AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT

March 24, 2015

TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

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1. ISIS “Wilayat Sana’a” claimed credit for the mass-casualty bombings in Sana’a.

2. ISIS claimed credit for the attack on the Bardo Museum in Tunis.

3. Iranian regime officials seemed less confident in reaching a political framework for a

nuclear deal with the P5+1 by March 31 following talks in Lausanne, Switzerland.

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ASSESSMENT:

Al Qaeda NetworkAl Qaeda may be looking to compete with the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) by encouraging low-level attacks by its

followers in the West. Al Shabaab recently called for supporters to target shopping centers in the West, copying its 2013

Westgate Mall attack in Kenya, for example. Despite competition with ISIS, the al Qaeda network will continue to direct

resources to the Iraq-Syria front to support the Sunni populations.

Al Qaeda continues to emphasize a strategy that attempts to minimize Muslim casualties as compared to the one put forth by

ISIS. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s response to the ISIS-claimed attack in Yemen’s capital underscores AQAP’s

continued commitment to and observance of the protection of “public spaces” from terrorist attacks.

Outlook: Al Qaeda seeks to reassert its relevance in the global jihadist movement and will try to influence the decision-making

of foreign fighters in the Iraq-Syria conflict.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associatesPakistani Islamist groups, including the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) under TTP leader Mullah Fazlullah, the TTP’s Jamaat-

ul-Ahrar, and Lashkar-e-Islam announced they had merged to form a unified front against the Pakistan government and military.

Jamaat-ul-Ahrar had split from the TTP over Fazlullah’s selection as emir. Jamaat-ul-Ahrar also claimed credit for the Lahore

church bombings.

The Pakistani military (PakMil) continues to target Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants in ground operations and air strikes

in tribal and urban areas of Pakistan, especially in Khyber. The TTP’s leadership is under significant pressure as U.S. and

Pakistani airstrikes target TTP leaders on both sides of the Afghanistan and Pakistan border.

Outlook: PakMil operations, drone strikes continue in North/South Waziristan, Khyber/Orakzai Agencies, and across Afghan

border. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) continues media operations and may launch additional spectacular attacks,

possibly in conjunction with TTP.

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AL QAEDA

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalThe Yemeni state is fragmented between an al Houthi-run government in Sana’a and a President Hadi-run government in Aden.

A military escalation on March 19 in Aden along with the ISIS attack in Sana’a on March 20 mobilized the international

community to push for a negotiated solution to the political crisis, but the al Houthis are unwilling to join in talks hosted by the

Gulf Cooperation Council. Iranian assistance to the al Houthi-run government is probably lessening the impact of economic and

regional marginalization of the al Houthis.

Outlook: The al Houthis’ continued refusal to participate in talks will progress in reaching a political solution.

SecurityThe security situation deteriorated rapidly in Yemen. The al Houthis escalated the conflict with Hadi in Aden and both sides are

now deploying forces in order to secure territory. The al Houthis have seized parts of Yemen’s third largest city, Taiz, and are

also massing forces along the Ma’rib-al Bayda border. ISIS claimed responsibility for its first mass-casualty attack in Yemen that

killed over 130 people. ISIS also claimed responsibility for the execution of 29 soldiers in Lahij governorate in south Yemen.

Militants, reported as being members of AQAP’s Ansar al Sharia but possibly ISIS supporters, temporarily seized control of

Hawta, the capital of Lahij, before Yemeni troops secured it under Hadi’s orders.

Outlook: Hadi and the al Houthi movement will both try to solidify military control of their territory in the coming weeks. The

ISIS-claimed attacks targeting al Houthis in mosques are designed to drive sectarian tensions in Yemen. The al Houthis may

use the attacks as an excuse to crack down on dissenters and anti-al Houthi political actors.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)AQAP publicly distanced itself from the March 20 mosque bombings and affirmed its commitment to the strategy put forth by al

Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri that seeks to minimize Muslim casualties in attacks.

Outlook: AQAP will probably seek to challenge ISIS’s arrival in Yemen. It will also continue to expand its popular support by embedding with local populations aligned against the al Houthis.

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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

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1) 19 MAR: Pro-Hadi popular committees defeated Special Security Forces (SSF) led by an al Houthi and Saleh-loyalist in Aden city.2) 20 MAR: ISIS conducted five SVEST attacks targeting al Houthis in Sana’a and Sa’ada. 3) 20 MAR: Militants temporarily seized al Hawta city, Lahij, and executed 29 SSF soldiers.4) 19 MAR: Al Houthi militants arrived in Taiz city, Taiz from Sana’a.

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ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalThe Kenyan National Assembly Majority Leader Aden Duale suggested that Kenya should negotiate with al Shabaab to prevent further attacks the day after an attack targeted the Mandera county governor, although later backed away from these comments. An al Shabaab spokesman responded that the group would be open to negotiations if the offer came from the Kenyan government. While the Kenyan government as a whole does not appear willing to negotiate with al Shabaab, it does seem that some members, such as Duale, would be open to the idea.

Outlook: Duale’s statement indicates the mounting political pressure the Kenyan government has been under as terrorist attacks in the country have increased.

Security Al Shabaab has re-focused on Kenya based on Kenya’s role in AMISOM. Al Shabaab carried out two attacks in Kenya, one on

March 15 in Mandera and the second on March 17 in Wajir, both in Kenya’s North Eastern province. It was reported that Kenya

conducted two airstrikes in Somalia, possibly in retaliation for the attacks. The first airstrike occurred on March 16, near

Bardhere and the second on March 17, near Beled Hawo, both in Gedo region.

Outlook: Kenya is still committed to fighting al Shabaab and will likely continue to carry out operations against the group both

in Kenya and Somalia.

Al ShabaabThere may be a divide within al Shabaab between those who favor declaring allegiance to ISIS and those who remain loyal to al Qaeda. An al Shabaab cleric issued a statement approving of ISIS and stating that he had no objections to al Shabaab joining the group. He is the first al Shabaab cleric to make such a statement. He also hinted at a divide within the group over the question of declaring allegiance to ISIS.

Outlook: The statement from the al Shabaab cleric is the most public instance of reported divides within al Shabaab over staying with al Qaeda or joining ISIS. If these divides cannot be managed by al Shabaab leadership, they may weaken the group and lead to infighting.

HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

1) 16 MAR: Kenyan airstrike targeted al Shabaab near Bardhere, Gedoregion.2) 17 MAR: Al Shabaab conducted an attack in Wajir, North Eastern province, Kenya. 3) 17 MAR: Kenyan airstrike targeted al Shabaab near BeledHawo, Gedo region.4) 19 MAR: SNA and AMISOM forces launched operation to open roads to Bulo-Burde, Hiraanregion.

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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

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ASSESSMENT:Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)Unconfirmed reports stated that the Algerian military killed several senior AQIM officials in an attack on an AQIM meeting in

Bejaia, near Algiers. Rumors claimed that Abdelmalek Droukdel, the leader of AQIM, was among those killed, although this

claim could not be verified.

Outlook: If either of the reports on the death of AQIM leadership are true, it would be a significant setback for AQIM. Unrest in

Libya will continue to benefit AQIM and contribute to its overall ability to carry out smuggling operations in the Sahel.

Ansar al Sharia (Libya, Tunisia)ISIS claimed a March 18 attack on the Bardo Museum in Tunis, which killed over 20 foreigners. The attack was one of the

deadliest in Tunisia in over a decade. Tunisian counter-terrorism operations continued before, and increased after the attack. In

Libya, Ansar al Sharia Libya (ASL) released a set of pictures showing fighters training at a camp in Benghazi, indicting ASL

maintains a presence in there despite Libyan military gains and reports of defections to ISIS.

Outlook: Militant activity targeting Tunisian security forces and retaliatory counter-terrorism operations will likely continue to

increase, particularly in the aftermath of the Bardo Museum attack.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)Thirty assailants attacked a MINUSMA convoy in Deliman, northern Mali. MINUSMA forces and the attackers exchanged

gunfire, resulting in the capture of four assailants. Meanwhile, AQIM militants executed one Malian civilian accused of spying for

French forces in Timbuktu. Suspected former MUJAO militants planted an IED close to Nampala that ultimately killed two

Malian soldiers. Malian security forces also killed one individual and arrested three others in connection to the 07 MAR al

Murabitoun restaurant attack.

Outlook: Militant activity targeting MINUSMA forces will continue to be a major problem for Mali. Recent AQIM and MUJAO

activity suggests that these groups will continue to stage more attacks, ultimately bringing more instability to an already divided

nation.

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MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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NORTH AFRICAWEST AFRICA

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1) 18 MAR: At least two gunmen killed over 20 foreign tourists in the ISIS attack at the BardoMuseum in Tunis. 2) 17 MAR: Tunisian security forces dismantled four terrorist cells and arrested 22 militants recruiting Tunisians to fight in Libya, in Kairouan.3) 19 MAR: Tunisian security forces dismantled four terrorists cells and arrested 12 militants in Gasfa.

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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SAHELWEST AFRICA

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1) 13 MAR: Unidentified assailants ambushed a MINUSMA convoy in Deliman. 2) 18 MAR: Malian security forces arrested three individuals connected to the 07 MAR Bamako restaurant attack. 3) 18 MAR: AQIM militants executed a Malian civilian on charges of spying for French forces in Tichift.4) 19 MAR: Suspected MUJAO members planted IED.

ASSESSMENT:

Regional Developments Iran’s Arab and African Affairs Deputy to the Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with Omani Foreign Minister Yusuf

bin Alawi bin Abdullah in Muscat, to discuss the ongoing political and security crises in Yemen. Abdollahian reiterated Tehran’s

support for a multiparty coalition government in Sana’a and implored opposing political groups to engage in inclusive dialogue.

Tehran condemned the March 20, suicide bombings that targeted al Houthi mosques in Sana’a and Sa’ada. The Foreign

Ministry said the attacks are part of a seditious plot to exacerbate insecurity and unrest.

Outlook: Iran will continue to voice its support for a balance of power in the government of Sana’a, while reinforcing the al

Houthis as the main power broker in Yemen.

Nuclear Talks

Over the course of six days of bilateral U.S.-Iran talks last week in Lausanne, Switzerland, regime officials expressed gradually

less confidence in reaching a political framework for a nuclear deal with the P5+1 by March 31. Atomic Energy Agency

Organization of Iran (AEOI) Head Ali Akbar Salehi expressed some hope on March 17 that two “remaining” issues would be

resolved by March 20, but Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif stated on March 20 that “two notable differences remain to

be negotiated.” The regime remained committed to reaching an agreement, however, as Zarif stated on March 19 that Iran

“would stay as long as it takes” in the talks. Iran and the P5+1 will resume negotiations on March 25.

Outlook: Iran will continue to work towards reaching a political framework for a nuclear deal with the P5+1.

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IRAN

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN

1214 MAR – 20 MAR 2015

15 MAR: Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to the Supreme Leader Ali Akbar Velayati stated that the Islamic

Revolution is transnational, devoid of ethnic and tribal allegiances, and recognizes the entirety of the

Islamic world as one body.

15 MAR: The Guardian Council approved amendments to the 2015 budget.

15 MAR: The number of Parliamentarians who have signed a proposal calling for the removal of all sanctions

rose to 260.

16 MAR: Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with Omani Foreign Minister Yusuf bin Alawi

bin Abdullah in Muscat to discuss the political crisis in Yemen.

17 MAR: President Hassan Rouhani inaugurated phase 12 of the South Pars gas project, while Oil Minister

Bijan Namdar Zanganeh said that the South Pars gas project is a clear message to the world that

sanctions will not stop Iran’s oil industry.

17 MAR: National Security and Foreign Policy Parliamentary Commission Chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi

stated that a nuclear agreement is more likely now than in the past.

18 MAR: Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani announced that Assyrian Christians

requested training and weapons in a recent visit to Tehran.

18 MAR: Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh criticized OPEC policies and said that Iran should work with non-OPEC

countries in reducing oil production.

19 MAR: Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif insisted that the nuclear deal must be binding under

Chapter VII of the UN charter, eliciting criticism from Hossein Shariatmadari, Managing Editor of

conservative media outlet Kayhan.

20 MAR: Iran’s nuclear negotiations team returned to Iran to participate in memorial services for President

Rouhani’s mother. Negotiations are set to resume on Wednesday March 25.

ACRONYMS

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Atomic Energy Agency of Iran (AEOI)

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)

Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T)

Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH)

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)

Islamic State (IS)

Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH)

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH)

National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)

North Waziristan (NWA)

Pakistani Military (PakMil)

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

Somalia National Army (SNA)

South Waziristan (SWA)

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT ANALYSTS

Katherine Zimmermansenior al Qaeda analystkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org(202) 888-6576

Alexis Knutsenal Qaeda analystalexis.knutsen@aei.org(202) 888-6570

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Mehrdad MoarefianIran analystmehrdad.moarefian@aei.org(202) 888-6574

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project,visit www.criticalthreats.org.

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