Assessment and Evaluation of the New Voters’ Registration System in Grenada

February 7th, 2013

Secretariat for Political Affairs

Department of Electoral Cooperation and Observation

Contents

Background ............................................................................................................ 4

Introduction ........................................................................................................... 5

Executive Summary................................................................................................ 6

Legal Framework ................................................................................................... 9

1.1 Continuous Registration...................................................................................................................... 9

1.2 Voter Qualifications ............................................................................................................................ 9

1.3 Documents for Registration .............................................................................................................. 10

1.4 Voter Identification Card................................................................................................................... 11

1.5 Publication and Revision of the Voters’ List...................................................................................... 11

Analysis of Voter Registration Process ................................................................. 14

2.1 General: Introduction of New System .............................................................................................. 14

2.2 Enumeration ..................................................................................................................................... 14

2.3 Registration Procedure ..................................................................................................................... 15

2.4 Voter Identification ........................................................................................................................... 16

2.5 Publication of the Voters’ List ........................................................................................................... 18

2.6 Distribution of the Voters’ List .......................................................................................................... 19

2.7 Cleansing and Rehabilitation Processes ............................................................................................ 20

2.8 Claims and Objections Process ......................................................................................................... 20

Technological Structure and Processes ................................................................ 22

3.1 Information Technology Unit ............................................................................................................ 22

3.1.1 Description of Functions and Responsibilities ........................................................................... 22

3.1.2 Software ..................................................................................................................................... 23

3.1.3 Hardware ................................................................................................................................... 24

3.1.4 Networks .................................................................................................................................... 26

3.1.5 Physical Security and Access Control ......................................................................................... 26

3.1.6 Quality Assurance Procedures ................................................................................................... 28

3.2 Integrity and Consistency of Databases and Identity Records in the Voter Registration System .... 28

3.2.1 Integrity and Consistency of the Databases .............................................................................. 29

3.3 Document for Identifying Individual Eligible Voters ......................................................................... 33

3.3.1. Registration Phase .................................................................................................................... 34

3.3.2 Validations within the System ................................................................................................... 34

3.3.3 Voter Registration Card.............................................................................................................. 35

3.3.4 ID Card Security Features ........................................................................................................... 37

3.3.5 Cards Processed as of 25TH January 2013 .................................................................................. 37

Survey to Establish Coverage of the Electoral Registry ......................................... 38

4.1 Objective ........................................................................................................................................... 38

4.2 Methodology ..................................................................................................................................... 38

4.3 Sampling Frame ................................................................................................................................ 38

4.4 Implementation Dates ...................................................................................................................... 39

4.5 Reports .............................................................................................................................................. 39

4.6 Results ............................................................................................................................................... 39

4.7 Breakdown by Age, Sex and Educational level ................................................................................. 41

4.7.1 Results by Age ............................................................................................................................ 41

4.7.2 Results by Sex ............................................................................................................................. 41

4.7.3 Results by Educational Level ...................................................................................................... 41

Findings and Recommendations .......................................................................... 42

General/Immediate................................................................................................................................. 42

Legal and Procedural ............................................................................................................................... 42

Technology .............................................................................................................................................. 44

Annexes ............................................................................................................... 46

Annex I: Letter of Invitation .................................................................................................................... 46

Annex II: Letter of Acceptance ................................................................................................................ 47

Annex III: List of Authorities and Public Officials Attending Meetings ................................................... 48

Annex IV: OAS Technical Electoral Team ................................................................................................ 49

Annex V: Survey Form ............................................................................................................................. 50

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Background

On January 8th, 2013, the Honorable Tillman J. Thomas, Prime Minister of Grenada, wrote to the

Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS) to request the “urgent assistance of the

OAS: in providing technical support to evaluate and verify the integrity of the new voter registration

system.” The letter requested the independent evaluation and verification of the new system by an

international body to ensure that the upcoming general elections, to be held in February 2013, were

conducted “in a clean, free, fair and transparent, manner.”

In a letter dated January 9, 2013, the OAS Secretary General responded positively to this request,

proposing the designation of a technical team to evaluate and verify the Grenadian voter registration

process. A six-person OAS technical team was consequently deployed to Grenada to conduct an

assessment of the legal, procedural and technical aspects of registration. Members of the delegation

met with electoral authorities, relevant state institutions, political parties and civil society groups to

gather information and exchange views on the process. The team’s designated technical specialists

worked closely with their counterparts in the electoral authorities to evaluate the technological

components of electoral registration and the integrity of the database. The technical team also

conducted a house-to-house statistical survey throughout mainland Grenada and the island of Carriacou

in order to assess the coverage of the electoral list.

The results and findings of the technical team are reflected in this report, as are specific

recommendations for the strengthening of the voter registration system. The OAS calls on the

Government of Grenada to consider the implementation of these recommendations in order to

contribute to the organization of clean and inclusive democratic elections in Grenada.

The OAS Technical Assessment Team wishes to express its gratitude to the Government of Grenada for

the invitation to assess the voter registration system, and to thank the Parliamentary Elections Office,

the Central Statistics Office of the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Legal Affairs and political parties

for their collaboration and cooperation. The team also wishes to recognize the invaluable support

provided by the OAS Office in Grenada through its Representative, Terence Craig. In addition, the OAS

Technical Team thanks the government of Canada for the contribution that made this assessment

possible.

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Introduction

The technical team initiated its activities on January 21, 2013. During its time in Grenada, the team met

with Governor General Sir Carlyle Glean, the Honorable Prime Minister Tillman Thomas, Leader of the

Opposition Dr. Keith Mitchell, Supervisor of Elections Judy Benoit as well as a variety of other

stakeholders including Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs Elizabeth Henry-Greenidge, Attorney

General Rohan Phillip, the Ministry of Health, the Central Statistical Office, representatives of the

National Democratic Congress, New National Party and the National United Front, members from Civil

Society Groups, the Bar Association, Council of Churches and the Chamber of Commerce, and with

various members of the Parliamentary Elections Office.

The OAS Technical Team was called upon to assess the new voter registration system, which was

implemented beginning in January 2012 with a countrywide enumeration process, whose end result was

the creation of an entirely new voters’ registry to be used in the February 2013 general elections. Prior

to the implementation of the new system, the Government of Grenada passed a wholesale reform of

the electoral code.

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Executive Summary

It bears mentioning that such important efforts to reform and modernize voter registration in Grenada

heeded the recommendations of OAS Electoral Missions in 1999 and 2003, to implement a system of

continuous registration that ensures an accurate and updated electoral list. A registry that accurately

reflects the voting population is a cornerstone of a clean and inclusive electoral process. In this regard,

there is no doubt that the creation of an electronic voter database with biometric identification

represents a significant step forward for Grenadian democracy.

The implementation of an entirely new voter registration process within a 13 month time period and

prior to a General Election evidently presented significant challenges. Many of the stakeholders with

whom the OAS Electoral Technical Assessment Team met expressed concerns about the efficiency and

integrity of the voter registration process in the lead-up to the February 19th elections. Such concerns

are inevitable for an initiative of this magnitude. In this sense, the OAS Technical Team noted several

areas in which the process could be strengthened.

Prior to the invitation from the Government of Grenada and the deployment of the team, the OAS

became aware of public unease regarding the veracity of the 2012 Consolidated List of Electors, which

was published on December 31st, 2012. A number of political parties contended that the national voters’

list, which must be published every six months as required by law, omitted the names of numerous

previously registered voters. The 47,573 voters on the December 31st list represented 8,399 fewer

names than figures provided to political parties by the Parliamentary Elections Office during a December

14th meeting.

In response to the public questioning by political parties, the Parliamentary Elections Office explained

that these names had not been removed permanently from the voter registration database. The names

in question had been “issued for correction;” clerical errors had merely prompted an additional

verification and correction process. The omission of these names from a periodic publication of the

voters’ list was the result of an administrative error. Interviews with political parties indicated that the

problems had been resolved prior to the beginning of the claims and objections period. Furthermore,

the legal framework governing registration in Grenada affords parties and voters the opportunity

present their claims and thus reinstate inadvertently omitted electors prior to the printing of the official

list used on election day. The OAS Technical Team was therefore able to conclude that the omission of

the 8,399 voters reflected errors in administrative procedures, but did not raise serious concerns over

the disenfranchisement of duly registered voters.

In addition to the controversy over the removal of the 8,399 names from the list, a number of general

concerns surfaced during the deployment of the OAS Technical Team in Grenada. The principal issues

raised involved delays in the process, both the voter registration itself and the distribution of the new

biometric voter identification cards. As of January 25th, only 36% of registered voters possessed voter

identification. Although the law allows electors to vote without identification, the OAS Mission

observed some confusion among political parties and the populace about voting requirements. In order

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to prevent deterring voters from heading to the polls on Election Day, the Parliamentary Elections Office

must take a proactive role to disseminate information that allays such confusion. Political parties also

expressed concerns regarding the distribution of the voters list, citing delays in the provision of hard

copies and the refusal of electoral authorities to provide an electronic copy in a format that would

facilitate a thorough revision by political parties and candidates.

As regards the technical aspects of voter registration in Grenada, the introduction of biometric

identification cards and an electronic voter database constitute significant improvements in voter

security relative to the processes that were previously in place. While the OAS team noted areas for

improvement in terms of the technical capacity of internal information technology personnel as well as

procedures for inter-institutional cooperation to update and cleanse the voters’ list, its verification of

the electoral database by the OAS team indicated strong levels of accuracy and reliability. The house-to-

house survey on voter registration attested to the integrity of the voter registration database: in 98% of

cases, there was almost perfect correspondence between the place of residence provided by the citizen

and the constituency in which that citizen was registered. Among those surveyed who claimed to have

registered to vote, 95% appeared on the most recent version of the electoral list.

Furthermore, Grenada has significantly improved the legal framework governing the voter registration

process. The 2011 Amendment to the Representation of the People Act provides for the establishment

of a permanent, centralized and computerized voter registration system, and establishes a more

stringent identification requirement; both of these reforms should lead to a more secure process that

increases confidence among the populace. While the previous electoral code called for an enumeration

exercise, and thus the creation of a new voters’ list, every five years, the 2011 Amendment grants

significant discretion to electoral authorities in determining the need for and timing of future

enumeration processes. This discretion facilitates the establishment of a voters list that can be

continually updated, obviating the need for costly and time-consuming enumeration processes. At the

same time, the legislation provides for checks and balances in terms of voter’s list data, guaranteeing

parties and citizens sufficient oversight over the registration process. Nevertheless, the electoral code,

which in many ways is still based on a paper voter registration system, would benefit from additional

updating to cover the procedures associated with the new biometric process.

The Parliamentary Elections Office and the Government of Grenada made an important investment, in

both financial and human terms, to implement an improved registration system ahead of the 2013

general elections. The current voters’ list evidently represents a more accurate reflection of the voting

population. The assessment of the OAS Technical Team is that the voter registration system in Grenada

is generally robust. Grenadian authorities deserve recognition for implementing a new system, which

constitutes real progress for the organization of clean and inclusive elections in the country.

The following report details the findings of the OAS Electoral Technical Assessment Team, and is

organized in the following manner: an analysis of the legal framework; discussion of the voter

registration process from a practical and procedural perspective; analysis of the technological processes

and a discussion of the design and results of the house-to-house survey. The final section presents the

findings and recommendations to the Government of Grenada, to strengthen the voter registration

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process. Likewise, the OAS Technical Team calls on the Grenadian authorities to consider carrying out an

assessment of the new system following this general election to evaluate the effectiveness of the new

system detect shortcomings and formulate potential improvements.

9

Legal Framework

The implementation of a new voter registration system in Grenada coincided with major reforms to the

Representation of the People Act, through Amendment Act No. 26 of 2011 (thereafter the ‘Amendment

Act’), which repeals and replaces the entire chapter of the electoral code governing the registration of

electors.

1.1 Continuous Registration The Amendment Act enacts significant changes to the voter registration process, providing for the

establishment of a single, uniform, centralized, ongoing and non-discriminatory computerized voter

system under the administration of the Supervisor of Elections (Clause 5, s.8 of the Amendment Act and

Clause 9, Rule 29 of the same Act). The permanent voter registry is to be populated via a complete door-

to-door enumeration of all eligible voters, as well as a continuous registration process in each

constituency. Clause 5, s.12-14 of the Amendment Act calls for registration offices to be open year

round for continuous registration and revision.

Electoral lists are catalogues of eligible voters and are fundamental components of any voting system

and any electoral framework. In this light, permanent voter registries generate certainty and security

that strengthens trust in the electoral process. The OAS team commends the legal reforms that call for a

permanent and computerized voter registration system that is subject to continuous revision and

updating.

Before the enactment of the 2011 reforms, the Representation of the People Act (former S.26b (3))

called for quinquennial enumeration, as the principal mechanism for updating and cleansing the voters

list. The timing of these exercises was not synchronized with the electoral cycle, nor were deadlines

necessarily met in practice. Clause 6, s. 26D of the Amendment Act eliminates periodic enumerations,

granting the Governor General the discretion to prescribe, upon the advice of the Supervisor of

Elections, an enumeration period. Eliminating the five-year requirement for enumeration constitutes a

welcome reform, by obviating the need for excessive repetition of this costly process, and placing the

burden for updating the list on electoral authorities themselves.

In the case of the 2012-2013 electoral process, enumeration is not an absolute requirement for

registration. Qualified electors who were not enumerated may register with the registration offices

responsible for the constituency in which the elector is ordinarily resident. The Amendment Act (s.9)

also provides for registration officers to visit qualified electors who are house bound. The fact that the

legal framework considers the needs of the elderly and special needs voters merits special mention as a

good practice.

1.2 Voter Qualifications Electoral laws should establish adequate mechanisms aimed at promoting the development and

permanency of the voters’ registry. Ideally, a registry will be updated, complete and inclusive, while also

providing checks and balances that prevent illegal registrations. Grenadian electoral legislation complies

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with these general guidelines. Rules regulating the registration of voters are inclusive, while pre-

requisites to registration are minimal.

According to the law, a person is entitled to be registered as an elector if he or she has attained the age

of eighteen years and is a citizen of Grenada, or a Commonwealth citizen who has resided in Grenada

for a period of at least twelve months immediately before the date of his or her registration (s. 32 of the

Constitution and Clause 5, s. 6 of the Amendment Act). Electors are only entitled to register in the

constituency in which they are ordinarily resident.

The Amendment Act provides a framework and several definitions of ordinary residence1

.Rule 4 of the

Amendment Act sets out important elements to determine a ‘place of ordinary residence’, establishing

the two most important aspects that are recognized in international best practices: the place where the

elector usually sleeps or that place where the elector turns to or intends to return when away from

home. Clause 9, Rule 5 of the Amendment Act adds that an ordinary residence of a person is generally

where his or her family is, unless he is living apart in another place that is his ordinary residence. Finally,

Clause 9, Rule 6(2) of the Amendment Act declares that a person who has more than one place of

ordinary residence may elect which place he desires to be registered. Accordingly, it should be noted

that there are no rules that set out which definition should have priority with regards to determining the

most relevant ordinary residence of a given registrant; nor are there any legal guidelines for proving

ordinary residence. The voter registration process would benefit from such clarification in the legal

framework.

1.3 Documents for Registration The 2011 amendments involve material changes to the identification documentation required for voter

registration. The electoral code in force prior to the 2011 reforms (Rule #69 of the Regulations in

Chapter 286A of the Representation of the People Act), did not require registrants to produce

supporting documentation, merely granting elections officials the right to request the production of a

birth certificate from a potential elector. On the other hand, the Amendment Act (Clause 5, s. 9(3) of the

Amendment Act) establishes supporting documentation - either a birth certificate, valid passport or

citizenship certificate - as a requirement for registration. This new requirement enhances the security of

the voters’ list and hampers the potential for misrepresentation and voter fraud. Nonetheless, the new

law retains an exception to this requirement: in cases in which the production of such documentation is

not practicable, a statutory declaration by the registrant of his date of birth is sufficient for registration

(Section 85(a), Schedule I of the Amendment Act).

In general, sound elections can only be undertaken with a proper verification that all voters fulfill legal

requirements with respect to their identity and residence. In Grenada, an elector who has not been

enumerated can register in his or her polling division by presenting either his or her birth certificate, his

valid passport or his citizenship certificate. The fact that the aforementioned documents do not contain

information on voter residence, and that no additional proof of residence is required by law, creates a

legal loophole which allows for potential selective registration. Nonetheless, it is important to mention

1 Clause 5, subsections 6(2), (3) and (4) and Clause 9, Rules 4, 5 and 6 of that Act.

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that the survey carried out by the OAS indicated a 98% correspondence between voter residences and

the constituencies in which they had registered.

It should also be noted that issues associated with ordinary residence are even more acute with regards

to citizens residing abroad. The legal framework would benefit from the inclusion of specific provisions

regarding proof of address for those who register outside of the enumeration process.

1.4 Voter Identification Card One of the most significant advances initiated by the new Grenadian voter registration system, legally

and in practice, is the creation of new biometric voter identification cards. According to Clause 5, s. 24 of

the Amendment Act, the Supervisor of Elections must issue a voter identification card with photo and

fingerprint information in the prescribed format to every duly registered voter.

Prior to the Amendment Act, a presiding officer was required to request the voter ID card from a person

only if the presiding officer had previously questioned that same person about his or her right to receive

a ballot (see former s. 59(1) and (2) of the Act). The new legislation requires voters to present voter ID

card to the presiding officer before they receive a ballot, regardless of whether they have been

questioned by the presiding officer. Nevertheless, the presiding officer may still grant a ballot to a

registered voter if the former is satisfied that that person has either not been issued a voter ID card or

his or her ID card has been destroyed or lost (subsection 59(5) of the Act). This clause protects the

franchise of duly registered voters. As a new general rule, electors are now required to show their voter

ID cards to the presiding officer before they can receive a ballot. The latter amendment not only

simplifies polling procedures but also adds clearer means to verify information contained on the voters’

list, thereby ensuring greater integrity to the voting process. Nonetheless, it is important to note that

the lack of voter ID card does not prevent electors from exercising their right to vote.

1.5 Publication and Revision of the Voters’ List During the course of the year and in-between electoral processes, the Supervisor of Elections is required

to periodically publish the voters’ list: on a quarterly basis for constituency lists and every six months for

the consolidated list. Quarterly publications also include addenda, facilitating the oversight of political

parties and citizens regarding the changes made to the list. As per clause 5, s. 12(2) of the Amendment

Act, all voters’ lists must contain the following fields: voter name, address, occupation, registration

number and sex. The current legislation provides that any person, including candidates and party

representatives, can receive a copy of the voters’ list upon request and payment of certain fees.

However, the legislation does not provide for the explicit and timely distribution of voters’ lists to

parties and candidates during an election, as is good practice. Given the importance of public oversight

over the electoral roll, the legislation should provide explicit provisions for the distribution of voters’

lists to these actors, especially in an electoral period.

According to the law, periodic publication is accompanied by continuous public scrutiny of the electoral

list in-between electoral periods. In the case of an electoral period, the publication of the final

preliminary list is followed by a seven-day period of formal claims and objections. Changes to the

electoral roll can be made by electoral authorities at any time outside of an election, which are then

12

reflected in the period publication of the voters’ list. (Clause 5, s. 14, Clause 9, Rules 48, 66-67 of the

Amendment Act). The legal framework is strong in the sense that it details specific procedures, due

process and fair hearings for these changes to be made by the electoral administration, notably through

a formal claim and objection process.

Changes to the voters’ lists can be made by the Supervisor of Elections and, with respect to their own

constituencies, by registration officers, who then share their changes with the Supervisor of Elections. A

member of the public, candidate, or party representative who scrutinizes the voters lists through the

claim and objection process can also request changes to the lists at all times outside an election (Clause

9, Rules 52-56), provided that the rules of claim, objections and applications as set out in Clause 9 are

followed and the request is duly accepted by the registration officer. It is noteworthy that there are no

legal provisions that provide communication mechanisms between the Parliamentary Elections Office

and the Ministry of Health, responsible for births and deaths, the Office of Immigration or any other

relevant government entity. The standardization of such communication mechanisms would facilitate

the updating and cleansing of the list, a fundamental aspect of a permanent voter registry.

According to Clause 9, Rules 61, 62 and 63 of the Amendment Act, the registration officer has the power

of a magistrate for the purpose of hearing a claim or an objection and must provide for due process and

a fair hearing: requiring documentation, summoning witnesses, and permitting all interested persons to

appear. The legislation provides for notice to be sent to persons involved in a claim or an objection,

containing information about the time and place when the case will be considered. A claimant or an

objector has the right to appeal a decision to the Supervisor of Elections; this decision can also be

appealed to a court as a final recourse. However, the legislation does not provide any time limits - for

the registration officer, the Supervisor of Electors or the Courts – to decide a case in a timely manner.

This lack of specificity can be problematic, especially in the context of an election period.

Once the writ of an election has been issued, the Supervisor of Elections must publish the current list no

later than the 14th day following its issuance. Following the date of publication of the official

preliminary list, a person has the right to issue a claim or objection within seven days. Successful claims

and objections are incorporated into the official consolidated list. Once the seven-day claims and

objections process has lapsed and the official consolidated list is published, this list must be used for any

election until it is superseded by a new voters’ list prepared in accordance with legislation.

Clause 9, Rules 69 and 70 of the Amendment Act provides for the enactment of further changes to the

official consolidated list after the conclusion of the claims and objections process and prior to polling

day. For instance, Rule 70 deals with the special procedures for the deletion of a name from the printed

list in such a circumstance. The Supervisor of Elections must hold a special review to investigate such a

case. A minimum of five-day notice about the time and place of the special review is given to the

concerned person, or a notice that is reasonably practicable to such person. These legal provisions are

significant because they provide for detailed procedures that allow for last-minute changes to the

voter’s list, while protecting citizen oversight and thus the rights of voters.

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Best practices call for collaboration between electoral officials and political parties in order to generate

transparency, inclusiveness and accuracy in the voter registration process. In general, Grenadian

legislation meets this standard. Checks and balances are provided by continuous public scrutiny outside

election periods and a claims and objections period during an electoral process. Nevertheless, the legal

framework governing such oversight could be improved in a number of ways, especially in the context of

an electoral period. Firstly, it is fundamental that legislation provides clear deadlines for the decisions

made by registration officers, the Supervisor of Elections and the Courts, so that all claims and

objections can be adjudicated well ahead of polling day. For greater clarity and certainty, the legislation

should be reviewed to provide two clearly separate claim and objection processes, one outside of an

election period, and another during an election period. Each process should specify clear deadlines for

the presentation and adjudication of claims and appeals.

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Analysis of Voter Registration Process

2.1 General: Introduction of New System OAS Electoral Observation Missions to Grenada 2003 and 2008 observed that the electoral registry and

voter registration were among the primary concerns regarding the electoral process. In particular,

stakeholders raised questions about the large size of the list, and the fact that it contained a significant

quantity of names belonging to dead people, or those who were otherwise no longer in Grenada to cast

ballots. The fact that the voters’ list was so padded was largely a reflection of the absence of updating

and cleansing mechanisms.

Concerns with the state of voter registration process in Grenada prompted the introduction of a new

computerized biometric voter registration system. The enumeration process scheduled for 2009 was

postponed until the new system was fully implemented. Subsequent to the passage of legal reforms, an

order was issued by the Governor General to initiate an enumeration process effective January 9, 2012

and lasting until June 8, 2012. The existing voters’ list was thereby erased, and a new list was populated

according to the new system.

2.2 Enumeration In a shift from previous practice in which enumerators completed the entire registration process

including the taking of photographs during the house-to-house process, the 2012 enumeration exercise

was two-pronged. One hundred and thirty-five enumerators were assigned to enumeration districts to

go door-to-door and pre-register eligible voters. Those who assented to the enumeration process and

provided the necessary information were given a receipt and then told to return to the registration

office in their constituency with the receipt. This enumeration process, though costly, ensured that

electors are registered with correct address information, thus promoting a voter registry that accurately

reflects the geographical distribution of registered voters. The OAS team was informed of some

confusion about this new process in which registration occurred subsequent to enumeration; some

voters apparently did not realize that an enumeration receipt did not constitute registration, and that in-

person registration at the registration office was required.

Nonetheless, the Supervisor of Elections reported to the OAS team that $24,000 had been spent on

campaigns to encourage voter registration. The massive efforts of the Parliamentary Elections Office to

disseminate information about the new voter registration system merit special recognition. According to

the Parliamentary Elections Office, over 50,000 voters were canvassed during the enumeration process,

representing approximately 80% of the voting population for the 2013 elections.

15

2.3 Registration Procedure To register with an enumeration receipt, a potential voter must go to a registration office in his or her

constituency and physically present the necessary documentation - a passport, birth certificate or

citizenship certificate – to a registration officer. In terms of security, the requirement to produce

identification documents constitutes a significant improvement from the previous registration process in

which such information was provided verbally.

As required by law, exceptions were granted for those cases in which the production of a birth

certificate was not practicable; in those cases, the registrant was permitted to make a statutory

declaration of his or her name and date of birth. In the context of Grenada in which a significant number

of people, particularly among the elderly, lack documentation, this exception is a necessary provision to

ensure that all eligible voters can exercise their franchise. Upon the provision of support documentation,

a registrant is required to provide a fingerprint as well as a signature and to get their photo taken, at

which point this information is inputted into the database.

In-person registration was conducted simultaneously to the enumeration process. Registration

continued well after June 8, 2012 until January 17th, 2013 when election writs were issued. The

procedure for the registration of non-enumerated registrants mirrors the process for enumerated voters

with one key exception. Whereas enumeration receipts contain address information verified by

enumerators, non-enumerated registrants must verbally provide an address; no supporting

documentation or proof is required. Because residences in Grenada rarely correspond to house

numbers or street names, voters tend to register with unspecified addresses, often just the name of the

village or neighborhood in which they reside.

This lack of specificity in voter residences hampers the ability of both the Parliamentary Elections Office

and political party canvassers to scrutinize voter residences and verify whether or not they are eligible

to vote in a particular constituency. Voters who live on the boundary of two constituencies represent

especially problematic cases. A system that requires no proof of address and in which voters are

difficult to locate is susceptible to voter manipulation such as strategic registration, the practice

whereby voters - regardless of their residence - register in a constituency that is perceived as

competitive. Registration officers have no legal basis for rejecting an address or constituency that is

given verbally by a voter. Nevertheless, registration officers do conduct informal verification processes.

If a registration officer has any doubts about a voter’s address, he or she will make phone enquiries to

neighbors to determine whether the person in question is a resident in that polling division. While the

small size of constituencies have allowed such an informal process to be generally effective in Grenada

– a fact confirmed by the OAS survey which revealed that the voter’s list is 98% accurate in terms of the

geographic registration of voters – additional more formal verification mechanisms would be

recommended in order to ensure the integrity of the electoral registry, a fundamental concern in a small

community with a first-past-the-post system in which elections can be won by a handful of votes.

Concerns related to unspecified addresses and the subsequent potential for manipulation are amplified

in the case of Grenadian citizens resident abroad. In practice, citizens resident abroad register in

constituencies where they have a familial connection or historical roots. The fact that the law implicitly

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states the diaspora voters register in the constituency in which they are ordinarily resident does not lend

any clarity to the subject. The creation of a new voter’s list with in-person registration has significantly

reduced the ability of strategic registration by diaspora voters in the 2013 elections. Furthermore, the

law states that voters who have not been present in Grenada for five years are to be removed from the

electoral list. However, it is not clear how these provisions are to be implemented in practice given that

there is no standardized communication between the Parliamentary Elections Office and the

government department responsible for immigration.

Though the registration process was largely successful, the OAS Technical Team observed a number of

concerns with the process. Many of these were unavoidable issues associated with the introduction of a

new system in the year before a general election, such as an insufficient timeframe for completion

before elections, concerns about the training of registration personnel, and inadequate human and

financial resources. Long lines at constituency offices were common. Significant delays were also

experienced in the printing and distribution of voter identification cards. Although the registration

procedure was described by some as slow and rather cumbersome, delays were often a result of the

added security features such as fingerprint recognition. Speed was necessarily sacrificed for greater

security and accuracy. Nonetheless, there was a consensus that registration officers would have

benefited from more technological training and that the number of constituency offices was insufficient.

There are currently 18 offices within the 15 constituencies. Most constituencies, some of which have

large areas with spread out populations, have only one office. Stakeholders worried that the long lines

at registration offices may have served as a deterrent to registration, especially for those of lesser

means who had to travel significant distances on multiple forms of public transportation to reach the

offices in their constituencies.

These drawbacks must be viewed as minor in context. The effort and investment employed to register

over 62,000 people between January 2012 and January 2013 should not be overlooked. In order to

handle the massive influx of registrants, the opening hours of registration offices were extended during

the enumeration period and in the months preceding the election, sometimes until midnight. Many

special arrangements were instituted to ensure that the voter registration process was conducted

efficiently. The Parliamentary Elections Office deserves particular praise for its efforts to register special

needs and elderly voters. In the 2012 registration process, the Parliamentary Elections Office operated

with four mobile units. Each unit was equipped with the registration IT infrastructure and was able to

carry out the exact same procedures as registration offices. These mobile units were deployed to

retirement homes and to other house bound persons to ensure that even those who could not

physically appear in registration offices were provided the opportunity to register. Mobile units were

also employed to hand out voter identification cards.

2.4 Voter Identification The voter identification card constitutes in many ways the hallmark of the new voter registration system

in Grenada. New biometric cards are to be distributed to every registered citizen and used as the

principal form of national identification. Voter ID cards issued ahead of the 2013 elections have a life

span of approximately ten years; each will expire in January 31, 2020. There is no new enumeration

17

scheduled for that date, but each elector will have to physically appear in the registration office in his or

her constituency to renew the card and update any changed information. This process will provide the

Parliamentary Elections Office with the opportunity to update and sanitize the list without going

through a costly and time-consuming enumeration process.

In the context of the 2012-2013 registration effort, receipt of the voter identification card is the final

step of the process. Once an elector has registered with a registration office and all pertinent data has

been inputted into the database, verified and approved, a voter card is printed. All cards are printed in

the central office and then distributed to the registration office for collection. Once a voter card has

been received, the registration officer informs the voter individually by phone that his or her card is

ready. At the registration office, the voter must verify that his or her fingerprint matches the

information previously recorded in order to collect the ID card.

In theory, every voter should receive their voter identification card a few weeks after completing

registration, following central verification and printing. However, the Parliamentary Elections Office has

experienced significant delays in the printing and distribution of cards, prompting many complaints by

voters who have not received their ID weeks and months after completing the initial registration

process. The OAS team was provided with numerous explanations for backlog in delays: the verification

process to detect and correct clerical errors proved time-consuming due to errors made during

registration, delaying the printing of cards for thousands of voters; the printing process experienced a

backlog explained by the large volume of registrants, whose numbers increased in the lead up to the

announcement of the election date. By January 13th, 2013 - five weeks before election day- only 26,932

cards had been printed, covering 47% of the 57,321 voters who had registered by that time. As of

January 25th, 31,367 voters IDs were printed for a voting population of 62,152, i.e. 50.5%. Out of the

31,367 voter cards, only 22,165 had been delivered; three weeks before the election, only 36% of

registered voters were in possession of ID cards. Official figures provided by the Parliamentary Elections

Office are consistent with the results obtained in the survey carried out by the OAS (34%). The

distribution of voter cards remains on-going. According to the Parliamentary Elections Office, voter

cards are printed at an approximate rate of 1,000 per day. Voters can collect their cards up to and

including polling day at the registration offices.

Concerns about poor distribution of voter identification are allayed by the fact that the new biometric

cards are not strictly required on polling day. Although the electoral code was amended to strengthen

identification requirements on election day, an elector will be permitted to vote with several other

forms of identification including a passport. If unable to produce photo identification, a voter may make

a declaration that he or she is the voter whose name appears on the voters’ list. The OAS team is

concerned, however, that this legal provision may cause confusion. All actors involved in the process

have touted the importance of the new voter identification card. The team observed a pamphlet of the

Parliamentary Elections Office posted in a public place that erroneously claimed that the voter card is

necessary to vote. Although there is a legal provision for undocumented voters, it is a serious concern

that this information has not been sufficiently absorbed by the population.

18

It bears mentioning that the Parliamentary Elections Office has conducted an information campaign

stating that the voter identification is not absolutely necessary. The danger remains, however, that

voters who have not yet received their voter ID cards will be deterred from voting. Electors without

sufficient identification may be subject to queries by party representatives.

As a result, the OAS Technical Team notes an urgent need for a sustained information campaign by the

Parliamentary Elections Office to fully explain the voting procedures in the new system and emphasize

the registered electors who are not in possession of the new voter identification will still be allowed to

vote. Care should be taken to ensure that this information is successfully transmitted to the entire

populace. Popular media such as radio and television could prove useful. Likewise, presiding officers and

other elections officials on polling day must be trained in the law and prepared to handle significant

numbers of voters without the new identification.

2.5 Publication of the Voters’ List As per the Electoral Code, the voters list must be published and posted in public places on a periodic

basis. The first list following the initiation of the re-registration process was published in the fall of 2012.

The second edition of the list was published on December 31st, 2012. As discussed above, the

publication of the December 31st list met with some controversy, as it purportedly contained 8,399

fewer names than figures provided to political parties by the Parliamentary Elections Office during a

December 14th meeting. Upon further study, political parties concluded that a significant number of the

missing names had appeared on previous iterations of the electoral registry. The result was public

outcry about the seeming disenfranchisement of thousands of voters in the weeks ahead of a General

Election, raising serious concern among the populace about the integrity of the new voter system.

The Parliamentary Elections Office explained that the names in question had actually not been removed

from the voter database, but were rather assigned the status of “issued for correction” due to

administrative or clerical errors in registration. These names were classified under a different status

category in the database; their omission of these names on a published list was merely an error. Both

the Parliamentary Elections Office and the political parties wisely called on voters to verify with their

registration offices that their names were on the list, prior to the issuance of election writs and the

closure of the voter registration process. Furthermore, in order to quell concerns among citizens and

political parties ahead of the elections, the Supervisor of Elections decided to publish a special and

unscheduled edition of the voters list on January 13th, in which the missing names had supposedly been

reinstated.

Although the OAS team was not able to verify the fact, political parties expressed satisfaction that all

names had been reinstated by the publication of the preliminary consolidated list to be used for claims

and objections. Nonetheless, the fact that such a high percentage of names had errors – over 15% of

registered voters – lends credence to concerns about the capacity and training of registration personnel.

In the future, care should be taken to ensure that such errors are addressed at the registration process.

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2.6 Distribution of the Voters’ List Public circulation of the electoral registry is an essential element of electoral democracy that promotes

the transparency of electoral authorities and facilitates oversight by citizens and political parties. The

ability of parties to canvass and review the list in a timely fashion is a fundamental aspect of voter

registration, and a necessary check on the electoral authorities. Although the Grenadian electoral code

is quite detailed about the periodic publication of the voters’ list and it’s posting in public places,

legislation does not provide for the explicit and timely distribution of the voters’ lists to the parties and

candidates during an election.

In fact, the relationship between the Parliamentary Elections Office and political parties in this respect is

rather informal. Common practice in Grenada is for the political parties to collect hard copies of the list

directly from the Parliamentary Elections Office. The OAS team noted that provision of the voters’ list

met with some controversy during the 2013 claims and objections period. According to the

Parliamentary Elections Office, the final preliminary list was published on January 21st, at which point

the seven-day claims and objections period officially began. Political parties expressed concerns about

delays in the provision of the official preliminary list, and of time lags between the public posting of the

list and the receipt of this list by political parties.

The OAS team noted a lack of clarity and uniformity about the dates in which lists were made available

to political parties. Electoral authorities explained that delays in distribution were due to the fact that

the printing process was on-going. The office operates with a policy that publication in district offices

must be completed prior to distribution to parties. Ideally, electoral lists should be posted and

distributed to political parties at the same time, in order to ensure that political parties, candidates and

voters each have the full legally mandated seven-day period for claims and objections.

The provision of electronic copies of the electoral list was also a point of contention between political

parties and electoral authorities. Both principal parties informed the OAS that they had formally

requested electronic copies to expedite voter canvassing and the preparation of claims. From a purely

technical perspective, the new electronic voter database should facilitate the rapid creation of an

electronic voters list. Although the Parliamentary Elections Office eventually furnished parties with a

PDF version of the list, it was apparently released days after the distribution of the printed list. The

timely release of a user-friendly list is important, given the fact that the seven-day window for claims

and objections begins after the first public posting of the paper list.

The Parliamentary Elections Office expressed reluctance to provide electronic copies of the voter

registry in a useable format (such as an excel spreadsheet) due to concerns about identity theft and the

misuse of personal voter information. Though legislation states that no information from the

registration process can be used for non-electoral purposes, the Act does not provide for specific

prohibitions, offences and penalties that would protect voters’ private information from other uses than

for elections and electoral canvassing by parties and candidates. There is a need for minor legal reforms

to ensure the safety of personal data and establish sanctions for the misuse of such information. Such

improvements would not only enhance trust in the voter registration process, but also eliminate

20

hindrances to the provision of electronic lists to political parties for use in the preparation of claims and

objections.

2.7 Cleansing and Rehabilitation Processes The law stipulates that a registered voter has the right to remain registered unless his or her name is

deleted from the current list. A person can be deleted from the list when the Supervisor of Elections has

determined that, since the publication of the list: the person has died; left the country and has not been

ordinarily resident in that constituency for a period exceeding 12 months (non-citizens); ceased to be

ordinarily resident in Grenada for a period exceeding five years (citizens); become ordinarily resident in

another constituency; had an objection to his registration allowed; or otherwise ceased to be qualified

by virtue of the Representation of the Peoples Act or any other law. The latter case refers primarily to

those who have been sentenced by a Court to death or to imprisonment for a term exceeding twelve

months; to a person who has been adjudged to be of unsound mind by a qualified medical practitioner;

or, a person who has been detained as a criminal lunatic under any law in force in the State.

Although the legislation clearly expresses those cases where a person should be removed from the

electoral register, there are no provisions that establish steps, conditions or supporting documents for

cleansing the registry of non-eligible voters. The establishment of a system of permanent voter

registration requires specific regulations to address such cases. Procedures should involve

communication mechanisms between the relevant public institutions and the Parliamentary Elections

Office, as well as the provision of official supporting documents to enable the Supervisor of Elections to

accurately determine whether a person should be removed from the list.

As a corollary, there are no procedures for the rehabilitation of citizens that have been previously

purged from the registry, a situation that occurs in the case of a person that has been sentenced to

imprisonment for a term exceeding twelve months, and has complied with the judgment or has received

a free pardon; the person who was ceased to be ordinarily resident who returns to Grenada and the

person who is no longer of unsound mind. In both cases, purging non-eligible and rehabilitating eligible

voters in the registry, competent public institutions should be required to inform the legal effects of the

cases referred to the Supervisor of Elections.

2.8 Claims and Objections Process The Prime Minister officially announced the election date on January 13, 2013. Election writs were

published on January 17, 2013, at which point registration ceased. Following the issuance of the writs,

the Parliamentary Elections Office had a 14-day window to print the list. The official preliminary list was

printed on January 21st, 2013, at which point the 2013 claims and objections process began. The

process lasted from January 22nd until January 29th, coinciding with the presence of the OAS Technical

Team in Grenada.

Grenadian custom holds that political parties submit all their claims and objections as a collective. In the

context of the 2013 electoral process, most of the claims submitted related to the registration of voter

21

in incorrect constituencies. Because of the lack of specificity in addresses, the identification of voters

registered in wrong constituencies is inherently problematic.

The Parliamentary Elections Office conducts independent and informal investigations to ensure that

voters against whom claims have been made are registered in the same constituency and polling

division as their ordinary residence. The OAS Technical Team was informed that this investigation

consists largely of phone calls to neighbors in the area, often made by the Supervisor of Elections

herself. The Supervisor informed the team that, apart from some minor changes to names and polling

divisions, none of the claims and objections submitted were substantiated and that the final list will

remain very similar to the list published on January 21st.

Though the OAS Technical Team learned of no specific queries to the claims and objections process, the

fact that the law does not specify a time frame in which claims and objections must be adjudicated

during an election period was the cause of some confusion. Legal clarification in this area would lend

more certainty to the process. In this case, on Wednesday January 31st, one day after the lapse of the

claims and objections period, the Parliamentary Elections Office reviewed and investigated all of the 50

or so claims and objections it had received. At that point, the electoral authorities began implementing

the necessary changes in the database in order to begin printing the official list to be used for elections

shortly thereafter. The final list was printed and published following the departure of the OAS Technical

Team. The printing and distribution of the final list more than two weeks before election date, as is

expected, represents significant progress from the 2008 General Elections when the list was not made

available until the days before polling day.

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Technological Structure and Processes

One of the main objectives of the OAS Technical Team in Grenada was to assess the adequacy,

effectiveness and reliability of key systems and operational controls in place at the Parliamentary

Electoral Office. The main emphases of this assessment are the registration process, the integrity of the

voter registration database, operational controls, information assurance and security. To that end, the

OAS Technical Team examined the controls in place within the information technology area of the

Parliamentary Electoral Office.

3.1 Information Technology Unit

3.1.1 Description of Functions and Responsibilities The Information Technology (IT) Unit at the Parliamentary Election Office is in charge of maintaining the

performance of all IT components within it, helping the office to achieve its main purposes: to plan and

execute fair and free elections, to register all eligible voters and to provide them with proper voter

identification. The IT Unit comprises a Systems Administrator and an IT assistant.

Figure 1: Parliamentary Elections Office Organizational Chart. Source: Official website of the Parliamentary Elections Office of Grenada http://peo.gov.gd/our-philosophy

23

The IT unit is responsible for all operations pertinent to the safeguard of equipment, databases, network

connections and software in use across the Parliamentary Elections Office; the training of personnel who

interact with the main IT components or the Voter Registration System; the evaluation and acquisition

of IT equipment and related services and maintenance contracts.

The principal IT component of Parliamentary Elections Office operations is the Voter Identification

Management System (VIMS). VIMS is a web-based application with two major functionalities: voter

registration and voter ID printing. Officially implemented on January 9th 2012, VIMS has since captured

information from more than 61,000 voters, replacing the former database in its entirety.

The Systems Administrator is responsible for the operation and management of the VIMS system at the

central location as well as oversight of all activity at the remote locations.

3.1.2 Software The software available to the Parliamentary Elections Office is mainly related to the Voter Identification

Management System acquired in 2011 after a single source contract procurement process. It includes all

the VIMS licenses for the Server and the Workstations, Microsoft SQL server and Crystal Reports, as well

as the Microsoft Windows licenses for Server and Workstations. All stations and server operate on a

Windows environment.

The IT Unit is not actively engaged in software development activities. All potential modifications to the

VIMS are to be performed by the software provider, at the request of the Parliamentary Elections Office.

The level of support provided by the third-party technical assistance goes beyond common

troubleshooting such as the provision of patches, updates and upgrades to the VIMS application. In

addition, this third-party assistance includes day-to-day administration support. To potentially alleviate

some of the effects of this dependency, the Parliamentary Elections Office should initiate an effort to

further train its personnel in information technology and initiate a transfer of knowledge and tasks from

the third-party provider to internal actors.

3.1.2.1 Voter Identification Management System (VIMS)

The Voter Identification Management System enables the capture of voter information in 18 local

registration offices across Grenada and the printing of voter ID cards from a central location. Several

networked PC workstations are used for capturing applicant data at registration offices via a web

browser; these workstations interface with the central database and card production system. The

application is web-browser Java based and resides on one Application Server at the central site.

The VIMS includes an Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), which is used to compare the

fingerprints collected from applicants against the list of existing voter ID holders. This feature allows the

Parliamentary Elections Office to detect duplicate registrations. The AFIS system also ensures that only

one card is issued to the authorized citizen. AFIS systems have revolutionized the identification system

in Grenada, migrating from a fingerprint card paper system that could not previously be digitized to an

automated identification system. The system can now return a search of thousands of records in under a

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minute. Expansion of this system to branches of the national government could be beneficial,

specifically for the civil registry and law enforcement officers.

Data Entry Operators at local registration offices are responsible for performing data input transactions

as well as delivering voter ID cards.

3.1.3 Hardware IT equipment employed by the Parliamentary Elections Office in the registration process includes all

servers, printers, mobile voter registration units, desktop scanners, fingerprint readers, signature tablets

and PC workstations operating at both the central site and local registration offices.

Figure 2: Systems Architecture. Source: Parliamentary Elections Office

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3.1.3.1 Central Location

Equipment at the central location includes the Application and Database Server with MS Windows

Server license to access the server application; the Biometric Matching server; the voter ID card printing

workstation; the Quality Assurance workstation with a 2D barcode reader; two enrollment and

authorization workstations; the System Administrator workstation; and the voter ID card printer. The

system is supplied with on‐line help documentation, a System Administrators Guide which includes

configuration and installation instructions as well as a User Guide. The configuration specifications for

the Application/Database server are:

HP ProLiant ML350 G5 SFF SAS Tower Server

2 x Quad‐Core Intel® Xeon® E5405 (2.00GHz, 1333MHz FSB, 80W) Processor

HP 4GB Fully Buffered DIMM PC2‐5300 8X512 Memory

Microsoft® Windows® Server 2003 R2, Standard Edition + 5 CALS (Pre‐Installed)

Smart Array E200i Controller

HP 128MB BBWC (Battery‐Backed Write Cache) Enabler

RAID 5 drive set (requires matching 3 hard drives)

4 x HP 146GB Hot Plug 2.5 SAS 10,000 rpm Hard Drive

2 x HP 1000‐W Hot‐Plug Power Supply (Main/Redundant)

Redundant Fan Kit HP 16X DVD‐ROM Drive Option Kit

Embedded NC373i Multifunction Gigabit Network Adapter

HP Ultrium 448 tape drive

Internal SCSI Adapter for the Tape Drive

Tape Media

17" LCD

HP T‐1500 UPS

The printer used is a Fargo HDP5000 card printer with a capacity to print, encode and laminate 48 to 95

cards per hour. Main and spare printers are both in the Computer Room.

3.1.3.2 Remote Locations

The system consists of seventeen local offices, each equipped with a single PC workstation configured

for voter enrollment (including keyboard, flat panel monitor, mouse and pad). Each workstation is

equipped to capture with the following peripherals: a digital camera to take the picture of the voter, a

fingerprint reader to take the marks of both pointer fingers, a signature tablet, a 2D barcode reader to

confirm the identity of the voter at the moment of collecting the voter ID and a flatbed scanner to

digitalize the image of supporting documents at the time of enrollment.

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3.1.4 Networks

3.1.4.1 WAN Network

A local carrier provides Digital Subscriber Line (DSL, technology for bringing high-bandwidth to small

offices) connection to link the remote stations and the server at the central location.

A virtual private network (VPN) is enabled to grant the provider access to the database. The connection

to this VPN is physically restricted by the System Administrator if necessary

3.1.4.2 Local Area Network

A local area network is available and completely separate from the VIMS network and includes all PC

workstations for personnel at Parliamentary Elections Office headquarters.

3.1.5 Physical Security and Access Control

3.1.5.1 Software

In order to access the system, the operator must first “Logon” using a unique name and password. In

addition to the standard text logon the operator must also perform a biometric logon using a single

fingerprint sign‐on. A fingerprint reader is attached to the print operator workstation.

The operator may also be assigned a particular role that restricts him from performing certain functions,

thereby preventing the issuance of an ID card by a single person. Each role represents a group of

privileges assigned to a user to define his/her rights of access within the system.

All transactions performed in the VIMS are recorded in the log, indicating date, time, user and

equipment where the transaction was performed and status of the application within the system. One

of the most important benefits of the logging system is to track exactly how users are using the

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application during the different stages of the registration process as well as to create an accountability

record of their actions.

3.1.5.2 Hardware

At the central location, the application server, AFIS server and backup servers are all situated in a same

rack within the computer room, located at Parliamentary Elections Office headquarters. Four different

workstations, Card Printer Equipment, all spare equipment and consumables are stored at the same

physical location. A security lock activated by a SmartCard grants access to the Computer Room.

At the remote locations, the peripherals attached to every workstation are unplugged everyday and

stored in a locked case at the registration office.

The OAS team became aware that two CPUs with the attached scanner and digital cameras were stolen

from workstations in Saint George Southeast and Saint George Northeast. This equipment was replaced

with spare units within a working day by the System Administrator. Nonetheless, all data is encrypted

and protected with a password. This is a security measure that cannot be circumvented and prevents

the decoding of the data in case data sets are lost or stolen.

Four portable registration units are available to permit the capture of voter data if the voter has reduced

mobility, and therefore cannot physically appear at a registration office. All portable units include all the

peripherals available at the remote workstation. Once captured, the information is encrypted and stored

within the unit and available for later download via an off-line import of information functionality.

These important tools allowed the Parliamentary Elections Office to register all eligible voters regardless

of their special needs without jeopardizing security.

3.1.5.3 Database and Networks

The VIMS database has a permanent VPN connection with the third-party software provider, which,

upon request of the System Administrator, allows online changes, modifications and routine

maintenance activities. The only way to input voter's data into the system is either via interface at the

local registration offices or via off-line import data from the mobile units. No batch (massive) upload of

records has been performed, nor available or allowed, as per the rules of the Parliamentary Elections

Office. This is a positive feature that contributes to the quality of data input.

To enhance security and ensure a proper management of data and internet connections, the IT unit

established two different and separate networks. One LAN was exclusively composed by the local

workstations and servers used by the VIMS, only connected to all remote workstations at the Local

Registration Offices via DSL connection. The security of the DSL connection is standard provided by the

carrier.

The second LAN was composed by all workstations used by other employees of the Parliamentary

Elections Office at the central location, with access to Internet. The two networks are disjoint and

completely separated.

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3.1.6 Quality Assurance Procedures

3.1.6.1 Hardware

All service and maintenance for remote and local workstations at the Parliamentary Elections Office is

performed by the Systems Administrator. In the case of major equipment failures, the IT Unit is able to

replace this equipment with available spare units. Further maintenance and repair needs are to be

handled according to the Support and Maintenance agreement with the provider.

3.1.6.2 Software

Modifications to the VIMS go through a change management process previously established between

the Parliamentary Elections Office and the provider, in which all additional requirements and

specifications are clearly identified in writing and then negotiated. Once a change is approved, the

provider is responsible for making changes to the software and to the database via VPN. Most service

and maintenance operations on the VIMS are performed by the provider through remote access; regular

maintenance support, and the provision of bug fixes via patch prepared by the provider and loaded

remotely when no upgrade in the Operating System or Database Engine is required.

3.1.6.3 Databases

In case of emergency, changes to the status of specific records within the system could be performed by

the provider, previous request by the IT Unit and internal approval of the Supervisor of Elections.

The OAS team was presented with two cases in which voter information was erased from the list due to

human error: in one, the voter ID was inactivated from the voter list because the name was mistakenly

included in the list of deceased provided by the Ministry of Health; in the second case, the voter ID was

inactivated upon delivery of an ID card that contained the wrong gender. A new registration was not

reinitiated on the spot. In both cases, a request was made to the provider to directly input the changes

into the database, as this event entailed the possible disenfranchisement of the voter in question.

Other outsourced activities include scheduled database maintenance tasks; full backup of the database

including the transactional log files, a replica of the database structure in place at the Parliamentary

Elections Office, remote database administration.

3.1.6.4 Network

No further details on the levels of availability required by the provider were indicated. No statistics on

average time offline or mean time between failures (MTBF) were indicated.

3.2 Integrity and Consistency of Databases and Identity Records in the

Voter Registration System Accurate and effective voter registration systems depend on electoral registries that are complete and

cleansed of outdated registrants. These conditions ultimately enhance public trust in elections and

strengthen the legitimacy of the electoral results. The existence of standardized mechanisms to ensure

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that only eligible voters are registered in the electoral roll should be combined with processes to keep

the voters’ list current and continually up to date.

3.2.1 Integrity and Consistency of the Databases

The Voters’ Registry is a database containing the name and information of all eligible voters in Grenada

who have formally requested to be registered as eligible voters. In order to register, an application must

be presented in person at one of the 18 registration offices located across Grenada.

At the point of registration, the information inputted into the database includes the personal

information about the voter along with his signature, fingerprints and photograph of the individual.

Electoral administrative information such as registration number, name of the constituency and the

polling division identification code, are also inputted into the database.

This electoral administration information is determined by the current address of the potential

registrant and only assigned to the voter once the documentation presented by the individual is verified.

A geographic-electoral frame in accordance to the voter’s home address (Parish and Village), determines

the polling division where the individual must vote. The voters’ list is created according to geographical

criteria, constituencies and polling divisions; it is categorized.

Voters’ lists are printed with the following fields: a sequence number, surname, given name(s), sex,

address, occupation, registration number and polling division.

In order to verify the integrity of the voter registration database, the OAS Technical Team conducted a

thorough assessment of the voter database to identify potential inaccuracies and inconsistencies.

3.2.1.1 Data Base System

The Identity Document Issuance System (IDIS) is a relational database containing table objects, which

accommodate data for different modules of the application being used for the Grenada voter

identification card system. The operating system of the host server is Microsoft Windows NT 6.1 and it

is running Microsoft SQL Server 2008R2. Both text and binary data (images) are saved in the database

tables. The data is encrypted in a dataset and the encryption is protected with a password known only

to the operators. This security measure is used to prevent the decoding of the data in case the data sets

are lost or stolen. Codes are being defined in tables to have better understanding of data being captured

and for further references. For reporting, database views, stored procedures and user defined functions

have been created.

3.2.1.2 Data Verification System (AFIS)

The Electoral Roll Database contains biometric information based on fingerprint recognition. During the

voter enrollment process biometric information from each individual is captured and stored. All records

contain alphanumeric information and fingerprint images. The matching program, AFIS (Automated

Fingerprint Identification System) uses the fingerprint details to determine the accuracy of each

potential match. The application supervisor can verify the data and images captured. If there are no

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duplicates or other discrepancies, the supervisor approves the transaction and saves the information in

the database. The basic premise in the above information is that biometric identifiers are unique to

individuals, and the system is able to perform comparisons in attempt to establish the identity of an

individual and prevent duplicate registrations.

3.2.1.3 Integrity and Consistency of the Voter Registration Database

The OAS team conducted an assessment of the database to identify the existence of inaccuracies such as

repeated identity, the presence of minors or citizens with more than one document, undue

concentration of voters in one place, null, empty or inconsistent fields, and jumps in the numbering of

identity documents. In general terms, the results obtained from this assessment indicate strong levels of

accuracy and reliability. The assessment process conducted by the OAS technical team aimed to confirm

the features of the electoral roll database system, and to provide recommendations to improve the

updating of the electoral registry in a continuous fashion.

Consistent Records Inconsistent Records Total

Electoral Registry Data Base as of Jan 29, 2013

62,346 120 62,466

Electoral List as of Jan 21, 2013

62,132 20 62,152

The following is a detailed list of the results assessment, listing the inconsistencies found:

Field Observation Number of

Cases

%

DOCUMENT_NBR Records that have identical Registration

Number. Please note that some of these

records appeared to be test cases. Some

were published in the voters list published

on Jan 21 2013.

31

0.0005

LAST_NAME,

FIRST_NAME,

DATE_OF_BIRTH

Homonyms found, cases that need to be

verified and investigated against official

documents. There were no duplicate records

registered in either the non-police and

police electoral list.

77

0.001

31

DATE_OF_BIRTH There were four voters over the age of 100.

OAS verified their age against documents

stored in the system. Two of the individuals

submitted a Statutory Declaration of Birth

to the Registration Office in lieu of an

official document. The other two had a

passport and/or birth certificates. There

were no minors found.

2

0.00003

LAST_NAME,

ISSUE_DATE,

Data Validation. There is one case in which

the field was a symbol “-“. There is another

case where the last name begins with a

special character “ ’ ”. The voter

registration system has field validations that

prevent operators from leaving blank fields.

Printed on the voters list published on Jan 21 2013.

2

0.00003

ISSUE_DATE There are four cases where the issuing date

occurred in 2010, which raises a flag

considering that the official registration

process began in January 2012. None of

these names were printed in the voters list.

4

0.00006

DOCUMENT_NBR There were 70 cases that did not have a

number assigned. However, the system

status indicates that these records have not

completed the registration process.

0

0

REGISTRATION_NBR

There are four cases that were not assigned

a Registration Number. However, these

records were not printed in the voters list

published on Jan 21 2013.

4

0.00006

3.2.1.4 Integrity of the Data of Registered Voters

The most current electoral registry database available at the time of this report is dated January 29

2013. According to the Parliamentary Electoral Office calendar, the registration deadline was January 16

2013. Additionally, the Parliamentary Electoral Office provided political parties an official preliminary list

on January 21, 2013 for examination by voters during the seven-day claims and objections period.

During the claims and objections period, the Parliamentary Elections Office continued to process and

generate new voter identification cards for those that had previously registered.

Given the strong requirements to prepare the forthcoming elections, the Parliamentary Electoral Office

had a series of actions in place to create and deliver new voter identification cards in addition to a

backlog of other activities. To that end, the OAS team conducted an assessment on the Electoral

Registry Database as of January 29 2013. At the moment in time, the Database indicated that there were

62,466 records for Non-Police and 885 records for Police. The Electoral Registry Database at that

moment in time indicated that there were 62,466 records for Non-Police and 885 records for Police.

32

Date Issued Category Total Number of Voters

Voters List as of Dec 31 2012

Dec 31 2012 Non- Police 46925

Dec 31 2012 Police 648

Dec 31 2012 Non-Police Addendum 13900

Dec 31 2012 Police Addendum 198

Dec 31 2012 Total (Police & Non-Police) 47573

Voters List as of Jan 21 2013

Jan 21 2013 Non-Police 61289

Jan 21 2013 Police 863

Jan 21 2013 Total (Police & Non-Police) 62152

Official Voters List Jan 31 2013 (List to be used on election day)

Jan 31 2013 Non-Police 61270

Jan 31 2013 Police 878

Jan 31 2013 Total (Police & Non-Police) 62148

3.2.1.5 Cleansing of the Deceased from the Electoral Registry

The Department of Births and Deaths, which is currently undergoing a process to digitize and modernize

the civil registry, informs the Parliamentary Electoral Office on a quarterly basis regarding deceased

persons.

To that end, the OAS verified the list submitted by the Department of Births and Deaths containing the

list of deceased individuals for the second and third quarter of 2012 against the electoral database

provided by the Parliamentary Elections Office on January 29, 2013.

Field Observation Check (=), Fields

Verified: Last_Name, First_Name

and Date_Of_Birth

Number of Cases Reviewed %

Carriacou None found 17 0 %

Saint Andrew None found 79 0 %

Satin David None found 21 0 %

Saint John None found 27 0 %

Saint Mark None found 9 0 %

Saint Patrick None found 18 0 %

Saint George None found 241 0 %

3.2.1.5 Voters’ List Creation

The voters list is published on a quarterly basis. The database gives the Parliamentary Elections Office

the capability to generate the list of registered electors at certain dates, and to subdivide the list by each

constituency or any particular constituencies chosen from a list. Upon receiving the instructions from

the Supervisor of Elections, the Application supervisor sets the defined criteria and generates the list

using the following filters:

33

1. Reference Date: Approved electors up to a set date.

2. Constituency: Selection range from individual constituencies or all constituencies.

3. Polling Division: Each constituency or any particular group of constituencies chosen from a list.

4. Occupation Type: Two selections are available (Non-Police and Police).

5. Application Status: Approved or Printed & Delivered.

Similarly, the Addendum to electoral list, as required by law, must be provided along with the quarterly

lists. The report includes all the electors that have been approved or issued a card between the

reference date and the addendum date. Upon receiving the instructions from the Supervisor of

Elections, the Application supervisor sets the defined criteria and generates the list using the following

filters:

1. Reference Date: Approved electors up to a set date

2. Addendum Date: Selection range, electors that have been approved or issued a card between

the Reference Date and the Addendum Date.

3. Occupation Type: Two selections are available (Non-Police and Police)

4. Application Status: Approved or Printed & Delivered

3.3 Document for Identifying Individual Eligible Voters In 2011 the Parliamentary Elections Office entered a single-source contract with a third-party provider

to obtain licenses for an Identity Card Issuance System, covering all aspects of enrollment as well as the

printing of identity cards with enhanced security features for all voters in Grenada.

Individuals who are eligible to vote can register at one of the 18 Parliamentary Elections Office serving

15 constituencies. In Grenada voter registration is not automatic or compulsory. Voters must voluntarily

register to receive a voter identity document card, according to the new Electoral Identification Card

Issuing system. The system allows the registration officers to rapidly enroll an individual, capturing the

facial image, signature and fingerprint along with individual personal information. In addition, the

system is equipped with an Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) capable of detecting

duplicate registrations. The system has been designed to collect applicant data in 18 local offices across

Grenada and to print cards from a central location, the Parliamentary Elections Office.

The voter registration card design includes personal voter details such as name, gender, age, residence,

country of birth, photo, signature and occupation as well as necessary administrative information such

as registration number, and the polling division identification code. Additionally, data stored in the card

includes biometric fingerprint templates in a two-dimensional barcode that is printed on the reverse of

the card. The card has a number of security features including a high security custom lamination that

helps to deter forgery or fraudulent alteration. The inclusion of biometric security information into the

voter’s identification card enables accurate and prompt fingerprint matching. The benefit of biometric

systems lies in the security that - even if a card is lost or stolen – it cannot be used by other individuals;

34

it is also difficult to forge. On one hand, alternate security features such as a password or pin can be

shared with other individuals. Other non-biometric types of identification cards only verify that the card

is present, saying nothing about the identity of the intended users. On the other hand, biometric ID

cards positively identify the ID carrier each time that it is used, because there is no way an individual can

share his or her unique characteristics. This provides an additional level of security.

Each of the 18 local offices is equipped with a single PC workstation configured for application

enrolment. Each of the enrollment units is equipped with a camera, fingerprint reader, signature table

and desktop scanner. All units are connected to a central application servers located in the

Parliamentary Electoral Office.

3.3.1. Registration Phase At the local registration office, each eligible voter presents a Certification of Enumeration and his/her

valid proof of identity to the data entry officer in order to complete the inclusion in the voters’ list. If the

registrant was not enumerated, he or she only presents proof of identity.

At that moment, the full biographic data (surname, given name, date of birth, address, gender, height,

nationality, occupation, place of birth, contact information) is provided for registration. Every record

includes the mandatory capture of the picture, the fingerprint and a scan of the supporting document

presented for further authentication.

To enhance accuracy and mitigate the possibility for errors while uploading the data in the new VIMS,

the list of valid supporting documents was limited to the birth certificate, valid passport and certificate

of residence. In cases in which the production of such documentation is not practicable, a statutory

declaration by the registrant of his date of birth is sufficient for registration.

3.3.2 Validations within the System The registration process begins with the presentation by the eligible voter of the support documentation

at the Local Registration Office and finishes with the delivery of the voter ID card after verification of the

voter’s identity. Furthermore, no enrollment can be performed by a relative or representative, or by

mail or by phone. In order to register, all eligible registrants must present themselves in person at the

registration office.

All information input in the system is performed by data entry officers at local registration offices. There

is no other means for the uploading of voter information for registration, with the exception of mobile

units that are also operated by registration officers.

An application is opened once voter information is registered. The status of this application will change

in the system depending on the point of the workflow. The key fields are mandatory, such as surname,

given name, date of birth, fingerprint, picture and a scan of the supporting document. This obligation

guarantees that no application can be officially entered in the system if anyone of these fields is not

completed.

35

The first validation checkpoint is completed immediately after the data entry officer has proceeded to

the data input: a receipt is printed for the voter to confirm and acknowledge that all data is correct prior

to further approval. A second validation is performed at the local registration office, where the

registration officer reviews the application; after approval, it is sent to a queue for a third validation

checkpoint at the central location, where the Assistant Supervisor of Elections reviews the application

and verifies if the captured fingerprint is already in the biometric database. If there is no match

returned, the application is approved. All approved applications appear in the voters’ lists that are

printed by the Parliamentary Elections Office and sent to the different local registration offices and

political parties for review.

A fourth validation checkpoint is in place when the operator in charge of quality assurance either

approves or disapproves the application after comparing biographic data with the information on the

supporting document. Once approved, the application is sent to the production queue.

The fifth validation checkpoint is performed after the card is sent to production, to verify the data

stored in the 2D barcode is correct and matches the voter information printed on the card. When ready,

the cards are organized by batches and delivered in boxes to the pertinent local regional office.

At the time of delivery, a last validation is performed by comparing the fingerprint stored in the card and

the one captured from the voter. If the match is positive, the voter ID card is delivered.

At every single point in time, each status change in an application within the system reflects the

different validations and checkpoints passed or failed. A transactional log keeps the information on the

user responsible for executing each transaction.

3.3.3 Voter Registration Card The voter registration card design includes personal voter details such as name, gender, age, residence,

country of birth, photo, signature and occupation as well as necessary administrative information such

as registration number, and the polling division identification code. Additionally, data stored in the card

includes biometric fingerprint templates in a two-dimensional barcode that is printed on the reverse of

the card. The card has a number of security features including a high security custom lamination that

helps to deter forgery or fraudulent alteration. The inclusion of biometric security information into the

voter’s identification card enables accurate and prompt fingerprint matching. The benefit of biometric

systems lies in the security that - even if a card is lost or stolen – it cannot be used by other individuals;

it is also difficult to forge. On one hand, alternate security features such as a password or pin can be

shared with other individuals. Other non-biometric types of identification cards only verify that the card

is present, saying nothing about the identity of the intended users. On the other hand, biometric ID

cards positively identify the ID carrier each time that it is used, because there is no way an individual can

share his or her unique characteristics. This provides an additional level of security.

Each of the 18 local offices is equipped with a single PC workstation configured for application

enrolment. Each of the enrollment units is equipped with a camera, fingerprint reader, signature table

36

and desktop scanner. All units are connected to a central application servers located in the

Parliamentary Electoral Office.

Grenada’s registration voter card includes textual details of the applicant, card information and a color

facial image and monochrome signature.

The following are the fields included in the Voter Registration Card, stored in the Electoral Registry

Database in Grenada.

Front Side Data Fields

Field Source Value Format Registration Number (sequential assigned #)

Generated by the Registration System

6 digit 999999

Surname and Given Name. Application Form Last Name, Given Name and First Initial

Alpha Text

Document number System 9 digit 999999999

Date of Birth Application Form Date of Birth DD MM YYYY

Sex Application Form Gender M, F, U

Country of Birth Application Form 3 letter ICAO code (default will be GRD)

Alpha Text

Date of Issue Print Module Date Printed DD MM YYYY

Distinguishing Mark Application Form Apha text Alpha Text

Expiry Date Print Module DOI + 10 Years DD MM YYYY

Holder’s

Signature

Application Form N/A Monochrome

Color image of

the applicant

Live Camera N/A Image

Reverse Side Data Fields

Field Source Value Format Card Number Generated by the

Registration System 9 digit

999999999

2D Barcode System Biographic data and 2 fingerprint templaes

PDF417

MRZ System

ICAO 9303

Figure 2. Example Voter Registration Card Layout (Front)

Figure 3. Example Voter Registration Card Layout (Back)

37

3.3.4 ID Card Security Features The card body is preprinted with fine line guilloche printing and layer with security features. Its custom

designed includes a layer of laminating film with built in security features, a preprinted stock number

that controls the inventory of the card and embedding biometric information in a 2D barcode on the

back of the card.

3.3.5 Cards Processed as of 25TH January 2013 According to data provided by the Parliamentary Elections Office, the total number of cards processed

as of January 25th 2013 was 31,367.

Figure 4. Information Provided by the Parliamentary Elections Office

38

Survey to Establish Coverage of the Electoral Registry

4.1 Objective The principal objective of the survey was to measure the coverage and quality of the voter registration

process and the electoral registry. Specific objectives were: a) to calculate the percentage of people over

18 years old (voting age) who were not registered in the electoral registry and to determine the main

reasons why; b) to verify that persons who claimed to have registered were correctly incorporated in

the voter list.

4.2 Methodology Data was collected by performing face-to-face interviews with Grenadian residents 18 years old or older

at their place of residence. Interview selection was decided by random sampling. Standardized questions

aimed to determine whether the person had or had not registered to vote as well as their personal data,

in order to verify that the data was correctly consigned in the source database.

4.3 Sampling Frame The sampling population constitutes all Grenada residents 18 years old or older, estimated to be 64,2192

persons.

Sampling stage Sampling Method

1. Enumerating

District (ED)

Stratified according to parish and number of homes. Enumerating

Districts were assigned proportionally to population.

In each stratum: Simple random sampling.

Selection: 56 ED from a total of 288 ED.

2. Household Systematic sampling with random beginning and continuing with every

three contiguous households.

3. Eligible Person “Most-recent-birthday” method. (Surveyor speaks exclusively to the

person in the household (over the age of 18) who celebrated his or her

birthday most recently.)

2 Source: Grenada Population Census 2001 and preliminary results of Grenada Census 2011 - Department of Statistics.

39

4.4 Implementation Dates Fieldwork was carried out between the 26th and 29th of January, 2013.

4.5 Reports A total number of 406 interviews were performed, proportionally distributed throughout Grenada.

Surveys were performed in all parishes on the island of Grenada, as well as the island of Carriacou. The

geographic location of every interview has been represented by a point in the map shown on the next

figure.

4.6 Results These are the main results of the survey:

Among citizens 18 years old or older (those able to participate in the elections), 84% are

registered in the voters’ list. Although there are no significant differences considering age

groups or educational levels, there is an apparent gender related imbalance: voter registration is

higher among women than among men (89% and 80%, respectively).

When persons absent from the voters’ list were asked about the reasons for not registering, two

main reasons were cited: lack of interest in voting, or not having enough time to complete

registration procedures.

Nearly two out of every three citizens registered in the voters’ list (63%) do not have the new

Voter Identification Card. This includes those who had not received the card as well as those

who had not collected it.

Figure 5: Map of surveys conducted

40

There is an almost perfect correspondence (98%) between the place of residence provided by

the citizen and the corresponding registered Constituency on the voters’ list.

There are six detected cases (around 2% of the sample) in which the interviewee claimed to

have registered to vote, but whose name could not be found in the voters list.

It should be noted that only 2% of those who responded positively about being registered could not be

identified on the electoral register. It is important to note that the information gathered from these

people in the sample was given verbally to surveyors, because the interviewees were unable to provide

an identification document. On the contrary, all respondents who were able to provide a supporting

identity document were identified in the registry, after a verification process carried out by the OAS

Technical Team.

41

4.7 Breakdown by Age, Sex and Educational level

4.7.1 Results by Age Registered Age

18 - 24 25-39 40-64 65 + NR Yes 58 79 143 59 2 No 12 21 24 6 2

Total 70 100 167 65 4 % Yes 83% 79% 86% 91% 50%

4.7.2 Results by Sex

Registered Sex

FEMALE MALE NR

Yes 209 132 -

No 27 36 2

Total 236 168 2 % Yes 89% 79% 0%

4.7.3 Results by Educational Level

Registered Education Level

No

Formal

Education

Some

Primary

Education

Completed

Primary

Education

Some

Secondary

Education

Completed

Secondary

Education

Tertiary

Education /

University

NR

Yes 8 33 124 26 94 52 4 No 1 4 16 7 18 17 2

Total 9 37 140 33 112 69 6

% Yes 89% 89% 89% 79% 84% 75% 67%

42

Findings and Recommendations

Following the 2013 General Elections, the OAS team encourages the Grenadian authorities to conduct a

thorough assessment of the functioning of the new voter registration system. A study of the legal

framework, the technical and the procedural aspects to strengthen the process in the future should be

considered.

In the spirit of constructive engagement, the OAS Technical Team presents the following specific

recommendations to the Government of Grenada regarding the voter registration system:

General/Immediate

Educational Campaign: It is vital that the Parliamentary Elections Office conducts an educational

and informational campaign informing all voters they will be able vote without the new voter ID

cards in this election. Such a campaign should be designed to reach the greatest amount of

people, employing popular media such as radio and television as well as billboards and signs in

public places, and should specifically mention the various documents that will allow electors to

exercise their right to vote.

Legal and Procedural

Though the fundamentals of the Grenadian legal framework governing voter registration process are

sound, electoral legislation continues to be grounded in the 1993 Representation of the People Act,

which is largely based on a paper system. The post-electoral period thus represents an excellent

opportunity for the government of Grenada to enact reforms so that legislation supports the new

electronic voter registration system. The OAS team emphasizes the following areas in which

international best practices could be incorporated, and where legislation could be strengthened:

Linkage between the Voters Registry and the Civil Registry: Despite the informal collaboration

between the Ministry of Health and the Parliamentary Elections Office, there are no legal

provisions that provide mechanisms for sharing the lists of deceased voters between the two

entities. The technical team recommends the enactment of legislation to formalize the linkage

and require the timely sharing of information between the Ministry of Health and Parliamentary

Elections Office. Special provisions should be enacted to ensure the timely sharing of the lists of

deceased voters in the context of an election, for instance within a few days after the issue of

the writ and before the claim and objection process begins. Such measures will ensure that the

list is continually cleansed and updated. Similar linkage measures could also be adopted for any

public authority that is in a position to provide information relevant to the accuracy of the

voters’ lists, such as those entities responsible for immigration, imprisonment and mental

43

health. All of the above should be accompanied by supporting documents that allow for the

clear identification of the person in question.

Internal Procedures to Purge and Rehabilitate Voters: A permanent voter registry requires

procedures for continual updating to ensure that the voters list accurately reflects the current

population of eligible voters. The Parliamentary Elections Office should establish standardized

internal procedures for purging the registry of non-eligible voters and for the rehabilitation of

citizens who have regained eligibility to vote. These procedures should detail the concrete steps

that need to be taken and the supporting documentation needed to authorize decisions in such

cases.

Proof of Residence: In light of concerns of strategic registration and lax requirements, the OAS

Technical Team recommends the enactment of provisions that require the furnishing of

documents, or statutory declarations, such as a witness under oath, to demonstrate one’s

ordinary residence. These provisions should also include prohibitions, offences and penalties in

case of manipulation.

Distribution of Voters Lists to Parties and Candidates: Provisions should be enacted so that all

parties and candidates simultaneously receive in a timely manner at least one electronic copy of

the voters’ lists at the publication date prescribed in the legislation. Clause 9, Rule 81 of the

Amendment Act should be amended to remove ‘so long as there are sufficient copies available.’

Clarification of Procedures and Timeframes for Claims and Objections: Particularities pertaining

to contestation processes outside and during an election operate in a very different timeframe.

The legislation mixes together provisions and procedures applicable to both processes, which

generate incompatibilities, inconsistencies and shortcomings. The OAS Technical Team

recommends that legislation be amended to provide clear and comprehensive procedures to

deal with claims and objections in a timely manner during an election. The legislation should

also be made more specific with respect to updating the voters’ lists from adjudicated decisions.

Protection of Personal Data: Provisions should be enacted to specifically prohibit and punish the

use of voters’ personal data for purposes other than electoral ends. This is especially important

as the voters lists can be an important source of information for commercial and advertising

companies, or even illicit activities. Such improvement would also enhance trust in the voter

registration process and facilitate transparency.

Consolidation of Electoral Laws: The Amendment Act has repealed, changed and added new

sections to The Representation of People Act, although the two pieces of legislation have yet to

be consolidated. This makes the legal framework difficult to access and understand, especially

for non-legally trained people. The technical team therefore recommends that the Ministry of

Legal Affairs follow through with their intention to consolidate the law into one single statute.

44

Technology

Strengthened Training and Transfer of Knowledge for IT Personnel: In order to strengthen the

autonomy of the IT unit with regards to operating the Voter Identification Management System

and to increase the capacity for independent response within the Parliamentary Elections Office,

the Elections Office should initiate an effort to train its personnel in the information technology

and carry out a transfer of knowledge and tasks from the third-party provider to internal actors.

Security of Hardware: In order to strengthen physical security and access control, both of which

are key elements in any IT process, the OAS team recommends locating backup servers in a

separate room with either very restricted or no access. Likewise, backup servers should be

located in an entirely different location. Furthermore, the Quality Assurance process for all voter

ID cards should be carried out in a separate workstation, located in a different environment or

room. Finally, increased security for the data capture equipment at the remote locations is

recommended.

Auditing of Procedures: Clear guidelines should be established for Process and Systems Audits

of voter registration procedures and of the Voter Identification Management System. Third-

party independent audits should be carried out periodically, to strengthen the transparency of

the Voter Identification Management System (VIMS)

Human Resources: The IT unit would benefit from additional personnel to facilitate a more

efficient distribution of tasks and responsibilities and to rebalance the workload. The addition of

human capital would increase the efficiency and reliability of the process especially around

election periods.

Procedures: A list of clear guidelines should be established to shape all procedures related to

voter registration. An operational manual should be developed to assist IT staff and provide a

reference tool to aid the registration process. The manual should include guidelines for

exceptions that require variation from the standard process, as well as reporting and approval

mechanisms for such instances.

Develop a homogeneous process and database: As mentioned before, the OAS Technical Team

recommends the development of an automated process that links and verifies the applicant’s

information with other institution databases or information such as the civil registry. An

effective enrollment system should ensure that evidence presented by the individual (birth

certificate, passport and others) constitutes concrete evidence of the voter’s identity. If the

bases of an individual claim to an identity (passport, birth certificate) presented during the

enrollment are not valid, in the current registration system, the individual may be able to obtain

a new forged identity through the enrollment process. To minimize the potential for fraud, a

pre-enrollment, or identity validation process may be required. In essence, a pre-enrollment or

45

cross-referring process should be considered a critical element in the biometric enrollment

process.

Quality of the Voter Registration Database

To overcome inconsistencies and improve the Voter Registration List, the following actions

should be considered:

i. Verify and investigate homonyms cases, against official documents.

ii. Implement a systematic informative campaign to inform eligible individuals of their right

to obtain a free voter’s identification card as well as to verify their information on the

voter registry, and report changes of residence as well as any deaths to the proper

authorities.

iii. Provide alternative means of information such as the telephone and Internet to help

voters verify their information on the voter registry.

Duplicate Registration

Purge the 31 duplicated records from the voters’ registration database. Duplicated registration

is generated as a result of the lack of established procedures. Essentially, there are two forms of

“duplication”:

i. The first case is a database record that is identical in all particulars to another record —

this case typically occurs when an individual has submitted more than one registration

application, as he or she may do so entirely by accident if a previous registration has

been forgotten. In general, this type of incident is rapidly detected and can be easily

corrected.

ii. A second case is presented when two records with non-identical information

correspond to the same individual. This form of duplicated registration arises in many

forms. The most common source is a change of address or change of name as a result of

marriage.

In both case presented above, it is necessary to clearly establish the procedures that must be

followed to remove a duplicate registration.

Provide Human Review of All Computer-indicated Removal Decisions

Inaccuracies in data may lead to false matching or removal by automated process. A human

review of each and every inclusion or removal of voters from the Electoral Registry must be

subject to the review and availability of trained personnel. Written procedures should be

developed for the verification of new voters and the handling of removals. These procedures

should explicitly address the specific field-level and record-level matching criteria of what

election officials intend to accomplish and provide a standard for accountability regarding past

actions and decisions made.

46

Annexes

Annex I: Letter of Invitation

47

Annex II: Letter of Acceptance

48

Annex III: List of Authorities and Public Officials Attending Meetings

1. Meeting with Governor General Sir Carlyle Glean

2. Meeting with Prime Minister Honourable Tillman Thomas

3. Meeting with the Leader of Her Majesty’s Opposition Dr. Keith Mitchell

4. Meeting with Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs Mrs. Elizabeth Henry-Greenidge

5. Meeting with Supervisor of Elections Judy Benoit

6. Meeting with Attorney General Rohan A. Phillip

7. Meeting with Ministry of Health, Department of Births and Deaths

8. Meeting with Ministry of Finance, Central Statistical Office

9. Meeting with Members of the National Democratic Congress

10. Meeting with Members of the New National Party

11. Meeting with Members of the National United Front

12. Meeting with Members of the Chamber of Commerce, Bar Association, Council of Churches and

Other Civil Society Groups

49

Annex IV: OAS Technical Electoral Team

Assessment and Evaluation of the New Voters’ Registration System in Grenada:

OAS Technical Electoral Team

Name Position Nationality

Tyler Finn Coordinator USA

Cristóbal Fernández Coordinator Chile

Alex Bravo IT Specialist USA

Yulimar Quinteros IT Specialist Venezuela

Daniela Zacharías Statistics Specialist Argentina

Alexander Michaud Legal Specialist Canada

50

Annex V: Survey Form

51