CIA FOIA. Military Thought -- A turning point in the development of Soviet military art, by...

8/14/2019 CIA FOIA. Military Thought -- A turning point in the development of Soviet military art, by Colonel-General Ivanov

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O U N T R Y : USSRSUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "A Turning Point inthe Development of .Sw.iet i Litary Art",

1961 ( P r i o r to May)- by Colonel-General Ye. Jvanov

DATE OF INFO:APPRAISAL OF

8 CONTENT : DocumentarySOURCE : A reliable source (B).

' Following i s a verbatim translation of an articletitled "A Turning Point in the Development of SovietMilitary Art", written by Colonel-General..Ye, Ivanov,This article appeared in the 1961 Second Issue ofa special version of Militar Thou uhl.ch is classl-fied TOP SECRET by t h - d s d ssued irregu-larly.

1961.The 1961 Third Issue went to press.in July

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A TURNING POINT IN THE DEVELOPMENTOF SOVIET MILITARY ART

Colonel-General Ye. IVANOV.

The discussion which has unfolded in the pages ofthe special Collection of Articles of the Journal"Military Thought" concerning the most important ques-tions of military theory, is a notable and, in itssignificance, a very important, event in the military-scientific life of the Armed Forces.

This article also intends to present certainconsiderations on the essence of a series of ques-tions, the examination of which, in our view,provides interesting topics for further broadening thediscussion.

A CRISIS IN MILITARY ART OR . A TURNING POINTIN ITS DEVELOPMENT?

In the recently published articles of certainauthors, the question is posed that there have been noserious changes whatsoever in Soviet military sciencesince-the end of World War II, and that in essence itIs undergoing a crisis.

"Dropping curtsies in the direction of missilesand introducing some minor corrections in the theoryof military art, we still hold in practice to the oldpositions existing at the end of World War II. Pastexperience, traditions, and habits taught to Us fordecades, tenaciously hold us back and prevent the samekind of revolution in military art which nuclear wea-pons and missiles created in the spherc Of armament"1,- states Colonel-General Gastilovich. He, like certain

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1 Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Mili-tary Thought", first issue, 1960, page 6 .

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other authors of articles published in the Collection,adheres to the view that the question is no more thanone of adapting old forms and methods to new condi-tions.It is quite obvious that such a presentation ofthe question is far from an objective evaluation ofthe state of development of Soviet military art.Military art, being a category of history, issubject in its development to the general laws ofMarxist dialectic. Therefore, it is subject in thefullest sense to the general dialectical law ofdevelopment, expressed as a transfer from quantity toquality. It manifests itself in all the processes of

nature, society, and thought - everywhere, where thechange from old to new is under way, including thedevelopment of military affairs.. With the appearance of nuclear weapons, i t hasbeen, of course, more or less clear to everyone thatthey constitute a new and extremely powerful weapon,

heralding the beginning of a revolution in the meansof armed combat an the ways of conducting it. Thisrevolution is going on gradually and in accordancewith the development of the means of combat. It isimpossible to accomplish it in a limited period oftime.Therefore, there is nothing surprising in thefact that five or six years ago, when our delibera-tions on thP cianduci_of Pagra.tions were based on twoCr three dozen nuclear weapons which'could bedelivered to their objectives only by aircraft, thediscussion obviously could realistically concern onlya partial "modernization" of certain aspects ofmilitary art, because many facts which only becameknown later were lacking for another approach.The appearance of new mean p of coulat, as theexperience of military history testifies, only brings

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about radical changes (a revolution) in military artwhen these means are introduced into the armament oftroops on a mass scale, and when by these means itproves possible to accomplish a majority of the tasksarising during military operations, but this alwaysrequired time. Fundamental changes in militaryaffairs have never been accomplished with lightningspeed.In this regard it should not be forgotton thatthroughout the entire history of class society, theequipping of armies with new types of armament andcombat equipment has, in all countries, come upagainst the definite limits of their economic poten-tial, and therefore, notwithstanding the great desireof certain military figures, the process of transfor-mation from old means of combat to new has beenaccomplished gradually over a definite period of timewhose duration depended primarily on the productivepotential of the country concerned.In this connection, along with new means ofcombat, the old means continued to be used as well,from a necessity dictated not only by combat butalso by economic factors. -Therefore, one should not be surprised by thefact that along with newly formulated views ofmilitary theory, the old naturally also continue toexist for a definite period. In the postwar period,a constant process of perfection of conventionaltypes of armament, as they have now come to becalled, was carried on in our armed forces. Theadvent of nuclear weapons and the improvement intheir combat characteristics, together with theyearly increase in their scale of production,was aconstant process of accumulation of qualitative andquantitative changes in the means of armed combat andconsequently in the methods of waging at.This process of development is not only as yetincomplete, but on the contrary, embraces an ever

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growing field and continues to bring about ever-newersituations in military art. Nevertheless, this doesnot mean that certain views have not already be enformulated on specific problems. It should be notedthat in recent times, on the basis of theoreticalresearch and general conclusions from the practicalexperience of troops, we have developed and put intoeffect new field service regulations, combat regula-tions for the various arms of troops, and instructionson the combat utilization of special troops. A greatdeal- of work, which has on the whole been a positivecontribution, has been done in examining questions ofthe conduct of combat and operations, especiallyduring the initial period, employing new means ofcombat. During this time, our industry, on the basisof principles developed scientifically and confirmedby the Party and the Government regarding the futurestructure of the armed forces, and in accordance withthese principles, was given the means to undertake ona mass scale the equipping of troops with missile/nuclear weapons. To ignore all this and to writeabout a "crisis" is to ignore all those progressivechanges which have' taken place and are taking place inthe development of Soviet military art. _

All that has been said, of course, does not meanthat our military theory has already fully resolvedall questions and that we have avoided all miscalcula-t i o n s - .

Marshal of the Soviet Union Malinovskiy, in aspeech at the All-Army Conference of Secretaries ofPrimary party Organizations, said; "We must saydirectly, that in a whole series of questions we havenot shown the necessary creative power, scientificdaring and boldness, if you will, but have long beenmarking time".Therefore, in the interests of the work itself wemust talk not of a crisis in mrlitary art, which weabsolutely do not and cannot have, but of those weak

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points in military theory which are in fact at theturning point in their development.

FOR WHAT TYPE OF WAR MUST WE BE PREPARED?

One of the most important questions raised in thepages of the Collection, is the question of Sovietmilitary doctrine. The increased interest in itsdevelopment is completely understandable. At theP ra sg T 1 t _ time_our armed forces find themselves at_t40!.turnin point o their developpAnt; therefore, afurther intensive analysis of military doctrinenaturally assumes paramount significance.

M.V. Frunze,.defining the concept of "a unitary military doctrine" pointed out that it is a "syllabusadopted in the army of a given state, which estab-lishes the nature of the structure of the armedforces of that country, the methods of combat trainingof troops, .their leadership on the basis of the pre-dominant views in the state-on the nature of themilitary problems facing them And the means forsolving them, and which emanates from the class natureof the state and the computed level of development ofthe productive forces of the country".'From the definition it is apparent that M. V.Frunze places prime importance on the question of thenature of the structure of the armed forces, whichdepends above all on the level of development of theproductive forces of the country, on its economicpotential. The question of the economic potential ofour country arouses no doubts in any of us. Our

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1 M.V. Frunze. Collected Works. Vol. II.Military Publishing House, 1957, page 8.

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socialist state is in a position to provide the armedforces with all presently known means of armed combat.However, there are examples in military historywhen economically strong countries, not laggingbehind their adversaries with regard to the equippingof their own armed forces with weapons and combatequipment, have yet suffered most devastating defeats.Why? In a number of cases this occurred becausemilitary-theoretical thought in the prewar years couldnot correctly resolve the question of the type of w arfor which its armed forces should be prepared.For example, prior to World War II the armedforces of France and fascist Germany had approximatelythe same level of equipment in aircraft, tanks, andartillery. However, France suffered.a swift defeat inthe war. Among the host of reasons which broughtabout her capitulation to fascist Germany, of nosmall significance.was, as is known, the'fact thatFrench military doctrine was based on the principlesof defensive strategy, but the German, on offensive.Subsequently, as is known, fascist Germany alsosuffered defeat, while having as the basis of itsmilitary doctrine the adventurist idea of waging ablitzkrieg..Consequently, to resolve correctly_the_questionof the character of the structure of the.armed.forces,scientifically based recommendations of military

theory are necessaryspecially'on Such questions asthe CharaCter and possible duration ..faiimed combat, whicharise from the afiri ifid:ObjedtSof wer_as:deftned_bythe political leadership.purng_thepastew year .s, , . these yeryquestionshave been the subject of heated controversy.

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What conclusions, for example, are to be drawnfrom the ideas of Colonel-General Gastilovich on thenature of a future war, its duration in general, andits initial period in particular, "There is no need tofear the term 'blitzkrieg' .... Under the conditionsof nuclear, war only 'blitzkrieg' operations canpromise vi .ctory." "Under present conditions thepossibility of victory must be assured by the readi-ness, the capacity, and the capability of concludingthe war in the shortest possible time. The theory ofa prolonged war is more acceptable at present to themonopolistic circles of the West..." "Taking overthe border zones and the zones of total destruction andradiation .. will not at all necessitate multi-millicnman armies". So writes Colonel-General Gastilovich.'In almost the same spirit General Goryainovwrites: "The missile/nuclear weapon has become (orcan become) a mass weapon and its destructive and inparticular its radiological qualities ( a reference tomegaton bombs - Ye. Ivanov) are actually capable ofcreating conditions in which the fundamental object ofwar - the destruction of the enemy - can be accom-plished technically in a short period of time and with-out over-taxing 'the economy of powerful industrialcountries".."just a few hundred powerful nuclearbursts will be the primary and decisive factorsaffecting the outcome of the war .. the' initial periodof a_war becomes its decisive period."21 Special Collection of Articles of the Journal"Military Thought", first issue 1960, pages 9,10.2 Special Collection of Articles of the Journal"Military Thought", second issue 1960, pages 97,101. 1

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If one were to summarize briefly all the quota-tions mentioned above, having cast aside certainreservations which the authors occasionally make withregard to ground troops and other types of armedforces, they could be said to be, essentially,exponents of an "atomic blitzkrieg". They considerthat a future war will have a rapid, blitzkriegcharacter; its outcome will be decided by the firstmissile/nuclear operations for which only some fewhundred thermonuclear warheads need be expended; thatit is not necessary to have a multi-million man armyfor waging war, and the basic function of the smallnumber of ground troops in a war should be confined tothe occupation of enemy territory.What would happen if these views were to belegitimized and raised to the status of fundamentalprinciples of our military doctrine? First, our armedforces would be subject to one-sided orientation intheir development, with all the consequences resultingfrom this, and secondly, in essence, we would beforced to abandon that versatile training of thetroops which we now conduct, counting on a fierce andrelatively extended armed confli-ct with the powerfulcoalition of the imperialist countries. Such anapproach to the organization of the armed forces andtheir military training would be one-sided.A future war in its political essence will be adecisive armed conflict between two world socio-economic_sy.s tems - capitalist and socialist. Astruggle between them will involve two of the mostpowerful military coalitions, armed as never before andpossessing colossal material and manpower .resources.Therefore, no matter what losses single governments

would suffer in the beginning of the_war,.serious con-siderati . on_mus . t_be given to the fact that a coalitionof nafrons,aa . hole:tan . prove capable of wagingMedlcombat . . . ove .i a . Oonsiderably protrActed period.

Without a doubt, massive missile/nuclear strikes Iof a strategic nature in the very beginning of the war

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will create conditions for the accomplishment, in theInitial period, of results that bear no comparisonwith the results achieved during the initial periodsof previous wars. Naturally, this will have a verygreat influence on the conduct and the general dura-tion of the war.However, to orient ones*lf, in building the armedforces kno R u _partng _ittke.country _for a"warthe initial period will be decisive .for.the.achievement-6 1 T Iffe uftimatg _goals_ of the war, would be completelyunfounded_Indeed, Comrade Goryainov admits to the possi-

bility, and with this one cannot disagree, that once awar has begun, the situation could arise where thestrategic missile troops of both sides, for a number ofreasons, might be only partially successful in theiraims and not achieve a decisive effect. For my part Iwill add: One cannot base one's estimates in war onlyon the availability of one's own means of destructionand not consider the means of destruction and counter-action open to the enemy, particularly the means ofantimissile defense which are now being developedrapidly. We may guess at the enemy's plans, but itis he who carries them out, and his actions, as theexperience of all wars can testify, usually introducesubstantial changes in our plans. Therefore, in theevaluation of the initial period of a war and conse-quently of the direction of organization of the armedforces, we should not in principle base our ideasonly on the possible decisive role of this period, butmust be prepared for the continued conduct of numerousoperations with all types of armed fo rces even in theensuing periods of the war.

At the same time we certainly must not under-estimate the definite role, in the light of knownconditions, of the first operations ofpthe initialperiod of the war and the possibility of destroyingthe aggressor in a short time. r--

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To deny this would be to stand out against a fullycomprehensive approach to the preparation of our armedforces. In these questions there should be no extreme.The Minister of Defense points out: Havingensured the security of our Motherland, we must developand perfect the means and methods of armed combat witha view to achieving victory over the aggressor aboveall in the Shortest possible time, but at the same time L,we must seriously prepare for an extended war, and this !!determines the direction of our military organization. ;Such is the only kind of approach to this question thatwe too can consider legitimate.The basic content of the initial Pg.LiDd of warcan consist of: the clikEuption_ancl_repekkina_ofwthefirst blow of the_aggressor on the ground, in theair, and on the sea; the inflicting upon him of ashattering blow_desi gned__todisorganiz.e_.the govern-mental and military leadership and also the destruc-tion of the most vital_ec.aaollic_target es eciallyindustrial enterprises csaineCt.gd.With.the_produc.of means for nuclear attack; conducting initialoperations with all types of_armed forces in closecoordination in order to accomplish the most imme-drTE -riiilitary-strategic tasks and the early seizureeir71Ui:tia.tegic initiative.The fulfillment of these tasks will doubtlesscreate the necessary prerequisites for the swiftconduct of the war and the achievement of finalvictory. But the prerequisites are not victoryItself. Military history indicates that armed forceswhich have successfully started a war can in thefinal analysis end up vanquished, and the first blowssuffered by an army at the beginning of a war stilldo not signify final defeat.Consequently, it behooves us to take as ourstarting point the fact that t'O rrthe successful con-duct of, and final victory in, a war,colossal.effdrts_of_the armed forces and the entire state as a

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whole may_bereguired. Massive armies and the' ibTili.zation.. of all the moral and physical strength ofthe peopje . and_of.the ecOnomy of the country will t:g& S S - a n t - J a i .

A position in which the decisive role for theachievement of the primary objectives of the war isdelegated to missile troops of strategic designationcertainly does not mean a reduction in the utiliza-tion of ground troops, but on the contrary indicatesa more important need for them on the basis of theirpotential capabilities.

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