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Interorganizational Relations in Marketing Channels Author(s): Torger Reve and Louis W. Stern Source: The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Jul., 1979), pp. 405-416Published by: Academy of ManagementStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/257196Accessed: 01-03-2015 01:50 UTC

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Academy of Management Review 1979, Vol. 4, No. 3, 405-416.

Interorganizational Relations In Marketing Channels

TORGER REVE and

LOUIS W. STERN Northwestern University

In most articles appearing in the organizational behavior journals, little reference is made to the extensive research performed in the marketing field addressing interactions in distribution channels. This article attempts to bring to the fields of sociology and organizational behavior relevant materials from marketing that will improve theories of interorganizational relations.

It is curious that there is seldom any reference made by organization behavior scholars investigat- ing interorganizational phenomena to the relatively lengthy stream of conceptual and empirical work focusing on marketing channels. There are two likely explanations for this omission. First, organization scholars may be unaware of the work done by researchers in marketing because it is published in places where they rarely look for insights or ad- vances to their own models. Second, organization and management theorists interested in interorganizational relations may not realize that marketing channels are perhaps the most numerous and eco- nomically most important interorganizational networks in any society. As a result, they unwittingly have ignored them and the literature dealing with them.

This paper (a) describes the conceptual thrust taken in the marketing channel literature relative to uncovering the salient behavioral dimensions of vertical relations between channel members, and (b) reviews the empirical studies that have examined these dimensions. We hope our discussion of theoretical concepts and empirical results may con- tribute to further integration of the rather fragment- ed field of interorganizational theory (8). (c, 1979 by the Academy of Management 0363-7425

The Conceptual Foundation

Scope of the Field

Marketing channels have been viewed by a number of academics (3, 58, 88, 119, 134) as interorganizational systems. They are seen as sets of interdependent organizations which, by an exchange of outputs, are involved in the process of making a product or service available for consumption. Rather than holding to a macro perspective and studying the social welfare implications of channel outputs (140, 19, 36, 28, 31), attention has increas- ingly focused on a micro orientation. This focus has been on the issues of developing effective processes and structures for the accomplishment of the distribution tasks and for the practice of interorganizational management (76, 90, 107, 112, 120, 138). Competition, in the channels literature, is viewed not simply as rivalry among firms or organizations on the same level of distribution (e.g., manufacturers versus manufacturers), but rather as rivalry among systems of distribution. This is referred to as intertype competition (92). Thus, the problem for actors within any distribution network is to find ways to cooperate in developing an interorganizational

405



system that will minimize suboptimization. The focus has been on the coordination of efforts among successive stages of distribution (84, 87).

In adopting this normative perspective, positive and explanatory research into the behavioral dimensions of marketing channels as interorganizational systems has been undertaken. In particular, the interorganizational studies of vertical marketing systems cited later in this paper have focused on the institutional interactions among the organizations that comprise a channel. They have also in- vestigated the ways in which power can be used to specify roles and manage conflict within given institutional structures. These investigations permit the drawing of normative implications for the design, implementation, and maintenance of viable interorganizational networks.

The normative questions of channel design and channel management can obviously be ap- proached from a number of other perspectives. Among the approaches included in the channel literature are (a) microeconomic modeling (25, 26, 27, 30, 127); (b) game theoretic modeling (15, 16, 17); (c) simulation modeling (9, 14, 61, 111); (d) logistics models of physical distribution (18, 23, 39, 68, 113); and (e) numerous descriptions and models of channel development and evolution (28, 38, 41, 64, 95, 86, 89, and citations in 91).

In this paper we focus on only the research into the behavioral dimensions of interorganizational relations in marketing channels. These latter studies are based on theories of social psychology, sociology, political science, and, of course, organizational behavior. At present, the marketing channel field has developed to the stage where research results should be reported to the basic behavioral science disciplines that have inspired the current research.

Channels as Superorganizations

In the study of marketing channels as interorganizational systems, it has been useful to conceive of marketing channels as "superorganizations." This term implies that channels have the characteristics of complex social organizations (144), even though channels are comprised of collectivities rather than individuals. Viewing interorganizational relationships as a superorganization corresponds to what organization theorists have referred to as a social action system (8, 135) or an interorganizational

collectivity (136), and what the marketing theorist Wroe Alderson (4) in a Parsonian tradition termed an organized behavior system.

The essential content of this definition of a marketing channel as a superorganization or as a social action system is that the channel exhibits the basic elements of any organized form of collective behavior. Thus, within marketing channels, there are:

a. activities among members which are aimed at attaining both collective and self-interest goals;

b. a division of functions and tasks resulting in interdependent processes;

c. integrated actions taking place which result in channels developing a unique identity separate from its members (135).

Collective Goals Within all distribution channel networks there are collective goals (73, 105, 147, 155) even though the goals themselves may not be explicitly noted or constantly accepted. The desire to serve the ultimate consumer in a satisfactory manner seems to pervade distribution systems, although there are occasions when one might question whether such a goal is being pursued ade- quately. The objective, however, of organizations involved in an interorganizational system is the at- tainment of goals that are unachievable by organizations independently (75, 142). Thus, the mere existence of marketing channels points to certain joint benefits for channel members, and collective goals may be inferred as supplementing the self- interest organizational goals.

Functional Differentiation and Interdepen- dency Marketing channels represent a grandiose division of labor among the institutions and agen- cies comprising them (26, 127). For instance, Al- derson has described this process of functional differentiation in his discussion of wholesaling.

Wholesaling is a manifestation of sorting as an essential marketing process. Goods are received from numerous suppliers and delivered to numerous customers. The essence of the operation is to transform the diversified supplies received into out- going assortments on their way to customers. The justification for an independent wholesaling operation rests largely on the ratio of advantage growing out of this intermediate sorting (2, p. 13).

Similar descriptions could be framed for all institutions within any channel network.

Specialization and functional differentiation lead

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to interdependency among channel members relative to their task performance. These interdependencies among channel members are considered central behavioral dimensions in the channel literature (4, 88, 115, 120) for several reasons. First, interdependency relationships are sufficient conditions to define a system (1). Thus, the interdependency by itself presents a rationale for viewing a channel as an interorganizational system; that is, as a set of interrelated and interdependent compo- nents engaged in producing an output. A marketing channel is comprised of two major subsystems or sectors - commercial and consumer (27). The commercial subsystem is comprised of a set of vertically aligned marketing institutions and agen- cies, such as manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers. The consumer (household, industrial, or institutional) subsystem is incorporated in the task environment of the commercial channel. Each commercial channel member is directly dependent on the other institutions in the channel for accom- plishing its tasks and achieving its goals. Thus, the interorganizational model is one of resource and task dependence (5, 6,109).

Second, varying degrees of interdependencies among channel members give rise to power relations between the organizations comprising the channel (20, 31, 43, 50, 67, 70). A main purpose of recent channel research has been to demonstrate how a study of power relationships in marketing channels may provide useful insights into channel functioning and interorganizational interactions. Power strategies are seen as being used to achieve effective role congruence and performance and to keep conflict within its functional range. Also, loci of power or power-centers within the system (120, 80, 30, 46, 52) are generally required to organize the resources of distribution channels. Thus most of the studies of marketing channels have dealt with the presence, use, and consequences of power (43, 44, 45, 49, 50, 70, 92, 149, 152, 153, 154), both in symmetrical and asymmetrical vertical power relationships.

Finally, one could argue that a dependency relationship brings seeds of conflict (12, 31, 42, 56, 66, 71, 82, 99, 105, 108). Conflict can take place within marketing channels over a number of issues. They include: (a) how much inventory should be carried by various members, (b) who has the right to repre-

sent a particular product within a given territory, (c) whether prices and service are being maintained at "reasonable" levels, and (d) why distributors and dealers are sometimes bypassed via direct selling. Traditionally, conflict in marketing channels has been thought to be dysfunctional (84) and some- thing to be avoided and eliminated (131). However, the existence of conflict is frequently highly functional (12, 33, 34, 77, 105, 106, 120, 140). Without conflict, channel systems are likely to become pas- sive, noninnovative, and eventually nonviable. Thus, even though conflict is direct, personal, and opponent-centered behavior (56, 80, 116), the conflict bred by the interdependencies and scarcity of resources can have positive consequences. How- ever, pathological conflict can be harmful (22, 40, 129). Given this line of reasoning, it is not difficult to see why much of the channel literature has focused on three items: (a) conflict in distribution channels (4, 11, 32, 81, 92, 102, 121); (b) the sources and consequences of interorganizational conflict in marketing channels (24, 52, 79, 93,101, 105,137); and (c) conflict management mechanisms in vertical marketing systems (10, 11, 69, 104, 117, 122, 124,125, 126, 146).

Because both power and conflict are considered functions of the interdependence between organizations in a marketing channel (31, 57, 99), power and conflict should be directly interrelated. Another indicator of such a relationship is the use of channel power as a response to conflicts in interorganizational management. Thus, studies of the relationship between power and conflict may be considered the third major area of interorganizational channel research (52, 70, 79).

Integrated Actions The existence of integrated actions in channels follows from the observations regarding vertical coordination or integration of efforts made earlier and from the fact that marketing channels are viewed as primarily competing against other channel systems (50). These systemic properties illustrate that a marketing channel acts as a unit and takes on a collective identity. Many activities in a marketing channel cannot be explained simply by analyzing the behavior of each member organization (118), thus giving increased credence to interorganizational analysis (141, 143).

Most marketing channels tend to meet the criteria

407



of a superorganization or a social action system, exhibiting the basic elements of organized forms of collective behavior. This presents a strong rationale for studying marketing channels as interorganizational systems (120), and for applying organization theory variables in the study of interorganizational functioning (5, 6, 83, 99, 148). Given this conceptual perspective, we now turn to the empirical findings which relate to interorganization relations in marketing.

Empirical Support: Power and Conflict in Marketing Channels

With the exception of a few early studies reported in the organization theory literature - e.g., Kries- berg's investigation (74) of norms and power among steel distributors, Ridgway's analysis (101) of the administration of manufacturer-dealer systems, and Assael's study (12) of the functional effects of vertical conflicts in the marketing channels

for automobiles - most empirical work on the behavioral dimensions of channel relations has been published in the marketing literature. The interorganizational studies reported below deal with the intrachannel processes of (a) power, (b) conflict, and (c) the relationship between power and conflict.

Studies of Power

A number of attempts have been made to measure power in marketing channels as a function of dependence and the sources of power (44, 45, 50, 59, 70, 151, 152, 153). These attempts build on the theory outlined previously which has drawn heavily on research by Dahl (36, 37), French and Raven (60), Thibaut and Kelley (128), Emerson (47, 48), Blau (21), and Raven and Kruglanski (98), among others.

Power, in a Weberian tradition, is seen as the ability of one channel member to get another channel member to do what the latter would not other-

Table 1 Empirical Studies of Power in Vertical Marketing Systems

Study Research Design

Empirical Setting

Sample Size

Operationalization of Constructs

Power Dependence

Empirical results

Sources of Power Power vs. Dependence

Power vs. Sources

Method of Analysis

Perceptual

?(17 issues) (3 issues) (17 issues) No relationship No relationship

Suppliers-l

|Field eManufa- s: P Perceptu Perceptuals Weakpositive Correlation Wilkinson study turers- = 50ratings: ratings: No relaositiveonshp No relationship Correlation

& Stern study 5 + 22 eperceplion (3 issues) (17 issues) and multiple

(197) (personal Retailer 27 (19 Attributed: tors: Attributed regressationship 24to04 mult

Interveews) tion-ers)Acive:

l ratinqs: Weak positive Field Franchisor- Perceptual Obective Per1Noncoeptual (2 measuresto Multiple

W sn study franchisees815 ratings: nd i insis- posite re lat p a

(1974) perstion- (ast food)franchisees Attributed: ances) Coercive: cation inteairews) (household dyads) (5-7 issues) m re ( bes ( me re: ate postive analyssi

(6 punish- X = .32 to .02

_? durables) franchise) R ~(.13 analys_ments)2=34

Insurance Actual~Perceptual Wapoive

ratings: d ia- positiv e Field Frmancisor-13cnr Percptual 1ooner- relation

N(197 (mail nsurance suindicators: octiv positie relation p orrelat

question- nsurance agents Counter- ( issues) indicators: 2= relat on analysis

naire) Sn.s p(ser:- (42. coercives) relation

Cal./Conn.mens) issues)R 34

Fiel Insurance Actual Podercal Eg sty c p s113 cOblective ratings & Very weak positive caon (mail Independent insurance (3 issues) indicators: oblective pQsitive relation retcoiro relation insurance s Counter- (4 issues) indicators: R2 = 07 lass

agents power:, (( issues) naire) Cal./Conn. (5 issues)

Walker (1972)

Laboratory experiment

Simulated manufacturer- retailer bargaining (students)

76

(1) Balanced power

(2) Imbalanced power

Imbalanced power

More asymmetrical outcomes More negative attitudes

t-tests

408



wise have done (20, 37, 110, 120). The empirical studies of vertical power relationships in marketing channels tend to define power operationally as the perceived or actual control one channel member exerts over the use of particular elements of another member's marketing strategies. Self-perceptions of power and/or perceived attributed power (13) are measured over a set of marketing strategies, and the measures are usually summed into an overall power score as weighted by obtained relative importance ratings of the strategy variables, similar to procedures used in developing an expec- tancy value model (150). However, the study by Etgar (50) also includes more direct measures of control instead of relying on reputational power alone. The use of objective measures of relative power is common in economic studies of vertical marketing systems (96, 97) although the analysis is usually at an aggregate industry level.

Table 1 summarizes the empirical settings, the methodologies, and the empirical findings of the studies of power in marketing channels. The results of the pioneering study (46) were inconclusive. In succeeding studies, the relationships between power and dependence and between power and its hypothesized sources were weak. This may be due to insufficient operationalizations and unreliable measures as well as the situational factors such as choice of empirical settings. Most of the studies use single item constructs and rely on single respon- dent perceptual data, so that measure validation cannot be performed in any real sense. Neverthe- less, some of the findings lay the groundwork for future research. For example, Hunt and Nevin (70) found that reliance on coercive sources of power is more effective in achieving short-run compliance than reliance on noncoercive sources. The use of coercive power, however, was found to be inversely related to a channel member's satisfaction with the relationship with the power wielder. These results are supported by Walker's laboratory experiment of channel bargaining (137) in which imbalanced power tended to create asymmetrical outcomes and negative sentiments.

In vertical channel relationships, Wilkinson (151, 152, 153) found that his measures of coercive, reward, expert, and legitimate bases of power corre- lated with the amount of attributed power in the range of r = .24 to r = . 19. Overall, however, Wilkin-

son's measures of the bases of power (60) did poorly in explaining relative power within the marketing channels studied. These results should be contrasted with Etgar (50) who found that his measures of power sources were relatively more potent explanatory variables of channel control than were his measures of dependence. His definition of power sources mainly included nonpecuniary services, while his definition of dependence explicitly or im- plicitly involved reliance on monetary rewards or threats of retaliation and punishment. The mana- gerial implications may be that nonpecuniary services rather than monetary rewards or threats may be more effective in generating control over dealers in the particular vertical marketing system studied.

Studies of Conflict

The conceptual foundation underlying the study of interorganizational relations in marketing channels stresses that conflict is inevitable. Organiza- tions strain toward maximizing their autonomy (62, 132, 145). Thus, mutual interdependencies will tend to create conflicts of interests (108, 130, 139). In vertical marketing systems, the stfain toward autonomy will be juxtaposed to the desire to cooperate (133), so a mixture of conflictual and coopera- tive motives will be present (7, 109, 120, 137). Fol- lowing the work of such organizational scholars as Pondy (95), Evan and MacDougall (55), Walton and Dutton (139), and Schmidt and Kochan (108), there have been a number of attempts to test models of interorganizational conflict in marketing channel settings, both experimentally (10, 124, 125, 126, 137) and in the field (24, 52, 79, 93, 105). The empirical settings, the methodologies, and the findings from these studies are summarized in Table 2. The studies demonstrate that conflict in marketing channels can be empirically measured in the field, as well as simulated in the laboratory. They also show, as conceptually postulated, that vertical conflict in marketing channels is a pervasive phenome- non, especially in channels with relatively high interdependence among members.

In addition, the applicability of process models of interorganizational conflict (31,95, 129) is generally supported, and there is evidence (82, 108) that the primary causes of interorganizational conflict are goal incompatibility, domain dissensus, and perceptual incongruities (105, 71, 94). Lusch (79)

409



Table 2

Empirical Studies of Conflict in Vertical Marketing Systems

Study

Rosenberg & Stern (1971)

Lusch (1976)

Research Design Field study (mail question- naire & personal interviews)

Field study (mail question- naires)

Empirical Setting

Manufacturer- Distributor- Dealers (household durables) U.S.

Manufacturer- Dealers (automobiles) U.S.

Sample Size 4+8 + 11 +-87 = 110 (3 sets of dyads)

567 dealers

Vertical Conflict

Perceptual rating: (32 issues) composite mean and mean differences

Perceptual rating: frequency of dis- agreements (20 issues) (a = .89)

Operationalization of Constructs Conflict Causes

Perceptual rating: (categoriza- tion of 32 issues) goals/domains/ perceptions categorical means & mean differences

Perceptual rating: non-coercive sources of power (16 assis- tances) coercive sources of power (6 punish- ments)

Conflict Outcomes

Perceptual rating: performance (1 measure) systemic attributes (measures)

Vertical Conflict Low conflict (insignificant differences)

Medium to high conflict

Empirical Results Conflict vs. Causes

Two significant causes in each set of dyads goals/domains/ perceptions

Noncoercive: R - .16

Cgercive: R - 21

C;ontlict vs. Outcomes

Significant relationship between dissatis- faction and conflict in two dyads.

Methods of Analysis t-tests Correlation analysis

Multiple regression analysis

Etgar Field Manufac- 138 Perceptual Attitudinal Medium A9itudinal: (Attitudinal Canonical (1977b) study turers- dealers rating: and structur- conflict R = .50 causes rel. correlation

(personal Dealers affective al causes M ftmost analysis interviews) (furniture conflict (48 issues) nfes mportant

automobiles (3 measures) 9 factors R 33

liquor, Objective shoes, indicators:

manifest insurance, manifest stereo) (3 measunflict____

(3 measures) Pearson Field Wholesalers- 54 Perceptual Archival Medium Lower Discriminant & Monoky study Retailers dyads rating: measures: conflict conflict; analysis (1976) (grocery) (15 conflict- service level higher

U.S. ual statements) of wholesalers output (15 coopera- to retailers tive statements)

Brown Field Manufacturer- 26 Perceptual Perceptual Low r =.38 Correlation (1977) study Dealers dealers rating rating: conflict analysis

(personal (autos) weighted satisfaction interviews) U.S. frequency with channel

exploratory of disagree- relations ments (8 Issues) ( - .75)

Stern, Laboratory Simulated 62 i Experimental conditions: Treatments: Significant Significant perceptual evidence P-tests Sternthal, experiment Manufacturer- 3-person (1) Low conflict Conflict management perceptual of effectiveness of management Analysis & Craig Wholesaler rus treatment mechanisms: and be- mechanism: of (1973a; channels groups (2) High conflict (1) superordinate behavioral common goals little variance 1973b; (students) (siu- treatment goals evidence of effective 1975)lated (2) exchange of conflict exchange of persons

organiza- persons somewhat effective tions) (3) no conflict in reducing conflict

management

found the frequency of disagreement among channel members to vary with the noncoercive and coercive sources of power used, and one of Etgar's studies (52) showed that affective and manifest conflict were both primarily generated by attitudinal factors. Pearson and Monoky (93) found service

output level to be inversely related to channel conflict, and Brown (24) observed an inverse relationship between conflict and satisfaction with the channel relationship.

There is evidence (117) that exchange of persons programs and the induction of superordinate goals have some effect on reducing the amount of conflict generated in laboratory simulations of mar-

keting channel relations (69, 124, 125, 126). Studies of channel bargaining behavior in conflict situations (10, 103, 137) have uncovered dimensions of bargaining in marketing relations and provide additional insights into interorganizational conflicts and interorganizational management.

410



Studies of the Relationship Between Power and Conflict

Limited empirical work has been performed that focuses on this critical element of interorganizational relations, irrespective of the setting or the field of scholarship. The studies that have been com- pleted by marketing academics using channel con- texts do, however, provide some useful results. In a laboratory study, it was found that conflict is lowest when referent and expert power are used and highest when reward and coercive power are used (123). These findings are consistent with the theoretical arguments given by Raven and Kruglanski (98). Building on the results of Hunt and Nevin (70), Lusch (79) found that coercive sources of power produce more conflict among channel members on different levels of distribution than do noncoercive sources.

Further investigations into the power-conflict relationship are likely to focus on the effects on vertical conflict of symmetrical versus asymmetrical power-dependence relationships (65, 72, 99). Wil- kinson and Kipnis (154) have described the type of power used in various conflict situations. They found that channel members in conflict with other members for such reasons as competition, or because they were provided with poor goods, services, and other contractual arrangements includ- ing finance, tend to invoke strong and controlling means of influence. This choice of tactics was especially likely to occur when the focal channel member was more powerful than the target member. Less coercive means of influence were used when the influencing member was trying to con- vince the target member to initiate some new action, such as buying its products. The Wilkinson- Kipnis research emphatically indicates that a full understanding of power usage must take into ac- count the nature of the conflict between the parties. Extensive modeling efforts of the power-conflict relationships have been undertaken (31, 66, 99), in- cluding more precise operationalizations of varia-

bles and a presentation of theoretical rationales for the hypothesized functional forms.

Conclusions Extensive studies of interorganizational relations

have taken place outside the traditional domain of sociology and organization behavior but have tended to be ignored by both these fields. Marketing academicians have focused on understanding interorganizational interactions within distribution networks. A perspective has developed which treats marketing channels as superorganizations or as social action systems, and attention has centered on the behavioral dimensions of the relations between interdependent organizations.

In empirical research in marketing, major em- phasis has been on understanding intrachannel power and conflict and on uncovering the relationship between the use of power and the generation of conflict. The studies of power have examined the construct as a function of dependence and of the various sources of power. Conflict has been viewed as opponent-centered behavior that can be functional as well as dysfunctional. Interorganizational conflict processes have been analyzed in terms of their causes and outcomes, and interorganizational conflict management mechanisms have been suggested.

In contrast to many of the interorganizational studies dealing with health and social services organizations, interorganizational research on marketing channels has permitted comparisons between tightly versus loosely joined systems (8). In fact, marketing channels may provide the richest settings for verification of many interorganizational dimensions and for testing of interorganizational theories. An alliance between marketing and organization behavior in this critical area of inquiry may have synergistic effects for both theoretical development of and empirical research on interorganizational relations.

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Torger Reve is a doctoral candidate in the Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, and an Assistant Professor of Business Administration at the Norwegian School of Economics, Bergen, Norway.

Louis W. Stern is the A. Montgomery Ward Professor of Marketing and Chairman, Department of Marketing, Northwestern University.

Received 6/2/78

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