Arcadia and Boeotia in Peloponnesian Affairs, 370-362 B.C.

Arcadia and Boeotia in Peloponnesian Affairs, 370-362 B.C.Author(s): James RoySource: Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Bd. 20, H. 5/6 (4th Qtr., 1971), pp. 569-599Published by: Franz Steiner VerlagStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4435225 .

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ARCADIA AND BOEOTIA IN PELOPONNESIAN AFFAIRS, 370-362 B. C.

The union of Arcadian states created in 370 never achieved major international power comparable to that of Athens, Sparta or Boeotia in the classical Greek world. Moreover by 362 the Arcadian League was divided internally, and such power as it had achieved was already lost. Possibly for this reason its aims and activities in the years 370-62 have not been fully investigated. Since it did nonetheless play a major part in the Peloponnesian affairs of that period, these too remain imperfectly analysed. This in turn ob- scures the Peloponnesian policy of Boeotia, Arcadia's ally and the other major anti-Spartan power interested in the Peloponnese. The present article seeks to explore the activities of these two states. They formed a decidedly anti-Spartan combination, but relatively little attention is given here to their enemy, Sparta, whose history in these as in other years has already attracted attention.

It is unfortunately impossible to discuss the history of these years without engaging in some assessment of chronology. Consequently an appendix on related chronological problems follows the article. A further appendix as- sembles and discusses the technical details of the alliances which united Ar- cadia, Boeotia, and other Peloponnesian states.

In this period conflict between oligarchs and democrats was rife in the states of the Peloponnese. Already in 375/4, if Diodorus' date may be trusted, no fewer than five Peloponnesian revolutions were attempted.'

Nonetheless, despite considerable unrest, Sparta dominated the Pelo- ponnese until the battle of Leuctra. Nor did the defeat at Leuctra immediately end this Spartan domination; still after the defeat Peloponnesian allies, even some like Mantinea which later broke away, contributed to the second force sent out by Sparta.2 However in the peace treaty of 375, the peace concluded at Sparta in 371 before Leuctra, and the peace treaty at Athens after Leuctra, Sparta accepted with progressively fewer reservations guarantees of freedom and autonomy for Greek states including her Peloponnesian

I D.S.XV.40. The case against 375/4 was strongly argued long ago by Stern, Gerchicbte der spar- taniscben und tbebaniscben Hegemonie, 93-99, 155, followed by e. g. Beloch, Griechische Geschicbie. III. 12. 174. n. 4. Lauffer, Historia. 8 (1959). 318 n. 5, has however suggested that Diodorus' date may be right. I hope to defend it more fully elsewhere. 2 Xen. Hell. VI. 4.18.



570 JAMES Roy

allies.3 In 370 Mantinea, relying on this guaranteed autonomy,4 began the Pelo- ponnesian reaction against Spartan control. (The extreme democratic move- ment in Argos known as the skytalismos was going on at the same time,5 but Argos was not under Spartan control.)

At Mantinea in 370 a democracy was re-established and the city re-syn- oecised; Sparta's work of 384 was wholly undone. The change, however, was evidently entirely peaceful, and quite possibly was managed within the existing Mantinean constitutional processes; not only does Xenophon mention no violence in connection with the change, but it is also clear that Sparta could find no excuse for intervention. King Agesilaus was sent to persuade the Mantineans at least to postpone their plans, but had no effective argument. Other Arcadian states sent workmen to help in the rebuilding, and Elis gave three talents towards the costs.6 At Tegea at the same time a political struggle was going on between pro-Spartan oligarchs and anti-Spartan democrats, both of whom were represented among the magistrates although the oligarchs were in the majority. The conflict led to open violence among the citizens, with the two sides more or less evenly matched, until with Man- tinean help the democrats finally prevailed. The oligarchic leaders were seized from a temple at Pallantium, tried, and executed, while 800 of their followers fled to Sparta.7 It is notable that at both Mantinea and Tegea the conflict between democrats and oligarchs began as a political struggle by constitutional methods; in Mantinea the democrats apparently found these methods sufficient to win control, but the Tegean democrats had to resort to violence. Evidently in some circumstances a single constitution could be manipulated to serve either oligarchy or democracy, and change from one to the other did not necessarily involve the overthrow of an existing constitution. The result was that at Mantinea, although the government became democratic, citizens of other political sympathies remained; but Tegea, whose oligarchs were in exile, was wholly committed to democracy.

A major point of dispute in the Tegean stasis, according to Xenophon, was the democrats' proposal to found a federal Arcadian council;8 Tegean democrats had an obvious interest in uniting Arcadia against Sparta. Diodo- rus names as the originator of the federal plan 'Lycomedes of Tegea', clearly meaning Lycomedes of Mantinea, who does not, however, emerge in Xenophon's account until later 369.9 In any case the plan for an

3 Ryder, Koine Eirene, 63-74, 127-33. Whether the peace was concluded at Athens late in 371 or

early in 370, its political consequences probably began in 370. 4 Xen. Hell. VI. 5.3, cf. ibid. 5. 6 D. S. XV. 57.3-58.4. s Xen. Hell. VI. 5.3-5. Bolte, RE. XIV. 1315, 1324, suggests that Argos also helped. 7 Xen. Hell. VI. 5.6-10. D.S.XV.59.1-3 gives a confused version of the same events.

8 Xen. Hell. VI. 5.6. 9 D.S.XV. 59.1 (he gives the correct nationality in XV. 62.2); Xen. Hell. VII.1.23.



Arcadia and Bocotia in Peloponnesian Affairs 571

Arcadian League clearly came from the democratic circles of Mantinea and Tegea in 370.

It was disputable whether the Mantinean intervention in Tegea violated the peace recently concluded at Athens,10 but Sparta decided that it justified an expedition against Mantinea. Many Arcadian states assembled at Asea to protect Mantinea; only Heraea and Orchomenus are known to have supported Sparta.'" Xenophon also says explicitly that Orchomenus refused to join the Arkadikon; therefore, when the Spartan campaign was launched, the Arcadian League already existed. Much remains obscure about this Arca- dian League, concerning both its membership and its constitution. Heraea and Orchomenus were clearly not original members, nor was Lepreum, which supported Sparta in 37012 and presumably was not yet considered a part of Ar- cadia. In a slightly later federal decree, these three states are represented, as is also Megalopolis, but many other Arcadian states are missing. The decree cannot be earlier than the foundation of Megalopolis (dated below to 368), nor, as Hiller von Gaertringen showed, later than 361. Yet at any time between 368 and 361 it is surprising to find so many Arcadian states not represented on the League, because of Xenophon's statement that all Arcadians took part in the invasion of Laconia in winter 370/69; and in particular it is surprising that Phigalia should be missing, since the Phigalian democrats might have been expected to join the League to seek protection against the Phigal- ian oligarchs exiled in Sparta. Altogether the simplest solution is to suppose that the inscription does not give a full list of the member-states of the Arca- dian League in the year when it was set up.13 Most, if not all, Arcadian states were probably members of the League at least by 369.14 Schaefer has, however, pointed out that, if some Arcadian states were not original members of the League but joined after its foundation (as seems clear in the cases of He- raea, Orchomenus, and Lepreum), the 'Ten Thousand' of the federal assembly, in any case probably not a precise figure, cannot have been a proportion of the total citizen body.'5 This leads to the question of the League's constitution. Our meagre information has recently been reviewed by Larsen,'6 but to his summary can be added the League's firm and active commitment to democracy, at least until winter 363/2. This emerges not so much from the League's constitution, which is not wholly clear, as from its political history.

10 Cf. the mixed Athenian reaction, Xen. Hell. VI.5.36. 11 Xen. Hell. VI. 5.10-11; cf. D.S.XV.59.4. 12 Xen. Hell. VI.5.11. 13 IG. V2.1 = Tod, GHI. no. 132. On the date v. Hiller von Gaertringen, MDAI (A). 36

(1911). 349-60, and also De Sanctis, RFIC. 55 (1927). 485-8. If not all current members of the League are listed, Cary's arguments for a date before 366 (JHS. 42 (1922). 188-90) are under- mined. On the invasion of Laconia, Xen. Ages. 11.24; on Phigalia, D.S.XV.40.2.

14 v. also Beloch, GG. III. 22. 169-70. "I Schaefer, Historia. 10 (1961). 310-14. 16 Larsen, Greek FederalStates, 186-95.



572 JAMES Roy

Firstly, its foreign policy was firmly pro-democratic, but this must be discussed below. Secondly, the League was the creation of the Mantinean and Tegean democrats, who would naturally give it a strong democratic bias. Lastly, the standing federal army was composed largely of men without independent means serving for pay, and it acted as an instrument of popular democracy; its political nature is shown by the Arcadian oligarchs' reaction in 363, when they took over the federal army to turn it from democratic ends to their own oligarchic purposes. It is notable that when the oligarchs had taken over the army, they were immediately able to control the federal assembly against the wishes of the federal magistrates."7 Probably the federal troops often made up a majority of the citizens attending the federal assembly, since it does not seem likely that other Arcadians would often be able to travel in great numbers to meetings of the assembly.'8 Also, in addition to the troops' actual voting, the existence of a strong federal army committed to democracy possibly allowed pro-democratic federal officials to override other political views. This evidence is sufficient to show the League's tendencies. One other point worth recalling is that the League was created before Boeotia was at all involved in Arcadian affairs; the Arcadian League was in no way the work of Boeotian statesmen.19

In 370 the new Arcadian League assembled its forces to meet the Spartan army. The Arcadians were supported by Elean and Argive troops, under the new alliance of Arcadia, Elis, and Argos (v. p. 594 below). Argos' part in such an alliance is understandable, since it gave the chance to support another democratic state against Sparta. It is quite possible that Argos also already had ambitions of expanding its power in the northeast Peloponnese, mainly at the expense of Spartan allies. These ambitions cannot be clearly seen, since Xeno- phon gives relatively little attention to Argive affairs of the period, but may be deduced from the scattered mentions of Argive campaigns in years following 370 against Phlius, Epidaurus, and Corinth.20 Elis' main motive in

17 Xen. Hell. VII. 4.34-5. Just before taking over the army the oligarchs were able to carry a

vote in the federal assembly, but it was on an issue with strong religious overtones (the use of

Olympic funds) and Xenophon's wording suggests that their majority was not great (ibid.). 18 Meetings of the Ten Thousand were eventually held in the Thersilium at Megalopolis (Paus.

VIII.32.1); but the only two meetings before 362 which can be placed were at Tegea (Xen. Hell. VII.4.36 and IG.V2.1, set up at Tegea with the Tegean damiorgoi at the head of the list). To reach Tegea, in extreme southeast Arcadia, would involve a long journey for many Arcadians. Tegeans

taking the opportunity to attend the assembly would no doubt reinforce the democratic feeling.

19 Cf. Pausanias (VIII.8.10; IX.14.4) who ascribes the even earlier rebuilding of Mantinea to

Epaminondas. Stern, op. cit. (n. 1 above) 431 n. 2 pointed out that this is impossible. 20 Phlius, spring 369, Xen. Hell. VII. 2.2-4; Epidaurus, autumn 369, Xen. Hell. VII.1.25 (Be-

loch, GG. III. 22. 238, dates this to spring 369 but the presence of Chabrias makes autumn more

likely, cf. D.S.XV. 68.1-2, 69.1-4); Corinth, Plut. Tim. 4.1. These were independent Argive cam-

paigns, as opposed to allied ventures. Cf. Corinth's campaigns against hostile neighbours, presu-



Arcadia and Boeotia in Peloponnesian Affairs 573

joining the alliance was to regain Triphylia and other adjacent areas, re- moved from Elean control by Sparta in 400.21 Swoboda argued that in 370 Elis was also democratic, but this is less clear. In 365 there was certainly considerable tension in Elis between democrats and oligarchs, the latter apparently being stronger. This tension probably existed already in 368, since it would explain Elis' ambiguous position in that year; Xenophon says that Elis sent no help against Spartan attack to Arcadia in 368 and was pleased when Arcadia lost the Tearless Battle, while Plutarch says that in 368 Elis in- tended to help Arcadia but was warned off by Archidamus of Sparta.22 It is safer to suppose that in 370 both oligarchs and democrats were competing for power in Elis, presumably within the framework of the existing constitution, and so that Elis was much less firmly committed to democracy than its allies, Arcadia and Argos.

The course of the rather ineffective Spartan campaign against Arcadia in late 370 is well known, and need not be repeated. During the campaign the new allies Arcadia, Argos, and Elis appealed for alliance first to Athens, which refused, and then to Boeotia, which accepted. The timing of these negotiations is clear from the fact that while the Spartans were still in Arcadia the Arcadians did not know whether Boeotia would send help.23 The result was that when Boeotian forces arrived, the Spartans had already withdrawn. The Boeotians had come to protect their new allies against Sparta, but not to mount a direct attack on Sparta; this, however, was now the wish of the Pe- loponnesian allies, and they succeeded in winning the Boeotians to their point of view.24 The whole allied force launched the famous winter invasion of Laconia, and then went on to liberate Messenia and found Messene. The creation of the new Messenian state was certainly due to Epaminondas, and as such was the first Boeotian initiative in these Peloponnesian affairs.25 Dur- ing the campaign Sparta appealed successfully to Athens for help, but the help was ineffective, and the Boeotians left the Peloponnese without serious hindrance.26

In spring 369, even without the Boeotians, fighting continued in the Pelo- ponnese, for Argos attacked Phlius while the Arcadians overran Pellana in northern Laconia.27 Then in summer 369 the Boeotians and their Pelo- ponnesian allies mounted another major campaign in the Peloponnese. Ac-

mably Argos (Xen. Hell. VII. 4.6), and Argos' peace in 365 with Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus, and other Spartan allies (pp. 597-598 below). 21 Swoboda, RE. V. 2401-3.

22 On 365, Xen. Hell. VII. 4.15-6; on 368, Xen. Hell. VII. 1.28-32, Plut. Mor. 219 A. cf. Swo- boda, RE. V. 2401-3.

23 Xen. Hell. VI.5.19. On the negotiations v. D.S.XV. 62.3; Dem. XVI.12, 19-20. 24 Xen. Hell. VI.5.22-5, cf. D.S.XV. 62.4-5. 26 On these events v. e. g. Stern, op. cit. (n. 1 above) 169-178; Beloch, GG. III. 12. 177-8. 26 Xen. Hell. VI.5.33-51; D.S.XV.63.1-3, 65.6. 27 Xen. Hell. VII.2.24; D.S.XV.67.2.



574 JAMES RoY

cording to Diodorus Arcadia, Argos, and Elis decided upon such a campaign, and then persuaded Bocotia to take part,28 and we have no reason to disbelieve him. Though Bocotia was prepared to exploit opportunities to strike at Sparta, it had other major interests; in 369, for instance, while Epa- minondas went to the Peloponnese, Pelopidas led Boeotian forces in Thessa- ly and Macedonia.29

While Sparta and Athens, now allied, tried to prevent Epaminondas' en- tering the Peloponnese,30 Arcadia, Argos, and Elis helped Phliasian democratic exiles in an attempt to take over Phlius. The attempt, though a failure, is interesting. Ten years before in support of democracy the inhabitants of Phlius had endured a bitter siege before being forced to yield to Sparta and accept an oligarchy. Yet in 369, when the exiled democrats briefly won control of the city, they were thrown out by the main body of Phliasians. A plau- sible explanation for the Phliasians' apparent change of feeling has recently been suggested by Legon, namely that the majority of Phliasians in 369, even if democratically inclined, were not prepared to accept a democratic regime installed by foreign powers, and in particular Argos, Phlius' traditional enemy.3'

After the Phliasian venture had failed the forces of Arcadia, Argos, and Elis joined Epaminondas, who had now crossed the Isthmus. Together they undertook operations in the northeast Peloponnese.32 Sparta's remaining Pe- loponnesian allies were almost entirely in that area - Corinth, Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermione, Halieis, Sicyon, Pellene, and Phlius.33 The main purpose of the campaign in summer 369 was no doubt to detach some of these states from Sparta, thereby also assuring communication between Boeotia and her Peloponnesian allies, and perhaps satisfying Argive ambitions. In the event Sicyon and Pellene were won over, but little else was achieved and some losses suffered; the allies therefore split up and Epaminondas left the Peloponnese.4 The case of Sicyon is however interesting. After early losses the Sicyonians debated their situation, and decided to break off their alliance with Sparta and come to terms with Epaminondas and his allies, which they then did.35 Class-conflict certainly existed in Sicyon, but Epaminondas made no attempt to foster democracy; instead he came to terms with Sicyon's rul-

28 D.S.XV.68.1. 29 D.S.XV.67.3-4; Plut. Pel. 26.1-4. 30 Xen. I-Iell. VII. 1-15; D.S.XV.68.1-3. 31 Xen. Hell. VII.2.5-9. v. Legon, His/oria. 16 (1967). 324-37, esp. 335-7. 32 Xen. Hell. VII.1.18-22; D.S.XV.68.5-69.4 (where the mention of Phlius at 69.1 is a mistake;

cf. Xen. Hell. VII.2.10-3.1). 33 Xen. Hell. VI.5.29, VII.2.2. Megara was evidently neutral (cf. Isoc. VIII. 118), possibly

intimidated by Bocotia (cf. Isoc. V. 53); D. S. XV. 68.2 is therefore wrong in listing it among

Sparta's allies in 369; v. Meyer, RE.XV.192. X4Xen. Hell. VII.1.20-2; D.S.XV.70.1. 35 Xen. Hell. VII.1.18, 3.2; D.S.XV.69.1 On Sicyon's earlier losses v. also Paus. VI. 3.2-3,

IX.15.4; Polyaenus, V.16.3; Frontinus, Siral. III. 2.10; Aeneas Tacticus, 29.12.



Arcadia and Boeotia in Peloponnesian Affairs, 575

ing oligarchs, though he also installed a garrison in the citadel.38 Pellene, where there was also class-conflict, probably capitulated in a similar way.37

Epaminondas was clearly not a champion of democracy, despite the strong democratic tendencies of his allies in Arcadia and Argos.

Again in autumn 369, as in the spring, after Epaminondas had gone Arca- dia and Argos went on fighting. The Arcadians overran Asine; the Argives attacked Epidaurus, but had to be rescued by the Arcadians from Corinthian and Athenian troops.38 There is no record of such campaigning by Elis, un- derstandably enough. Elis' main purpose in 370 was to regain her lost territories, which was sufficient reason to join an anti-Spartan alliance and parti- cipate in allied campaigns which would weaken Sparta. By 369 Elis had probably recovered Margane and Scillus of the territories she sought.39 Further south, however, Triphylia joined not Elis but Arcadia. In 369 the Triphylians claimed to be Arcadian, and the Arcadians accepted the claim, for on the Arcadian monument set up at Delphi to commemorate the devas- tation of Laconia Triphylus, the eponymous ancestor of the Triphylians, was presented as a son of Arcas, the eponymous ancestor of the Arcadians. Tri- phylia, organised with Lepreum as its centre, was probably incorporated in the Arcadian League in 369 or 368; a Triphylian served as Arcadian federal ambassador in 367, and Lepreum is represented by damiorgoi on a federal decree of the 360s.40 Further north Lasion too was claimed by Elis; but there were also Arcadian claims going back at least to 400, and by 365 Lasion was incorporated in the Arcadian League. Lasion, like Triphylia, probably claimed to be Arcadian in 369, and joined the League about then.41 Thus by 369 or 368 Elis had regained only a limited part of the territories she wanted, and the remainder was no longer under the protection of her enemy, Sparta, but belonged to her ally, Arcadia. Elis thus had no longer any compelling reason to go on fighting Sparta, and indeed had reasons, as Xeno- phon says,42 to be cool towards Arcadia.

Boeotia too by late 369 had little reason to continue campaigning in the Peloponnese. Boeotia was not involved there until late 370, when a powerful anti-Spartan coalition already existed. Boeotia was then expanding its influ-

36 Xen. Hell. VII.1.44-6; 2.2-3, 11; 3.2.-4. 37 The capitulation is not directly recorded, but Pellene certainly joined the anti-Spartan alli-

ance (Xen. Hell. 1.18, cf. 2.2-3, 11-15). Class-conflict, Xen. Hell. VII.4.17-18. 38 Asine: Xen. Hell. VII.1.25 (Beloch, GG. III. 2 2. 238 dates the attack to spring 369, but,

since the Arcadians were then attacking Pellana (n. 27 above), autumn is more likely. Beloch, ibid. 12. 185 n. 3 argues that Asine in Messenia is meant). Epidaurus: Xen. Hell. VII.1.25 (v. n. 20 above). 39 v. Bolte, RE. VIIA.199-200.

40 Xen. Hell. VII.1.26, 33 (cf. Paus. VI.3.9); FD.III.1.3-11; IG.V2.1. 20-22 (on which v. pp. 571-572 above). v. Bolte, RE.VIIA.200.

"I Xen. Hell. III.2.30; VII.1.26, 4.12. cf. the confusion between Triphylia and Lasion in D.S. XV.77.1-3, on which v. Bolte, RE. VIIA.200. 42 Xen. Hell.VII.1.26.



576 JAMES Roy

ence in Greece,43 and accepted the coalition's invitation to intervene in the Peloponnese, even to invade Laconia; Epaminondas then profited by the opportunity to create an independent Messenia. Again in 369 Boeotia accepted the coalition's invitation to campaign in the Peloponnese, and again Epami- nondas profited by the opportunity to create alliances with Sicyon and Pel- lene, regardless of Peloponnesian sympathies for democracy or oligarchy. By late 369 much of the Peloponnese (Messenia, Elis, Arcadia, Argos, Sicyon, Pellene) was allied to Boeotia. In view of the losses on Epaminondas' second Peloponnesian expedition, and of the fact that Athens had now joined the war on Sparta's side, not to mention Boeotia's interests elsewhere, it was hardly worth Boeotia's while to continue major fighting over Sparta's remaining alliances in the northeast Peloponnese.

For Arcadia and Argos however the prospects were different. Arcadia had made major territorial gains. Triphylia and Lasion in the west became Arcadian. Along the border with Sparta, where some Lacedaemonian perioeci were ready to revolt, Arcadia won Aegytis and Sciritis, which were incorporated in Megalopolis in 368, while Eua in Thyreatis possibly also became Arcadian." And there was more Spartan territory still to fight for; the Arcadians held Caryae against Sparta till 368, and Sellasia till 365.45 In addition Arcadia was prepared to intervene on behalf of foreign democrats; the attempt to restore the democratic Phliasian exiles in 369 was a first effort, soon followed by another at Sicyon in 368. Lastly Xenophon reports an up- surge of Arcadian nationalist pride in 369, fostered by the federal leader Ly- comedes and regarded somewhat sourly by the Boeotians and Eleans." The Argives cooperated with the Arcadians to establish democracies, and also probably had ambitions of expansion in the northeast Peloponnese (p. 572 f. above). The alliance thus entered a new phase. In 368 and 367 Elis and Boeotia47 conducted no major campaigns in the Peloponnese, while Arcadia and Argos continued warfare.

The attempt in spring 368 by the Persian envoy Philiscus to arrange peace in Greece had no effect on Peloponnesian affairs, for the terms which Phili- scus proposed to a conference of Greek states were so unfavourable to Boeo- tia that negotiations broke down.48

43 On Boeotian activity, outside the Peloponnese, which is not discussed here, v. e.g. Bengtson, GG.4 278-86.

44 Aegytis and Sciritis, Paus. VIII. 27.4 (on the text v. Hiller von Gaertringen, IG. V2.p.xviii); perioeci, Xen. Hell. VI.5.25-6, VII.2.2. On Eua cf. Theopompus fr. 60 (Jacoby).

46 Xen. Hell. VII.1.28, 4.12. 46 Xen. Hell. VII.1.22-6, 32. 47 The Boeotian garrison in Sicyon took part in an attack on Phlius in 367 (Xen. Hell.

VII.2.11-15; Meloni, RFIC. 79 (1951). 17-18), but no Bocotian expeditionary force was sent to the Peloponnese in 368 or 367.

48 Xen. Hell. VII.1.27; D.S.XV.70.2; v. Ryder, Koine Eirene, 79, 134-5.




Also in spring 368 the Sicyonian Euphron asked Arcadia and Argos to support him in establishing a democratic government at Sicyon; he argued especially that the existing oligarchic government was always liable to revert to alliance with Sparta. Arcadia and Argos agreed. Euphron and four others were then elected generals in free elections by the whole Sicyonian people, but with Arcadians and Argives present. Such intervention by Arcadia and Argos was of dubious legitimacy, since the alliance which bound together these Peloponnesian states contained a clause to guard against revolution or subversion of constitutional government; but it could have been argued that no violence was used, that the people of Sicyon in spring 368 voluntarily gave their firm support to Euphron, as they clearly continued to do. Xeno- phon's account of these events in Sicyon in spring 368 very much suggests a change in the Sicyonian constitution, which would also presumably have been a breach of the Peloponnesian alliance; but it is not clear that the irnitial stage, while the Arcadians and Argives were present, was anything more than the election to power, under the existing constitution, of a board of pro-democratic officials in place of the hitherto dominant oligarchs.49 Eu- phron's open use of the standard methods of the Greek tyrant may not have begun till later. In any case, however dubiously legitimate the Arcadian and Argive intervention, its purpose was clearly to establish a democracy in Si- cyon.

In summer 368 a Spartan army overran Caryae, and advanced into southwest Arcadia. Arcadia and Argos sent forces to meet it, and so too did Messenia. Clearly Messenia was still too weak to take any great part in its allies' campaigns; but it was essential for Messenian security that southwest Arcadia be held against Sparta, and on the two occasions in these years that Spartan armies entered southwest Arcadia, in 368 and 364, Messenia sent forces to help in defence. In 368 the allied forces succeeded in cutting off the Spartan army and forcing a pitched battle, a sound piece of strategy since a defeat of the Spartan main force would have been extremely damaging. The plan however ended in disaster, for the Tearless Battle proved a decisive Spartan victory, which did much to restore Spartan morale and prestige, while gratifying Arcadia's distrustful allies, Boeotia and Elis.50

The allies' defeat had however little military effect, for the same summer, shortly before harvest-time, Arcadia and Argos again attacked Phlius, without success.,' The most important result of the Tearless Battle was in fact

99 Xen. Hell. VII.1.44-5, cf. 1).S.XV.70.3. On Euphron's popularity at Sicyon v. Xen. Hell. VII.3.12. The Peloponnesian alliance is discussed below (pp. 594-599). On the chronology of Eu- phron's career v. Meloni, RFIC. 79 (1951). 10-33; this chronology is followed here, but the present political presentation differs in several respects from Meloni's.

60 Xen. Hell. VII.1.28-32; D.S.XV.72.3; Plut. Ages. 33.3-5, Mor. 218F. Messenian mobilisa- tion in 364, Xen. Hell. VII.4.27. fi Xen. Hell. VII.2.10 (cf. 5-9).

37 Historia XX/5-6



578 JAMES Roy

the foundation of Megalopolis, in order, as the ancient sources say, to strengthen southwest Arcadia against Spartan attack. Despite Pausanias' statement that 'Epaminondas might be called the founder of Megalopolis' there is no reason to believe that Epaminondas or Boeotia played any part in the foundation; Pausanias wrongly credited the rebuilding of Mantinea to Epaminon- das, and evidently made a similar mistake about Megalopolis.52

In 367 war continued in the Peloponnese. Phlius was yet again attacked, unsuccessfully, by Argos, the Boeotian garrison in Sicyon, Sicyon itself, and Pellene;53 and there were possibly other such raids and attacks of which we have no record. The most important activity of 367 was however diplomatic rather than military. Boeotia, Athens, and Sparta, each of whom had preten- sions to diplomatic leadership in Greece, all sent embassies to Susa to discuss Greek affairs with the Persian King. The proposals which won the King's approval were those of Boeotia, put forward by Pelopidas. They were wide- ranging and important, including a guarantee of Messenian independence, but one relatively minor point illuminates the current state of the Peloponne- sian-Boeotian alliance.54 Pelopidas as Boeotian ambassador was accompanied to Susa by Elean and Arcadian ambassadors, the Arcadian being a Tri- phylian.65 The fact that Arcadia sent a Triphylian suggests that the Elean and Arcadian embassies were sent not to offer joint support of Boeotia but to dispute their rival claims to Triphylia, and that moreover Arcadia sought to prejudice the question. In the event the King accepted the Boeotian proposal that Triphylia be restored to Elis.56 Boeotia and Elis were both clearly disen- chanted with Arcadia by 368; now Boeotia sought to favour Elis at the expense of Arcadia, within the Peloponnesian alliance. Boeotia nonetheless miscalculated, for it was still necessary to have the terms accepted by the Greek states, and when the ambassadors returned to Greece a congress was summoned for this purpose. The congress began badly; when the Boeotians wanted the assembled delegates to swear to the proposed terms, they objected that they were empowered only to listen. Then the Arcadian leader Lyco- medes further objected that 'the congress should be not in Thebes but wher- ever the war is', presumably meaning that Thebes had no authority to settle the affairs of other states. When the Boeotians accused him of 'destroying the alliance' - a disingenuous charge in view of the Boeotian handling of the

62 On the date of the foundation v. p. 590 f. below; on its purpose v. D.S.XV. 72.4; Paus. VIII. 27.1. Epaminondas and Megalopolis, Paus. VIII.27.2; cf. n. 19 above on Epaminondas and Manti- nea, and v. e.g.Larsen, Greek Federal SIates, 186 n. 1 (though a different date is there accepted).

53 Xen. Hell. VII.2.11-15; D.S.XV.75.3; v. Meloni, art. cit. (n.49), 24-5. 54 On the negotiations and proposals in general v. Ryder, Koine Eirene, 80-1, 136. 66 Xen. Hell. VII. 1.33 (where 'Argeios' is probably the Elean democrat of that name (Xen. Hell.

VII.4.15) rather than an anonymous Argive). On the identity of the Arcadian ambassador v. also Paus. VI.3.9. 56 Xen. Hell. VII.1.34-8; Plut. Pel. 30.3-5.




Triphylian question - Lycomedes and the other Arcadians left the congress, which then broke up. Later Boeotian attempts to persuade individual states to accept the terms were equally unsuccessful.57 The congress might well have failed in any case, since neither Athens nor Sparta could welcome the terms proposed, but the Boeotian attempt to curb Arcadia's power by diplomacy was clearly disastrous.

In 366 however Epaminondas again attempted to combine the promotion of Boeotia's interests with a check on Arcadian power. Achaea, though gov- erned by oligarchs, had so far been neutral in the recent wars. Epaminondas now launched an expedition to bring it into alliance with Boeotia, with the intention of then using it to exert pressure on Boeotia's disaffected Pelo- ponnesian allies. This intention would of course be secret, and the Pelo- ponnesian allies themselves co-operated in the expedition. Epaminondas was able to force entry into the Peloponnese and unite with his allies. Achaea then capitulated, apparently without fighting, and Epaminondas reached an agreement with the ruling oligarchs, as he had done at Sicyon in 369. He did nonetheless 'liberate' Dyme, Naupactus, and Calydon from the Achaeans, no doubt because of their strategic value.58 So far his plan had succeeded admir- ably, but it now broke down. The Arcadians and other supporters of democracy refused to accept a settlement with Achaean oligarchs, and their bitter protest at Thebes found support among Boeotian opponents of Epaminon- das. It was therefore decided to expel the Achaean oligarchs and institute democracies instead. When this was done, it quickly proved a fiasco; the exiled oligarchs mounted a successful counter-revolution and, once more in power, made Achaea firmly pro-Spartan. All members of the Boeotian-Pelo- ponnesian alliance thus lost by this venture; Achaea passed from neutrality to positive hostility.59 The incident nonetheless shows again Arcadia's enthusiasm for democracy, and also offers a rare glimpse of similar enthusiasm at Thebes.

Arcadia's next venture, the deposition of Euphron in Sicyon, is more puzzl- ing, since only two years earlier Arcadia and Argos had helped Euphron establish a democratic regime in Sicyon. If the incident could be clarified, it would help to show how far, and in what way, Arcadia supported foreign democracies. It is at least clear that, after a democratic government had been established in Sicyon with Arcadian and Argive support by the election of Euphron and four others as generals, Euphron rapidly

671 Xen. Hell. VII.1.39-40. I'l Xcn. Hell. VII.1.41-2; D.S.XV.75.2. 69 Xen. Hell. VII.1.43. The counter-revolution must also have affected Pellene; cf. Xen. Hell.

VII.2.17-23, and v. Meloni, art. cit. (n. 49), 25-6. Achaea is described as 'faithful to Sparta' bcfore the expedition by Hammond, History of Greece,

504; but its previous neutrality (accepted by Beloch, GG. 111.12.187) seems sufficiently proved by Xen. Hell. VII.1.43.

37*



530 JAMNES Roy

took all power into his own hands and, relying on strong popular support and on mercenary troops, ruled as a tyrant (in the Greek sense of the word). In the fullest recent study of Euphron's career Meloni has argued that Eu- phron's measures in Sicyon were less severe than a hostile tradition (Xenophon and Diodorus) reports; that Euphron's main aim was to create an independent policy for Sicyon; that his support for his Boeotian and Arcadian allies was less energetic than had been expected; and that the Arcadians deposed him for that reason.60 This interpretation however expressly contradicts the account of Xenophon, who says that Euphron took a vigorous part in his allies' campaigns, and that the Arcadians deposed him because of the way he was governing Sicyon.A' Clearly Xenophon did not like Euphron; but clearly too Xenophon did not like the Arcadian League, and there is no apparent reason why Xenophon's account of Arcadia's relations with Euphron should be biassed particularly against Euphron. It therefore seems better to accept Xenophon's version of the events, and the following interpretation is based on it.

From 368 Euphron established personal power in Sicyon. To do so he eliminated, by death or exile, not only oligarchic opponents but also the other democrats who had come to power with him in 368. He clearly continued to enjoy widespread popular support, and his internal policies were no doubt of a radically democratic nature; but he transformed the methods of government from open democracy to rule by one man, backed by mercenary troops.62 Such activities contravened the terms of the alliance which guarded against subversion of the constitution, and Euphron clearly knew this, since lhe was worried that his allies might intervene against him. He sought to forestall this by supporting their campaigns assiduously with men and money, thus sacrificing his foreign policy in order to be allowed to pursue his home policy.63 Apparently he had little to fear from Boeotia, for the Boeotian garrison which occupied the citadel in Sicyon from 369 onwards refrained quite remarkably from any intervention in internal Sicyonian politics; 64 Boeotia was evidently prepared to accept Euphron as an ally, just as it had accepted the Sicyonian oligarchs in 369. The Arcadians did however intervene in 366, and must have justified their intervention by the terms of the Peloponnesian alliance to which both Arcadia and Sicyon belonged, because Euphron's unconstitutional government was a breach of the alliance. The

'I Meloni, RFIC. 79 (1951). 10-33. v. also Berve, Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen, I. 305-7, 11.676.

The main source is Xenophon, Hell. VII. 1.44-6, 2.11-15, 3.1-12, 4.1; v. also D.S.XV.70.3. I" Xen. Hell. VII.1.46, 3.1. 62 Banishment, Xen. Hell. VII.1.46, 3.8; popular support, cf. ibid. 3.4, 12; mercenaries, ibid.

1.45-6, 2.11. 63 Xen. Hell. VII.1.46. On the terms of alliance v. pp. 595, 598-599 below.

64 On this garrison v. Xen. Hell. VII.2.11; 3.4, 9. Since the Arcadians were admitted to the cita-

del in 366 (ibid. 3.1), the Theban commander evidently acquicsced in the deposition of Euphron

(Meloni, art. cit. 27), but apparently without himself acting.




Arcadians were therefore obliged to undo the effects of Euphron's unconstitutional rule, for instance by recalling those whom Euphron had wrongfully exiled; those recalled would include Euphron's original fellow-democrats, but also oligarchs, since presumably the Arcadians would be unable to dis- criminate between banished oligarchs and banished democrats. The Arca- dians did not restore an oligarchy at Sicyon; instead, more or less necessarily, they restored free political life, in which oligarchs and democrats compet- ed for power.65 The Arcadian intervention was therefore not a departure from the Arcadians' support for democracy; but it shows that this support did not extend to tyrants, even if their policies were in the popular interest.

Euphron's later career may be briefly mentioned. When deposed, he handed over Sicyon's harbour to Sparta, but the Sicyonians soon recovered it with Arcadian help. Euphron then - probably later in 366 - returned to Si- cyon with mercenaries from Athens; with popular support he again took control of the city. Since the Boeotian garrison still occupied the citadel, Eu- phron went to Thebes to negotiate. Some of the exiles restored by Arcadia followed him to Thebes, and assassinated him, whereupon Boeotia at last made up its mind about Euphron by deciding that the murder was justified.66 It is notable that even after Euphron's death Sicyon maintained its alliances both with the other Peloponnesian states and with Boeotia.67

The deposition of Euphron illuminates Arcadia's ideas on democracy, but in itself was of little importance in international politics. It did not change the tension between Boeotia and Arcadia. Twice, in the negotiations of 367 and by the Achaean expedition of early 366, Boeotia had tried to reduce Ar- cadian power, and twice had failed. Then, later in 366, Arcadia seized a diplomatic opportunity to strengthen itself against its ally. Since late 370 Athens had been intervening in the Peloponnese as Sparta's ally to restrain the success of the Boeotian-Peloponnesian alliance, and to prevent the complete collapse of support for Sparta in the Peloponnese.68 Yet when, in 366, Athens lost the border-town Oropus to Boeotia, there was a disappointing lack of response from Athens' allies. The Arcadian leader, Lycomedes, took the chance to offer Athens an alliance with Arcadia. At Athens the advan- tages of reducing Arcadia's commitment to Boeotia were compared with the disadvantages of being allied simultaneously to Arcadia and Sparta, who were at war, and finally a mutual defence pact with Arcadia was agreed. Though Lycomedes himself was murdered by Arcadian exiles on his way

65 Arcadian intervention, Xen. Hell. VII.3.1; v. pp. 595, 598-599 below. Euphron's banishment of democrats, Xen. Hell. VII.1.46. Sicyon's politics after the intervention, ibid.3.4.

'I Xen. Hell. VII.3.2-12; Meloni, art. cit. (n.60). 28-32, dating Euphron's death in the earlicr months of 365.

67 SEG.XXII. 339.16 (v. pp. 594-595 below); D.S.XV.85.2. v. Meloni, ibid. 32-3; Berve, op. cit. (n. 60), I. 306-7. 68 v. ClocM, Lapolitique itrangreed'Atb?nes, 101-15.



582 JAMES Roy

home from Athens, the treaty was concluded.69 Lycomedes had engineered a considerable diplomatic success for Arcadia, which retained all its former alliances with Boeotia and Peloponnesian states but now had the additional as- surance of guaranteed Athenian protection.

In the Athenian discussions about the alliance the idea emerged of trying to secure control of Corinth. When this was tried, Athens merely provoked Corinth into expelling all Athenian forces from her territory. Having hired mercenaries to protect her independence, Corinth went on to campaign against hostile neighbours.70 Corinth moreover was in danger not only from foreign enemies, but also from social unrest at home, as the subsequent brief tyranny of Timophanes shows.7' Corinth therefore initiated negotiations whose results for the Peloponnese are clear, even if other aspects remain obscure. Boeotia and Argos, at least, on the one hand made peace with Corinth, Phlius, and some - probably all - of Sparta's other allies in the northeast Pe- loponnese.72 Argos evidently abandoned any ambitions of expanding its power over neighbouring states.73 The consequence of this peace for the Boeotian-Peloponnesian alliance was that the remaining war was essentially Arcadia's; warfare continued only against Sparta, which could operate only by attacking territory held by Arcadia. The warfare was soon extended when Elis changed sides and, supported by Sparta and Achaea, made war on Arcadia; but clearly this too was essentially Arcadia's war. Arcadia's allies, bound by their treaty obligations, were of course obliged to give her military support, even if they had themselves little to gain.

In 365, about the time peace was concluded, Sparta, with mercenaries from Dionysius II, continued the war with Arcadia and recaptured Sellasia, possibly after a protracted effort, since apparently nothing else was achieved or even attempted in this campaign.74

Soon after the recapture of Sellasia, however, war broke out between Elis and Arcadia over claims to Lasion, now incorporated in the Arcadian League. Elis seized Lasion, and was clearly regarded as the aggressor, since Athens helped Arcadia under the Athenian-Arcadian mutual defence pact of

69 Xen. Hell. VII.4.2-3, 6. v. n. 144 below on the 'Rededuell', which, if authentic, must belong

to an early stage of these negotiations, and would represent a Bocotian attempt to dissuade Arca- dia from the pact. It is difficult to accept Xenophon's report that Lycomedes fell into his murder- ers' hands by pure accident; his insistence on this point may be an attempt to disprove suspicions

of Spartan complicity in the murder. 70 Xen. Hell. VII.4.4-6; cf. Plut. Tim.4.1. 71 Plut. Tim. 4-5; Aristotle, Pol. 1306A.19-24; Nepos, Tim.1.1,3; D.S.XVI.65.3-5 (obviously

misdated). v. Berve, op. cit. (n. 60), 1. 304-5, II.676. Timophanes' tyranny, which relied on the

support of mercenaries as well as on popular support, probably followed Corinth's use of mercenaries in winter 366-5; but popular unrest must have been apparent earlier. Cf. the attempted rev-

olution of 375/4 (D.S.XV.40.3; v. n. 1. above). 72 v. pp. 597-598 below. 73 Argos did retain a fortress in Phliasian territory in which it had installed Phliasian exiles

(Xen. Hell.VII.4.11, cf. 2.1). 74 Xen. Hell. VII.4.12.



Arcadia and Boeotia in Pcloponnesian Affairs 583

366 (though Athens interpreted mutual defence so loosely as to support the Arcadians in Olympia in 364 with cavalry).75 Argos supported Arcadia against both Elis and Sparta, and even Messenia mobilised in 364, when one phase of the campaigns brought a Spartan army into southwest Arcadia. Boeotia sent some troops, though possibly not many, to help Arcadia against the Spartans, and it is highly likely that Boeotia also joined Arcadia in the war against Elis.78 Elis clearly had cut herself off entirely from the Boeotian-Peloponnesian alliance; even Boeotia, which had previously fa- voured Elis at Arcadia's expense, was now obliged to drop Elis. Elis did not however attempt to face her former allies alone. Early in the war, if not before it began, Elis concluded alliances with Sparta and Achaea. For the oligarchs who now had somewhat uncertain control of Elis association with the pro-Spartan oligarchs of Achaea, and with Sparta itself, was natural.77 Though frustration at the failure to regain Triphylia was probably the main reason for Elis' going to war, the war was clearly a policy decided upon and executed by the Elean oligarchs, for the Elean democrats remained friendly to Arcadia.78

The course of the fighting is reasonably straightforward. The first Arca- dian counter-attack reached the agora of Elis itself, and thereafter the Arca- dians fought on Elean territory. In their advance the Arcadians recaptured Lasion, and won control of much Elean territory. The Arcadian advance provoked the Elean democrats to attempt a coup; although driven from the city by the oligarchs, they were established by the Arcadians in Pylus, east of the city of Elis.79 A later Arcadian attack on Elis was repelled by the Elean oligarchs with Achaean help; the Arcadians therefore turned on Achaea while the Achaeans were still in Elis, and captured Olurus in Pellenean territory. Again in Pellene the Arcadians provoked a democratic uprising, and installed the democrats in Olurus, which the Pellenean oligarchs reduced after a siege.80 Faced with yet another Arcadian attack, Elis asked Sparta to intervene. Archidamus of Sparta occupied Cromnus in southwest Arcadia and

76 On Lasion v. p. 575 above. Elean attack in 365, Xen. Hell. VII.4.12; D.S.XV.77.1-2 (Diodo- rus says that the restoration of Arcadian exiles was Elis' pretext for seizing Lasion, but it is not clear who these exiles were nor where they had been while Arcadia and Elis were genuinely co-op- erative allics. Since in addition Diodorus' account is vitiated by confusion of Lasion and Triphy- lia, the existence of these exiles is doubtful). Athenian help to Arcadia in 365, D.S.XV.77.3; in 364, Xen. Hell. VII.4.29 (possibly referred to also in Xen. Vect. 3.7).

76 Argos and Messenia, Xen. Hell. VII.4.27, 29; on Bocotia v. pp. 595-596 below. 77 Elis' alliances with Achaea and Sparta were in force by 364, Xen. Hell. VII.4.17, 19. On the

oligarchs v. Xen. Hell. VII.1.43 (Achaea), 4.15-6 (Elis). Elis could not rely on any supposed inviolability of Elean territory; v. Walbank, Commentary on

Polybius, I. 526. 78 Xen. Hell. VII.4.15. "I Xen. Hell. VII.4.12-16; D.S.XV.77.1-4. On this Pylus v. Paus. VI.22.5. 80 Xen. Hell. VII.4.16-18.



584 JAMES Roy

installed a garrison; and, when the Arcadians and their allies then besieged Cromnus, a contest of strength developed, until Sparta finally lost Cromnus, and with it more than a hundred Spartiates and perioeci.A1 The episode dam- aged Sparta's military prestige, but successfully created a diversion; during the siege the Eleans took Pylus, executing the democrats, and also recaptured Marganeis.82

These operations lasted until summer 364, when the 104th Olympiad was approaching. It is not known how the Arcadians administered most of the Elean territory they now controlled, but Pisatis, including Olympia, became an independent state, allied to Arcadia, Messenia, Sicyon, and, doubtless, Argos.3 Pisatis therefore organised the games of 364, although real control was probably exercised by the Arcadians, who evidently had access to Olympic funds at this time.84 During the games the Eleans, with Achaean help, attacked Olympia, and were repelled only after a violent struggle in the sanctuary itself. Nonetheless the games were held as normally as possible.A5

No further fighting in this war is recorded after the Olympic festival of 364, and this is not surprising. Elis apparently resigned itself to loss of territory, for the number of Elean phylae, increased from 10 to 12 in 368, was reduced again to 8 in 364.88 Sparta, even if not yet ready to make peace, was probably not inclined to take risks after the unhappy experience of Cromnus, while Elis' other ally, Achaea, had little to gain by further fighting. On the other side the war was essentially Arcadia's. Among Arcadia's allies Athens had major interests elsewhere, as did also Boeotia, which in any case was probably reluctant to strengthen Arcadia; Argos and Sicyon had little to gain; and Messenia in these years mobilised only when Spartan forces entered southwest Arcadia. The future scope of the war therefore depended mainly on Arcadia.

Up to this point no dissension is apparent within the Arcadian League. Its policy had been consistent. Its strength lay in Arcadia's resources of man- power, united through Arcadian nationalism, and especially in the federal Arcadian army; using this strength the League had extended its territories and established international influence. The League did not however rely solely on military power. It pursued a consistently anti-Spartan policy, and moreover it consistently supported democrats in the unrest prevalent in most parts of the Peloponnese. Furthermore the League's diplomacy was ca-

"I Xen. Hell. VII.4.19-25, 27; Justin, VI.6.6-10; Plut. Mor. 535A-B, cf. 192A. The story about

the siege of Cromnus in Callisthenes, fr. 13 (Jacoby) is unreliable, being also told about a siege of

Praesiae by Polyaenus, 11.15 (cf. Plut. Mor. 222A). 82 Xen. Hell. VII.4.26. 83 v. n. 126 below. 84 Xen. Hell. VII.4.28 (cf. III.2.31); D.S.XV.78.2; v. Cary, CAH. VI.98. On the Olympic

funds, Xen. Hell. VII.4.33-4; D.S.XV.82.1. 86 Xen. Hell. VII.4.28-32; Paus. VI.4.2, 8.3, 22.3. The account in D.S. XV.78.1-3 is confused,

with a doublet at XV.82.1 (under 363/2). 88 Paus. V.9.5-6; v. Swoboda, RE. V.2404, 2429.



Arcadia and Boeotia in Peloponncsian Affairs 585

pable, at least so long as Lycomedes was alive; the League succeeded in re- sisting Boeotian attempts to curtail its power, and finally, by the Athenian alliance, escaped from dependence on Boeotia without losing Boeotia as an ally. The aims of the League's police were more or less necessarily limited to the Peloponnese, but within the Peloponnese by later 364 the League was ar- guably the most important single power.

Some qualifications of this judgment are necessary. Firstly, if our evidence was fuller, it might well show that behind the League's apparently consistent policy lay an interplay of different political groups within Arcadia. For instance, the Arcadian League had been at war continuously since it was created, and this constant warfare may have been burdensome - though evidence is lacking - to some Arcadians. Secondly, Arcadian policy was tending to di- vide the Peloponnese into democratic states, allied to Arcadia, and oligarchic states allied to Sparta; and Arcadian intervention to support other democrats was far from generally successful. After establishing democracy in Sicyon in 368, Arcadia had to intervene again in 366 to suppress Euphron's tyranny; and, whereas Sicyon remained an ally of Arcadia, the democrats whom Arca- dia supported in Achaea in 366 and in Elis and Pellene in 364 were all over- whelmed by oligarchs, who thereafter naturally relied all the more firmly on alliance with Sparta. The states which dropped out of the conflict in 365 were in fact those allies of Sparta in the northeast Peloponnese in whose internal affairs Arcadia and her allies had never been able to intervene. Given the seriousness of the conflict in the Peloponnese in the years from 370 onwards between democrats and oligarchs - evidence has been cited above of such conflict in Mantinea, Tegea, Argos, Phlius, Sicyon, Achaea (and especially Pellene), Corinth, and Elis - it is arguable that the Arcadian policy, de- finitely committed to one side of the struggle, was sounder than the Boco- tian policy (which was largely frustrated by Arcadia). Boeotia was prepared to further its influence by allying with Peloponnesian regimes of any political sympathy; such alliance had no common factor other than an appreciation of Boeotian power, and it is likely that the oligarchs of Sicyon and Achaea, with whom Epaminondas came to terms, would in the long run have proved no more reliable than the Elean oligarchs, who in 365 broke away and joined Sparta. Nonetheless, whether or not superior to Boeotian policy, Arcadian policy was not wholly successful, and in 364 could have been carried through only by further military success against Elis and Achaea, if not Sparta.

After the Olympic games of 364, however, internal dissension prevented Arcadia from continuing the war. The dispute arose over the use of Olympic funds for Arcadian federal expenses, against which Mantinea protested. Clearly there could be strong religious grounds for objection to the practice, and Mantinea raised its own contribution to replace the Olympic



586 JAMES Roy

funds; 87 to that extent Mantinea's protest could be considered politically neutral, but it is likely that it originated among anti-democratic Mantineans, whose activity soon became clear. The Arcadian League was created largely by the democrats of Mantinea and Tegea in 370. Clitor in northern Arcadia and later Megalopolis were evidently also prominent,88 but Mantinea and Tegea apparently continued to dominate the League. The two cities differed, however, in that, while in 370 Tegea became democratic by a violent struggle which killed or exiled the oligarchs and wholly committed the city to democracy, at Mantinea the change of government was peaceful and some oligarchs presumably remained in the city, ready to exert influence if an occasion offered itself to them.89190

When, in late 364 or 363, Mantinea protested against the use of Olympic funds for federal expenses, the Arcadian federal officials summoned the Man- tinean leaders before the federal assembly; when the Mantineans refused to appear, they were condemned in absentia, and an unsuccessful attempt was made to arrest them. A majority in the federal assembly, however, now shared Mantinea's views, and it was decided to stop drawing on Olympia. Since only Mantinea then raised a contribution to support the federal army, the troops who could not maintain themselves dropped out, and richer Arca- dians took their place in order to convert the federal army from an instrument of democracy to an instrument of oligarchy. The federal officials who had handled Olympic funds saw that their own position was now dangerous, and also that the emergent oligarchs would be sympathetic to Sparta; they therefore appealed for help to Boeotia. The assembly, however, sent ambassadors to Thebes to tell the Boeotians to send no troops to Arcadia except at the invitation of the Arcadian federal assembly. The assembly also decided to end the Elean war, which Arcadia could no longer pursue seriously, and a truce was arranged.9" When Xenophon reports the Arcadians' great joy at

87 Xen. Hell. VII.4.33. D.S.XV.82.1-2 gives Mantinea the opposite of its true role.

B8 Paus.VIII. 27. 2; Xen. Hell. VII.5.5. 89 v.pp. 570-571 above. 90 In the Delphic contribution-list published by Bousquet, BCH. 66-7 (1942-3). 85-6, no. 1, a

Mantinean is described as such while for other Arcadians the federal ethnic 'Arkas' is used

(11.23-4, 30-1, 38-9). So long as this inscription was dated to 364 (Bousquet ibid. 112), it seemed to offer further evidence of early Mantinean disenchantment with the Arcadian League; but it now appears that the archonship of Antichares, to which the list belongs, should be dated to

362/1. (The sequence of Delphic archons Antichares - Aeschylus - Mnasimachus - anon. - Argi- lius seems assured (Daux, Chronologie delphique, 12). It is highly likely that Argilius immediately

preceded Heracleius, and that Heracleius held office in 357/6 (Pouilloux, BCH. 73 (1949). 192-200, accepted by Bousquet himself, BCH. 80 (1956). 556. Antichares is thus dated 362/1).

Nonetheless it is difficult not to believe that the changing pattern of Arcadian ethnics, seen in

this list, in FD.III.5.3, and in FD.III.5.4 plus BCH. 66-7 (1942-3). 96-7, no.2, reflects the break-

up of the Arcadian League. "I Xen. Hell. VII.4.33-5. The terms of the peace with Elis are obscure; Olympia was evidently

restored to Elis, though it belonged not to Arcadia but to the independent state Pisatis, and Elis



Arcadia and Boecotia in Peloponnesian Affairs 587

the peace with Elis, his words serve mainly - given Xenophon's notoriously pro-Spartan bias - to betray the political tendencies of the Arcadian peace party, 'those who sought the best interests of the Peloponnese'.92 The League then divided into the federal officials, mainly sympathetic to Tegea, and the federal assembly and army, mainly sympathetic to Mantinea, and finally split after formal peace was concluded with Elis. When men from all over Arcadia came to Tegea to conclude and celebrate the peace, the federal officials, helped by the Theban commander who was still present, tried to arrest their opponents, especially the Mantineans; when this failed the Theban made his excuses to the federal assembly and went home. The assembly sent ambassadors after him to Thebes, demanding his trial and execution; but in reply Epaminondas rebuked Arcadia violently for making peace with Elis without consulting Boeotia, contrary to the alliance, and declared his intention of leading an expedition into the Peloponnese.93 In Arcadia a group headed by Tegea and Megalopolis held to the Boeotian-Peloponnesian alliance, while their opponents, led by Mantinea, held to the mutual defence pact with Athens and also sought support from Elis, Achaea, and Sparta itself.94 The Peloponnesian states to which the Mantinean group appealed are significant; they were the natural allies of an anti-democratic group. The Mantinean group claimed to be the Arcadian League, and as such in 362/1 joined Achaea, Elis, and Phlius in a new alliance with Athens.95 The Manti- nean protest over the Olympic funds thus led externally to association with oligarchic states, and within Arcadia produced changes of which the most obviously oligarchic is the takeover by the rich of the Arcadian federal army.96 This evidence seems sufficient to show that the Mantinean protest caused an oligarchic reaction in Arcadia, and that, when the Arcadian League split, the part led by Mantinea was oligarchic in character. There is no reason to doubt that the other part of the League, that led by Tegea, re-

apparently recovered most, if not all, of the other territory lost in the war (Niese, Hermes. 34 (1899).525), but the Elean phylae, reduced to 8 in 364, were increased to 10 only in 348 (Paus. V.9.6).

92 Xen. Hell. VII.4.35-6 (v. also ibid. 5.1). For this rcason it is unlikely that the peace party was seeking a 'victorious peace' (as Glotz and Cohen, Histoire Grecque, III.174), although 363 was ar- guably a suitable opportunity for such a peace.

93 Xen. Hell. VII.4.34-40. The Theban commander at Tegea used as an excuse his fear of Spar- tan designs on Tegea (ibid. 39); though Xenophon vigorously denies any such danger, there was possibly some truth in it (v. Stern, op. cit. (n.1) 229-30).

94 Xen. Hell. VII.5.1-5; D.S.XV.82.3-4. 95 Tod, GHI. II. no. 144 = Bengtson, Slaalsvertrage, II. no. 290. The constitutions of Arcadia,

Achaea, and Elis are apparently described in the treaty by the term 'politeia', that of Phlius by 'demos', if one relies on considcrable restoration of the text (11.30-3). Even so it is difficult to inter- pret the terms as oligarchic or democratic. Phlius, though using 'demos', was not a democracy (Legon, art. cit. (n. 31)), while 'politeia' was not necessarily oligarchic (cf. its use in Kunze, Olym- piabericht 7. 211-17, no. I.b.6 = SEG. XXII.339.15). 96 Xen. Hell. VII.4.34.



588 JAMES Roy

tained the democratic nature of the Arcadian League's earlier years.97 The Arcadian League was thus split by a conflict between democracy and oligarchy, largely because it had not outgrown the dominance of Tegea and Mantinea, the two cities which created the League.

The split in the Arcadian League altered the pattern of power in the Pelo- ponnese, and ended the period which this article seeks to analyse. It is well-known how each half of the Arcadian League called in its allies, thus producing at the Battle of Mantinea a confrontation of the powers of the Pe- loponnese and central Greece, and how the battle itself, on the death of Epa- minondas, proved indecisive, so that 'there was greater uncertainty and dis- order than before in Greece'.98

To sum up, in the years from 370 until 362 Boeotia's and Arcadia's in- volvement with each other and with Peloponnesian affairs passed through various phases. In the earliest stage, in 370, when the Arcadian League emerged and formed alliances with Elis and Argos, Boeotia was not yet involved in the Peloponnese at all. Then in late 370 and in 369 Boeotia profited by the invitations of Arcadia, Elis, and Argos to enter the Peloponnese, weaken Sparta severely, liberate Messenia, and form a series of alliances. From 368 Boeotia, with no further prospect of major advance in the Pelo- ponnese, gradually turned to attempts to limit Arcadia's growing power; these attempts however failed, and ended when Arcadia in 366 succeeded in concluding the mutual defence pact with Athens. The peace in 365 between Boeotia and states of the northeast Peloponnese illustrates that Boeotia had little more to gain in the Peloponnese by military or by diplomatic methods, and Argos too accepted this peace. Thus from 365 onwards the initiative in Peloponnesian affairs passed to Arcadia (among the states of the Boeotian- Peloponnesian alliance). Finally the split within the Arcadian League de- stroyed this Arcadian initiative, and indeed left power in the Peloponnese once more open to competition, so that Boeotia intervened afresh in 362, though its intervention was not decisive.

An attempt has been made above to show how Boeotian and Arcadian policies in the Peloponnese were related in their different ways to the conflict between oligarchs and democrats which was at the time widespread in the Peloponnese.99 This conflict deserves some examination in its own right. Its importance is clear simply from the number of cases mentioned above. It is also clear that existing regimes realised the danger which such conflict could hold for them, and sought to protect themselves by including in treaties pro-

97 This argument runs counter to the judgment of Larsen, Greek Federal States, 189, that 'it is

difficult . . . to know which of the two was the more oligarchic and which the more democratic'. 98 Xen. Hell. VII.5.27. On the campaign of 362 v. e.g. Stern, op. cit. (n. 1), 232-40; Beloch,

GG. NP.12.205-7. 99 Not of coursc only in the Peloponnese; cf. the Boeotian incidcnt in D.S.XV.79.3-6.




visions against unconstitutional action or subversion of constitutions.10? The danger was real; the Arcadian League, for example, was split by a conflict between opposed democratic and oligarchic tendencies. Treaty provisions were not an adequate safeguard; they did not preserve the Arcadian League in 362, and they did not enable Arcadia and Boeotia to keep the Achaean democrats in power in 366. Nonetheless in these troubled years foreign alliance was a regime's best hope of support, and most Peloponnesian democrats looked to Arcadia while oligarchs allied themselves with Sparta. It is not however accurate to simply equate oligarchy with alliance to Sparta, democracy with alliance against Sparta, since Boeotia, though firmly anti-Spartan, made alliances indifferently with oligarchs and democrats, while the Achaean oligarchs did not find it necessary to ally themselves to Sparta until 366. Moreover, so far as oligarchy and democracy can be equated with atti- tudes to Sparta, it was the oligarchic or democratic tendency which deter- mined the foreign relations, not vice versa; the Achaean oligarchs' alliance with Sparta in 366, the Elean oligarchs' alliances with Sparta and Achaea in 365 or 364, the alliance between the Mantinean section of the Arcadian League and Sparta, Elis, and Achaea in 363/2, all followed on as a consequence of internal changes in the states in question.

The extent and importance of the Peloponnesian conflict between oligarchy and democracy is clear. Its nature is unfortunately less clear. The two sides of the conflict are broadly categorised as oligarchs and democrats, but the categories were not uniform. In both Mantinea and Tegea, for instance, democracies were established in 370, but circumstances in the two cities differed considerably.101 Equally oligarchies differed. Pellene, for instance, was eventually dominated by a small group of oligarchs opposed by a majority of the citizens, whereas in Phlius a regime which may be called oligarchic en- joyed considerable popular support and apparently described its constitution officially as a 'demos', though admittedly in Phlius enmity to Argos may have outweighed considerations of internal politics.102 Apart from conceal- ing differences among oligarchs and democrats, however, the terms 'oligarchy' and 'democracy' also put a possibly misleading emphasis on constitutional forms. Various pieces of evidence in fact suggest that the form of constitution was of minor importance in the Peloponnesian conflict of these years. Firstly, oligarchic and democratic groups are recorded as competing within a given constitutional framework, as at Tegea in 370 and at Elis down to 365; 103 this must mean that a single constitution could offer scope to both oligarchs and democrats. Further, it seems that one of these groups could win control without any change in the constitution. The clearest case

100 v. pp. 595, 598-599 below. 101 v. pp. 570-571, 585-588 above. 102 Pellene, Xen. Hell. VII.4.18. On Phlius v. Legon, Hisioria. 16 (1967). 334-7; for the use of

demos', v. n. 95 above. 103 Xen. Hell. VI.5.6-7 (Tegea), VII. 4.15 (Elis).



590 JAMES Roy

is at Elis in 365, when the oligarchs won sufficient control to launch Elis on a war with Arcadia, although the Elean democrats who were still in the city remained friendly to Arcadia. If the analysis of Mantinean affairs offered above is sound, it is probable that no change of constitution took place when democrats won control in 370, since Mantineans of oligarchic tendency were able to assert themselves about 364. In Sicyon too in 368 the democratic takeover quite possibly did not involve any constitutional change until Euphron began to convert the democracy into a tyranny. Xenophon's fairly detailed account of Arcadian affairs in 364-2 shows how such a takeover without constitutional change might begin, with the oligarchs winning control of the federal army and the federal assembly, although the Arcadian League split before the oligarchic group were able to take over the executive offices.'04 We may safely assume that control of government in their home state was a main objective of all the various oligarchic and democratic factions then active in the Peloponnese, but constitutional change was not a necessary step to win power, and, at least in some cases such as apparently the Mantinean democrats of 370, factions which had succeeded in winning power did not think it necessary to change the constitution in order to make their control more secure. In these circumstances the democrats and oligarchs cannot have been adherents of doctrinaire constitutional theories, committed to establishing certain constitutional forms which they held to be ideals in themselves. Some Peloponnesians may of course have subscribed to such theoretical ideals, but in general the conflict between oligarchs and democrats was not over technical forms of constitutional law. The factions clashed in bids for power, presumably in order to pursue differing policies. The difference between factions must have lain in the different objectives of their policies. Possibly the objectives were doctrinaire, but at any rate they must have been concerned with current social and economic issues rather than with theories of constitutional structure. The essentially political account given by the ancient sources does not make clear what social and economic issues were important in the Peloponnese in the 360s. It is however clear that on these issues much of the Peloponnese was divided into two groups, broadly labelled oligarchs and democrats.

Appendix I: Chronology

Our chronological framework for the years 370-62 depends very largely on the work done by Niese and later modified by Beloch.105 They agreed that Epaminondas' first Peloponnesian expedition took place in winter

104 v. above pp. 572 f., 583 (Elis); 570, 585 if. (Mantinea); 577 (Sicyon); 585 if. (Arcadian

League). 105 Niese, Hermes. 39 (1904). 84-132 (hereafter referred to as 'Niese'); Beloch, GG.

III.22.238-53. v. also the earlier article by Niese, Hermes. 34 (1899). 520-52; and recent comments




370/69,106 and difficulties begin thereafter. For the period 369-7 the crucial problem is whether to date Epaminondas' second Peloponnesian expedition to 369 (as Beloch) or to 368 (as Niese). It is known that Dionysius I sent mercenaries to Greece at the time of the expedition and again later; strong recent arguments put his death early in 367; the mercenaries must therefore have been sent in 369 and 368, and the expedition must have been in 369. This es- tablishes Beloch's chronology for the period from spring 369 until spring 367, with the Tearless Battle and Pelopidas' imprisonment in Thessaly in 368 and Pelopidas' liberation in spring 367.107 To these years also belongs the foundation of Megalopolis, for which ancient sources offer various dates from 371/0 to 368/7.1017 Niese saw that, even if one allows for Xenophon's re- fusal to mention Megalopolis, his detailed account of the manoeuvres in southwest Arcadia leading up to the Tearless Battle is utterly misleading if a large fortified city (or even a large and vulnerable build`ng-site) then existed in that part of Arcadia. Niese therefore concluded that Megalopolis was founded after the Tearless Battle; and this is the strongest argument so far produced for dating the foundation, which would take place in 368.108 An- other event which belongs to 368, as Meloni has shown, is Euphron's coup d'etat in Sicyon.l08&

In the period from spring 367 until summer 366 the main problem is to set in order the embassies of Pelopidas and others to Susa, subsequent diplomatic activity in Greece, Epaminondas' third Peloponnesian expedition (to Achaea), and the deposition of Euphron.109 The expedition which freed Pe- lopidas in 367 presumably set out at the beginning of the campaigning season, but Epaminondas protracted operations lest Alexander of Pherae be provoked to extremes.110 Even when Pelopidas was freed, more time must have been needed to organise the embassy, especially since allied ambassadors accompanied him.1"' Thus the embassy can hardly have set out before

by Ryder, Koine Eirene, 170-2. The recent reconstruction by Hammond, History of Greece, 663, is subject to the same criticisms as Niese's reconstruction and is therefore not discussed here inde- pendently. 106 Niese, 88; Beloch, GG. III.22.238.

1017 Beloch, GG. III.22.239, cf. 247-51; Niese, 84-121. Dionysius' mercenaries, Xen. Hell. VII.1.20, 28; Dionysius' death, Stroheker, Dionysios I, 237 n. 83 (Beloch believed Dionysius died early in 366 but was prevented from sending mercenaries in 367 by war with Carthage).

107a 371/0, Paus. VIII.27.8; 370/69 or 369/8, Marmor Parium; 368/7, D.S.XV.72.4. None of these sources is obviously more reliable than the others.

108 Niese, 538-9; he also argued (ibid. 529) that the foundation of a Greek city was a single act, so that our sources' different <lates for Megalopolis' foundation cannot be explained as repre- senting the decision to build, the foundation ceremony, the actual building, etc. It does not affect the validity of Niese's argument that he dated the Tearless Battle in 367 (ibid. 539) rather than in 368 (Beloch, GG. III.22.238-9). iosaMeloni, RFIC. 79 (1951). 10-33.

109 Xenophon's narrative gives these events in that order, with Euphron's rise to power also following the Achaean expedition (Xen. Hell. VII.1.33-46).

110 Plut. Pelop. 29. 'll Xen. Hell. VII.1.33.



592 JAMES Roy

May 367. How long it took is unknown, but four months seems a minimum estimate of the time needed for the outward journey, the negotiations at Susa, and the return.112 After the ambassadors' return, and so at the earliest in September 367, time was spent in organising a congress of Greek states to hear the Persian King's letter, and then, when the congress failed, in sending Boeotian ambassadors to individual Greek states.113 There was therefore no time left in 367 after the negotiations for a campaign, but the negotiations could well have been over by spring 366. Epaminondas' third Peloponnesian expedition must have taken place either during the embassy in 367, or in 366 after the negotiations. Beloch dated it in 367, but his arguments have been refuted by Ryder.14 There is one strong argument for dating the expedition in 366. Boeotia was trying, by the embassy and subsequent negotiations, to win the approval first of the Persian King and later of the Greek states for terms amounting to a Common Peace and including guaranteed autonomy for Greek states.115 During such endeavours it would have been crass to coerce Achaea into subservient alliance by open military force, a blatant denial of the spirit of the proposals; on the other hand such a campaign is readily understandable after the Boeotians had failed to achieve their purposes by diplomacy. The expedition therefore most probably followed the diplomatic overtures, and can be dated to spring 366. It must have been followed quickly by the imposition of democratic government in Achaea, and the speedy oligarchic counter-revolution."16

From spring 366 until the Olympic festival of 364 the sequence of events is reasonably clear, though absolute dates are scarce in the ancient sources. In the main Beloch's conclusions about the chronology may be accepted, but some modifications are possible."7 The relevant events are as follows. Eu- phron was deposed in Sicyon shortly before Athens' loss of Oropus, which in turn prompted an Athenian-Arcadian alliance. Athens launched an attempt to win control of Corinth; Corinth rejected the attempt, hired mercenaries and campaigned with them against neighbouring enemies, but also initiated peace negotiations with Boeotia. About the time that these negotiations led to peace in the northeast Peloponnese, mercenaries of Dionysius II of Syra- cuse arrived in Greece and joined Sparta in a campaign which recaptured

112 Niese, 106 n. 4, suggested 4 or 5 months as sufficient; Beloch, GG.III.22. 241 regarded 6 months as a minimum but thought the embassy took longer. For the available evidence v. Beloch, GG. 111.12. 189 n. 2. Beloch, GG. 11I.22.241 tried to date the embassy's return by reference to ne-

gotiations reported in 366/5 by D.S.XV.76.3; but these were not the first negotiations after the return (cf. Xen. Hell. VII.1.39-40 and v. Ryder, Koine Eirene, 171). 113 Xen. Hell. VII.1.39-40.

114 Beloch, GG. III.22.241-2; Ryder, Koine Eirene, 171-2 (though Ryder's own suggested chronology is too compressed). Xenophon's narrative puts the expedition after the negotiations, but it also puts Euphron's rise to power after the negotiations (v. n. 109 above), and so is not wholly reliable. 116 On the Bocotian proposals v. Ryder, Koine Eirene, 80-1, 136.

'li Xen. Hell. VII.1.43. 117 Beloch, GG. 111.22. 242-3, where rcferences are cited.




Sellasia from the Arcadians. Soon after these mercenaries had returned home, the Elean-Arcadian war broke out and considerable fighting had taken place by the Olympic festival in summer 364. Beloch argues convincing- ly that the war must have begun in 365 to accommodate the known fighting before the Olympic festival. It must have begun late enough to allow time for the campaign by Dionysius' mercenaries, who cannot have arrived in Greece before the early campaigning season of 365. The peace prompted by Corinth's overtures was concluded, as Xenophon says, about the time of the mercenaries' arrival, and so in spring 365; but before it time must be allowed for the campaigns conducted by Corinth, and for the preliminary peace negotiations. These probably occupied winter 366/5, and so the Athenian attempt on Corinth would belong to autumn 366. There is no difficulty in supposing a winter campaign by Corinth's mercenaries, operating from a home base against nearby enemies; but it is difficult to believe that Athens sent a fleet to Corinth in winter, and so, since there is no room for the Athenian attempt on Corinth in the campaigning season of 365, it must belong to the later campaigning season of 366.118 That is the date deduced by Beloch for the conclusion of the Athenian-Arcadian alliance, and the two events belong roughly together.119 It is thus possible to place approximately the sequence of relevant events from spring 366 to summer 364.119a

After the Olympic festival of 364 no further fighting in the Elean-Arca- dian war is recorded. The events here relevant are the schism in the Arca- dian League, the Arcadians' various appeals to foreign powers, and the resultant campaign of 362 ending in the battle of Mantinea on 12th Sciro-

118 On the Athenian land and sea forces, and on Corinth's mercenaries, v. Xen. Hell. VII.4.4-6. Beloch, GG. III.22.243, puts the Athenian attempt on Corinth in spring 365.

119 Beloch, ibid.; Xen. Hell. VII.4.4. (Beloch puts the winter 366/5 between the Athenian-Ar- cadian alliance and the Athenian attempt on Corinth.) It does not seem possible to use the fall of Oropus as a fixed point in dating the sequence of events. Two absolute dates for its fall are offered by ancient sources - 367/6 (scholiast on Aeschines, I11.85) and 366/5 (D.S.XV.76.1) - but neither is very reliable, and it seems dubious to reconcile them by supposing that Oropus fell about mid- summer 366 (as Niese, 105-6; Beloch, GG. III.22 242), even though that date is perfectly possible. Cawkwell, C.Q. 11(1961). 84, has suggested that Oropus fell early in 366 but that leaves no time for such preceding events as Epaminondas' third Peloponnesian expedition.

119a Since the above was written, the chronology of 370-362 has been re-analysed in detail by J. Wiseman, Klio. 51(1969). 177-99, whose conclusions vary from my own. Without discussing his arguments at length, the following points may be made: (I) the 'trials of Epaminondas' (Wiseman's most important argument) are less compelling than he suggests because of our poor knowledge of Boeotian constitutional law, whose application in this case can be deduced only from the events in a restored chronology; (2) though Wiseman's introductory rcmarks refer to the problems of 370-362, his article refers almost entirely to 370-367 and his cxtcnded chronology of earlier events, while solving some problems, would create serious difficulties in 367- 364, especially in Peloponnesian affairs; (3) he is apparently unaware of Meloni's chronology of Euphron, nor does he cite Stroheker on Dionysius I. In sum his arguments fail to convince.

38 Historia XX/5-6



594 JAMES Roy

rophorion 362.120 Since the pro-Mantinean Arcadians, with Elis, Achaea, and Phlius, successfully appealed to Athens for help but did not have time to conclude a formal alliance until after the battle of Mantinea,l2l the appeal cannot have been made earlier than spring 362. This dates roughly the whole flurry of diplomatic activity of which the appeal was a late stage;122 this activity may have occupied the period from autumn 363 to spring 362. If so, the peace between Elis and Arcadia - the cause of the

subsequent diplomatic activity - was concluded in autumn 363.123 Forthe longish period, however, between the Olympic festival of 364 and the Elean-Arcadian peace treaty our slight information suggests only that fighting had stopped because of the growing dissension within the Arcadian League.124

Appendix II: Alliances

It is the purpose of this section to consider the alliances of the Arcadians with other Peloponnesian states, and the alliances of Peloponnesian states with Boeotia.

In 370 Arcadia, Elis, and Argos jointly sought an alliance first with Athens, which rejected their overtures, and then, successfully, with Boeotia.125 It is therefore reasonable to suppose that when these joint approaches were made the new Arcadian League, Elis, and Achaea were already allied to each other. This is confirmed by the fact that in 370 Elis and Argos sent forces to help Arcadia against Spartan invasion even before it was known whether Boeotia would also help.'26 Thus in addition to the alliance between Boeotia and the Peloponnesian states, there was a network of alliances among these Pelo- ponnesian states themselves.

A fragmentary Arcadian federal decree discovered at Olympia almost certainly refers to a later stage of this Peloponnesian alliance. The decree evidently belongs to the brief period during the Elean-Arcadian war of 365/4-363/2 during which Pisatis was an independent state.127 The new state of Pisatis was being admitted to an alliance which already included Arcadia

120 Beloch, GG. 111.22.245, with references. 121 Tod, GHI. no. 144. 122 Xen. Hell. VII.4.38-5.3. 123 Xen. Hell. VII.4.35-8. The peace was probably concluded during the campaigning season,

since the Bocotians were ready to take the field (ibid.35). 124 Xen. Hell. VII.4.33-5; cf. D.S.XV.82.1-4, which covers everything from the Olympic

Games to the beginning of the fighting in 362 (inclusive) under 363/2. 125 D.S.XV.62.3; Dem. XVI.12, 19-20. 126 Xen. Hell. VI.5.16, 19. 127 Kunze, Olymwpiabericht 7. 211-17 = SEG. XXII.339. The decree puts Pisa's independent sta-

tus beyond question. This status was in fact already apparent (though sometimes doubted) from

Pisa's gold and silver coinage (Meyer, RE. XX.1754) and from a Pisatan proxeny-decree (IvO.

36).




(since the decree is Arcadian), Sicyon, and Messenia. As Kunze remarked in editing the stone, the states represented form a clear anti-Spartan grouping, and it may safely be conjectured that Argos also was already a member of the alliance.128 Elis must have broken off its alliance with Arcadia and Argos at the beginning of the Elean-Arcadian war, in which Argos supported Arca- dia.'29 Messenia evidently entered into alliance with Arcadia, once it became an independent state, for it sent troops in 368 and 364 to assist Arcadia against Spartan attack.'30 Sicyon was certainlv allied to Arcadia and Ar- gos.131 It therefore seems that the grouping seen in the inscription from Olym- pia is a modified form of the Elean-Arcadian-Argive grouping of 370, with Elis now lost from the alliance and Messenia, Sicyon, and Pisatis added. No doubt the Achaean cities had also been members for a time, until pro-Spar- tans oligarchs regained control of them.'32 Because of the fragmentary state of the stone, the inscription from Olympia does not preserve in detail the terms of this alliance. It appears however that they included provision for mutual assistance against external attack, and also against internal revolu- tionary or unconstitutional movements. This last provision is interesting, for it shows that the allied states were worried at the prospect of revolution; this is one aspect of the widespread conflict in the Peloponnese in these years between democracy and oligarchy.

Boeotia also added further Peloponnesian alliances to those formed in 370 with Elis, Arcadia, and Argos. Xenophon says generally that the Peloponne- sian states hostile to Sparta were allied to Boeotia, and specifically that Si- cyon and Pellene had such alliances.133 It is a safe assumption that Messenia, which owed its independence largely to Epaminondas, was also allied to Boeotia; certainly one of Boeotia's main objectives in international diplomacy was to ensure Messenian independence.'34 The Achaean cities also formed an alliance with Boeotia in 366, though it lasted only briefly.'35 Thus the same Peloponnesian states of anti-Spartan tendency which were allied among themselves were also allied to Boeotia.

Elis presumably broke off its alliance with Boeotia, like its Peloponnesian alliances, in 365; by 364 Elis was allied with the anti-Boeotian states Achaea and Sparta, and in 362 it fought against the Boeotians at Mantinea.136 It is more important, however, to consider the alliance between Boeotia and At- cadia, for very serious disagreements certainly arose between the two states,

128 Kunzc, ibid., 213. The name of the Argives could readily be restored in the space available at Il.b.7-8 and 8-9 (SEG. 11.16-17 and 17-18); but because of the thinness of the stone (8.6-8.9 cm.) it is unlikely that it would be wide enough to admit more names.

129 Xen. Hell. VII.4.29. 130 Xen. Hell. VII.1.28-9, 4.27. 131 v. e.g. Xen. Hell. VII.1.44-6. 132 Xen. Hell. VII.1.18, cf. 2.2-3, 11-15 (on Pellene); VII.1.41-3 (on Achaea generally). 133 Xen. Hell. VII.1.22, 2.11. 134 Xen. Hell. V1I.1.27, 36. 135 Xen. Hell. VII.1.42-3. 138 Xen. Hell. VII.4.17, 19; 5.1, 18.

38*



596 JAMES Roy

and it has been suggested that the alliance broke down completely.137 There is no sign that this Arcadian-Boeotian alliance broke down before the congress organised by Boeotia to win the Greek states' acceptance of the terms negotiated by Pelopidas at Susa in 367, though some earlier disagree- ment between Arcadia and Boeotia is apparent. Then the congress failed largely because of a walkout by the Arcadian delegates.138 Yet the Arcadians clearly participated as Boeotia's allies in Epaminondas' third Peloponnesian campaign,139 which it has been argued above followed the congress. Later in 366 the Boeotian-Arcadian alliance was evidently still in force when the proposed Arcadian-Athenian alliance was discussed, since the Athenians accepted the proposal partly in order to detach Arcadia from reliance on Boeo- tia.140 There is no direct record of Boeotian troops' helping Arcadia against Elis, but they certainly supported Arcadia against Sparta in 364.141 Moreover when Arcadia was making peace with Elis in 363/2, a Theban commander who was present at Tegea with 300 hoplites swore to the peace along with the Arcadians; 142 it has been supposed that the Boeotian force had been sent shortly before to ensure Arcadian loyalty,143 but there is no evidence of when these troops arrived, and the fact that their commander participated in the peace (even if not authorised to do so by the Boeotian authorities) strongly suggests that the troops had been taking part in the war, i. e. that Boeotia supported Arcadia also against Elis. Finally, Epaminondas' objections to Ar- cadia's making peace with Elis could have no foundation unless Boeotia and Arcadia were then still allies.'44 In sum, the evidence shows that despite disagreements the Boeotian-Arcadian alliance continued from 370 until the split in the Arcadian League in 362 (after which some Arcadians continued to side with Boeotia).145

"I E.g. by Cloche, TbUbesde B6otie, 153, 160. 138 Xcn. Hell. VII.1.39; cf. ibid. 26, 32 for earlier disagreements. 139 Xen. Hell. VII.1.41-3. 140 Xen. Hell. VII.4.2. 141 Xen. Hell. VII.4.27; Justin, VI.6.6-10. 142 Xen. Hell. VII.4.36. 143 E.g. by Cloche, op. cit. (n. 137), 160; Larsen, Greek Federal States, 191 n. 1. "I Xen. Hell. V11.4.40.

246 Xen. Hell. VII.5.5. Evidence for a break in the Boeotian-Arcadian alliance would have to be

drawn from the sources for the 'Rededuell' between Epaminondas and the Athenian Callistratus

(Nepos, Epam. 6; Plut. Mor. 193 C-D, 810 F). The Rededuell may be authentic, though this is un-

certain (v. recent comment by Bengtson, Slaalsverlrage, II. no. 284). The context given by the sources is a time when Boeotia, already allied to Argos, sought alliance with Arcadia but an Athe- nian-Arcadian alliance was in prospect (Cawkwell, CQ. 11 (1961). 84 n.4 presses Nepos' Latin too hard to show that Athens and Arcadia were already allied). Such a context could only have arisen after 370, when Boeotia made alliances with Argos and Arcadia; and it would mean that the Boeo- tian-Arcadian alliance (but not the Bocotian-Argive) had subsequently broken down. The only

possible occasions known are 366, when Athens allied with Arcadia, and 362, when some Arca- dian states allied with Athens. 362 is excluded for the reasons clearly summarised by Swoboda, RE. X. 1733-4 (these reasons are not refuted by Cawkwell, ibid. 84 n. 2), which leaves only 366.

But in 366 Athens allied with Arcadia in order to detach Arcadia from reliance on Boeotia (Xen.




Some of the terms of the alliances between Boeotia and Peloponnesian states can be restored. It appears that no formal provision was made to give any single state supreme command of joint military enterprises. If in fact Epaminondas directed operations of the allied forces on his Peloponnesian campaigns, this was simply by agreement of the allies, and indeed provoked some resentment.'46

The terms of the alliance did, however, provide that an ally could not make peace without prior consultation. Such a provision, common in alliances of the period, is clear from Epaminondas' objections to Arcadia's peace with Elis in 363/2 ;147 and it may be assumed that such a clause formed part not only of the Arcadian-Boeotian treaty but of the other treaties between Peloponnesian states and Boeotia. This clause must have operated in 365, when negotiations initiated by Corinth brought some peace to Greece. Xenophon and Diodorus give differing accounts of apparently the same transactions in 365, but the more limited negotiations and treaties reported by Xenophon may be taken as a minimum. According to him, Boeotia and Argos made peace with Corinth, Phlius, and other Spartan allies (among whom Epidaurus can be identified).'48 We know that Corinth's alliance with Sparta obliged her to consult Sparta before making peace with Boeotia,149 and similarly Boeotia must have been obliged to consult Arcadia, and no doubt the other Peloponnesian allies (Messenia and Sicyon), before making peace. It is in fact perfectly possible that Arcadia, Messenia, and Sicyon also made peace in 365 with Corinth, Phlius, and the other Spartan allies. If Ar- gos, which had the strongest motive to continue fighting in the northeast Pe- loponnese, was prepared to make peace, the other Boeotian allies in the Pelo- ponnese would have no good reason to refuse, and in fact we hear of no further fighting in the northeast Peloponnese in the years following 365. Xenophon might well have failed to mention Arcadia, Messenia, and Si- cyon; in discussing the peace he is concerned almost exclusively with Boeo- tia on the anti-Spartan side and mentions Argos' participation in the peace only as an afterthought, because of an incident involving Phlius (to which he devotes great attention in Hellenica VII). Whether or not, however, Arcadia,

Hell. VII.4.2), which must mean that at the time of the Athenian-Arcadian alliance Arcadia was still allied to Boeotia. Therefore at the time of the Rededuell (if it took place) Boeotia cannot have been seeking an alliance with Arcadia, and the Boeotian-Arcadian alliance cannot have broken down. It is possible to suppose, however, that the wording of the sources is loose, and that Epa- minondas' embassy was an attempt by Boeotia, as an ally of Arcadia, to protect its interests at a preliminary stage of the negotiations for alliance between Arcadia and Athens.

146 Plut. Pelop. 24.3-4; Xen. Hell. VII.1.22. 147 Xen. Hell. VII.4.40; cf. e.g. Bengtson, Slaalsverirage, 1I.nos. 263, 293, 309. 148 Xen. Hell. VII. 4.6-11; Isoc. VI. 91 (on Epidaurus), cf. passim. Cf. D.S.XV.76.3. On this

peace v. Ryder, CQ. 7 (1957). 199-205, and Koine Eirene, 83, 137-9; Cawkwcll, CQ. 11 (1961). 80-6. 148 Xen. Hell. VII.4.7-10.



598 JAMES Roy

Messenia, and Sicyon participated in the peace in 365, the necessary consultation of allies before the peace was signed would involve very extensive diplomacy, and may go some way to explaining the apparent discrepancy between Xenophon's and Diodorus' accounts.

The sequel to Euphron's murder illustrates another provision of the alliances between Boeotia and Peloponnesian states. In 365 Euphron was murdered in Thebes by other Sicyonians; these were arrested by the Thebans, and Xenophon reports how the only assassin to admit guilt defended himself before the Theban council.'60 In his speech he recalled that, according to a Theban (or Boeotian) decree, exiles could be extradited from 'all allied states'.156 Such a condition cannot have been imposed unilaterally by Boeotia on such allies as Arcadia and Argos; the Sicyonian must have been referring - quite naturally, in the context - to the Boeotian ratification of the terms of alliance negotiated between Boeotia and allied states. Also it is not clear whether 'all allied states' means literally all the states which were then allied to Boeotia; but, to be relevant to Sicyonians, the term must have applied at least to all Boeotia's Peloponnesian allies. The Sicyonian also suggested that it would be only just to execute exiles who returned 'without a common decree of the allies'.152 The Sicyonian did not say that such a provision was actually in force, nor is it found in any known alliance of the period. Some con- temporary alliances did however provide that men exiled from one allied state be banished from all states participating in the alliance; 153 and in such a case, since all allied states combined to enforce banishment, it could reasonably be argued that sentence of exile should be lifted only by common consent of the allied states. We may therefore suppose that there was some such provision about banishment from all allied states in the terms of the alliances between Boeotia and the Peloponnesian states. That these alliances included provisions about exiles and banishment suggests again that the allied states were concerned about possible revolution or unconstitutional processes.

There is one further piece of evidence concerning the terms of alliance which bound these various states. When the Arcadians deposed Euphron in Sicyon in 366, they recalled the Sicyonian exiles 'banished without decree'.'54 This phrase, though shorter, recalls the words used by the Sicyonian assassin at Thebes, 'without a common decree of the allies', and clearly refers to some breach of constitutional law or treaty provision. It is unlikely that the phrase refers to some term of the alliances which bound Arcadia, Sicyon, and other Peloponnesian states to Boeotia, since the Arcadians, when intervening in

150 Xen. Hell. VII.3.4-11. On the date v. Meloni, RFIC. 79 (1951). 32. Ill Xen. Hell. VII.3.11. For similar provision in other alliances, v. Busolt-Swoboda, Griechische

Staatskunde, I. 232 n. 1. l62 Xen. Hell. VII. 3.11. 163 E.g. Bengtson, Slaa/sverlrage, II. no. 257.59-61; Tod, GHI. II.no.192. 10-13. 1614 Xen Hell. VILM .




Sicyon, would presumably base their actions not on the terms of the two states' respective alliances with Boeotia but rather on the terms of the alliance directly linking Arcadia and Sicyon. The phrase however does not appear to refer directly to any provision that could be restored in the space available at the appropriate point on the inscription from Olympia relating to the alliance of Arcadia, Sicyon, and other Peloponnesian states.155 The words 'banished without decree' therefore most probably refer to a breach of the Sicyonian constitution, and are equivalent to 'banished without a decree passed by the proper constitutional authorities in Sicyon'.156 These words in that case do not serve as evidence of a precise term of alliance; but, taken in their context, they suggest that unconstitutional procedure in Sicyon was in itself a breach of Sicyon's alliance with other Peloponnesian states, and so a ground for Arcadian intervention in Sicyon.157 Thus the fear of unconstitutional activities, apparent in the terms of the alliances both between Boeotia and the Peloponnesian states and among the Peloponnesian states themselves, was a serious fear of a real danger, against which the terms of the alliance were actually invoked.

Sheffield James Roy

155 Kunze, Olympiaberichi 7,210-17 = SEG. XXII.339. Any such provision would presumably have occurred in ll.b.5 ff. (SEG. 11.14 ff.); cf. the drafting of Bengtson, Staatsverirdge, II. no. 290, especially 11.25 ff. (where note the clause forbidding banishment, 1.33).

15 The words cannot mean 'banished without a decree of Euphron' since Euphron clearly did banish the exiles in question.

167 On Arcadian intervention in Sicyon v. also pp. 579-581 above.



Arcadia and Boeotia in Peloponnesian Affairs, 370-362 B.C.

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