Caesar 31 - Soviet Military Strategy and the Chinese Problem

8/2/2019 Caesar 31 - Soviet Military Strategy and the Chinese Problem

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APPROVED FOR RELEASEDATE: JU N 2 0 0 7 %6 APRILJ963- _ .I I

COPY NO S 3

HR70-14(U)

SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY AND THE CHINESE PROBLEM

DD/I STAFF STUDY

CIURSS

REFERENCE TITLX CAESAR XVII


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O f f . S e r . No. 8 .SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY AND TFiE CHINESE PROBLEM

T h i s is a working paper, a p r e l i m i n a r y s t u d y ofsome m i l i t a r y a s p e c ts .of t h e S in o- So vi et r e l a t i o n s h i p . Thepaper is one i n a s e r i e s of r e p o r t s and memoranda on Sovietm i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y and r e l a t e d matters .

The writer h a s drawn l i b e r a l l y upon t h e i n s i g h t s andr e s e a r c h f i n d i n g s of colleagues i n t h e D D / I ReseardbI;.Staf fand i n o th e r componen ts of th e D D / I , b u t is s o l e l y r e s p o n s i b lef o r t h e p ap er as a whole.The DDI/RS would welcome comment on t h e p a p e r , a d d re s s e dt o I rwin P. H al pe rn , t h e p r i n c i p a l a n a l y s t , o r t oor Deputy Chief of t h e s t a f f ,

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JO V I E T MILITARY STRATEGY AND THE CHINESE PROBLEM' 4' SUMMARY

I t is t h e t h e s i s of t h i s p ap er t h a t l t h e S o v i et s haven o t ne g le ct e d t h e m i l i t a r y i m p li c at i on s o f t h e r i f t w it hCommunist China. rHaving f a i l e d i n t h e 1950s t o i n t e g r a t e 7Chinese mi l i t a ry power i n t o a Moscow-controlled bloc-widem i l i t a r y e n t i t y , t h e S o v ie t s h av e t e n d e d s i n c e t o e x clu d eChina and her followers from major S o v i e t m i l i t a r y p l an n in gand bloc mi l i ta ry and economic o rg an i za t ion s .close S in o- So vi et m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e , as o r i g i n a l l y c o n c e i v e d ,was dead ; a v i c t i m of t h e c hanged p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i pBy 1960 t h e

I--between t h e t w o Communist giants.

The new Soviet course has been t o s t r e n gt h e n t h e WarsawP a c t as a m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i on , t o p r e s e n t i t as t h e ef -f e c t i v e b l oc m i l i t a r y f o r c e ( t o t h e e x c lu s io n o f C hina ), t od e v i s e a d o c t r i n e on the pr imacy of s t r a t e g i c weapons (under-sc or ing China' s compara tive mi l i t a ry weakness ) , and t o makei t c l e a r t h a t t h e d e t e r r e n t s h i e l d pro tec t ing China dependson Soviet good w i l l . (The S o v i e t s ha ve i m p l i c i t l y t h r e a t e n e dt o wi thdraw t h e d e t e rr e n t , which e v i d e n t l y n ev er e n t a i l e d a nautomatic Soviet commitment t o f i g h t on C h in a ' s b e h a l f , asl a t e as J a n ua r y 1 96 3. ) P e ip in g r e c o g n iz e s t h e u n c e r t a in ty ofS o vi e t m i l i t a r y h e lp i n t i m e of c r i s i s , and t h e r e is now v e r yl i t t l e m i l i t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n of any typ e between th e t w o regimes.appears in tended t o b lo c k a ve nu es f o r t h e e x p a ns io n of Chinesepower a nd i n f l u e n c e , and f o r a c t i n g m i l i t a r i l y a g a in s t C hinai f n e c es s a ry . With t h e s e o b j e c t i v e s i n view, t h e S o v i e t s h a v eden ied China advanced weapons; have sou gh t t o delay Chinesedevelopment of nu cl ea r/ de li ve ry weapons; have reduced economicand m i l i t a r y a i d t o China to th e minimum, sh or t o f r i s k i ng th eloss of Communist co nt ro l of China; have for mal ize d th e m i l i -t a r y a nd ec ono mic i s o l a t i o n of t h e Chinese camp from the restof t h e bloc ; have sought t o check t h e expans ion of Chinese in-f lu enc e i n underdeveloped areas i n Asia; i n s u p p or t in g t h egrowth' of l a r g e n e u t r a l i s t c o un t r ie ' s ( I n d i a- I n d o n es i a ) , h av ebeen bu i ld ing up long- te rm counte rweigh ts t o China i n t h e Fa rE a s t ; and have taken measures t o s t re n gt h en t h e s e c u r i t y ofS o v ie t b o rd e r s w i th C h ina ,E in c lud in g t h e t r a in in g of t r o o p sdeployed in t h e Far E a s t f o r combat a g a in s t C h in e s e f o r c e s . 3 r/

The new Soviet scheme f o r dea l in g wi th China, moreover,

I


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. 'SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY AND THE CHINESE PROBLEM

N a t i o n a l I n t e r e s t s a t Stake

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Among th e f ac to rs under l y ing the S ino-Sovie t d i sp u t e ,t h e c l a s h of n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s looms l a r g e and c l ea r ly per-m i t s no e a s y r e s o l u t i o n .have add re s sed themse lves t o t h e n a t i o n a l i s s u e , though mainlyi n p r i v a t e c ha nn el s. IBoth Chinese and Soviet spokesmen

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In t h e i r long-winded polemical a r t i c l e s ? t h e Chineseh a v e b e e n c a r e f u l t o a vo id s t a t i n g e x p l i c i t l y t h a t t h e i r d i s -pute with Khrushchev stems l a r g e l y fro m c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ofC h i na ' s n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s (which t h e S o v ie t leader has re-l e g a t e d t o a s e co n da r y p o s i t i o n of importance) , b u t they havec o n s i s t e n t l y c r i t i c i zed t h e S o v i e t leader f o r b i n di n g t h ee n t i r e s t r a t e g y of t h e. bloc t o S o v ie t f o r e i g n p o l i c y r e qu i r e-ments. There is e v id e n c e t h a t t h e C h in e s e w o u l d p r e f e r t ohave t h i s s i t u a t i o n re ve rs ed , t y i n g t h e e n t i r e s t r a t e g y oft h e b l o c t o Mao's idea of f o r e i g n p o l i c y r e qu i re m en t s f o rChina, whi le h id ing behind a s c r e e n of " i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t "p h r a s e s .

As f o r t h e S o vi e t s, t h e r e is s t r o n g e v id e nc e f ro m av a r i e t y of s o u r c e s t o i n d i c a te t h a t t h e S o vi e t l eader s f i n dthemse lves a t se r ious odds wi th th e Chinese i n t h e realm ofs t a t e as w e l l as p a r t y r e l a t i o n s . S o v i e t p ro pa ga nd a, as e a r l yas J u l y 1960, i n t im a t ed t h a t t h e C h in es e a re g u i l t y of "nar-row na t iona l i sm." And re ce n t ly , i n t h e 33 March CPSU l e t t e rt o th e Chinese Communist Par ty , t h e So vi et s warned a ga in s tor ga ni zi ng t h e Communist movement alon g geo gra phi cal n a t i o n a l ,or r a c i a l l i n e s .

I I

I.


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S o v ie t Image of t h e Chinese Threat

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O u t of t h e c o n t e s t of n a t i o na l i n t e r e s t s a r i s e s at h r e a t t o ,each. :other 's n a t i o na l s e c u r i t y .c e p t i o n s of t h e Chinese Communist n at io na l t h r e a t t o t h eUSSR are i n some r e s p e c t s a p p a r e n t t o u s . T hu s, t h e S o v i e t shave manifes ted concern over :with China;

The So vie t per-

(a) t h e s e c u r i t y of t h e i r c o u n t r y ' s e x t e n s i v e borde r s( b) C h in e se a s p i r a t i o n s t o become a nuclear power;(c)(d)

Chinese p re tens ions t o hegemony i n t h e F ar E a s t ,Chinese ( r a c i a l and nat ional) ' chauvinism i n

S o u th e a s t Asia and South Asia;genera1;

(e) th e magnitude o f ' the Chinese popula t ion ;( f ) C h in e s e i n t e r f e r e n c e i n t h e USSR's p u r s u i t of(g) C hin ese e f f o r t s t o d i s p l a c e Moscow as leader of

(h )

" n o r ma l " r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e Western powers;t h e wo rld Communist movement;

toward underdeveloped countr ies ; anda f f a i r s o f t h e USSR.

C h i n e s e e f f o r t s t o undermine Sovi e t po l i c i es(i) Chinese in f luence and i n t e r f e r e n c e in t h e i n t e r n a l

A t t h e bottom of S o v i e t w o r r i e s e v i d e n t l y i s t h e p r o sp e c t ofChina's emergence in time a s a p o w e r f u l m i l i t a r y n e ig h b o r ,independent of con t ro l o r s t r o n g i n f l u e n c e f ro m MOSCOW, andi n posse^&^ f ,huclear weapans. It is in t h i s , l i g h t t h a t Ithe


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as w e l l as shor t run- -po in t t o t h e e x i s t e n c e of a n o v e r a l ls t r a t eg i c scheme.b l u e p r i n t b u t a c o n t i n u a l l y e v o l v i n g s t r a t e g y t h a t i s basedon a c h an g in g r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h C hin a. (We a l s o al low f o rt h e p o s s i b i l i t y of d i f f e r en ce s among Sov i e t l e ad e r s on t h eChinese ques t ion . ) A t t h i s j un c t u r e , S o vi et s t r a t e g y as wep e r c e i v e i t is g e n e r a l l y b e nt on r e s t r i c t i n g t h e growth ofChinese mi l i t a r y power , whereas p r i o r t o 1960 S o v ie t s t r a s e g ysought t o promote i t wi t h in prede te rmined bounds .o p e r a t i v e e l e m e n ts of S o vi et s t r a t e g y f o r d e a l i n g w i t h t h eChinese problem, w e t h i n k , are t h e f o l lo w i ng :(nuc l ea r and non-nuclear) ;

t i c a l l y f e a s i b l e means are av a i l ab le , Chinese development ofa nuc l e a r w eapon/ de li ve ry ca pa b i l i t y ;( c ) g i v e v a r i o u s t y p e s of advanced weapons (non-nu-c l ea r ) t o co un t r i e s such as Indones ia and I nd ia , which mayem pl oy t hem po l i t i c a l l y or m i l i t a r i l y a g a i n s t China as w e l las a g a i n s t m e m b e r s of W e s t e r n a l l i a n c e s ;

By t h i s w e do not mean a r i g i d p l an o r

T he cu r ren t l y

(a) deny China technological ly advanced weapons(b ) d e l a y f o r as l ong as pos s i b l e , by w hat eve r po l i -

(d) f o s t e r , i n ge n er a l, a p o l i c y of c o n t a i n i n g t h es p r e a d of Chinese i n f lu ence in t h e underdeve loped areas oft h e wor ld ;(e) t a k e m e a s u r e s t o s t r e n g t he n t h e s e c u r i t y of bor-d e r s w i t h C h i n a , p a r t i c u l a r l y c r i t i c a l areas l i k e Vladivos tokt h a t might be vu lnerab le t o C hi nese a t t ac k and t h a t may bet a r g e t s of Chinese long-range i r r ede nt i sm; wi th t h e same endin v iew, encourage an t i -Chinese f e e l i n g among borde r peop l e si n S o v ie t C e n t r a l Asia and, i n a lower key , s ubve r t borde rpop ula t io ns i n Sinkiang, Inne r Mongolia and Manchuria; I( f ) i s o l a t e C h ina and her fol lowers m i l i t a r i l y andeconomica l ly f rom th e r e s t of t h e bloc, chang i ng i n subs t anceif n o t i n form t h e S i no -S ov ie t m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e ;

p e r i p h e r y of China, u s in g p o l i t i c a l l y f e a s i b l e i f d i v e r s eand seemingly cont rad ic t ory methods , in order to deny them t oChina;

(9) exp and S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e i n c o u n t r i e s on t h e


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(h ) i n t h i s r e g a r d , b u i l d up M ong olia m i l i t a r i l y ande c on o m ic a ll y , t h ro u gh i n t e g r a t i o n i n t h e CEMA community andclose ties w i th t h e Warsaw Pact ;(i) reduce a l l forms of economic and mi l i tary a i dt o C hi na t o t h e minimum ( s te p s beyond which would gi ve com-f o r t t o t h e "enemies of Communism''); i n o t h e r words, do no tseek t h e c o l l a p s e of t h e Communist regime i n C hi na , for such

8 development might crea te a n e v e n g r e a t e r t h r e a t t o t h e USSRi n t h e f or m of a n e u t r a l or even pro-Western Chines e regime';and( j ) r e t a i n s o l e and complete contsritl over the Sovie t :,s t r a t e g i c d e t e r r e n t , so as t o o f f e r China some p r o t e c t i o n f r o ma U.S .- led a t t a ck aga i n s t t h e mainland whi le minimizing ther i s k of be i ng dragged i n t o a war w i t h t h e U.S. or i t s a l l i e sas a r e s u l t of i nd ep en de nt C hi ne se f o r e i g n p o l i c y o r m i l i t a r yi n i t i a t i v e s .

The M i l i t a r y A l l i ance i n t h e F i f t i e s

In t h e f i r s t decade o f t h e C h inese Communist regime,China f e a tu re d i m po r ta n tl y i n S o v ie t s t r a t e g i c m i l i t a r y p la n-n ing . I t seems t o have been t h e view of S o v i e t o f f i c i a l d o m--of t h e S t a l i n and Khrushchev reg imes a l ik e- - t ha t t h e n a t i o n a ls e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s of t h e USSR would bes t be se rved by b u i l d -i ng up a s t ro ng m odernized conven t i ona l f o r ce in China ; tha tChinese power would play a v i a b l e r o l e in E a s t - W e s t r e l a t i o n s ,and w ould h e l p t o sw ing t h e s t r a t e g i c ba l ance o f power in t h ew o r l d d e c i s i v e l y in f a v o r o f t h e Sov i e t - l ed " s o c i a l i s t camp."S o v i e t p l a n n e r s m u s t a l s o have c a l c u l a t e d t h a t t h e USSR, t h roughp o l i t i c a l i n f l u e nc e i n P e ip i ng , c o u l d exerc i se adequate safe-gua rds ove r C h i nese m i l i t a ry fo rces and assure t h e i r closeco ord ina t io n wi th t h e S ovie t h igh command i n t i m e s of p o l i t i c a lcr i s i s as w e l l as in m i l i t a r y combat s i t u a t i o n s .A close m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e b etwee n t h e t w o s t a t e s wascreated i n Feb rua ry 1950, ; a Year. a f t e r P eip in g f e l l t o t h eCommunists, w i t h t h e s i g n i n g of a t h i r t y -y e a r t r e a t y of f r i e n d -s h i p a n d m u t u a l de fense , The t r e a t y committed t h e USSR t osuppor t C hi na i f a t t a cked by Japan or "any s t a t e a l l i e d w i t hi t , " b u t , a t l e a s t i n t h e pu b l is h e d v e r s i o n , d i d n o t u n d e r wr i t ep o s s i b l e Ch in es e m i l i t a r y i n i t i a t i v e s . The t r e a t y a l s o pro-v ided for t h e r e t u r n t o C h i n a , a f t e r a f i x e d p e r io d of t i m e ,

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of Port A r t h u r , Dairen, and t h e Manchurian rai lwa ys , and gr an tedChina a c r e d i t of 300 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s . A se r i e s of economicand t rade agreements were drawn up i n ensuin g months; Chinawas t o s u p p l y t h e USSR w i t h raw mater ia ls in exchange f o r arms,m ach inery , and t he s e r i v ce s o f So v i e t t e c hn i c i ans and adv i se r s .J o i n t Sino-Soviet companies , modelled on t h o s e i n E a s te r nEurope, were s e t up t o ex p l o i t China ' s minera l w e k l t h and o thern a t u r a l resources. Four months a f t e r t h e c r e a t i o n of t h e Sino-S o vi e t m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e , t h e Korean War w a s unleashed byd i r e c t i o n from Moscow. The w a r marked a p e r i o d of v e r y c l o s em i l i t a ry -po l i t i c a l c o ll a b o r a t io n between Moscow and Pe ipin g.I t i n t e n s i f i ed Chinese m i l i t a ry and economic dependence on t h eUSSR, which gave generously o f , i t s resources. Throughout t h ec o n f l i c t Moscow r e t a i n e d o v e r a l l c o n t r o l of Chinese and NorthKorean opera t ions , of t h e pro t rac ted and acrimonious negot ia-t i o n s (which c o n s t i t u t e d a n i m p o r t a n t t a c t i c i n t h e managementof t h e m i l i t a r y c r i s i s ) , and of t h e d e c i s i o n (made on l y a f t e rS t a l i n ' s d e a t h ) t o s i g n an armis t ice .

Th e l e s s o n s of t h e Korean War--notably, t h e w i l l i n g n e s sof China t o perform l o y a l l y as a j u n i o r p a r t n er i n a harmoniousr e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e USSR--undoubted1 y s t r e n g t h e n e d S o v i e tcon f idence i n t h e m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e . E v e n before t h e USSR fullyemerged from t h e p o l i t i c a l s uc c es s io n c r i s i s - - i n wh ich an i m -p o r t a n t d i v i s i v e i s s u e among t h e con t ende r s f o r power was t h eq u e s t ion of na t i ona l de fense and resource a l loca t ions- -a renewedS o v i e t e f f o r t w a s made t o s t r e ng t h e n t h e m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c ew i t h t h e C h in es e . In October 1954, Khrushchev and some ofh i s s u p p o r t e r s went t o P e i pi n g t o s i g n t h e second major eco-nomic a id t r e a t y w i t h China, ush er ing i n a per iod of massiveS o v i e t i n d u s t r i a l and m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e t o t h a t coun t ry .The S o v ie t s , t o be s u r e , demanded repayment f o r t h a t 7 a s s i s t a n o e .In exchange f o r t h e l o a n of s k i l l e d t e chn i c i ans and sh i pm en t sof machinery and equipment v i t a l t o C h i n a ' s i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o nprogram and armaments v i t a l t o h e r de fense , t h e USSR receivedraw mate r ia l s , f o o d s t u f f s and t e x t i l e s t h a t had no d i r e c t bea r-i n g on S o v i e t i n d u s t r i a l p ro d u c t i o n . The p r i o r i t y c o n t ri b u -t i o n s t o C hi na 's i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n pr ogr am as t h e Russ ianshave s a i d , were probably of c o n s i d e r a b l e cos t t o t h e S o v i e teconomy and hindered t o some extent t h e equipment of t h e

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t h e r a p i d d e t e r i o r a t i o n in S in o -S ov ie t r e l a t i o n s i n 19 60 .( U n t i l t h e n , a l l advanced weapons in E a s t Germany were i n t h ehands of S o v i e t t r o o p s s t a t i o n e d t h e r e . And t h e armies oft h e E a s t European s a t e l l i t e s , d e s p i t e t h e i r i nc l us io n i n t h eWarsaw Pact orga n i za t i on w hich w a s se t up i n 1955, were no ta s s i gn e d a n i m p o rt a nt r o l e i n S o v i e t m i l i t a r y p l an n i n g. ) Ins h o r t , p r i o r t o 1 96 0, t h e S o v i e t s s u p p l i e d t h e C h in es e w i t ht h e most advanced equipment made ava i l ab l e anyw here ou t s i det h e USSR, i n c l u d i n g l a t e r models of MIG's and even a f e wBadgers (TU-16's) .and SAH'i$. The. S o v i e t s a l s o helpedt o c o n s t r u c t a nd e qu ip a i r c r a f t p l a n t s i n C hina. B u t t h eamount and types of a i d t h a t t h e S o v i e t s g av e t h e C hi ne se i nt h e i r atomic energy and rocket programs is s t i l l l a r g e l y amystery .One of t h e most Ferp lexin g and c r i t i c a l ' u e s t i o n s is 'whether . . t he Sovie t scheme in t h e 1950s--to b u d d up Chinesem i l i t a r y might i n t h e " s o c i a l is t commonwealth" (sodr uzhes vo)- - inc luded an i n t e n t i o n t o help China become a nuclear poweri n a m i l i t a r y s e n s e . There are t h r e e d i s t i n c t a s p ec t s o ft h e n u c le a r - qu e s ti o n . F i r s t , i t is c lea r t h a t S o v i e t leadersf rom t h e s t a r t had no i n t e n t i o n of g i v i n g t h e C hi nese f i n i shednu cl ea r weapons. Second, th e r e is good ev idence tha t t h eS o v i e t s were w i l l i n g t o promote a t l e a s t a p e a c e f u l n u c l e a renergy program i n China. Fol lowing a "peaceful a toms" agree-ment with t h e C hi nese i n 1955, t h e S ov i e t s fu rn i shed t hemw i t h a r e s e a r c h reactor a l ong w i t h o t he r r e l a t e d equipmentand began t o t r a i n t h e ' Ch in es e i n n uc l ea r ene rgy t echno logy .The t h i r d and c r uc ia l ques tion- -which w e cannot as yet answers a t is f a c t o r i l y - - i s w he th er t h e S o v i e t s d e l i b epromote a m i l i t a r y rogram in China.arguments can be

ev i dence of d i r e c t S o v ie t a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e C hi ne se p r o j e c t .W are i n c l i n e d t o t h i n k , o n t h e b a s i s of t h e a v a i l -a b l e e v i de n c e , t h a t t h e S o v i e t l e ad e r s w e r e never more thanve ry r e l u c t an t pa r t ne r s t o any agreemerit t o p rom ote a n u c l e a rweapons program in China. W t h i n k i t p r o b a b l e t h a t in t h ey e a r o r t w o a f t e r t h e K o r e a n War, t h e expe r i ence of whichenhanced Sovie t conf idence i n t h e l o y a l t y and t r a c t a b i l i t y ofth e Chinese Communists , th e So vie t leaders acquiesced t o Chineser e q u e s t s f o r a s s i s t a n c e i n bo th a p e a c e f u l and m i l i t a r y n u c l e a r

r2:"&u s # e n n. There is s imply no i n d i s p u t a b l e

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energy program.* W t h i n k , f u r t h e r , t h a t t h e S o v i e t s may h av ehe lped t o get t h e C h inese m i l i t a r y prog ram o f f t h e ground byg i v i n g Ch in es e s c i e n t i s t s b a s i c t r a i n i n g i n n u c l e a r t e ch no lo gy .And i f a g as eo us d i f f u s i o n p l a n t does e x i s t i n C hi na , w e s u r -m i s e t h a t t h e S o v i e t s h el pe d c o n s t r u c t i t .** (The f a c t t h a ta l l work a t t h e s u s p e c t e d p l a n t ceased for a t l e a s t two yearsa f t e r S o vi et s c i e n t i s t s and t e c h n i c i a n s were withdrawn fromC hi na po i n t s t o S o vi e t p a r t i c i p a t i o n a t t h a t s i t e . ) B u t w et h i n k i t h i g h l y un l i k e ly t h a t t h e S o v ie t s a t any t i m e know-i n g l y g av e t h e Chinese t h e most c r u c i a l , s e n s i t i v e i n f o r m a t i o non nuclear weapons design. In o t h e r words, w e are i n c l i n e dt o t h in k t h a t t h e S m e ve r d e l i b e r a t e l y g av e t h e Chinesem u c h of t h e k i n d of t e c hn i c a l i n fo rm a t i on (wh ich w a s n o t a l r e a d ygeneral knowledge) or equipment needed f o r t h e development ofan atomic bomb. And w e a t t r i b u t e t h i s presumed s t a t e of a f -f a i r s p r im ar i l y t o a growing Sov ie t awareness i n t h e m i d d l eand l a t e 1950s t h a t t h e Chinese would n o t be c o ns ta n t i n t h e i rt r a c t a b i l i t y and l o y a l t y t o Moscow.

-If our t h e s i s is correct t h a t t h e USSR w i t hhe l d i n fo r -mation c r i t i c a l t o t h e development and , spec i f i ca l ly , t h e d e s i g nof t h e nuclear weapon, how d i d t h e Chinese come by t h e e s s e n t i a linformat ion (assuming t h a t t hey have i t ) ? According t o an ap-parent ly knowledgeable de fec to r , ]

e s p io & z e i n t h e USSR.ne L'ninese acquirea rn-m-q-nnmHowever, . t h e r e Ps no cozi4Sixitation

*There might even have been a q u i d pro quo arrangement . n. I- t h e Sov i e t s ag reed t o g i v e t h e C h inese t e c h n l c achange f o r f i s s i o n a b l e mate r ia l s ; t h e S o v i e t s ,acco rd i ng t o t h e source, k ep t t h e i r p a r t of t h e b a r g a in , b u tt h e Chinese reneged.**Recent U.S. n a t i o n a l estimates s a y i t is " p robab l e" t ha tt h e p l a n t in ques t i on ( a t Lanchow) is a g as eo us d i f f u s i o n p l a n t .B u t \ IJ' n e i p W i t h or in

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of t h i s i n any of t h e many pu b l i c and p r i va t e S i no -Sov i et po-lemics of recent y e a r s . *

re la ted t h e f o ll o wi n g -

, .. ..

. ...... ........ . ., . .

. . .

By 1959 , de sp i t e t h e S o vi e t r e f u s a l t oprov i de t h e C h inese w i t h i n fo rm a t i onconce rni ng t h e . p roduct i on o f nuc l ea rweapons, t h e Sov i e t s de te rm ined t h a t t h eChinese had begun t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n ofan atomic bomb. The pr od uc ti on andr e s e a r c h a p p e a r t o be c e n t er e d i n o neof t h e more remote nor t he rn p rov i ncesof C hina . The Sovi e t s upon fu r th eri n v e s t i g a t i o n d e te rm in e d t h a t C h i ne see x p e r t s a nd s c i e n t i s t s engaged i n t h i sp r o j e c t h a d b e e n t r a i n e d e a r l i e r a tS o vi e t i n s t i t u t i o n s . T hi s l e d t h eS o v i e t s t o c on si de r t h e p o s s i b i l i t yt h a t C hinese i n t e l l i g en ce had exp l o i t e dt h i s exchange and a s s i s t anc e p rogramin order t o p r o cu r e wi t h in t h e USSRi t s e l f t h e d e t a i l s needed fo r t h e i nau -g u r a t i o n of a c o n s t r u c t i o n and researchprogram f o r atomic weapons. Chargest o t h i s e f f e c t were made by th e So vi et s .The Chinese den ied these charges b u tw i t h an eve r more i n f l a t e d s e l f- c o n f i-dence boas ted t h a t t he y would have au s e f u l n u c l e a r bomb i n two ye ar s. Theyf u r t h e r f e l t t h a t w i t h t h i s weapon inhand t h e y c o ul d f u r t h e r i g n o re t h es t r e n g t h of t h e United S ta te s , and whent h e S o v i e t s c o n t r a d i c t e d ,them on t h i sth e Chinese impl i ed t h a t t h e R u s s i a n swere t r y i n g t o scare them with a "papert i ge r . " The ' angered Sov ie t s chargedt h e C h inese w i t h r eck l e s s nes s . T hesetwo Sov i e t cha rges , i . e . , Chinese espio-n ag e i n t h e USSR a n d r e c k l e s s n e s s i ni n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s p a r a l l e l e d e ac ho t h e r s i n c e t h e y were p r e c i p i t a t e d by t h esame r o o t cause. I n answer t h e Chinesecharged t h a t such a c c u s a t i o n s were un-doub t ed l y t h e r e s u l t of some "maskedprovocht ion" on t h e p a r t of unspec i f i edhe s i t u a t i o n


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. ...(. ..

. .. ,

....,.

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A l l t h e wh i le t h a t t h e S o v i e t s so ug h t t o s t r e n g t h e nt h e m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e w i t h China on Sovie t terms i n t h e y ea rs1955-59, forces were at work i n China t o reduce Chinese m i l i -t a r y dependence on t h e USSR and t o improve t h e i r j u n i o r p o s i -t i o n i n t h e a l l i an c e . As e a r l y as 1955, t he Chinese leader-s h i p had e v i d e n t l y dec ided t o s t r i v e f o r se l f - s u f f i c i en cy i narmaments pr od uc ti on . (Thus, a t a Nat iona l Peop le ' s Congressi n P e i p i n g i n J u l y 1 955 , a s e n io r o f f i c i a l , Yeh Ch ie n- yingim pl ic i t ly dep lored China ' s dependen t s t a t u s , d e c l a r i n g t h a t" o u r i n d u s t r y m u s t be speeded up i n orde r t o remedy China'si n a b i l i t y t o p r o vid e t h e armed f o r c e s w i th t h e most modernequipment.") On an e i t h e r / o r b a s i s t h e C h in e s e w o u l d p r e f e rt o purchase t h e means of p r od u c ti o n r a t h e r t h a n t h e f i n i s h e dweapons, so as t o r e d u c e r e l i a n c e of Sovie t good fe l lowsh ip .I n t h e l a t e 1950s, t h e S o v i e t s s a w s t i l l more reasonst o q u es t i on t h e i r e a r l i e r assumptions about t h e l o y a l s u b -s e r v i e n c e of t h e Chinese . Fol lowing t he announced Soviet ICBMt e s t i n September 1957 t h e Chinese began t o v ie w the wor lds t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n d i f f e r e n t l y t h an t h e S o vi e ts . I n t h e i rp u b l i c d i s c o u r s e , t h e C hine s e t o o k a more op t i mi s t ic v iew oft h e S o v ie t s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n t h a n t h e Sovie t s themse lvesd i d , and regarded t h e USSR as capab le of t a k i n g greater r i s k st h a n S o v i e t leaders were i n cl i ne d t o t a k e .I t has been per suas ive ly a rgued i n a number of placest h a t t h e November 1957 Conference of Communist parties inMoscow w a s of c r i t i c a l importance in t he S ino-Sovie t d i spu te

o v er s t r a t e g y and t h e ques t ion of nuc lea r weapons sh ar in g.I t was a t t h a t t i m e that Khrushchev probably balked a t giv-in g t h e Chinese s e r ious a s s i s t a n c e i n t h e d ev elop me nt o ft h e i r own nuclear weapons as w e l l as f in i shed nuc lea r weapons .This would help t o e x p l a in why i n t h e f o l l o w in g y e a r , t h eChinese pub l ic ly reasserted t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e t r a d i t i o n a l i s tmi l i t a ry doc t r ine expounded by Mao and v igorous ly d i sparagednuclea r weapons; rebuked pro fes s io nal ism i n t h e PLA; re jec tedt h e i m p l i c i t p l e a d in g of p r o f e s s i o n a l s f o r a c r a s h n u c l e arprogram i n China; and gen er al ly made i t c lea r t h a t C h in e s enu cl ea r weapons would have t o await t h e t i m e when Chinese in-dus t ry , sc ience and technology were s u f f i c i e n t l y d ev el op ed t oproduce them. If t h e y had b e en g r an t e d s u b s t a n t i a l S o v i e t a i dfo r the deve lopment of an indigenous nuclear weapons program,the Chinese would not have had t o as s e r t t h e n ee d t o developan i n d u s t r i a l s c i e n t i f i c base f i r s t . I n d i c a t i v e of t h e pes-s i m i s m i n P e i p in g on t h i s matter was t h e statement made by

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, .

.. . . .. . .. . .. .. .. ., ..: ,...' .. . .

..... .

by Marshal Eo Lung on 1 August 1958 t h a t China could n o t r e l yon " ou ts id e a id " i n t r y i n g t o s o l ve i t s m i l i t a r y p ro bl em s.(The day be fo re Ho's warning, Khrushchev, alarmed by a s h a r pupsurge in C hinese p ropaganda a a l l i n g f o r t h e " l i b e r a t i o n t iof Taiwan, a r r i ve d i n Pe ip ing f o r an unannounced th ree-dayv i s i t .)The Taiwan cr i s i s of 1958--the r e s u l t of a Chinesef o r ei g n p o l c y i n i t a t ve-probably had a c r i t i c a l e f f e c t onSov i e t a t t i t u d e s toward t h e m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e w i t h China.The eagerness of t he C h i nese in the Taiwan a f f a i r t o p i tSov i e t power and p r e s t i ge a ga i n s t U.S. power i n t h e area m u s thave had a s o b e ri n g e f f e c t on Khrushchev. The cr i s i s dramatizedf o r him t he dange r t h a t C h ina cou l d d rag t he USSR i n t o a

c a t a s t r o p h i c n u c le a r w a r w i t h t h e U n it ed S t a t e s . K hrushchev' sam i e y o v e r t h e poss b l e consequences of t h e S no-Sov i e tm i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e i n t h e Taiwan cr is is is s e e n i n t h e e x tr e me l yc a u t i o u s way t h a t h e r a i s e d t h e S o vi et d e t e r r e n t s h i e l d t opro t ec t C h i na from t h e U.S. t h r e a t . O n l y a f t e r t h e U.S.made i t c l e a r t h a t t h e r e w a s no p l a n t o a t t a c k Communist Chinaand Chou En-lai made an o f f e r t o n e g o ti a te d i d t h e S o vi etl e a d e r r e c a l l t h e USSR's commitment t o defend China.Also d u ri ng t h i s p e ri o d t h e S o v i e t s u n s u c c e s s f u l l ysought c lose r coopera t ion be tween th e S ovie t and th e Chineseo p e r a t i o n a l m i l i t a r y commands. I n t h i s r e s p e c t , t h e Sov i e t smade s e v e r a l p r o p o s a ls f o r m i l i t a r y c o o pe r at o n t h a t werere jec ted by t h e Chinese for u n s p e c i f i e d r e a s o n s . S p e c i f i c a l l y ,

Pe i p i ng is r e p o r t e d t o have rejected S o v i e t p r op o s a ls f o r t h ee s t a b l i s h m e n t of Sovie t submar ine , m i s s i l e bases, a i r basesand radar i n s t a l l a t i o n s i n C hina . * P e i p i n g r e p o r t e d l y a l s ore jec ted Sov ie t-proposed a r r angem ent s fo r j o i n t a i r di n w a r t i m e , t h a t is, m u t u a l u s e of t h e o t h e r ' s b a s e s .

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A proposa l had a l so r e p o r t e d l y b e e n made t o se t up a j o i n tna va l command i n th e Fa r E a s t ; a l t h o u g h i t c o u l d n o t be de-t e rmined f r o m t h e r e p o r t s what t h e terms of t h e proposa lwere or w h i c h p a r t y i n i t i a t e d i t , i t seems l i k e l y t h a t t h eS o v i e t s preferred it and t h e Chinese rejected it on t h e grounds -of b e i n g a l lo t ed a secondary ro l e .There is y e t a n o t he r d i s c o r d a n t e le m en t i n t h e Sino-S o vi e t m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p d u r in g t h e decade ( t h e 1950s)of g e n e r a l l y close p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y a s s o c i a t i o n . T h i sp e r t a i n s t o t h e h i s t o r i c a n x i e t y t h a t t h e Soviets have mani-f e s t e d o v e r t h e i r borders w i t h China. Since World War 11,S o v i e t m i l i t a r y c o n t i n g e n t s h av e b ee n c o n s t a n t l y d e pl oy e d a tv a r i o u s p o i n t s a l o n g t h e Sino-Soviet border , i n a d d i t i o n t o

t h e r e g u l a r border t r o o p s p er fo rm in g r o u t i n e s e c u r i t y d u t i e st h e r e . The Soviet forces were kep t there w i t h some f l u c t u a -t i o n s i n t h e i r complement a f t e r t h e w i t h d r a w a l of t h e U.S.ground t h r e a t from t h e area , a f ter a "friendly" Communistregime w a s s e t up i n China, and a f t e r t h e Korean War w a st e rmina ted ; and t h e y have been deployed i n a manner t h a tw o u l d permi t quickes t p e n e t r a t i o n i n t o C h in a. (In EuropeanR u s s i a , t h e b u l k of Soviet combat-ready fo rces has a l s o beenc o n c e n t r a t e d i n border areas t o f a c i l i t a t e a r a p i d t h r u s ti n t o Wes te rn Europe as w e l l as t o deal w i t h em ergenc i es i n t hes a t e l l i t e s .) S o v i e t forces d ep lo ye d n e a r C hi ne s e t e r r i t o r ymoreover, have nev er t o our knowledge p a r t i c i p a t e d i n j o i n tm i l i t a r y exercises w i t h t h e Chinese. (In c o n t r a s t , t h e S o vi e tsi n t h e 1950s h e l d combined exercises w i t h ne i ghbor i ng E a s t LEuropean a r m i e s . ) As w i l l be shown sh o r t l y , Sov i e t forces, i nt h e Far E a s t have been t ra ined t o act a g a i n s t a ' p o s s i b l eChinese enemy.

~

0

UThe Hew Soviet Concept of Bloc M i l i t a r y Power

Taking s tock toward t h e end of t h e f i r s t decade ofChinese Communist r u l e , t h e S o v i e t l e ad e r s saw ' p l a i n l y t h a tthey had f a i l e d t o a ch ie ve t h e i r main s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e sregarding China and t h a t the re were v e r y d i m prospec t s f o ra t t a i n i n g them. The USSR had n o t managed t o i n t e g r a t e C h i n e s em i l i t a ry pow er ~ i n t o a Moscow-cont ro ll ed m i l i t a ry e n t i t y ; hadno t s t r e ng t hened C h i nese l o ya l t y and subse rv i ence t o t h e USSR(of t h e s o r t i n ev id en ce i n t h e Korean War); and had not in -creased Chinese m i l i t a r y dependence on t h e USSR b u t l o s t much

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ground i n t h i s res pec t . The Sovie t leaders may a l s o have beenconcerned tha t t h e s u b s t a n t i a l c o n t r ib u t i o ns t h a t t h e USSRhad made--at no small cost--to t h e Ch in es e i n d u s t r i a l - m i l i t a r ymachine n o t o n ly were n o t p a y in g d iv id en d s , bu t had helpedt o create a s i g n i f i c a n t p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t t o themselves .By s p r in g 19 60 , when p o l i t i c a l t e n s io n s b etwe en t h et w o a l l i e s f l a r e d up, t h e S in o- So vi et m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e aso r i g i n a l l y c on ce iv ed w a s a l l b u t dead. From t h e Sovie t s tand-p o i n t , t h e n a t u r e of t h e a l l i a n c e had t o change once t h e USSRcou ld no l o n g e r s u f f i c i e n t l y i n f l u e n c e Ch in es e f o r e i g n andm i l i t a r y p o l i c y f ro m t h e cen te r - - i .e . , Pe ip ing . Th is w a s as i n e q u a non f o r t h e a l l i a n c e , as conceived by t h e S o v ie t s .KEoii-c?EZidence i n p o l i t i c a l in fl ue nc e ove r Peipi ng, Moscowcould no t a ss ign China a place of impor tance i n Sov i e t m i l i -t a r y p la n ni n g, f o r there would be no assurance t h a t t h e Chinesew o u l d execute t h e m i l i t a r y - p o l i t i c a l t a s k s ass igned i t in t i m eof cr is i s . Perhaps more important, t h e USSR would be vulner-able t o extreme m i l i t a r y r i s k s from any commitment t o China ' sd e f e n s e i n a cris is invo lv ing t h e United Sta t6es . As S o v ie tbehav ior in t h e 1958 Taiwan c r i s i s seems t o sugges t , a t not i m e was t h e Soviet commitment t o ac t on China ' s behal f auto-matic, b u t w a s t o be determined a t a n y j u n c tu r e on t h e b a s i sof a ca re fu l S o v i e t e v a l u a t i o n of t h e ac tua l s i t u a t i o n . Thet r e a t y i n so f ar as i t ex tends t h e d e t e r r e n t s h i e l d to ,China w a snot abrogated--for i t s t i l l se rved Sovie t purposes : As longas t h e USSR can manipula te i t s n u c l e a r d e t e r r e n t on China ' sb e h a l f , i t i s i n a p o s i t i o n t o l i m i t and perhaps de f ine t h en a t u r e of ov er t Chinese mi l i t a ry moves. For , as t h e 1958....- Taiwan cr i s i s has a gai n shown, China canno t ach iev e even l oca lo b j e c t i v e s i n t h e face of U.S. o p p o s i t i o n w i t h o u t o v e r t S o v i e tbacking ..:..

.The changed pol i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p be twe en Moscow andP e ip in g r e s u l t e d i n a S o v ie t d e c i s i o n t h a t t h e n a t i o n a l i n t e r -es t s of t h e USSR would bes t be s e r v e d n o t b y t h e b u i l d u p ofa bloc-wide, loose m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n , b u t by the concen-t r a t e d b u i l d u p of S o v i e t m i l i t a r y power and t h a t of s a t e l l i t e sm i l i t a r i l y c o n t r o l l e d by Moscow t h r ough t h e ins t rument of t h eWarsaw Pac t . Thus, t h e new Soviet course i n t r o d u c e d i n e a r l y1960 was t o s t r e n g t h e n t h e Warsaw Pact as a n o p e r a t i o n a l m i l i -t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n , w h i l e de-emphasiz ing So vie t r e l i a nc e onChinese m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h . By l a t e s u m m e r of 1960, t h e wholecomplement of S o v i e t s c i e n t i s t s , e n g in e e r s a nd t e c h n i c i a n s ,w i t h f e w e x c e p t i o n s , w a s withdrawn from China. In do ing t h i s

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. . ., , . ,.... ... . .. . .

I I

t h e S o vi et s v i r t u a l l y sabotaged t h e e n t i r e C hin es e i n d u s t r i a le f f o r t . A l s o Sovi e t-C h inese coope ra t i on i n nuc l ea r ene rgy wash e n c e f o r t h res t r i c ted t o t h e innocuous non-mi l i tary research .conducted a t t h e Sov i e t - con t ro l l ed D ubna In s t i t u t e , where mostbloc c o u n t r i e s h av e be en r e p r e s e n t e d .I t is a l so noteworthy t h a t i n e a r l y 1 96 0, t h e Sov i e t s(at K h r u s h c h e v ' s i n i t i a t i v e ) came f o r t h w i t h a new mi l i t a ryd o c t r i n e o'f primary re1 ance on nuclear/missi le weapons t h a tf u r t h e r widened t h e gap between Soviet and Chinese m i l i t a r yt h o u g h t , po l i cy , and force s t r u c t u r e . The import of t h e newS o v i e t m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e (which i n t i m e underwent importantm od i f i ca t i ons ) dramat b e d C hi na ' s con t i nu i ng m i l i t a r y weak-n e s s compared w i t h t h e m i l i t a r y p o s t u r es and s t r a t eg i es opent o t h e USSR and t h e United S ta t e s .ment, t h e Chinese l e a d e r s h ip w i t h i n a week a f t e r Khrushchevannounced t h e new doct r ine made i t c lea r ( i n a r e s o l u t i o n oft h e St and i ng Committee of t h e Nat io na l Peo ple ' s Congress) t h a tChina had grea t power p r e t e n s i o n s , asp i r ed t o become a nuc l ea rpower, w o u l d n o t permit i t s i n t e r e s t s t o be dis regarded byt h e grea t powers ( t h e USSR and United S t a t e s ) , and w o u l d notbe bound by Soviet commitments t o t h e West (as i n disarmamentagreements) .

Incensed over t h i s develop-

. .

I t h a s only been i n t h e p a s t th ree y e a r s t h a t t h e War{s a w Pact--created i n 1955 as a p o l i t i c a l c o u n t e r t o NATO andas a means f o r e x e r t i n g c o n t r o l o v er t h e s a t e l l i t e s - - h a s fea-t u r e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n S ov ie t w a r planning . S ince 1960 , a f t e rt h e f a l l o u t w i t h t h e Chinese, t h e Sovie t s have been press ingt h e development of t h e m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s of t h e WarsawPact a l l i a n c e . The armed forces of t h e Warsaw Pact m e m b e rs ta tes have been s t re ngth ened and re -equ ipped w i t h up-to-dateSov iet weapons; and inc reas ed emp h as i s has been placed oni n t e g r a t i n g W a r s a w Pact fo rces in .exerc i ses . O f l a t e , S o v i e tm i l i t a r y spokesmen have given prominence t o t h e Warsaw Pact ,p o r t r a y i n g i t as t h e e f f e c t i v e m i l i t a r y o r g an i z at i on of t h es o c i a l i s t camp. m s a s s t r o n g l y i n t i m a t e d by MarshalMalino vsky i n h i s Army-Navy Day speech of l a s t February. Inan obvious r e b u f f t o China, Malinovsky s t a t e d t h a t t h e S o v i e t ,armed forces a r e " devel opi ng and s t r en g t he n i ng t h e i r combatcomradeship w i t h t h e f r a t e r n a l armies of t h e s o c i a l i s t coun-t r i e s un i t ed by t h e Warsaw Pact"; he observed t h a t t h e s o c i a l -i s t s t a t e s - -wi th t h e i m p l i e d ex clu sio n of China and i t s f o l -lowers--have "merged t h e i r economic and m i l i t a r y p o t e n t i a l , ''i . e . , t h rough t h e CEMA and Warsaw Pact ; and he e qua t e d t h e

I

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. . . .

These developments do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a f f e c t t h e w i l l -i ngnes s of USSR t o pose as p r o t e c t o r of t h e e n t i r e s o c i a l i s tcamp and of Cuba as w e l l . Soviet spokesmen cont inue t o dot h i s ; witness Khrushchev 's 27 F e b ru a ry e l e c t i o n s p e e ch . B u twhat t h e S o v i e t s are sa yi ng now, it seems, is t h a t t h e b u l w a r kof d e f e n s e of t h e s o c i a l i s t camp is t h e W a r s a w Pact and f i r s tof a l l t h e USSR, n o t t h e armed fo rc e s o f t h e camp as a whole.Hence , though they l l c o r d i a l l y l l extend t h e p r o t e c t i v e umbre l l aof t h e s t r a t e g i c d e te r r e nt o ve r o the r c o u n t r i e s b u i l d i n gs o c i a l i s m , t h e Warsaw Pac t co un t r i e s headed by t h e USSR mayw i t h d r a w t h a t p r o t e c t i o n . An i m p l ic i t t h r e a t t o t h i s e f f e c twas made i n a . P r a v d a e d i t o r i a l as l a t e as 7 January 1963.Threatened w i t E i F G 6 l of t h e S o vi et s h i e l d a g a i n s t a t t a c k son China w a s a l s o i mp li ed i n S o v i e t s t a t e m e n t s i n t h e p a s t ,as i n Marshal Mal inovskg 's remarks on 24 January 1962, whenhe spoke of t h e S o vi et a b i l i t y t o defend s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s" f r i e n d l y t o us l * T hat ominous d i s t i n c t i o n be tw een f r i en d l yand un f r i end l y s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s was r e p e a t e d by t h e S o v i e tAmbassador i n Peiping i n t h e f ol lo wing month and used a g a i ni n a March 1963 i s s u e of t h e Sov i e t D efense Mi n i s t ry j ou r na l ,

- 15 --m

, .

Sov i e t - a l l i ed governm en ts w i t h t h e Warsaw Pact member s t a t e s ,n o ti n g t h a t t h e i r armed f o r c e s were, a l o n g w i t h S o v i e t f o r c e s ,brought t o a s t a t e of " com pl et e m i l i t a ry r ead i nes s " du r i ngthe Cuban cr i s i s . I t is also notewor thy tha t whi l e China wasnever a member of t he Warsaw P a c t , t h a t c o u n tr y w a s r e p r e s e n t e da t meet ings of t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n b y "observers." B u t no Chinese"observers"--whether by t h e i r cho ice o r by Soviet decis ion--have a t t ended W a r s a w Pa ct meet ings s in c e March 1961. (China 'sfo l lower Albania, acco rd i ng t o Sov i e t s t a t e m en t s ha s " excl udedi t s e l f '' f r o m t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n .) Also s i g n i f i c a n t a n d r e l a t ed ,t o t h i s devel opment was t h e e f f e c t i v e e x cl u s io n of China fromt h e f u t u r e e conomic l i f e o f t h e bloc w i t h t h e r e o r g a n i z a t i o ni n mid-1962 of CEMA, now portrayed as t he v i ab l e econom i co r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e s o c i a l i s t camp.'


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KOMMUNIST OF TEE ARMED FORCES.* I n o t h e r words, t h e S o v i e t shave t h rea t ened ab roga t i on of t h e Si no -Sov i e t t r ea t y in t h ee v e n t t h a t t h e Ch in es e do n o t h e e l t o .

. . ..... . ., . ..A&:.:.... ..... .. .

...

. .. ...... .

The Chinese, for t h e i r p a r t , t a k e a v e r y c o n s e r v a t i v eview of t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of S o vi e t m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e i n t h ee v e n t of Chinese involvement i n a m i l i t a r y cr is is . I

are t h e s c e p t i c i s m or tn c n i n e s e aD ouro f i g h t on C hi na 's b e h a l f , e s p e c i a l l y i nt h e e v e n t of U.S. involvement i n a m i l i t a r y cr is i s with China.We t h i n k t h a t i t i s almost c e r t a i n t h a t t h e S o v i e t s would n o te n t e r t h e c o n f l i c t on a predetermined bas i s or become auto-mat i ca l ly involved th rough a t r e a t y commitment. The So vie t

1

*The f i r s t t h e a t of t h i s t y pe was made i n a n a r t i c l e byS. T i ta r e n ko i n t h e 16 August 1960 i s s u e of SOVIETSKAYA L A T V I A :Can one imagine a s u c c e s s f u l c o n s t r u c t i o nof social ism i n con temporary condi t ionseven i n such a g r e a t c o u n t r y as , l e t uss a y , C h in a, i f t h i s c ou n t ry w a s i n an iso-l a t e d s i t u a t i o n , n o t su p p o r te d by t h e co-ope ra t i on and m u t u a l h e l p of o t h e r soc ia l -is t c o u n t r i e s ? I t would have been s u b j e c t e dt o an econom ic b l ockade f rom c a p i t a l i s tc o u n t r i e s ; s u c h a coun t ry a t t h e same t i m e

1 would be sub jec ted t o m i l i t a r y blo ws fmmo u t s i d e . I t would have been t r i e d byg r e a t e s t d i f f f c u l t i e s e ve n i n t h e e v e n ti t could wi ths t and th e mad ons l augh t oft h e enemy.

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.. ..

' . ( . ,. . . .... .

d e c i s i o n t o i n t e rvene , and the method of i n t e r v e n t i o n , w i l lmost p ro ba bly depend upon a S o v i e t e v a l u a t i o n of t h e generals i t u a t i o n a t t h e t i m e of t h e c r i s i s . )In t h e c u r r e n t s t a g e of m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s , t h e r e isv e r y l i t t l e m i l i t a r y cand t h e Soviet Union.

II And t h e S o v i e t s ,s i g n i r i c a n t l y h av e do ne n o th i n g (apart from t a k i n g n o t e , i nSoviet propaganda, of Chinese complaints) t o b r i n g a h a l t t oU-3 r econna i s sance f l i g h t s over China. In add i t i on , ev i denceof t h e l a c k of l i a i s o n be tween China and t h e USSR on mattersof m i l i t a r y p o l i c y w a s provided by U l b r i c h t l a s t January a tt h e S i x t h SED Congress. The East German p ar ty c hi ef complained--as no o ther b loc s o u r c e had pr ev iou sly done-- that Chinaf a i l e d t o g i ve advance no t i ce t o t h e bloc of i t s i n t e n t i o n t oa t t a c k I n d i a . (By t h e same t oken t h e Sov i e t s p robab l y d i dno t inform any bloc m e m b e r of t h e i r i n t e n t io n t o move s t r a t e g i cweapons i n t o Cuba.)

2:c). . ......

The q u e s t i o n of d e a l i n g m i l i t a r i l y w i t h t he Chinese~~ ~v" Iu , ~ w;Tl he s u b j e ct h r e a t has not been r a i s ed i n S o vi e t m i l i

aired pu bl i c ly . The absence of any r e fe rence t o t h e Chineseproblem i n t h e a va i l a b le -military a r t i c l e s may beexpla ined by t h e penchant of th e s e c u r i t y - c o n s c i o u s regimeto d i s c u s s d e l i c a t e quest ions--such as t h e Chinese problem,t h e r o l e and c a p a b i l i t i e s of t h e S o v i e t ICBM fo rce , con t i ngencyp l ann i ng f o r l o c a l m i l i t a r y cris i s--only among those ime-d i a t e l y conce rned - - i . e . , those having a "need t o know." I tis a l s o p o s s i b l e t h a t a doc t r i ne has no t been worked o u t , andw i l l no t b e , t h a t is e x p l i c i t l y addressed to t h e Chinese prob-l e m . It may be f e l t t h a t t h i s is s t r i c t l y a p o l i t i c a l ques-t i o n , t h a t doc t r i ne gove rn i ng t h e u s e of forces a g a i n s t t h eWestern a l l i e s may a l so app ly (minus nu cl ea r weapons) t o t h epossible Chinese enemy. (In t h i s r e s pe c t , i t is noteworthy ,

-P ected t o be\

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t h a t p robl em s o f conduc t ing ope r a t i ons i n deser t r eg i onsand i n t h e F ar E a s t , i n g e n e r a l , h av e be en d i s c u s s e d i n t h ed o c t r i n a l mater ia ls .)S t r a t e g y t o Preven t Nuclear/Missi le D i f fus i on

The USSR, i t is c l e a r , has sough t t o preven t t heChinese from becoming a nucl ear power f o r as l o n g as p o s s i b l e .With t h i s o b j e c t i v e , t h e S o v i e t s ha ve n o t g i v e n t h e Ch in es enuclear weapons (or modern d e l v e r v v e h i c l e s ) a nd ,

s t r a t e g i c c on se qu en ce s of t h a t a i d se ve ra l yea r s ago . TheSov i e t s have a l so exp l o red , b u t f o r t h e t i m e be-ing"evidentj lys h e l v e d , t h e i d e a of conclud ing an agreement wi th the U.S.w i t h t h e ob j ec t of p reven t i ng t h e sp read of nuclear weaponst o co un t r i es which do no t now possess them.t h e i r p a r t . h ave p u b li c l y attacked t h e U.S. posit ion--and byimp1 i c a t on t h e Soviet-on a t e s t ban and nu cl ea r non-dif f u-s i o n on t h e g ro un ds t h a t i t is de s igne d t o depr ive China oft h e p o s s i b i l i t y of becoming a nuclear power whi l e p reserv inge x i s t i n g U.S. (and Soviet) m i l i t a r y m i g h t . The C

'

G7ave den ied a idQU U e 3 C p o g r a m ,,d e - e v a l u a t i n g t h e

The Chinese, f o r

Ic + A p r y uuu ui-1 artacisea th S o v i e t s for t h i a t t empt .The appa ren t Sov i e t dec i s i o n no t t o p re s s f o r ag reem en t on anu cl ea r non-di ffus ion pa ct may have been t h e r e s u l t of a

d e c i s i o n t h a t s u c h a pac t would probably no t have any e f f e c ton China a f t e r a l l ; t h a t t h e e s t a b l i s h e d p o l i c y o f d e ny in ga n y S o v i e t a s s i s t a n c e is about a l l t h e USSR can hope t o d o t oslow down the pace of China ' s work i n t h e n u c le a r f i e l d .The Sovie t s have , of course, a l so den i ed t he C h i nesea n y f i n i s h e d m i s s i l e d e l i v e r y s y st e ms of s t r a t eg i c range . I ta p p ea r s i n r e t r o s p e c t , however, t h a t t h e S o v i e t s d i d h e l p t h eC hi ne se t o g e t some kind of a guided m i s s i l e program of f th eg round. The suppo s i t i on t h a t t h e Sov i e t s gave t he C h ineses u b s t a n t i a l a s s i s t a n c e i n t h e i r g uid ed miss i le program isbased mainly on t h e s i m i l a r i t i e s of c e r t a i n C h in es e l a u nc hf a c i l i t i e s t o t h os e i n t h e USSR. Sinc e 1960, th e Chinese' missi le program has progressed very s lowly , ev id en t ly hav ing

been s e t back d r a s t i ca l l y when t h e S o v i e t s w i th d r ew . Whatis more, t h e Sov ie t shave i n t h e p a s t year ev i nced a des i re t op r e v en t t h e C h i ne se f rom a c q u i r i n g s t r a t e g i c m i s s i l e s in t h e

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. .. . . . .

.. ,.

.... . . . . ..' ,. . .,.. . .,..... .._

.. .

f u t u r e th rough i n t e r n a t i o n a l a gr ee me nt . I n t h i s r e s p e c t ,Gromyko's proposal , f i r s t made a t t h e UN in September"1962and r e i n t roduced only l a s t month a t Geneva, that t h e U.S.and USSR agreed t o t h e maintenance between them of a l i m i t e dnumber of missiles fo r a l i m i t e d pe r i od o f t i m e , has s t r o n gant i -Chine se over ton es . By s i ng l i ng o u t t h e U.S. and USSRas t h e o n l y two c o u n t r i e s t o be excepted from t h e p r o v i s i o n sf o r t o t a l d e s t r u c t i o n of d e l i v e r y v e h i c l e s i n S t a ge I ofgenera l d i sa rmament , t h e proposal impl i ed t h a t o ther c o u n t r i e sw i l l no t have t h e i r ow n de fenses a t a t i m e when, presumably,t h e dange r o f pos s i b l e s t r a t e g i c a t t a c k r em ai ns .The S o v i e t s , i n s h o r t , seem t o have concluded t h a tt hey canno t p reven t t h e Chinese f rom acqui r ing a nuclear/mis-

s i l e c a p a b i l i t y ; a l l t hey can hope t o do, it seems, is t od e f e r t h e t i m e when t h e Chinese w i l l r e a l i z e t h i s goal .V a r i o u s S o v i e t s t a t e m e n t s foresee an ea r l y C h inese nuc l ea rexp l os i on ; even o u t s i d e Sov i e t estimates place i t w i t h i nthree y e a r s time.* B u t t h e S o v i e t s e v i d e n t l y ha ve n o t y e tmade adequate p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r t h e a r r i v a l of t h a t momentof t r u t h . Some kind of d e t e n t e w i t h t h e West--perhaps i nt h e form of a disarmament arrangement--may have- app eare d t ot h e S o v i e t s t o be a promising way t o p u t c u r b s on China oncei t becomes a nuclear power. B u t as r e c e n t r e p o r t s have pointedo u t , t h e S o v i e t s a t the disarmament t ab l e are s t i l l ( e a r l y 1963)p e s s i m i s t i c about a breakthrough i n disarmament in the n e a rf u t u r e ; t h e y p o i n t o u t t h a t t h e p o l i t i c i a n s and t h e m i l i t a r yi n t h e USSR m u s t f i r s t reach a common ground before t e c h n i c a lp l a n s for an accomodation w i t h t h e U . S . can even be cons i de red .And, most i m por t an t , epo r t s t h e view ofS o v i e t colleagues t c bU\r u U V A b C 3 U V o t even d i s c us s w ha tw i l l have t o be done w i t h t h e Chinese Communists or Chineser e s i s t a n ce i n t h i s f i e l d , i f t h e accomodat ion point should bereached. ''

There are c o n f l i c t i n g r e p o r t s a bo ut how t h e S o v i e t st h i n k t h e C h i n e s e w i l l ac t once t hev acauire a l i mc a p a b i l i t y .t h e Chinese ...rrr-uvu A c u J . b w n J .

*Statements of t h s sor t may r e f l e c t t a c t i c a l Sov i e t posi -t i on s i n d is armament d i s cu s s i o ns w i t h t h e West.

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. . ... .... . . speak in a more respons ib le fash ion .

Trade and A i d Develouments

The Sovie t po l icy of slowi ng down China 's pr og re sstoward becoming a m i l i t a r y - in d u s t r i a l power h a s b ee n i n f o r c ef o r t h r ee year s now. Sov ie t mi l i t a ry a i d a n d a s s i s t a n c e t oChina is now v e r y s m a l l , a l though no t c u t off a l toge the r :.(An example of t h e e xt r em e ly s e l e c t i v e and l ow -l ev el m i l i t a r ya s s i s t a n c e I\ti na has con- .v i e t t r ade w i t n eninuea t o d e c l i n e . S i o-Soviet t r a de , accord ing t o r e c e n t l yp u b l i s h e d S o v ie t t r a d e f i g u r e s , amounted t o some $600-700m i l l i o n in 1 96 2. T h i s f i g u r e is a t h i r d l e s s t h a n i t was i n1961 and r epr es en ts a two-thirds drop f rom th e peak of $2

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, ..

. .. .. .

.. . . .....-

.. . . .. . ... .

b i l l i o n i n 1959. The S o v i e t s s t i l l s e l l China some petroleumproducts and a few b a s i c he av y i n d u s t r i a l items. B u t e v e n t h i smay go by t h e board .*The Border Problem

Sovie t concern over t h e Sino-Sovie t borde rs long an te -d a t e s t h e ideological polemic between Peiping and Moscow.The So vi e t s s in ce World War I1 have kept s i z e a b l e ground forcesi n s e v e ra l areas near t h e Chinese border--and have s t rengthen edt h o s e f o r c e s in recent yea rs . The Sov ie t s have ev id en t lylong been a w a r e t h a t t h e C h in e se migh t h a b or e x p a n s io n i s tambitions, and have of l a t e been g iven s t r on g reason by t h eChinese t o f e a r and takes i b l e C hi ne se i n c ur s io n i n S o vi e t f r o n t i e r areas. A numberof b o r d e r i n c id e n t s ha ve p r o b ab ly s e r v e d t o he igh ten Sovie tp r e c a u t i o n a r y measures a g a in s t pos-

o f P e i p i n g ' s i n t e n t i o n s . In 1960r e p o r t e d a n i n c u r s io n by armed Chines DIunran-gK ir g i z SSR... I

L

of 1962.

*In March, Ambassador Kohle r repor t)hat China has d e c i d e d not t o make any fu r t he r deb t pay-m e n t s t o t h e USSR and that t h e l a t t e r i n r e tu r n is suspendinga l l t rade r e l a t i o n s . ( Th is r e p o r t has not been confirmed,and seems t o us d o u b t f u l . ) -

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. ... .. . . . .. .

. . .

.'... .

I

Then in M a r c h , Yelp ing openlyPeop l e ' s D a i l y e d i t o r i a l . The e d i t o r i a lused Khrushchev's s a r c a s t i c j i m o u t Chinese cau t ion ind e a l i n g w i t h Hang Kong, Macao, and Taiwan as a peg f o r b i t t e rd i scu s s i on o f t h e " unequal t r ea t i e s " by which t he C h i neseEmpire w a s sho rn o f i ts r i g h t s and t e r r i t o r y . T s a r i s t R u s s i aw a s named as one of t h e o f f end i ng co l o n i a l pow ers, t h e au t ho rof t h r e e of t h e n i ne agreement s sp ec i f i c a l l y m en ti oned . T h i sd i s c u s s i o n w a s fol lowed by a r e s t a t em en t of P e i p i n g ' s declaredi n t e n t i o n t o examine i n good t i m e a l l t re a t i e s concluded bypre vio us Ch inese governments and t o a c c e p t , r e v i s e , o r abroga te' them as i t sees f i t .

The S ov ie ts now mai nta in j u s t under t e n pe rcen t o fcombat-ready forces in t h e F a r E a s t . * Major concen t r a t i onsof g round forc es i n S ino-Sovie t border areas i n c l u d e t h r e eTashkent - A l m a A t a area; t h r e e t a n k a nd t w o r i f l e div%onsi n th e I r k u t s m e z r e c h n a y a area; one Z i f l e and one a i rborned i v i s io n i n t h e Blagoveshchensk-Belogorsk area; and six r i f l ed i v i s i on s i n t h e so u t he rn P r i morsk iy ICray; A t l e a s t some oft h e s e u n i t s seem t o have t r a i n e d f o r t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a tth ey would have to pro tec t S o vi e t t e r r i t o r y f ro m a n a t t a c k bythe Chinese . I t is a l s o noteworthy t h a t t h e Sov i e t s have i n

r i f l e d i v i s i o n s and one a i r b o m i o n n t h e Dush -

*The paragraphs on t h e deployment and exercises of S o v i e tf o r ce s i n t h e F a r E a s t were prepared w i t h t he he l p of t h e' M i l i t a r y D i v i s i on . o f O C I .

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... ... . . . . .. .. ..", . . ..... .. ....... .

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recent months deployed new a i r defense radar u n i t s n e a r t h eManchurian border and along t h e Soviet-Mongolian border . Thisp a t t e r n of deployment re f lec t s a f e l t need in t h e USSR t oi nc rea se cove rage of a ir c r a f t approaching from the d i r e c t o nof China.In March 1962 a Sov i e t f i e l d t r a i n i n g exercise count-ered a n a t t ack from across t h e Manchurian border southwardi n t o t h e Lake Khanka area of t h e Pr imorsk iy Rray. Thi s isan area which R uss i a acqu i r ed by t h e Treaty of Pek i ng i n 1865,which t h e Chinese have th rea ten ed t o abrogate. Because l a r g eSoviet ground force e x e r c i s e s almost i n v a r i a b l y a re conductedon t h e t e r r a i n and a lo n g t h e area a n t i c i p a t e d u n d e r w a r t i m econdi t ions and under as r e a l i s t i c c o n d i t i o n s as p o s s i b l e , i t

appea r s t h a t t h e exercise envi saged a Chinese Communist drivef r o m t h e n o r t h toward Vladivostok. /

1hile t h i s was th e f i r s x r i r ml n u i c a t i o n t h a t t r a i n i n g of h i s scope and na ture takes p l a c e ,there a re sugges t i ons t h a t a w ar i nes s on t h e p a r t of Sov i e tm i l i t a r y p l a n n e r s as t o C hi na' s i n t en t i o ns has ex i s t ed f o rs e v e r a l y e a r s .b r o i l e d i n f r o n t i e r clashes w i t h t h e Soviet Union. Since t h e

I

I t does n o t appear t h a t Pe i p i ng .w i shes t o become e m -s u m m e r of 1962, however, there have been a number of r e p o r t swhich sugges t Pe i p i ng has s t a r te d t o s t r e ng t he n borde r de fensei n t h e key Manchurian area by i n t r o d u c in g t r o o p s where t he r e, had prev i ous l y been on l v D O ~ C

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The Pursu i t of MongoliaWhi le economic and mi l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s between t h e USSRand C hi na ha ve d e t e r i o r a t e d t o t h e e x t e n t of v i r t u a l i s o l a t i o nof China f rom Sovi e t -co nt ro l l ed in t r a -b loc mi l i t a ry and econo-m i c orga n i za t i ons , Sov i e t r e l a t i on s w i t h Mongo lia have t akena s h a r p p o s i t i v e t u r n . I n J u l y 1 96 1, S o v i e t p r es i di u m memberSuslov was s e n t t o a t t end the Mongol i an Par ty Congress , a t 'which he made a r e f e r e n c e t o t h e " f i rm s e c u r i t y " of t h e O u t e rMongolia borders on both t h e Chinese and Soviet s ide s . Int h i s he may have been r ea s su r i n g t h e O u t e r Mongolian Partyt h a t Moscow would not t o l e r a t e Chinese a t t empts a t border ad-jus tme nts . (Chinese Communist maps, u nl ik e So vi et ones , have

p e r s is te n t l y shown t h e Sino-Mongol ia n bord er as undel imi ted. )In June 1962, Mongolia w a s made a f u l l member of CEMA, andt h e r e is some evidence of closer m i l i t a ry t i e s . be t w een Mongo l i aand the Warsaw Pact-although Mongolia has apparen t ly no t beenadmit ted t o f u l l memb ership, e v i d e n t l y f o r r e a s o n s of i t s ve ryd e l i c a t e geograph i ca l pos i t i o n . In Ju l y 1963, Marshal Rokos-sovsky made a p r o tr a c te d v i s i t t o Mongolia t h a t may have hadimpor tan t consequences f o r Soviet-Mongol i a n mi l i t a ry r e l a t io ns .Whi le there is no evidence of a re ce nt re-equipment programf o r t h e Mongolian armed fo rces ( i n t e l l i g e n c e on t h i s s u b j e c tis s p a r s e ) , i t seems l i k e l y t h a t t h e Sov i e t s have t aken s t ep st o s t r e n g t h e n M o ng ol ia 's d e f en s e s . H i n t s of s u c h a c t i o n w e r eheard . i n a Sov i e t b roadcas t of 18 March r e c a l l i n g t h e h i s t o r yof USSR-Mongol ian m i l i t a r y t i e s . The broadcast claimed t h a ti n r e c e n t y e a rs t h e Mongolian army h a s r ece i ved modern a i r c r a f tand ta nk s. Re fl ec t i ng Sovie t concern over Chinese Communistin t en t io ns toward Mongoli a, t h e broa dcas t a l so poin ted o u t t h a tthe Soviet-Mongolian m u t u a l de fense t r e a t y conc luded i n 1946has been An i mp o rt an t f a c t o r i n s a f e g u a r d i ng pe ac e i n t h e FarEast .

IThe Sovie t S t ra t egy of Containment

I t is now c l e a r t h a t t h e USSR w is h es t o c h ec k t h ei nc rea se o f C h inese i n f l uence no t on l y ac ros s t h e f r o n t i e r sof t h e USSR b u t ' i n S outh Asia and Sou t heas t Asia as w e l l . I tis a w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d f a c t t h a t t h e Sov ie t s have f o r some t i m ebeen t ry i n g by a v a r i e t y of means t o wean Communist Nor thKorea and North V i e t n a m away from China, and to i s o l a t e t h e J

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\ I. .. . ,.. . . . . . .. .~ ' ,~ ' . , ,. .. . . ,. .' _ > ,' .. .i

. . . ,

...,. .,

II

connec t ion , i t a l so appears t o be a long-range SovieP b j e c t i v en thisC hi ne se m i l i t a r i l y and e c o n om i ca l ly w i t h i n t h e bloc.t o s u p p o r t t h e growth of l a r g e n e u t r a l i s t c o u n tr i e s i n Asiat h a t could be used as counterweights , ' i n a g e o p o l i t i c a l s e n s e ,t o Chinese power i n t h e area. S o v i e t s u p p o r t t o t h e m i l i t a r ye s t a b l i s h m e n t s of such c o u n t r i e s as Indone s ia and In d ia , w h i l ev a ry i ng g r e a t l y a nd s e r v i n g d i f f e r e n t o b j e c t i v e s , seems t o bedes igned t o s e r v e t h i s o b j e c t i v e as w e l l . R ecen t i nd i ca t i onsof S o v i e t e a g e r n e s s t o r e nd e r m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e t o B u r m aand Cambodia--countries i n which C hi ne se p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e nc ea l r eady p redom inat es - -a re a l so sugg es t i v e of a S o v i e t i n t e r e s ti n improving t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e USSR i n t h e area, a t t h eexpense of t h e C hinese. . S i m i l a r l y , Sov i e t behav i o r in t h e ve rycomplex L a o t i a n s i t u a t i b n may a l s o be s a i d t o have an ti -Ch i neseover tones : to t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e y h av e cooperated i n s po n-s o r i n g t h e presen t a r rangement for govern ing t h e coun t ry , t h eSovie t s have he lped t o f o r e s t a l l what would amount t o a ChineseCommunist takeover of t h e coun t ry .p l y I n d i a w i t h some modern mi l i t a r y equipment--including MIG21's which had been denied t o China--for u s e aga i n s t C h i neseforces i n t h e Ind i an bo rde r d i s p u t e is s e l f - e v i d e n t . To bes u r e , i n s u p p l y in g I n d i a w i t h m i l i t a r y a i d , t h e S o v i e t s areseek i ng t o recoup bloc pres t ige which s u f f e r e d a g e n e r a l r educ-t i o n i n I n d i a as a r e s u l t of t h e m i l i t a r y clashes a l o n g t h eSino-Indian border l a s t f a l l . The S o v i e t s a re s t r o n g l y m oti-vated, f u r t h e r , by a f e l t need t o preven t a d r a s t i c swing onI n d i a ' s p a r t from non-alignment t o closer r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h eU.S. and U.K. But the f a c t remains t h a t t h e S o v i e t t r a n s f e rof weapons t o Ind ia a t a t i m e of c o n f l i c t w i t h China demon-s t r a t e s a d d i t i o n a l l y t h e S o v i e t desire t h a t t h e weapons heused p o l i t i c a l l y or m i l i t a r i l y a ga i n st t h e Chinese, as a r ebu f ft o appa ren t C h inese p re t ens i ons t o p o l i t i c a l hegemony i n t h earea. The f ac t t h a t t h e amount of Soviet m i l i t a r y a i d t o I n d i ais small is no t i m por t an t , it seems t o u s : th e Chinese t h r e a tto I n d i a was i t s e l f s m a l l , f o r t h e Chinese had no i n t e n t i o n

Ihe an t i -C h i nese na t u re of t h e S o v i e t d e c i s i o n t o s u p -*DDI Research S taff Intelligence Memorandum 11-63 of 7 TJanuary 1963, "Pyongyang-Peiping T ie s Tig hte n Under Sov ie tPressure" (TOP SECRET D I N A R ) , d e a l s a t some l e n g t h w i t h S o v i e tat tempts t o w in N ort h Korea away from C h i n a a l t e r n a t e l y bymeans of embel l i shments and t h r e a t s .

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of ove r run i ng Ind i a l a s t October. What does seem impor tan tis t h a t t h e S o v i e t s d e m on st ra te d a n e a r n e s t t o c h ec k the ' ex-pansion of C hi ne se p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e nc e in SoQ,th Asia, n o t i f y -in g Peip ing t h a t Moscow w o u l d n o t t o l e r a t e Chinese hegemonyi n t h a t area._I.. .-.

L i ke Ind i a , Indones i a is a powerful force i n i t s areaof t h e world. The m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h of Indones ia , t h e f i f t hl a r g e s t c o u n t r y in t h e world, is a l r ead y unequaled i n South-e a s t .Asia. And as i n I n di a, t h e S o v i e t s f i n d i n I n do n es i a au s e f u l counterweight t o Chinese in f luence and p o s s i b l e expan-s i o n i s t t e n de n c ie s i n S o u th e as t Asia. The Sovie t dec i s ion t osuppor t t he Suka rno regime and t o b u i l d u p t h e m i l i t a r y estab-l i shment t h e r e , a t ' t h e expense of t h e Communist-ra dical move-ment i n t h a t coun t ry , w a s t aken w i t h a number of o b j e c t i v e sin mind. As is known, t h e Sov ie t s have prov ided Indones iaw i t h a vast amount of m i l i t a r y a i d and a s s i s t a nc e . B eg inni ngi n e a r l y 1 96 1- -a ft er t h e S o v i e t f a l l - o u t w i t h t h e Chinese--theUSSR began t o pour f r s t - l i n e m i l i t a r y equipment i n t o Indones ia ,much t h e same k i nd of equipment s imul t an eous ly be ing i ssue#S o v i e t t r o o p s . I nc lu de d i n t h e m i l i t a r y s h ip m en ts were SAM ' s ,Komar boats and M I G - 2 1 s . Moreover, t h e Sovie t s have beenurg ing t h e Indonesians--who appear t o have reached a s a t u r a -t i o n p o in t , p robably because of t h e grea t cost of t h e pur-chases--to accep t s t i l l greater amounts of m i l i t a r y a i d . Byt h e t i m e of t h e West I r i a n a f f a i r , t h e S o v i e t s had al readyprovided Indones ia w i t h a much grea te r m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t yt h a n needed t o deal w i t h any of h e r ne i ghbor s or even w i t ht h e Dutch.

MAAG program i n I n do n es i a is t h e d e n i a l of t h a t coun t ry t o t h eWest, and i t is probably hoped t h a t Indones i a w i l l a t onep o i n t or ano t he r u s e i t s f o rc e s p o l i t i c a l l y or m i l i t a r i l ya g a i n s t a West e rn a l l i ance member. B ut i t a l s o seems l i k e l yt h a t S o v i e t s t r a t eg i s t s are count ing on Indones ian m i l i t a r ypower being d i r e c t e d p o l i t i c a l l y a nd ev en m i l i t a r i l y a g a in s tChina as w e l l . I t has no doubt been apparent to Sovie t p l an-n e r s t h a t Chinese ambit i ons f o r p o l i t i c a l hegemony th roughoutSoutheas t Asia are p o t e n t i a l l y on a c o l l i s i o n c ou r se w i t hIndones i an expa ns i on i s t de s i gns . Indeed, t h e Sov i e t s havebeen pub l i c l y suppo r t i ng Indones i an oppos i t i on t o the proposedMaylaysian Federat ion and have apparent ly , been p r i v a t e l y e g g i n gt h e Indones i ans t o t a k e ove r Borneo and.Sar awak. The Chinese,on t h e o the r hand, have given only very weak propaganda support

Undoubtedly a major o b j e c t i v e of t h e mass ive Sovie t

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f o r t h e I n d o n es i an p o s i t i o n , h a r b or i n g as t h e y m o s t l i k e l y dograve misg iv ings about increment s i n t h e power and p r e s t i g eof t h e t h i r d l a r g e s t c o u n t r y i n Asia.* (Moreover , t h e wi l l in g-n e s s of t he Indones i ans t o purchase vast amounts of up-to-dateSovi e t m i l i t a ry equipment may have sprung no t on l y f rom ades i re t o posse s s and f l aun t t h e s t a t u s symbols of b i g power,b u t a l so from t h e f ea r t h a t I n d o n e s i a w i l l u l t i m a t e l y h av e t o .d ef en d i t s e l f a g a i n s t C h i n e s e Communist influence o r a t t a c k . ). .. .

T h e r e is y e t another impor tan t an t i -Chinese aspe c t ofA fundamenta l Sovie t s t r a -o v i e t m i l i t a r y a i d t o I nd on es ia .t e g i c requi rement is of course t o prevent China from g a i n i n gp o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l o v er I n do ne si a. We s u r m i s e t ha t China prob-a b l y p r e s e n t s a gre a t e r t h r e a t t o S o vi et i n t e r e s t s in Indo-n e s i a t h a n d o es t h e U ni t ed S t a t e s , and t ha t t h i s t h r e a t w i l l 'i n c r e a s e s h o u l d t h e U.S. mi l i t a ry presenc e in Sou t heas t Asiabe reduced o r -withdrawn i n t h e f u t u r e . Within Indones ia , t heS o v i e t MAAG program is bo l s t e r i ng the government and th em i l i t a r y es t a bl i s hm e n t, t h e l e a d e r s of which a re s t r o n g l yant i-Communis t. Whi le th e Sovie t s a lmost c e r t a in l y hope t opromote pro-Soviet fe e l in gs among th e mi l i t a r y th rough closea s s o c i a t i o n . wi th S o v ie t m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s a nd t r a i n i n g i n t h e

*The s t r o n g e s t s t at em e nt of Chinese sympathy w i t h Indonesianoppos i t i on t o t h e Maylas ian Feder a t ion was made by L i u Shao-c h i d u r i ng h i s r e ce n t v i s i t t o Indones i a and i nco rpo ra t ed i n aj o i n t In do ne si an 4h in es e communique marking t h e conc l u s i on ofh i s t a l k s w i t h Suk arno. B u t t h i s e x pr e ss io n of common viewso n l y p a p e rs o v e r b as i c d i f f e r e n ce s i n t h e n a t io n a l i n t e r e s t sof t h e t w o cou n t r i e s . A ccordi ng t o a 1 9 A p r i l 1963 cable fromAmbassador Jo ne s, voi cedagreement with hi; t h a t t h bu i l t - in antagonisms betweJn Chiese anGIndones i ans would ove r t h e l ong pu l l p reven t r e l a t i on s f rombecoming so close as t o endanger Indones ian independence; andtha t the Indones ians would be more preoccupied over t h e nexty e a r s i n b u i l d i n g R dam against Chinese Communist expansionismra t he r t han i nc rea s i ng t he i r dependency upon t h e Chin ese . Ont h e s u b j e c t of los s of Sov i e t con t r o l of t h e In do ne si an Com-m un is t P a r t y t o t h e C hi ne se , Ambassador Jones no ted

g l n g ' i n c l u s i o n of t h e PIC1 in Sukar no's ca bi ne t .remark th a t So vi et Ambassador Mikhailov w a s

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32/32

.. . T ) II II I

USSR, t h e p o l ic y of s t r en g t h en i n g t h e m i l i t a r y e s t ab l i sh m e n tis bound t o have t he e f f e c t of pos t pon i ng t o a more d i s t a n tf u t u r e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a Communist p a r ty tak eo ver . Indeed,t h e arms g i ven Indones i a can be used a t some p o i nt i n t h efu t u re ag a i n s t t h e Communists i n t h a t c o u n t r y . B u t t h a t isd e s i r a b l e , from t h e s t a nd p o in t of S o vi e t n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s ,f o r th e Communist -radical movement i n In do ne sia is under pre-ponde rant C h inese i n f l uence . T hus, . .i n t h e con t e s t for i n -f l u e n c e i n I n d o n e s ia , t h e S o v i e t s ha ve c h o se n t o combat th eChinese by backing t h e n e u t r a l i s t regime and t h e anti-Communistarmy aga i n s t t h e Indonesi an Communist pa r t y . T h i s s i t ua t i o ncould d e ve l op i n t o o n e of t h e m os t t u rbu l en t pocke t s of t h eSino-Soviet d i s p u t e .

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Caesar 31 - Soviet Military Strategy and the Chinese Problem

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Transcript of Caesar 31 - Soviet Military Strategy and the Chinese Problem