2016-05-10 CTP Update and Assessment

14
AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT May 10, 2016

Transcript of 2016-05-10 CTP Update and Assessment

Page 1: 2016-05-10 CTP Update and Assessment

AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT May 10, 2016

Page 2: 2016-05-10 CTP Update and Assessment

TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS

2

1

2

1. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for Muslims to mobilize to Syria and unite in their jihad in order to set conditions for a future emirate.

2. A pro-ISIS cell attempted to weaponize anthrax and plan a mass-casualty attack in Kenya and Uganda, signaling possible ISIS expansion into East Africa.

3. ISIS is resuming a territorial growth strategy in Libya, bolstered by support from tribal factions in central Libya.

3

Page 3: 2016-05-10 CTP Update and Assessment

ASSESSMENT:

al Qaeda NetworkAl Qaeda continues to prioritize its efforts and the jihad in al Sham (Syria), calling for Muslims to mobilize. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri described the uprising in Syria as the only Arab Spring uprising that took the right path and called for Muslims to mobilize to Syria and for Muslims in Syria to unite in their fight against those seeking to repress Muslims, including the West, Iran, Turkey, and Russia. Zawahiri framed the fight in Syria as one to free Syria of the regime so that a “mujahid entity” will rise in it to govern. Zawahiri did not indicate that Jabhat al Nusra would be the governing force and acknowledge ambilavence to the organization behind the governance as long as it supported Islam. Zawahiri’s statement reinforced a massive campaign in Syria to mobilize Muslims against the regime. Hamza bin Laden, the son of Osama bin Laden, echoed the call to mobilization, calling on those unable to join the jihad in theater to conduct lone-wolf attacks.

Outlook: Al Qaeda is still setting the conditions for an emirate in Syria, but is calling for the defense of its positions and the unification of the fight.

3

AL QAEDA

Page 4: 2016-05-10 CTP Update and Assessment

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalAttempts to resolve Yemen’s political crisis are ongoing outside of the UN framework. Former Yemeni vice president and prime minister Khaled Bahah, whom President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi replaced in an April 2016 cabinet reshuffle, met with Saudi Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan, in Riyadh. UN-led talks continued in Kuwait, but the al Houthi-Saleh delegations have sustained their objectives to the agenda.

Outlook: The Kuwait talks will continue at the tactical level to negotiate prisoner exchanges and local ceasefires, but are unlikely to yield a negotiated political settlement.

SecurityClashes intensified in Taiz, Ma’rib, and Sana’a governorates, but remained below pre-ceasefire levels. Fissures between the Aden security elements and the Hadi government were evident when Aden security and police forces began expelling residents from northern governorates, which the Hadi government condemned. Southern powerbrokers are consolidating power in the city and undermining the Hadi government’s authority.

Outlook: Clashes will likely continue at present levels with localized exchanges between the coalition and al Houthi-Saleh forces. Southern officials will likely continue to foster regional constituencies and may attempt to sideline sources of opposition.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in YemenAQAP is consolidating in historical safe havens in central and northwestern Shabwah. Tribal and military leaders seek to avert coalition intervention through mediation with AQAP. Limited U.S. military deployments to Yemen will likely accelerate coalition operations as well as local efforts to preempt them. A Salafi-jihadi cell, possibly including AQAP militants from al Mukalla, launched IED attacks on civilians and local officials in Ma’rib city. Islamist militants continue to target Aden security officials.

Outlook: AQAP will negotiate to maintain its presence in Shabwah, absent indicators of coalition operations in the area, and will continue to carry out attacks in Aden in order to undermine the consolidation of a strong state.

4

YEMENGULF OF ADEN

Page 5: 2016-05-10 CTP Update and Assessment

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

5

YEMENGULF OF ADEN

1

4

3

2

1) 05 MAY: U.S. forces deployed to al Anad base, Lahij.2) 08 MAY: Southern security forces expelled northern Yemenis from Aden.3) 05 MAY: AQAP began to withdraw from Zinjibar, Abyan. 4) 09 MAY: Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired ballistic missile toward Saudi Arabia.5) 06 MAY: Possible AQAP militants detonated IED in a qat market in Ma’rib city.

5

Page 6: 2016-05-10 CTP Update and Assessment

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalThe Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) allegedly exploited underage, former al Shabaab members to identify active militants, according to the Washington Post. The UN has likened the practice to the use of child soldiers. A senior NISA official claimed that the CIA has full knowledge of all NISA activities, including this program. The UN began caring for the former militants when NISA halted the program in late 2015.

Outlook: The allegations may harm Somali counter-radicalization efforts, but will not impact NISA-CIA cooperation.

SecurityThe Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be expanding its influence in East Africa, though governments seeking counterterrorism funding may also exaggerate its presence. Kenyan and Ugandan security forces arrested three members of an ISIS-linked cell in Nairobi, Kenya and Kampala, Uganda. Kenyan authorities said the cell planned to carry out an attack similar to the 2013 Westgate Mall attack and may have sought to weaponize anthrax. The cell was reportedly communicating with ISIS in Libya and Syria. Ugandan police also increased security at Entebbe Airport after a “credible” al Shabaab threat.

Outlook: ISIS will court support in East Africa to compete with al Qaeda, but is unlikely to dedicate significant resources there.

Al ShabaabAl Shabaab is attempting to prevent security forces from operating effectively in Mogadishu. Militants conducted a complex attack with a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) on the traffic police headquarters. The group targeted Somali National Army (SNA) troops with an improvised explosive device (IED) at Afgoi town, which controls traffic on the main ground line of communication between Mogadishu and Kismayo. Militants claimed to have shelled the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) headquarters in an attempt to threaten a British deployment there.

Outlook: Al Shabaab will attempt to further constrain SNA and AMISOM movement through Mogadishu in order to move fighters and supplies into the city or its surroundings without interruption.

6

HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

Page 7: 2016-05-10 CTP Update and Assessment

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

7

HORN OF AFRICA

GULF OF ADEN

1) 03 MAY: Al Shabaab shelled AMISOM’s Halane Base in Waberi District, Mogadishu.2) 03 MAY: Kenyan and Ugandan security forces arrested ISIS-linked militants in Nairobi, Kenya and Kampala, Uganda.3) 05 MAY: ISIS claimed an ambush on NISA officers in Daynile District, Mogadishu.4) 06 MAY: Al Shabaab attacked SNA checkpoints in Bardhere, Gedo region.

43

1

2

Page 8: 2016-05-10 CTP Update and Assessment

ASSESSMENT:

PoliticalThe UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) remains weak, especially following allied Misratan forces’ loss of Abugrein to ISIS. The Libyan National Army (LNA) secured the support of militias in Libya’s oil crescent and is now the only Libyan force positioned to attack ISIS in Sirte, rendering it unlikely to concede authority to the GNA. Elements of the Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) support the GNA, but the LNA and its supporters in the HoR remain irreconcilable.

Outlook: The LNA will continue to position itself as an anti-ISIS force to gain political leverage, internally and internationally.

SecurityThe LNA is poised to attack ISIS’s stronghold in Sirte, but may also be using the impending offensive as cover to gain control in Libya’s central oil crescent. The LNA claimed complete control over al Jufra district, south of Sirte, including the regional airbase and nearby oilfields. Misratan militias are counterattacking in an effort to recapture Abugrein and key roads in the area. Misratan forces are stretched thin, however, because they continue to support the GNA in Tripoli. Outlook: The LNA will continue to consolidate control in the central oil crescent as well as in al Jufra. The Misratans will dedicate more resources in an effort to recapture Abugrein, possibly inviting opposition from anti-GNA forces in Tripoli.

Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in LibyaISIS has resumed its build strategy in Libya following the stalling of LNA and Misratan offensives on Sirte. ISIS is attempting to consolidate control in Abugrein in order to build its coherent system of control on the central Libyan coast. ISIS is also bolstered by the support of tribal leaders and elders, representing factions of a large tribal federation that has suffered since the fall of Qaddafi. These tribal leaders are aligning with ISIS against opponents in both the LNA and Misratan blocs, and may support ISIS-led campaigns on Libya’s oil infrastructure.

Outlook: ISIS will conduct explosive attacks to disrupt Misratan counterattacks on Abugrein and may pursue a similar strategy to fix the LNA to the south and east of Sirte.

8

LIBYAWEST AFRICA

Page 9: 2016-05-10 CTP Update and Assessment

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

9

LIBYAWEST AFRICA

1) 05 MAY: ISIS seized Abugrein and several nearby towns from Misratan forces.2) 05 MAY: A large ISIS convoy traveled south toward al Jufra.3) 03 MAY: Misratan-linked forces clashed with LNA-affiliated forces in Zillah.4) 06-07 MAY: Misratan forces counterattacked against ISIS militants near Abugrein.5) 08-09 MAY: ISIS detained individuals for Misratan and LNA ties in Abugrein.

4

3

1

2

5

Page 10: 2016-05-10 CTP Update and Assessment

ASSESSMENT:

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)AQIM is working to increase its military capabilities in El Oued province, eastern Algeria. The Algerian military is responding to this uptick in AQIM activity, however, and killed the group’s arms director, a deputy of AQIM emir Abdelmalik Droukdel. The leader of a militant group calling itself the “Islamic State in the Sahara,” who may be the former leader of an AQIM affiliate in the Sahel, threatened attacks on the UN mission in the Western Sahara and security and tourist targets in Morocco.

Outlook: AQIM will continue to reactivate its networks and build capabilities in Algeria, especially in its center and south.

Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)ISIS may be preparing to attack Jewish targets in Tunisia before or during Ramadan season. The Israeli Counter-terrorism Bureau issued a travel warning for Djerba Island, Tunisia, citing a “severe concrete threat” to an annual Jewish festival on 25-26 MAY. The warning comes a week after Tunisian security forces dismantled a cell in Djerba and interdicted a planned attack on a synagogue in La Marsa. ISIS traditionally surges before or during Ramadan, and the holiday’s juxtaposition with the Sykes-Picot centennial anniversary increases the incentive to attack. The AQIM-affiliated Uqba Ibn Nafa’a brigade continued efforts to build its support zone in the Tunisian-Algerian border region, where Tunisian security forces recently dismantled several logistical cells.

Outlook: ISIS will likely attack symbols of Western colonialism in northern Tunisia in the near term. Uqba Ibn Nafa’a will continue to build its support base and defend its safe haven in western Tunisia.

Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun) AQIM-linked groups in Mali are developing robust media arms, indicating a dedicated source of funding and a concerted effort to distribute a cohesive message. Ansar al Din likely shifted some of its media capabilities to its southern affiliate, the Macina Liberation Front, to help build up the group’s media production capabilities.

Outlook: AQIM affiliates will conduct coordinated messaging campaigns in order to market their brand and drive recruitment..

10

MAGHREB AND SAHEL

WEST AFRICA

Page 11: 2016-05-10 CTP Update and Assessment

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

11

MAGHREBWEST AFRICA

2

3

4

1

1) 03 MAY: Tunisian security forces dismantled a four-person terrorist cell in Sidi Bouzid.2) 04 MAY: Moroccan security forces arrested a suspected pro-ISIS militant in Saidia.3) 05 MAY: Tunisian security forces dismantled an Uqba Ibn Nafa’a cell in Kef.4) 07 MAY: Algerian forces seized a large weapons cache in El Oued, Algeria.5) 09 MAY: Israel warned against travel to Djerba Island.

5

Page 12: 2016-05-10 CTP Update and Assessment

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:

12

SAHELWEST AFRICA

321

4

1) 03 MAY: A UN vehicle struck a landmine in Agoufou, Timbuktu region.2) 04 MAY: Suspected Macina Liberation Front militants raided a Malian Army post in Nampala, Mopti region.3) 06 MAY: Gunmen attacked a Malian Army position in Asongo, Gao region.4) 09 MAY: Gunmen attacked a Malian Army base near Bamba, Gao region.

Page 13: 2016-05-10 CTP Update and Assessment

ACRONYMS

13

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)Libyan National Army (LNA)Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)Pakistani Military (PakMil)Possible military dimensions (PMD)Somalia National Army (SNA)Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

Page 14: 2016-05-10 CTP Update and Assessment

AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT

Katherine Zimmermansenior al Qaeda [email protected] (202) 888-6576

Paul BucalaIran [email protected](202) 888-6573

Marie DonovanIran [email protected](202) 888-6572

Heather Malacariaprogram [email protected](202) 888-6575

Emily Estelleal Qaeda [email protected](202) 888-6570

Caitlin PendletonIran [email protected](202) 888-6577

For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.

Frederick W. Kagandirector

[email protected] (202) 888-6569

14