i

An Analysis of the Global Maritime Energy Efficiency Partnership in Argentina and

Panama

Prepared for

The Global Environment Facility Independent Evaluation Office

By

Victor Escalona Aldana, Lauri Luosta, Peter Mosher, Seth Roca, and Hannah Tuttle

Workshop in Public Affairs Spring 2021

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©2021 Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System. All rights reserved.

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publications@lafollette.wisc.edu

The Robert M. La Follette School of Public Affairs is a teaching and research

department of the University of Wisconsin–Madison. The school takes no stand on policy issues; opinions expressed in these pages reflect the views of the authors.

The University of Wisconsin–Madison is an equal opportunity and affirmative-action

educator and employer. We promote excellence through diversity in all programs.

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Table of Contents Foreword ................................................................................................................................ vi

Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ vii

Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................ viii

Executive Summary .................................................................................................................ix

Introduction............................................................................................................................. 1 Maritime emissions are growing quickly .............................................................................................................. 1 The International Maritime Organization ............................................................................................................. 1

The Global Maritime Energy Efficiency Partnership ................................................................. 2

Analysis of Impacts in Argentina and Panama ......................................................................... 4 Methodology for assessing policies and policy change ........................................................................................ 4

Argentina ......................................................................................................................................... 5 National political environment ............................................................................................................................. 5 Capacity for implementation resides in three national institutions ..................................................................... 5 Maritime private sector ........................................................................................................................................ 7 Ships’ greenhouse gas emissions assessment ...................................................................................................... 7 Changes to laws and regulatory frameworks ....................................................................................................... 7 Emerging institutional capacity building ............................................................................................................... 8 Limited changes in private sector engagement .................................................................................................... 9

Panama ............................................................................................................................................ 9 National political environment ........................................................................................................................... 10 National institutional capacity ............................................................................................................................ 10 Maritime private sector ...................................................................................................................................... 11 Ships’ greenhouse gas emissions assessment .................................................................................................... 11 Changes to laws and regulatory frameworks ..................................................................................................... 11 Increased institutional capacity .......................................................................................................................... 13 GloMEEP spillovers to other government activities in Panama .......................................................................... 14 Engaging the private sector through inspections and awareness ...................................................................... 14

Impacts Beyond Argentina and Panama ................................................................................ 14 GreenVoyage2050 .............................................................................................................................................. 15 The Global Industry Alliance ............................................................................................................................... 15 IMO toolkits ........................................................................................................................................................ 15

Overall Evaluation: GloMEEP Achieved Its Goals ................................................................... 16 Task forces had divergent outcomes in these two cases .................................................................................... 17 Differences in developing national GloMEEP documents .................................................................................. 17 Outcome of workshops differed ......................................................................................................................... 17

Evaluation of Future Projects ................................................................................................. 18 Logic model ......................................................................................................................................................... 18

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Outcomes: Intermediate ..................................................................................................................................... 18 Outcomes: Legal, policy, and institutional reforms and capacity ....................................................................... 19 Outcomes: Policy implementation ..................................................................................................................... 19 Impact: Emissions ............................................................................................................................................... 19 Impact: Social benefits ........................................................................................................................................ 19

Recommendations and Conclusion ........................................................................................ 20 Five recommendations for future Global Environment Facility projects ............................................................ 20 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................................... 22

Appendices ............................................................................................................................ 23 Appendix A: Results of organizational assessment surveys given to project stakeholders in Panama and Argentina ............................................................................................................................................................ 23 Appendix B: GloMEEP planned outcomes, outputs, and activities ..................................................................... 24 Appendix C: Example intermediate outcome indicators for advocacy and capacity building projects .............. 26 Appendix D: Organizational assessment tool ..................................................................................................... 27 Appendix E: Sample of GHG shadow prices ........................................................................................................ 28

References ............................................................................................................................. 29

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List of Figures Figure 1: Factors & strategies key to GloMEEP’s success ........................................................................... x Figure 2: Estimations of CO2 emissions from international shipping, 1970–2018 ....................................... 1 Figure 3: A timeline of recent IMO regulations on greenhouse gas emissions. ........................................... 2 Figure 4: GloMEEP funding sources ............................................................................................................ 3 Figure 5: GloMEEP Lead Pilot Countries .................................................................................................... 4 Figure 6: Argentina's ministries related to maritime energy efficiency ........................................................ 6 Figure 7: Count and share of international ships inspected by the Prefectura in Argentinian ports ............. 7 Figure 8: Panama’s maritime energy efficiency-related agencies .............................................................. 10 Figure 9: Factors & strategies key to GloMEEP’s success ......................................................................... 16 Figure 10: Proposed logic model to evaluate future GEF policy reform projects. ..................................... 18 Figure 11: Sample range of social benefit calculations for GloMEEP ....................................................... 20

List of Tables Table 1: Objectives of the Global Maritime Energy Efficiency Partnership ................................................ 2 Table 2: Argentina’s recent related policies, 2019–2020 .............................................................................. 8 Table 3: Panama’s recent related policies, 2016–2019 ............................................................................... 12 Table 4: National Maritime Energy Efficiency of the Republic of Panama roadmap ................................ 13

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Foreword This report was written by students at the La Follette School of Public Affairs at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. The learning objective of the La Follette School is to provide graduate students the opportunity to improve their policy analysis skills while providing the client an analysis of a policy problem on which a decision or set of decisions needs to be made. The La Follette School offers a two-year graduate program leading to a Master’s Degree in Public Affairs (MPA) or a Master’s Degree in International Public Affairs (MIPA). Students study policy analysis and public management, and they spend the first year and a half of the program taking courses in which they develop the expertise needed to analyze public policies, including skills in statistics, economics, and policy analysis. The authors of this report all are in the final semester of their degree program and are enrolled in the Workshop in Public Affairs course. Although acquiring a set of policy analysis skills is important, there is no substitute for doing policy analysis as a means of experiential learning. The Workshop in Public Affairs gives graduate students that capstone opportunity as they produce a report for a real-world client about a question of importance to the organization. The client for this project is the Global Environment Facility Independent Evaluation Office (IEO), an international organization based in Washington, DC. The Global Environment Facility (GEF) was established on the eve of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit to help tackle our planet’s most pressing environmental problems. Four key contacts at GEF—Dr. Geeta Batra, Dr. Juha Ilari Uitto, Sara El Choufi, and Peixuan Zhou—have been instrumental in making this project successful. This group of five graduating MPA and MIPA students—Victor Escalona Aldana, Lauri Luosta, Peter Mosher, Seth Roca, and Hannah Tuttle—has spent the last four months working on this issue. They identified two key case study countries to assess: Argentina and Panama. In addition to understanding each country’s context, they assessed national and international efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from maritime shipping. Their five recommendations for the IEO are the result of careful analysis and rigorous research and embody the mission of the La Follette School, which is to:

Train leaders and conduct research to inspire evidence-based policymaking and to advance the public good.

Gregory F. Nemet Professor of Public Affairs

La Follette School of Public Affairs Madison, Wisconsin

May 2021

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Acknowledgements We thank the many stakeholders who provided input for this report. First, we recognize staff at our client organization, the Global Environment Facility Independent Evaluation Office: Dr. Geeta Batra, Sara El Choufi, and Peixuan Zhou. We also thank Astrid Dispert and Minglee Hoe at The International Maritime Organization, Dr. Andrew Hudson and Dr. David Vousden of The United Nations Development Programme, and the two government officials in Panama and Argentina who we interviewed. Finally, we thank Professor Gregory Nemet at the La Follette School, as he provided consistent guidance and support throughout the project. It has been a privilege to work with all of these incredible stakeholders, and we appreciate the valuable time, insight, and resources that each of them provided. The views, opinions, and recommendations in this report represent those of the authors alone and do not reflect findings, recommendations, or policies of the University of Wisconsin–Madison, the La Follette School, or The Global Environment Facility Independent Evaluation Office. Victor Escalona Aldana Lauri Luosta Peter Mosher Seth Roca Hannah Tuttle

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Abbreviations ACP Panama Canal Authority AMP Panama Maritime Authority GEF Global Environment Facility GHG Greenhouse Gas GIA Global Industry Alliance GloMEEP Global Maritime Energy Efficiency Partnership GT Gross Tonnage IACS International Association of Classification Societies IEO Global Environment Facility Independent Evaluation Office IMO International Maritime Organization LPIR Legal, Policy, and Institutional Reforms LPC Lead Pilot Country MARPOL The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships MEEF Maritime Energy Efficiency Framework NMEESP National Maritime Energy Efficiency of the Republic of Panama RIA Regulatory Impact Analysis RO Recognized Organization SMART Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic, & Time-Bound UNDP United Nations Development Programme

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Executive Summary This report presents an analysis of the Global Maritime Energy Efficiency Partnership (GloMEEP),

a project funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF), an international organization whose mission is to help tackle the world’s most pressing environmental problems. It is composed for the GEF’s Independent Evaluation Office (IEO), an autonomous body within the GEF that ensures the organization’s independent evaluation function. Its findings will contribute directly to the IEO’s recommendations for the GEF’s upcoming four-year funding replenishment cycle.

Based on data triangulation from multiple sources, we provide five recommendations for the GEF to use in policy reform projects:

1. Adopt more comprehensive evaluation strategies, including the collection of baseline, intermediate,

and long-term outcome data. 2. Establish rigorous country selection processes by (a) requiring commitment letters from multiple

participating national institutions and (b) focusing on countries where the sector of interest is important.

3. Apply a policy-making process framework to design project interventions and assess particular contexts in each nation.

4. Whenever possible, prioritize new in-country agencies' regulations over law changes. 5. Expand use of successful implementation strategies from GloMEEP, including (a) national task

forces, (b) early problem assessments, (c) legal proposals for policy reforms, (d) workshops, (e) building relationships with officials, and (f) adapting to country contexts.

GloMEEP spanned from 2015 to 2018 in 10 developing countries with a goal of assisting each nation to better regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from maritime shipping. The project was implemented in a partnership between three international organizations: the GEF provided initial funding for the project, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) acted as the implementing agency, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided support and co-financing. Our analysis compares case studies from two South American nations that participated in the project: Panama, where the project produced substantial impacts, and Argentina, where the project created more mixed outcomes. We specifically address the following research questions:

1. What were GloMEEP’s impacts, and would these have been realized in absence of the project? 2. What country-specific factors catalyzed (or inhibited) the success of the project in each nation? 3. What lessons can be learned from GloMEEP to inform future GEF policy reform projects?

Our analysis finds that GloMEEP was a highly successful project, although it created a greater impact in Panama than in Argentina. In Panama, the project spurred the generation of several successful policy reforms, all sanctioned using institutional regulatory faculties instead of more involved legislative changes. Panamanian implementation also achieved sustained collaboration from international private organizations. Even in Argentina, a country that had the commitment of just one institution in this project, GloMEEP helped generate networks between institutions and produce a maritime emissions assessment that was useful in the approval of a new law.

We also find that the project produced multiple positive global spillover effects. Building upon the success of GloMEEP, a new project, GreenVoyage2050, launched in 2019 and essentially seeks to replicate GloMEEP in at least 11 countries. Another success has been the formation and continued operation of the Global Industry Alliance (GIA), a public-private partnership body that includes 14 multinational shipping companies.

x

Additionally, we find that countries’ institutional buy-in and maritime sector relevance generated significant differences in the project’s outcomes. In Argentina, just the maritime authority was committed to GloMEEP, and the institution has limited power to push policy reforms given the country’s relatively small maritime sector. Conversely, many public and private institutions joined the national task force in Panama, where the maritime industry is very prevalent. The participation of diverse actors spurred the creation of policy alternatives, generated support for the implementation of new ideas, and facilitated project spillovers in other areas. Additionally, given the importance of Panama’s maritime sector, the maritime authority has relatively more resources to carry out reforms and those changes had bigger impacts.

We conclude that GloMEEP deployed an effective model to achieve policy change and recommend that the GEF replicate its most successful methods in future projects. We also find that national characteristics can significantly impact project effectiveness. The importance of the targeted sector for the national economy and institutional and personal commitments with the project can have a significant impact on the project outcomes. These differences can be mitigated by leveraging our suggested recommendations in future projects.

Figure 1: Factors & strategies key to GloMEEP’s success

We recommend that future GEF policy reform projects replicate GloMEEP’s most effective methods

(gray) and select nations that meet desired criteria (blue).

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Introduction

Maritime emissions are growing quickly In recent decades, climate change has become increasingly recognized as one of the most urgent

threats to the planet. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts that unmitigated climate change will cause global surface temperatures to rise between 2.5 and 7.8 degrees Celsius in the coming century (Pachauri and Mayer 2015, 20; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2015, 13). The projected effects of climate change include rising sea levels, increasing frequency of extreme weather events, ocean acidification, biodiversity loss, and a shifting availability of resources, including arable land and water sources—all of which will lead to potential danger, health risks, and disrupted livelihoods for a large proportion of the world’s population (Pachauri and Mayer 2015) (USGCRP n.d.). The maritime shipping industry plays an important role in contributing to global climate change, as it currently comprises an estimated 2.9% of the world’s total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Left unchecked, GHG emissions from international maritime shipping are projected to increase 50 to 250% by 2050 as the world economy continues to grow (Fourth IMO GHG Study 2020).

Figure 2: Estimations of CO2 emissions from international shipping, 1970–2018

Sources: Fourth IMO GHG Study 2020; Crippa et al 2019

The International Maritime Organization The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the global authority for the safety, security, and

environmental performance of international shipping, and it has a specific responsibility pertaining to “the prevention of marine and atmospheric pollution by ships” (“Introduction to IMO” n.d.). IMO standards on GHG emissions can be broadly characterized as a series of regulations tightening over time. The IMO adopted the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) in 1972 (“Introduction to IMO” n.d.). The regulation most relevant to this report, Annex VI of MARPOL, specifically focuses on placing limits on the emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other harmful substances. Additional recent regulations include the Maritime Energy Efficiency Framework (MEEF)

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(2010), which introduced standards on the construction and operation of ships (GEF 2015); the IMO Initial Strategy (2018), which established a goal of reducing shipping emissions by 50% by 2050 (GEF 2015); and the IMO Ship Fuel Oil Consumption Database, which mandated data collection on shipping emissions (“Introduction to IMO” n.d.).

Figure 3: A timeline of recent IMO regulations on greenhouse gas emissions

The IMO’s ability to regulate shipping emissions is constrained by several factors. First, the IMO is composed of 174 Member States and three Associate Members, and decisions within the IMO require broad agreement among member nations. This means that conventions often only go as far as the “lowest common denominator” (Rothwell et al. 2015; Axelrod and VanDeveer 2019). Second, the IMO has limited power to enforce conventions and often relies on member states to self-regulate. Finally, the IMO only governs international shipping, not shipping within countries, and lacks the ability to adopt global standards for common shipping terms. For example, it cannot dictate how a country defines a “fleet.” According to our research and interviews, these factors all hinder IMO action.

The Global Maritime Energy Efficiency Partnership The Global Maritime Energy Efficiency Partnership (GloMEEP) was initiated in 2015 in a

partnership between the GEF, IMO, and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The GEF provided initial financing for the project, while the IMO was the main implementing partner and the UNDP provided co-financing and technical support. The project ended in December 2018. Designed to contribute to the IMO’s Initial Strategy of reducing maritime emissions by 50% by 2050, the project aimed to assist 10 developing nations, termed Lead Pilot Countries (LPCs), to regulate maritime GHG emissions. The project involved 10 participating LPCs, including Argentina and Panama, and addressed four country-level objectives:

Table 1: Objectives of the Global Maritime Energy Efficiency Partnership

1. Creating legal, policy, and institutional reforms (LPIR) for GHG reduction through improved energy efficiency within the maritime transport sector in developing countries.

2. Building capacity (human and institutional) in the area of reducing shipping GHGs

3. Utilizing public‐private partnerships to catalyze innovation and R&D and transferring technology to meet the needs of developing countries.

4. Assuring effective implementation of IMO Maritime Energy Efficiency Framework (MEEF), particularly in developing nations.

Source: GEF 2015, 37

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The program's total cost was roughly 18.7 million USD (including in-kind contributions), provided

by a variety of actors. The IMO contributed 11.8 million USD, the GEF contributed 1.6 million USD, national participating governments committed 3 million USD, and smaller partners provided the rest. Numerous stakeholders were involved in the development and implementation of GloMEEP, including state ministries, port authorities, environmental agencies, as well as private shipping companies, NGOs, and other entities. Strategic partnership arrangements between maritime institutions and state agencies also played a significant role in the development of technical expertise, assessment tools, and other capacity building measures used in GloMEEP (Vousden 2018).

Figure 4: GloMEEP funding sources

Source: Vousden 2018

GloMEEP aimed to support implementation of MARPOL Annex VI in LPCs by building

operational and technical capacities to reduce NOx and SOx as well as carbon emissions in ports and waterways. GloMEEP’s objectives supported efforts by the IMO to reduce emissions in maritime shipping and uphold MARPOL Annex VI obligations that protect the marine environment and produce global benefits (Vousden 2018). GloMEEP’s country selection process involved an extensive back-and-forth between the applicant country, the IMO, and the GEF. First, the IMO sent a “Call for Expressions of Interest” to solicit applications from member states. Interested countries were asked to fill out a questionnaire including questions pertaining to the maritime activity in the country, potential stakeholders, and the country’s level of commitment. These responses were evaluated by the IMO Secretariat. Next, the IMO project implementers contacted shortlisted countries to discuss the activities, deliverables, and co-financing necessary for participation in the project. Finally, preselected countries submitted official letters of support to the IMO, documents which further committed them to the project and required the inclusion of a Lead Agency, a National Focal Point, and a National Project Coordinator.

To build and reinforce institutional capacity, GloMEEP conducted 31 workshops between 2015 and 2018 in the 10 LPCs. These workshops helped LPCs develop emission assessments and gain familiarity with the Maritime Environment Protection Committee’s “Ship Emissions Toolkits” as well as other capacity building measures. These developments ultimately helped LPCs create their own “Maritime Energy Efficiency Strategy" and a framework for creating national policies and laws.

The 2017 launch of the Global Industry Alliance (GIA) was one of GloMEEP’s most significant outcomes. The GIA functions as a public-private partnership that, in collaboration with GloMEEP and its supporting partners, provides technical expertise in decarbonizing global shipping. This organization works to address barriers to the implementation of energy efficiency measures and spur further energy-efficient innovation in this sector. The GIA consists of 14 members, including public ports, regulatory organizations, and private shipping companies. These partnerships have resulted in national, regional, and global progress in addressing emissions within maritime shipping (Vousden 2018).

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Analysis of Impacts in Argentina and Panama

Methodology for assessing policies and policy change Our project analyzed GloMEEP by investigating two of the 10 project LPCs: Argentina and

Panama. According to the GEF’s terminal evaluation of the project, Panama achieved all of the project’s key objectives while Argentina fell short by failing to ratify MARPOL Annex VI or pass relevant national legislation (Vousden 2018). By comparing a nation that achieved broadly positive outcomes to one with more mixed results, we identified the project’s differential impacts in each nation, as well as specific contextual factors in each nation that either contributed to or inhibited project success.

Figure 5: GloMEEP Lead Pilot Countries

Source: GEF 2015 Our analysis comes in two parts: First, we capture data on national political contexts in Argentina

and Panama, as well as the GloMEEP project’s impact in each country and its global spillover effects. Then, we tie this data together by identifying which contextual factors in each country catalyzed or inhibited the success of the project. To capture data, we utilized three methods: (1) literature review of documents from the GloMEEP project, national governments, and other external sources; (2) interviews with project stakeholders including two key in-country government officials (one in each country), alongside project stakeholders at the GEF, UNDP, and IMO; and (3) administering surveys to the in-country government officials.

Our analysis of political contexts in each nation, meanwhile, is based on the policy-making process framework developed by John W. Kingdon in his book Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (2003). Kingdon suggests that policy reforms are possible when the problem, policy, and political streams meet. The problem stream is the awareness that government officials have about different problems, an awareness that changes with information from indicators, focusing events, and feedback. The political stream is moved by the national mood, elections, and interest groups. It plays a significant role in determining which subjects receive serious attention from people within the government. The policy stream generates possible solutions to different problems. It is mainly governed by specialists who are not usually visible but play an important role defining technical solutions. Kingdon also describes the “policy entrepreneur,” an individual who invests resources to highlight problems, shares a specific solution, and tries to combine the different streams when an opportunity appears.

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With our analysis, we recognize the inherent difficulty of attributing the project’s causal impact on policy reform. We attempted to mitigate this issue, when possible, by triangulating data between our three methods. For example, to determine whether GloMEEP played an instrumental role in getting a policy passed in a country, we conducted a literature review to determine when the policy passed and what it contained, then we used a survey to ask key in-country stakeholders whether GloMEEP played an instrumental role in passing the policy, and finally, we reinforced this finding in interviews with officials.

We also note that the timing of our analysis adds to implementing agencies’ existing knowledge about the GloMEEP project, as it captures data from over two years after the project was concluded (December, 2018), while the project’s original terminal evaluation was completed the same month as the project was completed. Our ability to capture project outcomes, however, was limited due to data availability. Argentina

Argentina is a South American country of forty-five million inhabitants and a large Atlantic coast. It has recently gone through significant turmoil that likely delayed the ratification of MARPOL Annex VI. The country started the century in an economic crisis that generated social unrest and political instability, illustrated by a presidential resignation in December 2001. Between 2003 and 2015, the country found political stability, led first by Nestor Kirchner and then by his wife, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. Under the subsequent president, Argentina faced a new period of economic crisis and social unrest that led to a change of administration in the 2019 election. In the middle of an economic recession, former president Mauricio Macri presented a bill to ratify MARPOL Annex VI.

National political environment Argentina is a federal constitutional republic and representative democracy (“Casa Rosada,

Organización” n.d.). Although the country has 23 provinces and one capital city, Buenos Aires, the federal government makes most maritime-related decisions. The president of Argentina can present legislative initiatives and has the authority to veto legislative actions. This means that the executive branch has significant power to decide which bills are discussed in Congress and guide the policy stream. This presidential authority suggests that it is important to gather support among executive branch authorities to spur legislative changes, which is likely what occurred when the president sent the bill to approve Annex VI to Congress in 2019.

The executive branch leads the country’s international relationships. In the same vein, the president has the authority to sign international treaties, but Congress must approve them (Constitución Nacional Argentina 1994, art. 22). This two-step process to ratify international treaties increases the difficulty and delays in adhering to international regulations like MARPOL because it requires the initiative of both Congress and the president. In the case of MARPOL Annex VI, the former president Macri presented the bill to Congress in 2019. After more than a year, Congress approved it but did not define how it would be implemented. Now the new president, Alberto Fernández, must take the initiative to adhere to it and define which institution or institutions will implement the law.

Capacity for implementation resides in three national institutions Argentina has three major public institutions related to maritime energy efficiency: the Ministry of

Transport, which oversees ports; the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, which is responsible for coordinating national policies on environmental matters; and the Prefectura, the national maritime authority that falls under the Ministry of Security, which manages domestic law enforcement. The diversity of ministries involved likely hinders the progress in this field.

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Figure 6: Argentina's ministries related to maritime energy efficiency

The Prefectura was GloMEEP’s contact in this project. It serves in a coast guard role and is in

charge of maritime environmental protection. To enforce maritime regulations, it relies on resources like ships, planes, helicopters, and specialized staff. Prefectura can also generate maritime regulations to implement national laws. In 2012, the Prefectura used this power to issue the Directive 23/2012, a new regulation based on environmental law, that established much of MARPOL Annex VI—even though Argentina has not ratified Annex VI. However, the lack of changes to this regulation (“InfoLeg - Información Legislativa” n.d.) suggests that GloMEEP did not take advantage of its regulatory power. Furthermore, there is no evidence that this directive has been successfully applied in ship inspections due to the lack of a specific law about maritime emissions.

The Perfectura’s experience in establishing regulations shows that it has the ability to find possible solutions to regulatory issues. Its apolitical structure and expert knowledge on maritime issues give it credibility. However, the Prefectura is a relatively small institution that depends on the Ministry of Security, which is generally focused on national peacekeeping in times of social unrest. These features make it more difficult for the Prefectura to align political forces to approve policy reforms related to maritime environmental issues. Using our theorical framework concepts, the Prefectura can be defined as a strong actor generating policy alternatives in the policy stream but with limited influence in the political and problem streams.

In order to enforce Argentina’s maritime regulations, the Prefectura carries out routine inspections of ships in ports. Between 2015 and 2019, it inspected more than 1,000 ships each year, which is equivalent to between one third and half of international ships that used Argentinian ports (“Estadísticas Estado Rector del Puerto” 2019). The Prefectura’s capacity to inspect a significant number of international ships represents an opportunity to operationalize the knowledge acquired in GloMEEP’s workshops and enforce regulations to reduce maritime emissions, although there is no evidence that this has happened to date.

President

Ministry of Environment

Ministry of Transport

Ministry of Security

Maritime Authority

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Figure 7: Count and share of international ships inspected by the Prefectura in Argentinian ports

Source: “Estadísticas Estado Rector del Puerto” 2019

Maritime private sector According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 192 propelled seagoing

merchant vessels of 100 gross tonnage (GT) and above sailed under the Argentinian national flag in 2019, accounting for 622 thousand deadweight tons or 0.03% of global maritime capacity (UNCTAD 2020).

Argentina’s maritime private sector is self-organized in diverse associations that have an active role in maritime issues. This level of organization should facilitate private participation on regulatory matters. Despite this, no private institutions participated in the GloMEEP national task force. Several association representatives attended GloMEEP workshops, but there is no evidence on their websites that they engaged in energy efficiency matters either before or after GloMEEP.

Ships’ greenhouse gas emissions assessment The Argentina Maritime Authority assessed ships’ GHG emissions as part of GloMEEP, but the

Prefectura does not share that information publicly. The Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development keeps a GHG emissions inventory that contains information regarding ship emissions (Moreira Muzio 2019, 22), but the measure excludes international shipping and fishing boats. Therefore, there is no reliable public information regarding possible GloMEEP impacts on maritime emissions.

Changes to laws and regulatory frameworks As GloMEEP’s final evaluation mentions, Argentina was one of two countries that did not ratify

Annex VI by the end of the project (Vousden 2018, 37). By January 18, 2021, the country had ratified MARPOL Annexes I–V but not Annex VI, even though its National Congress approved adoption through law 27.584 of December 15, 2020 (Prefectura Naval Argentina 2021). The bill was presented to Congress by the federal administration in May 2019 and put before the Senate Commission of International Relationships and Culture, where it remained until it was revised and approved in the commission session on September 22, 2020. In that session, the commission president mentioned that the legislators received positive reports from the Argentinian Navy and the Maritime Authority, along with several requests from the private sector to move forward with the legislation (Senado Argentina 2020, 3). Although the law

34.5%596

42.0%808

42.2%976

50.4%980

35.9%727

2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

8

approved MARPOL Annex VI, it does not specify which institution will apply it; therefore, it has not been implemented yet.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs likely had a major influence on the approval of this law. Due to the IMO's pressure to approve MARPOL Annex VI, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs led several meetings with other ministries to review the matter. Through its lobby, the IMO probably affected the policy stream, taking advantage of a government concerned with international relationships. The Prefectura was not initially invited to these meetings but was introduced to this discussion by the Ministry of Environment through a connection created in GloMEEP’s workshops. The Prefectura helped assess the problem regarding ship GHG emission measurements developed during GloMEEP, increasing the awareness about this issue among public officials and thus affecting the problem stream. In conclusion, GloMEEP had an indirect influence on Annex VI approval by Argentina’s Congress through the networking generated during the workshops and via the assessment of maritime emissions.

The awareness of MARPOL Annex VI produced by GloMEEP contributed to the revision of the section about ships’ smog contaminations carried out as part of the general maritime regulation upgrade (Poder Ejecutivo Nacional 2019). Similarly, the knowledge about MARPOL Annex VI moved the Prefectura to issue a regulation that bans the discharge of used waters from exhaust gas cleaning systems (Prefectura Naval Argentina 2020).

Even though the country had not approved Annex VI, in 2012 the Prefectura issued Directive 23/2012 that established norms to prevent atmospheric contamination from ships, requiring similar protections to those in Annex VI regarding gas emissions and the establishment of an energy efficiency plan (Prefectura Naval Argentina 2012). The legislative and document database of Argentina’s Ministry of Justice and Human Rights says that this regulation has not been changed since its publication in 2012 (“InfoLeg - Información Legislativa” n.d.).

Table 2: Argentina’s recent related policies, 2019–2020

Resolutions & Reforms Impacts Survey: “Would it have

happened without GloMEEP?”

Decree 770/2019 • Revision of section related to smoke and soot in the updating of the Maritime, River, and Lake Navigation Regime (REGINAVE)

Maybe

Disposition15/2020 DISFC-2020-15-APN-DPAM#PNA

• Prohibits the discharge of washing water from the Exhaust Gas Cleaning Systems

No

Ley N° 27.584 • Approves MARPOL Annex VI Maybe

Emerging institutional capacity building There is significant evidence that this project successfully produced outputs related to capacity

building. In November 2016, the IMO held a three-day workshop in Argentina that gathered 20 participants from different ministries, maritime training institutes, and the maritime administration. The main topic was MARPOL Annex VI and Technology Transfer (“MARPOL Annex VI Workshop Held in Argentina” 2016). In November 2017, GloMEEP held a two-day workshop on the implementation of IMO Model Course 4.05 on Energy Efficient Operation of Ships. This event gathered participants from various maritime tertiary institutions, including maritime training institutes (“National Workshop on IMO’s Energy Efficiency Model Course Held in Argentina” 2017). Following this national workshop, in November 2017 GloMEEP

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implemented a regional workshop on “Port State Control and Enforcement of MARPOL Annex VI.” This event was hosted in Argentina and many members of its maritime authority participated (“Regional PSC Workshop Held in Argentina” n.d.). In July 2018, GloMEEP held a final workshop on the “Prevention and Control of Shipping and Port Air Emissions” that gathered almost forty participants in a three-day training course (“Port Emissions Workshop Held in Argentina” 2018).

Another significant GloMEEP capacity building output is the series of guides about ship and port emissions that provided directors with a way to assess emissions, generate changes in national laws, and develop reduction strategies. The port emission series was one of the main topics of the last workshop mentioned above and taught the maritime authority officials how to use these tools.

Despite the numerous capacity building outputs, there is little short-term evidence regarding concrete outcomes like changes in practices or networks. One of those outcomes was the inclusion of the Prefectura in the ministerial meetings lead by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Similarly, the Prefectura’s team that worked on GloMEEP was required to review an energy efficiency bill prepared by the Ministry of Environment in order to check that maritime issues were included.

However, the work of other ministries shows little connection with GloMEEP. For example, the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development did not include any initiative to reduce maritime emissions in the “National Mitigation Plan for the Transport Sector” (Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sustentable 2017). Likewise, the Ministry of Transport mentions just one initiative related to maritime energy efficiency in its website. In 2017, it created a program to reduce the Buenos Aires port fees of ships with an environmental certification issued by either the Environmental Ship Index or the Green Award (Administración General de Puertos 2017). However, according to the information shared on its website, this initiative responded to previous environmental legislation and not to GloMEEP’s initiatives (“Seguridad, higiene y ambiente” 2019).

Limited changes in private sector engagement There is no clear evidence of changes in Argentina’s private sector engagement. The news

regarding the workshops held by GloMEEP in Argentina mentions that there were different actors, but the pictures show mostly Argentinian Maritime Authority staff. Also, in the September 2020 meeting where the Argentinian Congress Commission of International Relationships and Culture discussed the ratification of MARPOL Annex VI, the president of that commission mentioned that legislators received several comments from the private sector asking to advance this project. However, there is no information regarding which institutions were involved (Senado Argentina 2020).

Panama

Panama is a Mesoamerican country of four million inhabitants situated between Colombia and Costa Rica. Since the fall of dictator Manuel Noriega in 1989, Panama’s institutions have been relatively stable. It has held five presidential elections and elected presidents from three different political parties. Despite having stable democratic elections, many of the administrations have been plagued with corruption accusations and other scandals. The current president, Juan Carlos Varela, has returned some normalcy to the country’s institutions but has faced similar criticisms of corruption as his predecessor ex-president Ricardo Martinelli (“BTI 2020 Panama Country Report”).

Panama has one of the largest economies in Central America. Seventy percent of its GDP comes from its service sector (“Panama | UNDP Climate Change Adaptation” 2021), which includes the Panama Canal. The Panama Canal connects the Atlantic and Pacific and is one of the most important waterways in the world, servicing 213 million metric tons in 2013 (“Panama Canal | History, Construction, Expansion, & Facts” 2021). The relative stability of Panama’s institutions and the prominence of the Panama Canal in maritime shipping may have made its political environment more conducive to meeting GloMEEP objectives and complying with MARPOL standards. Representatives at the IMO have iterated that these underlying factors are likely to have significantly contributed to the program’s success in Panama.

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National political environment Panama is a presidential republic made up of 10 provinces. It has a National Assembly and Supreme

Court. The president has the right to veto legislation passed by the National Assembly; however, the legislature can revote on vetoed bills if the Supreme Court facilitates it (“BTI 2020 Panama Country Report”). Panama’s governing bodies ratified MARPOL in May of 1999, 16 years before GloMEEP’s implementation. Panama is easily able to meet the obligations of new MARPOL annexes because, as one ex-country official noted, laws for new annexes do not need to be ratified and the maritime authorities can create new regulations as they see fit.

The Panama Canal is governed by an autonomous governmental entity, the Panama Canal Authority (ACP). The ACP has the ability to create and implement maritime policy and regulations within its jurisdiction (“Panama Canal | History, Construction, Expansion, & Facts” 2021). The ACP has worked in conjunction with the Government of Panama and the Panama Maritime Authority (AMP) to uphold obligations undertaken pursuant to international treaties signed with the UN, IMO, and other multilateral bodies (“Panama Canal | History, Construction, Expansion, & Facts” 2021). It has been more than two decades since Panama ratified MARPOL; since then, Panama’s governing bodies have implemented several policies to meet MARPOL’s objectives. This may indicate that Panama has had and continues to have a more conducive political and policy environment to pass effective maritime emissions regulations.

National institutional capacity Panama has several institutions related to the creation and implementation of maritime energy

efficiency policies. The Ministry of the Environment is responsible for addressing issues related to climate change and international agreements such as MARPOL. This institution implements and executes environmental laws, policies, and regulations to ensure the protection of Panama’s natural resources. Additionally, the AMP supports this institution in enforcing regulations and recommending policies as they relate to the maritime sector. The AMP’s Directorate of the Merchant Marine is directly responsible for ensuring that Panamanian-registered ships follow MARPOL standards. The ACP has similar powers to enforce policies and regulations within the Canal Zone to uphold MARPOL obligations. These three institutions are part of the National Committee on Climate Change of Panama. Formally organized frameworks of policy specialists likely fostered a positive environment for successfully meeting GloMEEP objectives.

Figure 8: Panama’s maritime energy efficiency-related agencies

Panama Canal Authority (ACP)

President

Ministry of Environment

Panama Maritime Authority (AMP)

4 Specialized Intra-Agency Departments

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Maritime private sector The strategic geographical importance of the Panama Canal makes it an international shipping hub,

engaging thousands of ships annually in fueling, transport, and other activities. Panama’s easily accessible open registry has more than 8,000 vessels flying its flag, making it the largest flag country in the world (“11th COOPERATION FORUM (SOMS),” n.d.). These vessels represent more than 17% of the world’s merchant marine fleets (“Panama Maritime Review 2019/2020” 2020). Panama’s AMP has opened a new office of Maritime Security (SEGUMAR) that offers technical and operative services to its flag ships including issuing “Confirmation of Compliance” certificates for MARPOL (“Panama Maritime Review 2019/2020” 2020). As noted in the previous section, the private industry has also been engaged in conducting workshops to train public and private officials on meeting MARPOL standards. The specialized administrative maritime agencies of the AMP and ACP have created a cooperative framework for engaging the private sector in compliance with MARPOL. These factors are likely to have played a critical role in GloMEEP’s success in Panama.

Ships’ greenhouse gas emissions assessment Similar to Argentina, Panama’s Maritime Authority (AMP) is responsible for addressing emission

pollution and regulations in oceanic waters. The AMP works in conjunction with the ACP, the group responsible for addressing both of these issues within the canal zone (“Panama - ITOPF” 2019). The emissions data that these agencies track is not publicly available, but it may be possible to gain access to similar data through IMO fuel consumption databases. Some institutions analyzing data have gained access to these databases for a specific year, but these are not adequate to hypothesize maritime emission trends over a given time span.

Changes to laws and regulatory frameworks Since GloMEEP’s launch, Panama has created and implemented several regulatory policies and

frameworks to address MARPOL obligations. GloMEEP workshops trained officials on the IMO’s Attained Energy Efficiency Design Index. Resolution No. 106-91 DGMM represents a policy reform that stemmed directly from these workshops in 2016. This policy incentivized corporate social responsibility programs aimed at the reduction of GHG emissions by allowing ships that have evidence of maritime emission reduction programs to register. Those that had registered already can claim a discount for three years with Panama’s National Merchant Marine (“Gaceta Oficial Digital” 2018). Following this, GloMEEP enabled officers to identify further functions for Recognized Organizations (ROs). This resulted in Resolution No. 106-26-DGMM, a resolution that implements more functions for ROs to meet the compliance requirements of Annex VI of MARPOL 73/78 Amendments (“Gaceta Oficial Digital” 2018).

Additionally, other workshops enabled Panamanian authorities to trust the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) as it related to evaluating and reporting data on flag ship emissions, resulting in Resolution No. 106-27-DGMM in 2018. This resolution allowed the IACS to collect data and report it to the IMO to enable Panama’s SEGUMAR to issue “Confirmation of Compliance” as well as ROs with Panama flag ships with regards to MARPOL Amendment 73/78. Furthermore, GloMEEP workshops boosted the knowledge of Panamanian authorities about IMO regulations on the reduction of GHG emissions contained within Amendment 73/78. This led to the adoption and implementation of MARPOL 73/78 by Panamanian authorities on January 1, 2018. This amendment calls for eligible ships to have a Ship Energy Efficiency Plan, for Confirmations of Compliance to be sent to the Directorate of the Merchant Marine, and for comprehensive reporting of fuel consumption for these ships, among other tasks related to GHG emissions tracking and reporting (“Gaceta Oficial Digital” 2018). These resolutions have been extremely successful in bolstering compliance with MARPOL. As one former government official noted, more than 90% of Panama’s 8,000+ flag ships have received their “Confirmation of Compliance” certificates. Recently, new policies have been created to meet the 2020 sulfur caps of Annex VI. Shipping

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advisory N-1-2019 prohibited the use of open loop scrubbers in the canal, and the ACP implemented a ban on heavy fuel carriages to reduce SOx and NOx emissions (“Personal Técnico de la AMP Se Familiariza con Equipos de Depuración de Óxido de Azufre (SOx) Scrubber | Autoridad Maritima De Panama” 2019).

Table 3: Panama’s recent related policies, 2016–2019

Resolutions & Reforms

Impacts Survey: “Would it have

happened without GloMEEP?”

Resolution No. 106-91 • Implements a subsidy for foreign ships to register with Panama

• More ships registered with Panama, and thus are required to provide evidence of MARPOL compliance

No

Resolution No. 106-21 • Requires ROs to report emissions data and submit “Certification of (MARPOL) Compliance”

N/A

Resolution No. 106 -27- DGMM

• Facilitates efficiency with the “Confirmation of Compliance” process by enabling the IACS to collect emissions data with ROs

No

Implementation of MARPOL Amendment 73/78

• Requires ships to submit Ship Energy Efficiency Plans, comprehensive reporting of fuel use, and other tasks related to GHG emissions reporting

No

Shipping Advisory N-1-2019

• Aims to reduce SOx emissions by prohibiting use of open loop scrubbers in Canal Zone

• Bans heavy fuel carriages

N/A

Along with regulatory policy reform, Panama has made significant progress in creating and

implementing regulatory frameworks to reduce maritime emissions. In 2018, the National Maritime Energy Efficiency of the Republic of Panama (NMEESP) was launched to support efforts of complying with Annex VI. NMEESP was developed in collaboration with GloMEEP, utilizing workshops, IMO toolkits, and engaging other maritime stakeholders. Its goal is to provide a national framework, policy solutions, and other measures to reduce air pollution and GHG emissions between 2018–2030 (“11th COOPERATION FORUM (SOMS),” n.d.). NMEESP includes three long-term outcomes. The first long-term goal of this strategy is the increase of energy efficiency and reduction of GHG emissions by adopting effective policies, collaborative platforms, and incentives. Second, at the end of this strategy, Panama aims to strengthen its institutional and technical capacity in developing innovative research and technologies related to energy efficiency, GHG emissions, and air pollution reduction. The last long-term outcome is the adoption of these energy efficiency and GHG reduction measures by all of its flag ships (“11th COOPERATION FORUM (SOMS),” n.d.).

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Table 4: National Maritime Energy Efficiency of the Republic of Panama roadmap

Long-Term Objective 1: Increased energy efficiency and

GHG emission reductions

Long-Term Objective 2: Strengthening institutional and technical capacity of research and technology

development

Long-Term Objective 3: Adoption of energy efficiency and GHG

reduction measures by its flag ships

Supporting Strategic Objectives 1, 2, & 5

Supporting Strategic Objectives 3 & 5

Supporting Strategic Objective 2

To support these long-term outcomes, Panama has developed five strategic objectives. The first

strategic is to develop a database to collect technical and operational data relating to GHG emissions and fuel consumption of flagged vessels using the Panama Canal. The second strategic objective builds on this by creating incentives to reduce GHG emissions and increase energy efficiency measures by flagged vessels within the canal. Third, NMEESP aims to provide funding for research of energy efficiency, GHG reduction, and air pollution mitigation at tertiary education institutions as well as research centers to build capacity. Fourth, the program seeks to establish an international center for business, as it relates to maritime liquified natural gas and energy efficiency in Panama. Lastly, NMEESP will implement regulatory frameworks to modernize its ports, utilizing technologies that will reduce GHG emissions, increase energy efficiency, and encourage other pollution mitigation measures (“11th COOPERATION FORUM (SOMS),” n.d.).

Increased institutional capacity Along with these strategic objectives, Panama has increased institutional capacity in technical and

operative aspects. All the resolutions noted above were direct outcomes of GloMEEP workshops that systematically created the foundation for compliance and adoption of MARPOL 73/78. This is a significant outcome that will allow Panama to be successful in compliance with IMO regulations as well as boost institutional capacity to do so, all while reducing GHG emissions and ensuring proper data reporting.

To further increase institutional capacity, Panama conducted multiple personnel training workshops with its technical staff to address Annex VI SOx regulations. In 2019, in collaboration with other national maritime agencies, the AMP directed training sessions with its personnel to familiarize them with the inspection of SOx scrubbers. These sessions aimed to improve technical responses by staff to SOx scrubber compliance in order to increase efficiencies in exchanging information with shipping companies (“Personal Técnico de la AMP Se Familiariza con Equipos de Depuración de Óxido de Azufre (SOx) Scrubber | Autoridad Maritima De Panama” 2019). Other workshops directly hosted by AMP and IMO personnel focused on raising awareness of compliance options and past regulations. These workshops also introduced participants—private company representatives and public officials—to IMO regulations on technology transfer, educated national institutions on IMO frameworks, and built capacity in ports for maritime related efficiencies (Vousden 2018).

Another important outcome of these workshops, as one project official noted, was to “train the trainers.” Essentially, individuals participating in earlier training workshops went on to help train others in later activities related to these workshops. To gain insight into other effects of the program, we developed surveys and conducted interviews with in-country project officials. These surveys can be found in Appendix A. The overall goal of these training sessions was to bolster awareness and compliance with Annex VI sulfur cap standards and other IMO obligations in the public and private sectors (“Panama Canal Launches Environmental Recognition Award” 2016).

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GloMEEP spillovers to other government activities in Panama The operations of GloMEEP in Panama had several significant spillovers into other government

activities, as noted by an ex-country official who agreed to be interviewed for this report. First, GloMEEP made governing authorities aware of the need for more human capacity to strengthen institutional capacity as it relates to MARPOL and IMO regulations. This has resulted in national maritime agencies hiring and looking to recruit staff members who are knowledgeable about these obligations to ensure compliance with IMO standards. Second, GloMEEP increased awareness of similar GHG reduction projects within country governmental networks, creating information spillovers and building capacity. Panama’s Ministry of Environment has a similar emissions tracking project for terrestrial sources. AMP officials have been able to teach the tracking strategies and analysis tools learned from GloMEEP for the Ministry’s staff working on the terrestrial project. Third, GloMEEP has pressured maritime agencies to improve the calculation of ships’ GHG emissions passing the Panama Canal. In 2019, Panama upgraded its Panama Maritime Single Window Systems to optimize CO2 tracking of ships passing through the canal. This directly builds capacity in the Canal’s “La Ruta Verde” program, which is aimed at implementing projects that reduce Canal emissions. Fourth, Resolution No. 106-91 has incentivized non-Panama flag state ships to adopt GHG reduction measurements to apply for discounted enrollment as a Panamanian flag state ship. This has global effects, as it incentivizes the adoption of GHG reduction measures to prospective Panama flag state ships and lowers shipping emissions around the world. Through these measures, Panama has committed to the reduction of GHG emissions in the maritime shipping sector by building a stable and consistent framework to track them, incentivizing outside adoption of GHG reduction measures, and increasing institutional capacity (“Personal Técnico de La AMP Se Familiariza Con Equipos de Depuración de Óxido de Azufre (SOx) Scrubber | Autoridad Maritima De Panama” 2019).

Engaging the private sector through inspections and awareness In addition to training staff, Panama has been engaging private sector shipping companies to

increase collaboration, knowledge, and coordination of reducing emissions under Annex VI through workshops. Panama shipping inspectors met with the technical and operative staff of the ship Marlin Majestic to exchange information and aspects of SOx scrubbers and other equipment to increase private and public capacity to meet Annex VI standards, along with other workshops noted above focused on raising awareness and compliance of IMO regulations. Furthermore, Panama became the first South American country to formally join the GIA. This public-private partnership will be crucial to ensuring that private companies work with public entities in implementing appropriate energy efficiency measures and reducing maritime GHG emissions (“Personal Técnico de La AMP Se Familiariza Con Equipos de Depuración de Óxido de Azufre (Sox) Scrubber | Autoridad Maritima De Panama” 2019).

Impacts Beyond Argentina and Panama While our evaluation primarily investigated GloMEEP’s impacts in Panama and Argentina, we also

note that GloMEEP created multiple positive global spillover effects. These findings align with GloMEEP’s original goals in that they go beyond creating impact in individual LPCs. On a broader scale, the project aimed to act “as a catalyst that will develop a truly global partnership that spurs government action and industry innovation to accelerate and support an effective implementation of IMO MEEF” (GEF 2015). The existence of positive global spillover effects also reinforce findings from GloMEEP’s terminal evaluation, which labeled the project “highly successful” (Vousden 2018).

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GreenVoyage2050 Building on the success of GloMEEP, in 2019 the IMO launched a new project, GreenVoyage2050.

This project essentially seeks to replicate GloMEEP’s goals and activities in seven new LPCs while continuing work with four other LPCs that carry over from GloMEEP. Like GloMEEP, GreenVoyage2050 will help LPCs to develop baseline emissions assessments; develop and pass legal, institutional, and policy reforms (LPIR); and implement new and innovative solutions to improve the efficiency of cargo ships (“About the Project: GreenVoyage2050” n.d.). The project was initially funded from a 5.4 million USD grant from the government of Norway, an amount three times larger than GloMEEP’s initial 1.6 million USD grant from the GEF (although GloMEEP was later buoyed by additional co-financing). GreenVoyage2050 represents a direct spillover from GloMEEP that will reach additional LPCs and build upon the project’s global momentum. GreenVoyage2050 was originally intended to include more than 50 countries (“UN Agency Launches New Global Project to Tackle Maritime GHG Emissions” 2019), but according to interviews, this goal will probably not be reached due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Although GloMEEP lacked procedures to remove a country as a participant if their commitment lagged, GreenVoyage2050 contains such a provision.

The Global Industry Alliance Another of GloMEEP’s successes has been the formation and continued operation of the Global

Industry Alliance (GIA), a public-private partnership body that includes 14 multinational shipping companies (“GloMEEP” n.d.). The GIA remains active, with each member contributing membership fees of 20,000 USD annually, thus constituting a significant funding pool. As of 2018, the GIA had worked to (1) improve ship performance assessments, (2) develop an e-learning tool for seafarers and shore-based personnel, (3) conduct a study on “just in time” services for ports, (4) develop a guide to alternative fuels, and (5) propose an ideas generations workshop (Vousden 2018). Browsing maritime news sources, such as Safety4Sea (“Home 2021” n.d.) and MarineLink (“Maritime News, Maritime Magazine” n.d.), reveals that the GIA remains active by adding new members, starting new initiatives, and continuing work on its original goals.

The two largest shipping companies in the world, the Danish A.P. Moller - Maersk and the Swiss-Italian Mediterranean Shipping Company, are both a part of GIA, suggesting that the private-public partnership organization created by GloMEEP has important private partners. However, the next largest shipping companies in the top 10 globally are not part of GIA, including large companies like the Chinese COSCO Shipping Lines and the French CMA CGM Group (“GLOBAL INDUSTRY ALLIANCE OVERVIEW” n.d.; “The Ten Biggest Shipping Companies by TEU Capacity in 2020” 2020).

IMO toolkits Another of GloMEEP’s successes was the development of five toolkits for LPCs, which supported

the project in (1) carrying out assessments of national maritime emissions and (2) developing and implementing relevant LPIR (“GloMEEP” n.d.). These toolkits contributed significantly to GloMEEP’s positive outcomes in its LPCs and continue to be used in GreenVoyage2050 (“About the Project: GreenVoyage2050” n.d.). Beyond ongoing use by the IMO, toolkits have also helped individual countries. With toolkits under category (1), many GloMEEP LPCs implemented their first-ever efforts to collect national maritime emissions data, both allowing them to assess national emissions for the first time and acquire the capacity to conduct future emissions assessments. Under toolkit category (2), interviewees revealed that, based on GloMEEP toolkits, other countries have developed national action plans, including the United Kingdom and Norway. Furthermore, the Marine Environment Protection Committee, an IMO subset, adopted a resolution encouraging member states to develop their own national action plans. Thus, GloMEEP’s toolkits have played an integral role in building many nations’ capacities to regulate and monitor shipping emissions.

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The GloMEEP strategy of developing several toolkits focused on assessing maritime emissions, creating reduction strategies, and developing national legislation worked as useful tools for both countries we studied. These tools aim to help in the development of measurements and policy alternatives that could affect both problem and policy streams. Similar to other aspects of GloMEEP, their effect in Panama was likely more fruitful because of the commitment of diverse organizations.

Overall Evaluation: GloMEEP Achieved Its Goals Overall, we find that GloMEEP was very successful. It created outstanding impacts in Panama,

including several successful policy reforms, all of them sanctioned using institutional regulatory faculties instead of more involved legislative changes. The project also achieved sustained collaboration from international private organizations. Even in Argentina, a country that had the commitment of just one institution, GloMEEP helped generate networking between institutions and produce a maritime emissions assessment that was useful in the approval of MARPOL Annex VI. For these reasons, we suggest that the GEF consider replicating several successful methods from the project, including forming national task forces and conducting workshops.

However, the project could have achieved even bigger outcomes if it had included strategies to incorporate high-level government officials or legislators in the project implementation. This was especially important in Argentina, where new laws are required to advance maritime emissions regulation. Kingdon’s policy-making process framework (Kingdon 2003) suggests that the political world must be included to achieve legal reforms. This highlights the need to include a clear theorical policy change framework in the project design to assure that the project addresses all the components required to create policy reform.

In addition to country buy-in and legal requirements, the difference between Argentina and Panama’s outcomes can be explained by the size of the maritime sector in each country. In Panama, the maritime sector is of great importance for its economy; therefore, maritime problems are more relevant to the country authorities and maritime institutions have relatively more regulatory power and resources to accomplish their goals. Panama’s fleet size, the world’s biggest, also amplifies GloMEEP’s global impact. Any positive change in Panama’s maritime policies generates significant effects in global maritime emissions. This suggests that interventions in countries with large maritime sectors can generate more significant impacts.

The IMO team’s commitment and motivation was highlighted in all the interviews as a critical factor in project success. Its commitment was considered one of the primary factors that led to an outstanding project appraisal in GloMEEP’s terminal evaluation.

Figure 9: Factors & strategies key to GloMEEP’s success

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Task forces had divergent outcomes in these two cases To start project implementation, the GloMEEP team worked with the IMO contacts in each country

and delegated the project management for each country. One of the first steps was to develop a national task force that included all the relevant actors. However, in Argentina the task force consisted of only three members of the maritime authority, each tasked with developing a different document: a legal proposal for policy reform, a maritime emission assessment, and a national maritime energy efficiency strategy. This reduced group was a severe constraint on GloMEEP implementation and significantly limited its outcomes.

Conversely, several public and private institutions comprised Panama’s national task force. This was crucial to developing lines of communication between different organizations committed to maritime energy efficiency, building the capacity to work collaboratively, and increasing the chance of positive spillovers in other areas. Also, the inclusion of private companies encouraged the association between public and private actors. The task force collaboration among diverse institutions similarly facilitated the formation of a coalition to support the policy changes proposed by GloMEEP.

The task forces had the potential to generate multiple policy alternatives within the policy stream. Uniting different institutions under the same goal also helped create coalitions that have some power to affect the political stream. Finally, the opportunity to share information about the problem with diverse public and private institutions created awareness about the issue, moving the problem stream. In conclusion, the importance of garnering the active participation of different institutions suggests that projects should take a more active role in assuring varying group buy-in during the selection process.

Differences in developing national GloMEEP documents At the beginning of this project, each country task force was in charge of producing three

documents: a maritime emissions assessment to raise awareness about the problem, a legislative proposal to generate a concrete policy alternative, and a maritime energy efficiency strategy. To do this, the task forces relied on the methodological direction summarized by the GloMEEP toolkit guides.

Both countries made progress on generating these documents; however, the isolated Argentina task force’s work did not bear any significant fruit. The legal proposal for policy reform and the energy efficiency strategy were not implemented. But the documents—especially the maritime emissions assessment—were used in the ministry meetings regarding MARPOL Annex VI to support its ratification and likely had some impact in this process.

In Panama, a specialist was hired to develop these documents. Their work was enriched with the feedback from the different institutions in the task force. Both the policy reforms and suggested strategies garnered extended support, and significant progress was made.

This comparison shows that the creation of work documents can be very useful if there is significant country buy-in in support of their use. Otherwise, their effectiveness is very limited.

Outcome of workshops differed GloMEEP implemented workshops in both countries, generating both technical learning outcomes

and networking opportunities. Argentina’s limitations in applying the knowledge resulted from a lack of legal regulation and the task force’s lack of diversity, which limited both the application of learning and the connections among different institutions. Conversely, Panama took advantage of these workshops, translating knowledge into practices and enriching ongoing conversations between multiple institutions about maritime energy efficiency.

The workshops, focused on GHG emission assessments and policy alternatives, likely had some impact in the problem and policy streams but did not affect the political stream. Again, this strategy appears to be far more fruitful if diverse institutions work together to implement it.

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Evaluation of Future Projects

Logic model Beyond our analysis of GloMEEP’s impacts, we also suggest several methods that the GEF can

use to evaluate future policy reform projects. The first two of GloMEEP’s four goals (Appendix B) respectively pertained to LPIR and capacity building in each LPC. Many experts recognize that advocacy and capacity building projects like GloMEEP are notoriously difficult to evaluate for several reasons, including their nonlinear nature, nebulous impacts, long time horizons, contextual sensitivity, and difficulty of attributing cause and effect (Telles and Schmitt 2011; van Wessel 2018). Thus, our recommendations are informed by a literature review of professional resources on evaluation of advocacy and capacity building projects. We organize our suggested evaluation methods with a logic model, which outlines the sequential order of the project’s inputs, activities, outputs, and outcomes:

Figure 10: Proposed logic model to evaluate future GEF policy reform projects

Logic models serve several purposes, two of the most important being that they (1) clearly outline how a project is structured and (2) provide a roadmap for how to evaluate whether its goals are achieved (“James Bell Associates” 2007). GloMEEP utilized its own logic model, including its planned activities, outputs, and outcomes, which was included in its original planning document (GEF 2015, Appendix B). We incorporate these existing elements into our logic model, indicating which ones carry over from the original project proposal by using the color gray. We then inserted our own additions in blue, which we discuss one-by-one in the remainder of this section.

Outcomes: Intermediate Distinct from GloMEEP’s original logic model, our alternative model splits outcomes into multiple

sections. Based on our literature review, we suggest a new class of indicators, intermediate outcomes, which we include as a new section to our alternative logic model. Intermediate outcomes could be thought of as benchmarks that signify progress towards a project’s final goals. Given the inherent difficulty of evaluating advocacy and capacity building projects, intermediate outcomes are a useful way to document progress even when it is not clear whether a project’s ultimate goals will be conclusively achieved (“The Open University” n.d.; Telles and Schmitt 2011; World Health Organization 2008). We include examples of intermediate outcomes, such as rhetorical change, new knowledge, and network building in Appendix C.

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Outcomes: Legal, policy, and institutional reforms and capacity We place the outcomes from GloMEEP’s original logic model in the LPIR/capacity outcomes

section of our new logic model. Measuring whether LPIR are achieved is relatively straightforward; for example, implementers can simply document whether new laws or regulations are passed. For capacity building activities, however, we suggest a new tool for assessing outcomes: the organizational assessment (OA) method, in which the implementer breaks down capacity into manageable areas and assigns numerical ratings for capacity levels, possibly involving the input of relevant stakeholders in the process (Simister and Smith 2010). A more detailed overview of OA is located in Appendix D.

Outcomes: Policy implementation While GloMEEP tracked whether LPIR were adopted, it did little to assess whether they were

implemented as intended. Implementing agencies should also create strategies, most likely alongside recipient nations, to also assess whether new LPIR achieve their objectives. For example, GloMEEP’s original evaluation failed to capture a key outcome: GloMEEP spurred Panama to introduce a new regulation in 2018 requiring ships to submit documents certifying their compliance to IMO standards (“11th COOPERATION FORUM (SOMS),” n.d.). Panama then began tracking ships’ adherence to this regulation, setting a goal of 90% compliance that was quickly achieved. GloMEEP implementing agencies could have required Panama to share this and other data on LPIR implementation, then used it to strengthen their evaluation of the project.

Impact: Emissions Beyond its LPIR and capacity building goals, GloMEEP’s ultimate objective was to contribute

toward reducing GHG emissions from maritime shipping (GEF 2015). This could be evaluated with data from the IMO Ship Fuel Oil Consumption Database, established in 2018 (Vousden 2018), which contains data on individual ships’ fuel consumption and, resultingly, GHG emissions (Appendix D) (“International Maritime Organization Home Page” n.d.). While we were unable to evaluate GloMEEP’s impact on shipping emissions due to restricted data access, we recommend that implementing agencies utilize the IMO database for shipping (or other similar databases for other sectors) to evaluate the impact of future policy reform projects with a GHG emissions focus. We note that while it may sometimes be inappropriate to attribute observed reductions on GHG emissions entirely to projects, this data can still help implementers get an idea of whether the project is creating impact, develop a broader view of maritime emissions in each country, and identify how to target further interventions.

Impact: Social benefits Reducing GHG emissions will cause positive downstream impacts, such as improvements to human

health from reduced air pollution, the preservation of marine biodiversity, etc. A widely accepted method for assessing the holistic social impact of GHG emissions is via values of estimated social cost. A sample of expert estimations for the social cost of one metric ton of CO2 gives a range between 14 and 187 USD (Appendix E). Evaluators can multiply a particular social cost value by the estimated amount of GHG reduction from the project (from the previous section) to produce a monetary value of the project’s social benefits. This figure serves two purposes. First, it provides a tool for the project implementers to advocate more compellingly for the project. Second, it allows implementers to assess the cost-effectiveness of the project using cost-benefit analysis, which it can also consider alongside other factors in a regulatory impact analysis (OECD 2008).

We provide example calculations of GloMEEP’s social benefits to offer a simplistic demonstration of how this might be done; we could not conduct our own detailed analysis due to restricted access to data on maritime emissions. The GEF predicted that GloMEEP would cause a reduction of 38 million tons of

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CO2 emitted per year by 2020 if LPCs fully adhered to IMO MEEF (GEF 2015). In our example we multiply a conservative estimate of the project’s emissions impact (one tenth of this value) by low-, medium-, and high-range estimates of the social cost of carbon. Even in the low-range scenario, the project’s social benefits each year far outweigh the project’s total cost. We provide this very rough estimate largely to demonstrate why a cost-benefit analysis might be useful; a deeper analysis utilizing emissions data would be much more accurate than this example.

We note that the GEF has sparingly used a metric of social cost (mean value of just $14/metric ton of CO2) to estimate the social benefits of certain projects (“Value for Money Analysis for GEF Land Degradation Projects 2016 | GEF Independent Evaluation Office” n.d.) However we recommend that the GEF revise its previous social cost of carbon metric, as it lies far below that currently used by peer agencies. We discuss this point in greater detail in Appendix E.

Figure 11: Example range of social benefit calculations for GloMEEP

Sources: GEF 2015;Vousden 2018; Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gasses, United States Government 2021; Shindell 2015; “Value for Money Analysis for GEF Land Degradation Projects 2016 | GEF Independent Evaluation Office” n.d.

Finally, in addition to our proposed evaluation methods, we recommend that the GEF evaluate projects over a longer time period. GloMEEP’s terminal evaluation was published the same year (2018) as the project was completed (Vousden 2018). However, our analysis revealed that some of the project’s most important outcomes were produced after the terminal evaluation was published. In the future, we suggest that the GEF consider five-year project reviews to capture project impacts more comprehensively.

Recommendations and Conclusion

Five recommendations for future Global Environment Facility projects Based on our analysis of GloMEEP in Panama and Argentina, we provide five key

recommendations for the GEF to use in future policy reform projects:

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Recommendation 1: Develop more comprehensive evaluation strategies for future policy reform projects. We particularly recommend adopting and adapting our logic model, which includes:

a. Collecting baseline data to compare with project outcomes; b. Collecting data on intermediate outcomes; c. Using the organizational assessment tool to assess organizational capacity building outcomes; d. Developing a strategy, possibly alongside partner nations, to assess implementation of LPIR; e. Developing a strategy to capture data on GHG emissions in partner nations; f. Estimating the social benefits created by the project by multiplying the quantity of GHG reduced

by a value for the social cost of carbon. This figure can be used in cost-benefit analysis of the project and multi-criteria analysis; and

g. Evaluating project outcomes over longer time scales via five-year reviews.

Rationale: Overall, our analysis concurs with the conclusion from GloMEEP’s 2018 terminal evaluation that the project was very successful. However, the evaluation strategy that implementing bodies used for GloMEEP was somewhat weak, resulting in limited availability of data and thus a limited capability to understand the project's full impact. More comprehensive evaluation strategies will allow the GEF to capture projects’ impacts more completely, advocate for greater material support, and develop an understanding of where projects fall short and how they can be improved. Recommendation 2: Establish a more rigorous country selection process for future GEF projects.

a. Projects should take measures to ensure the commitment of different public and private institutions to participate in each country. This includes requiring letters of commitment from different institutions during the selection process and an early assessment of different groups’ commitment, all of which should improve country buy-in.

b. Projects with a policy reform component should be implemented in countries where the relevant sector is of great importance. This can be included as a criterion in the selection process. Rationale: The participation of diverse organizations enriches the process of developing policy

alternatives, generates support for the creation of new regulations, and increases the chances of generating spillovers for other sectors or institutions. Specifically, when the maritime sector is of great importance to the country, it is easier to create awareness of problems concerning the industry. It is also likely that these countries will have more information readily available, the relevant institutions will have relatively more resources, and it will be easier for the project to facilitate the inclusion of policies in the decision agenda.

Finally, projects are likely to generate bigger impact by intervening in countries that play a greater role in the relevant sector. In GloMEEP’s case, the successful implementation on Panama has significant global impacts because the country’s national-flagged fleet includes 17% of the world’s maritime transportation capacity (UNCTAD 2013). Recommendation 3: Apply a policy-making process framework to design project interventions and assess particular contexts in each nation. We found the framework developed by Kingdon (2003) to be particularly useful and suggest its use in future projects. Rationale: Policy making is a complex process and the use of recognized models can both guide the development of strategies to generate policy reforms and give theorical background to initiatives. In

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this case, the use of Kingdon framework would have suggested the inclusion of politicians in Argentina’s implementation of GloMEEP to facilitate policy change. Recommendation 4: Whenever possible, prioritize new in-country agencies' regulations over law changes.

Rationale: Panama was able to implement several new policies in a short period of time using

agency capacity to issue new regulations without the need to pass a new law. Conversely, Argentina’s law ratifying Annex VI required support outside GloMEEP took considerably more time to approve and has not been implemented due to the lack of specificity regarding its execution.

Recommendation 5: Utilize the successful implementation strategies from GloMEEP in future projects, including:

a. Forming and centering national task forces to develop policy alternatives and to build coalitions to support those policies;

b. Establishing early problem assessments to help bring attention to the problem using quantitative indicators;

c. Requiring the development of legal proposals for policy reforms and plans, which helped guide the country work and provided useful tools for the national task force;

d. Building relationships with engaged ministry officials; e. Allowing adaptation of the project based on country contexts; and f. Using workshops to increase country capacities through the diffusion of technical knowledge and

the development of institutional networks. Rationale: The modular project design, its flexible implementation on diverse countries, and its

successful application in Panama suggest that many of the project characteristics can be effectively replicated in other contexts.

Conclusion Our analysis of the Global Maritime Energy Efficiency Partnership (GloMEEP), conducted through

a comparative case study of two nations, Panama and Argentina, found that the project was an effective model to achieve policy change. In Panama, the project facilitated new regulations and built the capacity of relevant agencies. Outcomes in Argentina, however, were more mixed with some reported improvement in capacity levels but limited impact on the adoption of international shipping standards.

GloMEEP methodology did not include a clear theoretical framework. Our research has led us to suggest new evaluation methodologies, framed by a logic model, for the GEF’s Independent Evaluation Office to use in future evaluations. There are many lessons from this project, first among them that national characteristics can lead to different outcomes. Specifically, the importance of the targeted sector for the national economy, the country’s sociopolitical stability, and, ultimately, the institutional and personal commitments to the project can have a significant impact on project outcomes. These differences can be addressed through a more rigorous country selection process and by leveraging our suggested recommendations in future projects. Our comparative case study suggests that policy reform is more easily achieved through institutional regulations than targeting legislative changes. Capacity building activities helped institutions frame problems and develop, issue, and implement new regulations. In general, the GEF should learn from GloMEEP success and utilize its successful implementation strategies in future projects.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Results of organizational assessment surveys given to project stakeholders in Panama and Argentina

We administered organizational assessment surveys to two key project stakeholders, one each in the Panamanian and Argentinian governments. Respondents were asked to rank each capacity area from 1-10, with 1 being very poor, 5 being average, and 10 being very good. The capacity areas chosen for the survey correspond to GloMEEP’s goals (Appendix B).

Capacity Area

Panama Argentina 2015

Before GloMEEP

2018 GloMEEP Completed

2021 Present

2015 Before GloMEEP

2018 GloMEEP Completed

2021 Present

Ability to enforce shipping emissions regulations 5 9 10

1 1 5 Knowledge of international laws and regulations on shipping emissions

5 9 10

1 5 5

Ability to measure/track shipping emissions under country jurisdiction

4 8 9

5 5 5

Ability to measure/track port emissions 4 7 7

1 1 1 Resources (funding, personnel, etc.) devoted towards regulation of shipping emissions

6 10 8

1 5 5

Ability to train/build awareness among new/external stakeholders on the topic of maritime shipping emissions

5 9 10

1 5 5

Cooperation with external stakeholders surrounding regulation of maritime emissions

5 9 10

1 10 5

These results reinforce several of our findings. First, increasing capacity scores nearly across the board for both countries from 2015–18 suggest that GloMEEP succeeded in building capacity in both nations. Second, both Panama’s initial and final capacity levels were higher than Argentina’s, suggesting that the Argentinian context was more difficult and that observed final outcomes in Panama may have appeared stronger. Finally, many scores in Panama continued increasing after the project concluded, but the same was not true in Argentina, suggesting that the project’s impact may have been more sustainable in Panama. However, these results should be interpreted carefully, as they reflect the opinions of just two project stakeholders, a very small sample size. Ideally, implementers would conduct much more comprehensive organizational assessments by administering surveys to a larger sample of country government officials as well as other stakeholders such as the project implementers and independent experts (Simister and Smith 2010).

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Appendix B: GloMEEP planned outcomes, outputs, and activities

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Source: GEF 2015

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Appendix C: Example intermediate outcome indicators for advocacy and capacity building projects

Type Indicators Data Collection Methods

Enhanced Skills • New skills/knowledge acquired • New skills/knowledge applied

• Training workshop evaluations

• Follow-up surveys • Observation

Networks • New networks formed • Stronger networks • More effective network activities

• Official Documents • Interviews • Observation

Improved consensus/teamwork

• Discussion initiated • Participatory process

initiated/expanded • Consensus reached • Collaboration improved

• Meeting minutes • Interviews • Observation

Policy agendas • Changes in oral or written rhetoric • New items appear in political

discussions • Issue is framed in new ways within

political discussions • Media coverage of issue

• Meeting/discussions agendas & minutes

• Observation

Key policy maker attitudes

• Key policy makers change public/private rhetoric

• Key policy makers change knowledge, attitudes, or behaviors

• Meeting/discussion agendas & minutes

• Interviews • Observation

Sources: Otoo et Al2009, 18.; “The Open University” n.d. For policy reform projects, the causal impact of project activities (i.e., workshops held, toolkits distributed) and outcomes (i.e., new policies adopted) is rarely straightforward, and the process can often take several years. Data on intermediate outcomes can help bridge this gap by capturing project activities’ more immediate impacts. In the rightmost column, we provide suggestions for methods that evaluators could use to collect intermediate outcome data. While “hard” methods such as workshop evaluations and meeting agendas may work for some indicators, others may require the use of “soft” qualitative methods such as relying on evaluators’ observations of how key stakeholders’ attitudes and rhetoric change during the project.

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Appendix D: Organizational assessment tool Used to assess capacity building outcomes.

Step Action Methodologies

1 Divide capacity into discrete areas i.e. internal management, human resources

• Match capacity areas with project goals • Utilize ideas from participants/stakeholders

2 Develop a ratings system • Likert scales (i.e. a range between 1-10) • Pre-defined ranks such as “satisfactory,”

“needs some improvement,” and “needs significant improvement”

3 Determine a process for rating capacity

• Decide whether to self-evaluate, or solicit opinions from other stakeholders like participants, partners, and policy experts

• Use surveys • Hold participatory meetings where the group

reaches a consensus Source: Simister and Smith 2010

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Appendix E: Sample of GHG shadow prices

Source Discount Rate Data in year Value (%) ($, 2020

per metric ton)

GEF IEO (2016) N/A 2014 14

Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gasses, United States

Government (2021)

2.5 2020 76

3 51

5 14

Shindell (2015) 1.4 2007 187

3 105

5 34

Sources: “Value for Money Analysis for GEF Land Degradation Projects 2016 | GEF Independent Evaluation Office” n.d.; Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gasses, United States Government 2021; Shindell 2015 Valuations of the social cost of GHG emissions vary significantly based on researchers’ methodologies and assumptions. With this table, we display a small sample of different estimations for the social cost of a metric ton of CO2 emitted. The IEO’s number, produced in 2016, is a self-proclaimed “conservative estimate” based on the mean value of metrics “drawn from 8,094 instances of reported carbon valuation,” from “official reports...academic articles, and...private-sector valuations” (“Value for Money Analysis for GEF Land Degradation Projects 2016 | GEF Independent Evaluation Office” n.d.). Meanwhile, under President Biden, the United States government recently approved an upward revision of the social cost of carbon to new temporary marks that will be further amended in 2022 in line with “recent developments in...science and economics” (Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Greenhouse Gasses, United States Government 2021). Shindell is one of many scientists who have produced much more aggressive estimates of the social cost of carbon (Shindell 2015). We recommend that the GEF consider updating its functional value for the social cost of carbon, as its previous estimate has not been revised in several years and now lies below that currently used by many other organizations and researchers. We also recommend that the GEF look for ways to utilize this metric more actively, as it can be a powerful tool to advocate more convincingly for both the cost-effectiveness and tremendous social benefits that its projects produce. The annual inflation statistics used to calculate present value of dollars is from the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (“CPI Inflation Calculator” n.d.).

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