AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT

February 17, 2015

TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

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1. Yemen’s ongoing political crisis is increasing strength of regional movements.2. Iranian regime officials celebrated the 36th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution and

focused on obtaining a favorable nuclear deal. 3. Tunisian counter-terrorism operation arrested militants from a new violent Islamist cell.

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ASSESSMENT:

Al Qaeda NetworkAl Qaeda may be looking to compete with the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) by encouraging low-level attacks by its

followers in the West. The Charlie Hebdo attack, claimed by AQAP, may provide both momentum to the movement and

propaganda for al Qaeda to push for such attacks. Despite competition with ISIS, the al Qaeda network will continue to direct

resources to the Iraq-Syria front to support the Sunni populations there.

Outlook: Al Qaeda seeks to reassert its relevance in the global jihadist movement and will try to influence the decision-making

of foreign fighters in the Iraq-Syria conflict.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associatesThe Pakistani military (PakMil) continues to target Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants in ground operations and air strikes

in tribal and urban areas of Pakistan. The TTP’s leadership is under significant pressure as U.S. and Pakistani airstrikes target

TTP leaders on both sides of the Afghanistan and Pakistan border. Despite increased counter-terrorism efforts by PakMil, there

has been a notable increase in sectarian attacks against Shia Muslims by the TTP and its affiliates in the last two weeks.

Outlook: PakMil operations, drone strikes continue in North/South Waziristan, Khyber/Orakzai Agencies, and across Afghan

border. The tempo of militant attacks may falter in response to intensified anti-TTP operations. Al Qaeda in the Indian

Subcontinent (AQIS) continues media operations and may launch additional spectacular attacks, possibly in conjunction with

TTP.

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AL QAEDA

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalYemen’s political crisis remains unresolved after the majority of Yemeni political groups rejected the al Houthi constitutional

declaration released on February 6. UN-led peace talks continue. Tribal leaders from Ma’rib, al Bayda and al Jawf governorates

met in Ma’rib to discuss creating an autonomous Sheba region, which preliminary reports say would reject al Houthi leadership

in Sana’a and cut off oil and power supplies to the rest of the country.

Outlook: The al Houthis strongly oppose the goal of tribal coalitions to create an independent Sheba region. Any attempt to

create the Sheba region will likely result in armed conflict.

SecurityAQAP’s Ansar al Sharia militants carried out a major attack against the Yemeni 19th Infantry Brigade in Bayhan, Shabwah,

seizing a military base and capturing large weapons reserves. The Yemeni military carried out airstrikes targeting the weapon

depots in the camp before local tribal mediation resulted in prisoner release and the withdrawal of Ansar al Sharia militants from

the base, which is currently under the control of tribal forces.

Outlook: Ansar al Sharia will likely continue attacks on key military targets in southern and eastern governorates.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)AQAP released a video mourning the death of senior leader Hadith bin Ghazi al Nadhari and praising Nadhari’s role as both a

religious leader and active combatant in the jihad as a model to all Muslims.

Outlook: AQAP will likely try to exploit the growing anti-al Houthi sentiment across Yemen to gain support among tribal forces

that feel threatened by al Houthi influence in their areas.

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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

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1) 07-10 FEB: Allied military and al Houthi forces drove Ansar al Sharia from DhiNa’im district and entered al Bayda.2) 12 FEB: Ansar al Sharia militants seized 19th Infantry brigade’s base and weapon stockpiles in Bayhan, Shabwah. 3) 08 FEB, 11 FEB: Al Houthi militants and tribesmen clashed in Makhabir and Qafirdistricts of Ibb.4) 09 FEB: Southern Movement militants attacked 33rd Brigade in al Dhaleh city.

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ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalThe Somali parliament approved the cabinet proposal of Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke ended weeks of political tensions. There was a move by some members of parliament against the speaker of the house prior to the vote. Separately, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud participated in a meeting in Dhusamareb, Galgudud region, with local and regional officials to discuss the formation of a regional administration.

Outlook: There is still likely to be political tension within the Somali federal government even after the cabinet formation. Attempts to form the regional administration may exacerbate tensions as different groups vie for positions in it.

Security Fighting between Somali federal government forces and Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ) militants, a moderate Sufi militant

group opposed to al Shabaab, broke out in Guriel, Galgudud region on February 10. ASWJ repelled a government attempt to

retake Guriel on February 12.

Outlook: The fighting between the Somali government troops and ASWJ militants may distract both forces from the fight

against al Shabaab.

Al ShabaabAl Shabaab assassinated a Somali member of parliament in Mogadishu on February 9. Al Shabaab also carried out raids in Boosaaso, Bari region on February 8 and Barawe, Lower Shabelle region on February 11.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will likely continue to carry out attacks on government officials. Al Shabaab is still able to launch attacks on security forces and may capitalize on the fighting between government forces and ASWJ in order to carry out more attacks in central Somalia.

HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

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SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:1) 09 FEB: Al Shabaab assassinates member of parliament in Mogadishu.2) 10-12 FEB: Somali government forces and ASWJ militants fight in Guriel, Galgudud region. 3) 08 FEB: Al Shabaab militants attack checkpoint in Boosaaso, Bari region.4) 11 FEB: Al Shabaab attacks AMISOM and SNA bases outside of Barawe, Lower Shabelle region.

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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

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ASSESSMENT:

AQIMAlgeria continued its counter-smuggling operations against AQIM near Algeria’s southern border. Algerian security forces interdicted 20 AQIM militants trying to infiltrate Algeria from northern Mali.

Outlook: Unrest in Libya will continue to contribute to AQIM’s overall ability to carry out smuggling operations in the Sahel. AQIM may seek to support Ansar al Din and associated movements in Mali and will likely continue its relationships with Ansar al Sharia in Libya and Tunisia.

Ansar al Sharia (Libya, Tunisia)Operation Dignity and Libyan military forces launched an operation against Ansar al Sharia Libya and allied forces for control of Benghazi. A reported 210 militants arrived by boat from the western city of Misrata to reinforce Ansar al Sharia. Libyan military forces seized almost full control of the Laithi and Sabri districts in central Benghazi, both previous Ansar al Sharia strongholds. Military forces also captured the Saiqa Special Forces Base, the largest military base in Benghazi, and the Tripoli-Benghazi highway, effectively cutting Ansar al Sharia’s western land and sea supply lines. In Tunisia, security forces carried out two large counter-terrorism operations, arresting 32 militants linked to the Uqbah Ibn Nafaa Brigade and 20 members of a new militant cell called the Abu Meriam Brigade.

Outlook: Despite recent Operation Dignity gains, the conflict in Libya is likely to continue unabated as Ansar al Sharia holds territory in Derna, Sirte, and Benghazi. In Tunisia, militant activity is likely to continue to increase.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)Inter-Malian peace talks are currently underway in Algiers, with the Malian government and various separatist rebel groups participating, including the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), and the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA). Meanwhile, Iyad Ag Ghali, the founder of Ansar al Din, reportedly returned to the Kidal region.

Outlook: It is unlikely the Malian peace talks will be able to solve the crisis in northern Mali and ease tensions between separatists rebel groups, the Malian government, and pro-government militias. Moreover, Ansar al Din and AQIM could potentially benefit from Mali’s political instability.

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MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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1) 07 FEB: Operation Dignity forces advance against Ansar al Sharia in several areas of Benghazi and seize the main military base in Benghazi.2) 07 FEB: Tunisian security forces arrest 32 militants linked to the Uqbah Ibn Nafaa Brigade3) 11 FEB: Tunisian security forces arrest 20 members of the Abu Meriam Brigade near Tunis.

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

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SAHELWEST AFRICA

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1) 07 FEB: A member of the MNLA shot and severely wounded a Malian soldier in Menaka, Gao region.2) 09 FEB: The Malian army arrested 16 terrorists, three of whom participated in the 05 JAN Nampalagarrison attack. 1

ASSESSMENT:

Nuclear Talks

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reiterated his ongoing support for the nuclear negotiations during a speech on

February 8; he also rejected a two-stage deal, in which a details-oriented settlement would follow a political agreement. The

Supreme Leader may be hinting that the framework of an agreement could be reached, but only if it is in one stage and

addresses his concerns about immediate sanctions relief.

Outlook: The Supreme Leader and regime members will continue to support the ongoing effort to reach a deal. If a deal fulfills

his requirements, he may begin preparing the rhetorical and political justifications for domestic audiences to accept it.

Military and Security

Artesh Commander Major General Ataollah Salehi stated that the Artesh forces “will be more capable than in the past

protecting the Islamic Revolution” ahead of the 36th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution this past week. The Artesh

Command and Staff College announced that it is “…ready to train Iraqi officers” after the topic during Iraqi Defense Minister

Khalid al Obeidi’s recent visit to Iran. These statements may reflect renewed self-confidence in the regime’s growing

investment in the Artesh, which has historically received less of the regime’s focus than the Islamic Revolutionary Guards

Corps (IRGC).

Outlook: The Artesh will continue to promote itself rhetorically as a fighting force aligned with the IRGC’s ideological goal of

protecting the Islamic Revolution.

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IRAN

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN

1207 FEB – 13 FEB 2015

08 FEB: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei gave a speech on the 36th anniversary of the Islamic

Revolution supporting the nuclear negotiations; he also stating that “no deal is better than a bad deal.”

08 FEB: Artesh Commander Major General Ataollah Salehi stated that the Artesh is “more capable” than ever

to protect the Islamic Revolution.”

09 FEB: The IRI Air Force unveiled “Lightning 2” fighter jet.

09 FEB: Artesh Commander Brig. Gen. Hossein Valivand said that the Artesh was ready to train Iraqi officers.

10 FEB: AEOI Head Ali Akbar Salehi announced that next generation centrifuges to be unveiled in 6 months.

10 FEB: President Hassan Rouhani met with Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval to discuss bilateral

relations.

11 FEB: President Rouhani urged a unified stance among Iranians on the the nuclear talks and rejected

President Obama’s previous argument that sanctions had forced Iran to the negotiating table on the 36th

anniversary of the Islamic Revolution.

11 FEB: IRGC Quds Force Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani stated that the Islamic Revolution

had spread throughout the region and that ISIS was close to being destroyed.

11 FEB: Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian supported a unified Yemeni government.

12 FEB: Senior Iranian officials echoed the Supreme Leader’s support for negotiations, while NSFP

Parliamentary Commission member Esmail Kowsari reiterated Khamanei’s opposition to a two-stage deal.

13 FEB: Rezaei said that “all sanctions should be lifted in one step, anything else would be unacceptable.”

13 FEB: An Iranian-built cement factory opened in Venezuela.

ACRONYMS

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Atomic Energy Agency of Iran (AEOI)

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)

al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)

Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T)

Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH)

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)

Islamic State (IS)

Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH)

Lebanese Hezbollah (LH)

National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)

North Waziristan (NWA)

Pakistani Military (PakMil)

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

Somalia National Army (SNA)

South Waziristan (SWA)

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT ANALYSTS

Katherine Zimmermansenior al Qaeda analystkatherine.zimmerman@aei.org(202) 888-6576

Alexis Knutsenal Qaeda analystalexis.knutsen@aei.org(202) 888-6570

Marie DonovanIran analystmarie.donovan@aei.org(202) 888-6572

Mehrdad MoarefianIran analystmehrdad.moarefian@aei.org(202) 888-6574

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project,visit www.criticalthreats.org.

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