Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA,petitioner,vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.,respondents.Regino Hermosisima for petitioner.F.P. Gabriel, Jr. for respondents.CONCEPCION,J.:An appeal bycertiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from a decision of Court of Appeals modifying that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complaint, filed with said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimonypendente lite, P50.00 a month, which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due course, later on, said court rendered a decision the dispositive part of which reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the orderpendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day of every month sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the further sum of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against defendant.On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.The main issue before us is whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry. The pertinent facts are:Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since one evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V "Escao," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action, which was commenced on or about October 4, 1954.Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil Code of Spain permitted the recovery of damages for breach to marry. Article 43 and 44 of said Code provides:ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an obligation to contract marriage. No court shall entertain any complaint by which the enforcement of such promise is sought.ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by an adult, or by a minor with the concurrence of the person whose consent is necessary for the celebration of the marriage, or if the banns have been published, the one who without just cause refuses to marry shall be obliged to reimburse the other for the expenses which he or she may have incurred by reason of the promised marriage.The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the foregoing article refers must be brought within one year, computed from the day of the refusal to celebrate the marriage.Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court ruled inDe Jesus vs. Syquia(58 Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of promises to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise". The Code Commission charged with the drafting of the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines deem it best, however, to change the law thereon. We quote from the report of the Code Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But these articles are not enforced in the Philippines. The subject is regulated in the Proposed Civil Code not only as to the aspect treated of in said articles but also in other particulars. It is advisable to furnish legislative solutions to some questions that might arise relative to betrothal. Among the provisions proposed are: That authorizing the adjudication of moral damages, in case of breach of promise of marriage, and that creating liability for causing a marriage engagement to be broken.1awphl.ntAccordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil Code, under Chapter I, Title III, Book I thereof:Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or impliedly.Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed directly by the future spouses.Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the consent of the parent or guardian, be entered into by a male between the ages of sixteen and twenty years or by a female between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years. Without such consent of the parents or guardian, the engagement to marry cannot be the basis of a civil action for damages in case of breach of the promise.Art. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the age of fourteen years is not civilly actionable, even though approved by the parent or guardian.Art. 60. In cases referred to in the proceeding articles, the criminal and civil responsibility of a male for seduction shall not be affected.Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to marry may be brought.Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by the aggrieved party even though a minor without the assistance of his parent or guardian. Should the minor refuse to bring suit, the parent or guardian may institute the action.Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not only material and pecuniary losses but also compensation for mental and moral suffering.Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and grandparents, of the affianced parties, who cause a marriage engagement to be broken shall be liable for damages, both material and moral, to the engaged person who is rejected.Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the engagement shall be obliged to return what he or she has received from the other as gift on account of the promise of the marriage.These article were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor are set forth in the report of the corresponding Senate Committee, from which we quote:The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decide in the case ofDe Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of breach of promise suit in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm suit in many of the American States.See statutes of:Florida 1945 pp. 1342 1344Maryland 1945 pp. 1759 1762Nevada 1943 p. 75Maine 1941 pp. 140 141New Hampshire 1941 p. 223California 1939 p. 1245Massachusetts 1938 p. 326Indiana 1936 p. 1009Michigan 1935 p. 201New York 1935Pennsylvania p. 450The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the more progression trend in legislation when it provided for breach of promise to marry suits. But it is clear that the creation of such causes of action at a time when so many States, in consequence of years of experience are doing away with them, may well prove to be a step in the wrong direction. (Congressional Record, Vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the light of the clear and manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral damages made by the lower courts is, accordingly, untenable. The Court of Appeals said award:Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the paragraphs preceding and those following the one cited by the Court of Appeals, and the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction" therein contemplated is thecrimepunished as such in Article as such in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which admittedly does not exist in the present case, we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner ismorallyguilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him,she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a monthly pension of P30.00 for the support of the child: (2) P4,500, representing the income that complainant had allegedly failed to earn during her pregnancy and shortly after the birth of the child, as actual and compensation damages; (3) P5,000, as moral damages; and (4) P500.00, as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals added to the second item the sum of P1,114.25 consisting of P144.20, for hospitalization and medical attendance, in connection with the parturiation, and the balance representing expenses incurred to support the child and increased the moral damages to P7,000.00.With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore, in all other respects, without special pronouncement as to cost in this instance. It is so ordered.Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-11598 January 27, 1959THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appelee,vs.FEDERIC BUSTAMANTE,defendant-appellant.Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Atty. Eduardo C. Abaya for appellee.Ramon S. Milo for appellant.REYES, J.B.L.,J.:Charged and convicted of the crime of bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Federico Bustamante appealed to this Court on points of law.The records disclose that defendant-appellant Bustamante was united in wedlock to one Maria Perez on August 9, 1954, before the Justice of the Peace of Binalonan, Pangasinan (Exh. "A", pp. 9-11, t.s.n.). A little over a year later, or on September 16, 1955, he contracted a second marriage with Demetria Tibayan, solemnized before Vice-Mayor Francisco B. Nato of Mapandan, Pangasinan, who was then acting as Mayor of the said Municipality (Exh. "B"), while the first marriage was still subsisting. Defendant dwelt with Demetria and her parents for about a month, after which a time he returned to Calasiao, Pangasinan to live with the first wife, Maria Perez. In the course of her search for him, Demetria discovered from the Binalonan municipal authorities the previous marriage of defendant Bustamante. Hence, this accusation.Defendant did not testify in his behalf during the trial. the main problem poised in this appeal concerns the authority of Francisco Nato to solemnize the second marriage.It appears that Enrique Aquino and Francisco Nato were the duly elected mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, of the municipality of Mapandan, Pangasinan in the elections of 1951. On September 16, 1955, Aquino went on leave of absence for one month. In view of this, the vice-mayor was designed by the mayor to take over the rein of municipal government during his absence; and Nato was acting in this capacity when he performed the second marriage of Bustamante with Demetria Tibayan.Appellant, relying upon article 56 of the Civil Code of the Philippines Art. 56. Marriage may be solemnized by:(1) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court;(2) The Presiding Justice and the Justice of the Court of Appeals;(3) Judges of the Courts of First Instance;(4) Mayors of cities and municipalities;(5) Municipal judges and justices of the Peace;(6) Priests, rabbis, ministers of the gospel of any denominations, church, religion or sect, duly registered, as provided in article 92; and(7) Ship captains, airplanes chiefs, military commanders, and consuls and vice-consuls in special cases provided in provided in articles 74 and 75.contends that there could not have been a second marriage to speak of, as Nato was merely acting as mayor when he celebrated the same, hence, without authority of law to do so. He lays stress on the distinction made by this court in the caseSalaysay vs. Hon. Fred Ruiz Castro, et al.*52 Off. Gaz., No. 2, 809, between "Acting Mayor" and "Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor", urging that while the former may solemnize marriages, the latter could not.We find this connection untenable. When the issue involves the assumption of powers and duties of the office of the mayor by the vice-mayor, when proper, it is immaterial whether it because the latter is the Acting Mayor or merely acting as Mayor, for in both instances, he discharges all the duties and wields the power appurtenant to said office (Laxamana vs. Baltazar,148 Off. Gaz., No. 9, 3869; Sec. 2195, Revised Administrative Code). The case ofSalaysay vs. Castro(supra) cited by the appellant, which revolves upon the interpretation of section 27 of the Revised Election Code, is entirely distinct from the one at bar. This instance does not involve a question of title to the office, but the performance of the functions thereunto appertaining by one who is admitted to be temporarily vested with it. As correctly observed by the lower court, that case even concedes and recognizes the powers and duties of the Mayor to devolve upon the Vice-Mayor whenever the latter is in an acting capacity. The word "acting" as held in the case ofAustria vs. Amante,245 Off. Gaz., 2809, when preceding the title of an office connotes merely the temporary character or nature of the same.The information charges that the appellant contracted the second marriage before theJustice of the Peaceof Mapandan, Pangasinan, while the marriage certificate, Exh. "B", and the testimonies of witnesses indicate clearly that it was performed by Francisco Nato. Appellant assigns as error the admission by the lower court of the said evidence, notwithstanding counsel's objection. This is not reversible error. The wrong averment, if at all, was unsubstantial and immaterial that need not even be alleged, for it matters not who solemnized the marriage, it being sufficient that the information charging bigamy alleges that a second marriage was contracted while the first still remained undissolved. The information filed in this case which properly states the time and place of the second wedding, was sufficient to apprise the defendant of the crime imputed. Neither procedural prejudice nor error was committed by the lower court in finding appellant guilty.Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code attaches the penalty ofprision mayorto the crime of bigamy. Pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court must impose an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Code (in this case the medium period of prision mayor, there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances), and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense (orprision correccionalmedium) (People vs. Gonzales, 73 Phil., 549).The penalty imposed by the lower court (imprisonment for not less than two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day ofprision correccionaland not more than eight (8) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor), being in accordance with law, is affirmed. Costs against appellant.So ordered.Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Endencia, JJ.,concur.

FootnotesRepublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-5955 September 19, 1952JOSE L. LAXAMANA,petitioner,vs.JOSE T. BALTAZAR,respondent.Gerardo S. Limlingan and Jose L. Baltazar for petitioner.Macapagal, Punzalan and Yabut for respondent.Ramon Duterte and Pedro Lopez as amici curiae.BENGZON,J.:When in July 1952 the mayor of Sexmoan, Pampanga, was suspended, the vice-mayor Jose T. Salazar, assumed office as mayor by virtue of section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code. However, the provincial governor, acting under section 21 (a) of the Revised Election Code (R.A. 180), with the consent of the provincial board appointed Jose L. Laxamana, as mayor of Sexmoan, who immediately took the corresponding official oath.Result: thisquo warrantoproceeding, based solely on the petitioner's proposition that the section first mentioned has been repealed by the subsequent provision of the Revised Election Code.If there was such repeal, this petition should be granted, and Laxamana declared the lawful mayor of Sexmoan. Otherwise it must be denied.1The two statutory provisions read as follows:SEC. 2195. Temporary disability of the mayor. Upon the occasion of the absence, suspension, or other temporary disability of the Mayor, his duties shall be discharged by the Vice-Mayor, or if there be no Vice-Mayor, by the councilor who at the last general election received the highest number of votes.SEC. 21 (a). Vacancy in elective provincial, city or municipal office. Whenever a temporary vacancy in any elective local office occurs, the same shall be filled by appointment by the President if it is a provincial or city office, and by the provincial governor, with the consent of the Provincial Board, if it is a municipal office. (R.A. 180, the Revised Election Code.SEC. 21 (a) The portion relating to municipal offices was taken from section 2180 of the Revised Administrative Code, which partly provided:SEC. 2180. Vacancies in municipal office. (a) In case of a temporary vacancy in any municipal office, the same shall be filled by appointment by the provincial governor, with the consent of the provincial board.(b) In case of a permanent vacancy in any municipal office, the same shall be filled by appointment by the provincial board, except in case of a municipal president, in which the permanent vacancy shall be filled by the municipal vice-president. . . .It will be seen that under this section, when the office of municipal president (now mayor) becomepermanently vacantthe vice-president stepped into the office. The section omitted reference totemporary vacancyof such office because section 2195 governed that contingency. In this regard sections 2180 and 2195 supplemented each other. Paragraph (a) of section 2180 applied to municipal offices in general, other than that of the municipal president.Under the Revised Administrative Code, specially the two sections indicated there was no doubt in Government circles that when the municipal president was suspended from office, the vice-president took his place.Temporary vacancy in office of municipal president. Paragraph (a) of this section (2180) should be construed to cover only municipal offices other than the office of president. Section 2195 of the Administrative Code should be applied in case of the absence, suspension, or other temporary disability of the municipal president. (Op. Atty. Gen. Sept. 21, 1917; Ins. Aud. Oct. 23, 1927.) (Araneta, Administrative Code Vol. IV p. 2838)Municipal president cannot designate acting president. There is no provision of law expressly or implied authorizing the municipal president to designate any person to act in his stead during his temporary absence or disability. From the provision of section 2195 of the code, it is clear that the vice-president or, if there be no vice-president, the councilor who at the last general election received the highest number of votes, should automatically (without any formal designation) discharge the duties of the president. (Op. Ins. Aud. March 2, 1926) (Araneta Administrative Code Vol. IV, p. 2839)Now it is reasonable to assume that the incorporation of the above section 2180 into the Revised Election Law as section 21 (a) did not have the effect of enlarging its scope,2to supersede or repeal section 2195, what with the presumption against implied repeals.3"Where a statute has received a contemporaneous and practical interpretation and the statute as interpreted is re-enacted, the practical interpretation is accorded greater weight than it ordinarily receives, and is regarded as presumptively the correct interpretation of the law. The rule here is based upon the theory that the legislature is acquainted with the contemporaneous interpretation of a statute, especially when made by an administrative body or executive officers charged with the duty of administering or enforcing the law, and therefore impliedly adopts the interpretation upon re-enactment." (Sutherland Statutory Construction, sec. 5109.)Indeed, even disregarding their origin, the allegedly conflicting sections, could be interpreted in the light of the principle of statutory construction that when a general and a particular provision are inconsistent the latter is paramount to the former (sec. 288, Act 190). In other words, section 2195 referring particularly to vacancy in the office of mayor, must prevail over the general terms of section 21 (a) as to vacancies of municipal (local) offices. Otherwise stated, section 2195 may be deemed an exception to or qualification of the latter.4"Where one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter will prevail, regardless of whether it was passed prior to the general statute." (Sutherland Statutory Construction, sec. 5204)In a recent decision,5we had occasion to pass on a similar situation repeal by subsequent general provision of a prior special provision and we said,:It is well-settled that a special and local statute, providing for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute,general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law. . . . It is a canon of statutory construction that a laterstatute, general in its termsand not expressly repealing aprior specialstatute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions, of such earlier statute. (Steamboat Company vs. Collector, 18 Wall. (U.S.), 478; Cass County vs. Gillett, 100 U.S. 585; Minnesota vs. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 396.)Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general the terms of the general brood enough to include the matter provided for in the special the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. (State vs. Stoll, 17 Wall. (U.S.) 425)In fact even after the Revised Election Code was enacted, the Department of the Interior and the office of executive Secretary who are charged with the supervision of provincial and municipal governments have "consistently held that in case of the suspension or other temporary disability of the mayor, the vice-mayor shall, by operation of law, assume the office of the mayor, and if the vice-mayor is not available, the said office shall be discharged by the first councilor." (Annex 5 of the answer.)Needless to say, the contemporaneous construction placed upon the statute by the executive officers charged with its execution deserves great weight in the courts.6Consequently it is our ruling that when the mayor of a municipality is suspended, absent or temporarily unable, his duties should be discharged by the vice-mayor in accordance with sec. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code.Thisquo warrantopetition is dismissed with costs. So ordered.1wphl.ntParas, C.J., Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ.,concur.THIRD DIVISIONREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Petitioner,-versus-JOSE A. DAYOT,Respondent.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xFELISA TECSON-DAYOT,Petitioner,-versus-JOSE A. DAYOT,Respondent.G.R. No. 175581G.R. No. 179474Present:AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.,Acting Chairperson,TINGA,*CHICO-NAZARIO,VELASCO,**andREYES,JJ.Promulgated:March 28, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xD E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO,J.:Before us are two consolidated petitions.G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa voidab initio.The records disclose that on24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at thePasayCity Hall.The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.[2]In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,[3]also dated24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.On7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint[4]for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch 25.He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same.According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986.Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being his landlady.Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to thePasayCity Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother fromSaudi Arabia.At thePasayCity Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them.They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa.He initially refused to do so.However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship.Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left.It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa.He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisas house.When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa.When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended the validity of their marriage.She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference.[5]In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on31 August 1990.On3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board.[6]The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year without emolument.[7]On26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision[8]dismissing the Complaint.It disposed:WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration.Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].[9]The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on24 November 1986was valid.It dismissed Joses version of the story as implausible, and rationalized that:Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper.[Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were atPasayCity Hallto get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said package.Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers.And yet it took him, more or less, three months to discover that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract.[Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be taken in for a ride by [Felisa.][Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisas] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false.[Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency.This Court does not believe that the only reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there then.This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes.The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.[10]Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had prescribed.It cited Article 87[11]of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud.Thus:That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage contract.[Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest instance.x x x.[12]Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals.In a Decision dated11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit.The dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.[13]The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.The appellate court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 86[14]of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties.Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by law.The Court of Appeals struck down Joses appeal in the following manner:Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed.Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or intimidation ceased.Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment of marriage.However, it was only onJuly 7, 1993that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.[15]Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his marriage to Felisa was voidab initiofor lack of a marriage license.It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 76[16]of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained therein.In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit.The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage.Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Joses argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged.According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56[17]of the Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officers church or religious sect.The prescription was established only in Article 7[18]of the Family Code which does not govern the parties marriage.Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof.His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar.In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage.Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated7 November 2006, thefalloof which reads:WHEREFORE, the Decision datedAugust 11, 2005isRECALLEDandSET ASIDEand another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson voidab initio.Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.[19]In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court inNial v. Bayadog,[20]and reasoned that:InNial v. Bayadog,where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage.This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken.Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed.The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law.The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage.There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception.It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning.Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, voidab initiobecause of the absence of a marriage license.[21]Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail.The appellate court rendered a Resolution[22]dated10 May 2007, denying Felisas motion.Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting.Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate courts Amended Decision.On1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.[23]The Republic of thePhilippinespropounds the following arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:IRESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.IIRESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.IIIRESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.[24]Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misappliedNial.[25]She differentiates the case at bar fromNialby reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose.Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability.Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa.To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented bypetitionersRepublicof thePhilippinesand Felisa.The Republic of thePhilippinesasserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa.For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Courts ruling inHernandez v. Court of Appeals.[26]To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license.It is the Republics position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained.The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years.In addition, the Republic posits that the parties marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage.To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisas name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Joses company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisas name as his wife.The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code.A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union.Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:(1)Legal capacity of the contracting parties;(2)Their consent, freely given;(3)Authority of the person performing the marriage; and(4)A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.(Emphasis ours.)Article 58[27]makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.[28]Article 80(3)[29]of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.[30]This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,[31]whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void.The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.[32]Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79.To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages inarticulo mortisor at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages,[33](3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.[34]The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other.The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.The reason for the law,[35]as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.[36]It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage license.In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that they have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other.[37]One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage voidab initiofor lack of a marriage license.We answer in the affirmative.Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license.Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly[38]but reasonably construed.[39]They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.[40]Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication.[41]For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is asine qua nonthereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written.The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other.The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation.No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise.The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law.For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with.It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character.It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts[42]in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage.The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage.[43]The Court of Appeals also noted Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution.[44]The appellate court also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.[45]Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature.A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.[46]Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Courts review.[47]It is already well-settled that:The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.[48]Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with.The argument deserves scant merit.Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license.Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at bar.Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to theprima faciepresumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.[49]Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.[50]The present case does not involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied.There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code[51]that every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the law.The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance.The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage.[52]The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.[53]To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law.If this Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law.The contrast is flagrant.The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all.Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath.If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect.Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing.This is a misplaced invocation.It must be stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a law.[54]There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code.Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability.[55]The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license.It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.This is erroneous.An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.[56]Jose and Felisas marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license.No other conclusion can be reached except that it is voidab initio.In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage.[57]It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken.[58]WHEREFORE,the Petitions areDENIED.The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated7 November 2006in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot voidab initio, isAFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any.No costs.SO ORDERED.FIRST DIVISIONREPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, G.R. No.154380

- versus - Present: Davide, Jr.,C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna,JJ.

CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,Respondent. Promulgated: October 5, 2005

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xDECISIONQUISUMBING, J.:Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails theDecision[1]dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and itsResolution[2]dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The courta quohad declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. Thefalloof the impugned Decision reads: WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law. IT IS SO ORDERED.[3] The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows. On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied. In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE[4]The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.[5] Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.[6] For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.[7] At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:RULE 63DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIESSection 1.Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.. . . The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.[8]This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage. Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?Brief Historical BackgroundOn July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings[9]on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:1.The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.2.This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)Legislative IntentRecords of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of theCivil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case ofVan Dorn v. Romillo,Jr.[10] TheVan Dorncase involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case ofQuita v. Court of Appeals.[11]InQuita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way ofobiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.[12]If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:1.There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and2.A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenshipat the time a valid divorce is obtained abroadby the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse. However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.[13] Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that hiswife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[14] Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.[15] Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage. Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.ACCORDINGLY,the petition by the Republic of the Philippines isGRANTED. The assailedDecisiondated May 15, 2002, and Resolutiondated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are herebySET ASIDE.No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 175581 March 28, 2008REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Petitioner,vs.JOSE A. DAYOT,Respondent.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xG.R. No. 179474FELISA TECSON-DAYOT,Petitioner,vs.JOSE A. DAYOT,Respondent.D E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO,J.:Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision1of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.2In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit,3also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint4for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisas house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference.5In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board.6The Ombudsman found Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year without emolument.7On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision8dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].9The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Joses version of the story as implausible, and rationalized that:Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to "discover" that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be "taken in for a ride" by [Felisa.][Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisas] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the only reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.10Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had prescribed. It cited Article 8711of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.12Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.13The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 8614of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Joses appeal in the following manner:Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.15Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 7616of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Joses argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 5617of the Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officers church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in Article 718of the Family Code which does not govern the parties marriage.Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof.1avvphi1His central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.19In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Nial v. Bayadog,20and reasoned that:In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage license.21Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court rendered a Resolution22dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisas motion.Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate courts Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.23The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:IRESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA.IIRESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.IIIRESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.24Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Nial.25She differentiates the case at bar from Nial by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Courts ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.26To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republics position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the following documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisas name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Joses company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisas name as his wife.The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:(1) Legal capac