33158740 Research Project BSc

Scientists Versus Non-Scientists: The Role of Autistic Traits in Autobiographical Memory

Recall in the Typical Population.

33158740

Goldsmiths, University of London

Supervisor: Dr Lorna Goddard

2nd April 2012

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of a BSc in Psychology.

PS53012A: RESEARCH PROJECT SCIENTISTS VERSUS NON-SCIENTISTS: THE ROLE OF AUTISTIC TRAITS IN 33158740 AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY RECALL IN THE TYPICAL POPULATION. APRIL 2012

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Abstract

Previous research has indicated that individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) have a reduced

capacity for episodic memory. This deficit is thought to be linked to the perspective used when recalling

autobiographical memories. Separate research has also suggested that different levels of autistic traits are

often more prevalent in individuals who study science as compared to individuals who study other subjects

such as humanities. This present study primarily aimed to investigate the effect of autistic traits in the typical

population, on the perspective used during recall of personal memories, between a group of scientists and a

group of ‘non-scientists’. Data from 32 participants were collected and analysed for the purpose of this study.

Participants were required to fill in the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) to assess levels of autistic traits; the

Twenty Statements Test (TST) to assess self-concept and also take part in a Memory interview in which they

were required to recall 5 memories and answer certain questions about these memories. It was hypothesised

that individuals with higher levels of autistic traits (i.e. a higher AQ score) would be more likely to employ an

observer (third person) perspective when recalling memories. It was also predicted that participants in the

scientist category would be more likely to obtain higher scores on the AQ. The analyses revealed a mixture of

support for the predictions and non-significant results.

Introduction

Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a widely documented disorder, with many known deficits which

are mostly linked to communication and social problems (Baron-Cohen, 2008). Research has previously

indicated that Individuals with ASD have a reduced capacity for episodic memory (Lind & Bowler, 2010). Lind &

Bowler (2010) stated that if individuals with ASD did suffer from a poorer ability for episodic memory, it would

be expected that these individuals would also have difficulty recalling memories and re-experiencing these

memories mentally. In order for efficient re-experience or recall of memories, it is thought that a particular

type of self-consciousness, called autonoetic awareness, is necessary. Autonoetic awareness refers to the

ability to be aware of states of the self at various different time periods, i.e. past, present and future, which

allows memories to be re-experienced by the individual. This type of self-awareness is considered to be the

main trait of episodic memory function (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997; in Lind & Bowler, 2010). Individuals

with autism have been consistently shown to have a reduced ability to recall autobiographical (personal)


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memories (Crane & Goddard, 2008) which is considered to be one component of episodic memory, despite an

intact capacity for semantic memories (Lind & Bowler, 2010). Individuals with ASD have also been directly

measured on their ability for autonoetic awareness during a task which required recognising memories, and

were found to be less likely to use this mechanism during such a task (Bowler, Gardiner & Gaigg, 2007).

Boucher (2007) suggested that the worsened ability for episodic memory in autistic individuals may likely be

due to an underlying executive problem which results in a poorer capacity for retrieving any stored

information. In their study, Lind & Bowler (2010) required participants to recall and relay specific memories

from seven different, specified time periods and were then required to answer a certain set of questions about

these memories. Participants were also required to do the same thing for imaginations about future

possibilities (Lind & Bowler, 2010). Lind & Bowler (2010) conducted their study with typical participants,

individuals with autism and individuals with other psychiatric illness. It has also be reported that individuals

with autism take significantly more time to access specific autobiographical memories – which comprise

events and information regarding the self (Crane, Goddard & Pring, 2010).

This ability to recall autobiographical memories, i.e. executive functioning, has also been significantly

linked with the number and intensity of positive and negative emotions which are recalled (Leist, Ferring &

Filipp, 2010). Similarly, emotionality of recalled memories has been linked to the perspective used to recall

these memories (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). The researchers found that an observer perspective was linked with

diminished emotionality and feelings of reliving of the memories both for memory recall from a natural and

forced observer perspective (Berntsen & Rubin, 2006). This may indicate therefore that individuals with autism

would be likely to recall memories from a less emotional stance as well as having less feelings of re-

experiencing the memory.

Autism has also been linked to a poorer self-concept, or awareness of the self. Toichi and colleagues

(2002) measured self-consciousness in autistic individuals compared with typical individuals. In this

experiment, all participants were required to answer questions which were designed to provoke one of three

different types of processing: phonological, semantic, and self-referent. This study revealed an apparent deficit

in individuals with autism for self-awareness. Toichi et al. (2002) found that individuals with autism behaved in

ways which were symptomatic of a deficit in self-concept, for example, talking about oneself in third person.


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These kinds of deficits have been found by many behavioural studies, also (Toichi et al., 2002). It was

suggested that such impairments in self-consciousness from a young age may lead to an underdeveloped self-

concept, and these impairments may underlie the common trait in autism of reversing pronouns, which, to be

used properly, require an understanding of the self and others (Toichi et al., 2002). One useful and efficient

tool for measuring self-concept in adults in the typical population is the Twenty Statements Test (Kuhn &

McPartland, 1954). The TST is a short questionnaire which requires the individual to provide up to 20

responses to the question “Who am I?” (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954). In 1960, Kuhn developed the idea that

responses on the TST can be categorised into the five different categories as follows: social groups and

classifications; ideological beliefs; interests; ambitions; and self-evaluations. The TST is thus a useful tool for

uncovering spontaneous beliefs about the self (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954).

In 2002, Libby & Eibach investigated the ways in which current self-concept affected the way in which

individuals recalled their memories. The researchers discovered that memories could be recalled from either a

third-person (observer) perspective or a first-person (field) perspective, and the perspective used fluctuated

depending on what the recalled memory was. Participants were found to be more likely to use an observer

perspective when they recalled memories which they believed to be discrepant from their present self-

concept. The use of an observer perspective in recalling such memories which are not congruent with the

present self is thought to be linked to the lack of consistency between the past and present selves (Libby &

Eibach, 2002). In line with Toichi et al.’s (2002) study which indicated a lack of self-concept in individuals with

autism, perhaps Libby & Eibach’s (2002) hypothesis for an inconsistency between the present and previous

selves is the common underlying mechanism for the two studies, which provoked the use of an observer

perspective in autobiographical memory recall rather than a field perspective.

The Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) is a 50-item questionnaire designed to assess autistic traits in

individuals with typical intelligence (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). In this report, Baron-Cohen and colleagues

assessed the effectiveness of the AQ between various groups of people, including ‘scientists’ and ‘non-

scientists’. Participants were labelled as ‘scientists’ if they studied the following subjects: physical sciences,

biological sciences, mathematics, computer sciences, engineering, and nonspecific science. On the other hand,

participants were called ‘non-scientists’ if they studied: humanities, languages, geography, history, economics,


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political sciences, social sciences, law, and so on. The results of this report showed that scientists scored

higher, on average, on the AQ than non-scientists, with maths students scoring particularly high even within

the scientist condition (Baron-Cohen, 2001). In this particular report, the agreed cut-off point on the AQ which

indicated that a diagnosis of autism might be called for if the individual obtained a higher score was 32/50.

This cut-off was, however, contested in a later report, which indicated that actually a score of 26 was a better

cut-off point for investigation into further testing (Woodbury, Robinson, Wheelwright & Baron-Cohen, 2005).

The idea of this study was therefore, to investigate whether these such findings for clinical samples of

individuals with ASD are also relevant to typical individuals with varying levels of autistic traits, as measured by

the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ). On top of this, the aim was to apply the results of Baron-Cohen and

colleague’s (2001) study, which showed a differentiation in levels of autistic traits between scientists and non-

scientists, to this research with typical individuals. This current study also aims to address the issue of a

missing connection between the present self and the past self in autism which leads to the use of an observer

perspective in memory recall (Toichi et al., 2002); a mechanism which also appears to be present in people

who feel disconnected from a memory of their former self (Libby & Eibach, 2002).

Prediction/Hypotheses

1) Individuals who score highly on the AQ will be more likely to employ an observer perspective during

autobiographical memory recall, and therefore less likely to use a field perspective;

2) Individuals in the Scientist category will, on average, score higher on the AQ as compared to the Non-

scientist category;

3) Participants with higher scores on the AQ will provide fewer responses on the TST, i.e., have a poorer

self-concept;

4) Individuals with a low score on the AQ will be able to:

a. maintain change of perspective for a longer period of time at time-2;

b. have greater feelings of reliving the memory at time-1; and

c. find it easier to change/modify their perspective at time-2.


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Method

Design

This experiment used a between-participant (or independent samples) design as participants were

either placed in the ‘scientist’ or ‘non-scientist’ category according to the information each participant

provided regarding their field of study/expertise. Participants were also later separated into only one of the

two levels of AQ group as well (High/Low). Participants in both the scientist and non-scientist groups were

required to complete the AQ and the TST as well as take part in both parts of the memory task/interview: part

one (time-1) required participants to recall five different personal memories from five time periods which were

specified by the researcher. In the second part of the memory task (time-2) the participant had to either

change or enhance the perspective they used to recall two of the original five memories (as chosen by the

researcher).

The first independent variable of this study was the participant’s score on the AQ (AQ Group).

Participants were divided into two groups: high and low, depending on the score they obtained on the AQ.

Participants with a score of 17 or below were put in the low group and participants with scores of 18 and

above were placed in the high group. Therefore, this independent variable had two levels: 1) high and 2) low.

The second independent variable was subject group, which had two levels: 1) scientist and 2) non-scientist.

Participants were allocated to the appropriate group according to the information they provided on their

demographics form regarding their field of study/expertise. Participants were placed in the scientist or non-

scientist categories according to Baron-Cohen and colleagues (2001) classifications.

The dependent variables of this study were as follows: 1) perspective used when recalling the

autobiographical memories (observer/field); 2) emotionality; 3) feelings of reliving the memory; 4)

participants’ score on the TST; 5) length of perspective change at time-2; and 6) ease of perspective change at

time-2.

This experiment required the use of a between-participants design – as opposed to a within-

participants (or repeated measures) design – because the aim of the study was to investigate the differences in

levels of autistic traits and visual perspectives employed in memory recall, between scientists and non-


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scientists. Therefore, samples of both scientists and non-scientists were required, thus participants were only

allocated to one level of the grouping variable (scientist/non-scientist). However, a matched-pairs design could

have alternatively been used for better comparisons, for example if participants were matched on age and

gender, and differed only on scientist/non-scientist category, this may have allowed for better comparisons to

be made.

Participants

The participants recruited for this research included 32 males (n=17) and females (n=15) who were

placed in one of two categories: scientists (n=15) and non-scientists (n=17). Participants were aged between

19 and 61 years old (mean = 23.14 years). The participants were recruited via opportunity sampling and were

required to give information about their field of study/expertise (e.g. maths, psychology, etc.). Participants

were also asked for information regarding their age and gender, but information about participants’ ethnicity

or nationality was not collected.

Materials/Stimuli

Consent was obtained in written form, and debrief was given both in a written format and verbally.

The materials used in this experiment consisted of: a demographics form, which was used in order to acquire/

information about the category in which the participant would be placed (scientist/non-scientist); the Twenty

Statements Test (TST; Kuhn & McPartland, 1954), which was used to gather information about the

participant’s self-concept; the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001): used to assess the

individual’s level of autistic traits; and two items which were taken from the Memory Characteristics

Questionnaire (MCQ; Johnson, Foley, Suengras & Raye, 1998; in Lind & Bowler, 2010) which were concerned

with the perspective the participant employed during memory recall (either field or observer). The participants

were asked to fill in the demographics form, AQ and TST independently. In the memory task/interview,

however, the researcher noted down the participants’ responses to questions and the participant was not

required to record anything for that portion of the experiment.


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Scoring the Twenty Statements Test

The TST (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954) was administered following completion of the demographics

form. The Twenty Statements Test was given to participants in order to gather a measure of their self-concept.

Participants were told to provide as many responses as possible – with a maximum of twenty – to the question

“Who am I?”. Participants were instructed to provide their responses as if they were giving the answers to

themselves and not to somebody else. It was also made aware that the order or logic of their responses was

not important and participants should record their responses in the order that they occurred to them (Kuhn &

McPartland, 1954). It has been proposed that the TST is a better method for obtaining spontaneous

statements of self-concept and that this measure allows for a more inclusive evaluation of a person’s attitudes

and identity awareness (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954). Participant data for the TST were scored according to

placing their responses in one of the following five categories:

1) social groups and classifications [TST 1] e.g. ‘I am a psychologist’;

2) ideological beliefs [TST 2] e.g. ‘I am a Christian’;

3) interests [TST 3] e.g. ‘I am interested in music’;

4) ambitions [TST 4] e.g. ‘I am determined to become a painter’; and

5) self-evaluations [TST 5] e.g. ‘I am generous’, as suggested by Kuhn (1960).

Participants were given five separate scores according to the number of responses they provided for

each of the five categories as well as a score of the number of responses they provided in total.

Scoring the AQ

The Adult version of the AQ, which was administered to all participants, is a 50-item questionnaire

designed to assess individuals with normal intelligence as to where they lie on the autism spectrum (Baron-

Cohen et al., 2001). The AQ consists of ten questions for each of the following five categories: social skill;

attention switching; attention to detail; communication; and imagination. Participants may score either a ‘1’ or

a ‘0’ on each of the 50 items, and for each question participants can answer with any of the following

responses: “definitely agree”; “slightly agree”; “slightly disagree”; or “definitely disagree”. The AQ was

designed so that roughly half of the items provoke a “disagree” response, and vice versa, in a high scoring


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person with high functioning autism/Asperger’s syndrome (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). On 25 of the items, a

response of “slightly agree” or “definitely agree” score 1 point and on the remaining 25, a response of “slightly

disagree” or “definitely disagree” score 1 point, with the opposite responses scoring a 0 (Baron-Cohen et al.,

2001). In this current study participants were allowed to omit any questions they did not feel comfortable

responding to.

Memory Interview part 1 & 2 scoring

Part 1 of the memory interview/task (time-1) followed the AQ, and this required participants from

both conditions to recall five autobiographical memories from the following five time periods: 1) a week ago;

2) a month ago; 3) a year ago; 4) five years ago; and 5) ten years ago (Lind & Bowler, 2010). These time periods

were presented in a different random order for each of the participants, and each was presented one at a time

so participants were only asked to recall one memory at a time. Participants were instructed to allocate a cue

word to each memory in order to make it easier for the participants to recall exactly the same memory at

time-2 if required. Following time-1, there was a second part to the memory interview (time-2) in which the

researcher chose two of the original five memories from time-1, via the cue words, for the participants to

again answer questions about. At both time-1 and time-2 participants were asked to rate emotionality, in

terms of both intensity and positivity/negativity. Participants were asked to score emotionality using a 7 point

Likert scale ranging from -3 (very negative) to 0 (not emotional) to +3 (very positive). Participants were also

asked to answer the following items which have been taken from the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire

(MCQ; Johnson et al., 1988; in Lind & Bowler, 2010) at both time-1 and time-2:

1. While remembering this event, I feel as though I am reliving it ( 1 = not at all, 7 = completely)

2. When you remember this event, how do you see it? From the following options, choose the one

that corresponds to your memory.

a. In your memory, you see the scene in the same way as an external observer would see

it. In other words, you can see yourself in your memory as well as other aspects of the

situation. (observer perspective)


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b. In your memory, you see the scene from your own point of view and not from that of an

external observer. In other words, you see the scene through your own eyes. (field

perspective)

c. Neither of these above mentioned perspectives corresponds to your memory of the

event. If this is the case, how would you describe your memory?

At time-2 participants were also required to respond to the questions concerning how easy it was to

change their perspective of their memories and how long they could maintain this change of perspective. Both

of these questions were scored in the same fashion as question (1) of the MCQ; on a Likert scale with 1 = not

at all, and 7 = completely.

All scores and ratings were recorded by the researcher and stated verbally by the participants.

Key terms of the memory interview which were defined to the participant are: observer perspective (someone

else’s point of view), field perspective (through your own eyes), autobiographical (personal) memory, and

specific memory (i.e. a memory which was not recurring, and only happened at one particular time).

Procedure

First of all, participants were recruited via opportunity sampling, and were invited to take part in the

current study. All participants were tested on an individual basis to ensure complete confidentiality of their

data. Each participant was welcomed and was given a brief explanation of what the research would entail.

Participants were told that they would be required to fill in three separate forms (demographics, AQ and TST)

and then would be asked to participate in a memory interview. Participants were all warned that the AQ,

whilst being one part of a battery of tests used to make a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorders (ASD), it was

not a sufficient tool for diagnosing autism when used alone, and should they be worried about completing the

form or their score on the AQ, they would be provided with contact information for support and information

about ASD during the debrief stage. Participants were then provided with the relevant forms for the

experiment beginning with the consent form. Each participant was advised and encouraged to read the

consent form thoroughly before deciding whether to continue with the experiment; they were also asked to

sign and date the form should they agree to continue. In addition, participants were assured that should they


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decide to continue with the experiment, their data would be treated with complete confidentiality and their

names would not appear on their questionnaires and forms; instead, all data would be labelled as “Participant

1, Participant 2, etc.”. The researcher also made aware that should they decide to cease their participation in

the experiment, their data would be disposed of and would not be used to contribute to the findings of the

research. Following the signing of the consent form, participants were provided with the demographics form

which specified the required information (field of study/expertise). Next, participants were asked to complete

the TST; they were informed that they should provide as many responses as they could to the question “Who

Am I?” with a maximum of twenty statements. Participants were instructed to respond to this question as if

they were answering to themselves and not to anybody else. Upon completion of the TST, the AQ was

administered and participants were asked to attempt to answer all 50 items of the questionnaire but they

were allowed to omit any questions that they did not feel comfortable answering. When the AQ was

completed to the participant’s satisfaction, the researcher spent a short while explaining the procedure of the

following memory interview as well as the key terms relevant to the memory interview. Participants were told

that in the first part (time-1) of the interview they would need to recall five specific, autobiographical

memories, from five different time periods, as specified by the researcher, about which they would be asked a

number of questions. Participants were informed that they were not required to provide a description of any

of their memories but were asked to answer a certain set of questions .Following this initial part of the

memory interview, participants were informed that they would be required to answer several further

questions about two of the original five memories (time-2) – these two memories were chosen by the

researcher. The researcher informed participants that they would be asked to recall these two chosen

memories again at time-2 but this time they would have to modify their perspective during memory recall. The

way in which participants were to modify their perspective depended on their perspective of the two chosen

memories at time-1 – if they initially viewed the two memories from an observer perspective, they were

instructed to change their perspective to field at time-2; however, if they originally recalled the two memories

from a field perspective, they were instructed to really enhance their field perspective at time-2. The

memories chosen by the researcher at time-2 were made easily identifiable for the participant by the

allocation of different specific cue words for each memory by the participant at time-1. The researcher made it

aware that the participants would not have to divulge any intimate or detailed information about their


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memories; they were required only to answer questions regarding emotionality, perspective, and feelings of

reliving the memory during time-1 of the memory task, and at time-2 the questions were concerned with

emotionality; how easily they could change their perspective of the memory; and how long they could do this

for. Once the memory interview was complete, the participant was thanked for their participation and was

fully debriefed on the aims and hypotheses of the experiment, and was given a written debrief form. Once the

data for all participants were collected, they were analysed.

Results

The data for all 32 participants were collected and analysed, first of all to provide some descriptive

statistics. The descriptive statistics for all participants of the study are displayed clearly in Table 1 below, and

the means and standard deviations for a variety of variables are provided for both levels of the AQ Groups

(High and Low) in Table 2. Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations of the variables measured in the

experiment for both levels of Subject group: Scientist and Non-scientist. Initially, the participants were going to

be split only depending on the Subject group (Scientist/Non-scientist) that they were allocated to according to

their field of study/expertise obtained from their demographics form. However, following analysis for

descriptive statistics between Subject groups, participants were then separated according to the score they

obtained on the AQ; a median split was performed on the data collected from all participants and then the

participants were split into two groups (AQ group: High & Low) based on which side of the median their score

fell. Descriptive statistics were also run on both AQ groups and a number of other analyses followed.

Table 1: Minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation values for all participants (n=32).

VARIABLE MINIMUM MAXIMUM MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION

AQ score 10 24 17.44 2.687

Number of responses given on TST 8 20 16.47 3.027

Number of memories recalled at time-1 3 5 4.84 .448

Percentage of observer memories at time-1 0 100 43.75 35.988

Percentage of observer memories at time-1 0 100 56.25 35.988


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Table 2, Mean and Standard Deviation values for participants in levels of the AQ Group (High & Low)

Table 2 above displays the means and standard deviations for some of the variables which were

measured in the experiment for both levels of the AQ Group: High and Low. From the descriptive statistics

provided in Table 2, it seems that participants in the two levels of AQ group differed on the following things:

responses in TST 1 and TST 5 and the percentage of field/observer memories they recalled. Participants in the

High group (M = 6.20, S.D = 1.656) appear to have responded with more statements to TST 1 than participants

in the Low group (M = 5.06, S.D = 2.331). In contrast, participants in the Low condition (M = 8.94, S.D = 2.883)

AQ GROUP

HIGH

N = 15

VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION

AQ Score 19.53 1.807

Number of TST responses 16.20 3.707

Number of memories recalled 4.67 .617

Number of responses: TST 1 6.20 1.656

Number of responses: TST 2 .93 .961




Percentage of field memories 65.33 33.989

Percentage of observer memories 34.67 33.989

Feelings of reliving the memory 4.307 1.4616

LOW

N = 17

AQ score 15.59 1.839








Percentage of field memories 48.24 36.782

Percentage of observer memories 51.76 36.782



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gave more responses in the TST 5 category than participants in the High condition (M = 6.93, S.D = 3.348).

Table 2 also reveals that on average, participants in the High condition (M = 65.33, S.D = 33.989) recalled more

memories from a field perspective than participants in the Low condition (M = 48.24, S.D = 36.782) therefore

participants in High condition (M = 34.67, S.D = 33.989) also recalled less memories from an observer

perspective than participants in the Low condition (M = 51.76, S.D = 36.782).


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Table 3: Mean and standard deviation values for Subject Group: Scientist and Non-scientist

SUBJECT GROUP VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION

SCIENTIST

N = 15

AQ score 18.80 2.396








Percentage of field memories at time-1 58.67 37.960

Percentage of observer memories at time-1 41.33 37.960

Change in emotion from time-1 to time-2 -.133 .7432

Ease of perspective change from time-1 to time-2 4.033 1.1872

Length of perspective change from time-1 to time-2 3.900 1.6605


NON-SCIENTIST

N = 17

AQ score 16.24 2.386






Number of responses: TST 4 .88 1.054


Percentage of field memories at time-1 54.12 35.189

Percentage of observer memories at time-1 45.88 35.189

Change in emotion from time-1 to time-2 .294 .7717

Ease of perspective change from time-1 to time-2 3.529 1.7453

Length of perspective change from time-1 to time-2 3.382 1.3639



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Key for Tables 2 & 3:

TST 1 = Social groups and classifications

TST 2 = Ideological beliefs

TST 3 = Interests

TST 4 = Ambitions

TST 5 = Self evaluations

One of the predictions made prior to this experiment was as follows: participants in the scientist

condition would be more likely to obtain higher scores on the AQ. As shown in Table 3 above, this prediction

was supported by the results of this experiment; the average score on the AQ for participants in the scientist

condition (M = 18.80, S.D = 2.396) was, not hugely, but significantly higher than the average AQ score of

participants in the non-scientists condition (M = 16.24, S.D = 2.386). Similarly, the descriptive statistics also

picked up on a difference between the two groups on the number of responses provided on the TST in

category number 5 (Self-evaluations). The average number of self-evaluation responses provided by scientists

(M = 6.87, S.D = 3.114) was, again not largely, but significantly lower than the average number of self-

evaluation responses given by non-scientists (M = 9.00, S.D = 3.062). There also seems to be a slight

discrepancy between the group subject groups regarding the percentage of field memories which were

recalled at time-1 of the memory task, with scientists (M = 58.67, S.D = 37.960) recalling a slightly higher

percentage of memories from a field perspective than non-scientists (M = 54.12, S.D = 35.189). Scientists (M =

-.133, S.D = .7432) also appear to have shown more negative emotionality between time-1 and time-2 recall of

the two memories which were chosen by the researcher, compared to non-scientists (M = .294, S.D = .7717)

who showed a positive emotionality change; non-scientists showed more change on average in emotion

between time-1 and time-2. There seems to have been very little difference between the remaining variables

however, for example there was not much discrepancy in ratings of feelings of reliving the memory between

scientists (M = 4.08, S.D = 1.4693) and non-scientists (M = 4.024, S.D = 1.3836).

Following the descriptive statistics, further analyses were run to discover if there were any interactions

and effects of the data collected. Most of these analyses were run using the AQ Groups (High & Low) rather than

the Subject Groups (Scientist & Non-scientist) as the difference between the two levels of the Subject Group,


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despite being significant, was not very big. The first of these analyses was the only one to be run using Subject

Group and was an independent t-test in which the grouping variable (Subject Group) was measured against all

variables listed in Table 3. The independent t-test revealed that there was a significant difference between

conditions, with equality of variance not assumed, for AQ score (t = 3.028, df = 29.471, p < .003, one tailed) with

scientists (M = 18.80, S.D = 2.396) scoring higher than non-scientists (M = 16.24, S.D = 2.386). There was also a

significant difference between scientists (M = 6.87, S.D = 3.114) and non-scientists (M = 9.00, S.D = 3.062) on the

number of responses given for TST category number 5 (t = 1.949, df = 29.372, p < .031, one tailed); equality of

variances was not assumed.

A second independent t=test was run to establish any differences between levels (conditions) of AQ

group (High & Low) on the percentage of memories recalled at time-1 from a field perspective. The analysis

revealed no significant difference between groups on the percentage of memories recalled from a field

perspective (t = 1.359, df = 30, p = .092, one tailed): high (M = 65.33, S.D = 33.989); low (M = 48.24, S.D = 36.782).

This independent t-test therefore did not support the prediction that participants who scored higher on the AQ

would recall significantly less memories from a field perspective; the mean values alone actually indicate the

opposite effect.

The next analysis that was conducted was a two-way repeated measures 2 x 5 ANOVA. The first factor

was AQ group with two levels: High and Low; and the second factor was TST category, with five levels: TST 1

(social groups and classifications); TST 2 (ideological beliefs); TST 3 (interests); TST 4 (ambitions) and TST 5 (self

evaluations). The analyses revealed a significant interaction between AQ Group and TST category: F(4, 120) =

2.504, p = .046, partial 2 = .077. The main effect of TST category was also significant: F(4, 120) = 78.707, p = .000,

partial 2 = .724. To discover where this significant interaction occurred, post hoc independent t-tests were run.

An independent t-test was conducted on AQ group (high/low) and all TST categories with a particular focus on

TST 1 (Social groups and classifications) and TST 5 (Self-evaluations) as these two categories of the TST were

shown to have the greatest mean values and discrepancies in means between the high and low conditions. the

independent t-test revealed no significant differences between the two levels of the AQ group for any of the TST

categories at the two-tailed level. However, if there were a one-tailed hypothesis for AQ group and TST 5, there

would have been a significant difference between groups on TST category 5 (t = -1.823, df = 30, p = .039, one


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tailed) with the high group (M = 6.93, S.D = 3.348) providing less responses than the low group (M = 8.94, S.D =

2.883).

The next analysis conducted was a two-way repeated measures 2 x 2 ANOVA. The first factor was AQ

group, with two levels: High and Low, and the second factor was Emotion, also with two levels: time-1 and time-

2. This analysis revealed no significant interaction between emotion and AQ group: F(1, 30) = .007, p = .934,

partial 2 = .000. The analysis did however, pick up on a very strong trend between levels of the AQ group (F(1,

30) = 4.078, p = .052, partial 2 = .120), with the low group (M = .794) reporting significantly more intense and

more positive emotionality for the two chosen memories than the high group (M = -.300). An independent t-test

followed, which was used to indicate any differences between AQ groups on emotion, ease of perspective

change, length of perspective change and feelings of reliving the memory. This independent t-test revealed no

significant differences between levels of the AQ group for emotion, ease of perspective change or feelings of

reliving but there was a significant difference between groups on the length of perspective change (t = 2.285, df =

30, p = .015, one tailed) with the high group (M = 4.233, S.D = 1.2373) scoring higher than the low group (M =

3.088, S.D = 1.5536) which is the opposite to what was predicted.

A bivariate correlation was run on two of the TST variables: TST 1 and TST 5, with the percentage of

memories which were recalled from a field perspective in order to discover if there were any relationships

between the variables. The analysis revealed no significant correlation between percentage of field memories

and self-evaluations (TST 5) nor with percentage of field memories and social groups and classifications (TST 1)

but there was a significant negative correlation between TST 1 and TST 5 (r = -.378, N = 32, p = .033, two tailed).

The penultimate test conducted was a bivariate correlation between subject group (scientist & non-

scientist) and AQ group (high & low) to establish whether this study supported the prediction that participants in

the scientist group would score higher on the AQ than participants in the non-scientists group. The bivariate

correlation revealed a significant negative correlation between AQ group and subject group: r = -.484, N = 32, p <

.002, one-tailed).

Finally, a chi-square test was conducted on AQ group and subject group which indicated a significant

relationship between AQ group and subject group (χ2 (1, N = 32) = 7.937, p < .002, one tailed) with the scientist


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condition (High N = 4, Low N =13) containing more high scorers and the non-scientist condition (High N = 11, Low

N = 4) consisting of more low scorers on the AQ. The results from the chi-square test are displayed visually in the

graph below.

Figure 1, The number of high and low scorers in both levels of subject group (scientist & non-scientist)

Discussion

This study was carried out to discover the role of autistic traits in autobiographical memory recall in

members of the typical population. A number of predictions were made prior to the investigation: 1)

Individuals who score highly on the AQ will be more likely to employ an observer perspective during

autobiographical memory recall; 2) Individuals in the Scientist category will, on average, score higher on the

AQ as compared to the Non-scientist category; 3) Participants with higher scores on the AQ will provide fewer


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responses on the TST, i.e., have a poorer self-concept; 4) Individuals with a low score on the AQ will be able to:

a) maintain change of perspective for a longer period of time at time-2; b) have greater feelings of reliving the

memory at time-1; and c) find it easier to change their perspective at time-1. Unfortunately, the analyses

revealed that the data were not in line with the first prediction that was made, the mean values alone indicate

the opposite effect in fact, however the analysis that was conducted showed no differences between groups,

so the first prediction was not supported by the data of this experiment. Conversely, the second prediction

was supported by this experiment, with significantly more high scorers on the AQ in the scientist condition and

more low scorers in the non-scientist condition. The third prediction which was made prior to this

investigation was that participants with lower scores on the AQ would have a poorer self-concept and this

would be shown in their TST scores. This was supported by the analyses, one of which found a significant

interaction between the TST categories and the AQ groups. Interestingly, participants in the high group were

found to provide more responses which fell into the TST 1 category (social groups and classifications) whereas

participants in the low group offered more statements concerned with TST 5 (self-evaluations). This could

perhaps be interpreted as support for the prediction that participants who scored more highly on the AQ

might have a poorer self-concept than participants with a lower AQ score. This is possible as the high

condition, on average, provided more information about the social groups and classifications they felt to be a

part of, which are perhaps more external and detached descriptions of themselves when compared with the

self-evaluative responses which were more commonly reported by the participants who had lower scores on

the AQ. There were no significant differences between the high and low groups on any of the other three

categories of the TST however (TST 2, 3 & 4). It was also found that this experiment provided no support for

the prediction that participants in the low condition would experience more intense emotions at time-2., nor

was there support for the prediction of a better performance from low scorers on the ease of perspective

change at time-2 of the memory experiment or for feelings of reliving the memory at time-1. The data did

however show the opposite effect of what was predicted for differences between groups of the length of

perspective change at time-2, with the high group maintaining their perspective change, on average, for a

longer amount of time than the low group. This current study therefore seems to have a provided a mix of

support for predictions and hypotheses as well as some non-significant results.


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It is possible that a lot of the non-significant results were due to limitations such as population sample

size, as unfortunately there was a rather small sample size for this study, of only 32 participants. It was also

only an opportunistic sample of participants. Should this experiment be re-created at all, it would be highly

beneficial to recruit a larger sample size to gather data from a greater number of individuals to increase

reliability and validity of results. It could also be interesting to re-create this experiment with more stringent

criteria for participant recruitment, for example instead of simply testing a group of “scientists” against a

group of “non-scientists”, it could be informative to instead recruit only mathematicians and psychologists for

example, and study the differences between people from just these two subjects.

Possible extraneous variables which could have been limitations to the study were things such as the

environment in which participants took part in the experiment. Participants were not all tested in the same

environment therefore each participant may have been subject to different confounding variables such as

comfort, room temperature, background noises, etc. An improvement upon this methodology would be to

ensure that all participants are tested in a similar if not the same, standardised environment with as little

background noise as possible. These such confounding variables are important to consider as this current

study required the participant to concentrate on recalling specific autobiographical memories, which would

most likely be made more difficult in the presence of background noise, unbearable temperatures or

uncomfortable settings, for example. A standardised environment could potentially eliminate these such

problems.

One limitation of the data collected in this experiment could be the fact that the participants were not

required to divulge any information about the content or intimate details of their memories. This decision was

made in order to optimise the comfort of the participant throughout the experiment, which in turn hopefully

reduced the chance of any participants withdrawing their data from the study. However, this decision may

have had implications on the quality of the information collected from the memory interview, for example,

when instructed to recall specific memories from each the five time periods, it is possible that participants did

not recall something which happened on only one event, as was instructed, but as the content of the

memories was not shared with the participant, this is impossible to know. This could therefore also have

impacted on the data collected from the questions asked during the memory interview hence affecting the


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validity or strength of the data. The obvious improvement which could be made to this limitation is to request

that participants divulge the entire memory to the researcher prior to answering the set questions, however,

as indicated, this could be an uncomfortable or sensitive process for some participants, so this approach

should be considered with caution.

Another potential alteration which could be made to any replications of this study would be to

measure the differences between age groups, and gender. It is widely agreed that males are more likely to

develop autism spectrum disorder (Baron-Cohen, 2008) therefore it could be interesting to replicate this study

with the typical population to discover whether more males in the typical population also show more autistic

traits and therefore whether they would score lower on the TST as compared to females. It may also be

interesting to see whether there is a similar discrepancy between age groups on the measures used in this

experiment. It might also be informative to re-create a similar study to this current one but with a different

differentiating factor, for example, rather than measuring the differences between scientists and non-

scientists as was done by Baron-Cohen and colleagues (2001), future studies could instead perhaps measure

the differences between individuals who are high or low on neuroticism or extraversion for example.

One final limitation of this study could be the timescale of the experiment, i.e., there was no time gap

left between time-1 and time -2 of the memory interview. This may have had an effect on the data collected as

the responses to the questions asked in time-1 would likely still be fresh in the participants’ mind, and

therefore may affect the responses the participants provided at time-2. For example, should a participant have

recalled their two chosen memories from an observer perspective at time-1, and therefore were asked to

recall these same memories instead from a field perspective at time-2, the temporal proximity of time-1 and

time-2 may have meant that the mental imagery that the participant conjured up at time-1 (from an observer

perspective) may still be rather salient and hence could hinder the participant’s ability to recall this same

event/memory from a different perspective (field). This would thus also have a knock-on effect on their

responses to the questions asked at time-2, regarding ease of perspective change, length of perspective

change and emotionality. It is also possible that participants may have guessed the researcher’s predictions

about what might happen at time-2 after the perspective change and hence change their behaviour/responses

to questions. This problem is particularly likely with the participants with a background in psychology who


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were recruited. One way to hopefully reduce this would be to avoid recruiting too many psychology students,

rather recruit individuals with backgrounds in other ‘non-scientist’ subjects.

The primary aims of this study were first of all to offer a new study to the literature in this particular

area as well as to add new angle to literature in an area which is mostly populated with experiments using

clinical samples of participants who have been clinically diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder. Whilst not

all of the data were significant, this study provides a good starting point for further studies to use as a

benchmark. It could also be interesting, if possible, in future studies to assess whether the suspected cognitive

impairments of individuals with ASD (Lind & Bowler, 2010) are at all present, even very slightly, in those typical

individuals with high scores on the AQ, but who do not have a clinical diagnosis of autism. This could be

measured potentially via various other questionnaire items assessing impairments which are common in ASD.

The next step for this current study could be to follow the lead of Lind & Bowler (2010) who measured

both autobiographical memory and future thinking, i.e. being able to imagine a potential future event, in

typical individuals; individuals with ASD; and individuals with other psychiatric illness. This methodology could,

in future, be applied to a population sample similar to this current study, in order to measure memory recall

and future thinking between scientists and non-scientists in the typical population.

To conclude, one of the significant predictions for this experiment was that participants in the

scientist condition would score more highly on the AQ than participants in the non-scientist condition, a

prediction which was supported by this current experiment. There were unfortunately a number of

hypotheses which were not directly supported, but this could be due to any number of limitations and can

only be resolved with the replication of this study. However, as discussed there are a number of viable

improvements which could be made in the event of a replication study, as well as various alterations which

could be made to allow for studying participants based on various other criteria, e.g. high and low scorers of

neuroticism, etc. It is important that replication studies are performed, before any of the significant findings

which have been revealed are used to draw concrete conclusions, due to the afore mentioned limitations

which may have affected viability and reliability of the data.


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References

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Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Skinner, R., Martin, J., & Clubley, E. (2001). The Autism-Spectrum

Quotient (AQ): Evidence from Asperger Syndrome/High-Functioning Autism, Males and Females,

Scientists and Mathematicians. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 31, 5-17.

Berntsen, D., & Rubin, D. C., (2006). Emotion and vantage point in autobiographical memory.

Cognition and Emotion, 20(8), 1193-1215.

Boucher, J., (2007). Memory and generativity in very high-functioning autism: A firsthand account,

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Libby, L. K., & Eibach, R. P. (2002). Looking Back in Time: Self-Concept Change Affects Visual

Perspective in Autobiographical Memory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 167-179.

Lind, S. E., & Bowler, D. M., (2010). Episodic Memory and Episodic Future Thinking in Adults with

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Toichi, M., Kamio, Y., Okada, T., Sakihama, M., Youngstrom, E. A., Findling, R. L., & Yamamoto, K.,

(2002). A Lack of Self-Consciousness in Autism. The American Journal of Psychiatry, 159, 1422-1424.

Woodbury-Smith, M. R., Robinson, J., Wheelwright, S., & Baron-Cohen, S., (2005). Screening Adults for

Asperger Syndrome Using the AQ: A Preliminary Study of its Diagnostic Validity in Clinical Practice.

Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 35, 331-335.

Appendix

Consent Form

Demographics Form

TST

AQ

Experimenter record sheet for memory interview part 1 & 2

Debrief form

33158740 Research Project BSc

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Transcript of 33158740 Research Project BSc