Signals in Peloponnesian War

The Criticality of Understanding the Target’s Perception of Strategic Signals;

Case Study: The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War

LtCol David Varick Ready, USMCR

Joint Forces Staff College

Advanced Joint Professional Military Education

Class 09-04

January 5, 2009

Faculty Advisor: LTC Bridget Powell, USAF

1

Table of Contents

Biography………………………………………………………………………………….2

Thesis……………………………………………………………………………………...3

Threats to Peace between the Peloponnesian & Delian Leagues, Sept 433 to 432 BC …...4

The Siege of Potidaea and the Spartan Decision for War 432 BC………………………....8

The Peloponnesian League Assembly & the Start of the War Sept 432- March 431 BC…13

Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………18

Appendix I: Political Background…………………………………………………………19

Appendix II: The Corcyran Crisis 436/435 .………………………..…………………….25

Appendix III: The Crisis Unfolds, Summer 433 BC …………………………..……….....27

Appendix IV: The Battle of Sybota and Aftermath, September 433 BC………………….30

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………….33

2

Biography

Lieutenant Colonel David Varick Ready, USMCR is the Communications Officer for the

25th

Marine Regiment in Ft Devens, MA. He received a reserve commission through

Officer Candidate School and holds masters’ degrees in Business Administration (Yale

University) and History (University of Dublin, Ireland). Prior to his current assignment,

LtCol Ready has served on active duty for approximately 7 years, with another 9 years in

the reserves, as a communications, civil affairs, and an information operations officer.

He is a graduate of and instructor at the Canadian Joint Command and Staff Program in

Toronto, Ontario. He is a veteran of the Kosovo and Iraq campaigns and speaks German.

He has been selected to command Marine Air Control Squadron 23 commencing in

September of 2009. In civilian life, he owns and operates a civil construction firm, and

has a beautiful wife and three wonderful children, with a fourth coming in March of

2009. His interests are physical fitness and studying history and international relations.

3

Thesis:

Formulizers of national strategy must be aware that what may seem like a rational,

limited message to the sender, may be received by its intended audience as something

perhaps more starkly menacing or, conversely, supinely feckless. Therefore, the

employment of national power must take into consideration the target’s perception of the

message: it is critical to understand the target’s perception or potential perceptions of

strategic signals. Where there is a misalignment of the message, there is the potential for

unintended and potentially grievous consequences.

This paper will examine key political, diplomatic, and military events in Greece from 433

to 429 BC, the years shortly after Sparta’s and Athens’ Thirty Year Peace of 445 BC that

ended the First Peloponnesian War, to just prior to and at the beginning of the Second –

or what is usually referred to as “The” - Peloponnesian War. During this period Athens

headed the Delian League, perhaps better thought of as an Athenian maritime empire.

Sparta heads the Peloponnesian League, a coalition of landward military powers, though

not to the degree as Athens dominates the Delian League. We will compare what

message was meant to be conveyed and the preconceived expected reactions with what

the target perceived and their actual reactions.

We will examine the actions of the key protagonists using the Diplomatic –Informational

– Military – Economic principle of applying all elements of national power and evaluate

how they reached or failed to meet their objectives. Due to their close association at the

time, the Diplomatic and Informational aspects of DIME will be fused into “DI”.

The key protagonists we will look at are (1) Athens, personified by Pericles1 and (2)

Sparta, and the Peace Party, personified by King Archidamus II.2 Though Pericles and

Archidamus were both opposed to war, war did erupt,3 as the machinations of Corinth

and the Spartan War Party, coupled with Pericles’ mistakes, and, ultimately, unprovoked

Theban aggression, ensured that war could not be avoided.

1 Opposed within Athens by the Athenian war party, led by Cleon. Cleon is not much of an actor at this

stage as Pericles had Athens firmly under his control until the plagues of 430-426 BC, outside the scope of

this paper. 2 Opposed within Sparta the Spartan war party, led by Sthenelaidas.

3 This paper assumes that most readers will not necessarily be familiar with the world of 5th Century BC

Greece. To this end, we have included an appendix that covers a brief description of the political landscape

and its key nation states. To this end, this paper includes Appendix I which gives a brief outline of the

Civitae Dramatis that play key roles in this discussion. Moreover, due to a somewhat limited scope, this

paper covers the initial events from 436 to 433 BC in Appendices II, III and IV. It may behoove some

readers to start with the Appendices.

4

Threats to peace between the Peloponnesian and Delian Leagues, September 433 to

mid 432 BC

Pericles of Athens and King Archidamus of Sparta did not wish to get drawn into a war

that advanced neither of their state’s interests. Further, both rulers were bound by the

Thirty Years Peace4 not to go to war with each other. However, the rational calculations

that were the bedrock of their policies were running into powerful passions and irrational

responses. The Corinthians, a major Peloponnesian League power twice defeated at sea

by their erstwhile colony Corcyra (the second time with the aid of two small but decisive

Athenian fleets) signaled they were not willing to give up the fight and come to an

accord.5

Logically, Pericles wished to maintain what he perceived as Athens’ Center of Gravity6

(CoG): Naval Power. To do so, he had to maintain Athens’ ability to wage a naval war,

even if this required temporarily evacuating all of Attica7 outside of Athens’ formidable

walls, thereby negating, to a large degree, the Peloponnesian League’s CoG: Military (i.e.

Land) Power. To initiate, maintain, and repeat when reinvaded these evacuations,

Pericles needed money to replace the income lost from Athens’ farms and recoup the

costs of subsidizing imports for the displaced rural population. To shore up Athens’

economic ability to wage war, he curtailed his magnificent building program.8

On the offense, but still within the strictures of the Thirty Year Peace, Pericles issued an

economic embargo against Megara, a state that had aided the Corinthians with ships and

who were a historic enemy of Athens. Pericles’ “Megarian Decree” is the first known

example of a peace time embargo and was not, technically, a violation of the Thirty

Years Peace.9 Pericles’ purpose was to punish Megara and warn other powers within the

Peloponnesian League that even without breaking the Peace, Athens could punish

malefactors.

Pericles’ second offensive action, also within the strictures of the Thirty Years Peace,

was to demand that Potidaea, a Corinthian colony that was part of the Delian League, pull

down its substantial walls on the water side, send hostages to Athens, and expel all

Corinthian epidemiourgoi.10

Although Potidaea had done nothing to overtly warrant any

Athenian action, it appears that Corinth had been “revenging themselves”11

by some anti-

4 The Thirty Years Peace ended the First Peloponnesian War.

5 By taking a Corcyran colony, Anactorum.

6 See Clauswitz if unfamiliar with this parlance. A more readily digestible version is found in Centers of

Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak

the Same Language, Dr. Joe Strange, Marine Corps University Perspectives on Warfighting Series, Number

4, Second Edition, 1996. 7 Attica is the province that contains most of Athens landward territories, including the capital.

8 Which included, among other buildings, the Acropolis

9 See Fornara, Charles W. (editor), Translated Documents from Greece and Rome: Archaic Times to the

end of the Peloponnesian War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1983, p 141 for the alleged

causes of the Megarian Decree. 10

Representatives or magistrates sent annually. 11

J.B. Salmon, Wealthy Corinth, A History of the City to 338 BC, Oxford University Press, New York,

1997 p 293

5

Athenian measures in that area. By issuing this demand, Pericles was sending a

diplomatic signal to any of its Delian League members with sympathies for Corinth that

any such leanings would not be tolerated. Pericles, it seems, was trying to prevent any

defection from the Athenian cause by sending a forceful diplomatic message.

Both of Pericles’ offensive actions were rationally designed to send a message to

opponents to not interfere with Athens. Moreover, they were in accord with the Thirty

Year Peace. However, all they did was stir up fear, anger, revolt, and desire for revenge

against the Athenians, as the metric of what was rational was different in his audience

than it was to Pericles.

By issuing the Megarian Decree, Pericles supposed that Megara would be discouraged

from lending Corinth naval support against Corcyra, and Athenian interests. However,

all the Megarian Decree seemed to do was cause hardship in Megara and earn the

perception in Sparta and other Peloponnesian powers that Athens was using its power in

an unrestrained fashion to harm members of the Peloponnesian League, Peace or no

Peace.12

As noted, Pericles wished to make an example of Potidaea to ensure loyalty to the Delian

League. Pericles mistake was that he issued the ultimatum from a position of temporary

weakness. He had no immediate forces present near Potidaea to give his demands any

real credibility. His rational calculus that Potidaea would not risk war with Athens due to

the high risk did not overcome the anger and resentment that the Potidaeans felt upon

receipt of the ultimatum. Thus, they conspired with the Peloponnesians13

and then

revolted. Had Pericles issued the ultimatum as an Athenian fleet bore down on Potidaea,

he would have probably achieved his goal, as the Potidaean emotions of anger and

resentment would have been tempered by the fear that an overwhelming Athenian force

would have presented.

Corinth took the ultimatum to Potidaea as an insult. Its former colony was being stripped

of its defenses and the Corinthian representatives cast out. Corinth was thereby

motivated to seek revenge upon Athens and took steps with Sparta to see this done.14

The secondary effect of Pericles’ actions was that King Archidamus, proponent of peace

with Athens, was no longer has control of Spartan foreign policy, as the recent Athenian

actions had thrust the Spartan War Party under the ephor Sthenelaidas into power. The

War Party then promised the Potidaean embassy that Sparta will invade Attica if Athens

attacked Potidaea.15

This change of policy is a remarkable occurrence, as an invasion of

Attica would be a breach of the Thirty Years Peace, something very atypical for

conservative Sparta.

12

Much like Britain or Germany in WWII, injuries to civilian populations often harden resolve to fight. 13

Potidaea sent an embassy to Athens to protest the ultimatum and dissemble; Simultaneously, it sent an

embassy to Sparta seeking support if attacked by Athens. Then, upon receipt of Spartan assurances of aid,

Potidaea revolts, not understanding that by revolting they negated the Spartan assurance of aid if attacked

by Athens. 14

Megara, relatively powerless without aid, complains to Sparta about its treatment by Athens. 15

Note that this was not a Spartan guarantee to invade if Potidaea revolted; only if Athens attacked.

6

Threats to peace between the Peloponnesian and Delian Leagues, September 433 to

mid 432 BC

Actor Action/DIME

Athens (Pericles) Curtail Athenian construction expenses to ensure a large war chest

(E); Issue Megarian Decree (E and DI); Issue ultimatum to

Potidaea (DI);

Potidaea Sends embassy to Athens to protest ultimatum and dissemble

while awaiting response from Sparta (DI); Sends embassy to

Sparta – a power outside of the Delian League --seeking support if

attacked by Athens (DI); Prepares to resist Athenian Attack (M);

Revolts (M)

Corinth Sends signals – taking Corcyran colony -- that it will not give up

the fight (DI/M); Sends embassy with Potidaeans to Sparta to ask

for intervention against Athens if Athens attacks Potidaea (DI);

Raises and Dispatches a “corps of volunteers” to aid Potidaea (DI

and M)

Sparta (War Party) Sthenelaidas and the War Party, in a position of power due to fear

of an ascendant and uncompromising, aggressive, Athens,

promises the Potidaean embassy to invade Attica if Athens attacks

Potidaea. (DI)

7

Measured/Logical

Action

Advocates/Actor Expected

Response/Outcome

Actual

Response/Outcome

Pledge of Support to

Potidaea if attacked by

Athens

Sparta (War

Party)

Containment of

Athens

Potidaea revolts;

Athens besieges

Potidaea; Sparta

stays out of conflict

Build up finances,

Economic sanctions on

Megara; Ultimatum

upon Potidaea

Athens Preparation for war;

signal to

Peloponnesian

League that Athens

is committed to its

ally Corcyra and

not to interfere;

Punishment of

Megara for entering

conflict; Security

within Delian

League from

rebellions

War Party assumes

position of

dominance in

Spartan politics;

Potidaea revolts

Stirs up unrest in

Potidaea; Mercenary

Corps to support

Potidaea’s revolt;

pressure on Sparta to

militarily intervene

Corinth Humbling of

Athens; Message to

Athens to stay out

of Corinth’s affairs

Potidaea revolts,

tying up substantial

Athenian forces

and monies for

years; War Party

ascendant in Sparta

Emotional or

Unmeasured Action


Response/Outcome

Actual

Response/Outcome

Revolt from Athens Potidaea Independence from

Athens; Spartan and

Corinthian invasion

of Attica

No Spartan invasion

of Attica as Athens

did not attack until

Potidaea revolted;

limited Corinthian

assistance;

Athenian siege

8

The Siege of Potidaea and the Spartan Decision for War 432 BC

In the summer of 432 BC Pericles dispatched an expedition to Potidaea. Athens now

undertook a siege upon Potidaea, an event that would last two years and drain a

considerable portion of the Athenian treasury.16

Potidaea was almost certain to fall. However, the Potidaeans responded with revolt

because Pericles failed to make his threat manifest by backing up the ultimatum with

immediately available force. Therefore, Potidaea disregarded the rational answer that

they must accede to Athens demands and chose the irrational, emotional response of

revolting.

The siege of its colony Potidaea infuriated Corinth and made it extremely eager to

humble Athens. Corinth then redoubled its efforts to get the Peloponnesian League to

enter the conflict against Athens. In July of 432 BC, the Spartan ephors17

responded to

pressure and called a council wherein anyone who had a complaint against Athens could

voice it.

The Spartans had discouraged Corinth from pursuing the war with Corcyra. Corinth had

disregarded this Spartan advice and now found itself in a limited conflict with Athens

over Corcyra and now Potidaea. In short, Corinth arrived in this conflict with Athens by

trying to advance solely its own interests. Furthermore, there were no legal or rational

grounds for Sparta breaking the Thirty Years Peace and declaring war on Athens. This

lack of a proper casus belli, coupled with Pericles’ personal friendship with Archidamus,

was the bedrock of Archidamus’ rational approach to dealing with crises. As events

would prove, emotion trumped his rational policies.

During the Spartan Assembly, Corinth’s ambassador presented a non-rational and

emotion based argument to the ephors and assemblymen. They conveyed that the

Athenians were a grave and dynamic threat that will grow in relative power against the

staid and unmoving Spartans. The ambassador’s words are worth quoting:

“You have never considered what sort of men you are going to fight and how totally different than

you. They are revolutionary and quick to formulate plans and put them into action, while you

preserve what you have, invent nothing new, and when you act do not complete what is needed…

they are daring beyond their power, run risks beyond wisdom and are hopeful amid dangers, while

it is your way to do less than your power permits, to distrust your surest judgments, and to think

you will be destroyed by any dangers… one would be correct in saying that is in their nature to

neither enjoy peace nor to allow it to other men”18

16

Instead of emerging as an empowered hegemon from its concentration with Potidaea, Athens emerged as

a power who was struggling to maintain order in its Delian League Empire. This failure is directly

traceable to Pericles’ misunderstanding of rationale and emotional responses to threats and insults. 17

Magistrates that balance the power of the assembly and the duoarchy. 18

Thucydides 1.70; Version used in this writing is The Landmark Thucydides, A Comprehensive Guide to

the Peloponnesian War, edited by Robert B. Strassler; Touchstone, New York, 1998 p 40

9

Though there may be some truth in the characterizations, Athens had done nothing to

expand its territories since the 450s. Moreover, since 445 BC and the Thirty Years

Peace, Athens had subscribed to the letter of this accord. Only in the past year had

Athens taken aggressive actions and these had been in response to Corinth’s assaults on

its ally Corcyra, actions that were in no way in Sparta’s interest.

The Corinthians ended their peroration with this veiled threat: If Sparta failed to honor its

promise to support Potidaea,19

“you betray your friends and kinsmen to their worst

enemies and turn the rest of us to some other alliance.”20

There was, of course, no other

alliance, excepting Athens itself.21

Corinth was using fear, besmirch of honor, and

simple prejudice to overcome the fact that Athens had broken no truce.

An Athenian, conveniently there on “other business22

” but clearly sent by Pericles to

present his case, then spoke. He argued in a factual tone that Sparta should not be led

astray by unfounded arguments from self-advancing allies and to demonstrate that Athens

had gained its Delian League Empire through legitimate means. He finished by pointing

out that in accordance with the Thirty Year Peace, if Sparta had a perceived casus belli

with Athens, it should submit its dispute to arbitration.23

The Athenian emissary finished

by noting that if the Spartans should refuse to arbitrate “with the gods as our witnesses,

we will try to take vengeance on those who have started the war when you have led the

way.”24

Pericles had every reason to believe that this rational and strength-based

approach, which offered Sparta a face savings channel to enter arbitration and thereby not

leave its allies unsupported, might succeed. Moreover, Pericles knew that Archidamus

was not only a personal friend, but also was predisposed toward peace.

The Spartans then debated among themselves. Corinth’s influence25

now urged war. The

Spartan assembly was angry and fearful of the apparently growing Athenian threat and

was inclined towards breaking the peace. Then Archidamus, “a man with a reputation for

wisdom and prudence”26

spoke up and urged to send an emissary to Athens to make

official complaints, while simultaneously sending for aid to Persia and Greek Sicily for

naval support. He advanced the rational course that Sparta could potentially sway the

Athenians and avoid war and, if they could not, then Sparta could use the next two or

three years to build up the financial resources, navy, and key alliances needed to have a

chance at defeating Athens.

19

Sparta was not bound to intercede as Athens did not attack until after Potidaea revolted. 20

Thucydides 1.71.4; pp 40-41 21

Or perhaps Argos, a neighboring mid-sized landward power. A discussion of Argos is beyond the scope

of this paper, but it suffices to say it had had tensions with the Peloponnesian League and was independent

of the Delian League. 22

Thucydides 1.72.1; p 41 23

Arbitration was a then-new concept that appears to be one of Pericles’ rational creations. 24


In 440 BC Corinth urged peace over the Samian Rebellion. 26

Thucydides 1.79.2; p 45

10

However, the Spartan War Party under Sthenelaidas argued that Sparta must act now lest

Potidaea27

would fall. Arbitration would not help Corinth, either, indicating, perhaps,

just how much influence Corinth had with Sparta. The danger to Sparta -- an overbearing

and arrogant Athens -- drove the majority of the Spartans to the side of the War Party.

They insisted that Athens must be humbled. Sthenelaidas’ words are poignant:

“… if we are wise, we will not look on while they wrong our allies, nor will we delay seeking vengeance;

for our allies are already suffering. Others may have much money, ships, and horses, but we have good

allies whom we must not betray to the Athenians. Nor should we submit to judgments by courts or words,

for we have not been injured by words. Instead we must take swift vengeance with all our forces. And let

no one tell us we must take the time to consider when we have been wronged; rather let those who

contemplate doing a wrong reflect for a long time. So vote for War, Spartans, in a manner worthy of

Sparta. Do not allow the Athenians to grow stronger, but let us, with the help of the gods, march out

against the wrongdoers.”28

Sthenelaidas uses a counterfactual argument as: (1) Potidaea is already an Athenian Ally

and by punishing them, Athens is not growing stronger; (2) Corinth made the decision to

pursue war against Corcyra despite dissuasion from Sparta and only in accord with

Corinth’s interests; (3) There is no indication as to how Sparta had been wronged; (4)

From a military perspective, the Spartans will not be able to simply march out and deal

with the Athenians. To suppose so indicates a gross misunderstanding of Athens’ walls

and it ability to employ its maritime power.

Sthenelaidas couples his counterfactual argument with emotion, rendering it all that more

effective propaganda, something that Pericles never quite mastered or understood the

consequences that could result from the artful manipulation thereof. Specifically,

Sthenelaidas plays on the Spartan concept of the maintenance of honor, fear of an all

powerful Athens, and contempt for words, negotiation and, implicitly, strict legal

interpretation of treaties, which he thinks unmanly and unworthy of Sparta. By not

understanding how these emotions could be manipulated, Pericles miscalculated.

Moreover, Athens’ ambassador’s cool, factual demeanor only stoked the emotions of the

Spartan war party. In July of 432 BC, the Spartan Assembly voted for war. Neither

declaration nor any hostile action had yet been taken, but the intent of Sparta was clear:

they would try and humble Athens. It would be very difficult for peace advocates to

avoid a general war.

27

An ally of neither Corinth nor Sparta. 28

Thucydides 1.86; p 48. Quotation translation text is taken from Kagan’s The Outbreak of the

Peloponnesian War, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1989; pp 304-5. Credit is due to Kagan for this

aspect of this paper’s argument as he clearly pointed the way.

11

The Siege of Potidaea and the Spartan Decision for War 432 BC

Athens (Pericles) Besieges Potidaea (M); Continues Embargo of Megara (E); Makes

legalistic and logical based presentation to Sparta that Athens has

not broken the Thirty Year’s Peace and is acting legitimately (DI);

Invokes Arbitration Clause of Thirty Years Peace with Sparta (DI)

Megara Complains to Sparta about Megarian Decree and urges that Sparta

go to war with Athens (DI)

Potidaea In concert with Corinthian mercenaries, resists Athenian Siege

(M)

Corinth Presses Sparta for war at Spartan Assembly by invoking the

specter of an aggressive, unrestrained Athens (DI); Assists

resistance of Potidaea through mercenary volunteer corps (DI and

M)

Sparta

(Sthenelaidas)

Holds assemblies to hear sides for and against war with Athens,

including diplomats from Corinth, Megara and Athens; (DI) Based

on fear of an overly aggressive Athens and honor for Sparta’s

dominant role in Greece, disregards caution, logic, and even

Archidamus’ practical war preparation advice and votes for war;

(DI); Summons whole Peloponnesian League Assembly to review

if war is to be pursued. (DI)

12

Measured/Logical

Action


Response/Outcome

Actual

Response/Outcome

Cautions against

pursuing war

immediately ; urges

mediation and

preparation for war

Sparta (King

Archidamus)

Arbitration with

Athens and, if war

does come, Sparta

will be well

prepared with a

strong navy, allies,

and finances to

support its army

Spartan War Party

ignores logic and

votes for war

Besieges revolting

Potidaea; Continues

embargo of Megara;

Makes legalistic

argument to Sparta that

Athens has not broken

peace and suggests

arbitration

Athens Potidaea subdued

and hegemony

within Delian

League maintained;

containment of

Megara and signal

to others not to

intervene;

arbitration with

Sparta

Siege of Potidaea

continues; Megara

presses Sparta for

relief; Spartan

assembly refuses to

arbitrate and votes

for war

Incites Sparta to War

through specter of an

ascendant, aggressive,

and hegemonic Athens

Corinth Sparta will enter

war in support of

Potidaea and

Corinth; Athens,

now humbled, will

stay out of

Corinthian affairs

Although Sparta

votes for war,

Sparta will not take

offensive action

until Peloponnesian

League also votes

for war and then

declares war

Emotional or

Unmeasured Action


Response/Outcome

Actual

Response/Outcome

Votes for War now by

citing the fear of an

alien and aggressive

Athens

Sparta (War

Party)

Containment of

Athens; support of

allies (Corinth and,

falsely, Potidaea);

maintenance of

Spartan hegemony

in Peloponnesian

League.

Sparta realizes that

they do not have the

means to compel

Athens without

significant allied

support; calls

Peloponnesian

League assembly

13

The Peloponnesian League Assembly and the Start of the War September 432-

March 431 BC

In August of 432 BC Sparta’s allies convened. Corinth, diplomatically artful, had already

lobbied each to vote for war.29

Nonetheless, quite a few Peloponnesian states favored

peace.30

The Corinthians argued that their war aims were limited, that enough money

could be gathered from the collected to build up the needed fleet, and that one solid naval

victory would do in the Athenians. Moreover, since many of the Athenian sailors were

from the Delian League states, they could be bribed away and hired. Further, Sparta and

the land powers of the Peloponnesus could invade and ravage Attica and leave a fort

there to ensure that the Athenians capitulated. They even assured that Apollo31

approved

of war. Finally, the Corinthians argue that the war is unavoidable and must be

undertaken proactively. After the Corinthian speech a majority of those Peloponnesian

states present32

voted for war.

Apparently, quite a few Peloponnesian states voted no. Moreover, as Archidamus

counseled, war preparations were needed, particularly in regards to money and ships,

before the Peloponnesians had a chance at winning. Sparta’s Peace Party, or perhaps,

portions of the War Party had not yet given up a settlement, then sent embassies to

Athens. The first embassy, sent just after the August 432 Spartan assembly, was

insincere, demanding that Athens “drive out the curse of the goddess”33

or coded speech

for exiling Pericles, as his family was supposedly cursed for a generations-previous

assault in Athena’s temple.34

The second embassy was sincere. It made some demands that Athens withdraw from

Potidaea and another state, but contained the explicit line “… there would be no war if

they (Athens) withdrew the Megarian Decree.”35

Pericles, however, now hard-headed in his insistence on the arbitration mandated in the

Thirty Years Peace, turned the embassy away. Pericles miscalculated that by concluding

that by giving in to this one concession, he would be undermining Athens. In truth, the

demand and promise to settle indicates that Corinth and Sthenelaidas were not able to

completely corral the whole Peloponnesian League into belligerence, as Megara, for

example, was willing to settle for a restoration of normal economic relations with Athens.

Sparta was willing to settle all of the other grievances if the economic embargo that

29

Donald Kagan, Outbreak, p 311. 30

Outbreak p 312 31

Delphi was under Peloponnesian control. 32

Indicating that not all were present. 33

Outbreak p 317 34

The Spartans, it seems, reckoned they could undermine the strength of the Athenian government by

bringing into question Pericles’ hard nosed logic and perhaps cause Athens to adopt a more appeasing

politic. However, Pericles was not unseated and continued to steer Athens along a firm course of not

backing down. Pericles’ logic, it seems, was that if Sparta wanted to negotiate it should submit to

arbitration, as the Thirty Year’s Peace demanded. Athens must not make unilateral concessions in light of

Sparta’s refusal to abide to the Peace. Such concessions would only invite deterioration of Athens power

and hegemony. 35

Thucydides 1.139; p 79

14

Athens had placed on Megara was removed. And the Megarian Decree was merely a

diplomatic and economic tool to advance policy. If its revocation achieved Athens’

political goal, then it was a worthy tool.

Athens would have lost nothing by revoking the Megarian Decree. But Pericles, with his

hidebound refusal, would not make concessions based on his perception Sparta’s illegal

action: its refusal to arbitrate. Pericles’ refusal would mark the last chance for avoiding

war. He won his arguments in the Athenian Assembly and his agents told the Spartan

Embassy that they could not take down the Megarian decree that had been passed and

posted.36

Another Spartan embassy followed, but offered no reasonable terms, as the

Spartan Peace Party had been discredited by Pericles’ refusal to come to terms on so

small a matter.

It was still many months before Sparta went to war, so the Spartan Peace Party was

apparently not out of the equation. Moreover, when war does breakout in March, 431

BC, it was not due to Sparta’s active decision. Rather, it was because of their allies –

Thebes – made a surprise assault on the at-peace Delian League/Athenian ally Plataea.

Even after this clear breach of the Thirty Year’s Peace, Archidamus sent an embassy to

Athens to try and prevent war. The ambassador was refused by Pericles and, passing out

of Attica, remarked “This day will be the beginning of great evils for the Greeks.”37

During his subsequent invasion of Attica, Archidamus deliberately conducted a limited

war, with incremental ravaging in an attempt to bring the Athenians out from behind their

walls and to the negotiation table, but to no avail. As Archidamus predicted, this would

be a war that both Athens and Sparta would pass onto their sons. The war, quite

avoidable in the instance, would last twenty-seven years and would be total in its

execution.

36

The Spartans, laconically, replied that the Athenians then need not take it down, but may simply turn it

around. Outbreak p 324 37

Outbreak p 342

15

The Peloponnesian League Assembly and the Start of the War September 432-

March 431 BC

Athens (Pericles) Besieges Potidaea (M); Continues Embargo of Megara (E);

Refuses to revoke Megarian Decree due to strict adherence to

legal proprieties of the Thirty Years Peace, despite the explicit

assurance from Sparta that such a revocation would mean no war

and despite that Athens had no major state interest at stake (DI and

E); Continues to invoke Arbitration Clause of Thirty Years Peace

with Sparta (DI); Maintains that Athens has the maritime might,

money, and the fortifications to be unbeatable by the

Peloponnesians and therefore refuses to yield (DI, M, and E)

Megara It appears that they press Sparta to do what is needed to get

Athens to revoke the Megarian Decree, even if that means seeking

peace and abandoning Corinth’s insistence for war. (DI and E)

Potidaea In concert with Corinthian mercenaries, resists Athenian Siege

(M)

Corinth Presses Peloponnesian League Member States for war at

Assembly by invoking the specter of an aggressive, unrestrained

Athens (DI); Assists resistance of Potidaea through mercenary

volunteer corps (DI and M)

Thebes Takes advantage of the situation to attack its Delian League

neighbor Plataea, thereby breaking the Thirty Years Peace (M)

Sparta (King

Archidamus)

After Spartan War Party’s sends initial hot-headed embassy, sends

an embassy with real offer of peace if the Megarian Decree is

revoked (DI and E); Apparently, keeps Peloponnesian Army from

invading Attica until after Thebe’s unprovoked attack on Plataea

(DI and M); Sends final embassy (DI) and even after invasion of

Attica conducts limited razing of crops, buildings, etc to bring

Athens to negotiations (DI, E, and M)

16

Measured/Logical

Action


Response/Outcome

Actual

Response/Outcome

Besieges revolting

Potidaea; Continues

embargo of Megara;

Makes legalistic

argument to Sparta that

Athens has not broken

peace and suggests

arbitration; fortifies for

war.

Athens (Pericles) Subdue Potidaea;

maintenance of

Athenian hegemony

in Delian League;

arbitration with

Sparta to maintain

Thirty Years Peace;

readiness for war

Huge expenditure

of monies, ships,

and manpower at

Potidaea; failed

arbitration;

empowerment of

Spartan war party;

encouragement of

Thebes to attack by

seeming

inevitability of war

Sends conciliatory

embassy to Athens

indicating peace if

Megaran Decree is

withdrawn; restrains

military action.

Sparta (King

Archidamus)

Athenian revocation

of Megarian decree;

arbitration through

non-Thirty Years

Peace mechanisms;

Maintenance of

peace; restoration

of peace on status

quo ante bellum

Athenian rejection;

discrediting of

Spartan peace party;

empowerment of

war Party

Incites Peloponnesian

League to War through

spectre of an ascendant,

aggressive, and

hegemonic Athens

Corinth Peloponnesian

League will enter

war in support of

Potidaea and

Corinth; Athens will

stay out of Corinth’s

sphere of influence

in the west

Although

Peloponnesian

League votes for

war, Sparta will not

declare war or take

offensive action

after it realizes that

there is no

immediate casus

belli and that Sparta

is not prepared for

war

Emotional or

Unmeasured Action


Response/Outcome

Actual

Response/Outcome

Rejection of Spartan

offer to maintain peace

if Megaran Decree

Athens (Pericles,

miscalculation)

Force Sparta to

arbitrate in

accordance with the

30 Years Peace

without giving in

anything up ahead

of arbitration.

Discrediting of

Spartan peace party

and portrayal of

Athens as

unreasonable and

threatening;

empowerment of

war party

17

Refusal to arbitrate in

accordance with Thirty

Years Peace

Sparta

(Archidamus

miscalculation)

Believes Megarian

compromise will

make this

unimportant

Pericles insists on

arbitration and

refuses to revoke

the Megarian

Decree without

arbitration

Attacks Delian League

Neighbor

Thebes Defeat of Manitea;

improve position

before “inevitable

war”

Theban defeat; start

of war

18

Conclusion

Both the rulers and much of the populations of Athens and Sparta did not want war.

Sparta, despite the wise counsel of King Archidamus, allowed itself to be drawn into war

by the self-serving actions of its allies and the fomenting of fear and insecurity among

less circumspect members of their governing body. In Athens, Pericles sent signals based

on rationale when signals founded in brute strength would have served better. Moreover,

he refused to yield to compromise over the Megarian Decree, citing principle over

practicality, and, perhaps, forgetting that a diplomatic tool can be shelved at little cost if

by shelving that tool one achieves one’s -- or most of one’s -- goals. Furthermore and

critically, he failed to understand the themes that he was communicating to his adversary

were being manipulated by effective Spartan War Party and Corinthian propaganda.

Had both sides done a better job of using the proper signals, gauging the potential

reception of those signals, interpreting the signals of their adversary and, in Sparta’s case,

restraining headstrong allies, then the cataclysmic Peloponnesian War could have been

averted.

As Archidamus and Pericles could attest, rational responses to rational actions are not

assured. Formulizers of national strategy must be aware that what may seem like a

limited message to the sender, may be received by its intended audience as something

starkly different. In the case of the Megarian decree or the siege of Potidaea, Athens was

perceived as starkly menacing. In the case of Athens initial demands upon Potidaea not

being backed up by potential immediate military action, the message conveyed was of

Athenian weakness or lack of resolve.

Sparta’s assurance to remain at peace if the Megarian Decree was revoked was

reasonable to Archidamus, but Sparta’s refusal to arbitrate per the Thirty Years Peace

made such revocation unreasonable to Pericles. Therefore, the employment of national

power must take into consideration the target’s perception of the message conveyed and

tailor one’s message accordingly. Where there is a different perception message, there

exists the threat of the unintended escalation of a confrontation. Had, for example,

Archidamus agreed to arbitration under the Thirty Years Peace or Pericles to remove the

Megarian Decree, then this war could have been avoided or, at a minimum, forestalled

for some period at little cost.

19

Appendix I: Political Background

The Greek world in 436 to 429 BC is – with a few key exceptions -- divided into two

halves, the Peloponnesian League led by Sparta and Delian League led by Athens. Both

parties had united in the Hellenic League between from 480 to 478 BC to drive the

Persians out of Europe. Sparta then decided to return to its affairs in southern Greece and

leave Persia to dominate Ionian Greece38

. Athens with a vested interest in maritime

activities, continued the long war with Persia and eventually made peace39

with Persia in

449 BC, keeping the Persian threat back to “three days march” from the coast of what we

would today call western Turkey. Sparta and Athens and their respective allies, jealous

of each others encroachments, fight a brief, limited war in 45840

and then sign a Thirty

Years Peace that demands arbitration of all disputes before initiating hostilities and

forbids a member of either league from joining the other league, one of the main causes

of the war. Tensions continue, but both sides are at peace with each other until events in a

remote corner of the Greek world.

The Major Powers

1. Athens

38

Ionian Greece is what we would today call the coastal strip of western Turkey and the Greek and Turkish

Islands in the Ionian Sea. 39

The Peace of Callias 40

The First Peloponnesian War

20

Athens’ Government

Athens, located in the Attic peninsula in east central Greece, is a wealthy imperial41

democracy where all citizens can partake in the government. Almost all political

positions are decided by lot, not by election. The only elected positions are those of the

ten generals, each annually reelected. They have no power outside of military operations

and are subject to regular review by the Athenian assembly. The leading man in Athens is

Pericles, a general who has been elected each year for many years. However, Pericles

holds power only through constitutional means and has no power outside of what is voted

unto him. The cornerstone of Pericles national security policy is control of the seas, as

Athens is dependent on foreign imports and pays for many of its expenditures through

money gained from its island and littoral empire, the Delian League. Moreover, Athens

itself – though on the Greek mainland – is much like an island as its walls are near

impervious.

Athens’ Military

Athens has a mid-sized but excellent army42

and an extremely powerful navy. Athens is

one of only two states to maintain a fleet. Athens, although on the Greek mainland,

can be thought of as an island as it is connected to the sea by its long walls (see

diagram below). Moreover, much of its population can shelter within these walls, though

this would mean their farms will be destroyed.

41

Imperial in the sense that it enforces obedience from all members of the Delian League, prevents

secession, controls taxation and expenditures, and formulates most of the foreign policy of the Delian

League 42

Beginning of PP War: Athens had 13 k hoplites/infantry and 16k garrison troops

21

Athens’ Economy

Although Athens has poor to middling agricultural capabilities, Athens has a large annual

income from its own and Delian taxation and trade revenues43

. Athens is dependent on

imports of foodstuffs from the Ukraine area and Egypt and becomes more so when its

farmlands become occupied or devastated by Peloponnesian Forces. To counter this

vulnerability, Pericles has built up a large war chest44

in case of prolonged hostilities.

Athens’ Politics

Within Athens, there are basically two parties relative to relations with Sparta: the peace

party and the war party. Pericles, a man of the established traditional elite houses, is the

leading voice in the peace party and, it seems, Cleon, a “new man” who hated or

distrusted the established families, was the leader of the war party. The peace party

advocates maintaining the status quo and seeks to limit expansion. The war party seeks

aggressive expansion and, if that brings Athens into conflict with Sparta and its allies,

then so be it.

Athens Relations with the Delian League

43

1,000 Talents of income; 400 internal from Athens and 600 from its empire. See Donald Kagan,

Pericles of Athens, Macmillan Press, New York, 1991, p 232. 44

6000 talents in silver were in Athenian treasury; Another 500 in uncoined gold and silver and 40 more on

the Statue of Athena, see p 232 Pericles. To put these numbers in perspective, a talent will cover the costs

of feeding/paying 200 men to operate a trireme for one month. Given that there are 8 sailing months a

year, one trireme will take 8 talents to operate for a year. Athens had 200 ships in service in 431 BC. At one

talent a month for 8 months per year, this equals 1600 talents for naval expenses alone.

22

Athens is the hegemon of the Delian league. Several times in recent years members of the

Delian League have rebelled from Athenian sovereignty and have had to be dealt with by

Athenian expeditions. As the Athenian dominance and taxation is considered irksome by

many Delian constituent states, given the opportunity, more states will revolt.

2. Sparta.

Sparta’s Government

Sparta has a combined oligarchic, judicial, duarchic (two kings), and limited democracy

government. The one king of any influence was Archidamus,45

a personal friend of

Pericles and a proponent of peace. However, their existed a war party amongst the other

sections of the government led by the ephor Sthenelaidas whose goal it was to humble

Athens and strip it of its empire. The ruling class – the Spartiates – performed only

soldiering and governance functions.

Sparta’s Military

Sparta has the best infantry in the world, with, including allies, around two to three times

the number of hoplites the Athenians could field46

and was backed by excellent allied

cavalry and auxiliaries in 431 BC. Sparta does not have a navy to speak of. Further,

Sparta’s siege abilities are minimal, meaning that the walls of Athens were a significant

barrier. Sparta is very reluctant to send major portions of 4,000 or so Spartiate infantry

far away or for extended periods from the Peloponnesus, as their deployment would

increase the danger of a helot revolt.

Sparta’s Economy

Sparta has a basic agrarian economy where the lands are worked by helots (serfs).

Rudimentary manufacturing and trading for basic needs is performed by freemen called

pereoikoi. Sparta did not allow gold or silver currencies in its territories and had access

to extremely limited financial assets. Sparta is faced by repeated threats of or actual

revolts by its enserfed helot population. These helots were former free Greeks from

neighboring states who were defeated in battle by the

Sparta’s relations with the Peloponnesian League

Sparta is the major power of the Peloponnesian League. Other powers have significant

might, but it is Sparta that enjoys the foremost position in the league. However, Sparta

does not wield the same power as Athens does in the Delian League, if for no other

reason that Athens is able to concentrate its power relatively easily through naval

maneuver into any one location of its empire, whereas Sparta would have some difficulty

marching to any but the closest locations.

45

The other, Pleistoanax, was exiled after being accused for taking bribes from Athens during the First

Peloponnesian War and abandoning the Spartan advance on Athens in 458 BC. The alleged briber was

Pericles. 46

See Kagan Peloponnesian War page 57. Also See Pericles of Athens page 231, which quotes Plutarch as

there being 60,000 Spartans and allies in the field. Kagan reckons this number is a little high, but remains

convinced that the Spartan led Army far larger than the Athenian led army.

23

Other Peloponnesian League Powers.

Corinth

Corinth is a member of the Peloponnesian League and an ally of Sparta. It is a wealthy

oligarchy with rich agricultural lands and a large merchant fleet but no standing navy to

speak of. In the past, it has built up a mid-sized navy relatively quickly and could do so

again, but such a navy would take time to develop the proficiency of those of Athens or

Corcyra, who both maintain active fleets. Corinth occupies a strategic position straddling

the route between Athens and Sparta and also allowing Corinth to drag ships from the

Aegean Sea to the Gulf of Corinth, giving it a unique advantage that it can quickly and

safely shift any navy from the east of Greece to the west of Greece. It has a mid-sized

army that it contributes to the overall Spartan-led army. Corinth has multiple colonies

throughout the Greek world, notably Corcyra. Relations with Corcyra, however, are very

poor. Corinth also has strained relations with Megara, another Spartan ally. Corinth’s

relations with Athens are mixed, with respect and rivalry combined. It is an enemy to

Argos, an unallied neighboring state in the Peloponnesus that is still under a mandated

peace treaty with the Peloponnesian League.

Thebes. Thebes, the major power of Boeotia, is an oligarchy and a member of the

Peloponnesian League and a titular ally of Sparta, though a clear rivalry exists between

them. It has a mid sized army with exceptionally fine cavalry (a specialty of Boeotia, the

region north of Attica). It has no navy to speak of. It has very poor relations with Athens

and was an abettor of Persia during the Persian Invasion of Greece. It has bad relations

with Plataea, a small democratic power between Thebes and Athens.

Megara. A mid sized land power just south of Athens. Controls key mountainous routes

into the Peloponnesian Peninsula. Seceded from the Peloponnesian League at the onset

of the first Peloponnesian War (458 BC) and joined the Delian League. Subsequently

withdrew from the Delian League, betraying Athens, and rejoined the Peloponnesian

League. Megara is an enemy of Athens and somewhat hostile to Corinth, its ally, as well.

Other Delian League Powers

Samos. Samos is a mid sized island power who in 440 BC revolted from the league but

was besieged and then submitted to Athens under reasonable but expensive terms,

including stripping it of its navy and a very large fine.

Plataea. Plataea is a small Boeotian democratic city between Athens and Thebes. It is

very loyal to Athens in past wars with its small but capable army. Plataea has banished

some of its citizens with oligarchic sentiments, who have then found refuge and backing

in Thebes. Tensions between Plataea and Thebes are high.

Potidaea. A small well-fortified Corinthian colony on a peninsula in the Thracian area

near Macedonia and that is part of the Delian League. It has loyalties toward Corinth, but

24

has not yet displayed any outward signs of disloyalty to Athens, despite increased

tribute.47

Neutral Powers

Persia. Persia is the barbarian (meaning non-Greek) superpower to the east. Persia is

very wealthy and has a large fleet and a large army. However, it has numerous

commitments in Egypt and modern day Afghanistan that it must attend to. Moreover, its

army, however, is not able to stand up to the Greeks unless it can deploy its cavalry to

good effect. Its navy has been bested by the Athenians multiple times. Persia strives to

see Athens and Sparta wear each other out so that it can reclaim its coastal satraps

(provinces) in western Caria and Phyrgia (western modern Turkey).

Corcyra. Corcyra (modern Corfu) is a remote island power off of western Greece. It is a

colony of Corinth but, unusually, has antagonistic relations with Corinth. Corcyra

maintains a proficient mid-sized (120 triremes) navy and has enough wealth to not only

maintain this navy, but also pursue a policy of local imperialism and isolation from the

rest of Greek affairs. Internally Corcyra it is riven by two violently opposed political

factions, one that represents the landed or otherwise wealthy nobility – the aristocrats –

and the other that represents the demos (the radical democrats).

Epidamnus. Epidamnus is a small and remote city state on the coast opposite Corcyra,

its founding/colonizing mother city. As Corinth founded Corcyra, Epidamnus looks to

Corinth as its “grandmother” city.

Argos: Mid-sized independent land power near Corinth and Megara in the Peloponnesus;

A rival to Sparta, having fought a war with it recently; Bound by peace treaty with Sparta

to not go to war until approximately 420 BC.

47

Pericles p 210

25

Appendix II: The Corcyran Crisis 436/435 BC

In 436 BC, civil war started between the democratic and ruling aristocratic factions of

Epidamnus. The Epidamnian democrats soon cast out the aristocrats. These aristocrats

then appealed to their founding mother-city Corcyra for aid. Corcyra, not wanting to get

involved, declined to intervene.

Rebuffed, the aristocrats then appealed to Corinth, the founder of their founder Corcyra,

and offered to become a colony if Corinth aids them. Though colonizer and colony,

Corinth and Corcyra have “uniquely bad”48

relations. Despite knowing that intervention

will likely result in conflict, Corinth decided to intervene and sends an expedition that

restored the aristocrats.

Corinth, with no immediate threat to their interests, wished to humble their recalcitrant

colony Corcyra. Corcyra, although they had no stake in the Epidamnian civil strife,

elected to confront the Corinthian encroachments in their political sphere. Corcyra then,

with Epidamnian aristocrat aid, laid siege to Epidamnus.

Despite Spartan diplomatic pressure to not pursue hostilities, Corinth rejected Corcyra’s

peace entreaties and declares war on Corcyra. Corinth then built a fleet of 75 triremes and

sent soldiers and settlers from allied Peloponnesian states49

to deal with the Corcyrans.

En route, the Corinthian Fleet was intercepted by Corcyra in the Battle of Leucimne and

defeated resoundingly. Epidamnus fell to Corcyra the same day. Multiple constituent

states from the Peloponnesian League were now involved and the conflict had gone from

a remote corner to the center of the Greek world.

Initial Reactions to the Corcyran Crisis 436/435 BC

Corcyra Sent embassy to Corinth (DI) to seek arbitration; Prepared to fight

(M); Prepared to send Embassy to Athens (DI)

Corinth Refused Compromise (DI); Sent expedition against Corcyra (M)

Sparta (King

Archidamus)

Favored diplomatic peaceful resolution for fear that Athens will

intervene. Put diplomatic pressure on Corinth to resolve conflict

peaceably (DI).

Athens (Pericles) No known action; Too remote for standing policy.

Measured/Logical

Response


Response/Outcome

Actual

Response/Outcome

Declined to get

involved

Sparta Restraint by Corinth Corinth declared

war on Corcyra

Advocated arbitration,

restraint over

Corcyra Restraint by Corinth Corinth declared

war on Corcyra

48

Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, Harper Perennial, London 2005, p 25 49

Including Megara, Athens’ unfriendly neighbor.

26

Epidamnus

Emotional or

Unmeasured Response


Response/Outcome

Actual

Response/Outcome

Intervention, Military

expedition, assault

Corinth and local

allies (including

Megara)

Humbling of

Corcyra

Corinth Defeated at

sea

27

Appendix III: The Crisis Unfolds, Summer 433 BC

In the summer of 433 BC, a Corcyran diplomat presented his case in an open air forum --

the Pnyx – before the assembled citizens of Athens. Pericles wanted peace and was

disinclined to intervene. However, the diplomat played upon Pericles’ concern for naval

dominance. He claimed that it was better to have Corcyra on Athens’ side in the

“coming” war with the Peloponnesian League as:

“there are three fleets worthy of mention in Greece, yours, ours, and the Corinthians’; if the

Corinthian get control of us first, you will have to fight against the Corcyran and Peloponnesian (League)

fleets at once; if you accept us you will fight with our ships in addition to your own.”50

Corinth’s diplomats then responded. They began by pointing out they had convinced

Sparta not to intervene against Athens when Samos, a Delian League member with a

strong navy, revolted in 440 BC. Corinth had recognized that the Aegean was Athens

sphere of influence and that Athens could attend to unruly states therein as it saw fit.

They asked that Athens return this diplomatic courtesy by acknowledging that the Gulf of

Corinth and the nearby Ionian Sea were Corinth’s sphere of influence.

Further, the Corinthians argued that war between the Leagues was not inevitable.

Moreover, Athens should not ally with Corcyra because, although Corcyra was neutral,

such an alliance would be a violation of the spirit of the Thirty Year Peace between the

Leagues, which forbade either league from aligning with former members of the other

league. They followed with a threat:

“for if you join with them it will be necessary for us to include you in our punishment of them.”51

The Athenians then deliberated about what course to follow. On the first day, the

Corinthians emerged as favored, as by allying with Corcyra – who was already at war

with Corinth – Athens would become a combatant in that war and thereby break the

Thirty Years Peace. On the second day, Pericles, who reckoned he could not allow the

naval superiority of Athens to be overtaken, put forward a defensive treaty with Corcyra.

Athens would defend Corcyra, but not engage in offensive operations against Corinth.

This rational middle road was Pericles signal to Corinth to come to some sort of accord

with Corcyra. To back it up, he sent a small fleet of 10 triremes to Corcyra, followed 23

days later by 20 more when he was convinced by others he needed a stronger signal.

50

Thucydides 1.33.3. p 22 51

Thucydides 1.40.3-4; p 26

28

The Corcyran Crisis Unfolds, Summer 433 BC

Corcyra Sent embassy to Athens for military and political aid. Played on

Athens fear of losing control of the seas. (DI)

Corinth Built up new, larger fleet over two years, hired experienced rowers

from around the Greek world, including Athens (M); Sent counter

embassy to Athens to convince Athens that getting involved

would be imprudent, unnecessary, and counter to the good will

that Corinth had shown Athens by convincing Sparta not to

intervene during the Samian Revolt of 440 BC (DI)

Sparta (King

Archidamus)

Seemed to have pressured Peloponnesian League allies to stay out

of the conflict between Corcyra and Corinth52

(DI)

Athens (Pericles) Accepted Corcyra as a mutual defense ally; no aggressive action

against Corinth would be supported but defense against Corinthian

attacks would be provided (DI). He then decided to send a small

naval force (10 triremes) to support the Corcyrans in defensive

operations only; Pericles believed that the Athenian presence

would be a strong enough signal deter the Corinthians. (Mix of DI

and M);Other Athenians convinced him to send 20 more ships 23

days later to reinforce the initial signal force. (M)

52

Pericles, p 202

29

Measured/Logical

Action


Response/Outcome

Actual

Response/Outcome

Non intervention by

Peloponnesian States

Sparta Restraint by Corinth Corinth escalated

Concluded defensive

alliance with Corcyra,

motivated by

preservation of naval

dominance; Small fleet

sent to Corcyra

followed by second

larger, but still small,

fleet

Athens Restraint by Corinth

some negotiated

end to hostilities;

maintenance of

Athenian naval

dominance

Corinth escalated;

Attempted to dissuade

Athens from intervening

by a spheres of

influence argument and

by pointing out that war

is not inevitable;

prepared fleet

Corinth Athens would

acknowledge that

Corcyra is in

Corinth’s sphere of

Interest and stay out

of the conflict

Athens formed

defensive alliance

with Corcyra and

sent small fleets to

support Corcyra

Prevailing Emotional

or Unmeasured Action


Response/Outcome

Actual

Response/Outcome

Ignored diplomatic

signals and sends

second Military

Expedition

Corinth,

supported by

Megara

Humbling of

Corcyra; Message

to Athens to stay

out of others affairs

Corcyra resolved to

resist, Athens sent

fleets to support

defense (only) of

Corcyra

30

Appendix IV: The Battle of Sybota and Aftermath, September 433 BC

In the summer of 433 BC, Pericles had miscalculated. He had thought that a signal from

a small Athenian fleet would resonate with the Corinthian Fleet and cause them not to

press home their attack against the Corcyran Fleet, as by doing so Corinth would be

escalating a local war into one that could involve Athens. His rational calculus failed to

anticipate that the 10 triremes Athens had dispatched to help its ally Corcyra would not

be enough to deter the Coronthians and only appear feckless. Corinth now entered a

course of thoughtless aggression toward Corcyra.

“Hatred for Corcyra had so warped the judgment of Corinth that she believed herself to be in the right in

chastising her rebellious colony – just as Athens had chastised Samos with Corinth’s help a few years

before.”53

Corinth had a great deal of pride vested in defeating Corcyra. This pride, coupled with

Corinth’s anger for Athens’ interference in what was their historical sphere of influence

and a perceived lack of appreciation that for the support that Corinth had shown Athens

during the Samian Revolt, ensured that Pericles’ rational approach would falter. Wealthy

Corinth built of fleet of 150 new triremes, including allies54

and colonies and prepared to

put an end to Corcyran efforts to keep Corinth from taking over the Corcyran colony of

Epidamnus.

The Corinthian Fleet sailed to Corcyra and was met at the Battle of Sybota by 110

experienced Corcyran triremes, accompanied by 10 Athenian veteran crews. The

Athenians attempted to follow Pericles intent of signaling the Corinthians, as manifested

in their orders to get involved in defensive actions only. In short, the Athenian ships were

there not to fight, but only to signal Corinth the gravity of pursuing the fight against

Corcyra. Yet, the Corinthians bore down on the Corcyran fleet and engaged them

anyway, until the Corcyrans began to route.

At this point, having little choice, the Athenian ships engaged fully to try and prevent a

total defeat of their ally Corcyra,55

only to be forced back themselves. Suddenly, the

Corinthians broke off the attack and retreated. The now-damaged Corinthian ships had

seen an approaching fleet and would not know until later that it contained only the 20

ships that Athens had sent to reinforce Pericles’ initial force.

After the battle the Corinthians sent heralds to the Athenians.56

Corinth’s envoys were

explicit about not having broken the Thirty Year’s Peace and told the Athenians:

53

J.B. Salmon, Wealthy Corinth, A History of the City to 338 BC, Oxford University Press, New York,

1997 p 291 54

Among them, anti-Athens Megara. 55


Of note, the heralds did not carry the herald’s staff (a flag of truce or parley), as use of this staff would be

a formal admission of a state of war between Corinth and Athens.

31

“If you intend to prevent us from sailing to Corcyra… and in this way break the treaty, first seize us and

treat us as enemies.”57

The Athenians, following Pericles’ instructions, were circumspect in their answer:

“We are not beginning a war… nor are we breaking the treaty, but we have come to help our Corcyran

allies. If you want to sail anywhere else we will not hinder you, but if you mean to sail against Corcyra, we

will not permit it, insofar as it is in our power.”58

Blows had been struck, but formal war had not yet been declared.

The Battle of Sybota and Aftermath, September 433 BC

Corcyra Defend against Corinthian Invasion Fleet (M); tried to get a formal

state of war between Athens and Corinth (DI)

Corinth Built and assembled a large fleet to attack Corcyra; Perceived

limited Athenian fleet (10 ships) as a sign of weakness; Was

narrowly defeated due to arrival of second Athenian Fleet (M);

After the battle sent emissaries to Athens to induce Athens to be

the one to break the 30 Years Peace or to withdraw its forces from

the theater (DI)

Sparta (King

Archidamus)

Sought not to get Peloponnesian League involved (DI)

Athens (Pericles) The Athenian fleet sought only to show the flag and not engage

(DI); When this failed they entered combat and, with the arrival of

the second fleet, caused the Corinthians to break off. (M)

After the battle, informed the Corinthians that Athens was not

starting a war, merely protecting an all and that the Corinthians

can avoid war by sailing away (DI).

57

Pericles p 204. Corcyra, of course, tried to get the Athenians to formally enter the war. 58

Thucydides 1.53.4; p 32

32

Measured/Logical

Action


Response/Outcome

Actual

Response/Outcome

Non intervention by

Peloponnesian States

Sparta Restraint by Corinth Corinth escalated

Limited Military

involvement meant to

signal Corinth

diplomatically rather

than crush militarily

fleet

Athens Restraint by Corinth

in face of Athenian

naval presence;

some negotiated

end to hostilities;

maintenance of

Athenian naval

dominance

Corinth escalated

and engaged

Corcyran and

Athenian fleet; 10

Athenian ships

indicated to Corinth

that Athens is not

serious about its

commitment to

Corcyra

Second Military

Expedition

Corinth,

supported by

Megara

Humbling of

Corcyra; Message

to Athens to stay

out of Corinth’s

affairs

Corinth narrowly

defeated at sea due

to arrival of second

Athenian Fleet;

Corinth resolved to

continue conflict

and draw

Peloponnesian

League into the

war.

Emotional or

Unmeasured Action


Response/Outcome

Actual

Response/Outcome

All Measures appear

calculated

NA NA NA

33

Bibliography

Fornara, Charles W. (editor), Translated Documents from Greece and Rome: Archaic

Times to the end of the Peloponnesian War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,

UK, 1983

Hanson, Victor Davis, A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans fought the

Peloponnesian War, Random House, New York, 2006

Kagan, Donald, Pericles of Athens and the Birth of Democracy, Macmillan Press, New

York, 1991

Kagan, Donald, The Peloponnesian War: Athens and Sparta in savage conflict 431-404

BC, Harper Perennial, London, 2005

Kagan, Donald, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, Cornell University Press,

Ithaca, NY 1989

Salmon, J.B., Wealthy Corinth, A History of the City to 338 BC, Oxford University Press,

New York, Special edition for sandpiper Books 1997.

Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War. Version used is The Landmark Thucydides, edited

by Robert B. Strassler with forward by Victor Davis Hanson, Touch Stone, New York,

1998

Signals in Peloponnesian War

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Transcript of Signals in Peloponnesian War