Bangladesh in 1977 Dilemmas of the Military Rulers

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Bangladesh in 1977: Dilemmas of the Military RulersAuthor(s): M. RashiduzzamanReviewed work(s):Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Feb., 1978), pp. 126-134Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643306 .

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BANGLADESHN1977:DILEMMASOFTHEMILITARY ULERSM. RashiduzzamanTHE OUTSTANDING EVENTS in 1977 reveal two leadingpatternsn Bangladesh.On the one hand,the first alf of theyearwascharacterizedy the government's ragmatist olicy, ts stability ndconfidence. uring thisperiod themilitary egimesought egitimacythrough referendum, nationwideelection was held for the localcouncils, nd the governmentauncheda wide rangeof socioeconomicpolicies.Duringthe secondhalfof theyear,on theotherhand,diver-

gentpoliticalforces enerated ension nd an abortivecoup shookthemilitary stablishmentnd introduced lementsofdisquiet and insta-bility.The purposeof thispaper is to outline the changing vents n1977,thedilemmasof themilitary overnment,nd themanagementof the nternal conomy nd international elations.Pursuit f PoliticalLegitimacy

In thereferendumf May 30 therewere more than 99% "yes"votes n supportof General Ziaur Rahman (usually called Zia). It isobviousthatZia wanted to gain political supportfor his government.Although ia had run thecountryincehe came topower n thewakeof bloodymilitary pheavals n November1975,Justice yemhad con-tinued s Bangladesh'sPresident ntilhe resigned arly n 1977.WhenZia took over as President,he quickly decided on a referendum. l-though here s no seriouschallengeto thevalidity f the referendum,thecritics re obviously uspiciousof such a massivevictorywithveryfewnegative otes.According o oftencritical ources, ia could easilyhavewon60-70% of thevote.Such an overwhelmingoteof confidencehasbeen attributedo severalfactors:a) participation f thebureaucra-cies nmobilizing ublic support; b) unqualified upport f a majorityof thenewly lectedUnion Parishad villagecouncils) eaders; c) active

126i 1978 by The Regentsof the University f California0004-4687/78/0215-0126$00.25


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BANGLADESH 127help from the moderateand rightwing forces; d) influence f theofficiallyontrolledmedia; and (e) absence ofanyothercandidate.The military id notgo to thepeople emptyhandedas Zia offereda 19-point ocioeconomic rogram. ince SheikhMujiburRahmanwaskilled in a violentcoup on August 15, 1975, the countryhas passedthrough periodofuncertainty ithoutnationalpolitical institutionsor a leaderwithan aura of legitimacy. he overwhelming onfidencevotegaveZia a sense ofcredibilitynd legitimacyo continueuntil anelection sheld totransferowerto thepolitical eaders.Although hemilitary ulers ontinueto stickto their arliercom-mitment o hold elections n December1978,manyobservers onsiderthisunlikely or variety freasons. n the pursuitof legitimacy, en-eralZia himself as become a politicalpersonality. he militarys nolongerconsidered n impartialbrokerabove politics. Some observersfeel thatZia laid down the foundationof his futurepolitical careerthroughhereferendum,nd it is feltthathe may become a "civilianleader" n the near future y oiningsomepoliticalparty fhis choiceand contestingheelection.Zia appearsto havegained a supportbasethroughhe referendumnd hispragmatist olicyand ifhe decides toenterpolitics, e maybe able toprovide eadershipfor n organizationwithbroad-based oliticalsupport. ventually,tmight e theonly wayforZia to stay n officeince itwill be difficultor him to continueasPresidentfBangladesh swellas army hieffor n indefiniteeriod.Early in December severalmembers f the PresidentialAdvisoryCouncil weredroppedand new advisorswererecruited yZia. One ofthe new Advisorss EnayetullahKhan,owner oftheinfluentialweeklyHolidayand wellknownforhispro-Pekingnd anti-Indian iews.Mostof the otherrecruitsweretechnocrats.Local CouncilElections:Rightists' esurgenceAfter henationalelectionspromisedfor1977 werepostponed, hemilitaryuthorities uicklyordered the electionof village and urbanmunicipal ouncils.Early n 1977,the Union Parishad villagecouncil)electionsgenerated onsiderable nterest n the rural areas. It was a"partyless" lectionbut thepolitical affiliationsf thecandidatesweregenerally nown to thelocal people. Manylocal leaderswhohad beendiscredited or theiralleged collaborationwith the Pakistanarmy n1971surfacednd tookactivepart n these lections.An analysis f thenewly lectedmembers nd chairmenn someselected ouncils ndicatethat bout77% ofthemwerepolitically lignedto theright nd center;about 21% of themwere moderately eft and about 1% radicals.1About47% ofthemhad had at least someform fassociationwith the

1A surveyof 51 selectedvillage councils and 201 members and chairmen wasconductedby thiswriter n the summerof 1977.The study s expected to be com-pleted later in 1978.


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128 M. RASHIDUZZAMANAwamiLeague during ecentyears.But thesurprise f theelectionwastheresurgencef those ightistlementswho were dentifieds support-ers of the MuslimLeague andAyub Khan's "Basic Democracies" n the1960s.According othesurvey, bout23% of theelectedvillage eadersclaimedto be supporters f theMuslim League and otherright-wingparties.Afterthe armedliberationstruggle n 1971, manyobservers e-lievedthat ruralpolitics n Bangladeshhad been radicalizedand thattherightist orceswerecompletely liminated.The resurgence f suchelementsmaybe explained in severalways.First, t reflectshefailureof the radicals to seize the opportunity rovided by the 1971 armedstruggleoestablish firm rganizational oothold mong thepeasants.Second,partyless lectiondoes not offer ny clear opportunity o thevillagers o identifyhepoliticalbackground f the candidates eekingvillagecouncil elections.Third, the emergenceof the moderate ele-mentsmaybe viewed as a resultofvillagers'disillusionmentwithvio-lence, orruption,nd the nefficiencyfAwamiLeague governmentnthepost iberation eriod.Finally,there s thevillagers' videntprefer-ence forpragmatic nd experienced eaders with local ties instead ofradicals.General Zia seemedto be willingto use thenewlyelectedvillageleadersforhisprogram nd as a political supportbase. Soon after heirelections, he Presidentcalled upon them to implement the 19-pointsocioeconomic rogram orruraldevelopment nd populationcontrol.The governmentrrangedfora massiveprogramto trainthe newlyelectedmembers nd chairmen n management f local administrationand a family lanning campaign n thevillages.Seminars nd confer-enceswereheld to establishclosercontactbetween thevillageleadersand thebureaucracy,nd groupsofmemberswere sentabroad as partof theirtraining. ia seemed to havewon the confidence f theruralleaders ince the administration ffered hemvisibility nd a commit-mentto transferesources o thevillages.Elections n 78 municipalitieswereheld in Augustand September.A totalof421 candidates orchairmanshipsnd 3339candidatesforthepostofcommissioners erecontesting8 and 867positions espectively.2Except for a fewminor incidents, he electionswere held peacefullyand the urban areaswereheavilypoliticizedduringtheelectoralcam-paign.After heelections, oththeAwamiLeague and MuslimLeaguemade claims bout the numberof seatstheyhad captured n theurbancouncils.According o one report, heAwami League won 25 and theMuslimLeague 17chairmanshipsn themunicipal ouncils.3The otherparties id notclaimmanyofthenewly lectedurbanleaders). n spiteof claims nd counterclaims,t is difficulto ascertain hereal politicalloyalties ftheelectedChairmen t this tage. n the ight f local coun-

2 The Bangladesh Times, August 14, 1977.S Holiday,August21, 1977.


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BANGLADESH 129cil elections, t is believed thatboth the Awami League and MuslimLeague will decide to contestmostofthe seats n theforthcominglec-tion, whenever t is held.

The notable development n the municipalelectionswas the vic-tory f the moderate orcesn Dacca Municipalitywhere youngright-istbarristerwas elected chairman. everal Awami League members fthe newlyelectedmunicipal councilwalked out as a protestfor notusinga secret allotfor he electionof the chairman.4Divergent olitical orces

After hereferendum,herewere two monthswithoutany signifi-cant political ncident n Bangladesh. t now appears that thepoliticaltension vident n Augustprovided thebackgroundforthe "insurrec-tion" that hook thecountryn October.This firstppeared in DaccawhentheAwami League decidedto observeAugust15 (theday Mujibwas assassinated) s a dayofmourning. t was fearedthat therewouldbe sabotage and violence on that day by pro-Mujib elements. TheAwamiLeague movewas denounced,and Zia called upon thepeopleto uniteagainstthoseelements hatwant to disruptthecountry.Vari-ous political eadersalso denouncedthe Awami Leaguerswho wantedto stage a comeback n politicsunder the pretextof condemning heoverthrow fMujib. There wereclashesbetweenrivalgroups t DaccaUniversity.There were alsoreports fsporadicviolence n thecountryside. c-cording o reliablesources, hefollowers fMujib and theJSD (JatiyaSamajtantrik al) established working lliance to eliminatetheirpo-liticalfoes n thevillages.Some of their upporterswere arrestedforallegedinvolvementn acts of sabotage.Hidden armswere knowntohavesurfaced n thehands of "anti-social lements"who indulgedinbanditry,idnapping,ndextortion n thevillages. he August oliticaltension was heightenedby another incident which involvedthe re-moval of a statue of a javelin thrower rom public place. Followingthat ncident controversytarted etweenrivalpoliticalfactions. ev-eral accusationsweremade layingthe blame at the door of religiousgroups who considered tatuesdepictingthe human formun-Islamic.There was immediaterepercussion mong the studentgroupswhoclashed n Dacca University.5earswereexpressed hattherightwingIslamic forcesweregetting heupperhand and mighteventually urnagainst he tatues f the freedom ightersuiltin severalplacesduringthepostliberationeriod.The religious nd rightwing leaders,on theotherhand,blamed thosewho wanted to create a misunderstandingbetweenthegovernmentnd the Islamic forces.The border ncidents etweenthearmy nd thepro-Mujib nsur-

4 The Bangladesh Observer,October 31, 1977.5 The Bangladesh Times, August29, 1977.


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130 M. RASHIDUZZAMANgentsallegedly peratingfrom ndian soil substantially eclined afterthe downfallof Mrs. Indira Gandhi. There was a deal betweenZiaand thenew Desai administration herebyBangladeshhad to acceptthosepro-Mujib lementswho wantedtoreturn nd New Delhi offeredthosewho preferredostay n India politicalasylumbut restrictedheirinsurgent ctivities. angladeshauthorities alled upon the returneestobehave, ut ater omeof themwereallegedlynvolvedn theabortiveOctober nsurrection.The summer f1977also markedthebeginning f a demand foraunitedpoliticalpartyas a coalition of "democratic nd nationalisticforces."Ataur Rahman Khan, the leader of the BangladeshJatiyaLeague and former hiefMinister,made an appeal to establish uch aplatform itha view toforging ationalunity.He also appealed to themilitary uthorities o announce a firm lection date fortransferringpower to elected eaders. Severalpolitical leaderssupportedKhan andmade thesame plea. If this move s successful,t mightprovide a cen-trist ational platform orBangladeshpolitics.TheAbortive oupandAftermath

The mostdramaticpolitical eventof 1977was the abortivecoupon September 0 and October 2 whichkilled 11 air forceofficersndten soldiers.Accordingto reports, he abortivecoup started n Bograon September30 and the rebels then struckDacca on October 2.Japaneseterrorists ijacked a JAL plane to Dacca airportfromwherethey argainedfor therelease oftheir ailed compatriotsn Japan anda sixmilliondollarransom.Almost the entireBangladeshadministra-tion,ncluding opair force fficials, erenegotiatingwith theterroristsat Dacca airport. t provided n ideal opportunity orthe"disgruntledelements"within thearmedforces o stage an insurrection, hichwasquickly suppressed, owever.Total casualties on both sides exceeded230,according ounconfirmedources.It is notyetclear who werethe actual leaders of theattempted n-surrection.nitially, the Dacca authoritiesplayed down the incidentwithoutblamingany politicalgroup forthe uprising.A fewdays ater,thepoliticaldimension f theattempted oup becameclearwhen tworadicalparties-the JSD and thepro-MoscowCommunistParty-andthemoderateDemocraticLeague were banned forhaving ncited thecoup.Three leadersof thesepartieswerealso arrested. ia wenton theradio to announcethat all those nvolved n thecoupwill be tried ndseverely unished.Later, it was reportedthat about 500 people weretriedforalleged complicity nd that 92 persons received the deathsentence or nciting ebellion.The abortiveOctobercoup was no surprise o observersn Bangla-desh. A politicized rmy ike thatofBangladesh s susceptible o coups


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132 M. RASHIDUZZAMANadhered to the principles of nonalignment,mutual respectfor sov-ereignty, oninterferencen internalaffairs f other countries, ndpeaceful ettlementf all disputeswithintheframeworkf UnitedNa-tions.7After everalmeetings etweenthetwocountries, angladeshandIndia,came to an agreementn thesharing f theGangesRiverwater.The Farakka ccordcovers hesharing f theGangeswaterbetween hetwo countriesduringthe dryseason extendingover a period of fiveyears, nd may later be renewedby the two countries.Nobody hasapplauded the agreementn Bangladesh,and the typicalattitude s"wait and see." If thisagreementworksout happily,the relationsbe-tweenBangladeshand India may improve.However,therewere pro-tests romWestBengalimplying hat the Farakkaaccordwas seen thereashavingbartered waytheBengali nterestsn India.The relationship etweenthe two countries lso soured aftertheabortive oup. On October 15,Zia stronglyondemnedthemutinousactsatBograand Dacca and blamedtheconspiratorsor ryingomakeBangladesha "satellite."8 ndian unhappinesswas clearwhen thegov-ernmentexpresseddissatisfaction ver "attempts by Dacca to dragDelhi's name into therecentmilitary prising n Bogra and Dacca."9JayaPrakashNarayan,theprominentndian leader,openlycriticizedBangladeshfor xecuting he allegedconspiratorsnd largescale arrestsof politicaldissidents.10 he Soviet Union and Amnestynternationalalso criticizedBangladesh forthe trial and execution of the allegedconspirators.Zia touredNepal, India, and Pakistan n Decemberto emphasizefriendly ieswith theneighbors.The Indian trip was significant s apost-Farakka greementelationship etweenthe twocountries. herewerereportsof political refugees romBangladesh seeking helter nIndia. Zia wanted that New Delhi should not provideany sheltertothe Bangladeshirebels in Indian soil. Prime Minister Desai talkedabout friendshipnd tradebetween the twocountries.Socio-Economic olicies

The economydid not look so good comparedto 1976.A growthrateof3% is estimated ortheyearcomparedto 9.7% during thepre-vious year.The decline in thegrowth atehas been attributed o theshort all n theagriculturalector. ood grainsproductionn 1977 wasestimated o be shortby about one million tonsfrom hetarget f 13million ons. xcessive ain and flood aused thisdecline.The industrial

7 The Bangladesh Times, October6, 1977.8 The Bangladesh Times, October 16, 1977.9 The Statesman Weekly),Calcutta,October22, 1977.10B.B.C. (Bengali Broadcast),October 29, 1977.


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BANGLADESH 133output increasedbecause of higher productionof sugar, fertilizer,cement, aper,and otherproducts.As a result fthe griculturalhortfall, rices f foodgrains ook anupward trend n the spring of 1977, but again declined duringtheharvest eason. Large quantitiesofwheatand rice had to be importedto meetthe deficit. he government ontinued tspolicyof supplyingfarmers ith such nputsas fertilizersnd seeds at subsidizedpricestoraise agricultural roductivity.The highlights f the 1977-1978budgetcould be summarized sfollows: a) totalrevenue ncomeTaka 11,560million official xchangerate is approximately 1 = Taka 15.50); (b) total expenditureTaka20,960million includingTaka 960 million on revenueexpenditure,Taka 11,900million on development, nd Taka 400 million forfoodand works rogram; c) an anticipatedgrowth ateof7%; and (d) agri-cultural ectorprojectedto grow by8%, industrial ectorby 7%,,andothersby 9%. The investment limate in the private sector lookedfavorable orthefirst imesince 1972 as thegovernment ent aheadwith tspolicyof encouraging ntrepreneursoth at home and fromabroad.Therewas no indication ffurther ationalization nd theNa-tional nvestment oard openednewindustrial nitsforprivate nvest-ment.About200 smaller ndustriesweredenationalizedby thegovern-ment nd returned otheprivate ector.Although Bangladesh was far fromachieving self-sufficiencynfood, herewere ndications fserious ffortso achievethisgoal. Ruraldevelopmenteceived op priorityn 1977 and substantial nternationalaid waspromised o increase gricultural roductivity. he program fSwanirvarself-reliance) as launched n selected reas to improve gri-culturethrough oluntaryabor offered y thevillagers.Zia was im-pressedbytheshowpiece of thisprogram t Ulashi in Jessore istrictand urgedthevillagersto follow the spiritof development hroughself-reliancehroughouthecountry.There werepositive ignsfora comprehensiveopulation controlprogramn Bangladesh.The government as declaredpopulation asthenumber ne problemof thecountry nd thefamily lanning pro-gramhas been integratedwith the total development fforts f thecountry. opulationcontrol s now a community ased multi-sectoralprogramwith a strong ural bias thatrequirescloserparticipation fthe rural administration.Conclusion

Of all theevents n 1977,the abortive oup will havedecisive m-pact on Bangladesh'sfuture. t has shakenthe stability hatZia pro-videdthecountryinceNovember1975and on whichhe basedmostofhis claim to legitimacy. he internalpoliticsof Bangladeshhas also


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134 M. RASHIDUZZAMANbeen internationalizeds a result of foreigncriticism f the toughmeasures akenagainstthosewho were allegedly nvolved n theinsur-rection. here aresigns fpublicuneasiness boutmilitary ndisciplineandZia willhave toput a lid on the soldiers' crambleforpower.Themilitaryuthoritiesn Dacca will have toreview heirpoliticalstrategyin thelightofwhathappenedin thefall.There are indicationsthatmilitary fficers ill be graduallywithdrawn rommanycivilianposi-tions.How Zia will depoliticize deeply politicizedmilitary s notyetclear.But thewidespreadfeelingof uncertaintyannot continue in-definitely.wo main options seem to be available for theDacca gen-erals: They maybow out of politics and transfer he power to electedrepresentativesnd concentrate n building a genuinelyprofessionalmilitarywhichwould not meddle into politics; or the militarymaycontinueto play a political role indefinitely,scillatingbetweenanauthoritarian ystem nd somekind of"controlled emocracy."

M. RASHIDUZZAMAN is Associate Professor f Political Science at Glassboro StateCollege, New Jersey, nd Research Associate, Southern Asian Institute,ColumbiaUniversity, ew York.

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