Bill.bastedo

Bill BastedoJohn Williams

February 26, 2008

How the Lessons Learned on Other Government Space Programs Apply to NASA’s Constellation Program

NASA Project Management Challenge

This document is confidential and is intended solely for the use and information of the client to whom it is addressed.

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How the Lessons-Learned on Other Government Space Programs Apply to NASA’s Constellation ProgramNASA Project Management Challenge

IntroductionOver the past decade, there have been significant shifts in the nation’s Space Industrial Base (SIB) and consequently its collective ability to support national space programs of all types

These shifts are in response to various stimuli – including trends in government contracting –that simultaneously enable and constrain the kinds of support NASA can expect to receive for the Constellation Program

Understanding the characteristics of the SIB landscape is critical for leaders in NASA and industry alike

A number of systematic studies have been performed to determine critical success factors of complex programs in the National Security Space (NSS) sector, as well as to determine key reasons why space programs fail in an attempt to formulate and manage more successful programs in the future– The key findings of these studies are presented and discussed in terms of their applicability

to the Constellation Program

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Table of Contents

Environment

Space Industrial Base Studies

Space Acquisition Studies

Relevance to NASA

Backups

3


Industrial Base Environment – Aerospace Industry Consolidation

L o r a l S p a c e & C o m m u n i c a t i o n s

Def

. Ele

ctro

nics

& S

ys. I

nt.

G e n e r a l D y n a m i c s ( F t . W o r t h )

S a n d e r s A s s o c i a t e s

M E L D e f e n s e S y s t e m s

L o c k h e e d

G E A e r o s p a c e

G o u l d ( O c e a n S y s t e m s )

G e n e r a l D y n a m i c s ( S p a c e S y s t e m s )

M a r t i n M a r i e t t a

C o m s a t

L o c k h e e d M a r t i n1 9 9 5

G o o d y e a r A e r o s p a c e

F a i r c h i l d W e s t o n S y s t e m s

B D M I n t e r n a t i o n a l

H o n e y w e l l ( E l e c t r o - O p t i c s )

L T V ( M i s s i l e s )

L i b r a s c o p e

U n i s y s ( D e f e n s e S y s t e m s – P a r a m a x )

I B M F e d e r a l S y s t e m s

L o r a l

1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 2 0 0 0

1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5

F o r d A e r o s p a c e

1 9 9 0

O r i n c o n C o r p o r a t i o n I n t e r n a t i o n a l

2 0 0 3

O A O C o r p o r a t i o n

2 0 0 1

A f f i l i a t e d C o m p u t e r S e r v i c e s ( F e d e r a l S y s t e m s )

1 9 9 3

G E A i r c r a f t E n g i n e C o n t r o l s

1 9 9 4

1 9 9 3

E l e c t r o n i c a n d C o n t r o l S y s t e m s ( t o B A E )

L - 3 C o m m u n i c a t i o n s C o r p .

1 9 8 6 1 9 9 1

1 9 8 8

1 9 9 11 9 8 7 1 9 9 21 9 8 9

1 9 8 8

1 9 9 6

L i t t o n P r e c i s i o n G e a r

A r g o S y s t e m s

H u g h e s H e l i c o p t e r s

M c D o n n e l l D o u g l a s

A u t o m e t r i c

R o c k w e l l I n t e r n a t i o n a l ( A e r o s p a c e )

H u g h e s E l e c t r o n i c s S a t e l l i t e

J e p p e n s e n S a n d e r s o n

B o e i n gB o e i n g 1 9 9 7

R o c k e t d y n e ( t o U T C )

2 0 0 01 9 9 6 2 0 0 51 9 9 51 9 8 7

1 9 8 4

G D , C o n v a i r , A i r c r a f t S t r u c t u r e s U n i t

1 9 9 4

A s t r o T e c h ( t o S p a c e H a b )

N e w p o r t N e w s S h i p p i n g

A l l e g h e n y T e l e d y n e - R y a n A e r o n a u t i c a l

N o r t h r o p

L o g i c o n

G r u m m a n

T R W

N o r t h r o p G r u m m a n

G e n e r a l I n s t r u m e n t , D e f e n s e

S t e e r a g e C o r p . / S p e r r y M a r i n e , I n c .

P R C , I n c .

V a r i a n ( S o l i d S t a t e E l e c )

G e n C o r p , A e r o j e t G e n e r a l , E l e c t r o n i c s a n d I n f o r m a t i o n S y s t e m s ( E I S )

A v o n d a l e I n d u s t r i e s

G e o d y n a m i c s

L i t t o n I n d u s t r i e s

1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7

T A S C , I n c .

1 9 9 1

S c a l e d C o m p o s i t e s

W e s t i n g h o u s e , E l e c t r o n i c S y s t e m s G r o u p

H a r n i s c h f e g e r I n d u s t r i e s – S y s c o n C o r p o r a t i o n

2 0 0 1

C o m p t e k R e s e a r c h , I n c .

2 0 0 0

F e d e r a l D a t a C o r p o r a t i o n

C o m p u t e r A s s o c i a t e s / S t e r l i n g S o f t w a r e - F e d e r a l S y s t e m s G r o u p

V o u g h t C o r p . / L T V – L T V A i r c r a f t D i v i s i o n

1 9 9 4

H a d s o n C o r p o r a t i o n – U l t r a s y s t e m s D e f e n s e

1 9 9 1 1 9 9 61 9 9 5

D P C T e c h n o l o g i e s

I n t e r - N a t i o n a l R e s e a r c h I n s t i t u t e ( I N R I )

1 9 9 9 2 0 0 7

1 9 8 2

E s s e x C o r p .

X o n T e c h , I n c .

2 0 0 32 0 0 2

1 9 9 81 9 9 6 1 9 9 9

C e s s n a ( t o T e x t r o n )C e s s n a A i r c r a f t

K - C A v i a t i o n

G T E ( G o v e r n m e n t S y s t e m s C o r p )

G a l a x y A e r o s p a c e

B a t h I r o n W o r k s

G u l f s t r e a m A e r o s p a c e

G e n e r a l D y n a m i c sG e n e r a l D y n a m i c s

M o t o r o l a ( I n t e g r a t e d I n f o r m a t i o n S y s t e m s G r o u p )

T e l e d y n e ( V e h i c l e S y s t e m s D i v i s i o n )

L o c k h e e d M a r t i n ( D e f e n s e S y s t e m s & A r m a m e n t S y s t e m s )

C e r i d i a n ( C o m p u t i n g D e v i c e s I n t e r n a t i o n a l )

L u c e n t ( A d v a n c e d T e c h n o l o g y S y s t e m s )

N a t i o n a l S t e e l a n d S h i p b u i l d i n g C o ( N A S S C O )

1 9 9 7

V e r i d i a n C o r p o r a t i o n

2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4

E n g i n e e r i n g T e c h n o l o g y I n c .

2 0 0 6

A n t e o n I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o r p .

S p e c t r u m A s t r o

2 0 0 1

P r i m e x T e c h n o l o g i e s

1 9 9 9

1 9 9 8

1 9 9 81 9 9 61 9 9 51 9 8 51 9 8 51 9 8 2

C h r y s l e r D e f e n s e

1 9 9 2

E - S y s t e m s

B r i t i s h A e r o s p a c e , C o r p o r a t e J e t s

T e x a s I n s t r u m e n t s , D e f e n s e

A T K M a r i n e S y s t e m s G r o u p

C h r y s l e r T e c h A i r b o r n e

R a y t h e o nR a y t h e o n

R e d i f f u s i o n S i m u l a t i o n , L t d .

H u g h e s A i r c r a f t

M a g n a v o x E l e c t r o n i c s

G e n e r a l D y n a m i c s M i s s i l e O p e r a t i o n s

G M , D e l c o

C A E I n d u s t r i e s

J P S C o m m u n i c a t i o n s , I n c .

2 0 0 2 2 0 0 7

R a y t h e o n A i r c r a f t b e c o m e s H a w k e r B e e c h c r a f t

1 9 9 61 9 9 3 1 9 9 8

1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7

M / A - C O M T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s

1 9 8 8 1 9 9 5

Hug

hes

Airc

raft

1 9 9 7

1 9 9 7

A l l i e d S i g n a l , C o m m u n i c a t i o n s S y s t e m s

L i n k

C A E - L i n k1 9 8 8

1 9 9 2

1 9 9 5

G M , H u g h e s E l e c t r o n i c sH u g h e s S p a c e a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n s ( t o B o e i n g )

H u g h e s E l e c . ( t o N e w C o r p )

2 0 0 0 2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

P a n A m S a t ( t o K K R )

F l i g h t S i m & T r a i n i n g ( t o L - 3 )

H u g h e s N e t w o r k S y s t e m s ( t o S k y T e r r a )

2 0 0 6

2000s1990s1980s

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Industrial Base EnvironmentTo deal with excess capacity in the 1990s and early 2000s, industry underwent a series of mergers and acquisitions– Only a handful of primes remain, limiting competition. Primes were deep in debt due to this

consolidation activity, but have experienced strong recent recovery due to increased defense spending

– Similar reductions occurred in the sub-tier. In some cases, critical sub-tier suppliers with unique expertise and capability were lost or put at risk

The challenging financial situation, combined with a smaller number of Government procurements, led to “must win” behavior in industry– Competing successfully on major programs became “life or death” for industry, resulting in

extreme optimism in the development of cost estimates and program plans– This cost optimism had at least one surprising consequence – during one stretch, the

incumbent was unseated all but once in a series of over two dozen competitions (the incumbent retained in one instance only via a protest)

Industry also has dealt with an aging of the aerospace workforce, challenges getting certain skills, and new worker recruitment and retention

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National Security Space EnvironmentAll major National Security Space (NSS) missions undergoing upgrades this decade and next– Characterized by small numbers of large, expensive, multi-mission systems optimized for

mission assurance and acquired via long development timelines

Congress and the Defense & Intelligence leadership have lost confidence in the NSS acquisition community due to cost and schedule overruns in numerous programs. This was primarily a result of:– Acquisition reform of the 1990s and inadequacy of the Total System Performance

Responsibility (TSPR) approach– Reduction in Government acquisition workforce size compounded by an aging workforce– Inadequate cost estimation by both Government and industry

Recent Government responses have included:– “Back-to-Basics” block approach for acquisition of NSS systems– Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) program initiation– Cost estimating improvements, to include a Joint Government/Aerospace Industries

Association (AIA) permanent council tasked with improving the fidelity of cost estimates on military space programs

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28%

72%

Typical DoD Life Cycle Cost Curve Typical Space Life Cycle Cost Curve

~ 30%

~ 70%

System Development

& LRIP

Production, Operations & Support

Operations & Support

System Acquisition

MS “A” MS “B” MS “C” KDP “A” KDP “B” KDP “C”

Life Cycle Curve DSMC Acq Log Guide 1997 Notional Life Cycle Curve

DoD and Space Systems Life Cycle Comparison – Space Systems Acquisition Unlike Typical Government Programs

Source: Gen. Lance W. Lord, AFSPC, “Space Acquisitions: Achievements & Challenges,”May 24, 2005

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Table of Contents

Environment



Relevance to NASA

Backups

8


Space Industrial Base Studies2000 – Space Industrial Base Study (SIBS): Assessed the sufficiency of the space industrial base to meet national security requirements over the next 15 years

2002 – Space Research & Development Industrial Base Study (SRDIBS): Assessed if the R&D sector of the SIB was sufficient to preserve space technology leadership

2004 – Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Industrial Base: Determined composition and sufficiency of the current and projected solid rocket motor industrial base to meet the national security requirements for the next 6-10 years and if there will be adequate industry competition

2004 – Enabling Assured Access to Space: Assessed the DoD’s plans and investments needed to better support “assured access to space” (i.e. achieving mission capabilities on orbit, enabling space operations)

2006 – ICBM Industrial Base: Quantitative assessment of the investment required to maintain or reconstitute the capabilities of the ICBM industrial base in various scenarios

2007 – Space Industry Export Control Impact Assessment: Assessed the impact of U.S. export controls on the health, competitiveness, and ability of the U.S. SIB to continue to support NSS requirements

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Industrial Base FindingsSIB can support the national security community’s near-term requirements, beyond that there could be challenges in areas such as technological superiority and workforce

The base will continue to experience mergers, consolidations, and exits – especially at sub-tier levels. Sub-tier suppliers are having problems due to low demand for components, particularly those that are space-qualified

The nature of the base has changed dramatically over the past decade, evidenced by a shift in roles matched by a shift in Independent Research and Development (IRAD) investment. Primes now focus primarily on system integration with IRAD focused on integration innovation and doing less internal technology development. – In contrast, the sub-tier suppliers are the source of technology innovation, outspending the

primes 3-to-1 in IRAD

Export controls have had marginal financial impact to the SIB but had serious unintended consequences in that a large part of the base no longer engages overseas and significant foreign competition has sprung up

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Industrial Base FindingsCommercial sector– Expected demand in the commercial sector never materialized in the late 1990s, leaving the

Government to bear the burden of maintaining the industrial base in the first part of this decade

– Recent years have seen a significant resurgence in the commercial marketplace – in the satellite communications, remote sensing/imagery, and especially in commercial services

– New, exciting potential for growth exists with the many “New Space” firms

The U.S. base of human capital and knowledge is declining and is underscored by a lack of opportunities to grow future generations via sufficient space program experience– The Government and industry face challenges in finding and retaining high-quality program

management leaders and workers due to declining funding and fewer program opportunities

The relationships between industry, academia, and government are “sub-optimal” and analysis identified ways in which the various sectors had become more adversarial and often competed in non-traditional ways, with a blurring of the “lanes,” or roles, they played– This shifting generally was to compete for funding and retain relevance in a tough

environment

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Industrial Base RecommendationsFocus on retention of U.S. space technological leadership– Requires increased cross-sector Government attention, commitment, coordination, and

integrated planning & execution to achieve and maintain

Effective relationships between the stakeholders in the space industrial base are key if the U.S. is to remain technologically competitive– Recreate partnership with industry while maintaining sufficient competition

Increase industrial base knowledge in acquisition strategy development and execution– Consider methods to develop and manage source selection strategies toward a vision of a

sustainable and competitive industry structure– Consider methods to create more stable program time lines, multi-year funding or multi-year

programs– Government must ensure sub-tier viability and competition. The range of options include both

partnership (direct investment) and competition (monitoring of prime make-buy decisions and sub-tier competitions)

– Direct investment, at all industry tiers, may occur for reasons such as to sustain RDT&E technical competition, maintain current capacity, or to increase independent cutting edge research

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Table of Contents

Environment



Relevance to NASA

Backups

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Space Acquisition Studies2002 – Space Systems Development Growth Analysis (SSDGA): Qualitative assessment based on interviews and a quantitative assessment based on a review of SBIRS-HI, AEHF, GPS-III. Developed an understanding of why development growth occurs. Determined whether the government is facing a systemic challenge or isolated events. Developed options that the government should consider to improve space system acquisition.

2003 – Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (DSB/AFSAB) Joint Task Force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs: Assessed why cost growth and schedule delays occur, considering all aspects of the acquisition process. Assessed the space industrial base and the government’s role, as well as examining the US national security dependence on space.

2006 – Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA) Project: An integrated acquisition assessment considering every aspect of acquisition, including requirements, organization, legal foundations, decision methodology, oversight, and checks and balances, and developed a recommended acquisition structure and processes with clear alignment of responsibility, authority and accountability.

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Changing Acquisition Environment

Total Systems PerformanceShifted accountability to the contractor

Contractor to deliver end-to-end “systems”

Contractors allocated performance requirements

Contractors provided their own statements of work

Contractors provided an approach to development using their own embedded processes (commercial best practices!)

Government involvement held to a minimum and was only accountable for top level “systems performance”

Pre-Acquisition Reform EraSignificant accountability between the Government and the Contractor

Government maintained system integrator role in most cases

More Government specification

Rigorous Government oversight…but…

Poor Government system integration experiences

Higher price and longer length of developments thought to be traceable in part to excessive Government oversight

The thinking…We can do Better!!

Post-Acquisition Reform EraRevitalized Government / Contractor collaboration

Re-emphasizing solid Systems Engineering

Growing our own credentialed Space Professionals and keeping Program Managers in place

Re-baselining all Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) and Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) Policies and Processes

Independent Reviews

Proactive oversight, flexible acquisition procedures

NOW


THENWAS

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Space Acquisition Findings

The Government’s ability to lead and manage the space acquisition process has seriously eroded. Deficiencies also exist in industry implementation of space systems acquisition

Cost has replaced mission success as the primary driver in managing space development programs

Unrealistic cost estimates lead to unrealistic budgets and unexecutable programs– Under-funding in a given fiscal year causes work which ultimately must be accomplished in

the future at a cost premium of as much as 3-to-1

Undisciplined definition and uncontrolled growth in systems requirements lead to cost overruns– The scope of a new program cannot be totally determined and the tendency is to always

under-scope– Requirements “understanding” and “clarification” virtually always result in additional scope

An issue such as a test failure, parts problem, component delivery, etc. – while potentially small, has a large impact because of the “marching army syndrome.”

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Development Growth Quantitative Framework

PerceivedDevelopment

Growth

AdditiveCost

Growth

Growth dueto cost realism

FundingConstraints

Competitive Pricing & Lack ofRequirements Understanding

True CostOf

OriginalScope

Estimated Cost

Budgeted Cost

Awarded Price

Actual Cost/ Price

Bid Price

Unquantifiable Risk, Schedule & Cost Estimating

Techniques

Added Scope, Changes in

Quantity, Directed Slips Real Growth

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Development Growth Causes (Quantitative Analysis)

Comparison of total dollars growth by category for two space programs at a point in time. Total Value of Pie is $6.1B

25%

11%

25%

9%

11%

11%

8% REQUIREMENTS GENERATION &TRANSLATIONBUDGET/FUNDING

COST ESTIMATION

UNDERESTIMATION OF RISK

SCHEDULE SLIPS (GOVT &CONTRACTOR)PRICE INCREASES

OTHER

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ReworkManufacturing process changesEngineering changes

Industrial base issuesSupply chain managementLogistics support

Invalid estimating proceduresOld/inappropriate parametric dataCost estimating uncertainty

Forgotten itemsUnforeseen problemsTechnical risk

Sources of Error in Cost EstimatesOriginal

Estimate

Quality

OtherFactors

Cost Estimating Errors

Incomplete Information

“CostRealism”

Funding instabilityRequirements changesQuantity changes

Evolving expectationsPerformance enhancementsAdditional capabilities

DesignChanges

ProgrammaticChanges

Scope & Content Changes

Revised Cost

Variances

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Space Acquisition Findings & Resulting Government Action (from Tom Young’s One Year After Review of the DSB/AFSAB’s Impact)

StatusActions / ResponseOriginal Finding

Reintroduction of specifications & standardsContractor Benchmarking / Executive Committees

5. Industry failed to implement proven prgm management and systems engineering practices

Program Managers extended to four-year toursExtensive new system engineering and education & training programs

4. Gov’t space acquisition capabilities seriously eroded

“Urgent & Compelling Rqmts” ProcessDisciplined Configuration Management

3. Undisciplined system requirements

Rigorous reviews: Independent Program Assessments, Program Management Reviews, Independent Cost AnalysisContinue to improve cost estimating models & tools

2. Unrealistic estimates=unrealistic budgets=unexecutable programs

Revitalized focus on mission assuranceIndependent Readiness Review Team, Flight Readiness Review, Aerospace Watchlist

1. Cost #1, not mission success


“Extraordinary cultural change…in only one year.”

- Tom Young, July 2004

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Space Acquisition Recommendations

Budget to a most probable (80/20) cost which includes a reserve of 20-25% management reserve.– Management reserve should not be used for new requirements

Approach requirements in an evolutionary manner.– Plan for and accept incremental improvements

Develop technology roadmaps, invest in establishing technology readiness levels for each program, and advocate a technology transition program.– Demonstrate technologies in relevant environments, product design demonstrated before

CDR– Annually reevaluate and confirm critical technology and schedule paths

Build risk reduction activities into acquisition strategy that builds upon long term planning.

Utilize senior advisory reviews at critical acquisition milestones with experienced, respected outsiders.

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Space Acquisition RecommendationsEmphasize comprehensive initial budget estimate development for new systems– Insist that technology and acquisition management personnel participate in initial budget

estimates– Understand, state, and track technical, cost, system and process assumptions

Emphasize cost realism over bid cost– Source selections should evaluate contractor cost credibility and use the estimate as a

measure of contractor technical understanding– Emphasize systems engineering, early testing and other risk reduction activities as part of

technical approach– Consider penalties for unsubstantiated optimism (negative scoring)– Establish ways to better facilitate and communicate technical, operational, and system

requirements to contractors

Conduct effective independent cost estimates and program assessments, and incorporate the results into the program budget and plan.

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Table of Contents

Environment



Relevance to NASA

Backups

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NASA is Vulnerable to Many of the Same Issues Faced by DoD and National Security Space Programs

The same Space Industrial Base supports all NASA development programs as it does the other Space segments – but perhaps with even fewer players in the game

Most of the same behaviors observed in the National Security Space segment are consistent with observations in the NASA segment– All competitions represent “Must-win’s” between the limited pool of “Primes”– Strong cost pressures exist in most all procurements – NASA procurement organizations across the agency are experiencing their busiest

acquisition seasons in memory – taxing their ability to plan and complete acquisitions while also managing on-going critical contracts

It is not unreasonable to expect that NASA could experience similar “unintended consequences” as did the DoD and the National Security Space segments have in the recent past

Because of these factors, it is also not unreasonable that the lessons learned in the other segments would have similar benefits in the NASA environment

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The Constellation Program is Vulnerable to Many of These Issues Because of its Basic Formulation

Constellation will constantly exist in a budget constrained situation for it’s entire life cycle– Highly ambitious goals and a broad and

complex architecture

This can lead to aggressive cost estimates and proposed costs which will have to be managed through disciplined program management practices

Constellation’s complex architecture with multiple spacecraft-spacecraft and spacecraft-ground systems ICD’s and its evolutionary system develop plan can lead to requirements immaturity/change as well as requirements creep further compounding potential development cost over-runs

True CostOf

OriginalScope

Estimated Cost

Budgeted Cost

Awarded Price

Actual Cost/ Price

Bid Price

25%

11%

25%

9%

11%

11%

8% REQUIREMENTS GENERATION &TRANSLATIONBUDGET/FUNDING

COST ESTIMATION

UNDERESTIMATION OF RISK

SCHEDULE SLIPS (GOVT &CONTRACTOR)PRICE INCREASES

OTHER

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The Constellation Program is Vulnerable to Many of These Issues Because of the Challenges it Faces with It’s Workforce

NASA and its contractors, like the other Space Segments, have to deal with an aging of the aerospace workforce, challenges getting certain skills, and new worker recruitment and retention– This is further exacerbated as the “Apollo generation” moves further into retirement and the

“Space Shuttle generation” completes its transition out of the workforce over the next 5 years

Program Management and Systems Engineering skills are in short supply across the Aerospace Industry and competition to capture these will be keen across the entire industrial base– These skills represent the highest leverage capabilities needed protect against cost and

schedule over runs in light of the threats on the previous pages

The broad geographic footprint of Constellation will strain communications and increase integration risk as well as potentially cause late requirements growth

26


The Constellation Program is Vulnerable to Many of These Issues Because of the Evolutionary Nature of Its Architecture

Interfaces for elements in development today will be to elements that will not be designed for many years– Requirements turbulence later in development and operations phases is possible

Technologies will become obsolete and need to be replaced/upgraded at multiple points in the life cycle of a Project and new, unproven, technologies needed for Lunar/Mars missions– Risk of becoming “hostage” to a high risk technology development program will be higher

The geographic distribution of development work across multiple centers when Agency-wide processes best practices are not widely practiced increases risks– Technical integration risk higher due to incompatibility of specs, standards and processes across

centers– Approaches, standards and levels of expertise for cost estimating vary widely across centers

decreasing ability to develop high fidelity cost estimates at Program Milestones

Lessons learned from other segments may prove useful in mitigating Program and Project risks

27


Questions?

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Table of Contents

Environment



Relevance to NASA

Backups

29


M o d e r n iz a t io n /R e c a p i t a l iz a t io n o f e v e r y N S S p r o g r a m

2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 2 0 1 3 2 0 1 41 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8

R u m s f e ld C o m m is s io n

2 0 0 9

F a s t e r , B e t t e r , C h e a p e r

C o lu m b ia &C A I B

U n i te d L a u n c h A l l ia n c e

M a r s P o la r L a n d e r L o s t

M a r s C l im a t eO r b i t e r L o s t

I n t e r n a t io n a l S p a c e S ta t io n

“ B a c k t o B a s ic s ” & O R S

F I AT e r m in a t e d

C O T S

I r id iu mB a n k r u p t c y

Y o u n g P a n e lI / I I

D A R P A B e g in sI n c r e a s e d S p a c e R & D

N A S A A u t h o r iz a t io n A c t

S p a c e S h ip O n e& V ir g in G a la c t i c

I n c r e a s in g D e m a n d f o r C o m s a t B a n d w id t h

G E O C o m s a tD o w n tu r n

S R M I B C o n s o l id a t io n t o t w o

In c r e a s in g s e c u r i t y a n d e c o n o m ic d e p e n d e n c e o n s p a c e c a p a b i l i t i e s

L a u n c h D e m a n d a t a M in im u m

G r o w in g p r o l i f e r a t io n o f c o m m e r c ia l s p a c e t e c h n o lo g y

“ N e w S p a c e ” e n t r a n t s t o s p a c e t o u r is m m a r k e t

N e w N a t io n a lS p a c e P o l i c y

C o n s t e l la t io n P r o g r a mE S A SV S E

F ir s t E E L V la u n c h

C o m m e r c ia l s p a c e “ b o o m ”

T e le d e s ic c a n c e l le d

N a r r o w in g g a p b e t w e e n N S S a n d C o m m e r c ia l S p a c e

E E L V A s s u r e d A c c e s s s t u d y

D e f e n s e s p e n d in g r e b o u n d s9 /1 1

T S P R im p le m e n t a t io n a n d g o v e r n m e n t a c q u is i t io n w o r k fo r c e

d e c l in e N S S a c q u is i t io n s N u n n - M c C u r d y b r e a c h e s

M a s s in d u s t r y c o n s o l id a t io n

C o m m e r c ia l s a t e l l i t e s s u b je c t t o IT A R

I n c r e a s e in n u m b e r o f n a t io n s u t i l i z in g s p a c eC h in e s eA S A T T e s t

P o o r f in a n c ia l o u t lo o k f o r S I B

S I B f in a n c ia l o u t lo o k r e c o v e r y ( a t t o p le v e ls )

D e c l in in g S T E M w o r k f o r c e in t h e S I B

C o m m e r c ia lS p a c e L a u n c h

A m e n d m e n t s A c t

Gov

ernm

ent

Civ

il Sp

ace

NSS

Indu

stry

Com

mer

cial

Spa

ceIn

dust

rial B

ase

Mac

roEn

viro

nmen

t

Space Environment – Top Level View

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Aero Industry Consolidation – Lockheed Martin

Loral Space & Communications

Def

. Ele

ctro

nics

& S

ys. I

nt.

General Dynamics (Ft. Worth)

Sanders Associates

MEL Defense Systems

Lockheed

GE Aerospace

Gould (Ocean Systems)

General Dynamics (Space Systems)

Martin Marietta

Comsat

Lockheed Martin1995

Goodyear Aerospace

Fairchild Weston Systems

BDM International

Honeywell (Electro-Optics)

LTV (Missiles)

Librascope

Unisys (Defense Systems – Paramax)

IBM Federal Systems

Loral

1996 1997 2000

1994 1995

Ford Aerospace

1990

Orincon Corporation International

2003

OAO Corporation

2001

Affiliated Computer Services (Federal Systems)

1993

GE Aircraft Engine Controls

1994

1993

Electronic and Control Systems (to BAE)

L-3 Communications Corp.

1986 1991

1988

19911987 19921989

1988

1996

31


Aero Industry Consolidation – Boeing

Litton Precision Gear

Argo Systems

Hughes Helicopters

McDonnell Douglas

Autometric

Rockwell International (Aerospace)

Hughes Electronics Satellite

Jeppensen Sanderson

BoeingBoeing 1997

Rocketdyne (to UTC)

20001996 200519951987

1984

GD, Convair, Aircraft Structures Unit

1994

32


Aero Industry Consolidation – Northrop Grumman

AstroTech (to SpaceHab)

Newport News Shipping

Allegheny Teledyne - Ryan Aeronautical

Northrop

Logicon

Grumman

TRW

Northrop Grumman

General Instrument, Defense

Steerage Corp./Sperry Marine, Inc.

PRC, Inc.

Varian (Solid State Elec)

GenCorp, Aerojet General, Electronics and Information Systems (EIS)

Avondale Industries

Geodynamics

Litton Industries

1996 1997

TASC, Inc.

1991

Scaled Composites

Westinghouse, Electronic Systems Group

Harnischfeger Industries – Syscon Corporation

2001

Comptek Research, Inc.

2000

Federal Data Corporation

Computer Associates/Sterling Software - Federal Systems Group

Vought Corp./LTV – LTV Aircraft Division

1994

Hadson Corporation – Ultrasystems Defense

1991 19961995

DPC Technologies

Inter-National Research Institute (INRI)

1999 2007

1982

Essex Corp.

XonTech, Inc.

20032002

19981996 1999

33


Aero Industry Consolidation – General Dynamics

Cessna (to Textron)Cessna Aircraft

K-C Aviation

GTE (Government Systems Corp)

Galaxy Aerospace

Bath Iron Works

Gulfstream Aerospace

General DynamicsGeneral Dynamics

Motorola (Integrated Information Systems Group)

Teledyne (Vehicle Systems Division)

Lockheed Martin (Defense Systems & Armament Systems)

Ceridian (Computing Devices International)

Lucent (Advanced Technology Systems)

National Steel and Shipbuilding Co (NASSCO)

1997

Veridian Corporation

2003 2004

Engineering Technology Inc.

2006

Anteon International Corp.

Spectrum Astro

2001

Primex Technologies

1999

1998

199819961995198519851982

Chrysler Defense

1992

34


Aero Industry Consolidation – Raytheon

E-Systems

British Aerospace, Corporate Jets

Texas Instruments, Defense

ATK Marine Systems Group

Chrysler Tech Airborne

RaytheonRaytheon

Rediffusion Simulation, Ltd.

Hughes Aircraft

Magnavox Electronics

General Dynamics Missile Operations

GM, Delco

CAE Industries

JPS Communications, Inc.

2002 2007

Raytheon Aircraft becomes Hawker Beechcraft

19961993 1998

1985 1987

M/A-COM Telecommunications

1988 1995

Hug

hes

Airc

raft

1997

1997

Allied Signal, Communications Systems

Link

CAE-Link1988

1992

1995

GM, Hughes ElectronicsHughes Space and Communications (to Boeing)

Hughes Elec. (to NewCorp)

2000 2003

2004

PanAmSat (to KKR)

Flight Sim & Training (to L-3)

Hughes Network Systems (to SkyTerra)

2006

35


Aero Industry Consolidation – Alliant Techsystems (ATK)

Thio

kol

Honeywell (Defense divisions)

Alcoa

Systems Integrated, Gov’t Systems Division

Mission Research Corp (MRC)

Micro Craft

GASL

Alliant Techsystems1990

PSI Group

2004

Swales Aerospace

20072003

Science and Applied Technology, Inc. (SAT)

2002

Hercules Aerospace

1995 20011992

Boeing (Ordnance)

1997

Motorola (Fusing)

Alcoa 2000

Thiokol, Inc./Cordant Technologies

Morton Thiokol

Morton

1989

2001

36


Government’s Role in Space Acquisition Program ManagementManage overall Acquisition process

Budget and allocate funds

Establish, manage and control requirements

Manage and control budget, including reserve

Approve Program Definition

Assure responsible risk management

Participate in trade studies

Assure engineering “best practices” are utilized in program implementation

Manage contract including contractual changes

Sustain a viable and competent workforce

Source: Task Force Briefing, “Acquisition of National Security Space Programs,” November 19, 2002.

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Attributes of a Healthy Space AcquisitionTrust between government organizations as well as with contractors

A government and industry workforce experienced in the space discipline that includes both senior personnel and a pipeline of new talent

A validated set of requirements with a limited number of documented, realistic assumptions based on an understood and approved CONOPS

Continued and sustained support by senior leadership - active user community support and involvement – enduring decisions - A champion

Authorities commensurate with responsibilities –accountabilities flowed down and supported by leadership

An acquisition strategy that balances cost, schedule, and performance risks and a source selection process which delivers a realistic performance, schedule and cost baseline

Adequate, stable and properly phased funding including an acknowledged and defendable management reserve to include a sufficient margin particularly at the outset of the program

A well defined and realistic acquisition program baseline supported by a thorough and in depth CARD developed with contractor participation, if applicable - also a historical descriptive timeline

A well-founded and funded, proactive risk management program

Repeatable “best of class” acquisition and program management processes which can be tailored

Meaningful metrics that help determine the current and future health and status of the program

A healthy (sufficient and competitive) industrial base motivated to provide executable programs and incentivizedto deliver on commitments

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Development Growth Causes

The ability to respond to development growth is compounded by acquisition workforce problems

Flawed Program PlanningRequirements

Initial planning

Acquisition Strategy

Corporate Process Directed Actions

External and frequent

Little flexibility to respond

DEVELOPMENTPRE-ACQUISITIONPLANNING

Competitive EnvironmentAggressiveness

Source Selection

39


SourcesBooz Allen Hamilton, “U.S. Space Industrial Base Study, Final Report,” February 7, 2000.

Booz Allen Hamilton, Space Research & Development Industrial Base Study, “Phase I Final Report,” February, 2002.

Booz Allen Hamilton, “Executive Summary of the Space Systems Development Growth Analysis,” October 2, 2002.

Booz Allen Hamilton, Space Research & Development Industrial Base Study, “Phase II Final Report,” August, 2002.

Briefing to the Joint Task Force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs, “Acquisition of National Security Space Programs,” November 19, 2002.

“Report of the Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs,” May 2003.

“One Year Review” of the Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific Advisory Board Joint Task Force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs, July 2004.

Gen. Lance W. Lord, Air Force Space Command, “Space Acquisitions: Achievements & Challenges,” May 24, 2005.

GAO, “Defense Acquisitions: Incentives and Pressures That Drive Problems Affecting Satellite and Related Acquisitions,” June 23, 2005.

“Report by the Assessment Panel of the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Project,” January 2006.

GAO, “Space Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Systems Acquisitions and Keys to Achieving Them,” April 6, 2006.

GAO, “Space Acquisitions: DoD Needs to Take More Action to Address Unrealistic Initial Cost Estimates of Space Systems,” November, 2006.

Michael Bruno, Aviation Week & Space Technology, “Leadership Vacuum,” November 12, 2007, p. 79.

Bill.bastedo

Technology

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