t h e c h o o s in g of weapons i n t h e USSR. I t may simply meana l a s t - m in u t e a t t e m p t t o u n l o a d , t h e c o u n t r y 's s t r a t e g ic a t -t a c k weapons i n a n e f f o r t t o blunt an impending enemy attack.

Such a concep t of pre-emption, however, would i m-p l y a n i r r e s p o n s i b l e a t t i t u d e on t h e p a r t of t h i n k e r s s ocommitted a s a re t h e S o v i e t s t o t h e p r i n c i p l e of t o t a l plan-n in g . W e b e l i e v e it m u c h more l i k e l y t h a t t h e i r concep%Zfpre-emption is i n de e d e x p r e s s e d i n p l a n n in g , is o r g a n i c t ot h e i r w a r p lann ing . In t h i s sen se t he concep t no t on l y means

t h e l a u nc h i ng of a f o r e s t a l l i n g f i r s t blow (as opposed t o anunprovoked f i r s t s t r i k e a g a i n s t a n o p po n en t ); it a l so meansa s t r a t e g y t h a t w o u l d d i c t a t e t h e assemblage of a m i l i t a r yforce t h a t is capable o f d e l i v e r i n g an e f f e c t i v e f o r e s t a l l i n gblow, even though such a blow w o u l d n o t x s m l y d e s t r o yt h e enemy's c a p a b i l i t i e s .

.. .

. . . . . . ,, ..,;..,; ,;.:,..'>'...,..-

.. ... .

'.',.. ,.:: .:

As t o c u r r e n t S o v i e t c a l c u l a t i o n s of t h e e f f e c t sof a S o v i e t f i r s t s t r i k e a g a i n s t t h e Un it ed S t a t e s , w e cano n ly g ue s s i n t h e d a r k . The m i l i t a r y do not come t o grips

w it h t h i s q ue s ti o n d i r e c t l y i n t h e open discourse . A t t h emost, one could p o i n t t o i n d i r e c t i n d i c a t o r s of S o v i e t t h i nk -i n g on t h i s matter, w i t h o u t drawing any f i r m c o n c lu s io n s .I n e l e c t i n g , as they appea r t o do, a pre -empt ive a t t acks t r a t e g y , t h e m i l i t a r y leaders imply t h e b e l i e f t h a t sub-s t a n t i a l b lu n t i ng of the enemy's at tack forces c o u ld beachieved by a S ov ie t f i r s t s t r i k e . T hi s h yp ot he si s is b u t -r e s s e d b y t h e i r e x p re s s ed c o nf i de n ce i n a n a b i l i t y t o d e s t r o yt h e whole s y s t e m of American overseas bases, as w e l l as byt h e i r s t a te m e nt s t h a t a s u r p r i s e a t t a c k could be d e c i s i v e .On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e i r s t a t e m e n t s b e a r i n g on s t r a t e g i ct a r g e t i n g i n t h e f i r s t phase of war s e e m to r e f l e c t a l a ck

of c o n f i de n c e i n an a b i l i t y t o d e s t r o y t h e long-range a t tackforces based w i t h i n t e r r i t o r i a l United S t a t e s . T h i s wouldseem t o s u g g e s t t h a t , i n t h e i r view, an importan t p a r t of t h eU . S . long-range at tack f o r c e w o u l d su rv ive even under t h emost adve rse cond i t i ons o f a So v ie t n u c l e a r a t t a c k . Never-the le s s , i t s e e m s obvious t h a t t h e l e v e l of d e s t r u c t i o n w o u l dbe h i g h e r i n a pre-emptive blow t h a n i n a r e t a l i a t o r y blow,

so t h e i n a b i l i t y t o e f f e c t t o t a l d e s t r u c t i o n w o u l d n o t i n -v a l i d a t e a pre -empt ive s t ra tegy .

- 28 -



111. DOCTRINE FOR W A R AFTER THE FIRST ATTACK

The Sovie t m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s h i p , f r o m a l l i n d i c a t i o n s ,is p r e p a r i n g t h e S o v i e t armea f o r c es f o r f u t u r e w a r o n t h eg u id in g a s s um p t io n s t h a t i t w i l l invo lve more t h a n a m i s s i l ed u e l between t h e major powers and w i l l c o n t in u e o n a l a rgesca l e a f t e r t h e f i r s t n uc le ar blows have been s t r u c k . Ont h e same assumptions , the m i l i t a r y leaders have sought t owork o u t a body of t h e o r y on t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e e n t i r ecourse o f f u t u r e w a r as a bas i s f o r S o v ie t w a r p lann ing . The

f a c t t h a t t h e y have n o t had complete success i n t h i s e n t e r -

p r i s e h a s a l r e a d y been n o te d i n t h i s s t u d y , as h a s t h e t en -d en cy o f g r o u p s o f o f f i c e r s t o t ak e t r a d i t i o n a l i s t o r pro-g r e s si v e p o s i t i o n s . I n t h e s ec t i o n s t h a t fol low, w e s h a l lf i r s t o u t l i n e t h e s p e c i f i c c on ce p ti on s of how war w i l l developa f t e r t he f i r s t a t t a ck , d i s t i ng u is h in g , as w e go, betweenp o i n t s of agreement and con tro ver sy i n t h e m i l i t a r y l i t e r a -t u re . Then w e s h a l l a s s e m b le e v id e n c e of p r o b a b l e So v i e ts t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s f o r war as a whole and of methods ofa t t a i n i n g them.

. .

A. C h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s of Fu tu r e War

1. Dura t ion of War

The ques t ion of a f u t u r e w a r ' s d u r a t i o n is ac o n t e n t i o u s o ne i n t h e S o v i et m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t . T he reis no h ar d and f a s t d o c t r i n e on t h i s matter, a l t h o u g h t h e r eonce w a s . Up u n t i l 1960, t h e n o ti o n t h a t f u t u r e w a r wouldbe v e r y l o n g and a t t r i t i o n a l was n o t d i s p u t e d i n t h e m i l i t a r yl i t e r a t u re .* I n f a c t , as l a t e as 1959, a Defense Minis t rytex tbook , " In Aid t o Of f ic e r s S tudy ing Marx is t -Len in i s t Theorb, ''env is ioned a t h i r d w or ld w a r as l a s t i n g l o n g e r t h a n WorldWar 11. B u t s i n c e 1960, many views have been expressed ont h e s u b j e c t . Some w r i t e r s , p r i n c i p a l l y m i l il t a ry e c on om i st s ,con t inued t o p r e d i c t t h a t a f u t u r e w a r w o u l d be l e n g th y be-cause of t h e f a c t t h a t bo th c oa l i t i on s possesse d immense

human an d mater ia l resources as w e l l as a l a r g e t e r r i t o r y ,which could not be knocked o u t by n u c l e a r blows i n a s b r tt i m e . (Major G e n e r a l Lagovsky, SOVIET FLEET, 6 February,1960; V. Uzenyev, KOMMUNIST O F THE ARMED FORCES, No. 6 , 1961)

" . ..

* C a l l s for upgrading t h e importance of su r p r i s e may have

- 29 --mplied s h o r t war.



On t h e other hand, o t h e r s h a v e m u s e d o v e r t h ep o s s i b i l i t y k h a t w a r might be concluded w i t h t h e f i r s t n u c l e a rb r o a d s id e s .f e a s i b i l i t y of a b l i t z k r i e g in t h e f u t u r e under t h e " r i g h tc o n d i t i o n s , 1 t b u t w e n t on t o d i sc o un t i t a t l e a s t a s a pract ic-a b l e Western s t r a t e g y a g a i n s t t h e USSR w i t h i t s v a st t e r r i t o r yand p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r d i s p e r s i o n o f means of d e f e n s e .*

The l i k e l i h o o d t h a t a f u t u r e c o n f l i c t w i l l t a k et h e form of a b l i t z k r i e g o r s i n gl e - st a g e w a r is c l e a r l y am in o r i t y v i ew p oin t i n t h e So v ie t m i l i t a r y , how ever. Even t h eou tspoken p rogress ive experts on m i l i t a r y s c i e n c e now t en dt o d i sc o un t t h i s n o t io n . C ol on el

S.Koelov, one of t h e co-

a u t h o r s of the 1960 tex tbook on "Sovie t M i l i t a r y Science" t h a te n t e r t a i n s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a b l i t z k r i e g , i n 19 61 w ro te d i s -parag ing ly abou t unnamed Sov ie t o f f i c e r s who p r i va te ly looktow ar d a b l i t z k r i e g as t h e war of t h e f u t u r e . (KOMMUNIST OFTRE ARMED FORCES, No. 11, J u n e 1961)

extremes of b l i t z k r i e g a n d o f a l e n g t h y w a r of a t t r i t i o n , a n t i -c i p a t e s a w a r which w i l l continue beyond t h e f i r s t s t age b u twhich w i l l n o t be l o n g and drawn out l i k e World W a r 11. M i l l -

t a r y s po ke sm en t e n d t o agree t h a t a t l e a s t t h e i n i t i a l phaseof war-which , by d e f i n i t i o n , w i l l end when one of t h s i d e sa t t a i n s i ts immediate s t r a t e g ic a i m s - - w i l l be v e r y s h o r t .Khrushchev ' s p ic tu re of t h e i n i t i a l p hase of f u t u r e war, drawnin January 1960, .had scheduled t h e d e l i v e r y o f t h e d e c i s i v es t r a t e g i c s t r i k e s " n o t o n ly d u r in g t h e f i r s t days b u t d u r in gt h e f i r s t m inu te s of t h e war.*lmore c o n s e r v a t i v e m i l i t a r y t y p e s (who, i n c i d e n t a l l y , e x p e ctmuch t o be done i n t h e i n i t i a l p ha se , i n c l ud i n g t h e c om pl et io nof t r o o p m o b i l i z a t i o n and t r a n s f o r m a t io n of t h e economy t oa war f o o ti n g ) s a y t h a t t h e f i r s t s t a g e w i l l be counted i nt lhours o r i n days . 1 (Colonels Kolgushkin and Bershadsky, MILI-

One source went so f a r as t o acknowledge t h e

P r e v a i l i n g m i l t a r y o p i n i o n , a v o i di n g b ot h t h e

S i m i l a r l y e ve n c e r t a i n of t h e

TARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, NO. 8 , August 1960)

. , .. .* "So viet m i l i t a r y s c i e n c e d oe s n o t d en y t h e b l i t z k r i e g method

of conduc t ing war. I t p o i n t s o u t , how ev er, t h a t t h e s u c c e s s f u lconduct of a b l i t z k r i e g r e qu i r es an advantageous combinat i o nof ecotmmic, p o l i t i c a l a nd m i l i t a r y c o n d i t i o n s . . ." (Defenseh l in i s t r y t e x tb o o k , "On S o v i e t M i l i t a r y S c i e n c e , 1 Moscow, 1960 .)

- 30 -



. . . . . . . . . .

More noteworthy is t h e f a c t t h a t s e n i o r m i l i -

t a r y l eaders , no ta bl y Marshals Malinovsky and Moskalenko, haveo f l a t e conveyed the impress ion for t h e . f i r s t t i m e t h a t t h eye x p e c t n o t o n l y t h e i n i t i a l p hase of war b u t t h e w a r as awhole t o be s h o r t . They d i v u l g e d t h i s o u t l o o k i n t h e cour seof d r a m a t i z i n g t h e s w i f t n e s s w i th which s t r a t e g i c o b je c t i v esc o u l d be a t t a i n e d w i t h t h e u s e of b a l l i s t i c miss i l es .i n an a r t i c l e on Sov ie t rocke t power i n RED STAR of 13 September1961 , exp la ined t h e new out lo ok i n terms of t h e r e v o l ut i o ni n weapons technology.

Moskalenko,

U n t i l t h e appearance of r o c k e t - n u c l e a r wea-pons t h e r e were no means wi th the a i d of

which i t would be p o s s i b l e t o a t t a i n t h ed e c i s i v e g o a l s of a w a r w i t h i n b r i e f p e r i o d sof t i m e and i n any t hea te r o f m i l i t a r yo p e r a t i o n s .

I n t h e p a s t t h e s t r a t e g i c g o a ls of a warwere a t t a in ed by means o f c o n se c u t i v e ors i m u lt a n eo u s s o l u t i o n s of t a c t i c a l ando p e r a t i v e ta s k s i n t hea t e r s of m i l i t a r yo p e r a t i o n s on l and , and t h i s w a s accompaniedby a c o n s i d e r a b l e l o s s of t i m e , e f f o r t , andm e a n s .Today o u r armed f o r c e s d i s p o s e of powerful

s t r a t e g i c rockets w i t h n u c l e a r c h a r g e swhich m a k e it p o s s i b l e t o a t t a i n t h e s t r a -t eg i c goa l s o f - a w a r w i t h i n s h o r t p e r T Z Fof t i m e . Th e r o c k e t t r o o b s are cabable

of c o n d u c t i n g o p e r a t o n s bf v a r y i n g s c o p ei n any area of t h e g l o b e , a nd t h e y c a ne x e r t an e s s e n t i a l i n f l u e nc e n o t o n l y o nt h e c o u r s e b u t a l s o on the outcome of aw a r as a whole.

. . . . . . .. . . .

. . . . . . . . .

And Malinovsky underwrote h i s c o l l e a g u e ' s s t a t e -ments i n a sp e e c h before the 22nd CPSU Congress i n O c t o b e r1961:

The u s e of a tomic an d thermonuclear weaponsw i th u nl im i te d p o s s i b i l i t i e s of d e l i v e r i n gthem t o a n y t a r g e t i n a matter of m i n u t e s

- 31 --



bv means of r o c k e t s makes i t D oss i b l ei n th e s h o r t e s t p e r io d t o ach i eve deci-s i v e m i l i t a r y r e s u l t s a t any range andove r i m m ense t e r r i t o ry .

t . .. .. ,

Khrushchev's pronouncement 02 January 1960t h a t n u c l e a r / r o c k e t forces w i l l p l a y the main ro l e i n f u t u r ewar is now an unquestioned a r t i c l e of S o v i e t m i l i t a r y doct r ine.Unchallenged though It may be, t h i s canon is open t o d i f f e r -

e n t I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s as t o i t s meaning f o r th e ways i n whichwar 'may be conducted a f t e r t h e f i r s t s t r a t eg i c s t r i k e s .

S o v i e t m i l i t a r y spokesmen do n o t , as a rule ,go so f a r as t o s a y t h a t f u t u r e war w i l l s i m p l y be a "missi led u e l o r a "push-but ton war. '' (Klirushchev had impl i ed t h a t ,

war would take s u c h a form i n J anua ry 1960 , and aga i n i n Feb-r u a r y 1962 i n a n o t e t o President Kennedy on disarmament is-sues , ) While acknowledging the primacy of nuclear weapons,t h e m i l i t a r y n e v e r t h e l e s s see a p l ace fo r conven t i ona l t ypesof forces i n a f u t u r e g e ne r al war. They d i f f e r among them-se lves , however , over t h e kind of r o l e t h a t conven t i ona l forcesand weapons w i l l p l a y i n it.

. ...< . ... .. . ../:....,.,...,.... . . . . . ..'...'... , '

Progressive-minded ind iv i dua l s , on th e onehand, minimize t h e importance of con ve nti ona l 'weapons ands i m i l a r i t i e s betweeii lhethods of waging t h e f u t u r e war and .those of t h e p a s t , In t h e i r view, on l y nuc l ea r / rocke t wea-pons can f u l f i l l rJtrategic m i s s i o n s T m o d e r n warfare.(Marshal Yeremenko, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, No. 6 , June 1961)Even i n t a c t i c a l s t t u a t i o n s , t h e y s a y , b a t t l e s w i l l be de-c ide d by b lows d e a l t by nuc le ar weapons ; and they p i c t ur eb a t t l e s as g e n e r a l l y b e i n g f o ug h t w i t h nu cle ar weapons. (L t ,Col. M, Popov, RED STAR, 18 J u l y 1961)

T r a d i t i o n a l i s t s , o n t h e other hand, tend t oemphasize t h e importance of co nv ent ion al weapons. They r a i set h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t convent ional weapons might even play a

rimar r o l e i n s e c on da ry t h e a t e r s of o p e r a t i o n s , or i n t h e!hida t e r s a t c e r t a i n s tages i n t h e war.viewpoint ( i t s p o p u l a r i t y is i nde t e rm i nab l e from avai lableevidence) is ths fo l l ow i ng estimate b y General of t h e ArmyP. Kurochkin:

T yp i ca l of t h i s

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. . . ..

. . .

A f u t u r e w a r is u n l i ke l y t o have i d e n t i c a lforms of s t r u g g l e i n a l l t h e a t e r s of m i l i -

t a r y op er a t io ns . The most powerfu l weaponsw i l l o b v io u s ly be c o n c e n t r a t e d i n t h e chief

t h e a t e r s and d i r e c t i o n s . B u t i n t h e o t h e rt h e a t e r s and s e c t o r s of t h e s t r u g g l e i t i sn o t excluded t h a t m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s may be

c o n du c t ed i n t h e m ain w i t h c o n v e n t io n a l w e a -pons. Thus t h e b a t t l e i t s e l f i n these t h e -a t e r s w i l l acqu i re fo rms which w i l l be i nsome degree s i m i l a r t o t h o s e wh ic h c h a r a c t e r i z -ed t h e Second World War. (MILITARY-HISTORICAL,JOURNAL, N o . 8 , August 1961.)

Defense Min is te r Mal inovsky h imse l f t akes amore ba la nc ed , open-minded view of t h e r e l a t i v e i mp or ta nc eof modern and conv en ti on al weapons i n his s t a t e m e n t s on p o l i c yf o r S o v ie t f o r c e s t r u c t u r e , as w i l l be s e e n i n d i s c u s s i o n ofS o vi et s t r a t e g y f o r t h e a t e r w a r f ar e l a t e r i n t h i s s t ud y.

I t s h o u l d a l s o be p o in t e d o u t t h a t S o v i e t lit-

erature t a k e s i n t o a c co un t t h e p o s s i b l e u s e of chemical -b io-l o g i c a l warfare in a f u t u r e g e n e r a l war. A t t e n t i o n has beendrawn t o t h e f a c t t h a t a dv an ce s i n r o c k e t t e c h n iq u e s mayr a d i c a l l y i n c r e as e t h e m i l i t a r y e f f e c t i v e n e s s of chemica l andba ct er io lo gi ca l weapons "whose development i n t h e West i sp r o c e e d i n g i n t e n s i v e l y . ' (Major General N. Talensky, INTER-

NATIONAL A F F A I R S , No. 10 , October 1961) Cur ious ly , d i sc us s i onof CBW i s l i m i t e d t o t h e u s e of su ch weapons by t h e West andd e f e n s e a g a in s t t hem by S o v ie t f o r c e s .

3. The Role of Man i n War....... .

. ....... ,

The new emphasis on weaponry notwithstanding,m i l i t a r y t h o ug ht stresses t h e r o l e tha t men w i l l pl ay i n modernw a r f a r e . U n de r st a nd a bl y , t r o o p i n d o c t r i n a t i o n i n t h e USSRem phas ize s t h i s p o i n t i n a n e f f o r t t o buoy up morale and t oimpart a s e n s e of purpose and importance t o o f f i c e r s and men.There is, however, a t e c h n i c a l m i l i t a r y d i m e n s i o n t o t h i s q u e s -t i o n as w e l l . D o c t r i n e now c a t e g o r i c a l l y states--as i t hadbefo r e 1960- - tha t f u t u r e w a r w i l l demand th e p a r t i c i p a t i o n

of "mass, m u l t i m i l l i o n a r m i e s . '' (Uar sha l Mal inovsky, 23 October1961 speech) Ehrushchev had ev id en t l y t r i e d ' t o g e t t h e m i l i t a r yt o break w i t h t h i s o l d m a x i m in p lay ing down the need f o r l a r g earmieg in h i s J a n ua r y 1960 p r e s e n t a t i o n . H i s viewpoint found

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. ... . .

.. . .

, .. :.. :

. , .

e x p r e s s i o n i n a r t i c l e s by some m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s i n e a r l y 1960.Thus, Major Genera l G . Po krovsky ( i n SOVIET FLEET, 9 March1 9 6 0 ), h a i l i n g t h e anno unce d t r o o p c u t as c o n s i s t e n t witb t h e ,g e n e r a l t r e n d of t h e h i s t o r y o f warfare , argued tlqat a w a rof t h e fut .ur e would be waged wi th smal ler l a n d a r m i e s t h a ni n t h e p a s t . ' Even Co lo ne l I . G r u d inin , who t r e a t e d t h e t r o o pc u t as a peace t ime measure, fo resaw on ly a " c e r t a i n " i n c r e a s ei n t h e s i z e of t h e armed f o r c e s i n case of war. (RED STAR, ' . ' -

1 6 February 1960)

In l a t e 1960, however, t h e o l d m a x i m reappea redi n t h e m i l i t a r y l i t e r a t u r e . I n a new w a r , Genera l Kras i ln ikov

wrotei n RED STAR i n November of t h a t y e a r , " m a s s , mult i -mil-

l i o n s t r o n g armies w i l l p a r t i c i p a t e . I'

I n e a r l y 1 9 61 , t h e r e were s t i r r i n g s a m o n g t h em i l i t a r y ab ou t t h e p r a c t i c a b i l i t y of l a r g e - s c a l e m o b i l i z a t i o ni n w a r t i m e . A mil i ta ry economis t seemed t o q u e s t i o n t h e w i s -dom of t h o s e who b e l i e v e d t h a t m a ss iv e m i l i t a r y m o b i l i z a t i o ncould be r e a l i z e d a f t e r t h e s h o o t in g had s t a r t e d . He wrote:

The c on s t a n t i n c r e a s e o f m i l i t a r y a c t i o n a tt h e r ea r o f w a rr i n g c o u n t r i e s causes g r e a tlosses among t h e c i v i l p o p u l at i o n and c u t sdown on t h e number of re se rv es which can be

mob iliz ed. An in cr ea se i n t h e s t r e n g t h ofthe armed forces of t h e w a rr in g c o a l i t i o n sis p o s s i b l e o n l y u nd er c o n d i t i o n s of a g r e a ti n c r e a s e i n t h e number of c o u n t r i e s a c t i v e l yp a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e armed c o n f l i c t . (V .Uzenyev, KOMMUNIST O F THE ARMED FORCES, No.5 , March 1961)

By April 1961, it had become c l e a r t h a t t h eq u e s t i o n of t h e need f o r l a r g e armies i n w a r t i m e ( a t l e a s t )was r e s o lv e d f o r S o v i e t m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e . RED STAR of 5Apr i l 1961 ca r r i ed wha t appea red t o be a d e f i n i t i v e a r t i c l eo n t h e s u b j e c t , and t h e m i l i t a r y l i t e r a t u r e h a s s i n c e n ot

. q u e s t i o n e d t h e "mass, m i l t i m i l l i o n a r m i e s ' ' co nce pt. The doc-t r i n e ( ad op te d i n e a r l y 1960) t h a t m a k e s a c o u n t r y ' s m i l i t a r yp o t e n t i a l d ep en de nt p r im a r i l y o n f i r e p o w e r r a th e r t h a n num-b e r s o f t r o o p s h a s b ee n r e t a i n e d a t the 'same t i m e , however.

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... ... ,. . . .

4. The Scope of War

Another basic t e n e t of m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e ist h a t f u t u r e w a r w i l l b e g l o b a l i n s c a l e and involve l a rgec o a l i t i o n s of s t a t e s i n armed combat agains t one another ."A cons ide rab ly grea te r number" of c o u n t r i e s are expec tedt o be drawn in to a new war t h a n t oo k p a r t i n t h e l as t ,(Lt. Gen. Krasilnikov, RED STAR, 18 November 1960) Eu ro pe ,America ahd "o the r con t ihen ts" w i l l become " theaters of war."*

' t h e a t e r w a r f a r e t h ro u gh o ut t h e course of a f u t u r e war--howeverMilltary o p in io n e n v i s a g e s t h e c o n d u c t of

l o n g o r s h o r t it may be, T h e or i s ts p i c t u r e t h e war as s t a r t -i n g w i th a s t r a t e g i c a t t a c k by " n u c l e ar - t i pp ed r o c k e t s , aviL-t i o n , o r co mb ined s t r i k e s b y those and o ther means ." A t t h esame t i m e , t h e y s a y , " s e v er a l f r o n t s would s p r i n g up i n d i f -f e r e n t t h e a t e r s of m i l i t a r y o p e ra t i on s " i n which t h e o t h e rty p e s of s e r v i c e would go i n t o a c t i o n . (Col. P. Sidorov,KOMMUNIST OF THB ARMED FORCES, No. 13, June 1961)

Taking a page from Khrushchev's book, th ey s a yt h a t t h e r e w i l l be l i t e r a l l y "no b o r d e r l i n e bet ween t h e f r o n tand the r e a r a r e a ; t h e t e r r i t o r y of e a c h s t a t e t h a t is invo lvedi n t h e war w i l l become a t h e a t e r o f m i l i t a r y o pe r at i on s ."(Col. A.M. Yevlev, RSD STAR, 5 A p r i l 1961) With some excep-t i o n s , * * t h e y ad d that t h e war w i l l be waged on land, sea and

in t h e a i r s imultarreously and i n many th e a t e r s of o p e r a t i o n .(Major General ( R e s , ) V .A . Semenov, "Short O u t l i n e of t h e D e-velopment of .Sovidt 'Opera t ional A r t , '* 1960)

- %

* C o l . R. GridasGv, RED STAR, 18 3 u m e X960. Major Genera lN . Ta le nsk y may have h a d Communist Ch in a i n mind as w e l l ast h e Un it ed S t a t e s when he wrote, in $an a r t i c l e i n KOMMUNISTof May 196 0, t h a t there cannot be :a '"thrird and win ning pa rt y"i n a f u t u r e w a r .

**The. au t ho rs of t h e 1960 textbook "On So vie t Mi l i ta ryScience ' ' were t a ke n t o t a s k by Col. Genera l N . Lomov (REDSTAR, 10 May 1961) f o r " inc orr ec t ly" implying t h a t i n a( h y p o t h e t i c a l ) s h o r t war, the re wou ld be no l a n d , s e a , anda i r b a t t l e s , t h a t t h e war would s imply co ns i s t of a miss i l eexchange.

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5 . Decis ive Charac te r o f War

. . ... .. . . . , .. .. .

.. ...

.. ..;..... .. ..

M i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e a l so t e a c h e s t h a t t h e warr ing

s i de s w i l l s t r i v e fo r t o t a l v i c t or y i n w a r . Discuss ions off u t u r e w a r o f t e n m en tion t h e " de ci s iv e" p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r yaims o r goals t o be purs ued, and emphasize t h e sev e r e conse-quences t h a t w i l l b e f a l l t h e warr ing pa r t i e s - -though no t i n

equal measure. A f u t u r e w a r , accord ing t o Marshal Malinovsky,will be,

w i t h r e s p e c t t o i t s p o l i t i c a l meaning, adec is ive a rmed c l a s h of t h e t w o opposings o c i a l sys tems. I t shou ld be q u i t e c l ea r

t o u s t h a t t h e s h ar p c l a s s n a t u r e of suchI '

a war w i l l prede te rmine the extreme deci -s i v e n e s s of t h e p o l i t i c a l and m i l t a r y

Eent of means of mass d e s t r u c t i o n a n do a l s of t he combatant sid es. . . . The employ-

a n n i h i l a t i o n w i l l impar t t o w a r an un-

pre ced ent edl y d es t r u ct i v e na tu re . (PRAVDA1 4 September 1961.)

Discuss ion of t h e consequences of war g e n e r a l l ya pp ea r i n p o l i t i c a l c o n t e x t s and c an no t r e a d i l y be e v a lu a t e dfo r t h e meaning i t might have for s e r i o u s S o v i e t m i l i t a r y t h i n k -ing . I t i s noteworthy , however , t h a t no Sov ie t source ha si n d i c at e d t h a t t h e p ro s pe ct o f w a r is a g r e e a b l e t o Sov ie t

m i l i t a r y l eader s ; n or h a s t h e t e n o r of m i l i t a r y l i t e r a t u r eas a whole borne a h i g h l y o p t i m i s t i c o u tl o ok w i t h r e s p e c t t ot h e outcome of a f u t u r e g e n e r a l w a r f o r t h e USSR. M i l i t a r yl eaders , on t h e c on t r a r y, t e n d t o p a i n t a gloomy p i c t u re ; i nkeep ing wi th t h e mainst ream o f p ropaganda , the y p re d i c t t h a ta n u c l e a r w a r w o u l d e n t a i l g r e a t d i s a s t e r s f o r a l l p a r t i c i pa n ts ,indeed for a l l mankind. Thus, Marshal Malinovs ky wrote i nPRAVDA on 24 January 1962, a f u t u r e war would do " i r repa rab ledamage t o a l l co un tr ie s . " Spokesmen f r eq ue nt ly as se r t t h a tt h e USSR would va nq ui sh t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s and c a p i t a l i s m w o u l dmeet i t s demise i n t h e even t of w a r ; b u t o n l y i n f r e q u e n t l ydo t h e y s p e a k i n terms of a clear -cut m i l i t a r y v ic to ry . Theyn e v e r d i r e c t l y admi t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f defea t of t h e USSR

- 36 -



. . . . . ... .... .

i n w a r , a l t ho u g h s e v e r a l p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t s carr ied i n t h emass propaganda media d u r i n g t h e p a s t y e a r h ave come closet o such an admiss ion .* I t shou ld be noted however, t h a tt h e S o v i e t los ses t h a t h av e be en e x p l i c i t l y c on ce de d r e f e rt o a w a r i n i t i a t e d by t h e West. The Sovie t l eade rs ' estimateof t h e losses t h a t t h e West might be able t o i n f l i c t o n t h eUSSR a f t e r b e i n g sub jec ted t o a So v ie t f i r s t s t r i k e , ofcourse, has no t been d i scussed .

would s u f f e r g r e a t ly i n t h e e v en t of war o b v io u s ly arep u b l i c i z e d f o r propaganda e f f ec t - - t o unde r l ine t h e s i n c e r i t yof t h e Sovie t government in i t s s t r i v i n g t o avo id a new war

an d t o s t a b i l i z e m u t u a l d e t e r r e n c e . The e x t e n t t o which thes t a t e m e n t s r e f l e c t actual m i l i t a r y es t imates of a n t i c i p a t e dl e v e l s of d e s t r u c t i o n c an no t be determined. I t c a n o n ly bes u r m i s e d from t h e g e n e r a l t e n o r of o p e n m i l i t a r y discourse- -t h e f e a r s of a Western f i r s t s t r i k e , t h e a p p r e c i a t i o n of nu-c lea r weapons e f f e c t s , e tc . - - t aken t oge the r w i th t h e a b s e n c eof ev idence t o t h e c o n t r a r y , t h a t t h e ex p re s se d f e a r s on t h econsequences of w a r are q u i t e g en ui ne .

The s t a t e m e n t s a c k n o w le d g in g t h a t t h e USSR

B. A l t e r n a t i v e S t r a t e g i e s : M a x i m u m o r L i m i t e d

D e s t r u c t i o n

S o v i e t s t r a t e g i c ob jec t ives beyond t h e immediate

s t r a t e g i c a i m s of t h e w a r a re d i f f i c u l t t o d i s t i n g u i s h w i t h ,

*Thus Malinmrsky, i n hi s 22nd Congress spee ch l a s t October ,expr esse d agreement with Kennedy 's s ta tem ent (as d i d ghrushchevin t h e p r e v io u s m onth) t h a t t h e s u pe r po w er s are "capable ofd e s t r o y i n g each o th e r . " Although t h e Defense Min is te r wen ton t o m a k e t h e customary boas t t h a t t h e USSR would des troyany aggressor i n a new w a r , h e d i d n o t as s e r t t h a t t h e USSRw o u l d s u r v i v e i t . The m a s s propaganda also came very closet o a d m i t t i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a S o v i e t defea t i n w a r whenTASS , on 22 J a n u a r y 1962, q uo te d T o g l i a t t i a s - s a y in g t h a t" n e i t h e r of t h e t w o s i d e s c an s a y t h a t i t h as t h e s l i g h t e s tconf idence t h a t it w i l l su r v iv e an armed con f l i c t w i t h i t sopponent." A PRAVDA v e r s io n of t h e T o g l i a t t i s p ee ch i n w hicht h a t s t a t e m e n t w a s made s i g n i f i c a n t l y om i t t ed it, b u t ca r r ieda n o th e r f o r c e f u l s t a t e m e n t o f t h e same t e n o r : "War m u s t bea v e r t e d a t any p r ice . "

- 37 -



c e r t a i n t y . T h e " f u l l defeat" of t h e enemy is d e s i r e d , b u tt h e mea ning o f t h i s t e r m is n o t s p e l l e d o u t . I t i s n o t c l ea rhow close t h e S o v i e t f o r c e s m u s t come t o t o t a l a n n i h i l a t i o nof t h e enemy--his armed forces , h i s c i v i l i a n p op ul a ti o n, andh i s ov e r a l l war-making capac i ty- - to accompl i sh th e " f u l l de-fe a t " o f th e enemy.

, . . . .. . .. .

. ... .. .

. . . ...,.

.,.. ..

The Soviet s t r a t e g i c a t t a c k e f f o r t , as exp la inedi n o pe n sources , w i l l be d i f f u s e d . Groupings of enemy fo rcesi n t h e a t e r s of m i l i t a r y opera t ions and impor tan t t a r g e t s i nt h e enemy's r e a r area w i l l both be "p r imary ob jec t ives" o fs t r a t e g i c s t r i k e s . The d e s t r u c t i o n of the enemy's fo r ces i nt h e f i e l d is s e e n as a m a j o r p r e r e q u i s i t e for v i c t o r y . A t

l e a s t i n t r a d i t i o n a l i s t quar ters , emphasis has been p lacedon the comple te smashing of t h e enemy's armed fo rces .(Marshal Grechko, PRAVDA, 9 May 1960) On t h e o t h e r hand, thisp r i n c i p l e no l o n g e r e n jo y s t h e o v e r r i d i n g emphasis which w a sp laced on i t before t h e 1960 d o c t r i n a l r e v i s i o n . Once t h eg u id in g s t r a t e g i c concept , i t m u s t now, under "progress ive"in f lue nce , sh a r e p r imary impor tance wi th rea r area bombard-ment i n o f f i c i a l ( p u b l i c ) d o c t r i n e .

p e a r s t o b e p r e d i c a t e d on the a s sumpt ions (1) t h a t a t t h ev e r y l e a s t , t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of rear area c i v i l i a n - m i l i t a r yt a r g e t s w o u l d b r i n g v i c t o r y more q ui ck ly th an i f t h e f u l lweight of t h e S o v i e t a t t a c k were d i r e c t e d a g a in s t g r o u p in g s

of armed fo rces in t h e f i e l d ; and (2) that under optimumcond i t ions , heavy r e a r area a t t a c k might b r in g t h e s w i f tc a p i t u l a t i o n o f a number of co un t r ie s , the reb y p rec l ud ingt h e need f o r major engagements with enemy armed forces i nt h e f i e l d and t h e comple te de s t ruc t i on of tho se forces .

The present emphasis on rear-area bombardment ap-

With regard t o t h e f i g h t a g a in s t e n e m y rear areas,. open discourse unfo lds a v a r i e t y of s t r a t e g i c d es i gn s, i n t e r -

woven w i t h propagand is t i c a ims . Which one o r which combina-t i o n of t h e f o l l o w i n g s t r a t e g i e s p l a y s a p a r t i n S o v ie t w a rp lann ing canno t be determined from t h e open sources a lone .

ing" (not a So v ie t p h r a s e ) i s one l i k e l y a l t e r n a t i v e s u gg es te d

by the p u b l i c So v ie t s t a t e m e n t s .

(1) M a x i m u m r e t a l i a t o r y damage o r "country-bust-

a. In Weste rn Europe, c e r t a i n co un t r i e s sub-j ec ted t o S o v i e t n u c l e a r s t r i k e s may, because o f t h e i r s m a l l

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. .......

s ize , be "knocked o u t of t h e war" w it h t h e f i r s t s a lv o s."Whole countr ies w i l l be t u r n e d i n t o . l i f e l e s s deser t s cov-ered w i t h ashes." (Malinovsky, 23 October 1961) Thesec o u n t r i e s w i l l be the ones wh ich house U.S. or NATO s t r a -t e g i c a t t a c k f o r c e s and th e r eb y p r e s e n t a grave danger t ot h e U S S R .

b. Regarding th e Uni ted S ta t es , t h e USSRw i l l "wipe from t h e face of t h e e a r th a n y a g g r e s s o r , w h e r e v e rhe may be" s h o u ld he t c t ry ' ' t o encroach upon t h e S o v i e t camp.' (Marshal Malinovsky, PRAVDA, 23 F e b r u a r y 1962) U p u n t i l l a t e1959, t h e p ro pa ga nd a p i c t u r e d o n l y t h e NATO a l l i e s a s vu lne r -

ab le t o a S o v i e t a t t a c k on a "country-bust ing" s c a l e . B u ti n November 1959, and aga in in th e f o l l o w i n g t w o months,Khrushchev by implica t ion d i r ec t ed h is "coun t ry -bus t ing"t h r ea t s a g a i n s t t h e United St a t e s as w e l l .

(2) L i m i t e d d e s t r u c t i o n of d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s ,on t h e o t h e r h a n d , can also be s e e n as a s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v eu n d e r ly in g c e r t a i n s t a t e m e n t s made o v e r t h e p a s t t w o y e a r s .

S ta te s may no t be d e s i g n a t e d f o r c o m p le t e d e s t r u c t i o n ; i n d e e d ,t h e t ho r ou g h d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e Weste rn co a l i t i on may no t bef o r e s e e n as a s t r a t e g i c a i m of war. The b run t o f t he So v ie tn u c l e a r / m i s s i l e a t t a c k mi gh t b e d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t t h e U . S . l a n d

mass and i t s o v e r s e a s bases, whereas l e s s d r a s t i c means mightbe u s e d t o n e u t r a l i z e t h e European a l l i e s ( shou ld t h e y s u r v i v et h e s t r i k e s a g a i n s t t h e A m e r i c a n bases on t h e i r s o i l ) . T h i sd i s t i n c t i o n a p p e a r s t o be made in t h e f o l l o w i n g s ta t e m en t :"W e have a t o u r d i s p o s a l t h e necessary means of combat no to n ly t o dea l a c r u s h in g blow a g ai n st t h e t e r r i t o r y of t h e UnitedSt a t e s , b u t a l s o t o r e n d e r harmless t h e a g g r e s s o r ' s a l l i e sand t o c r u s h t h e U.S. m i l i t a r y bases sca t t e red a l l over t h eworld. (ghrushchev, PRAVDA, 8 August 1961.)

a. Western European a l l i e s of t h e United

b . As f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , many t h r e a t s ofS ov ie t r e t a l i a t o r y blows bear t h e i m p l ic a t io n t h a t t h i s coun-t r y w i l l s u f f e r more l i m i t e d d e s t r u c t i o n t h a n i t s smal lera l l i e s and ove rseas bases because of i t s g r ea t s i z e and w i d e l y

d i s p e r s e d p o p u la t i o n a nd i n d u s t r y . I t has neve r ' been s a i dby S ov ie t spokesmen abou t th e Un i ted S t a t e s , as it h a s aboutWestern Europe, f o r example , tha t a spec i f ied number of nu-clear weapons w o u l d knock o u t t h i s c o un t ry . The d i s t i n c t i o nis a p p ar e n t i n t h e f o ll o w i ng s t a t e m e n t by Army General Ivanov,

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-f===wL



...

. . . ....._ .. . . .

. . .

made i n a message t o U.S. v e t e r a n s over Radio Moscow l a s tSeptember:

A b o u t t e n So vi et nu cl ea r bombs would be s u f -f i c i e n t t o wipe o u t c o u n t r i e s l i k e B r i t a i n ,West Oermany and Fr an ce . The Unit ed S t a t e swou ld no t e scape e i the r .

The p i c t u r e pa in t ed above of mixed objec t ives-- i fassumed t o be a de l ibe ra te and coord ina ted one - -p robab ly isd e s ig n e d t o k e e p t h e West o f f balance as t o where t o e x p e c tt h e m a i n d i r e c t i o n of So v ie t s t r a t e g i c a t t a c k . On t h e o t h e rhand, i f it is n o t t h e r e s u l t of a c oo rd in at ed e f f o r t , t h e

p i c t u r e c ou l d p o s s i bl y r e f l e c t i n d e c is i o n o r d i f f e r e n c e s i nv iew among the Sov ie t mi l i t a ry p la nne rs themse lves ove r ba s i co b j e c t i v e s a nd c a p a b i l i t i e s r e q u i r e d t o a t t a i n them. I n de e d,i t is d i f f i c u l t t o know whether Soviet s t r a t e g i c p lann ing ,as r e v e a l ed i n t h e open sources , is purpose fu l ly confus ing - -o r merely confused .

I t may shed some l i g h t on t h e pr ob le m t o s t u d y t h ec o n t r a d i c t o r y n a t u r e of t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s t r a t e g i e s of m a x i m u ma n d l i m i t e d d e s t r u c t i o n of enemy c o u n t r i e s . F i r s t , if m a x i m u md e s t r u c t i o n o f NATO a l l i e s i n Europe by a s i n g l e n u c le a r s a l v owere p lanned ( log ic t e l l s us as it probably has Khrushchev) ,t h e w a r in Europe would be s h o r t ; t h e r e w o u l d be no expecta-t i o n of massive land engagements between Western and Soviet

armies; a n d t h e r e w o u l d be no need t o occupy enemy t e r r i t o r y(which according t o Malinovsky would be reduced t o " l i f e l e s sd e s e r t s a n d h e a p s of r u bb l e" ). S o v ie t d o c t r i n e , s t i p u l a t i n gt h a t t h e i m m e d i a t e s t r a t e g i c aims of war can now be achievedi n a v e r y s h o r t t i m e , is consonan t wi th such a s t r a t e g i c o u t -look . B u t d o c t r in e c a l l i n g f o r a "mass , mult i -mil l ion" armywould appear t o be anomalous f o r such a s i t u a t i o n . Y e t bo thp o i n t s of d o c t r i n e are s im u l t a ne o u s ly e sp o us e d by t h e m i l i t a r yl e a d e r s h i p .

mass ive So vie t la nd army t h a t t end , i f somewhat weakly , t or e c o n c i l e it w i t h a "coun t ry-bust ing" s t ra te gy . The h igha t t r i t i o n r a t e due t o enemy n u c l e a r s t r i k e s a nd t h e d e p thand breadth of opera t ions (even i f conducted with sm a l lu n i t s ) are g iv e n a s r e a s o ns f o r needing "grea t r e s e r v e s ofcommand personnel and enormous contingents of r an k and f i l etroops. '" (Lt. Gen. Kra sil nik ov, RE D STAR, 18 November 1961)

So v ie t w r i t e r s have of f e r e d j u s t i f i c a t i o n s f o r a

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, .. .. .. .. . . . . .

Also, t h e argument has been advanced t h a t grea t numbers oft roops may be n e e d e d f o r d e f e n s iv e o p e r a t i o n s on So v ie t s o i l :

In a d d i t i o n t o t h e t r oo p s t h a t w i l l conductt h e combat o p e r a t i o n s d i r e c t l y , a grea t num-be r of t r o o p s w i l l b e ne ed ed f o r a n t i - a i r -c r a f t , a n t -atomic and ant -chemical defen se ,t o guard the communications, t o l i q u i d a t e t h econsequences of t h e employment of means ofmass d e s t r u c t i o n , . t o d e s t r o y a i r b o r n e andn a v a l l a n d in g s , e t c . (Col. A.M. Yevlev, REDSTAR, 5 Apr i l 1961).

On t h e o t he r hand, i f o n l y p a r t i a l d e s t r u c t i o n oft h e NATO a l l i e s were p lanned , the re w o u l d be c l e a r j u s t i f i c a -t i o n f o r a powerfu l Sovie t land army, and the b e l i e f t h a tt he r e would be i n t e n s i v e t h e a t e r w a r fa r e on ground, sea anda i r . I n this e v e n t , l a r g e g r ou pi n gs o f NATO fo rces wou ld -beexpected t o s u r v i v e t h e i n i t i a l n u c l e a r e xc ha ng e and t h e r ew o u l d be i m po rt a nt , i n ha b it e d t e r r i t o r y t o be se ized and oc-cupied b y So v ie t f o r c e s . Log ic t e l l s us, though it does no tassure us, t h a t t h e USSR would pre fe r t o l e a v e as m u c h ofEurope a s p o s s i bl e i n t a c t i n order t o h a v e b e n e f i t s t o r e a pin t h e e v e n t of v i c t o r y .

Taking t h e problem of c o n f l i c t i n g e vi d en ce of So-v i e t s t r a t e g i c o bj e c t i ve s a s t e p f u r t h e r i n our d i s c u s s i o n ,

w e can draw some t e n t a t i v e c o n c l us i o ns a b ou t t h e s t r a t e g i cout look of t h e So v ie t m i l i t ary l e a d e r s h i p .

I n h i s po l i cy s ta tem ent s , Marshal Malinovsky hasa ck no wled ge d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a s h or t' i n i t i a l p e ri o d o fwar i f n o t a s h o r t war as a w ho le ; h e h a s g iv e n s t r o n g h in t sof a "coun t ry-bust ing" po l ic y wi th re sp ec t t o Western Europe,i f n ot t o th e United S t a t e s as w e l l ( "we w i l l wipe any agres-s o r f r o m t h e f ace af t h e e a r t h " ) . A t the same t i m e , he hascarved o u t an impor tan t ro le f o r t h e conven t iona l a r m s ofs e r v i c e i n P f u t u r e war, t a k i n g i n t o a c co un t t h e p o s s i b i l i t yt h a t war might l a s t w e l l beyond t h e i n i t i a l n u c l e a r e xch an ge .

c o n t r a d i c to r y a p p r o a c h t o t h e problem. The Defense Mi ni st eris p r e p a r i n g S o v i e t f o r c e s f o r a number of e v e n t u a l i t i e s .H e is s e e k i n g a f l e x i b i l i t y t h a t w ould ha ve be en d e n ie d t h eSo v ie t armed forces ha d K hr us hc he v' s s t r a t e g i c b l u e p r i n t of

C l e a r l y t h i s is a markedly c a u t i o u s i f somewhat

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. . .

J a n ua r y 19 60 b ee n t r a n s l a t e d w i th o u t m o d i f i c a t i o n i n to m i l i -t a r y p o l i c y . H e w o u l d n o t gamble, as Khrushchev seemed w i l l -i n g t o do, on r e ly in g a lm o s t c o m p le t e ly o n n u Se a r ' /m i s s i l eweapons. I n h i s v iew, nuc lea r /m iss i l e weapons m i g h t be s u f -f i c i e n t t o t h e t a s k of d e t e r r i n g t h e enemy from going t o war;b u t should war break o u t , ot he r weapons and for ce s w o u l d ber e q u i r e d t o see it th rough t o v i c t o r y .

C. S t r a t e g i c P l a n ni n g fo r T h e a t e r Warfare

S o v i e t s t r a t e g y h a s not exaggera ted t h e

importance of t h e newest weapons.mass a p p l i c a t i o n o f atomic weapons doesnot a t a l l e l im in a t e w a g in g f u tu r e war in.t h e form of l a n d , sea and a i r o p e r a t i o n s .W ithou t t h e s e forms of armed f o r c e s , a n dw i t ho u t t h e i r c o r r e c t i n t e r - co o r d i n at i o n ,it is imposs ib le t o wage w a r s u c c e s s f u l l y .The c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e So v ie t armed f o r c e sas w e l l as t h e i r o p e r a t i o n a l - t a c t i c a l t r a i n -i n g is be ing conduc ted i n acco rdance wi tht h i s p r e c e p t ." (Maj. Gen. V . A . Semenov," S h o r t O u t l i n e o f t h e Development of SovietO p e r a t i o n a l A r t , 'I 1960)

The

, . ,.... . ..

. ...

Such is t h e credo of S o v ie t m i l i t a r y s c i e n ce , t h ekeystone of d o c t r i n e f o r t h e a t e r warfare.

The in te r -coord ina t ion of nuc lea r / r ock et and con-v e n t i o n a l f o r c e s is c e n t r a l t o t h i s credo. The t hea te r w a r -f a r e m i s s i o ns a s s ig n ed t o t h e n u c l e a r / r o c k e t forces o f t h es t r a t e g i c command and t o t h e o t h e r t y p e s of forces i n t h e USSRa re a t once d i f fe ren t and complemen ta ry . I n t h e Sovie t v iew,t h e n u c l e a r s a l v o s o n a s t r a t e g i c and t a c t i c a l s c a le s e r v eas a n e n t r e e f o r fo l low-up ope ra t ions by o t h e r t y p e s of forces .Through i t s n u c l e a r / r o c k e t s , a c c o r d in g t o a prominent progres-s i v e v ie w " t h e s t r a t e g i c command in f lu ence s t h e subsequentope r a t i ons of g roups of armed f o r c e s , p r e d e t e r m i n i n g t h e i rsuccess as a who le.'' On a t a c t i c a l s c a l e , nuc lea r / rocke t

s t r i k e s s o l v e t h e main tasks and t h e o p e r a t i o n s of o t h e r t y pe sof f o r c e s r e a l i z e and improve on what w a s accomplished by then u c l e a r /m i s s i l e a t t a c k s . ( C o l . S. Kozlov, KOIVIMUNIST O F THEARBilED FORCES, N o . 11, June 1961)

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\



.. . ... .. ... . ,. . ..

. .

' -

1. Ground Warfare

S o v i e t m i l i t a r y l eader s f o r es e e an e s s e n t i a li f s econda ry ro l e f o r Sov i e t g round t roo ps i n a f u t u r e war." I t is on l y w i t h t h e h e l p of t h e ground t roop s , " t he y say" t h a t t h e successes gained w i t h t h e new means of warfare canbe s e c u r e d and expanded. '' (Marsha i Yereienko, INTERNATIONALAFFAIRS, No. 11, November 1360) U nt i l J anua ry 1960, t h eground t roops p layed t h e l e a d i n g ro le i n S ov ie t s t r a t e g i cplanning and were r e g a r d e d a s t h e "main type" of armed forces .Now, however, t h e S t r a t e g i c Rocket Forces , as t h e b a s ic forcef o r t h e employment of nu cl ea r weapons, are o f f i c i a l l y regard-ed as t h e "main type" of s e r v i c e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , as notede a r l i e r , some o f t h e more c o n s e r v a t i v e m i l i t a r y t h i n k e r senv i s i on t h e ground t roops as p l a y i n g ev en t h e p r i n c i p a l r o l ei n "secondary" t h e a t e r s o f o p e r a t i o n s .

According t o a u t h o r i t a t i v e S o v ie t s t a t e m e n ts ,th e ground t roop s have themselves been t ransformed i n to anuc l ea r / rocke t fo r ce . R ocke t un i t s o f "ope ra t i o na l - t a c t i ca ldes i gna t i on , " w i t h r anges up t o "many hundred k i lo m e te r s ,have supplan ted t h e a r t i l l e r y as the "main f i r e s t r i k i n g force"of t h e ground t ro ops . In an a r t i c l e i n RED STAR of 18 Novem-ber 1961, C h i e f Marshal of A r t i l l e ry Varen t sov p re sen t ed alis --"by no means complete"--of t h e t a sks of ope ra t i ona l -t a c t i c a l r o c k e t u n i t s :

Deal ing blows t o t a r g e t s s i t u a t e d i n closeproximi ty t o o u r t anks and i n fa n t r y , de s-t r o y i n g t h e most important grouping sof enemy means of n u c l e a r a t tack , majorc o n t r o l p o i n t s of o p e r a t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e ,important communicat ion centers , and a i r -f i e l d s of atom-carrying a i r c r a f t t h a t arelocated i n t h e d ee p o p e r a t i o n a l r e a r .

t h e l i m i t a t i o n s of even t h e t a c t i c a l nuclear / rocke t weapons ,warning t h a t t h e y a l o n e c an no t b r i n g v i c t o r y i n combat. " I tis n o t p r o f i t a b l e t o u s e atomic w eapons aga i n s t t a rge t s w h i c hare very wide ly deployed and d i sp ers ed , " s a i d a m i l i t a r y lec-t u r e r . "Some t a r g e t s c a n n o t be des t royed by nuc lear weaponswhen one's fo rces are i n close proximi ty t o t hose of t h eenemy. Moreover, as a r e s u l t of h igh ly deve loped engineerf o r t f i c a t ons ( inzhinernoe oborudovanie mestnost i) m u c h of

A t t h e same t i m e , m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e has s t r essed

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t h e f i r e p o w e r of t h e enemy can remain i n t a c t i n a r e g i o n s u b -j e c t e d t o an atomic blow." (Lt. Col. Abramov i n a t a l k o ve rRADIO VOLGA t o S o v i e t fo rces i n Germany)

Reasoning t h u s , the m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s h i p c on-t i n u e s t o e q u ip t h e g r o u n d t r o o p s w i th c o n v e n t io n a l t y p e s ofweapons. Marshal Malinovsky made a p o i n t o f t h i s in hisspeech before t h e 22nd CPSU Congress last October:

. .' I

W e are n ot r e l a x i n g a t t e n t i o n t o the conven-t i o n a l t y pe s - o f w eapons, i n p a r t i c u l a r t oa r t i l l e r y . O u r motorized r i f l e d i v i s i on i sc o n s id e r a b ly smal ler i n number of personne l

t h a n i t was a t t h e end o f t h e l a s t war, b u ti t s f irepower--exclus ive of rocket weapons--h as in c r e a s e d o v e r f o u r f o ld . A s r e g a r d st a n k s , t h e r e are more of . them i n our modernmotorized r i f l e a nd ta n k d i v i s i o n s t h an i n '

. t h e mechanized and ta nk c orp s of t h e GreatFa th e r l a n d War, and i n t h e cor respond ingd i v i s i o n s of any NATO coun t ry .m u c h a t t e n t i o n is b e in g p a id t o The a i r b o r n et roops and m i l i t a r y a v i a t i o n t r a n s p o r t .

/h add i t ionL7

. . . ...

D o c t r i n e , i t would s e e m , a s s ig n s t h e g r o u n dt r o op s t h e t a s k of destroying enemy t roop c o n c e n t r a t i o n s n o tt a k e n o u t by s t r a t e g i c m i s s i l e s t r i k e s . B u t it is n o t c lear-:diether t h e d o c t r i n e e n v i s io n s m as s iv e and e x t e nd e d l a n dcampaigns o r o n l y smaller, "mopping-up" operations fo r t h ecombined ground and supporting a i r teams. E s t i m a t e s of t h es t re ng th of enemy t ro op fo rma t ions t h a t m ig h t s u r v iv e t h eblows of t h e s t r a t e g i c r o c k e t forces are no t g iven . A num-ber of writers appear t o be open-minded on t h i s q u e s t i o n ,a l l o w in g f o r o p e r a t i o n s of b o t h l a r g e , head-on engagementsand s m a l l detachments .

S e i z i n g t h e enem y's t e r r i t o r y i s i m p l i c i t int h e m is s io n of the ground t roops of f o l l o w i n g - u p s t r a t e g i cs t r i k e s and c o n so l i da t i ng v i c t o r i e s , b u t i s seldom mentioned.The s u b j e c t w a s broached, however, i n a 1960 tex tbook onm i l i t a r y s c i e n c e , w h ic h s po ke of c a p t u r i n g t h e "economicmat e r i a l bases" of t h e enemy, and inc lu de d among t h e g o a l sof a m i l i t a r y cam paign i n f u tu r e w a r t h e g a in in g of e f f e c -t i v e c o n t r o l o v er t h e e n e m y ' s t e r r i t o r y . (Maj. Gen. M. V,Smirnov, - -t a l . , "On So v ie t M i l i t a r y Sc ie n c e .")

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. .

. I . -1AL

.. . , .. .I.. :.

Khrushchev i n Janua ry 1960 had pu bl ic ly d i s -avowed t h e i d e a of occupa t ion o f an opponen t ' s t e r r i t o r y ,b r e a k in g w i th t h e m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e which s t i p u l a t e d t h a t"d es pi te new weapons, t ro op s occupyi ng t h e opponen t ' s t e r -r i t o r y w o u l d d e t e r m in e t h e outcome of war." (SOVIET FLEET,5 January 1957) H i e m o t i va t i o n i n d o i n g s o may not haveb ee n e n t i r e l y p o l i t i c a l : h e may n o t h av e b ee n a b l e t o re-c o n c i l e t e r r i t o r i a l o c c u p a t i o n w i t h h i s s t r a t e g y of "country-bus t ing . ' ' In h i s January 1960 speech he j u s t i f i e d t h e S o v i e tt r o o p c u t n o t o n l y on t h e grounds t h a t f i r e p o w e r r a t h e r t h a nnumbers of t r o o p s was t h e c h i e f i n d i c a t o r of a c o u n t r y ' s m i l i -

t a r y p o t e n t i a l , b u t a l so on t h e g ro un ds t h a t t h e S o v i e ts t r a t e g y was t o deve lop a force c a p a b l e o n ly of d e s t r o y in g

an enemy, not of o ccupyi ng h i s t e r r i t o r y . O n l y a c o u n t r y, b e nt on a g g r e s s i o n , . d e s i r i n g t o conquer anoth er people , hes a i d , r equ i r e s a l a r ge army.

2 . Naval Warfare

The importance of t h e S o v i e t n a v a l a r m in af u t u r e w a r a g a i n s t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a s r e c e n t l y b ee n u nd er -scored i n S o v i et s t a te m e n ts . As d e p ic t e d i n S o v i et m i l i t a r yd i s c o u r s e , t h e w a r w i l l be c a r r i e d t o t h e United S t a t e s v i an u c l e a r str ikes from ro ck et s , submarines and poss ib ly manneda i r c r a f t . N o mention is made of t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of conduct-ing ground warfare in t h i s c o u nt r y . The s t r a t e g y t h a t isd i s c u s s e d for t h e s ec on d s t a g e of w a r a g a i n s t t h e U ni te d

S t a t e s is t o i n h i b i t forces and mate r ia l based t he re fromc ro ss i ng t h e ocean. Khrushchev made a p o i n t o f t h i s defen-s i v e s t r a t e g y i n h i s address t o t h e 22nd CPSU Congress l a s tOctober. H e s t a t e d t h a t an enemy a t t a c k i n g th e USSR--namelyt h e United Sta tes--must achieve supremacy of t h e seas i n ordert o be s u c c e s s f u l . B u t t h i s requ i remen t cou ld no t be m e t byt h e United S t a t e s , s a i d Khrushchev, owing t o t h e enormousc a p a b i l i t y of t h e Sov i e t submar ine f l e e t t o i n t e r d i c t f o r e i gns h ip p in g a n d t o deny command of t h e seas t o t h e enemy. Ins t r e s s i n g t h i s p o i n t , h e r e pe a te d t h e claim f i r s t made a weeke a r l i e r i n an IZVESTIA a r t i c l e on S o v i e t atomic submarines

. .

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. . . ) . . I . ............,.... ,

, .. . .. ,...

. .

t h a t t h e S o v i e t un de rw at er f l e e t is equipped with " t a rge t -s e e k in g " r o c k e t s f o r u s e agains t moving t a r g e t s . *

S o v i e t m i l i t a r y wri t e r s have d e a l t w i t h t h eq u e s t i o n of dominance of the seas i n t h e p a s t b u t have not inr e c e n t y e a r s p o s e d i t as a r e qu i re m en t f o r v i c t o r y o v e r t h eUSSR,t i o n f r o m i t s a l l i e s as a s e r i o u s l i a b i l i t y , however. (Mar-s h a l V a s il e vs k y, f o r example , i n an a r t i c l e i n RED STAR on1 4 August 1957 s t r e s sed t h e Sov ie t advan tage o f no t hav ing .t h e American problem of v i t a l c om mu nica ti on l i n e s o v e r t h es e a w i t h i t s a l l i e s . ) And the y have con seq uen tly regardedt h e i n c r e a s e d v u l n e r a b i l i t y of s u r f a c e vesse l s , owing t o

modern weapons developments, as a tremendous advantage t o t h eUSSR.

Desp i te Khrushchev' s ind i sc r im ina te d i spa rage -ment of s u r f a c e s h ip s i n t h e p a s t , So v ie t n a v a l l eaders speakof im p or t a nt an d v a r i e d r o l e s f o r s u r f a c e v e s s e l s o f d i f f e r -e n t classes as w e l l as submar ines in a f u t u r e war. The atom-powered submarine equipped w i t h n u c l e a r rocket weapons is nowregarded as t h e "backbone" of th e So vi et navy, and t h e sub-marine arm i s p o r t r a y e d a s i t s m a i n s t r i k i n g force . But v o ic e sare h e a rd c a u t i o n i n g a g a i n s t p l a c in g e x c e s s iv e em ph as is on t h esubmarine a t the expense of ot he r nav al weapon sys tems. Ac-c o r d in g t o Rear Admira l V . Prokof iev :

They have always regarded America's geograph ica l sepa ra -

Sov ie t nava l though t opposes th e ones idede x a g g e r a t i o n t o a n e xt r em e of a n y p a r t i -c u l a r arm fif t h e navy7. Naval combatopera t ions- wil l develop ove r enormous oceanand coas ta l a reas an d w i l l r e q u i r e t h e

*Soviet submarine armament i s s a i d t o inc lude long- rangeb a l l i s t i c r o c k e t s w i t h n u c l e a r warheads, se lf -homing rockets(winged rockets) f o r f i r i n g a t v a r i o u s n a v a l t a r g e t s , and a nasso rtme nt of torpedoes--magnetic , self-haming , and others--f o r a t t a c k i n g s u r f a c e s h i p s and s u bm a ri ne s . A n atomic sub-

marinew i t h

i t s r o c k e t s c a n d e s t r o y "a l a r g e n a v al base oft h e enemy, a l a r g e i n d u s t r i a l c e n t e r , or a format ion of a i r -c r a f t c a r r i e r s . " (IZVESTIA, 10 October 1961)

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._ ... . ..

, .. . .. .. .

-coopera t ion of a l l f o r c e s as w e l l as com-prehensive combat suppor t fo r t h e mains t r i k in g f o r c e s -t h e s u bm a rin es . Surf aces h i p s i n p a r t i c u l a r w i l l h ave t o s o l v e al a r g e number of t as ks , which in contemporarywarfare conditions have become exception-a l l y complex .. (RED STAR, 13 January 1962)

The genera l miss ions of t h e Sovie t navy, eguip-pe d with roc l ie t crulsers, atomic and convent ional submarines ,and cut te rs armed w i t h r o c k e t s , h av e b ee n c i t e d ' b y a numberof d i f f e r e n t S o v i e t s o u r ce s . These are

(a) t o c an du ct ba t t l e s a g a i n s t a s t r o n g n a v a l

(b) to break ocean and se a l i n e s of communi-

( c ) t o d e s t ro y p o r t s , n av al bases, and o t h e r

enemy, destroying i t s s t r i k i n g power;

ca t o n s ;

i n s t a l l a t i o n s o n t h e Shore;

(d) t o i n f l u e n c e t h e achievement of t h e generalaims of t h e armed c o n f l i c t ; a n d

(e ) t o g e t h e r w i t h other arms, t o defend t h e

shore from enemy Invasion from t h e sea and f rom s t r i k e s f romt h e d i r e c t i o n of t h e sea.

Concern over t h e U.S. Po la r i s s u bm ar in e h a sf o r a long time b e e n r e g i s t e r e d in S o v i e t m i l i t a r y d i s c o u r s e .-CMalinovsky bo as te d t h a t t h e Po la r i s s u b m a r in e s w i l l note s c a p e d e s t r u c t i o n , i n an Army-Navy Day a r t i c l e in PRAVDA of23 February 1962). Against these and o ther NATO s u b m a r i n e s ,t h e S o v i e t s w i l l deploy t h e i r nava l a i r arm and k i l l e r s ub -mar ines . Thus rocke t -ca r ry ing nava l a i r c r a f t , which were

demonstrated f o r th e f i r s t t i m e a t Tushino in J u l y 1961 aresa id t o be capab le of d e t e c t i n g a t great d is tance and des t roy -ing enemy ship6 of a l l types , "bo th on t h e s u r f ac e and s u b -merged." (Marshal Ve rs hi ni n, RED STAR, 16 September 1961)Anbther so ur ce has sa id t h a t , in a f u t u r e w a r , underwater com-b a t w i l l be one of the bas ic me thods of defending sea borde rsa g a i n s t t h e approach of enemy submarines: "The hew power andt h e new weapons open f o r th e nov ie ;7 a tomic submar ines g r ea to p p o r tu n i t i e s f o r t h e s t r u g g lT a g a in s t t h e enemy su bm ar in es ."(IZVESTIA, 1 0 Oc to be r 1961)

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. .

. . . .. . . .. I . ,

: . '

. . . . ...

. . . .

,

3. Aviat ion and A i r Defense

The S o v i e t a i r fo rces w i l l a l s o be a s s ig n e dv a r i e d a nd im p o rt a n t s u p p o r t m i s s io n s i n a f u t u r e war. A i rf o r c e l eade rs h a v e c o n s i s t e n t l y declared t h a t manned aviationw i l l p la y a n im p o r t a n t ro l e i r r e s p e c t i v e of developments inroc ke t t echno logy , even when Xhrushchev and ce r t a i n mi l i t a r yl eader s v o ic e d c o n t r a r y v i ew s. Now the re a p p e a r s t o be aconcensus among the pa r ty and mi l i t a ry l eader s on t h e n e e dt o develop manned a vi a t io n f o r o f f e n s i ve s t r a t e g i c a nd tac-t i c a l m i s s i o n s as w e l l as def ens ive miss ion s . The change i nKhrushchev's .view is s t r i k i n g :

"The mi l i t a ry a i r force and-zurf ace7 navy have l o s tt h e i r pf;evious importance. . . .A l m o s t t h e e n t i r e m i l i t a r ya i r fo rce is b e in g r e p l a c e dby rocket equipment . Wh av e a l r e a d y s h a r p l y c u t andit seems w i l l con t inue t o c u ts h a r p l y and even d i scon t inue ,t h e manufacture of bombersand o ther obsolete equip-ment." (14 Ja nu ar y 1960speech . )

" In equ ipp ing t h e armedfo rces w i t h r o c k e t s a n dan atomic submarine f l e e tw e do n o t d i s c o u n t t h ea i r fo rce b u t c o n t in u et o develop and improvei t . * (Speech del ivereda t t h e 22nd CPSU,Congress,O c t o b e r 1961)

The new op t im is t i c v iew of t h e u s e f u l n e s s ofbomber a v i a t i o n i n a f u t u r e w a r seems t o s p r in g m a in ly f r omt h e new p o s s i b i l i t i e s g i ve n i t by ro ck et armament. So vie t

' o f f i c e r s describe air - to-ground ro ck et s , which the y now claimfor t h e USSR a i r fo rces , as "bomber a i r c r a f t weapons" whichp e r m i t t h e bombers n o t only t o a vo id e n t e r i n g t h e a n t i - a i rde fense zone of t h e t a r g e t b u t " to avoid approaching i t . "And t h e y asc r ibe to such rocket-equipped bombers a "cons ide r -a b ly lowered v u l n e r a b i l i t y . " ( C o l . Gen. A.N. Ponomarev, REDSTAR, 18 November 1961)

Bomber a v i a t i o n i s a p p a r e n t l y s l a t e d f o r a sup-p lemen ta ry o r s u p p o r t r o l e i n -the f u l f i l l m e n t of s t r a t e g i cas w e l l as s u b - s t r a t e g i c ' m i s s i o n s i n a f u t u r e war. According

t o Marshal Malinovsky, t h e S o v i e t a i r f o r c e is c a p a b l e ofd e l i v e r i n g n u c le a r s t r i k e s a g a i n s t a n a g g re s s o r " j o i n t l y w i t ht h e s t r a t e g i c ro ck et t roops .1 ' (Speech of 23 October 1961,a t t h e 22nd CP S U C on gr es s) Th i s c a p a b i l i t y , he s a y s , d e r i v e s

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.. ..

,..( ..

. .

f r o m t h e "new" j e t a i r c r a f t , i n c lu d i ng " i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l s up -e r son ic bomber s , '' w hic h c a r r y r o c k e t s c a p a bl e of d e s t r o y i n genemy in s t a l l a t i o n s "many.hundreds o f k i l om ete r s from th e spo tw he re t h e r o c k e t is launched." (PRAVDA, 23 February 1962)

As f o r a i r d e f e n se , o t h e r el e m e n ts of t h e a i rfo rces , n o t a b l y , f i g h t e r a v i a t i o n , "w ork ing i n c o o p e r a t i o nw i th t h e a n t i - a i r c r a f t d e fe n se forces of t h e c o u n t r y , " w i l ls t r i v e t o r e p u l s e a i r a t t acks . (Mal inovsky , 23 October 1961s pe ec h) M i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e p r ov i de s t h a t i n a f u t u r e w a r ," t h e c r u sh i n g of t h e n u c l e a r - r o c k e t a nd r o c k e t - c a r r y i n g forcesand the nuc lea r 8i.r force of! the enemy w i l l become one of t h emain f i t r a t e g i c 7 t a sk s . " (Lt . Gen. Kras i ln ik ov , RE D STAR,

18 November 1 9 g O ) Accordingly , the a i r defe 'nse fo rces m u s tg i v e t i m e l y w a r ni n g of t h e t h r e a t of a n u c l e a r a t t a c k andde te c t and des t ro y approach ing enemy fo rces b e f o r e t h e d e a d lyp ay lo ad s r e a c h t h e i r t a r g e t s . T he re i s no d i s p u t i n g t h e s eb a s i c i m p e ra t i ve s i n t h e m i l i t a r y l i t e r a t u r e .

b ei ng v i t a l t o t h e success of t h e operat ion . Inasmuch a s t h eoutcome o f b a t t l e w i l l be d e c i d ed i n " n o t o n l y m i n ut e s b u te v e n f r a c t i o n s of secon ds," t h e enemy m u s t be "wiped o u t ont h e f i r s t a t t a c k or t h e f i r s t l a un ch in g of a r o c k e t . " (Mar-sh a l B i ry u zo v , RED STAR, 23 September 1961) A i r force com-manders a re admonished that t o p e r m it e v e n o ne t a r g e t t or e a c h t h e o b j e c t i v e c a n ha ve " v e r y u n f o r t u n a t e c o n se q u en c es , '

and t h a t t h e NATO forces have powerful means of long-rangea t t a c k a n d w i l l use r a d a r i n t e r f e r e n c e on a "wide sca le" t op r e v e n t c o u n t e r a c t i o n s by S o v i e t forces . (Marshal Savi tsky,RED STAR, 1 4 November 196 1)

of t h e c o u n tr y is b as ed p ri m a r i l y o n t h e a n t i - a i r c r a f t r o c k e tt r o o p s .s t a n t i a l a n t i m i ss i l e fo rce w i l l a l so p r o t e c t t h e USSR. Ine v i de n t a n t i c i p a t i o n of t h i s c a p a b i l i t y , M arsha l M al in ov sk y--having pr ev io us ly announced t h a t t h e USSR had sol ve d t h eprob lem of d es t ro y in g m is s i l e s i n f l igh t - -now cla ims t h a t t h eS o v i e t a i r de fen se fo rc es "p osses s equipment and weapons cap-ab le o f des t ro y in g enemy a i r and spa ce methods of a t t a c k a t

grea t h e i g h t s a n d d i s t a n c e s .'' (PRAVDA, 23 February 1962)

The t i m e f a c t o r is r e p e a t e d l y u n d e r sc o r e d as

Now, t h e S o v i et s s a y , t h e a n t i - a i r c r a f t d ef en se

B u t t h e y a l r e a d y l o o k f o r w a r d t o t h e t i m e when a sub-

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. . . .. . .. . . ... ,

. . . , .

.. .

The pro jec ted r o l e of a m i s s i l e defense sys t emf o r t h e USSR i s worth mentionin g. For advanced weapons tec h-nology now has a c o ve te d p l a c e i n S o v i e t m i l i t a r y t h i n k i n g ont h e waging of a f u t u r e war as w e l l as on t h e problem of deter-r i n g i t . F r eq u en tl y i n t h e m i l i t a r y l i t e r a t u r e - - a s w e l l asi n Khrushchev ' s speeches - -a t t en t ion i s drawn t o t h e ne ed f o rt h e USSR t o have a weapons s u pe r i or i t y over th e prob able enemy.The concept of s u p e r i o r i t y , i n s o f a r as it i s r e v e a l e d i nt h e l i t e r a t u r e , is d e r i v e d f r o m an assessment of q u a l i t a t i v ec r i t e r i a as w e l l as nu me ric al compar3Sons. They s a y t h a t " i fone s i d e has a more ef fec t ive weapon , it is p o s s i b l e f o r t h a ts i d e ( a l l o ther t h i n g s b e i n g equa l ) t o h o l d t h e upperhand overthe enemy which posses se s i n fe r i o r weapons . '* (V. Uzenyev,KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, NO. 6 , March 1961) Rea son ingt h u s , t hey emphas ize sc i en t if c a n d t e c h n o l o g i c a l c a p a b i l i t i e sas such, and are ve ry much concerned w i t h ga i n i ng lead t i m e

ove r t h e U ni te d S t a t e s i n t h e development of weapons and counter-measures. "The So vi et Government is n o t l i m i t i n g i t s e l f t ot h o s e m i l i t a ry m eans which t h e adve r sa ry a l r eady h a s , " s a i d

a USSR Defense Minist ry book, " f o r undoubted ly th i s w o u l d be

i n s u f f i c i e n t . Any preempting of t h e adve r sa ry s p o t e n t i a l i nt h e c r e a t io n of the newest means of1 combat not only gives un-'doubted s u p e r i o r i t y i n case of war, b u t a l s o m a k e s i t d i f f i -C u l t f o r t h e a g g r e s s iv e i m p e r i a l i s t f o r c e s t o un l eash wars."(E. I . Rybkin, "War and Po li t i cs " ) And th ey warn, fu r the rmore ,t h a t "s lowing down i n any of t h e l i n k s of the complex systemof d e f e n s e o r i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n on a broad s c a l e of contem-pora ry technology , can l ead t o t h e m o s t d i f f i c u l t consequencesf o r a r m i e s and count r i es . " (Genera l V. Kurasov, MILITARY-HIST ORICAL JOURNAL, No. 3, March 1961) If w e may h a z a r d aconc l us i on f r o m t h i s b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n of t h e concept of m i l i -

t a r y s u p e r i o r i ty , i t i s t h a t t h e Sov iet Union is not neces-s a r i l y committed t o mainta in ing a s u b s t a n t i a l lead i n t h eq u a n t i t i e s of modern weapons: it may r e l y t o a cons i de rab l edegree on t e chno l og i ca l (qu a l i t a t i v e ) adxances i n t h e develop-ment of weapons for fu ture w a r .

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IV . APPENDIX: THE STATUS OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE ON TH E

EV E OF WORLD W A R I1

The search f o r a dynamic mi l i t a ry doc t r ine wh ich w i l l

f a c i l i t a t e a c c u r at e pr o gn o st i c at i o ns f o r t h e f u t - u r e w a r ishaving a s a l u t a r y e f f e c t on S o v ie t m i l i t a r y h i s t o ri o g r a p hy .The t r e n d toward g r ea t e r o b j e c t i v i t y is becoming more pro-nounced as more and more p a r t i c i p a n t s in World. War I1 are b e in gencouraged t o w r i t e memoires and t r a c t s i n a f o r t h r i g h t a n dob je c t iv e manner. Sov i e t m i l i t a r y leaders who p u t muchs t o re by p a s t e x p er i e nc e i n s i s t t h a t t h e o b j e c t i ve t r u t h m u s tbe found and s t a t e d i n t h e w r i t i n g of m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y i n order

t h a t t h e p r o p e r l e s s o n s c an be l e a r n e d a n d a v i a b l e d o c t r i nep r e p a r e d f o r t h e cont ingency of a f u t u r e w a r . Whethe r t ru thsw i l l be s t a t e d even i f p o l i t i c a l l y i n c on v e ni e n t, how ever, re-mains t o be s e e n .

I n t h e p r o c e ss of r e w r i t i n g m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y , one oft h e c e n t r a l i s s u e s debated h a s be en t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e s t a t u sof S o v ie t m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e o n t h e eve of World War 11. A l -t hough a c o n t e n t i o u s q u e s t i o n , i t s e r v e d t h e p u r p o s e s of thev a r i o u s deba t e r s who were i n t e n t on impress ing o t h e r s w i t ht h e importance of having a f u l l y e labora ted , up-to-date theoryof f u t u r e war and t h e i n e v i t a b l e p e n a l t y t o be p a i d i n t h eabsence of such a t h e o r y . Because of t h e r e l e v a n c e of t h i sq u e s t i o n t o o u r s t u d y , and because of t h e i n s i g h t s t h e d i s -

c u s s io n a f f o r d s u s i n t o t h e process of r e a s s e s s i n g e s t a b l i s h e dd o c t r i n e s i n t h e U S S R , w e s h a l l by way of a p o s t s c r i p t o u t l i n et h e p r i n c i p a l a r g u m e n t s on t h e s t a t u s of p r e - w a r m i l i t a r yd o ct r i ne t h a t were publ ished between 1959 and 1961.

_. . ..... . . . .:..

. . . . ... ... . * * * * * * * *

In October 1 9 5 9 , p r i o r t o t h e p u b l i c a t i o n of t h e l a t e s to f f i c i a l m u l t i - v o lu m e h i s t o r y of World War 11, Maj. Gen. I .Rukhle s e t o f f a sharply-worded debate i n tk pages of t h eMIL ITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, w i th a f ee-wheel ing cr i t c i s mo f b o th t h e pr e- wa r m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e a nd t h e s p e c i f i c c o n t r i -

b u t io n s o f c e r t a i n S o v i et m i l i t a r y t h e o r e t i c i a n s . Most of t h ep a r t i c i p a n t s i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n i n t h e JOURNAL mater ials werei n c l i n e d t o s u p p o r t R u k h l e ' s view--which eventually becamet h e o f f i c i a l view--but there were s o m e n o t a b l e d e p a i t u r e s . .

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I , ._

The f o l lo wing v iews on t he s u b j e c t are p r e s e n t e d i n c h r o n o lo g i -ca l order t o g i ve t h e f l a v o r of t h e debate as i t unfolded ont h e pages of t h e MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL.

In December 1959, R u k h l e ' s p o s i t i o n w a s deba ted in t h eG e ne r al S t a f f m i l i t a r y s e c t i o n , and a n a cc ou nt of t h e debatew a s ca r r ied i n t h e A p r i l 1960 i s s u e d f t h e j o u r n a l . A C o l .Nazarov r eca l l ed t h a t pre-war m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e ha d co n s id e r edt h e p o s s i b i l i t y of s u r p r i s e a t t ac k -- b ut had not drawn then e c e s s a r y c o n c lu s io n s :

... h e p o s s i b i l i t y of s t a r t i n g a w a r w i t h as u r p r i s e a t t a c k and s t r i v i n g t o d e l i v e r t h ef i r s t powerfu l blow was examined i n t h e t h e o r yof m i l i t a r y art between t h e f i r s t and secondworld w a r s . However, neither ours, n o r f o r e i g nm i l i t a r y t he or y, foresaw a l l t h e consequencesof a s u r p r i s e blow, and nei ther worked o u tmeasures f o r i t s preven t ion .

. ..

... .. .

C o l . Verzkhovsky, i n t h e same d i s c u s s io n , w a s f u l l ysympa the t ic w i t h R u k h l e ' s p o s i t i o n :

Before World War 11, t h i s p ro bl em /The i n i t i a lp e r i o d of t h e war7 wa s not worked o u t i n s u f -f i c i e n t d eg re e. P er ha ps t h i s p la ye d a c e r t a i nr o l e i n o u r f a i l u r e s i n t h e f i r s t days of t h ew a r .

Lt. Gen. Skorobogatk in , on t h e o t h e r ha nd, at tackedRukhle f o r b e r a t i n g pre-war m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e . The same i s s u eof t h e JOURNAL r e p o r t e d him as s a y i n g a t t h e h e e ti n g :

I c a n no t a g r e e w i th Ru k hle 's a s s e r t i o n on t h ebackwardness of S o vi et m i l i t a r y s c i e n c e beforeWorld War 11. So v ie t m i l i t a r y s c i e n c e w o r k e do u t , e a r l i e r tha n th e German, not on ly t h et h e o r y o f b a t t l e s and o p e r a t i o n s i n d e p th , b u ta l s o o r g a n i z a t i o n of t r o o p s , a5 w e l l as t h ep r a c t i c a l d e c i s i on s of t h i s t h e o r y . W hadt h e first mechanized corps, w e e a r l i e s t ofa l l began t o app ly a i r s t r i k e s and t o i n t r o -

duce t h e u s e of t a n k s in l a r g e fo rma t ions( soed inen ia ) . A l l these p rob lems were a l -r e a d y worked o u t by o u r m i l i t a r y s c i e n c e b y

.,

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1937. I n t h e R e d A r m y l a r g e sca le maneuverswere c o n d u c t e d w i t h t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n o fmechanized corps . Bu t l a t e r , t h e mechanizedc o rp s , i n s p i t e of t h e t h e or y , were disassem-b led . During t h e w a r w e c o ul d n o t f o r as e r i e s o f r e a s o n s r e a l i z e o u r t h eo r y i n t h ef i r s t p e r i od ; l a t e r , however, i t j u s t i f i e d

, I t s e l f .

Rukh le ' s po s i t i on won o u t , f o r t h e t i m e being, and foundi t s e x p r e s si o n i n Y o l u m e I of "The Hi st or y of the Great P a t r i o t i cWar of t h e So vi et Union, 1941-45." (Signed t o t h e p r e s s 28

May 1 96 0) . Acc ord ing t o t h a t a u t h o r a t i v e source, S o v i e t m i l i -t a r y d o c t r i n e was i n a d e q u a t e ly d e ve lop e d t o meet t h e s i t u a t i o ne n c o u n te r e d i n t h e e a r l y p a r t o f t h e w a r . The fo l lowing ex-c e r p t s r e p r es e n t t h e g i s t of t h e o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n on t h e pre -w a r d o c t r i n e :

S o v i e t s t r a t e g y /zn t h e e v e of t h e war7 recogn izedt h e d e f e ns e as a-necessary form of armed s t r u gg l eb u t s u b o r d in a t e d i ts r o l e t o t h e o f f e n s i v e . Asr e g a r d s t h e q u e s t i o n of d e f e n s e , o m y a sn o t f u l l y worked out. I t c o n s id e r e d defense asp o s s i b l e a nd n ec e s sa r y i n s e p a r a t e d i r e c t i o n s ,b u t n o t on t h e whole s t r a t e g i c f r o n t . In p r i n -c i p l e , s t r a t e g y c o n si de r ed a f o r c e d wi thd rawa lp o s s i b l e , b u t o n l y on s e p a r a t e s e c t o r s of t h e

f r o n t a n d as a temporary phenomenon connectedw i t h t h e p r e p a ra t i o n of a n o f f e n s iv e . Theq u e s t i o n of wi thdrawa l o f l a r g e f o r c e s fr om t h et h r e a t of a n e n c i r c l e m e n t had not been workedo u t . \

The ques t ion of t h e c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e as ap a r t i c u l a r ki nd of s t r a t e g i c o f f e n si v e be-f o r e t h e g r e a t p a t r i o t i c war was not posedd e s p i t e t h e r i c h e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e coun te r -o f f e n si v e i n t h e c i v i l war of 1918-20.

A major s ho rt co mi ng i n t h e t r a i n i n g o f t h eh ig h command cadres of t h e R e d army on t h e

e ve of t h e w a r w a s t h e absence of a manualo n a t t a c k .

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. . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . .

I

......................

The whole organizat ion of t h e de fense oft h e s t a t e bord er proceeded from t h e f a c tt h a t a sudden a t t a ck by t h e enemy w a s ex-c luded . . .

The i s s u e w a s no t ye t r e so l ved , how ever . In t h e Septem-ber 1960 i s s u e of t h e JmNAL--several months a f t e r t h e pub-l i c a t i o n of t h e o f f i c i a l h i s t o ry of t h e war--Mad. Gen. Mernovo f f e r e d a d i s s e n t i n g v i ew . L i k e Genera l Skorobogatk in , hedefended the s t a t u r e of t he pre-war d oc t r i n e :

W e c o n s i d e r t h a t S o v ie t m i l i t a r y t h e o re t i -c i a n s s t u d i e d t h e new cha ra c te r o f armed

f o r ce s . .. a n d had pr ov id ed f o r t h e s t r a t e g i cdeployment of armed forces i n t h e even t o fenemy s u r p r i s e a t t a c k as w e l l as i n t h ecase of a declared w a r . For t h i s purposei t w a s recommended t h a t t h e r e be an armyo f d e f en s e i n c o n s t a n t m i l i t a r y p r ep a re d -ness as a f i r s t s t r a t e g i c eche lon . Theseviews w e r e based on a c o r r e c t u n de r st an d -i n g a t t h a t t i m e o f t h e n a t u r e o f f u t u r ewars as w a r s of l o n g d u r a t i o n i n v o l v in gm ul t i -m i l l i on mass armde6, w i t h t h edep loym en t o f subsequen t s t r a t e g i c eche-

l o n s .

The pendulum swung t h e o ther way i n t h e f o l l o w i ng s p r i n g ,however, when Lt. Gen. Kolchigin--in t h e A p r i l 1961 i s s u e oft h e JOURNAL--rapped t h e kn uc kl es of Mernov f o r be ing a n apolog-is t f o r t h e pre-war m i l i t a r y t h e o r i s t s :

.. Maj . Gen. Mernov i n h i s a r t i c l e t r i e s t odeny t h e m i s t akes committed i n t he p re -w arpe r i od by cer ta in of o u r m i l i t a r y t h e o re t i -c ians (Mel ikov , E ideman, Ts i f fe r ) i n q u e s -t i o n s of t h e i n i t i a l p er io d of w a r , i n p a r -t i c u l a r i n r e s p e c t t o t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o fd e f e n s e . T he se t h e o r e t i c i a n s , as Rukhleco r r ec t l y obse rved , "m i st akenl y t hough tt h a t t h e i n i t i a l p e r i od of t h e war would

i n v o l v e o p e r a t i o n s of s m a l l armies defend-i n g ' t h e r i g h t t o be deployed. ' " (pravor a z v e r n u t ' s i a ) T h e y d i d n o t f o r e s e e t h ep o s s i b i l i t y of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n by t h e enemy

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f



. . , . .. . . .

. .

. . .. .. . . ..._.. . .

of sec re t \me thods o f mob i l i za t ion and dep loy -ment of armed forces w i t h t h e o b j e c t i v e ofa s u r p r i s e a t t a c k a t once by t h e main fo rc esa nd t h e r e f o r e c o n s id e r e d t h a t t h e i n i t i a lp e r io d w o u l d b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y o p e r a t i o n sof smal l armies under defense which would bee f f e c t e d by t h e s t r a t e g i c deployment anda c t i o n s of the ma in mass of armed f o r c e s .N o t deny ing t h i s p o s i t i o n , G e n e r a l V. Mernovw r i t e s : "Main tenance i n cons tan t r ea d in essof a s t rong a rmy of d e f e n s e a lo n g t h e b o r -der would have f a c i l i t a t e d t h e t r a n s i t i o nof the a rmy of peace t ime on to a w a r f o o t i n g

under any c i rcums tances ." In o u r view,t h i s i s a m i st a ke n p o i n t , s i n c e it was madewithout account of t h e s i t u a t i o n of 1 9 4 1 ,. ...D e s p i t e t h e o p i n i o n of General Mernov, w ea l s o c o n s i d e r t h a t t h e p re wa r t h e o r e t i c i a n s .i n s u f f i c i e n t l y s t u d i e d t h e new charac te r of

armed f o r c e s and i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e r a p i dand deep invasion by enemy armies.

Major Gen. Cherednichenko came t o Rukhleb and Ko lch ig in ' ss u p p o r t i n the same i s s u e of t h e JOURNAL, once again underscor-i n g t h e shor tcomings of t h e pre -war do c t r i ne and th e mis takesof t h e s t r a t e g i s t s i n t h e f i r s t days of t h e w a r :

R uk hle i n h i s a r t i c l e , i n o u r o p i n i o n , h a sc o r r e c t l y o b s er ve d t h e mistakes o f m i l i t a r yt h e o r e t i c i a n s i n t h e pr ew ar y e a rs , i n c l u d i n gV. Melikov and R. Eideman, on qu es ti on s oft h e i n i t i a l p er io d of war. .. So v ie t armedf o r c e s by t h e b e g inn in g o f t h e w a r t u r n e do u t no t t o have been (deployed) i n an ap-p r o p r i a t e s t r a t e g i c and ope ra t iona l way ,b a t t l e - r e a d y , or' p r e p a r e d t o r e b u f f a s u r -p r i s e a t t a c k by t h e g ro un d and a v i a t i o n forcesof f a s c i s t Germany, A l l t h i s had s e r i o u sconsequences on the course of t h e i n i t i a lpe r iod o f war . .. .Even ts a t t h e beg inn ing o ft h e w a r w o u l d have taken a d i f f e r e n t c h a r a c t e r

i f o u r armed fo rc es had i n good t i m e beenba t t l e - re ady and p rop e r ly dep loyed ; i f a v i a -t i o n and a r t i l l e r y had immediately d i r ec t edc o u n t e r - s t r i k e s a g a in s t t h e a dv an ce g r ou p s

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\

of t h e f a s c i s t t r o o p s , t h e i r a r t i l l e r y anda v i a t i o n ; . a nd if f r o n t s a n d armies had a tonce deve loped ac t ive and o rgan ized combato p e r a t i o n s t o f r u s t r a t e t h e a gg r e ss o r 'sa t t a c k . T h e r e were p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r t h i s ,b u t t h e y were n o t u t i l i z e d .

O u r army, having s u f f e r e d se r ious los ses a tt h e s tar t of t h e w a r , needed t o r e t r e a t deepi n t o t h e c o u n t r y . Such o p e r a t i o n s came asa s u r p r i s e t o t h e o p e r a t i o n a l a n d s t r a t e g i cl e a d e r s h i p as w e l l as t o t h e t r o op s . Greatf l e x i b i l i t y , a r a p i d e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e com-p l e x s i t u a t i o n , t h e p o s in g of cor rec t t a s k st o t h e f r o n t s , a v i a t i o n and f l e e t s and t h eo r g a n i z a t i o n fo r f u l f i l l i n g t h es e t a s k s wererequ i red , under t h e new condi t ions , of t h es t r a t e g i c and o p e r a t i o na l l e a d e r s h i p . How-e v e r, i n t h e f i r s t days of t h e w a r , becauseof i n c o r r e c t e v a l u a t i o n of t h e s i t u a t i o n ,t h e S o v i e t f o r c e s were g i v e n u n f u l f i l l a b l et a s k s , and t h e i r p o s i t i o n was f u r t h e r ag-grava ted and made more d i f f i c u l t .

F in a l ly , Marshal Zakharov, i n an a r t i c l e c o n c lu d in gt h e debate i n t h e J u l y 1 961 i s s u e o f t h e JOURNAL, a l s o r e i n -f or ce d t h e o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n i n a b r i e f b u t s h a r p c r i t ic i smof t h e pre -war doc t r ine :

I t m u s t be s a i d t h a t on t h e e v e of t h e G rea tP a t r i o t i c War, d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t t h e ag-g r es so rs had a l rea dy had exper ienc e i n con-d u c ti n g s u r p r i s e a t t acks i n t h e West, l i t t l ea t t e n t i o n was p a i d t o t h e conduct of beg inn ingo p e r a t i o n s i n o u r m i l i t a r y t h e o ry . An e s p e c i -a l l y b i g omiss ion f rom theo ry and p rac t ice asw e l l ,. w a s such an impor tan t ques t ion as con-d u c t n g o p e r a t i o n s u nd er c o n d i t i o n s i n w hichthe enemy takes t h e i n i t i a t i v e f r o m t h e o u t s e to f t h e war; / in s h o r t 7 m e a s u r e s f o r r e s i s t i n ga s u r p r i s e aztack weFe n o t f o r e s e e n .s i n c e t h e s i t u a t i o n a t t h e s t a r t of t h e w a rw a s unforeseen by o u r s i d e , t h e S o v i e t h i g h

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Caesar 28 - Soviet Military Thought on Future War

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