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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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Type of Event: Interview Date: November 24, 2003 Special Access Issues: Prepared by: Alexis Albion Reviewed by: Team Number: Three (Counterterrorism Policy) Location: CIA HQs Participants — Commission: Alexis Albion, Dan Byman, Lloyd Salvetti, Kevin Scheid Non-Commissional (CIA) -------- 9/11 Closed by Statute

Background

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(C) CIA has been working the counterterrorism (CT) issue for many years, even before the creation of the Counterterrorist Center (CTC) in 1986,1

The Agency knew about Usama bin Ladin (UBL) for a long time, but thought of him not so much as a problem but as someone to keep an eye on. Only when UBL went to Sudan did CIA begin to worry abouit him. In Hughes' opinion, CIA always took. UBL seriously, but it was not clear to him that the USG was as concerned until after the August 1998 East Africa embassy bombings. He recalled first hearing about 'Al Qaedal in the early 1990s.

(U) Despite CIA's awareness ofUBL, Hughes pointed out that the Agency still had to operate under certain caveats.'Notably, there were limitatiOns regarding resources. Resources (C) At the beginning of the 1980s1 ,both at home and abroad. This figure rose lend of the first Bush adMinistration dropped! 1999,1 I,DUring the Clinton years,j took a 20-30% cut. ‘Eight'years of post-Cold War .downsizing resulted in inadequate resources both in term§'of funding and r;ersonriel, ; a condition that CIA was only just corning put of by •

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(C)"Budget-cutting also affected prioritization, diverting funds from less critical to more critical areas—though) that CIA is always being pulled away from yesterday's problems towards tomorrow's problems. Befor0 1998, Afghanistan did'not t rn un on anyone's target list, mostly hecalke there ere so 1 many 'other prioritks 9/11 Classified Information I The Jeremiahjeport, which'reviewed the Agency's failure to detect nuclear testing in Pakistan, directed much criticism toward the CIA and the Intelligence Community (IC) in general,'


There was not much encouragernexit to move resources away from hese hirer priority issues to somewhere like Afghanistan, thought

had always directed,some resources toward Afghanistan, just in case.

9/11 Classified Information land had to do far less "salami slicing." This was a result ofl 'focus on more of the main issues as well as better resource management.

Resource Management

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Since the late 1970s, 'very focused on radical Iranian fundamentalists and Hezbollah, and not Al Qaeda, as the organizations most dangerous to U.S. interests;' 1prior to the 9-11 attacks, the bombing of the marine ,barracks in Beirut was the most lethal terrorist attack on the U.S. Those who followed Middle Eastern issues were concerned about the veterans from the Soviet-Afghan war who were known to be receiving paramilitary training and, importantly, were involved in transnational networking.t aving conversations about this phenomenon in the mid-. 1,990s. It was only with the August 1998 East African embassy bombings, however; that Al Qaeda came to occupy the fo refront) lin terms of both"the will and means to confront the USG.

(q4 kid not obtain all the resources he wanted


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Saudi Arabia

Saudi support for Islamic radicalism oes not see deliberate encouragement for Islamic radicalism on the

part of the Saudis!


1.C)1 !that although Saudis give money and do not always know where it is going, there is one level of the population "who are just doing the right thing", and think they are helping refugees and so on. It is a much smaller number who are actively trying to support an Islamic war." that clearly there are wealthy individuals who have given large sums of money and did not ask enough questions.


Wahabism that the Saudi leadership has been roundly criticized by a

number of other Arab states (such as Jordan) for its sponsorship of Wahabism, and that these complaints go back in time long before the OPM/SANG attack in 1995.


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.. . „ . . . . thatIack Downing ancl . Rich Taylor "did a brave thing' ' . . fin attempt to try to integrate .. ., . , . more people on both sides (CIA and NSA) and at both the senior and working level.

\ \ Currently] .‘,., la step away from this practice:I I ., !while what is needed is more

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gration, not less. •

\ The 'Teasan for thisl I iS\a function Ofboth changing personalities and the restruCturing.ofthe NSA toward inore ,of a defense purpose. The DOD views all the ICorganizations as combat supportorgartizationSI 'pulling them 'back td.,beleSs a part of the IC and more part of force protection.

. . „ . . . . . . This is especially true,,since,.9/11 and the war inAraqj Ithat everyone now want '• ', 'satellite coverage or going into combat. But choices need to be made about resources and 'targets.' There is increasing presSurel . lover Iraq and Afghanistan—and there is a tension in the system as to how to allocate those resources, because there are not enough satellites to\ go roundto cover everyone's competing needs. According to

t seems that the combat commanders are winning out. Global coverage has become less important than' overage over a combat area.

. . . . . , The NSA now has a large CT component.] 'trying to build better bridges

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at the Working level between the NSA and CTC.

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I . Ithat NSA Director Rich and the NSA in general tended to be very responsive to CIA taskingsl lat the NSA they would talk about conersatiOns and taskings from DC1 Tenet and others: "they took it very seriously."' 'did not recall much about the DCI's December 1998 'declaration of war' memo or whether meetings had been held in response.


that we need to reduce redundancies (stovepipes)

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CIA-FBI Historically, the FBI has not had that many Legats in the Middle East and had tended to be regional in their assignments. For example, before the Khobar Towers attack the regional Legat was in Rome.

Recommendations and Comments The CIA is chronically understaffed. 9/11 Classified Information

along with the DO and CIA in general, is constantly surging and suffers from exhaustion. Because there are never enough people and officers never have enough time between assignments, the DO only does training "as an after-thought." And it is a 5 to 7 year process to 'grow' new officers.

Since 9-11, personnel have been taken off of old problems (which are normally high priority) and being put onto new projects—but the old problems have not gone away. "Nobody ever takes anything off my plate,"

g adding that CIA has never been very good at saying no to policymakers (and policymakers are apt to change their minds). As a result, understaffing and chronic fatigue are endemic throughout the CIA. By contrast, the military is always adequately staffed,(

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the CIA as a whole needs to be plussed up. Currently, the demands for intelligence have increased/


He said that the CIA is as understaffed now as it has ever been.

2. The budget process is in appropriate to current needs. Given the CT mission, the Agency needs to be able to plan several years in advance. One year budgets, continuing resolutions, supplementals, and not getting money until part way through the year is "an awful system," which prevents the Agency from being able to shift focus to new problems on short notice. noted, however, that this is not just an Agency issue but a function of t e (unwieldy) way in which the USG works.

3. The CIA needs both area divisions and centers. Area divisions ark necessary for obvious reasons. But centers provide analytic depth and global overview. The CIA needs to have both.

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