$ASQIsraeli and US strikes on Iran...Cordesman: Israeli and US Strikes on Iran 3/5/07 Page 2 Israeli...

Center for Strategic and International StudiesArleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy1800 K Street, N.W. • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006

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Israeli and US Strikes on Iran:A Speculative Analysis

Anthony H. CordesmanArleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy

Rough Working Draft for Outside Comment

March 5, 2007

Cordesman: Israeli and US Strikes on Iran 3/5/07

Israeli and US strikes on Iran

Israel and the US differ over the timing and level of risk posed by Iran's nuclear efforts.The US sees a mature or serious Iranian nuclear threat as coming well after 2010. Israelclaims to see it as coming as early as 2009 -- although much of this may be Israeli hypedesigned to push the US into diplomatic action, and military action if that fails.

Official US policy is to leave all options on the table, and emphasize diplomatic activitythrough the EU3 and the UN. The US estimates of timelines for Iran's nuclear and missileefforts also leave at least several years in which to build an international consensusbehind sanctions and diplomatic pressure, and a consensus behind military options ifdiplomacy fails.

The US would also have the potential advantage of finding any Iranian “smoking gun,”improving its targeting and strike options, and being able to strike targets in which Iranhad invested much larger assets. The fact Iran can exploit time as a weapon in which toproliferate, doe not mean that the US cannot exploit time as a weapon with which tostrike Iran.

Israel, on the other hand, sees Iran as an existential threat. A single strike on Tel Avivand/or Haifa would raise major questions about Israel's future existence.

The Problem of Targeting

There are no risk-free military options for Israel, the US or neighboring states. Tehran'sknown nuclear research facilities are dispersed around the country, generally large, andhave constant new construction. Many key sites are underground and many others may beunknown or are not identifiable. IAEA inspections have identified at least 18 sites, butothers argue that there might be more than 70. A great deal of the equipment other thanmajor centrifuge facilities is also easy to move or relocate. Iran may already be playing ashell game with key research facilities and equipment, constantly changing the targetingpattern.

Tehran has had a quarter of a century to learn from the experience of Israel's attack onIraq in 1981. Iran may have built redundant sites, underground facilities, and constructedhigh level of protection around its known nuclear research centers. Others have arguedthat Iranian nuclear sites may have been deliberately built near populated areas or infacilities with many other “legitimate” purposes so Israel and the US would beconfronted with the problem of collateral damage or being charged with having hit an“innocent target.” The previous chapters have also strongly suggested that many of Iran'sresearch, development, and production activities are almost certainly modular and can berapidly moved to new sites, including tunnels, caves, and other hardened facilities.


US and Israeli officials have publicly identified key nuclear research sites that may havebeen placed underground to shield them again airborne assaults. For example, the USidentified the Parchin military complex, located south of Tehran, as a “probable” locationfor nuclear weaponization research. This site alone has many sections, hundreds ofbunkers, and several tunnels. It is also a site that is being used to manufactureconventional armaments and Iranian missiles. This is one possible site that could beattacked, but even the evidence linking this to military nuclear weapons manufacturingwere ambiguous. The site has civilian and conventional military use. The IAEA initialassessment was that the site was not linked to nuclear weapons manufacturing, but mostagree that there was not definitive proof.

It is equally important to note that Iran had increased its protection of sites againstpossible US or Israel air strikes. It has been reported that the Islamic RevolutionaryGuards Corps (IRGC) launched a program to protect major nuclear facilities. Theprogram was recommended by the Nuclear Control Center of Iran and endorsed by Iran'sSupreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. The program's mission was to build a defenseinfrastructure for Iran's nuclear research facilities.

This program, reportedly coordinated with North Korea, is to build underground halls andtunnels at the cost of “hundreds of millions of dollars.” Some key sites such as Esfahanand Natanz are high on the list of the program to protect. The logistic defenseinfrastructure would include natural barriers (tunnels into mountains and cliffs), andmanufactured barricades (concrete ceilings and multiple floors), and camouflageactivities around key sites. The construction, a joint venture between Iranian and NorthKorean companies, was estimated to finish by June 1, 2006.

Israeli Options

A number of Israeli officers, officials and experts have said that Israel must not permitthe Iranians acquire nuclear capabilities, regardless of Tehran's motivations. Some havecalled for preemptive strikes by Israel. Ephraim Inbar, the President of the Jaffee Centerfor Strategic Studies, said, “For self-defense, we must act in a pre-emptive mode.”

Senior US officials have warned about this capability. Vice President Richard Cheneysuggested on January 20, 2005 that, “Given the fact that Iran has a stated policy that theirobjective is the destruction of Israel, the Israelis might well decide to act first, and let therest of the world worry about cleaning up the diplomatic mess afterwards.”

General Moshe Ya'alon, the Israeli Chief of Staff, was quoted as saying in August 2004that Iran must not be permitted to acquire nuclear weapons. He added that Israel must notrely on the rest of the world to stop Iran from going nuclear because he said a nuclearIran would change the Middle East where “Moderate States would become moreextreme.”

Israeli military officials were quoted in press reports in January 2006, as saying that theIDF got the order to get ready for a military strike against Iranian nuclear sites by March


2006. It is unclear what type of military strikes Israel may chose, if it decides to respondpreemptively. Some have argued that Israel may declare its nuclear weapons andestablish a “mutually assured destruction: deterrence. While the impact of an Israelideclaration remains uncertain, it is likely to have little impact on Israel's strategic posturein the region, since most states factor Israel's nuclear weapons into their strategicthinking.

Some experts argued that Israel does not have viable military options. They argue it doesnot have US targeting capability and simply cannot generate and sustain the necessarynumber of attack sorties. Some argue that Israel might do little more the drive Iranianactivity further underground, provoke even more Iranian activity, make it impossible fordiplomatic and UN pressure to work, and make Israel into a real, rather than proxy orsecondary target.

There is no doubt that such a strike would face problems. Israeli does not haveconventional ballistic missiles or land/sea-based cruise missiles suited for such a mission.The shortest flight routes would be around 1,500-1,700 kilometers through Jordan andIraq, 1,900-2,100 kilometers through Saudi Arabia, and 2,600-2,800 kilometers in a loopthrough Turkey.

Even if Israel had the attack capabilities needed for the destruction of the all elements ofthe Iranian nuclear program, it is doubtful whether Israel has the kind of intelligenceneeded to be certain that all the necessary elements of the program were traced anddestroyed fully. Israel has good photographic coverage of Iran with the Ofeq series ofreconnaissance satellites, but being so distant from Iran, one can assume that other kindsof intelligence coverage are rather partial and weak.

Brig. General, Shlomo Bro has argued that Israel's capabilities may not be enough toinflict enough damage on Iran's nuclear program:

…any Israeli attack on an Iranian nuclear target would be a very complex operation in which arelatively large number of attack aircraft and support aircraft (interceptors, ECM aircraft,refuelers, and rescue aircraft) would participate. The conclusion is that Israel could attack only afew Iranian targets and not as part of a sustainable operation over time, but as a one time surpriseoperation.

All that said, this does not mean that Israel and the US cannot target and strike much ormost of Iran's capabilities. One great danger in open-sourced analysis is that it is nottargeting intelligence and cannot provide a meaningful picture of what the US or otherpotential attackers know at the classified level. It is also dangerous, if not irresponsible,for analysts with no empirical training and experience in targeting and modern weaponseffects to make sweeping judgments about strike options. They simply lack basicprofessional competence and even minimal credibility.

Israel could launch and refuel two-three full squadrons of 36 to 54 combat aircraft for asingle set of strikes with refueling. It could use either its best F-15s (28 F-15C/D, 25 F-15I Ra'am or part of its 126 F-16CDs and 23 F-16I Sufas. It has at least three specially


configured squadrons with conformal fuel tanks specially designed for extended rangeuse. It could add fighter escorts, but refueling and increased warning and detection wouldbe major problems.

For the purposes of guessing at how Israeli might attack, its primary aircraft wouldprobably be the F-15I, although again this is guesswork. Global Security has excellentreporting on the F15I.(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/israel/f-15i-specs.htm)

The key aspects are that Boeing’s (formerly McDonnell Douglas) F-15E Strike Eagle enteredservice with the IDF/Heyl Ha’Avir (Israeli Air Force) in January of 1998 and was designated theF-15I Ra’am (Thunder). The F-15E Strike Eagle is the ground attack variant of the F-15 airsuperiority fighter, capable of attacking targets day or night, and in all weather conditions.

The two seat F-15I, known as the Thunder in Israel, incorporates new and unique weapons,avionics, electronic warfare, and communications capabilities that make it one of the mostadvanced F-15s. Israel finalized its decision to purchase 25 F-15Is in November 1995. The F-15I,like the US Air Force's F-15E Strike Eagle, is a dual-role fighter that combines long-rangeinterdiction with the Eagle's air superiority capabilities. All aircraft are to be configured witheither the F100-PW-229 or F110-GE-129 engines by direct commercial sale; Night Vision Gogglecompatible cockpits; an Elbit display and sight helmet (DASH) system; conformal fuel tanks; andthe capability to employ the AIM-120, AIM-7, AIM-9, and a wide variety of air-to-surfacemunitions.

Though externally the Ra’am looks similar to its USAF counterpart, there are some differences,mainly in the electronic countermeasures gear and the exhaust nozzles. The Ra’am has acounterbalance on the port vertical stabilizer instead of the AN/ALQ-128 EWWS (ElectronicWarfare Warning System) antenna found on USAF Strike Eagles. The Ra’am uses two AN/ALQ-135B band 3 antennas, one mounted vertically (starboard side) and one horizontally (port side).These are located on the end of the tail booms. They are distinguished by their chiseled ends,unlike the original AN/ALQ-135 antenna, which is round and located on the port tail boom ofUSAF Eagles.

The Ra’am utilizes extra chaff/flare dispensers mounted in the bottom side of the tail booms.Unlike USAF Eagles, the Ra’am still use engine actuator covers (turkey feathers) on theirafterburner cans. The U.S. Air Force removed them because of cost and nozzle maintenance,though curiously, USAF F-16s still have their actuator covers installed. Israeli Strike Eagles andsome USAF Eagles based in Europe use CFT air scoops. These scoops provide extra cooling tothe engines.

The 25 F-15Is operational since 1999 [and the 100 F-16Is] were procured first and foremost todeal with the Iranian threat. In August 2003 the Israeli Air Force demonstrated the strategiccapability to strike far-off targets such as Iran [which is 1,300 kilometers away], by flying three F-15 jets to Poland 1,600 nautical miles away. After they celebrated that country's air force's 85thbirthday, on their return trip, the IAF warplanes staged a fly-past over the Auschwitz death camp.

Israeli aircraft would probably need to carry close to their maximum payloads to achievethe necessary level of damage against most targets suspected of WMD activity, althoughany given structure could be destroyed with 1-3 weapons. (This would include the mainBushehr reactor enclosure, but is real-world potential value to an Iranian nuclear programis limited compared to more dispersed and/or hardened targets). At least limited refuelingwould be required, and back-up refueling and recovery would be an issue.


They key weapon to be used against hard targets and underground sites like Natanzmight be the GBU-28, although the US may have quietly given Israel much moresophisticated systems or Israel may have developed its own, including a nuclear armedvariant.

The GBU-28 is carried by the F-15I. It is a "5,000 pound" laser guided bomb with a4,400-pound earth-penetrating warhead that can be upgraded by the IAF to use electro-optical or GPS targeting. It is a vintage weapon dating back to the early 1990s, and theIAF is reported to have bought at least 100. It has been steadily upgraded since 1991 andthe USAF ordered an improved version in 1996.

It looks like a long steel tube with rear fins and a forward guidance module. It can glidesome 3-7 miles depending on the height of delivery. It is 153" long X 14.5" in diameter.(photos at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/smart/gbu-28.htm).

Multiple strikes on the dispersed buildings and entries in a number of facilities would benecessary to ensure adequate damage without restrikes - which may not be feasible forIsrael given the limits to its sortie generation capability over even Iranian soft targets. Asfor hardened and underground targets, the IAF's mix of standoff precision-guidedmissiles -- such as Harpoon or Popeye - would not have the required lethality withconventional warheads and Israel's use of even small nuclear warheads would causeobvious problems.

Israel may have specially designed or adapted weapons for such strikes, and bought 500bunker busters from the United States in February 2005. Experts speculated whether thepurchase was a power projection move or whether Israel was in fact planning to use theseconventional bombs against Iranian nuclear sites. These speculations were furtherexacerbated with the Israeli Chief of Staff, Lt. General Dan Halutz, was asked how farIsrael would go to stop Iran's nuclear program, he said “2,000 kilometers.”

The hard target bombs it has acquired from the US are bunker busters, however, are notsystems designed to kill underground facilities. They could damage entrances but notthe facilities. What is not known is whether Israel has its own ordnance or has secretlyacquired the more sophisticated systems described later.

Its main problem would be refueling -- its 5 KC-130H and 5 B-707 tankers are slow andvulnerable and would need escorts -- and its ordinary B-707 AE&W, ELINT andelectronic warfare aircraft are also slow fliers, although the new G-550 Shaved ELINTaircraft is a fast flier and the IAF has some long-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)that could support its aircraft, before, during, and after such missions.

The big manned “slow fliers” would have serious problems penetrating and surviving inIranian air space. Israel has, however, specially configured some of its F-15s and F-16swith targeting, EW, SAM-suppression aids, and ELINT for this kind of mission. The fulldetails of such capabilities are unknown.


Repeated strikes would be a problem because Israel could probably get away with goingthrough Jordan and then through Saudi Arabia/Gulf or Iraq once, but any repeated effortwould be too politically dangerous for Arab governments to easily tolerate. Israel hasalso had problems with its intelligence satellites and its battle damage assessment andtime-urgent retargeting capabilities for precision strikes with a target mix as complex asIran's could be a major problem.

Much would depend on just how advanced Israel’s long-range UAV capabilities reallyare and whether Israel could get access to US intelligence and IS&R capabilities for bothits initial targeting and restrikes, but confirming the actual nature of damage, carrying outrestrikes, and sending a clear signal that Israel can repeat its strikes if Iran rebuilds orcreates new facilities would be a problem.

The radars in the countries involved would probably detect all IAF and US missionsrelatively quickly, and very low-altitude penetration profiles would lead to serious range-payload problems. The countries overflown would be confronted with the need to eitherreact or have limited credibility in claiming surprise. An over flight of Iraq would be seenin the region as having to have had a US “green light.”

Iran would almost certainly see Jordanian, Turkish, and/or Saudi tolerance of such anIAF strike as a hostile act. It might well claim a US “green light” in any case in an effortto mobilize hostile Arab and Muslim (and possibly world) reactions.

Many have compared current Israeli military options with Iran to that of the 1981 attackagainst Iraq's Osiraq reactor, and have noted the conditions are very different. Forexample, Peter Brookes, a military expert, argued that have argued that Israel has severaloptions including satellite-guided JDAM bombs, cruise missiles on submarines, andSpecial Operation Forces. He, however, argued that attacking Iranian nuclear facilitiesare “much tougher” to target given the nature of the Iranian nuclear facilities and thestrategic balance in the region.

Covert action demands different kinds of operational capabilities and intelligence. Thereis no indication that Israel has capabilities of covert operations in Iran. The recentinformation about the development of the Iranian program indicated that it reached astatus of being independent of external assistance. Moreover, the assistance Iran got wasmostly from Pakistan, another place that is not a traditional area of operations for theIsraeli secret services, like Europe or South America. It seems that there is no realpotential for covert Israeli operations against the Iranian Nuclear program.

Iranian Defense Against Israel and US Strikes

Iran would find it difficult to defend against US forces using cruise missiles, stealthaircraft, stand-off precision weapons, and equipped with a mix of vastly superior aircombat assets and the IS&R assets necessary to strike and restrike Iranian targets in nearreal time.


Iran might be able to incept Israeli fighters, Iran has "quantity," but its air defenses havelittle "quality." It has assigned some 12,000-15,000 men in its air force to land-based airdefense functions, including at least 8,000 regulars and 4,000 IRGC personnel. It is notpossible to distinguish clearly between the major air defense weapons holdings of theregular air force and IRGC, but the air force appeared to operate most major surface-to-air missile systems.

Total holdings seem to include 30 Improved Hawk fire units (12 battalions/150+launchers), 45-55 SA-2 and HQ-2J/23 (CSA-1) launchers (Chinese-made equivalents ofthe SA-2), and possibly 25 SA-6 launchers. The air force also had three Soviet-madelong-range SA-5 units with a total of 10-15 launchers-enough for six sites. Iran hasdeveloped and deployed its own domestically manufactured SAM dubbed the ShahabThaqeb. The SAM requires a four-wheeled trailer for deployment and closely resemblesthe R440 SAM.

Iran's holdings of lighter air defense weapons include five Rapier squadrons with 30Rapier fire units, 5-10 Chinese FM-80 launchers, 10-15 Tigercat fire units, and a fewRBS-70s. Iran also holds large numbers of man-portable SA-7s, HN-5s, and SA-14s, plusabout 2,000 anti-aircraft guns -- including some Vulcans and 50-60 radar-guided and selfpropelled ZSU-23-4 weapons. It is not clear which of these lighter air defense weaponswere operated by the army, the IRGC, or the air force. The IRGC clearly had largernumbers of manportable surface-to-air launchers, including some Stingers that it hadobtained from Afghanistan. It almost certainly had a number of other light air defenseguns as well.

There are no authoritative data on how Iran deploys air defenses, but Iran seems to havedeployed its new SA-5s to cover its major ports, oil facilities, and Tehran. It seems tohave concentrated its Improved Hawks and Soviet and Chinese-made SA-2s aroundTehran, Isfahan, Shiraz, Bandar Abbas, Kharg Island, Bushehr, Bandar Khomeini,Ahwaz, Dezful, Kermanshah, Hamadan, and Tabriz.

Although Iran has made some progress in improving and updating its weapons, sensors,and electronic warfare capability, and has learned much from Iraq's efforts to defeat USenforcement of the "no-fly zones" from 1992-2003, its defenses are outdate and poorlyintegrated. All of its major systems are based on technology that is now more than 35years old, and all are vulnerable to US use of active and passive countermeasures.

Iran's land-based air defense forces are too widely spaced to provide more than limited airdefense for key bases and facilities, and many lack the missile launcher strength to befully effective. This is particularly true of Iran's SA-5 sites, which provide long-range,medium-to-high altitude coverage of key coastal installations. Too few launchers arescattered over too wide an area to prevent relatively rapid suppression. Iran also lacks thelow altitude radar coverage, overall radar net, command and control assets, sensors,resistance to sophisticated jamming and electronic countermeasures, and systemsintegration capability necessary to create an effective air defense net.


The Iranian air force has 14 main combat squadrons. These include nine fighter ground-attack squadrons, four with at least 65 U.S.–supplied F-4D/Es, four with at least 60 F-5E/F, and one with 30 Soviet-supplied Su-24MK, 13 Su-25K, and 24 French F-1EMirage aircraft. Iran possesses some MiG-29, Su-25K and -24MK, and Mirage F-1EIraqi aircraft it seized during the Gulf War. How many of these are operational is notknown.

Some reports indicate that Iran ordered an unknown number of TU-22M-3 “Backfire C”long-range strategic bombers from either Russia or the Ukraine. While such discussionsdo seem to have taken place, no purchases or deliveries can be confirmed. There havebeen rumors that Iran might have Su-30 fighter aircraft, however, such reports have notbeen confirmed by official Iranian or Western sources. Another source reports that Chinamay supply 90 FC-1 and 60 J-10/F-10 aircraft to Iran. China’s ability to export suchaircraft in the near term is uncertain, given the needs of its own forces, however, and it isunclear that China would provoke the Us by making such a sale.

Iran has five fighter squadrons, two with 25 U.S.–supplied F-14s each, two with 25–30Russian/Iraqi-supplied MiG-29A/-UBs, and one with 24 Chinese supplied F-7Ms. TheIranian Air Force has a small reconnaissance squadron with 6 RF-4E Phantom Aircraft. Ithas 1 RC-130, and other intelligence/reconnaissance aircraft, together with large numbersof transports and helicopters.

Most Iranian squadrons can perform both air defense and attack missions, regardless oftheir principal mission—although this does not apply to Iran’s F-14 (air defense) and Su-24 (strike/attack) units. Iran’s F-14s were, however, designed as dual-capable aircraft,and it has not been able to use its Phoenix air-to-air missiles since the early 1980s. Iranhas claimed that it is modernizing its F-14s by equipping them with Improved Hawk (I-Hawk) missiles adapted to the air-to-air role, but it is far from clear that this is the case orthat such adaptations can have more than limited effectiveness. In practice, this meansthat Iran might well use the F-14s in nuclear strike missions. They are capable of long-range, high payload missions and would require minimal adaptation to carry and release anuclear weapon.

Reportedly, Iran has acquired spare parts for F-14 aircraft from U.S. overstock throughintermediaries. As a consequence, the U.S. Defense Logistics Agency tightened itssupervision of surplus goods sales. One source states that, although Iran claims to beingable to produce up to 70% of all F-14 parts indigenously, it is questionable if Iran cankeep more than 30 F-14 aircraft serviceable.

Iran's air forces are only marginally better able to survive in air-to-air combat than Iraq'swere before 2003. Its land-based air defenses must operate largely in the point defensemode, and Iran lacks the battle management systems and data links are not fast andeffective enough to allow it to take maximum advantage of the overlapping coverage ofsome of its missile systems-a problem further complicated by the problems in trying tonet different systems supplied by Britain, China, Russia, and the US. Iran's missiles and


sensors are most effective at high-to-medium altitudes against aircraft with limitedpenetrating and jamming capability.

Iranian Retaliation Against Israel

As is the case with a US strike, Iran has the capabilities to strike back against Israel. Infact, it has threatened retaliation if attacked by Israel. The Iranian Foreign Minister,Manouchehr Mottaki, was quoted as saying that an attack by Israel or the US would have“severe consequence,” and threatened that Iran would retaliate “by all means” at itsdisposal. Mottaki added: “Iran does not think that the Zionist regime is in a condition toengage in such a dangerous venture and they know how severe the possible Iranianresponse will be to its possible audacity…Suffice to say that the Zionist regime, if theyattack, will regret it.”Iran has several options to respond to an Israeli attack:

1. Multiple launches of Shahab-3 including the possibility of CBR warheads against Tel Aviv, Israelimilitary and civilian centers, and Israeli suspected nuclear weapons sites.

2. Escalate the conflict using proxy groups such Hezbollah or Hamas to attack Israel proper withsuicide bombings, covert CBR attacks, and missile attacks from southern Lebanon and Syria.

3. Covert attacks against Israeli interests by its intelligence and IRGC assets. This could include low-level bombings against Israeli embassies, Jewish centers, and other Israeli assets outside andinside Israel.

In addition, any Israeli military option would have to include an air strike and wouldseriously can complicate Israel's fragile relations with Jordan and may provoke SaudiArabia to respond. An Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities may also strengthenthe Iranian regime's stance to move toward nuclear capabilities, and drive manyneighboring states to support Iran's bid for nuclear weapons. In addition, it could lead tofurther escalation of the Iraqi insurgency and increase the threat of asymmetric attacksagainst America interests and allies in the region.

On the other hand, Israeli officials have expressed the concern that if Iran acquiresnuclear weapons and the means to deliver them, this spark further proliferation in theregion. This would spread WMD capabilities around the Middle East, and greatlyincrease the threat of CBRN attacks against Israel and the entire region. Waiting alsohave its penalties.

US Options Against Iran

A power as large as the US would have far more capability than Israel. It could strike atpossible targets as well as confirm targets. The problem with a shell gamer is that itvirtually provokes strikes at all the shells.The US also could strike at a wide range of critical Iranian military facilities, including itsmissile production facilities. Most are soft targets, and would be extremely costly to Iran.Even if many of Iran's nuclear facilities did survive US strikes, Iran would be faced with


either complying with the EU3 and UN terms or taking much broader military losses --losses its aging and limited forces can ill afford.

Military operations against Iran's nuclear, missile, and other WMD facilities and forceswould be difficult for Israel and challenging for the US. Iran would find it difficult todefend against US forces using cruise missiles, stealth aircraft, stand-off precisionweapons, and equipped with a mix of vastly superior air combat assets and the IS&Rassets necessary to strike and restrike Iranian targets in near real time. For example, eachUS B-2A Spirit stealth bomber could carry eight 4,500-pound enhanced BLU-28satellite-guided bunker-busting bombs-potentially enough to take out one hardenedIranian site per sortie. Such bombers could operate flying from Al Udeid air base inQatar, Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, RAF Fairford in Gloucestershire, UnitedKingdom, and Whiteman US Air Force (USAF) Base in Missouri.

The United States has a wide range of other hard target killers, many of which are indevelopment or classified. Systems that are known to be deployed include the BLU-109Have Void “bunker busters,” a “dumb bomb” with a maximum penetration capability offour to six feet of reinforced concrete. An aircraft must overfly the target and launch theweapon with great precision to achieve serious penetration capability. It can be fitted withprecision guidance and converted to a guided glide bomb.

There seems to be a follow-on version of the 2,000-pound BLU-109, with an advancedunitary penetrator that can go twice as deep as the original BLU-109. Newestdevelopment is 5,000-pound BLU-122, which is supposed to be operational in 2007.Further, there is the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP), weighing almost 30,000pounds, carrying 5,300 pounds of explosives. According to some estimates optimumpenetrating distance is up to 200 feet. Possible alternative: directed energy and high-power microwave (HPM) testing phase.

The Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) GBU-31 version has a nominal range of 15kilometers with a CEP of 13 meters in the GPS-aided Inertial Navigation System (INS)modes of operation and 30 meters in the INS-only modes of operation.

More advanced systems that have been publicly discussed in the unclassified literatureinclude the BLU-116 Advanced Unitary Penetrator (AUP), the GBU-24 C/B (USAF), orthe GBU-24 D/B (US Navy), which has about three times the penetration capability ofthe BLU-109. US is investing in weapons that are supposed to destroy targets that areburied under more than 20 meters of dirt and concrete.

It is not clear whether the United States has deployed the AGM-130C with an advancedearth penetrating/hard target kill system. The AGM-130 Surface Attack Guided Munitionwas developed to be integrated into the F-15E, so it could carry two such missiles, one oneach inboard store station. It is a retargetable, precision-guided standoff weapon usinginertial navigation aided by GPS satellites and has a 15-40-NM range.


The United States does, however, have a number of other new systems that are known tobe in the developmental stage and can probably deploy systems capable of roughly twicethe depth of penetration with twice the effectiveness of the systems known from itsattacks on Iraq in 1991. The nature and characteristics of such systems are classified butthe newest development in the BLU-series that has been open reported is the 5,000-poundBLU-122, which is supposed to be operational in 2007. Further, there is the MassiveOrdnance Penetrator (MOP), weighing almost 30,000 pounds and able to carry 5,300pounds of explosives. According to some estimates optimum penetrating distance for theMOP is up to 200 feet. A possible alternative to these weapons are directed-energy andhigh-power microwave (HPM) weapons, none of which are currently beyond testingphase.

It is not clear whether such weapons could destroy all of Iran's most hardenedunderground sites, although it seems likely that the BLU-28 could do serious damage at aminimum. Much depends on the accuracy of reports that Iran has undertaken a massivetunneling project with some 10,000 square meters of underground halls and tunnelsbranching off for hundreds of meters from each hall.

Iran is reported to be drawing on North Korean expertise and to have created a separatecorporation (Shahid Rajaei Company) for such tunneling and hardening efforts under theIRGC, with extensive activity already under way in Natanz and Isfahan. The facilities aresaid to make extensive use of blast-proof doors, extensive divider walls, hardenedceilings, 20-centimeter-thick concrete walls, and double concrete ceilings with earthfilled between layers to defeat earth penetrates. Such passive defenses could have a majorimpact, but reports of such activity are often premature, exaggerated, or report far higherconstruction standards than are actually executed.

At the same time, the B-2A could be used to deliver large numbers of precision-guided250 and 500-pound bombs against dispersed surface targets or a mix of light and heavyprecision-guided weapons. Submarines and surface ships could deliver cruise missiles forsuch strikes, and conventional strike aircraft and bombers could deliver standoff weaponsagainst most suspect Iranian facilities without suffering a high risk of serious attrition.The challenge would be to properly determine what targets and aim points were actuallyvaluable, not to inflict high levels of damage.

On analyst projects that strikes against some 400 targets would be necessary to dismantlethe program. According to other reports, the U.S. Department of Defense is consideringboth conventional and nuclear weapons to use against reinforced underground targets,and would strike at Iran’s other WMD facilities, missiles and missile productionfacilities, and create an entry corridor by destroying part of Iran’s air defense system.This could easily require 800-1,200 sorties and cruise missile strikes.

More generally, the US could cripple Iran's economy by striking at major domestic gasproduction and distribution facilities, refineries, and electric power generations. There areno rules that would preclude the US from immediate restrikes or restrikes over time. Ifthe US chose to strike at the necessary level of intensity, it could use conventional


weapons to cripple Iran's ability to function as a nation in a matter of days with attackslimited to several hundred aim points.

Possible US War Plans: Attacking. Delaying, andWaiting Out

If the US does choose to respond militarily, it has several major types of military andstrategic options. Each of these options might have many of the following broadcharacteristics, although it should be stressed that these are only rough outlines of USoptions and are purely speculative and illustrative points. They are more warnings thanrecommendations, and they are not based on any inside knowledge of actual US warplans, and calculations. Those who argue strongly for and against such options shouldnote, however, that there are many different ways in which the US could act. There areno rules or certainties that either say such attacks could not succeed or that they would.

Demonstrative, Coercive, or Deterrent Strikes

1. Conduct a few cruise missile or stealth strikes simply as a demonstration or warning of theseriousness of US intentions if Iran does not comply with the terms of the EU3 or UN.

2. Hit at least one high value target recognized by IAEA and EU3 to show credibility to Iran,minimize international criticism.

3. Might strike at new sites and activities to show Iran cannot secretly proceed with, or expand itsefforts, by ignoring the UN or EU3.

4. Could carrier base; would not need territory of Gulf ally.

5. International reaction would be a problem regardless of the level of US action.

6. Might trigger Iranian counteraction in Iraq, Afghanistan, and dealing with Hezbollah.

Limited US attacks:

1. Limited strike would probably take 16-20 Cruise missile and strike sorties. (Total sorties in Gulfand area would probably have to total 100 or more including escorts, enablers, and refuelers.

2. Might be able to combine B-2s and carrier-based aircraft and sea-launched cruise missiles. Mightwell need land base(s) in Gulf for staging, refueling, and recovery.

3. Goal would be at least 2-3 of most costly and major facilities critically damaged or destroyed.

4. Hit at high value targets recognized by IAEA and EU3 to show credibility to Iran, minimizeinternational criticism.

5. Might strike at new sites and activities to show Iran cannot secretly proceed with, or expand itsefforts, by ignoring the UN or EU3.


6. Might slow down Iran if used stealth aircraft to strike at hard and underground targets, -but impactover time would probably still be more demonstrative than crippling.

7. Hitting hard and underground targets could easily require multiple strikes during mission, andfollow-on restrikes to be effective.

8. Battle damage would be a significant problem, particularly for large buildings and undergroundfacilities.

9. Size and effectiveness would depend very heavily on the quality of US intelligence, and suitabilityof given ordnance, as well as the time the US sought to inflict a given effect.

10. Iran's technology base would survive; the same would be true of much of equipment even infacilities hit with strikes. Little impact, if any, on pool of scientists and experts.

11. Iranian response in terms of proliferation could vary sharply and unpredictably: Deter and delayvs. mobilize and provoke.

12. Likely to produce cosmetic Iranian change in behavior at best. Would probably make Iran disperseprogram even more, and drive it to deep underground facilities. Might provoke to implement(more) active biological warfare program.

13. Any oil embargo likely to be demonstrative.

14. Would probably trigger Iranian counteraction in Iraq, Afghanistan, and dealing with Hezbollah.

15. International reaction could be a serious problem; US might well face same level of politicalproblems as if it had launched a comprehensive strike on Iranian facilities.

Major US attacks on Iranian CBRN and major missile targets:

1. 200-600 cruise missiles and strike sorties; would have to be at least a matching number of escorts,enablers, and refuelers. Period of attacks could extend from 3 to 10 days.

2. Hit all suspect facilities for nuclear, missile, BW, and related C4IBM.

3. Knock out key surface-to-air missile sites and radars for future freedom of action

4. Would need to combine B-2s, carrier-based aircraft and sea-launched cruise missiles, and used ofland base(s) in Gulf for staging, refueling, and recovery.

5. Threaten to strike extensively at Iranian capabilities for asymmetric warfare and to threaten tankertraffic, facilities in the Gulf, and neighboring states.

6. At least 7-10 days to fully execute and validate.

7. Goal would be at least 70-80% of most costly and major facilities critically damaged or destroyed.

8. Hit at all high value targets recognized by IAEA and EU3 to show credibility to Iran, minimizeinternational criticism, but also possible sites as well.

9. Strike at all known new sites and activities to show Iran cannot secretly proceed with, or expandits efforts, unless hold back some targets as hostages to the future.


10. Impact over time would probably be crippling, but Iran might still covertly assemble some nucleardevice and could not halt Iranian biological weapons effort.



13. Size and effectiveness would depend very heavily on the quality of US intelligence and suitabilityof given ordnance, as well as the time the US sought to inflict a given effect.

14. Much of Iran's technology base would still survive; the same would be true of many equipmentitems, even in facilities hit with strikes. Some impact, if any, on pool of scientists and experts.


16. A truly serious strike may be enough of a deterrent to change Iranian behavior, particularly ifcoupled to the threat of follow on strikes in the future. It still, however, could as easily produceonly a cosmetic Iranian change in behavior at best. Iran might still disperse its program even more,and shift to multiple, small, deep underground facilities.

17. Might well provoke Iran to implement (more) active biological warfare program.

18. An oil embargo might be serious.

19. Iranian government could probably not prevent some elements in Iranian forces and intelligencefrom seeking to use Iraq, Afghanistan, support of terrorism, and Hezbollah to hit back at the USand its allies if it tried; it probably would not try.

20. International reaction would be a serious problem, but the US might well face same level ofpolitical problems as if it had launched a small strike on Iranian facilities.

Major US attacks on military and related civilian targets:

1. 1000-2,500 cruise missiles and strike sorties

2. Hit all suspect facilities for nuclear, missile, BW, and C4IBM, and potentially “technology base”targets including universities, dual use facilities.

3. Either strike extensively at Iranian capabilities for asymmetric warfare and to threaten tankertraffic, facilities in the Gulf, and neighboring states or threaten to do so if Iran should deploy forsuch action.

4. Would require a major portion of total US global assets. Need to combine B-2s, other bombers,and carrier-based aircraft and sea-launched cruise missiles. Would need land base(s) in Gulf forstaging, refueling, and recovery. Staging out of Diego Garcia would be highly desirable.

5. Would probably take several weeks to two months to fully execute and validate.

6. Goal would be 70-80%-plus of most costly and major CBRN, missile and other delivery systems,key conventional air and naval strike assets, and major military production facilities criticallydamaged or destroyed.


7. Hit at all high value targets recognized by IAEA and EU3 to show credibility to Iran, minimizeinternational criticism, but also possible sites as well.

8. Strike at all known new sites and activities to show Iran cannot secretly proceed with, or expandits efforts, unless hold back some targets as hostages to the future.


10. Impact over time would probably be crippling, but Iran might still covertly assemble some nucleardevice and could not halt Iranian biological weapons effort.


12. Size and effectiveness would depend very heavily on the quality of US intelligence and suitabilityof given ordnance, as well as the time the US sought to inflict a given effect.

13. Much of Iran's technology base would still survive; the same would be true of many equipmentitems, even in facilities hit with strikes. Some impact, if any, on pool of scientists and experts.


15. Such a series of strikes might be enough of a deterrent to change Iranian behavior, particularly ifcoupled to the threat of follow on strikes in the future. It still, however, could as easily produceonly a cosmetic Iranian change in behavior at best. Iran might still disperse its program even more,and shift to multiple, small, deep underground facilities.

16. Might well provoke Iran to implement (more) active biological warfare program.

17. An oil embargo might be serious.

18. Iranian government could probably not prevent some elements in Iranian forces and intelligencefrom seeking to use Iraq, Afghanistan, support of terrorism, and Hezbollah to hit back at the USand its allies if it tried; it probably would not try.

19. International reaction would be a serious problem, and far greater than strikes that could be clearlyassociated with Iran's efforts to proliferate.

Delay and then strike:

1. The US could execute any of the above options, and wait until after Iran provided proof wasproliferating. Such a “smoking gun” would create a much higher chance of allied support, andinternational tolerance or consensus

2. Iran will have committed major resources, and created much higher value targets

3. The counter-risk is an unanticipated Iranian break out; some form of Iranian launch on warning(LOW), launch under attack (LUA), or survivable “ride out” capability.

4. Iranian dispersal and sheltering may be much better.

5. Iran might have biological weapons as a counter


6. Allied and regional reactions would be uncertain. Time tends to breed tolerance of proliferation.

Ride out Iranian Proliferation:

1. Announce or quietly demonstrate US nuclear targeting of Iran's military and CBRN facilities andcities.

2. Tacitly signal US “green light” for Israeli nuclear retaliation or preemption.

3. Deploy anti-ballistic and cruise missile defenses, and sell to Gulf and neighboring states.

4. Signal US conventional option to cripple Iran by destroying its power generation, gas, and refineryfacilities.

5. Provide US guarantees of extended deterrence to Gulf states;

6. Tacitly accept Saudi acquisition of nuclear weapons.

7. Maintain preventive/preemptive option at constant combat readiness. Act without warning.

8. Encourage Israel to openly declare its strike options as a deterrent.

9. Announce doctrine that any Iranian use of biological weapons will lead to nuclear retaliationagainst Iran.

The “ride out” option is one that many commentators need to consider in more depth.Unless the US does find evidence of an imminent Iranian threat -- which at this pointmight well require Iran to find some outside source of nuclear weapons or weapons-gradematerial -- the US may well simply choose to wait. Patience is not always a virtue, but ithas never been labeled a mortal sin.

Iranian Retaliation Against US Strikes

This does not mean it would be easy or desirable for the US to exercise its militaryoptions. US forces are preoccupied in Iraq, and some believe that the lack of security inIraq makes a full military attack against Iran all too unlikely. US military options are notrisk-free, and the consequences of US strikes are enormous. Tehran has severalretaliatory options:

1. Retaliate against US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan overtly using Shahab-3 missiles armed withCBR warheads

2. Use proxy groups including al-Zarqawi and Sadr in Iraq to intensify the insurgency and escalatethe attacks against US forces and Iraqi Security Forces

3. Turn the Shi'ite majority in Iraq against the US presence and demand US forces to leave

4. Attack the US homeland with suicide bombs by proxy groups or deliver CBR weapons to al-Qaeda to use against the US


5. Use its asymmetric capabilities to attacks US interests in the region including soft targets: e.g.embassies, commercial centers, and American citizens

6. Attack US naval forces stationed in the Gulf with anti-ship missiles, asymmetric warfare, andmines

7. Attack Israel with missile attacks possibly with CBR warheads

8. Retaliate against energy targets in the Gulf and temporarily shut off the flow of oil from the Straitof Hormuz

9. Stop all of its oil and gas shipments to increase the price of oil, inflict damage on the global andUS economies

Iran has close relations with many Iraqi Shi'ites, particularly Shi'ite political parties andmilitias. Some Iraqi groups have warned against US military strikes against theirneighbors. For example, Moqtada Sadr pledged that he would come to the aid of Iran inthe case of a military strike by the US against Tehran. Sadr pledged that his militia, theMahdi army, would come to the aid of Iran. According to Sadr, Iran asked him aboutwhat his position would be if Iraq was attacked by the US and he pledged that the Mahdiarmy would help any Arab or neighboring country if it was attacked.

Many observers argue that a military strike against Iran can add to the chaos in Iraq andmay further complicate the US position in Iraq. While the consequences of US militaryattacks against Iran remain unclear; the Shi'ite majority in Iraq can 1) as the US to leaveIraq, 2) Shi'ite militia groups directly attack US forces, and/or 3) turn the new Iraqisecurity and military forces against US forces in Iraq.

Iran has extensive forces suited to asymmetric warfare. It could not close the Strait ofHormuz, or halt tanker traffic, but it could threaten and disrupt it can create a high-riskpremium and potential panic in oil markets. Iran could potentially destabilize part ofAfghanistan, and use Hezbollah and Syria to threaten Israel.

Iran can also use its IRGC asymmetric warfare assets to attack US interests in the region.Iranian officials do not hide the fact that they would use asymmetric attacks against USinterests. For example, a Brigadier General in the IRGC and the commander of the“Lovers of Martyrdom Garrison,” Mohammad-Reza Jaafari, threatened US interest withsuicide operations if the US were to attack Iran:

Now that America is after gaining allies against the righteous Islamic Republic and wants to attackour sanctities, members of the martyrdom-seeking garrisons across the world have been put onalert so that if the Islamic Republic of Iran receives the smallest threat, the American and Israelistrategic interests will be burnt down everywhere.

The only tool against the enemy that we have with which we can become victorious aremartyrdom-seeking operations and, God willing, our possession of faithful, brave, trained andzealous persons will give us the upper hand in the battlefield...

Upon receiving their orders, our martyrdom-seeking forces will be uncontrollable and a guerrillawar may go on in various places for years to come…


America and any other power cannot win in the unbalanced war against us.

Iran could seek to create an alliance with extremist movements like al-Qaeda in spite oftheir hostility to Shi'ites. It can seek to exploit Arab and Muslim anger against US ties toIsrael and the invasion of Iraq on a global level, and European and other concerns that theUS might be repeating its miscalculation of the threat posed by Iraq and striking withoutadequate cause. Unless Iran is far more egregious in its non-compliance, or the US canfind a definitive smoking gun to prove Iran is proliferating, Iran would be certain to havesome success in such efforts.

Iran's energy resources are another potential weapon. Shutting off exports would deeplyhurt Iran but would have an impact on global markets. As Iraq found, energy deals canalso sharply weaken support for even diplomatic options, and Russia and China mightwell oppose any kind of US military strike, regardless of the level of justification the UScould advance at the time.

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