2610674_TTICMFR

9/11 Classified Information

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-CONFIDENTI-At

Event: Overview of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC)

Type of Event: Briefing

Date: July 18, 2003

Special Access Issues: None

Prepared by: Gordon Lederman

Team Number: 2

Location: George Bush Center for Intelligence (GBCI)

Participants – non-Commission: John Brennan, Director of TTIC; Jim Bernazzani, .... ......... ............ V ...... g711 Closed by Statute Principal De ut Director Chief-of-Staff egl ........

Adviser; Director - PlanS- & Administration.

Participants – Commission: Chris Kojm, Kevin Scheid, Barbara Grewe, Betty Swope, Mike Jacobson, Peter Rundlet, Kevin Shaeffer, Lance Cole, Gordon Lederman

cc)- Summary:

(1) TTIC's role in the U.S. Government's overall counterterrorism effort is unclear. TTIC appears to be in competition with CTC, the Department of Homeland Security's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, and the FBI's SIOC.

(2) Information-sharing within TTIC is dependent upon the judgment of TTIC's staff, who are assignees from participating departments and agencies. TTIC lacks the authority to transfer documents from one agency to another. Instead, TTIC facilitates information-sharing amonTTIC's assignees, who can then inform their parent agencies of what documents to request from fellow agencies.

(3) TTIC is a purely analytic operation. It has no tasking authority and will not engage in intelligence collection or operations.

(4) TTIC has neither appropriations nor permanent staff. It currently has assignees and is located at the GBCI. By May 2004, TTIC will hav people and will be co-located with CTC and the FBI's CTD at a building

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(5) TTIC has no responsibility for siiiiring_information with State and :focal government.

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(C) Mr. Brennan distributed a Powerpoint presentation classified at the Confidential level (see Exhibit 1) and Director of Central Intelligence Directive 2/4, classified as For Official Use Only, which provides guidance concerning TTIC (see Exhibit 2).

(05 Mr. Brennan is former Deputy Executive Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and also served' 9/11 Classified Information ,In addition, he was the DCI's Chief of Staff and is a career analyst:

(e) Following President Bush's January 2003 State of the Union Address announcing TTIC, an interagency steering group was formed to establish TTIC. TTIC was created because the scope and complexity of the terrorist threat against the United States requires the U.S. Government's intelligence, law enforcement, homeland security, defense, and diplomatic components to join forces and combine their knowledge. TTIC is a "joint venture" — an "independent establishment" that is not part of any government department — in order to integrate information, expertise, analysis, and the missions across the federal Government. The Director of TTIC reports to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).

(C5 TTIC will focus on international terrorist threats against the U.S. homeland and installations outside of the United States. In contrast, TTIC will not focus on purely domestic terrorist threats such as domestic extremist groups; domestic terrorism remains the FBI's responsibility. Mr. Brennan justified TTIC being under the DCI's authority because of the DCI's orientation toward foreign intelligence, which is the source ofthe overwhelming amount of threat-related information. It was unclear whether he meant that foreign intelligence produces the overwhelming amount of threat-related information because of (I) the inherent nature of such threat-related information, or (2) the possible lack of a domestic intelligence infrastructure to produce significant amounts of threat-related information.

(C) TTIC has no tasking authority and will not engage in any intelligence collection or operations — it will be a purely analytic operation. In the course of performing analysis, TTIC will identify gaps in counterterrorism knowledge across the U.S. Government.

(CI TTIC does not have an appropriation, nor will it have its own staff. It will develop strong relations with the CIA, the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), the FBI, DoD's intelligence components (i.e., the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA], the National Imagery and Mapping Agency [NIMA], and the National Security Agency [NSA]), and other agencies such as the Departments of Health and Human Services, Agriculture, and Energy. TTIC will not deal directly with State and local governments and the private sector; these entities will interact with DHS and other federal agencies. However, TTIC will consider how information it generates can be composed in such a manner to facilitate sharing of that information by other federal agencies with State and local governments and the private sector.

(Cc TTIC is composed of "assignees" from various agencies. The assignees' agencies must continue to pay their salaries. Mr. Brennan indicated that assignees maintain their

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authorities from their home agencies when they are assigned to TTIC, although the practical implications are unclear. Mr. Brennan can reject an agency's proposed assignee and order an assignee to leave TTIC. He noted that assignees frequently learn for the first time about the capabilities of other agencies. TTIC is working on a training curriculum and process to assist assignees in acclimating to TTIC and learning about other agencies' capabilities. Mr. Brennan does not believe TTIC's existence or structure should be enshrined by statute.

I'S In essence, TTIC serves as a protected space in which assignees from various agencies share information with each other concerning terrorist threats. TTIC's assignees have access to various databases from each relevant agency, although not every TTIC assignee has access to every database. (The FBI's "ACS" system is piped into TTIC except for databases concerning public corruption and espionage; non-FBI assignees have access to that system.) Such information-sharing is not considered "dissemination" by the assignees' agencies. And TTIC does not transmit information obtained from one agency to other agencies. Accordingly, if a CIA assignee introduces a particular CIA document into TTIC, and an FBI assignee believes that the document would be of interest to an FBI component, that FBI assignee cannot send the document to the FBI but rather must request that the CIA disseminate that document to the FBI. As Mr. Bernazzani indicated, TTIC requires a high degree of trust between the agencies, and any violation of TTIC's information-sharing rules will harm TTIC significantly.

(S,) The DHS Secretary, the Attorney General, and the DCI signed a lengthy memorandum of understanding ("MOU") concerning infoimation-sharing among their entities. Certain parts of this MOU are subject to various interpretations. In any event, just because DHS, the FBI, or the CIA have shared information with TTIC does not relieve them of information-sharing responsibilities set forth in the MOU among DHS, the FBI, and the CIA.

(C), According to DOD 2/4, the top two officials of TTIC cannot be from the same agency, although DOD 2/4 does not require that the top slots be rotated among interested agencies. TTIC's Director - Mr. Brennan - is from CIA, while his deputy is from FBI. TTIC currently has an Associate Director for Homeland Security from DHS and an Associate Director for Defense Issues from DIA. TTIC currently has three units:

(1) Threat Monitoring, Integration & Analysis, led by an NSA official. This section has three parts: (a) Threat Integration, responsible for drafting threat matrices and other situation reports; (b) Threat Analysis, responsible for more in-depth analytical products, assessments, and advisories; and (c) Threat Database, which will build a national terrorism database.

(2) Community Counterterrorism Board ("CCB"). The CCB was formerly the Executive Secretary for the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT). This unit will eventually be folded into the Threat Monitoring, Integration & Analysis unit.

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(3) Plans & Administration. Focusing on budgets,finance, etc. TTIC also has a counterintelligence office.

(C) TTIC will apparently become a line item in the" Community Management Staff's budget. TTIC does not have its own appropriation,"although this issue is apparently being or will soon be debated.

TTIC currently has l includingl -1 Fifty percent of these analysts are from CIA, with the rest from DHS (including Customs, the /Coast Guard, the Secret Service, and the Transportation Security Administration), FBI, ILIA, NSA, NIMA, the Capitol Police, the Departments of Energy and State, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Half of the analysts would be from CIA because TTIC had assumed responsibility for CTC analytic products such as the threat matrices. The FBI has disbanded its counterterrorism strategic analysis group and given the .mission and analysts to TTIC - although Mr. Brennan noted that thel !affected analysts at FBI were actually CIA, employees detailed to the 1 4BI.

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‘articles for the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB); (4) daily situation reports and commentaries; and (5) community assessments, which are coordinated with other agencies. Mr. Brennan attends weekly Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) meetings and briefs the CSG on threats.

(C) Counterterrorism-related information is currently shared among relevant agencies

9/11 Classified Informatior i i IC will develop an electronic

ra7 o-r9 nd to provide "one-stop shopping" for counterterrorism products, including unclassified products.

(C) TTIC will also create a new watchlist database to supersede the 15-odd databases currently used among relevant agencies. Mr. Brennan called it the "National Terrorist Identities Database." In addition, TTIC will exploit cutting-edge data exploitation tools - he mentioned DoD's Total Information Awareness (TIA) project - to mine data for counterterrorism purposes.

(C) As of May 1, 2003, TTICI land is located at the GBCI. By May 1, 2004, 'TTIC will have land will movel 9/11 Classified Information 1


people. CTC and,the - FBI's Counterterrorism Division (CTD) are supposed to relocate to that building as: vell so that TTIC, CTC, and FBI-CTD will be co-located.

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C) TTIC produces various analytic products, including IS `threat matrices

OS& Mr. Brennan noted that the National Intelligence Council recently considered creating the position of National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Terrorism. However, TTIC was concerned about overlap between an NIO for Terrorism and TTIC, so the NIC ultimately created the position called NIO for Transnational Threats.

Mr. Brennan noted a number of challenges facing TTIC, including:

(1) How is "threat" defined? In other words, how broad is TTIC's mandate for information-sharing and analysis given that TTIC is limited to "threat" integration? Mr. Brennan indicated that he favored a broad interpretation of the term "threat" to include information more generally concerning terrorism such as information concerning terrorist finances.

(2) What is the division of responsibilities between 'TIC and relevant agencies? Mr. Brennan said that Dick Kerr, former Deputy DCI, will lead a team to provide an independent assessment and recommendation regarding the proper division of labor between agencies and TTIC.

(3) More generally, what is the division of labor for counterterrorism among agencies? There is significant redundancy across the federal government concerning counterterrorism, which wastes resources and may cause gaps in coverage.

(4) How can the federal government develop new "business practices?" Mr. Brennan cited the need for a new dissemination process and that analysts, not collectors, should own data underlying analyses.

(5) How should information concerning U.S. persons be minimized? The different minimization procedures for U.S.-person information across the federal government must be rationalized.

(6) How should the U.S. Government's counterterrorism infrastructure interact with the private sector?

'CC-) Many of the Commission staff's questions to Mr. Brennan focused on TTIC's relationship to DHS's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate. Mr. Brennan noted that some individuals on Capitol Hill are concerned that TTIC will undercut IAIP. However, he stressed that IAIP will still have a prominent mission even with TTIC's success, as IAIP will be responsible for conducting in-depth analyses concerning vulnerability. In other words, IMP will take threat-related information from TTIC and compare it with detailed vulnerability information in DHS's possession. He said that DHS would still have a need for a 24x7 watch center despite TTIC's existence and planned establishment of an operations center.

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ir•- Mr. Brennan's response to another question indicated that the federal government's process of conducting warning still needs clarification. He could not identify one individual responsible for warning of future attacks the United States.

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UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTI 2/4

TERRORIST THREAT INTEGRATION CENTER

(Effective 1 May 2003)

This directive is promulgated pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947, as amended; the Homeland Security Act of 2002; the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001; the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended; Executive Order 12333; the direction of.the President, as articulated in his State of the Union Address on 28 January 2003, in his remarks at Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Headauarters on 14 February 2003, and in - the related White House Fact Sheets; and the Memorandum of Understanding . (MOU) between the Intelligence Community, Federal Law Enforcement Agencies and the Department of Homeland Security Concerning Information Sharing dated 4 March 2003 (the MOU on Information Sharing).

A. Purpose

This directive provides guidance in carrying out the direction of the President to establish a Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC).

B. Mission

1. The Terrorist Threat Integration Center's mission is to enable full intearation of US Government terrorist threat-related information and analysis. The Terrorist Threat Integra0en Center will be an interagency joint venture that will integrate and analyze terrorist threat—related information, collected - domestically or abroad, and disseminate such information to appropriate recipients. Specifically, TTIC will:

a. Make full use of available terrorist threat-related information (collected domestically or llroad), exmertise, and capabilities to conduct threat analysis and inform collection strategies.

b. Create a structure to institutionalize sharing across appropriate federal acercy lines of terrorist threa - related information, collect=-r' domestically or abroad, in

order to form the most com-orsiv poss ible threat picture and minimize any seams between analysis of terrorist threat-related information collected domestically or abroad.


c. Serve as the principal manager of interagency formulation of DCI terrorism threat warning (without affecting existing responsbilities, authorities, or -Procedures for warnings retarding threats to homeland security) in collal7oration with the Community Counterterrorism Board, the Warn Five Agencies (FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], the Defense Intelligence Agency [D -11A], the National Security Agency [NSA], and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State [State/INR]), the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), and the Department of Homeland Security (DES).

d. Along with other organizations, provide comprehensive, all-source terrorist threat analysis and assessments to US national leadership;

e. Play a . lead role, along with other organizations, in overseeing a national terrorist' threat tasking and requirements system:

f. Maintain an ut-to-date data:nage of known and suspected terrorists accessible to appropriate government officials.

2. The TTIC itself will have no new or independent authority to engage in the collection of intelligence or to mandate the conduct of such collection. Nevertheless, departments and agencies with employees assigned to TTIC (TTIC members) , under procedures agreed upon between the Director of TTIC (D/TTIC) and TTIC members, may utilize individual employees assigned to TTIC to carry out, under the authority and direction of the assigning TTIC member, any lawfully authorized function of the assigning TTIC member.

3. The TTIC members include, but are not limited to, the Department of Justice/FBI, DES, CIA, NSA, NINA, DIA, and -the Department of State.

C. Responsibilities

1. The DC:, as head of the US Intelligence Community, will oversee the activities of TTIC.

2. The D/TTIC will report to the DCI as head of. the US Intelligence Community and will manage TTIC on a day-to-day basis.


D. Organization

1. The TTIC will be headed by a senior US Government official appointed by the DCI in consultation with the Director of the FBI, the Attorney General, and the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Defense.. The D/TTIC, in coordination with•TTIC members and with the concurrence of the DCI, shall designate the Principal Deputy Director of TTIC (PDD/TTIC), who shall not come from the same department or agency as D/TTIC. The D/TTIC will consult with other TTIC members on the designation of other TTIC deputies.

2. The TTIC members may assign employees to TTIC in support of the TTIC mission, consistent with other provisions herein.

3. The TTIC members will retain ultimate responsibility for, and authority over, their employees assigned to TTIC. Such assignees will be under the general day-to-day . management and coordination of D/TTIC for purposes of TTIC functions.

4. The TTIC members will be responsible for all personal services expenditures (such as salaries and benefits) relating to their employees assigned to TTIC. Personnel administration (e.g., pay accounting, promotion, and disciplinary actions) of TTIC assignees will be the responsibility of the parent department or agency with input from TTIC, as appropriate. Substantive input for performance evaluation of TTIC assignees will be provided by TTIC under arrangements with each TTIC member.

5. To the extent permissible by law, the capabilities and legal authorities of TTIC members, as approved by the heads of TTIC member departments and agencies, including by delegation to their assignees, will be used in such a way as to most effectively carry out TTIC's mission. Nevertheless, TTIC!_ assignees will remain subject to any legal limitations aArd_ restrictions applicable to their assigning TTIC members. Under section 103(d) of the National Security Act, CIA will provide human resource, security, contracting, information management, and other administrative support and services to TTIC- -Such support may be provided by other TTIC members upon agreement between D/TTIC and the heads of such other TTIC Members with appropriate legal authorities. When a CIA employee serves as D/TTIC, he is hereby authorized to exercise all lawfully delegable DCI and CIA authorities to award monetary and non-monetary awards to all personnel assigned to TTIC, as authorized by law.

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6. The TTIC members shall ensure that assigned employees comply with security clearance requirements for background investigations and polygraph examinations as needed for appropriate access to classified information within TTIC. Personnel assigned to TTIC with access to information at the TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION level must have appropriate security clearances and accesses for such information, including a counterintelligence polygraph examination. Processing for assignment to TTIC will be consistent with FBI and CIA procedures for assignment to their counterterrorist elements of personnel from other agencies. Appropriate components of the FBI, Defense Department, and CIA will provide security and counterintelligence support to TTIC, as needed. In coordination with TTIC members, D/TTIC shall also designate a focal point for security. In coordination with TTIC members, the security focal point shall be responsible for security matters relating to TTIC assignees and advising D/TTIC on security matters.

7. Requirements for personnel to report on training or compliance with regard to activities not undertaken as part of TTIC's mission such as ethics, Intelligence Oversight Board reporting, and Inspector General matters will continue to be administered by the assigning TTIC members. Such activities with regard to the TTIC mission will be handled in accordance with paragraph F.1. below.

8. The D/TTIC, or designees, will exercise the final review and approval authority for TTIC-generated products, after appropriate consultation or coordination with TTIC members. For national-level analytic products produced outside TTIC, the originating department's or agency's existing review processes and procedures should be followed until D/TTIC and appropriate senior officials of those departments or agencies agree on other arrangements. All national-level analysis on terrorism .4.treat matters will be disseminated in accordance with the MOU-Gn-InfoLluation Sharing, or appropriate consultation or coordination procedures established in agreement with D/TTIC that mandate equal or greater information sharing than that required by the MOU on Information Sharing, and are not otherwise inconsistent with the MOU on Information Sharing.

E. Information

1. The TTIC analysts will have access to terrorist threat-related information collected dometically or abroad. Terrorist Threat: Integration Center information sharing shall be governed by the MOU on Information Sharing, except that TTIC Members may agree to information sharing arrangements that provide for

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greater information sharing than those mandated by the MOU. TTIC members not parties to the MOU on Information Sharing will enter into agreements with all TTIC members for sharing information they originate, provided that such agreements mandate•ecual or greater information sharing than that recuired by the MOU on Information Sharing, and are not otherwise inconsistent with that MOU. Terrorist Threat Integration Center assignees with a need-to-know (as determined by D/TTIC) will have unfettered access to terrorist threat—related information, collected domestically or abroad, provided to TTIC by TTIC members or otherwise, and may disseminate such infoziaation back to their assigning TTIC members only in accordance with procedures established by agreement between D/TTIC and the TTIC members, provided that any such agreement is strictly consistent with the MOU on Information Sharing and the other authorities cited herein. Dissemination of such information, including to state and local officials, will be done in accordance with the MOU on_Infozmation Sharing. As used in this DCID, terrorist threat-related infoiwation includes . "terrorism infoziaation" defined in section 2(r) and amplified in section 3(e) of the MOU On Information Sharing, which includes ,

but is not limited to, everything from raw reports to finished analytic assessments, however defined and whether collected domestically or abroad. Such access will be established in consultation with oriainating departments and agencies and in accordance with appropriate personnel, physical, and information technology system security procedures. Senior TTIC assignees, including, at a minimum, D/TTIC; PDD/TTIC; the Deputy Director for Threat Monitoring, Integration, and Analysis; the Deputy Director for Plans and Administration; and the Associate Directors for Homeland Security and Defense Issues, will have access to terrorist threat-related infotiltation no less than that of the Chiefs of the DCI Counterterrorist Center and the FBI Counterterrorism Division.

2. The TTIC's information technology implementation program will adhere to Intelligence Community and commercial standards and practices. The TTICis information technology strategy_ and implementation will be managed by the TTIC Chief Information Officer (TTIC CIO). The TTIC CIO will coordinate this implementation program with all TTIC Members and with:t_5e Intelligence Community CIO Executive Council.

3. The TTIC assignees will continue to be bound by all applicable statutes and Executive Orders, including those relating to the protection of Constitutional rights and privacy. TTIC assignees will also continue to be bound by applicable provisions of regulations, internal guidelines and procedures, and memorandums of understanding and agreement that are not inconsistent with the MOU on Information Sharing or any Presidential guidance.

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4. To the maximum extent possible, TTIC assignees shall facilitate the assigning department or agency Processes to downgrade or declassify TTIC member-originated infoluiation and to disseminate such information free of use restrictions. These determinations, and all decisions to provide, downgrade, declassify, and disseminate information provided to TTIC, will be made consistent with the MOU on Infoifflation Sharing, Executive Order 12951, as amended, Executive Order 12958, as amended, and other applicable Executive Orders and Presidential guidance.

5. For purposes of the Federal Records Act, the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act, and the Mandatory Declassification Review provisions of Executive Order 12958, as amended, and for all other purposes (unless otherwise agreed upon by D/TTIC and TTIC members):

a. Records created by TTIC assignees at the request of D/TTIC or a designee shall be considered CIA records that are housed in a CIA records system, unless and until other arrangements are made by D/TTIC in coordination with TTIC members.

b. Records originated by departments or agencies, including TTIC members, that are used by TTIC shall be considered records of the originating department or agency.

F. Other

The D/TTIC, in coordination with TTIC members, shall designate focal points consistent with existing statutory and regulatory responsibilities who shall be responsible for legal, Congressional, and Inspector General (IG) matters relating to TTIC. Such focal points will address such matters in consultation, or, as appropriate, coordination, with TTIC members and other organizations, and in accordance with their res,1;ective responsibilities. Each TTIC member's legal office will.9 responsible for providing legal guidance to the TTIC member's assignees on matters relating to the use of the TTIC member -s authorities. Counsel for the DCI shall be responsible for coordinating such advice when necessary and appropriate_

14 May 2003

Dire• for o_ ent 1 Intelligence Date

2610674_TTICMFR

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