Baldwin (2012) Power and International Relations

8/11/2019 Baldwin (2012) Power and International Relations

1/35

9

Power

and

International

Relations

DAVID

A.

BALDWIN

Most definitions of politics involve power. Most international interactions are political or have rami

ficationsforpolitics.Thus,itisnotsurprisingthatpowerhasbeenprominentindiscussionsofinternational

interaction fromThucydides to thepresentday.The longhistoryofdiscussionsof the roleofpower in

internationalrelations,however,hasfailedtogeneratemuchagreement.Scholarsdisagreenotonlywith

respecttotheroleofpowerbutalsowithrespecttothenatureofpower.HansJ.Morgenthau(1964:27n)

suggeststhattheconceptofpoliticalpowerposesoneofthemostdifficultandcontroversialproblemsof

political science.KennethN.Waltz (1986:333)notes thatpower isakey concept in realist theoriesof

internationalpolitics,while conceding that 'itsproperdefinition remains amatterof controversy.And

RobertGilpindescribestheconceptofpoweras'oneofthemosttroublesomeinthefieldofinternational

relations'(1981:13)andsuggeststhatthe'numberandvarietyofdefinitionsshouldbeanembarrassment

topoliticalscientists' (1975:24).There is,however,widespreadconsensusamong internationalrelations

scholars on both the necessity of addressing the role of power in international interactions and the

unsatisfactorystateofknowledgeaboutthistopic(Guzzini,2000;BarnettandDuvall,2005;Berenskoetter

andWilliams,2007).

Although it is often useful to distinguish among such power terms as power, influence, control,

coercion, force, persuasion, deterrence, compellence, inducement and so on, it is possible to identify

commonelements

underlying

all

such

terms.

Robert

A.

Dahl

(1957)

has

suggested

that

underlying

most

suchtermsisthebasicintuitivenotionofAcausing(orhavingtheabilitytocause)Btodosomethingthat

B otherwisewould not do. (In the discussion that follows, 'A' refers to the actor having or exercising

influence; while 'B' refers to the actor being, or potentially being, influenced.) Although alternative

definitionsofpowerabound,nonerivalsthisone inwidespreadacceptability.Inthefollowingdiscussion,

the term 'power' will be used in a broad generic sense that is interchangeable with such terms as

'influence'or 'control'unlessotherwise indicated.Thisusage isnot intended todeny thevalidityor the

utilityofdistinguishingamongsuchtermsforotherpurposes.

POWER

AND

THE

STUDY

OF

INTERNATIONAL

POLITICS

Internationalpoliticshasbeendefinedintermsofinfluencing'majorgroupsintheworldsoastoadvance

thepurposesof some against theoppositionofothers' (Wright,1955:130).Although the term 'power

politics'hasunsavoryconnotations forsome,suchadefinition implies that the term is redundant (Carr,

[1939]1946;Morgenthau,[1948]1960;SproutandSprout,1945;Spykman,1942;Wright,1955).Fromthis


2/35

perspective,allpoliticsispowerpoliticsinthesensethatallpoliticsinvolvespower.Thisisnottosaythat

politicsisonlyaboutpower.

Traditionally,thestudyofinternationalpoliticsassumedtheexistenceofnationalstateswithconflicting

policies,placingahighvalueonmaintaining their independence,and relyingprimarilyonmilitary force.

Thestates

with

the

most

military

power

were

designated

'Great

Powers',

and

the

'game'

of

international

politicswas 'played' primarily by them (Spykman, 1942; Sprout and Sprout, 1945, 1962;Wight, 1946).

Notingthatonlyafewstatespossessedthemilitarycapabilitiestosupporttheirforeignpolicieseffectively,

an influential text in the 1930s averred that 'these alone constitute the Great Powers' (Simonds and

Emeny,1937:28.1

In the eighteenth century, 'the power of individual states was conceived to be susceptible of

measurementby certainwelldefined factors' (Gulick,1955:24), includingpopulation, territory,wealth,

armies and navies. In the ensuing years, this approach evolved into the 'elements of national power'

approachto

power

analysis

reflected

in

Hans

J.

Morgenthau's

influential

textbook

Politics

Among

Nations

([1948]1960seealsoSproutandSprout,1945).

Statesweredepictedasseekingtomaximizepowerrelativetoeachother,thusproducinga'balanceof

power'orasseekingtoproduceabalanceofpower(Claude,1962;Gulick,1955;Haas,1953;Morgenthau

[1948]1960).Eachversionofbalanceofpowertheorysharedtheassumptionthat itwaspossibletoadd

upthevariouselementsofnationalpower,sometimescalled'powerresources'or'capabilities',inorderto

calculatethepowerdistributionamongtheGreatPowers.Modernversionsofthisapproacharefound in

Waltz's Theory of International Politics (1979) and John J.Mearsheimers The Tragedy ofGreat Power

Politics(2001).

THEPOWERANALYSISREVOLUTION

The 'elementsofnationalpower' approachdepictedpower as apossessionorpropertyof states. This

approachwaschallengedduringthelasthalfofthetwentiethcenturybythe'relationalpower'approach,

developed by scholars working in several disciplines, including psychology, philosophy, sociology,

economicsandpolitical science (Baldwin,1989;Barry,1976;Cartwright,1965;Dahl,1957, [1963,1984]

1991;1968;

Frey,

1971,

1985,

1989;

Harsanyi,

1962;

Nagel,

1975;

Oppenheim,

1981;

Simon,

1957;

Tedeschi

and Bonoma, 1972). Somewould regard the publication of Power and Society byHarold Lasswell and

AbrahamKaplan (1950) as thewatershedbetween theold 'powerasresources' approachand thenew

'relationalpower'approach,whichdevelopedtheideaofpowerasatypeofcausation.Thiscausalnotion

conceivesofpowerasarelationship(actualorpotential)inwhichthebehaviorofactorAatleastpartially

causesachange inthebehaviorofactorB. 'Behavior' inthiscontextneednotbedefinednarrowly,but

maybeunderstoodbroadly to includebeliefs, attitudes,preferences, opinions, expectations, emotions

and/orpredispositions toact. In thisview,power isanactualorpotential relationshipbetween twoor

moreactors(persons,states,groups,etc.),ratherthanapropertyofanyoneofthem.


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The shift from a property concept of power to a relational one constituted a revolution in power

analysis.Despitetheancientoriginsofthestudyofpower,Dahlmaintainsthat 'thesystematicempirical

studyofpowerrelations isremarkablynew'(1968:414).Heattributesthe 'considerable improvement in

the clarity'ofpower concepts to the fact that 'the last severaldecadeshaveprobablywitnessedmore

systematiceffortstotiedowntheseconceptsthanhavethepreviousmillenniaofpoliticalthought'(Dahl,

[1963,1984]1991:27

8;

Dahl

and

Stinebrickner,

2003:

12).

DimensionsofPower

The relational power perspective views power as multidimensional rather than monolithic and

unidimensional. This allows for the possibility that power can increase on one dimension while

simultaneouslydecreasingonanother.Amongthemoreimportantdimensionsofpowerarethefollowing:

Scope ScopereferstotheaspectofB'sbehavioraffectedbyA.Thiscallsattentiontothepossibilitythat

anactor'spowermayvaryfromoneissuetoanother.Thus,acountrylikeJapanmayhavemoreinfluence

with respect toeconomic issues thanwith respect tomilitary issues;and the reversemaybe trueofa

countrylikeNorthKorea.

Domain Thedomainofanactor'spowerreferstothenumberofotheractorssubjecttoitsinfluence.In

otherwords,howbigisB;orhowmanyBsarethere?Thus,astatemayhaveagreatdealofinfluencein

one regionof theworld,whilehaving littleorno influence inotherpartsof theworld.Thedomainof

influenceofRussiatodayissmallerthanthatoftheformerSovietUnion.

Weight Theweightofanactor'spowerreferstotheprobabilitythatB'sbehaviorisorcouldbeaffected

byA(Dahl,1957;seealsoDeutsch,[1968]1988;LasswellandKaplan,1950).Thus,acountrythathasonlya

30percentchanceofachievingitsaimsintradenegotiationsislesspowerfulthanonewitha90percent

chance,ceterisparibus.Thisdimensioncouldalsobelabeledthe'reliability'ofA'sinfluence.

Costs Both thecosts toAand thecosts toBare relevant toassessing influence (Baldwin,1989;Barry,

1976;Dahl,1968;Harsanyi,1962;Schelling,1984:26890). Is itcostlyorcheapforAto influenceB?Is it

costlyor cheap forB to complywithA'sdemands? Somehave suggested thatmore power should be

attributed to an actor that can exercise influence cheaply than toone forwhom it is costly (Harsanyi,

1962). IfAcangetB todo something that iscostly forB, somewouldcontend that this is indicativeof

morepowerthanifAcanonlygetBtodothingsthatarecheapforB.EvenifAisunabletogetBtocomply

with itsdemands, itmaybeable to imposecostsonB fornoncompliance.Somehaveargued that this

shouldbeviewedasakindofpower(Baldwin,1985;Harsanyi,1962;Schelling,1984:26890).

Means There aremanymeansof exercising influence andmanyways to categorize suchmeans.One

scheme (Baldwin, 1985) for classifying the means of influence in international relations includes the

followingcategories:


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1. Symbolicmeans. Thiswouldincludeappealstonormativesymbolsaswellastheprovisionof

information. Thusonecountrymightinfluenceanothereitherbyremindingthemthatslavery

isbadorby informingthem thatAIDS iscausedbyHIV. Itwouldalso includewhatThomas

Risse(2000:33)hascalledcommunicativeactionarguinganddeliberatingabout identities,

interests,andthestateoftheworld. Discourses,propaganda,framing,andnarrativescould

alsobe

considered

symbolic

means

of

influence.

2. Economicmeans. Augmentingorreducingthegoodsorservicesavailabletoothercountries

hasalonghistoryinworldpolitics.

3. Militarymeans. Actual or threatenedmilitary force has receivedmore attention than any

othermeansininternationalrelations.

4. Diplomaticmeans. Diplomacyincludesawidearrayofpractices,includingrepresentationand

negotiation.

Whichdimensionsofpowershouldbespecified formeaningfulscholarlycommunication?There isno

singlerightanswertothisquestion.Thecausalconceptofpower,however,doesimplyaminimumsetof

specifications.ThepointiswellputbyJackNagel(1975:14):

Anyonewhoemploysacausalconceptofpowermustspecifydomainandscope.Tosay'Xhaspower'may

seemsensible,buttosay'Xcauses'or'Xcancause'isnonsense.CausationimpliesanXandaYacauseand

aneffect.Ifpoweriscausation,onemuststatetheoutcomecaused.Stipulatingdomainandscopeanswers

thequestion'Poweroverwhat?'

Theideathatameaningfulspecificationofapowerrelationshipmustincludescopeanddomainiswidely

sharedbypoweranalystscommittedtosocialscientific inquiry (Barry,1976;Dahl,1991,1968;Dahland

Stinebrickner,2003;Deutsch,[1968]1988;Frey,1971,1989;LasswellandKaplan,1950).

Themultidimensionalnatureofpowermakes itdifficulttoaddupthevariousdimensions inorder to

arriveatsomeoverallestimateofanactor'spower.Althoughtherearesomesimilaritiesbetweenpolitical

power and purchasing power (Baldwin, 1989), one important difference is the lack of a standardized

measuring rod for the former.Whereasmoney canbeused tomeasurepurchasingpower, there isno

comparablestandard

of

value

in

terms

of

which

to

add

up

the

various

dimensions

of

power

so

as

to

arrive

atanoveralltotal.Forthisreason,estimatesofanactors'overallpower'arelikelytobecontroversial.

FacesofPower

Oneofthemostfamousdebatesintheliteratureonpowerduringthelasthalfofthetwentiethcenturyis

knownasthe 'FacesofPower'debate(BachrachandBaratz,1962; Isaac,1987;Lukes,1974).Thedebate


5/35

was triggered by reactions to Dahls study of governance in New Haven, Connecticut (1961). The

methodologyadoptedforthestudy ofpowerinNewHavenidentifiedthreeissueareasandattemptedto

determinewhocouldsuccessfully initiatepolicyproposals indecisionmakingwithrespecttothese issue

areas.2BachrachandBaratz(1962;1963)arguedthatDahlsapproachneglectedasecondfaceofpower

representedbythesuppressionofsomeissues,thus,ineffect,keepingthemfrombeingconsidered.That

isto

say,

keeping

them

off

the

agenda

of

the

decision

makers.

A

decade

later,

Lukes

(1974)

introduced

the

ideaofyetanother faceofpowerthe third face. Hepointedout thatoneway forA togetB todo

somethingBwouldnototherwisedoistoaffectBspreferences,wants,orthoughts.

Eachofthesesocalledfacesofpowerhassomerelevanceforthestudyofinternationalrelations.

The first face, focusedondecisionmakingwithrespecttospecific issues, isonviewanytime the foreign

policymakersofone country try to influencedecisionmaking in another country.3 The second face is

illustrated whenever an agenda item is suppressed by some countries despite the desires of other

countries. Andanexampleofthethirdfacemightbethe(alleged)abilityoftheUnitedStatestogetother

countriestoembracetheWashingtonconsensusorneoliberaleconomicviews. Thisthirdfaceofpower

isclosely

related

to

Nyes

concept

of

soft

power

and

to

Antonio

Gramscis

idea

of

hegemony.

(Lukes,

2005,2007).

The significance of the threefaces debate is easily and often exaggerated. Contrary to the

understanding of many, the three faces do not imply a need for fundamental reconceptualization of

power. Lukes himself admits that the three views can be seen as alternative interpretations and

adaptations of one and the same underlying concept of power, in which B is affected by A (Lukes,

1974:27).4 TheonefundamentaldifferencebetweenDahlsconceptofpowerandthatofLukeswasthe

lattersinsistencethatpowerbedefinedasdetrimentaltotheinterestsofB. Inthesecondeditionofhis

book,however,Lukesadmitsthat thisviewwasamistakeandadoptsapositionclosertoDahls (Lukes,

2005:1213;2007).

INTERNATIONAL

POWER

ANALYSIS

Althoughmanypoliticalscientistshavecontributedtothepoweranalysisrevolutionduringthepastfifty

years,very fewhavebeenstudentsof internationalrelations (Baldwin,1971b;Singer,1963).Haroldand

Margaret Sprout,whohadbeenproponentsof theelementsofnationalpower approach in theirearly

work (SproutandSprout,1945), later repudiated thatapproachandwereamong the first international

relationsscholarstocallforincorporationoftherelationalpowerapproachintothestudyofinternational

politics(SproutandSprout,1956,1962,1965).DespitetheeffortsoftheSproutsandothers,however,the

elementsofnationalpowerapproachisstilldeeplyembeddedintheinternationalrelationsliterature(e.g.,

Mearsheimer,2001;Waltz,1979).Thissituationhasgivenrisetoseveralproblemsintheanalysisofpower

intheinternationalarena,someofwhicharediscussedbelow.


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ThePotentialPowerProblem

The elements of national power approach to power analysis is a variant of the powerasresources

approach. Inthisapproach,powerresourcesare treatedas iftheywerepower itself.Oneproblemwith

thisapproachisthatwhatfunctionsasapowerassetinonesituationmaybeapowerliabilityinadifferent

situation.Planes

loaded

with

nuclear

bombs

may

be

worse

than

useless

in

asituation

calling

for

planes

withconventionalweaponswith insufficient time tounload thenuclearweaponsand reload theplanes

withconventionalones.Andthesamestockpileofarmsthatisusefulfordeterringonecountrymaytrigger

anarmsracewithanother.Similarly,whatconstitutesa 'goodhand' incardgamesdependsonwhether

oneisplayingpokerorbridge.

Discussionsofthecapabilitiesofstatesthatfailtodesignateorimplyaframeworkofassumptionsabout

who istrying(ormighttry)togetwhomtodowhatarecomparabletodiscussionsofwhatconstitutesa

good hand in cards without specifying which game is to be played. The Sprouts called this set of

assumptionsa'policycontingencyframework'(1965,1971).Focusingonthecapabilitiesofstatesissimply

awayofdrawingattentiontotheirpotentialpower.Itmakesnomoresensetotalkaboutstatecapabilities

ingeneralthantotalkaboutstatepowerwithout(explicitlyor implicitly)specifyingscopeanddomain.If

onewantstoestimatethepotentialpowerofGuatemala, ithelpstoknow,nay, it is imperativetoknow

whetheritconcernsaborderdisputewithEISalvadororatradeagreementwiththeUnitedStates.

Althoughitissometimessuggestedthatinsistenceonspecificationofthescopeanddomainofpotential

power relationshipsmakes prediction and or generalization nearly impossible (Guzzini, 2000; Keohane,

1986), this isnot true. Specificationof scope anddomain (orpolicycontingency frameworks)neednot

implyatheoreticalempiricism.Policycontingencyframeworksmaybedefinedmoreorlessbroadlytosuit

thepurposeoftheanalyst.AsNagel(1975:14)observes,'domainandscopeneednotbeparticularisticor

unique.Dependingonone'spurposeandthe limits imposedbyreality,theoutcomeclassmaycontaina

fewsimilarmembersormanydiverseelements'.Itis,ofcourse,possibletomakepredictionsorgeneralize

about thepotentialpowerofGuatemala (or similar states)without reference toGuatemala'sgoalsand

withoutreferencetothegoalsorcapabilitiesofotherstates;butitisnotclearwhyonewouldwanttodo

so.

Powerresourcesaretherawmaterialsoutofwhichpowerrelationshipsareforged.Although itmight

seem that the predictive value of power resource inventories is impaired by insistence on prior

specificationof scope anddomain, theopposite is true. The accuracyofone'sestimateofwhether an

architect

has

adequate

raw

materials

to

complete

his

or

her

project

is

likely

to

improve

if

one

first

ascertainswhetherthearchitectplanstobuildabirdhouseoracathedral.

Although it iscommonpractice to refer to the power resourcesor capabilitiesofa stateas if

theywerepossessionsofthestate,thispracticecanbemisleading. Strictlyspeaking,thepowerresources

ofastatearenotattributesofthestateinthesamesensethatpopulationorterritoryareattributes. To

designatesomething(time,reputation,weaponry,money,oil,andsoon)asapowerresourceistoimply

somethingabout itsusefulness ingettingotherstochangetheirbehaviorandthusto implysomething

about the value system and capabilities of these others. (Threats do not work very well against

masochists.)


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TheFungibilityProblem

'Fungibility'referstotheeasewithwhichpowerresourcesuseful inone issueareacanbeused inother

issueareas.Money inamarketeconomy istheprototypicalfungibleresource.Indeed,fungibility(that is,

liquidity)isoneofthedefiningcharacteristicsofmoney.5Inamarketeconomyonedoesnotusuallyneed

tospecify

the

scope

or

domain

of

the

purchasing

power

of

money

because

the

same

euro

(yen,

dollar,

etc.)

canbeusedtobuyacar,ameal,ahaircut,orabook.

Itissometimessuggestedthatpowerplaysthesameroleininternationalpoliticsthatmoneydoesina

marketeconomy(Deutsch,[1968]1988;Mearsheimer,2001;Wolfers,1962).Politicalpowerresources,of

course,dovaryindegreeoffungibility.Money,timeandinformationtendtobemorefungiblethanmost

otherpowerresourcesinthattheyareuseful inmanydifferentsituations.Totheextentthatthepower

money analogy leads to ignoring the need to specify scope and domain, however, it can be quite

misleadingforthepoliticalpoweranalyst(Baldwin,1989).

Somescholarshavesuggestedthatthefungibilityofpowerresourcesincreasesastheamountincreases

(Art, 1996;Waltz, 2000). Thus, power is said to bemore fungible for powerful states than forweaker

states. It is not clearwhat thismeansorwhy itmight be true. It is, of course, true thatmore power

resources allowone todomore things, that is, influencemore actors and/ormore issues.This implies

nothing about the fungibilityofanyparticularpower resource. Fungibility refers to theusesof agiven

amountofapowerresource,nottotheusesofvaryingamounts.Intheeconomicrealm,richpeoplecan

buymore thingsthanpoorpeople;butthis isnotbecausearichperson'sdollar ismore fungiblethana

poor person's dollar. The contention that fungibility increaseswith the amount of power resources is

basedeitherona confused conceptof fungibilityorona logic thathasyet tobe spelledout (Baldwin,

1999;Guzzini,1998).

TheProblemofIntentions

MaxWeber(1947:152)definedpoweras'theprobabilitythatoneactorwithinasocialrelationshipwillin

aposition to carryouthisownwilldespite resistance, regardlessof thebasisonwhich thisprobability

rests'.Thisdefinitionclearlymakesthe intentionsofactorAan importantpartoftheconceptofpower.

Manyof themost interesting and important questions in international relations concern the ability or

inabilityofgovernmentstorealizetheirgoals.CantheAllieswintheSecondWorldWar?CantheUnited

StatesgetothercountriestojointheUnitedNations?CanJapangetthemembersoftheUnitedNationsto

letitjoin?CanRussiagettheapprovalofmembercountriestojointheWorldTradeOrganization?Canthe

poorcountriesgettradepreferences fromtherich?Allsuchquestions involvetheabilityofcountriesto

realizetheirgoals.

Butwhat about unintended effects?When theUnited States FederalReserve system raises interest

rates, it usually intends to affect the American domestic economy; but the actual effects are likely to

reverberatearoundtheworld.Thereisnoquestionabouttherealityorimportanceofunintendedeffects

in international politics (Guzzini, 2000; Jervis, 1997; Strange, 1988). The question is whether the

conventionalconceptofpowercanaccountforsuchphenomena.Althoughintentionsareoftenbuiltinto


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thecausalconceptofpower,forexample,theWeberianversion,theyneednotbe.It isquitepossibleto

differentiatebetweensituationsinwhichAintentionallycausesachangeinB'sbehaviorandsituationsin

which A does so unintentionally (Baldwin, 1989; Frey, 1989). Relational power analysis is historically

indebted to theWeberian formulation,but it isnot logicallyboundby it. Thus, there isnoneed for a

fundamentalreformulationoftheconceptofpowerinordertoaccountforitsunintendedeffects.

Those who call for more attention to the unintended effects of power tend to imply that these

unintendedeffectsaredetrimental to the interestsof thoseaffected (BarnettandDuvall,2005;Guzzini,

2000; Strange, 1988). This is not necessarily so. The unintended effects can also be beneficial to the

interests of those affected.When theUnited States encourages tradewith other countries, it does so

primarilywith the intentionof improving itsowneconomicwelfare;but thismayhave theunintended

effectof improving thewelfareof its tradingpartnersalso.When theUnitedStates took steps todeter

Soviet nuclear attack onNorth America during the ColdWar, it did so primarilywith the intention of

providingforitsownsecurity;butthisactionhadtheunintendedeffectofprovidingforCanadiansecurity

also.6Whethertheunintendedeffectsoftheactions(orinactions)ofpowerfulstatestendstobebeneficial

ordetrimental

to

the

interests

of

those

affected

is

an

empirical

question.

It

should

be

answered

by

research,notbydefinitionorassertion.

TheMeasurementProblem

Before one canmeasure power, onemust first have a concept of power. In the field of international

relations,thedesiretomeasurepoweronasingledimensionthatwouldallowstatestoberankedoften

getsinthewayoforevenprecedesconceptualanalysis.Frey(1989)haspointedoutthatthedifficultyof

measuringpoweroften leads researchers to redefine it soas tomakeoperationalizationeasier. 'In this

fashion,power

has

frequently

been

defined

in

terms

of

supposed

resources

e.g.,

the

ability

to

mobilize

resources,possessionofresources,andother formsofwhatElster(I976:252)calls"generalizedfetichist

theories,"thatis,theoriesthatattempttoregardrelationsasproperties'(Frey,1989:78).Dahl(1984:21)

identifiesconfoundingpowerwithresourcesasafallacyinpoweranalysis,andanotherwriterlabelsitas

thevehiclefallacy(Morriss,2002:1819).

Asnotedabove,thereisnopoliticalcounterpartformoney.Thereisnostandardizedmeasurethat

facilitates reducing the various dimensions of power to a single dimension. Yet the desire tomeasure

powermakesthisaninconvenientfact:

Thesearchforanindexofnationalpowerhasbeenlargely,...basedontheassumptionthatitispossibleand

desirabletofindacurrencyofpolitics.Aseconomistsvieweconomictransactionsofallsortsandatalllevels

intermsofastandardizedunitofcurrency, ...so,theassumptionruns,mustthepoliticalscientistfindan

absolutescalealongwhichtoevaluatethe'power'ofnationstates.(MerrittandZinnes,1988:142)

It is thedesireof international relations scholars to rank theoverallpowerof states fromhighest to

lowest that generates the most difficult measurement problems. This requires comparing different

dimensionsofpowerrelationswithoutanyagreeduponwaytodothis.Somescholarscontendthatthe

questionof 'Who'snumberone?' isasuseful in international relationsas it is in sports (RayandVural,


9/35

1986).Itisnotclear,however,thatitiseithermeaningfulorusefultoaskthisquestionevenintherealm

of sports. Assessing athletic abilitywithout reference to a specified set of athletic activities is akin to

assessingpowerwithoutreferencetoscopeanddomain.Howisonetocompareagolfer,aswimmer,an

archer,arunnerandaweightlifter?AsDahl([1963,1984J1991:27)haspointedout,'itisdifficultenough

toestimaterelative influencewithinaparticularscopeanddomain; it isbynomeansclearhowwecan

"addup"

influence

over

many

scopes

and

domains

in

order

to

arrive

at

total,

or

aggregate,

influence'.

This

isequallytrueofattemptsto'addup'andcompareathleticaccomplishmentsindifferentsports.

Most indicesofoverallnationalpower relyprimarilyonGNP,butare sometimes supplementedwith

demographicandmilitarymeasures(MerrittandZinnes,1988).Thebestknownoftheseisthatdeveloped

by the Correlates of War Project (Singer, 1988). Such measures can be useful if they are set in an

appropriatepolicycontingencyframework. WhatmakestheCorrelatesofWarpower indexmoreuseful

thanmost such indices is that itwasdeveloped andhasusuallybeen applied in amilitary context. It

shouldbenoted,however, thatevenmilitary capabilitiesmayvarygreatly fromonepolicycontingency

frameworktoanother. Nuclearweapons, forexample,maybeuseful fordeterringattackbutmayhave

littleor

no

relevance

to

prevailing

in

acounter

insurgency

situation.

Although resources should not be confounded with power, they can be useful in measuring it.

CountrieswithlargeGrossDomesticProducts,forexample,arelikelytobeabletoinfluencemorepeople

with respect tomore issues thancountrieswithsmallerGDPs (ceterisparibus). Othermeasures of the

power of A with respect to B (domain) andwith respect to C (scope) can bemade on the following

dimensions:(1)theprobabilityofB'scompliance;(2)thespeedwithwhichBcomplies;(3)thenumberof

issuesincludedinC;(4)themagnitudeofthepositiveornegativesanctionprovidedbyA;(5)thecoststo

A; (6) the costs to B; and (7) the number of options available to B (Dahl, 1968; Frey, 1985, 1989). If

international relations researcherswere togiveup the search forauniversallyvalidmeasureofoverall

nationalpower,muchuseful research couldbe focusedonmeasuring thedistributionofpowerwithin

specifiedscopesanddomains.

POWERININTERNATIONALRELATIONSTHEORY

'Thepropositionthatthenatureof internationalpolitics isshapedbypowerrelations' isoften listedasa

'definingcharacteristicofRealism'(Wendt,1999:967).AsWendt(1999:97)pointsout,however,this is

notauniquecharacteristicofrealism.Neoliberals,Marxists,postmodernists,constructivists,dependency

theorists,globalistsand feministsall thinkpowermatters.Noattemptwillbemadehere to survey the

treatmentsofpowerrelationsinallofthesetheories.Thediscussionwillconfineitselftothreewellknown

andinfluentialtheoriesthebalanceofpower,neorealism,andoffensiverealism.


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ClassicBalanceofPowerTheory

The 'balanceofpower'wasusedbyThucydidestoexplaintheonsetof thePeloponnesianWar,wasthe

subjectof an essaybyDavidHume (1742) in theeighteenth century, and continues to fascinate inter

national relations theorists even today (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2005; Claude, 1989; Guzzini, 2000;

Kaufman,Little,

and

Wohlforth,

2007;

Little,

2007;

Moul,

1989;

Nexon,

2009;

Paul,

Wirtz,

and

Fortmann,

2004;Schweller,2006;Walt,1987;Waltz,1979).Althoughmanydifferent theoriescarry the 'balanceof

power' label, the term itself, 'implies that changes in relative political power can be observed and

measured'(Wright,1965:743).

Thequestionofpreciselywhatisbeingobservedandmeasured,however,hasremainedelusive.Inthe

nineteenth century Richard Cobden argued that the term 'balance of power' could 'be discarded as

fallacious,sinceitgivesnodefinitionwhetherbybreadthofterritory,numberofinhabitants,orextentof

wealthaccordingtowhich,inbalancingtherespectivepowers,eachstateshallbeestimated'(quotedin

Gulick,1955:27).Pollard(1923:58)concludedthattheterm'maymeanalmostanything;anditisusednot

only indifferentsensesbydifferentpeople,or indifferentsensesbythesamepeopleatdifferenttimes,

but in different senses by the same person at the same time'.Morgenthau (1960: 167) discussed the

balanceofpoweratlength,butadmittedtousingthetermtomeanfourdifferentthings.Oneistempted

todespairwhenonewriterdismissesthetermasmeaningless(Guzzini,2000),whileanothercontendsthat

theproblem is 'not that ithasnomeaning,butthat ithas toomanymeanings' (Claude,1962:13;Haas,

1953).Itisbeyondthelimitsofthischaptertoattemptclarificationofthisconceptualmorass.

Nomatterwhichversionofbalanceofpower theoryoneconsiders, the ideaofpowerasaproperty

rather than a relation is firmlyembedded. It couldhardlybeotherwise, sinceany attempt to interpret

balance of power theory using the relational concept of power would immediately encounter the

difficultiesflowingfromthemultidimensionalityofpowerandthelackofastandardizedmeasureofvalue

in terms ofwhich these dimensions could be expressed. Suppose a country drains resources from its

domesticeconomyinordertoincreaseitsmilitarystrength,astheSovietUniondid.Itsmilitarypowermay

be increasing at the same time, and partly because, its economicpower isdecreasing.How is one to

calculatetheneteffectontheoverallbalanceofpower,giventhedifficultyofaddingupvariousscopes

anddomainsofpower? It isprecisely thesedifficulties that leadGuzzini (1998,2000) topronounce the

termmeaningless.

Totheextentthatbalanceofpowertheoryhasbeenmeaningful,ithasbeenbasedonaconceptionof

power

as

a

particular

type

of

power

resource

used

in

a

particular

policy

contingency

framework,

that

is,

military forceconceived in thecontextofwarwinningability (Claude,1962;Gulick,1955;Mearsheimer,

2001;Morgenthau,[1948]1960;Walt,1987;Waltz,1979;Wright,1965:743ff).Theanalyticalperspective

ofrelationalpowerpromptsonetoask,'Powertogetwhomtodowhat?'Oneofthebenefitsofbringing

thisperspectivetobearonbalanceofpowertheoriesisthatitbringstolighttheunderlyingassumptions

that:(1)militaryforceisthemeasureofpower;and(2)warwinningiswhatmattersmost.Onlyafterthese

assumptionshavebeenmadeexplicitcanfruitfuldebateastotheirwisdomoccur.


11/35

Neorealism

The theory of neorealism (aka structural realism or defensive realism) developed by Waltz (I979)

dominateddiscussionsof international relationstheoryduringthe lastquarterof the twentiethcentury,

muchasMorgenthau's (1948)versionof the theoryof realismdominateddiscussionsduring theperiod

between1950

and

1975.

Overall

evaluation

of

neorealism

is

beyond

the

scope

of

this

chapter.

Instead,

the

focusisontheroleofpowerandcapabilitiesinthetheory.

Waltzadvancesa structural theoryof internationalpolitics.Oneof thedefiningcharacteristicsof the

structureof the international system is thedistributionof capabilities. Sincejudgmentsmustbemade

abouthowcapabilitiesaredistributed,Waltzmustconfrontthe issueofhowtomeasurethem.Realizing

that his theory requires the rank ordering of states according to their capabilities, he resists the

specificationofscopeanddomainnecessitatedbyarelationalnotionofpower.Rankingthecapabilitiesof

states ismuchharder ifpower(orcapability) isconceivedasmultidimensionaLThus,heassertsthat 'the

economic,military,andothercapabilitiesofnationscannotbesectoredand separatelyweighed' (1979:

131). He provides neither argument nor evidence to support the assertion that different kinds of

capabilities cannotbemeasured separately;he simply asserts it. Itmaybe thatWaltzhas inmind the

constraintsofhis theory in the sense thatpermitting capabilities tobeweighed separately couldmake

rankingstatesexcessivelydifficult.Waltzgoesontosaythat'statesarenotplacedinthetoprankbecause

theyexcelinonewayoranother.Theirrankdependsonhowtheyscoreonallofthefollowingitems:size

ofpopulationandterritory,resourceendowment,economiccapability,militarystrength,politicalstability

andcompetence.Statesspendalotoftimeestimatingoneanother'scapabilities,especiallytheirabilities

todoharm'(1979:131).Theuseoftheterm'score'isrevealing.Itimpliesameasuringrod,orstandard,in

termsofwhichthevariouselementsofnationalpowercanbeevaluated;butthereisnoindicationofwhat

thisstandard is.Theassertionthatstatesdevote'a lotoftimetoestimatingoneanother'scapabilities' is

unsupportedandcontestable.Thedefenseministriesofstatesformulatecontingencyplanswithrespectto

avarietyofpolicycontingencyframeworks,but it isunlikelythattheyspendmuchtimeestimatingeach

other's capabilities in general or without reference to actual or postulated situations. The idea that

AmericanpolicymakersspendalotoftimecalculatingthecapabilitiesofCanadaortheUnitedKingdomin

general, or in the abstract, seems rather farfetched. Still, these are empirical questions and are, in

principle,researchable.

Despite his admission that 'states have different combinations of capabilities which are difficult to

measure and compare' (1979: 131),Waltzproclaims that 'ranking states ...doesnot requirepredicting

their

success

in

war

or

in

other

endeavors.

We

need

only

rank

them

roughly

by

capability'.

This

assertion,

ofcourse,begsthequestionofhow'capabilities'aretobedefinedadefinitionthatWaltzneverprovides.

We are toldonly that capabilities are 'attributes of units' (1979: 98). Clearly, the relational concept of

powerorcapabilitiesisruledout,sincethatconceptofpowerdepictscapabilitiesaspotentialrelationships

ratherthanaspropertiesofasinglestate(orunit).Thequestionof'Capabilitytogetwhomtodowhat?'is

simplybegged;andthepowerasresourcesconceptunderlyingWaltz'stheorybecomesapparent.

At some level,however,most international relations theorists recognize thewisdomof the Sprouts

contention that 'without some setofgivenundertakings (strategies,policies),actualorpostulated,with

referencetosomeframeofoperationalcontingencies,actualorpostulated,therecanbenoestimationof


12/35

politicalcapabilities' (1965:215). Inmost treatmentsof theelementsofnationalpower in international

politics an implicit set of policycontingency assumptions can be identified, usually having to do with

military power. Just as Morgenthau's discussion of the elements of national power implies that war

winning is thestandardofjudgment (Baldwin,1993:1718),carefulreadingofWaltzgeneratesastrong

suspicionthatwarwinningabilityistheunstatedstandardbywhichstatesarebeingranked.Morgenthau's

contentionthat

'nations

active

in

international

politics

are

continuously

preparing

for,

actively

involved

in,

or recovering fromorganizedviolence in the formofwar' ([1948]1960:38) is remarkably similar to the

outlookinWaltz'sTheoryofInternationalPolitics.'Thepossibilitythatforcewillbeusedbyoneoranother

ofthepartiesloomsalwaysasathreatinthebackground.Inpoliticsforceissaidtobetheultimaratio.In

internationalpolitics forceserves,notonlyastheultimaratio,but indeedasthe firstandconstantone'

(Waltz,1979:113). 'Thedailypresenceof forceand recurrent relianceon itmark theaffairsofnations.

SinceThucydidesinGreeceandKautilyainIndia,theuseofforceandthepossibilityofcontrollingithave

been thepreoccupationsof internationalpolitical studies' (Waltz,1979:186).Given theabsenceofany

explicitstandardfor'scoring'thecapabilitiesofstatesinWaltz'stext,thereismorethanalittlereasonto

suspectthatwarwinningistheimplicitstandardbeingapplied.

Althoughthebook isnearlydevoidofreferencestothescholarly literatureonrelationalpower,atthe

endofTheoryofInternationalPolitics(1979:1912),almostasanafterthought,Waltzlaunchesaconfusing

andconfusedattackontherelationalconceptofpower:'Wearemisledbythepragmaticallyformedand

technologically influenced American definition of powera definition that equates powerwith control.

Power isthenmeasuredby theabilitytogetpeopletodowhatonewantsthem todowhenotherwise

theywouldnotdo it.'This isapuzzlingandmisleadingcriticism.It isunclearwhyWaltzusesthephrases

'pragmatically formed,' 'technologically influenced,'or 'American'. The relational conceptofpowerwas

developedbynonAmericansaswellasAmericans(Barry,1976;GoldmannandSjstedt,1979;Hagstrm,

2005;Lukes,1974;Weber,1947)andhasnointrinsicallyethnocentricbiases.Andneitherthemeaningnor

thesignificanceofpragmatismandtechnologyisselfevidentorexplained.

Waltzgoesontoassertthat'thecommonrelationaldefinitionofpoweromitsconsiderationofhowacts

and relationsareaffectedby the structureofactionwhich isnotnecessarily true,and thatunintended

effectsareruledoutofconsideration,whichistrueofsomeversionsofrelationalpowerbutnotothersas

notedabove.

'According to the common American definition of power, a failure to get one's way is proof of

weakness.'Inasensethisistrue.Actorsthatconsistentlytryandfailtoinfluenceotheractorsareunlikely

tobeviewedaspowerful.Indeed,Waltzhimselfappearstobelievethis,sincehe laterobservesthat 'the

strongergettheirwaynotalways,butmoreoftenthantheweaker'(Waltz,1993).

Waltzthenasks: 'Whatthencanbesubstitutedforthepracticallyand logicallyuntenabledefinition? I

offertheoldandsimplenotionthatanagent ispowerfultotheextentthatheaffectsothersmorethan

theyaffecthim.'Thereare several remarkableaspectsof thisproposeddefinitionofpower.First,after

rejectingbothcausaland relationalconceptsofpower,heproposesadefinition that isbothcausaland

relational. Second, thenotionproposed is similar to thoseespousedbyDeutsch (1953,1963) and Frey

(1985),bothofwhom saw themselves as contributing to thedevelopmentof the relational conceptof

power.Third, it is inconsistentwith the statement in theverynextparagraph that 'theextentofone's


13/35

powercannotbeinferredfromtheresultsonemayormaynotget'.Andfourth,theproposedconceptof

powerseemstohavelittleornothingtodowiththeconceptsofpowerandcapabilityusedthroughoutthe

earliersectionsofthebook.Ifcapabilityisdefinedasthepotentialpowertoaffectothersmorethanoneis

affectedbyothers,itisnolongerapropertyofasingleactor.

Eventhe

critics

of

neorealism

credit

it

with

having

enhanced

the

clarity

and

rigor

of

the

realist

theoretical tradition (Keohane, 1986).With respect to its treatment of power and capability,however,

Theory of International Politics seems to have introduced a considerable amount of confusion, and

contradiction.

OffensiveRealism

Offensiverealism(Mearsheimer,2001)differentiates itselffromboththerealismofMorgenthauandthe

neorealismofWaltz. AlthoughbothMorgenthauandMearsheimerdepictstatesasstrivingtomaximize

theirpower,7

the

former

attributes

this

to

alust

for

power,

while

the

latter

views

it

as

anecessary

consequenceof theanarchical international system. AndalthoughbothWaltzandMearsheimerderive

stategoalsfromthestructureoftheinternationalsystem,theformerviewsstatesaspursuingonlyenough

security to assure survival,while the latter depicts them as seeking all the power they can get with

hegemonyastheirultimategoal(Mearsheimer,2001:22).

ForMearsheimer, calculationsaboutpower lieattheheartofhowstatesthinkabouttheworld

aroundthem. Poweristhecurrencyofgreatpowerpolitics,andstatescompeteforitamongthemselves.

Whatmoney istoeconomics,power isto internationalrelations(2001:17). Likeotherrealists, including

MorgenthauandWaltz,Mearsheimerviewspower largely inmilitary terms. Unlike them,however,his

emphasis on military force is quite explicit: In international politics, . . . a states effective power is

ultimately a functionof itsmilitary forces . . . . The balance of power is largely synonymouswith the

balanceofmilitarypower. Idefinepower largely inmilitarytermsbecauseoffensiverealismemphasizes

that force is theultima ratioof internationalpolitics (Mearsheimer,2001:5556). It isnotjustmilitary

powerthatmattersforoffensiverealism,itislandpower. Armiesmattermorethannaviesorairforces

becauseoftheirsuperiorabilitytoconquerandcontrolland,whichisthesupremepoliticalobjectiveina

worldofterritorialstates(86).

Criticsofrealismoftenportray itasemphasizingthematerialbasesofnationalpower. Although

suchcharacterizationsaresomewhatunfairtoMorgenthauandWaltz,thisisnotthecasewithrespectto

offensive realism. ForMearsheimer, power represents nothingmore than specific assets ormaterial

resourcesthatareavailabletoastate(57).

LikeWaltz,MearsheimerconsidersandexplicitlyrejectsDahlsrelationalconceptofpower,which

heviewsasequatingpowerwithoutcomes. Accordingtothislogic,heasserts,powerexistsonlywhena

state exercises control or influence, and therefore it can be measured only after the outcome is

determined (p.57). This issimplywrong. Capabilityanalysismaybedifficult,but it isnot impossible

whichMearsheimer seems toadmitwhenhedescribesattempts todetermine thebalanceofpower in

advanceasalmostimpossible(60).


14/35

Offensive realismhas little to sayabout statesability toachievegoalsother than survival. The

conceptofpowerembedded inthistheory iszerosumandbasedon thematerialresources relevantto

conquering and controlling land, which it considers the supreme political objective of states (86).

Regardlessofwhetheroneagreeswiththisviewornot,ithasthegreatmeritofmakingitspremisesand

muchof

its

logic

explicit.8

CURRENT

ISSUES

The studyofpower in international relationshas generatedanumberof issues. Among theseare the

following:polarityandbalancing,theroleofmilitaryforce,structuralpowerandconstructivism.

Polarityand

Balancing

TheendoftheColdWarandthedisintegrationofoneofthesuperpowers inabipolarworldtriggered

renewed interest inbalanceofpower theory. Could the theoryor somevariant thereofexplain the

abruptendof theColdWar? Wasbalanceofpower theory relevant toapost coldWarworld? Could

balanceofpowertheorypredictthefutureevolutionoftheinternationalsystem?

Somepredictedthatbalanceofpowerdynamicswould leadtoamultipolardistributionofpower

(Layne, 1993;Mearsheimer, 1990;Waltz, 1993),whileothersexpected the postColdWarworld tobe

characterizedbyunipolarism(Ikenberry,Mastanduno,andWohlforth,2009;Wohlforth,1999). Brooksand

Wohlforth(2008)

contend

that

the

disparity

in

power

between

the

United

States

and

other

countries

is

so

greatthattheworldisunipolarandlikelytoremainsoforalongtime.

Othershavearguedthatthepowerbalancingprocesscontinuestooperateusingmethodsother

thantraditionalmilitarycapabilityadjustments. Thissoftbalancingprovidesacheckonthepowerofthe

UnitedStates(Pape,2005;Paul,2005).

The renewedattention to thebalanceofpowerduring the last twentyyearshasnotgenerated

much consensus among scholars. Onewriterobserves that recentworkon the subject suggests that,

despitedecadesofattemptstogivegreateranalyticalprecisiontothephrasesbalancingandbalanceof

power,therehasnotbeenmuchprogress(Nexon,2009:334). Othersscholarsfindthatbothsystemic

outcomes and state behavior directly contradict the core balanceofpower hypothesis that balancing

behaviorpreventssystemichegemony(Wohlforthetal,2007). Eventhequestionofwhat ismeantbya

polehasbeencontested. AccordingtoWagner:

It is a remarkable fact that, in spite of all the discussion and debate about bipolarity and

multipolarity,nottomentionthepossibleconsequencesofunipolarity,sincetheendofthecold

war, neitherWaltz nor anyone else has ever specifiedwhat the polarity of an international

system refers to.And thereforenoonehaseverpresented a valid argument in supportof the

claimthatstatesbehavedifferentlyinsystemswithdifferentpolarities(Wagner,2007:21;1993).9


15/35

MilitaryPower

Many writers have commented on the preoccupation with military force by students of international

politicsdown through the ages (Art andWaltz, [1971]1999;Baldwin,1989;Osgood andTucker, 1967;

Sproutand

Sprout,

1945,

1962,

1965;

Wagner,

2007;

Waltz,

1979;

Wright,

1955,

[1942]

1965).

Although

warisanimportantphenomenonthatinternationalrelationsscholarsregardastheirspecialprovince,the

fieldofinternationalrelationshaspaidapriceforitspreoccupationwithmilitaryforce.Theimportanceof

militaryforcehasbeenexaggerated;theroleofnonmilitaryformsofpowerhasbeenunderestimated;and

thefieldofinternationalrelationshasbeenimpoverishedbyitsinsulationfromstudiesofpowerinother

realms.

The privileged place of military power in the study of international politics is demonstrated and

reinforced by references to the 'centrality' of force to international politics (Art, 1996; Baldwin, 1999;

Wagner,2007);tothestudyofpoweras'astudyofthecapacitytowagewar'(Cline,[1975]1997);toforce

as'the

ultimate

form

of

power'

(Gilpin,

1975,

1981);

or

to

international

security

studies

as

'the

study

of

the

threat,use,andcontrolofmilitaryforce'(Walt,1991:212).EvenKeohaneandNye([1977]2001:15),who

have criticized the traditional emphasis on military force, depict force as dominating other means of

power.

Thetendencytosingleoutforceastheultimatemeasuringrodtowhichotherformsofpowershouldbe

compared is anathema to the approach advocated by LasswelI and Kaplan (1950: ix, 76, 85, 92, 94).

Althoughtheygave'specialconsiderationtotheroleofviolence',theyrepeatedlydeniedthatpowerrests

'always,orevengenerally,onviolence';andtheymaintained'thatpowermayrestonvariousbases';that

'noneoftheformsofpowerisbasictoalltheothers';andthat'politicalphenomenaareonlyobscuredby

thepseudosimplification

attained

with

any

unitary

conception

of

power

as

always

and

everywhere

the

same'.DespitethevigorouseffortsofLasswellandKaplanand the traditionofrelationalpoweranalysis

theyspawned,thecontemporary literatureon internationalrelationsoftenexhibitsthesametendencies

toexaggeratetheroleofmilitarypowerasdidearlierworks(Baldwin,1995;Mearsheimer,2001;Rayand

Vural,1986;Walt,1991;Waltz,1979).

Thepreoccupationwithmilitaryforceinthestudyofinternationalpoliticshasledtotheneglectofnon

militaryformsofpower,suchaseconomicstatecraft(Baldwin,1985).Inaddition, ithas ironically limited

understandingofmilitarystatecraft itself.Thequestionofwhenmilitaryforceshouldbeusedcannotbe

answeredwithoutconsiderationofalternativeinstrumentsofstatecraft(Baldwin,1995;1999/2000).Thus,

theneglect

of

non

military

forms

of

power

has

hampered

understanding

of

the

conditions

under

which

militaryforceshouldbeused.

Structuralvs.RelationalPower

Therelationalpowerapproachhasbeencriticizedbothforneglectingthestudyofstructuralpowerandfor

itsallegedinabilitytotakeaccountofstructuralpower(Guzzini,1993,2000;Strange,1988).Totheextent

thatstructuralpowerisviewedasunrelatedtohumanagencyorbasedonanoncausalnotionofpower,it


16/35

would be fair to say that relational power and structural power represent fundamentally different

approachestothestudyofpower.Otherwise,therelationalconceptofpower isquitecapableoftaking

accountofpowerstructures.

If structural power refers to unintentional power or to power with respect to the creation and/or

controlof

structures

(Guzzini,

1993;

Krasner,

1985;

Strange,

1988),

there

is

no

need

to

seek

an

alternative

totherelationalconceptofpower.Thefirstmeaningcanbetakencareofbyexcludingintentionalityfrom

the concept of power, as noted above. And the second meaning of structural power can easily be

accounted forbyproperspecificationofscopeanddomain.Thecreationand/orcontrolof structures is

simplyaninstanceofinfluencewithaparticularscopeanddomain.

The study of power structures does present difficulties for the relational notion of power if such

structuresaredepictedasunidimensionalandmonolithicandunspecifiedastoscopeanddomain.Thus,

the idea of a single power structure dominating all issue areas and all domains to an equal degree is

difficulttoreconcilewiththerelationalpowerapproach.Somediscussionsof'hegemony' in international

relationsseem

to

imply

this

view.

There

is

no

reason,

however,

why

structures,

defined

as

persistent

patterns of power relationships in specified scopes and domains, cannot be usefully studied using the

relational conceptofpower (Frey, 1971). It isworthnoting that Lasswell and Kaplan (1950)devoted a

wholechapterto'structures'.

Constructivismvs.Rationalism

Howdoesthedebatebetweenconstructivismandrationalismintersectwithpoweranalysisinthestudyof

international relations? It depends onwhich of themany versions of constructivism one examines. If

constructivismis

viewed

as

rejecting

human

agency

and

causal

concepts

and

theories,

there

is

very

little

overlap. The postmodernist followers of Michel Foucault, for example, may find the relational power

approach of little interest. Subscribers toWendt's (1999) version of constructivism, however,will find

muchgristfortheirmillintherelationalpowerliterature.Wendt(1999:97)dividesinternationalrelations

theoriesintothosethatemphasize'brutematerialforces'asbasesofpowerandthosethatviewpoweras

'constitutedprimarilybyideasandculturalcontexts'.10

Fromitsinception,therelationalpowerapproachhasincludedbothmaterialandnonmaterialbasesof

power.LasswellandKaplan(1950:87)citedrespect,rectitude,affectionandenlightenmentasbasevalues

ofpowerandinfluence;andtheydevotedawholechapterto'symbols'.AndDahl([1963,1984J1991:35)

includesinformation,friendship,socialstandingandtherighttomakelawsinadditiontothreatsofforce

andmoneyinalistofpoliticalpowerresources.

Inaddition,norms,values,ideasandculturalcontextshavefiguredprominentlyintherelationalpower

approach.Amongthefactorsthatapoweranalystmightwanttoexamine inexplainingpowerrelations,

Dahl (1968: 412) included values, attitudes, expectations, decisionmaking rules, structures and

constitutions. No constructivist is more emphatic about the importance of cultural context in power

analysisthanareLasswellandKaplan(1950:85,94):


17/35

Inparticular,itisofcrucialimportancetorecognizethatpowermayrestonvariousbases,differingnotonly

fromculturetoculture,butalsowithinaculturefromonepowerstructuretoanother.

Noneoftheformsofpowerisbasictoalltheothers. Aspatternsofvaluationinaculturearemodified,

andchangescomeaboutinthesocialorderandtechnology,nowoneformofpowerandnowanother,plays

afundamentalrole. Politicalanalysismustbecontextual,andtakeaccountofthepowerpracticesactually

manifested

in

the

concrete

political

situation.

Insum, far frombeingabattlegroundfor thedueling forcesofconstructivismandrationalism,power

analysismaybeapointofconvergenceforatleastsomemembersofeachcamp.

Noting that Wendt does not discuss the meaning of power, let alone provide a rival

conceptualization of it, Berenskoetter (2007:22n) concludes that Wendts promise to present an

alternative understanding of power constituted primarily by ideas and cultural contexts rather than

brutematerial forcesremainsunfulfilled. Guzzini (2007:23),however,statesthat constructivisimhas

putsomeorder into itsownpowerconcepts,whichusuallycomeasvariationson the themeofLukes

plus

Foucault.

He

cites

only

articles

by

himself

(1993)

and

by

Barnett

and

Duvall

(2005)

in

support

of

this

assertion.11

Barnett and Duvall (2005) contend that the discipline has shown conceptual favoritism by

conceivingofpowerastheabilityofoneactortogetanothertodosomethinghewouldotherwisenotdo.

Their characterization of this as a realist conception of power is puzzling since realism is usually

associatedwiththepowerasresourcesapproachratherthantherelationalpowerapproachandsincethe

twomostprominentrealists,WaltzandMearsheimer,bothexplicitlyrejectarelationalconceptofpower.

TheconceptofpowerproposedbyBarnettandDuvall(2005:42)isasfollows:

Power is the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the

capacitiesofactorstodeterminetheircircumstancesandfate.

Theyconcedethatthisconceptisrestrictedincomparisonwithanalternativeviewthatseespowerasthe

productionofanyandalleffectsandthusasnearlysynonymouswithcausality. Whatdoesthisalternative

approach include thatBarnettandDuvall leaveout? It includes social relationsofjointaction through

mutualagreementandinteractionsinwhichoneactorisabletoconvinceanotheractortoaltervoluntarily

andfreelyitsbeliefs,interests,oraction. Theythusadmitthattheirproposedconceptofpowerexcludes

bothcooperationandpersuasion. Theyjustifythisexclusionbyassertingthatmostscholarsinterestedin

powerare

concerned

not

simply

with

how

effects

are

produced,

but

rather

with

how

these

effects

work

to

theadvantageofsomeandthedisadvantageofothers. Thisviewofpowerasworkingtotheadvantageof

AandthedisadvantageofB,ofcourse,isthesameasthatespousedbyLukesin1974andrepudiatedby

himin2005.

Although Barnett and Duvall depict their concept of power as broader than Dahls, it is actually

narrower in at least three respects: First, it excludes persuasion; whereas Dahls concept includes it.

Second,itexcludescooperationformutualgain,whichDahlsconceptdoesnot. Andthird,itexcludesall

powerrelationsinwhichAspowerbenefitstheinterestsofB.


18/35

POWER

ANALYSIS

AND

POLICY

RELEVANCE

The twodominant traditions inpower analysis in international relationshavebeendescribed above in

termsof

the

elements

of

national

power

approach,

which

depicts

power

as

resources,

and

the

relational

powerapproach,whichdepictspowerasanactualorpotential relationship.Which ismore likely tobe

usefultopolicymakers?Nye(1990:26;2011:240)suggeststhattherelationalpowerapproachislikelyto

seem 'too ephemeral' to 'practical politicians and leaders'. The idea of power as the 'possession of

resources', he contends, holds more appeal for policymakers because it 'makes power appear more

concrete,measurable,andpredictable'thandoestherelationaldefinition.'Powerinthissense,'henotes,

'meansholdingthehighcardsintheinternationalpokergame.'

A case can be made, however, for the opposite conclusion. It is the elements of national power

approachthathasprovedusefulintheCorrelatesofWarProject.Variousstudiesbasedonthisprojectof

numerouswars

during

the

past

500

years

(Small

and

Singer,

1982;

Stam,

1996;

Wang

and

Ray,

1994)

have

producedusefulknowledgeaboutthecausesandoutcomesofwar.Policymakers,however,tendtohave

notoriouslyshorttimehorizons.Iftheyareconsideringgoingtowar,itisnotveryhelpfultopointoutthat

iftheyfightfiftywarsduringthenextcentury,theyare likelytowinmostofthem.Noraretheylikelyto

caremuchaboutwhat factorswere important inmostof thewars for thepast500years.Mostpolicy

makersarelikelytobeinvolvedinonlyonewar.Theywanttoknowwhethertheircountryislikelytowina

particular war, fought in a particular context, during a particular time period, against a particular

adversary. The gross inventory of American elements of national powerwas not only of little help in

predictingtheoutcomeoftheVietnamWar,itwasquitemisleading.TheUnitedStatesmayhavebeenthe

greatestpowerinthehistoryoftheworld,butitwasillequippedtofightaguerillawarinafarawayland

withlanguage,

culture

and

history

that

it

understood

poorly.

In

that

situation,

arelational

power

approach,

settingthecapabilityestimateinthecontextofarelevantpolicycontingencyframework,wouldprobably

havebeenmoreusefultoAmericanforeignpolicymakers.Contextmatters,andpolicymakers,aspractical

people,arelikelytounderstandthismorereadilythanacademics.Itispermissibletodepictthe elements

ofpowerasholdingthehighcardsinaninternationalcardgame,butitisimpermissibletoimplythatthere

isonlyonekindofcardgameininternationalpolitics.Ifthenameofthegameisbridge,thepersonwith

thegoodpokerhandmaybeinbigtrouble.Policymakersneedtoknowthenameofthegameinorderto

evaluatethestrengthoftheirhands.12

FUTURE

RESEARCH

DIRECTIONS

Poweranalysisintersectswithalmosteverymajorresearchprogramininternationalrelations.Itwouldbe

impossibleto identifyallofthepromisingavenuesofresearchforthepoweranalystduringthenextten

yearsorso.Thosediscussedheredonotbegintoexhaustthepossibilitiesforfruitfulresearch.


19/35

PowerRelationsasDependentVariables

Powermaybetreatedaseitheradependentoranindependentvariable(Dahl,1968).Dahl's(1961)classic

studyofcommunitypowerwasentitledWhoGoverns? Inthisstudy,powerwastreatedasadependent

variable.The studybegan, as the title implies,with theassumption thatpowerwasbeingexercisedby

thosewho

govern

and

proceeded

to

ask,

'By

whom?';

'On

what

issues?';

'How?';

and

so

on.

International

relations scholars may want to devote more attention to power as a dependent variable. Instead of

focusing on how a given power distribution affects regime formation or war initiation, international

relations scholarscoulddevotemoreattention toquestions like 'Whohaspowerwith respect towhich

otheractors,onwhichissues?''Bywhatmeansisthispowerexercised?'And'Whatresourcesallowstates

toexercise thispower?'Agoodexampleof thiskindof research isCoxand Jacobson's (1973) studyof

influence in internationalorganizations.Theyfocusonthedistributionof influence,different issueareas,

and different time periods. They also examine the bases of power of various actors. Students of

internationalrelationsneedtodevotemoreattentiontotreatingpowerasadependentvariableandless

totreatingitasanindependentvariable(cf.CaporasoandHaggard,1989).

FormsofPower

Preoccupationwithmilitarypowerhas led studentsof international relations toneglectother formsof

power.

Softpower The term 'softpower'was introduced byNye (1990) andhas been popularized byhim in

ensuingyears(2004;2007;2011).Heusedittocallattentiontotheabilitytoget'otherstowantwhatyou

want'(Nye,1990:312).Notingthatthisabilitytoaffectthepreferencesofothers'tendstobeassociated

with intangiblepowerresourcessuchasculture, ideology,and institutions',hedistinguished it from 'the

hardcommandpowerusuallyassociatedwithtangibleresourceslikemilitaryandeconomicstrength.

Inlaterwritingsonsoftpower,Nyeemphasizedattraction:What issoftpower? Itistheability

togetwhatyouwant throughattraction rather thancoercionorpayments (2004:x). InTheFutureof

Power Nye(2011:2021)offered alonger,moreformaldefinitionoftheconcept:

Fullydefined,softpoweristheabilitytoaffectothersthroughthecooptivemeansofframingthe

agenda,persuading,andelicitingpositiveattractioninordertoobtainpreferredoutcomes.

Apparently,thetangibilityofresourcesisnotanessentialdefiningcharacteristicofsoftpower,but

ratheranempiricalassociation. Militaryforce,whichmanyunderstandtobetheprototypicalexampleof

hardpower,onlyappearstobeadefiningcharacteristicofhardpower(Nye,2007:167),sinceitcanalso

beused toproduce softpower. This amalgamationof thediscussionofdefining characteristicsof soft

powerwithempiricalobservationsabout ithasgeneratedneedlessconfusion.13 Futureresearchonsoft

powershouldclearlydistinguishbetweendefinitionalmattersandempiricalones.

AlthoughNyesometimesreferstohimselfashavingcoinedthetermsoftpower,atothertimes

heclaimstohaveintroducedtheconcept(2007;2004;2011). Theformerassertion istrue,the latteris


20/35

not. Thereisadifferencebetweencoiningaphraseand inventingaconcept. Theconceptofinfluencing

someonebyshapingthatpersonspreferencesgettingthemtowantwhatyouwanthasdeephistorical

roots,whichhavebeenexploredbyGallarotti(2010b).

Nye (2004:150)suggeststhatthe idea buildsonwhatPeterBachrachandMortonBaratzcalled

thesecond

face

of

power.

(Bachrach

and

Baratz,

1963:

632

42).

Those

familiar

with

the

faces

of

power

debate,however,willrecognizethattheconceptofsoftpowerisclosertoLukesthirdfaceofpowerthan

tothesecond.

Furtherresearchwouldalsobehelpedbyrecognitionthatthere is littlenew inthe ideaofsoftpower

fromthestandpointoftheliteratureonrelationalpower.AlloftheformsofsoftpowerdiscussedbyNye

arefamiliartorelationalpoweranalysts.Furtherresearchonsoftpowershouldbemorefirmlyrooted in

thatliterature.

Positivesanctions Positivesanctionsareactualorpromisedrewards.Mostoftheresearchonpower in

internationalrelations

focuses

on

negative

sanctions,

i.e.,

actual

or

threatened

punishments

(Baldwin,

1971a).Despite anumberof recentworkson the roleofpositive sanctions (Cartwright,1997;Crumm,

1995;J.Davis,2000;P.Davis,1999;KahlerandKastner,2006;Long,1996;Newnham,2000;Nincic,2010;

Solingen,2011),theopportunitiesforfurtherresearchareenormous.

Comparative influence techniques The instruments of statecraftdiplomatic, economic, military and

symbolictendtobestudiedseparately.Thisisahindrancefromthestandpointofboththeoryandpolicy

relevance.Without comparative researchon techniquesof statecraft, theorists can say little about the

utilityofvariouspolicyinstruments.Ifthesuccessrateofeconomicsanctionsisestimatedat34percent,

shouldoneconcludethatpolicymakersarefoolsforusinganinstrumentwithsuchalowrateofsuccess?

Oristhisaboutthebestthatcanbeexpectedofanyinstrumentofstatecraft?Thereislittleornoreliable

dataoncomparativesuccessratesofinstrumentsofstatecraft.

Policymakershave littleuseforresearchfindingsregardingonetechniqueofstatecraft.Policymakers

need informationthatwillhelp themchooseamongalternativepolicyoptions.Thus,what theywantto

knowis:Howsuccessfulisagivenpolicyinstrumentlikelytobe,withrespecttowhichgoalsandtargets,at

whatcost,andincomparisonwithwhichpolicyalternatives?Withoutcomparativestudiesoftechniquesof

statecraft,itishardtoanswersuchquestions(Baldwin,1999/2000).

Militaryforce Despitetheemphasisonmilitaryforceintheliteratureoninternationalpolitics,muchwork

remains tobedone.Threeproblemsareespeciallydeservingof further research.First, thequestionof

whether theutilityofmilitary force isdecliningneedsattention.The groundwork for this researchwas

providedby Knorr (1966:5) long ago.Thebasicquestions tobe askedwere identified as follows: 'How

muchhasit[i.e.,force]lostinutility,iftherehasbeenanylossatall?Andutilityforwhatpurpose?Andto

whom? And under what, if not all, circumstances? And military power in all its forms and modes of

employment,oronlyinsome?'UtilityfortheeconomistKnorr,naturally,wasafunctionofbothcostsand

benefits.Recentstudiesthatpurporttosaysomethingabouttheutilityofmilitarypowerwhiledevoting

littleornoattention to thecostsofusing forcecanbequitemisleading (e.g.,Art,1996;ArtandWaltz,


21/35

[1971]1999;Pape,1996).ThebookonthecostsofthewarinIraq byJosephE.StiglitzandLindaJ.Bilmes

(2008)entitledTheThreeTrillionDollarWarconstitutesamajorstepintherightdirection.

Second,thefungibilityofmilitaryforceneedsfurtherstudy.Towhatextentcanmilitaryforcebeusedto

exercise influence inwhich situations?Although it is usually assumed that force is quite fungiblewith

respectto

military

issues

and

conflicts,

this

assumption

needs

to

be

questioned.

Wars

and

militarized

conflicts come inavarietyof sizesand shapesguerillawar, civilwar, limited conventionalwar, limited

nuclearwar,chemicalandbiologicalwarfare,largescalenuclearwarfare,deterrentsituations,etc.Itisnot

clearthatthemilitarypowerresourcesusefulinonetypeofwarcaneasilybetransferredtoanothertype.

Thus, more studies of the use of particular types of military power in different policycontingency

frameworksareneeded(BymanandWaxman,2002).

The third problem concerns the question of how to define andmeasuremilitary success (Baldwin,

1999/2000;BymanandWaxman,2002;JohnsonandTierney,2006).Despitethevoluminousliteratureon

war,verylittleattentionhasbeendevotedtoexplicatingtheconceptofsuccess.Theideathat'everywar

hasawinner'

is

deeply

embedded

in

the

literature

on

military

force.

The

persistence

of

the

zero

sum

conceptofmilitaryconflictistroublesomesinceitisincompatiblewithmanyofthetopicsdominatingthe

scholarlyresearchagendaduringthepastfiftyyears.AsSchelling(1984:269)notes:Deterrence...

ismeaninglessinazerosumcontext.Soissurrender;soaremostlimitedwarstrategies;andsoarenotions

likeaccidentalwar,escalation,preemptivewar,andbrinkmanship.Andofcoursesoarenearlyallalliance

relationships,armsracephenomena,andarmscontrol.Thefactthatwarhurtsthatnotalllossesofwarare

recoverablemakeswaritselfadramatically nonzerosumactivity.

Institutions

and

Power

Powercanbeexercisedintheformationandmaintenanceofinstitutions,throughinstitutions,withinand

amonginstitutions.Institutionsmayreflectpowerrelations,constrainthem,orprovidethebasisfortheir

existence.TowhatextentdotheWorldBankandtheInternationalMonetaryFundserveasinstrumentsof

American foreignpolicy?TowhatextentdoestheUnitedNationsenhancethepowerofsomecountries

and constrain the power of others? To what extent does the World TradeOrganization constrain US

power?TowhatextentdoesitstrengthenUSpower?HowispowerdistributedwithintheEuropeanUnion

(GarrettandTsebelis,1999;HollerandWidgren,1999;SteunenbergetaI.,1999)?Towhatextentdointer

national institutionsexercisepowerratherthanmerelyreflecting it(Mearsheimer,1994/95)?Allofthese

questionsprovide

arich

research

agenda

for

the

study

of

institutions

and

power

relations

(Martin

and

Simmons,1998).

DomesticPolitics

Howdoesdomesticpoliticsaffectnationalpower?Evenclassicelementsofnationalpowerapproaches

included national morale, quality of government, public support and political stability among the


22/35

determinantsofacountry'spower(Morgenthau,[1948]1960).Doesregimetypematter?Aredemocracies

atadisadvantage in internationalbargaining?How, ifatall,doesdividedgovernmentaffectacountry's

internationalbargainingposition?Although the conventional realistwisdomhasdepicteddemocracy as

hampering theefficientconductof foreignpolicy,recentstudieshavecalledthisview intoquestionand

opened new lines of research on the relationship between domestic politics and the exercise of

internationalpower

(Fearon,

1994,

1998;

Lake,

1992;

Mansfield

et

aI.,

2000;

Martin,

2000;

Miiner,

1997,

1998;MilnerandRosendorff,1996;Mo,1995).

StrategicInteractionandBargaining

Thebarebonesspecificationofpower intermsofAcausingachange inB'sbehavior iscompatiblewith

strategic interaction, but it neither calls attention to strategic interaction nor requires taking it into

account. This is unfortunate, since most of what interests students of international politics involves

strategic interaction.Oneofthemost importantresearchneeds is linkingtherelationalpower literature

withresearch

on

international

strategic

interaction

(e.g.,

Martin,

2000;

Milner,

1997,

1998;

Mo,

1995;

Powell,1999;2004).14

This isnottosuggest,however,thatgametheory istheonlywaytoanalyzestrategic interaction.The

workofJervis(1997),LakeandPowell(1999),Larson(1998),Schelling(1984)andothershasdemonstrated

the value of nonmathematical approaches to strategic interaction. Game theory is a useful tool for

analyzingstrategicinteraction,buttheanalysisofinternationalstrategicinteractionistooimportanttobe

left togame theoristsalone.AsLakeandPowellobserve: 'The strategicchoiceapproach is theoretically

inclusive....[It]providesafoundationforintegratingandsynthesizingmanyotherwisecompetingtheories

ofinternationalrelations'(1999:6).

DistributionofPower

Thequestionofhowpower isdistributedneeds tobestudiedusingthe relationalpowerapproach.The

work of Frey (1971, 1985, 1989) is especially relevant to this line of research. Rather than striving to

produceyetanotherglobalrankingofthesocalled'overallpower'ofeverycountryintheworld,scholars

needtofocusonpowerdistributionswithinspecifiedissueareasandperhapswithinspecifiedregions.To

theextentthatpersistentpatternsarefound,issuerelevantstructuresofpowermaybeidentified.Rather

than trying to identify a single overall international power structure, scholars should strive to identify

multiple structuresofpower indifferent issueareas.15

Admittedly, such researchwillnot try toprovide

answerstothequestionof'Who'snumberoneinthegameofinternationalpoker?'Butsimplyredirecting

attention away from that kind of questionwould, in itself, constitute progress in international power

analysis.


23/35

CONCLUSION

Power has figured importantly in discussions of international interaction since the time of Thucydides.

Despitethelongtraditionofpoweranalysisininternationalpolitics,scholarlyagreementonthenatureof

powerand itsrole in internationalrelations is lacking.Thetwoprincipalapproachestopoweranalysis in

internationalinteraction

have

been

the

'power

as

resources'

(or

'elements

of

national

power')

approach

andthe'relationalpower'approach.Thelatterwasdevelopedduringthelasthalfofthetwentiethcentury

by scholars in philosophy and a variety of social science disciplines. Both approaches are evident in

contemporaryinternationalrelationsscholarship.

Althoughpowerisanancientfocusinthestudyofinternationalrelations,therearemanyopportunities

for furtherresearch.These include (I) the treatmentofpowerasadependentvariable; (2)the formsof

power;(3)institutionsandpower;(4)domesticpoliticsandpower;(5)strategicinteraction;and(6)power

distributionsindifferentissueareas.

Althoughscholarlyagreementonthenatureandroleofpowerininternationalinteractionisunlikelyin

thenear future, research along the lines suggested abovemayneverthelessenhanceunderstandingof

importantdimensionsofinternationalbehavior.


24/35

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Baldwin (2012) Power and International Relations

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Transcript of Baldwin (2012) Power and International Relations