AEI’s Critical Threats ProjectUpdate and Assessment

January 24, 2017

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TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

1. ISIS cells in Libya may support external attack networks in Europe.2. Al Qaeda affiliates are developing more lethal explosive attack capabilities in

northern Mali, where they seek to disrupt security and co-opt local groups.3. The Saudi-led coalition renewed efforts to seize territory from the al Houthi-

Saleh faction in an effort to reset political negotiations, setting conditions that will strengthen AQAP in southern Yemen.

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| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA

Al Qaeda NetworkAl Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri continues to focus his public statements on countering the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Zawahiri eulogized deceased leaders from Jabhat Fateh al Sham (JFS), the successor of al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat al Nusra, and from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in a video released on January 16. Zawahiri praised the militant leaders for avoiding the “quagmire” of pursuing a nation state, in reference to ISIS’s efforts to establish a territorial caliphate.

Al Qaeda is using its safe havens in Syria, Afghanistan, and elsewhere to support an external network capable of conducting attacks in the West. U.S. airstrikes killed an al Qaeda facilitator and an external operations leader, both with ties to networks in Europe, in Idlib Province, Syria, on January 12 and 17. U.S. airstrikes also killed approximately 100 JFS militants at a training camp in Idlib province, Syria on January 19, continuing intensified operations to degrade al Qaeda in Syria. U.S. strikes have killed approximately 150 al Qaeda militants in Syria since January 1, 2017. Outlook: Al Qaeda central leadership will continue to position itself as the “moderate” alternative to ISIS. JFS will replace attrited leadership and continue to pursue al Qaeda’s objectives in Syria.

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GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

PoliticalThe UN-led peace process remains stalled. UN Special Envoy to Yemen Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed met with the Hadi government and al Houthi-Saleh officials to advocate for a political solution to the Yemeni civil war. Each side attempted to set conditions for the negotiations to which the other is unlikely to agree. Representatives of President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government claimed that a new peace deal will keep President Hadi in power instead of establishing a consensus leader, as the UN had proposed in October 2016.The al Houthi-Saleh alliance demanded the return of commercial flights to Sana’a’s airport, which would require the Saudi-led coalition to lift its restrictions on Yemen’s airspace.

Outlook: Direct peace negotiations will not resume in the near term.

SecurityHadi government and allied forces are expanding their control over Yemen’s western Red Sea coast as part of Operation Golden Spear. Hadi government forces took control of Mokha port, Taiz governorate on January 23. Hadi government forces are focused on seizing al Houthi-Saleh bases between Mokha and Taiz city. The loss of these bases will disrupt al Houthi-Saleh supply lines into Taiz city.

Outlook: Hadi government forces will attempt to seize the rest of Mokha city before advancing northward into coastal al Hudaydah governorate.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenAQAP is attempting to regain access to historical safe havens in southern Yemen. AQAP militants conducted near daily attacks on al Hizam security forces in northern Abyan governorate in January, compelling al Hizam forces to withdraw from multiple checkpoints. Driving al Hizam forces from northern Abyan would increase AQAP’s freedom of movement between its safe havens in Abyan and al Bayda governorates. AQAP also targeted al Houthi-Saleh forces in southern al Bayda.

Outlook: AQAP will maintain a high operational tempo against al Hizam forces at strategic sites in Abyan.

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

1) 15 JAN: AQAP militants ambushed and shelled al Hizam forces in Lawder, Abyan. 2) 17 JAN: Hadi government forces seized ballistic missiles in Nihm, Sana’a governorate.3) 19 JAN: Al Hizam security forces withdrew from checkpoints in northern Abyan.4) 20 JAN: AQAP conducted three attacks against al Houthi-Saleh forces in southern al Bayda. 5) 23 JAN: Hadi government forces seized Mokha port.

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PoliticalSomalia’s federal election process is advancing, but disruptions remain likely. Somali representatives elected speakers and deputy speakers for both houses of parliament in January 2017. Some races were closely contested, increasing the likelihood that the upcoming presidential race will also be competitive. An ally of incumbent President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud lost a deputy speaker race, possibly indicating weakness in Mohamud’s grip on power. The presidential field includes President Mohamud, Somalia’s current Prime Minister, and several other high-profile candidates.

Outlook: President Mohamud will likely win re-election, but adversaries may attempt to challenge his legitimacy.

Security The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) coalition remains intact but is struggling to consolidate gains against al Shabaab in central and southern Somalia. The Burundian government rescinded a threat to withdraw its 5,500 troops from Somalia after reaching a deal with the African Union and the European Union to facilitate salary payments to Burundian troops participating in AMISOM. Al Shabaab recaptured Barire town in Lower Shabelle region on January 17, only hours after AMISOM and Somali National Army (SNA) forces seized the town.

Outlook: AMISOM will remain an effective force in as long as troop contributing countries (TCCs) receive payment.

Al Shabaab Al Shabaab is attempting to take control of Afgoi, a strategic town located 15 miles from Mogadishu. Al Shabaab militants seized large parts of the town and forced SNA and AMISOM forces to retreat on January 23. Al Shabaab also attacked SNA outposts in and around Afgoi on January 24. Al Shabaab has conducted multiple raids on Afgoi in the past three weeks.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will use support zones surrounding Mogadishu, including Afgoi, to disrupt security in the capital.

GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

1) 15 JAN: Al Shabaab raided SNA bases in Qoryooley, Lower Shabelle region.2) 17 JAN: Al Shabaab ambushed AMISOM convoys near Mahaday, Middle Shabelle region.3) 17 JAN: Al Shabaab recaptured Barire village, Lower Shabelle region. 4) 20 JAN: U.S. airstrikes targeted al Shabaab near Afgoi, Lower Shabelle region.5) 23 JAN: Al Shabaab raided SNA and AMISOM positions in Afgoi.

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PoliticalA joint effort by Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria to broker a political settlement in Libya is unlikely to succeed in the near term. Political allies of the Libyan National Army (LNA), backed by Egypt, are pursuing a political option that would marginalize the LNA’s main rivals, who support the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). LNA-allied political leaders are also stalling the UN-led peace process. Militias allied with a defunct Islamist-led government occupied government buildings in Tripoli and declared a coup against the GNA for the second time since October 2016, underscoring the GNA’s inability to secure Libya’s capital.

Outlook: Islamist leaders will block any political deal that gives LNA leaders a significant role in Libya’s security apparatus.

SecurityThe LNA is closing in on the last remaining militant-held strongholds in Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city. The LNA seized the Bosnib district and is advancing against the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC) in the Qanfouda and Sabri districts. The BRSC is part of a network of Islamist and Salafi-jihadi militants that operates not only in Benghazi, but throughout central and eastern Libya. Militants conducted a reported vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack in al Majori, Benghazi, on January 20, signaling continued attack capabilities in LNA-controlled areas.

Outlook: The BRSC and its allies will sustain an anti-LNA insurgency after the fall of Benghazi.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in LibyaISIS is operating Europe-focused external attack cells in Libya. The U.S. conducted airstrikes on ISIS training camps southwest of Sirte city on January 19 that targeted operatives planning attacks in Europe. These operatives may be connected to the December 19 attack on a Christmas market in Berlin. The U.S. strikes disrupted ISIS’s efforts to reconstitute its primary ground force in Libya after the loss of its former stronghold in Sirte in late 2016.

Outlook: ISIS will continue to carry out attacks in eastern and western Libya in order to foster increased instability.

WEST AFRICA LIBYA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA

1) 16 JAN: The LNA retook the Bosnib district in southwestern Benghazi.2) 17 JAN: The LNA conducted airstrikes targeting the Abu Salim Martyrs' Brigade in Derna. 3) 18 JAN: The U.S. conducted airstrikes targeting two ISIS training camps southwest of Sirte.4) 20 JAN: A militant detonated a VBIED outside of a mosque in Majouri district, Benghazi.5) 21 JAN: A suspected VBIED exploded in Dahra district, Tripoli.

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Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the MaghrebISIS sympathizers may be infiltrating economic protests in Tunisia. Protests coinciding with the sixth anniversary of Tunisia’s revolution occurred in several locations in Tunisia’s marginalized interior regions on January 15. Rioters reportedly waved ISIS flags in one protest, which Tunisian police broke up with tear gas. The Tunisian government extended a state of emergency, established following an ISIS attack in November 2015, in an effort to control militant activity. The state of emergency also increases government control over the public sphere.

Outlook: Salafi-jihadi groups in Tunisia will exploit the repressive environment created by government crackdowns to attract supporters and recruit new members.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)AQIM is attempting to inflame and co-opt resistance to UN-backed peace accords in northern Mali. AQIM affiliate al Murabitoun conducted a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attack on a joint military base in Gao city, signaling a step-change in the group’s explosive attack capabilities. The attack aimed to disrupt cooperation between the Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA), a Tuareg separatist coalition, and the Malian army. Some elements of the CMA accused the Malian army of failing to secure the base or being complicit in the attack. An AQIM shari’a official threatened additional attacks on those who collaborate with Malian and UN forces.

The Nigerian military's disregard for civilian life in northeastern Nigeria is preserving conditions permissive to Boko Haram and reinforcing the population's reliance on local vigilante groups. The Nigerian Air Force struck an internally displaced persons (IDP) camp on January 17, killing as many as 236 civilians and wounding as many as 300. Approximately 100 Boko Haram militants assaulted the same IDP camp two days later, killing approximately 15 people, mostly civilians. The Nigerian military’s actions cause civilians to mistrust it as much as Boko Haram. Both organizations have long histories of targeting civilians accused of supporting their enemies.

Outlook: AQIM will continue attacks on joint security forces in Mali. Civilians in northeastern Nigeria will resist or remain neutral as the Nigerian state attempts to counter Boko Haram.

WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB

1) 11-13 JAN: Protesters clashed with security forces in Ben Guerdane, Tunisia over the closure of the Ras Jedir border crossing.2) 14-16 JAN: Protesters waving ISIS flags demonstrated in Sidi Ali Ben Aoun and Meknassi, Sidi Bouzid governorate, Tunisia. Police broke up protests with tear gas.3) 18 JAN: Tunisia and Libya reopened the Ras Jedir border crossing.4) 23 JAN: Algerian police destroyed a bomb factory in Tizi Ouzou city, Tizi Ouzou Province, Algeria.

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1) 16 JAN: Boko Haram suicide bombers killed five civilians in a mosque in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria.2) 17 JAN: The Nigerian Air Force struck an IDP camp in Rann, Borno State, Nigeria.3) 18 JAN: Al Murabitoun conducted a SVBIED attack on a military base in Gao city, Mali, killing more than 70 security personnel.4) 20 JAN: Yahya Jammeh conceded the Gambian presidency after a standoff with ECOWAS forces.

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ACRONYMS

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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Katherine Zimmermanresearch managerkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran analystpaul.bucala@aei.org(202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram managerheather.malacaria@aei.org(202) 888-6575

Emily Estelleal Qaeda analystemily.estelle@aei.org(202) 888-6570

Caitlin PendletonIran analystcaitlin.pendleton@aei.org(202) 888-6577

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirector

fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569