Bioterrorism, Agroterrorism, and Food Safety

Jerry Jaax

Associate Vice Provost for Research Compliance and University Veterinarian

Kansas State University

Association of Food and Drug Officials Annual Conference

Kansas City MO, 8 June 2005

It is a complicated world - and it is shrinking every day

Emerging… or Intentional??

Biological WarfareThe intentional use of micro-organisms or toxins derived from living organisms to produce death or disease in humans,

animals and plants

Bio-terrorism is the random use of these weapons against the public

With the purpose of demoralizing a country, exacting revenge, and/or affecting policy

Potential Targets for Biological Weapons

• Humans– Pathogenic diseases– Vector-borne diseases– Zoonotic diseases– Toxins

• Food• Animals• Plants• Materiel

The Challenge in Talking about Bioterrorism

Striking a balance between:

• alerting and informing the public with a realistic sense of the risk,

without

• exaggerating and arousing harmful or paralyzing fears

Government, Scientists, and the

Press

• No information

• Misinformation

• Differing Agenda

• Different Perspective

• Interpretation

• Ideology

• Dual-use technologies

• Technology explosion

• Intent

Accurate conclusions are difficult!!

Analysis of “Threat Biology” is complex

Information looks different

to different people

Biological Agents as Weapons.

• Sythian arrows dipped in blood of decomposing bodies (400 BC)

• Diseased bodies in water supplies

• Saliva from rabid dogs in artillery shells (Poland, 1650)

• Smallpox infected clothing or blankets

• Nomadic Mongols catapult bubonic plague-infested bodies into the Genoese trading post in the Crimea.

• German Glanders efforts

• Japanese Imperial Units 731 and 100

Excludes “Biocrimes”

• Anthrax mailings

• Ricin mailings

Food and Water Borne Biocrimes(1932 - Present)

‘96 - Diane Thompson--Dallas hospital….Shigella in pastries (12 ill)‘95 - Debora Green---Kansas City….Ricin in meals (1 ill)‘84 - Rajneeshees---Oregon...Salmonella on salad bar (751 ill)‘70 - Eric Kranz---Montreal… Ascriis suum in food (4-5 ill) ------‘66 - Dr. Mitsuru Suzuki---Japan…S. typhi in food (ca.412 ill / 12 dead)‘39 - Kikuko Hirose---Japan…Salmonella in pastries (12 ill)‘36 - Tei-Sabro Takahashi---Japan…Sal. in pastries (10 ill / 4 dead)‘32 - Prince Mikasa---Japan…Cholera in fruit (0 ill)

<1200 ill & 16 dead

• Must be presented as a respirable aerosol

Therefore • Preparation and weaponization may jeopardize viability• Aerosols are dependant on meteorological conditions

However...

• Contagious agents can be delivered without weaponization• Some agents can be spread by vectors

Implications and Constraints for the Bioweaponeer

Courtesy David Franz

Magic Involved

Little or No Magic Involved

Urban Myth: Biologics too sophisticated for terrorist use Reality: Bloody rag, a blender and a highly contagious virus• 1997 - New Zealand farmers illegally introduce rabbit

hemorrhagic disease (RHDV) – calicivirus • Circumvented one of the best bio-security systems in the world

Virus entered 3 ways: mailed into the country in a vial Carried in a vial placed in an air travelers sock Carried in a handkerchief drenched in blood/tissues from infected rabbit

Infected rabbits - lungs, spleen, and liver Used kitchen blender to make slurry to mix with rabbit

food Not a human pathogen

Possible Indicators of a BW/BT Attack

• Disease entity not naturally-occurring in the area

• Multiple disease entities in same patients (mixed agent attack)

• Large # of military and civilian casualties (inhabit same area)

• Data suggestive of a massive point source outbreak

• Apparent aerosol or cutaneous route of invasion

• High morbidity and mortality relative to # at risk

• Localized or circumspect area for illness

• Low attack rates for personnel working with filtered air or closed ventilation systems

• Dead sentinel animals of multiple species

• Absence of a competent natural vector in area of outbreak

• Severe disease in previously healthy population

• "biological weapons can be delivered by a few

• present a small signature for which the U.S. has ill-developed intelligence gathering capability

• conventional concepts of deterrence are not necessarily effective

• the nation has a limited response capability to contain the consequences."

Defense Science Board July 2002

Biodefense is the "single most significant modern challenge to U.S. sovereignty"

Recommended quadrupling the DoD biodefense budget

"Biology is about to lose its innocence in a profound way. While physics dominated weapons in the 20th century, biology will dominate weapons in the 21st"

George Poste

Defense Science Board

The Dark Side of Biotechnology

• “Constructed” polio virus (3 years)

• Virus (Phi X174) built from scratch in 2 weeks (DOE funded project)

• Mouse Pox “super virus”

• Camelpoxvirus is the causative agent of Camelpox • Causes Pox disease in dromedary camels - Africa and Asia

• Iraqi BW lab with genetic engineering capability admittedly worked with the agent

Prudence or Paranoia???

WHY???

• Primary human pathogen in non-endemic area?

• Genetic modification as BW agent?

• Lab surrogate for Variola?

• Worried about Camels??

Biowarfare in the Former Soviet Union

• Dr. Ken Alibeckov - Biopreparat

• Defected from the FSU - wrote “Biohazard”

• Defined the scope of the FSU bio programs

• Tens of thousands scientists and technicians

• Thousands involved in Offensive Agricultural BW programs

• Strategic as well as Tactical Doctrine

Potential proliferation of expertise, technology, agents

The Crux of the Proliferation Problem

"If you are not financially independent, it influences your moral decision-making."

Daan Goosen, former managing director of Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (RRL) in South Africa

Russian scientists make an average of $1,644 yearly ($137/mo); the U.S. Labor Department puts the average annual salary for an American scientist at $59,200.

Chicago Tribune 2004

''We stockpiled hundreds of tons of anthrax and dozens of tons of plague and smallpox near Moscow and other Russian cities for use against the United States and its allies''

Soviet defector Colonel Kanatjan Alibekov, MD

Biopreparat's deputy chief (1992)

Alibek predicts in “Biohazard” that the threat of biological attack has actually increased as techniques developed in the USSR have ''spread to rogue regimes and terrorist groups . . . they are cheap, easy to make , and easy to use

One gram, or one twenty-eighth of an ounce, high-grade anthrax can hold up to 100 billion spores. Estimated conservatively, at 10,000 spores to a lethal dose, one gram in theory could cause about 10 million deaths

Anthrax Spores

Ken Alibek

Anthrax

Pulmonary (aerosol) 80%

Cutaneous (contact) 20% Gastro-intestinal (oral)

**Not contagious from one individual

to the other

• Spore form is Spore form is extremely stableextremely stable• Inhalational disease highly lethalInhalational disease highly lethal• Starter cultures widely availableStarter cultures widely available• Weaponized Weaponized by all major by all major

offensive BW programsoffensive BW programs• Susceptible populationSusceptible population

ATLANTA, Mar 20, 2002 (BW HealthWire) – “Pneumonic plague.. has the dubious distinction of placing high on the CDC list of agents that could be deployed as a bioterror weapon, according to a report in the March 20 Bioterror Medical Alert.”

Plague

“While experts note that an aerosolized release of plague would not cause a massive epidemic akin the 14th century "Black Death" scourge that killed tens of millions, a 50-kilogram release of pneumonic plague over a large city could infect 150,000, causing 36,000 fatalities.

Ricin is a stable toxin easily made from the mash that remains after processing Castor beans for oil. Castor beans are grown agriculturally worldwide and the plants grow wildly in arid parts of the United States. Castor beans are slightly larger than pinto beans and have been described as looking like blood-engorged ticks. The beans are not normally used as food.

No Known Treatment Available – Supportive Care only

Poisoning can occur following inhalation, ingestion, or injection of ricin toxin from castor beans.

Deadly in less than milligram amounts

• Moderately toxic by inhalationModerately toxic by inhalation• Relatively not toxic orallyRelatively not toxic orally• Somewhat difficult to formulate as powderSomewhat difficult to formulate as powder• Quite stableQuite stable• Dose-dependant morbidityDose-dependant morbidity• Castor beans Castor beans widely available and popularwidely available and popular• Weaponization attempted by US, USSR and IraqWeaponization attempted by US, USSR and Iraq

Smallpox (Variola major)

• Highly contagiousHighly contagious (not (not ‘extremely’)‘extremely’)

• Quite stableQuite stable• ca. 30% mortalityca. 30% mortality• Virus not widely availableVirus not widely available• WeaponizedWeaponized by the USSR by the USSR• Susceptible populationSusceptible population• No animal reservoirNo animal reservoir

• More historical deaths than plague and all wars combined

• In some ancient cultures, naming infants forbidden prior to smallpox survival

• 18th century, smallpox killed every 10th child born in Sweden and France, every 7th child in Russia

• 1949 - Last U.S. case

• 1977 - Last natural case

“My most successful research was the finding that a bacteria called Legionella could be modified in such a way that it could induce severe nervous system disease. And the symptoms of nervous disorders [similar to those of multiple sclerosis] would appear several days after the

bacterial disease was completely "cured." So there would be no bacterial agent, but symptoms -- new and unusual

symptoms -- would appear several days later”.

NOVA interview with former Soviet biowarrior

Sergei Popov

What About Engineered Pathogens

The Biological Threat has Evolved

Cold War

Gulf War Today… and Tomorrow??Dissolution of USSR

“Terrorist” use against military, population centers, and economic/agricultural infrastructure

Tactical use on battlefield

….and strategic use against mainland U.S.

Geopolitical “Asymmetry has changed the face of the game. The U.S. has few or no “near-peers” for conventional forces

Courtesy David Franz

Diseases often mentioned in the context of Biological Warfare

Human Diseases

• Smallpox• Cholera

• Shigellosis

Zoonoses

• Anthrax• Brucellosis

• Coccioidomycosis

• VEE/EEE/WEE

• Marburg/Ebola

• Histoplasmosis

• Rift Valley fever

• Melioidosis

• Glanders

• Plague

• Psittacosis

• Q fever

• Tularemia

• Lassa fever

Animal Diseases

• African Swine Fever

• ** Foot & Mouth

• Fowl plague

• Newcastle

• Rinderpest

Plant Diseases

• Wheat Stem Rust

• Rice Blast

• Pathogenic Plant Fungi

• Karnal Bunt

• Botulism

• SEB

• Ricin

Toxins

Courtesy David Franz

“CDC List”Category A• Anthrax

• Plague

• Smallpox

• Tularemia

• Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers

• Marburg

• Ebola

• Lassa

• Machupo

Category B• Brucellosis

• Epsilon Toxin (C. Perfringens)

• Food and water safety threats• Salmonella, E. coli O157:H7, Shigella, Vibrio,

Cryptosporidium

• Glanders

• Meliodosis

• Psittacosis

• Q Fever

• Ricin

• SEB

• Typhus• Viral encephalitities (VEE/EEE/WEE)

Category C• Emerging diseases

• Nipah

• Hantavirus

• Yellow Fever

• Drug resist TB

• etc

http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist.asp

High Priority Lower Priority

Categorizations based on various factors that affect

potential as weapons

“OIE List A” Animal Diseases

• Foot and Mouth Disease• Rinderpest

• Pest des petis ruminants

• Hog Cholera

• African Swine Fever

• Swine Vesicular Disease

• Vesicular Exanthema

• African Horse Sickness

• Exotic Newcastles

• Avian Influenza (HPIA)

• Sheep and Goat Pox

• Lumpy Skin Disease

• Rift Valley Fever

• Vesicular Stomatitis

Transmissible diseases with potential for serious and rapid spread that are of serious socio-economic or public

health consequence and major importance in international trade of animals and animal products.

80% of “Category A” agents are zoonotic

“Category A” agents

• Pose a significant risk to national security because:

• easily transmitted from person to person

• high mortality

• require special efforts to ensure preparedness

                                       

  

The Risk is Agent, Target, and Delivery

Dependent

The Silent Enemy

BW Attack

Incubation Period

Clinical Signs

Mass Casualties

The longer a BW attack goes

undetected or unrecognized, the

more serious it becomes.

Prevention

Impact

Early detection and effective

intervention is critical

Emerging or Intentional Disease Event

Dick and Jane from Kansas City just returned from travel in the UK and introduced Foot and Mouth Disease into the massive food animal economy of the United States.

Or were they Terrorists intent on damaging the U.S?

Was this an innocent mistake?

Its not about killing cows!!

An economic assault on our national security and infrastructure

Why Agricultural Targets ??

The Great Engine of Our Prosperity

…Our ability to produce safe, plentiful, and inexpensive food creates the discretionary spending that drives the American standard of living…. Dr. Jon Wefald

President KSU

Homeland Security Presidential Directive #9

30 Jan 04

• The U.S. will protect the agriculture and food system from terrorist attack, major disasters, and other emergencies by:

• Identifying and prioritizing sector-critical infrastructure and key resources for establishing protection requirements

• Developing awareness and early warning capabilities to recognize threats

• Mitigating vulnerabilities at critical production and processing nodes

• Enhancing screening procedures for domestic and imported products

• Enhancing response and recovery procedures

…..a successful attack on the United States agriculture and food system could have catastrophic health and economic

effects.

"Biological agents that could be used to harm crops or livestock are widely available and

pose a major threat to U.S. agriculture."

Harley Moon, co-author

Both primary authors of the report said a biological attack on U.S. agriculture was a

matter of “when - not if.”

NRC Report to the USDA on Vulnerability of U.S. Agriculture,

20 Sept 2002

Mad Cow Disease (BSE)

Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD)

Agroterrorism Threats / Agents?

Highly contagious virus (days) Slow-acting prion (years)Aerosol transmission & fomites Infected tissues in foodNot zoonotic Zoonotic (vCJD)

Widely available Rare – hard to findCause epidemic Isolated cases or clustersMass depopulations Limited depopulationsSignificant economic impact Significant economic impactRequire no delivery system Require thoughtful delivery

#1 Agroterrorism threat Improbable terrorism threat

Regional concentration magnifies vulnerabilities and potential consequences.

Dairy Beef Swine

Corn WheatPoultry

http://www.nass.usda.gov/census/census97/atlas97/

Potential Impacts of Foreign Animal Disease on Industry

• Productivity losses

• Decreases in market prices

• Value of animals destroyed

• Vaccination costs

• Carcass disposal costs

• Cleanup and disinfection costs

• Profit losses

Direct Impacts

Council for Agricultural Science and Technology, Number 28, Feb 2005

Potential Impacts of Foreign Animal Disease on Industry

Indirect Impacts

• Loss of exports and foreign demand

• Loss of domestic sales / demand

• Loss of competitive position domestic/export markets

• Costs to rebuild production capabilities

• Decreased demand for services (processing / marketing / etc.

• Emotional / psychological trauma

Council for Agricultural Science and Technology, Number 28, Feb 2005

“Prior to September 11, 2001, all known victims of criminal use of biological agents in the U.S. were exposed by the oral route - with

food as the vehicle”David Huxsoll, DVM, Ph.D.

KVMA, Jan 02

In the 1980’s, the Rajneeshee cult contaminated salad bars with

Salmonella typhimurium in an effort to influence a local election in Oregon

• 751 known cases of GI disease

• a more virulent strain (S. typhi could have caused many deaths

Informant cracked the case!!

"If that hideousness (FMD) came here, it wouldn't be any more hideous for the animals — they are all bound for a ghastly death anyway. But it would wake up consumers. I openly hope that it comes here. It will bring economic harm only for those who profit from giving people heart attacks and giving animals a concentration camp-like existence. It would be good for animals, good for human health and good for the environment.“

ABCnews.com 4/2/2001

Ingrid Newkirk, PETA President and Co-founder

“I don't think you'd have to kill too many [researchers]. I think for five lives, 10 lives, 15 human lives, we could save a million, 2 million, 10 million non-human lives.”

Jerry Vlasak, MD, Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine (PCRM) spokesman at an animal rights convention

The Observer, July 25, 2004 (UK)

“If vivisectors were routinely being killed, I think it would give other vivisectors pause in what they were doing in their lives… Call it political assassination or what have you…”

“Would I advocate taking 5 guilty vivisector’s lives to save 100’s of

millions of innocent animal lives? Yes I would.”

Development and testing of biodefense and emerging disease countermeasures rely heavily on

animal-based research

Texas Tech professor found not guilty of smuggling plague samples, but guilty of fraud and improper shipping John Dudley Miller

Physician

Respected researcher

Family man

Convicted felon

Terrorist?

Scapegoat?

60 FBI agents on campus

• Lost his job and his medical license.

• 24 months in prison.

• Fined $15K & $38K restitution.

At least 11,600 tons of illegal bush meat, including monkey, rat, bat, gorilla, camel and elephant, were smuggled into Britain during 2003, exposing cattle to a range of infectious diseases, including foot and mouth. The extent of the illegal trade in meat from Africa, Asia and the Middle East is revealed in an internal government report (Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs UK), which says that the problem is far worse than had been thought. Almost all of the meat, which is bound for street markets and ethnic restaurants, is hidden in passengers' suitcases and goes undetected by airport security. The food includes snake and antelope meat, frogs' legs, snails, and cows‘ nostrils, as well as meat from endangered species such as chimpanzees, antelopes and elephants.

The Telegraph 5 Sept 04

Oh waiter, there seems to be a rock (python) in my soup!

How are we going to counter these new and ominous threats to our national security, our people, or our economic infrastructure

We must Improve and Refine Traditional Countermeasures to potential emerging Public Health Threats

Virtually all are dependent upon $$, facilities and personnel

• Intelligence / Surveillance / Catch the Bad Guys!!

• Vaccines, Prophylaxis, Treatments

• Disease Surveillance

• Genetic enhancement of resistance

• Rapid diagnostic capabilities

• Rapid - Incident Response

• Consequence Management

• Enhance Surge Capacity

• Training

• Increase Bio-security Profile

• Innate Immunity Ramp-up

Government

Industry Academia

A coordinated and collaborative partnership is critical

Basic and Applied R&D

Federal

State

Local

Biological Threat Countermeasures

• Vaccines

• Prophylaxis

• Treatments

•Enhanced resistance

• Coordination / Training

• Biosecurity

• Response & Preparation

• Containment

• Decontamination

• Disposal

• Indemification

• Incident Management

• Consequence Management

• Intelligence

• Risk Assessment

• Surveilance

• Regulatory Safeguards

before

after

Big $$

Bigger $$

Attack

Reactive Measures

Proactive Measures

The overall risk of some kind of bioterrorist event in the U.S. in

the future is probably high

Individual Risk is Extremely Low

However…..

“When you hear hoof beats, don’t look for Zebras”

We need to at least be thinking about the “zebras” when it comes to surveillance, diagnostics, and response

• Agriculture generates 17% of U.S. GDP & 13% of U.S. jobs• Livestock and cropping systems are interdependent - e.g., an

attack on either beef or corn affects the other

• Failures would cause widespread international disruption

Potential Consequences of Agroterrorism are High.

Foot and mouth disease in the UK cost an estimated $5B to agriculture alone. Tourism losses wre an additional $7.2B - $8.5B. http://www.defra.gov.uk

http://www.whale.to/m/fmd70.html

• West Nile

• Nipah Disease

• Prion Diseases

• Avian Influenza

• Exotic Newcastles

• SARS

• Marburg / Ebola

• Etc, etc, etc…

Doesn’t have to be intentional to be serious!

The Good News• Heightened Awareness

• Accelerated / Applied Research• New Facilities

• Rapid Diagnostics

• First Response capabilities

• Countermeasures (vaccines, treatments, containment strategies)

• Pre-positioned materials/teams (vaccines, treatments, PPE)

• Better Planning, Coordination, Communication and Training

• Improved Intelligence, Security and Surveillance

• Reinvigorating Public Health Infrastructure

• Government Reorganization (Homeland Defense Dept)

The Defense Science Board estimates that we have only a few of the dozens of antidotes or vaccines

needed to counter the top bioterror threats”

“After successful prevention, the next line of defense is the development of new vaccines

and antidotes for bioterror”

Christian Science Monitor 11 Feb 2003

The Bad News

• The U.S. has been highly successful in preventing the natural or accidental introduction of many dangerous agricultural diseases for generations

• Foot and Mouth Disease

• Rinderpest

• African Swine Fever

• Containment and response strategies for those diseases that do occasionally occur have been effective - but costly

• Avian Influenza

• Exotic Newcastle disease

• VEE

• Classical Swine Fever (Hog Cholera)

Agriculture Seduced by our Successes

Historical accomplishments can promote complacency and a sense of invulnerability in the face of new potential threats

The dual threat of emerging and intentionally inflicted disease is frightening, but there is “cause for some cautious optimism.” Scientists have an “ever-growing toolbox of sophisticated technologies and strategies at their disposal that will help detect, prevent, treat, and respond to new and old infectious agents as they emerge, whether by an act of nature or by deliberate design.”

Cautious Optimism??

Forensics & Countermeasures

Anthony Faucci MD, NIAID/NIH

Emerging Infectious Diseases/ A Clear and Present Danger to Humanity,

JAMA. 2004;292:1887-1888.

“… powerful new tools, including ones that expose the genetic signature of microbes, are being used to detect and identify known and novel pathogens and to develop new drugs and vaccines.”

"For the life of me, I cannot understand why the terrorists have not attacked our food

supply, because it is so easy to do”

Resignation comments - Tommy Thompson, Secretary of Health and Human Services

December 3, 2004

The Daunting Challenges

• Endemic Infectious Disease

• Emerging Infectious Disease

• Exotic / Foreign Disease

• Prion Disease

• Food Safety Human Animal Plant

Bioterroris

m / Agroter

rorism