1043-Understanding Brazil - United States Relations

8/12/2019 1043-Understanding Brazil - United States Relations

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coleo

Poltica

ExternaBrasileira

UNDERSTANDING

BRAZILUNITED STATES

RELATIONS


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MINISTRY OFEXTERNAL RELATIONS

Foreign Minister Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar PatriotaSecretary-General Ambassador Eduardo dos Santos

ALEXANDRE DE GUSMO FOUNDATION

President Ambassador Jos Vicente de S Pimentel

International RelationsResearch Institute of

Center for Diplomatic Historyand Documents

Director Ambassador Maurcio E. Cortes Costa

TheAlexandre de Gusmo Foundation(Funag) was established in 1971. It is a publicfoundation linked to the Ministry of External Relations whose goal is to provide civilsociety with information concerning the international scenario and aspects of theBrazilian diplomatic agenda. The Foundations mission is to foster awareness of thedomestic public opinion with regard to international relations issues and Brazilianforeign policy.

Ministry of External RelationsEsplanada dos Ministrios, Bloco HAnexo II, Trreo, Sala 170170-900 Braslia-DFTelephones: +55 (61) 2030-6033/6034Fax: +55 (61) 2030-9125Website: www.funag.gov.br


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Braslia 2013

UNDERSTANDING

BRAZILUNITED STATES

RELATIONS

CONTEMPORARY HISTORY, CURRENT

COMPLEXITIES AND PROSPECTS

FOR THE 21stCENTURY

Monica Hirst


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Impresso no Brasil 2013

Copyright Fundao Alexandre de GusmoMinistrio das Relaes ExterioresEsplanada dos Ministrios, Bloco HAnexo II, Trreo, Sala 170170-900 Braslia-DFTelephones: +55 (61) 2030-6033/6034Fax: +55 (61) 2030-9125Website: www.funag.gov.brE-mail: [email protected]

Editorial Staff:Eliane Miranda Paiva

Fernanda Antunes Siqueira

Guilherme Lucas Rodrigues Monteiro

Jess Nbrega Cardoso

Vanusa dos Santos Silva

Graphic Design:

Daniela Barbosa

Cover:Yanderson Rodrigues

Layout:

Grfca e Editora Ideal

Bibliotecria responsvel: Ledir dos Santos Pereira, CRB-1/776

Depsito Legal na Fundao Biblioteca Nacional conforme Lei n 10.994, de 14/12/2004.

H669u Hirst, Monica.

Understanding Brazil-United States relations : contemporary history, currentcomplexities and prospects for the 21st century / Monica Hirst. Braslia : FUNAG,

2013.

281 p. (Coleo poltica externa brasileira) ISBN 978-85-7631-442-4

1. Relaes exteriores - Brasil - Estados Unidos. 2. Brasil - poltica externa. I.Ttulo. II. Srie.

CDD 327.81


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EDITORIALBOARDOFTHE

ALEXANDREDEGUSMOFOUNDATION

President: Ambassador Jos Vicente de S Pimentel

President of the Alexandre de Gusmo Foundation

Members: Ambassador Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg

Ambassador Jorio Dauster Magalhes

Ambassador Jos Humberto de Brito Cruz

Minister Lus Felipe Silvrio Fortuna

Professor Clodoaldo Bueno

Professor Francisco Fernando Monteoliva Doratioto

Professor Jos Flvio Sombra Saraiva


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o my children Janaina and Francisco and grandchildrenCarolina and Manoel


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Time present and time past

Are both perhaps present in time future

And time future contained in time past

If all time is eternally present

All time is unredeemable

(T.S. Eliot, no. 1 ofFour Quartets)

...el proceso de previsin del futuro debe basarsenecesariamente en el conocimiento del pasado. Lo que vaya aocurrir tendr forzosamente alguna relacin con lo que ya haocurrido. Y este es el nico aspecto en el que el historiador tienealgo que decir. (Eric Hobsbawm, en El arot del Historiador, inEntrevista sobre El Siglo XXI).

it is necessary that Brazil makes clear to the United Statesand for the world the difference between confrontation aiming atautonomy and antagonistic confrontation. Te kind of world thatBrazil wishes is a multi-polar world in which the South Americansystem will enjoy autonomy vis--vis the North American system,but will be solidary with it in what concerns values. It will besolidary with it in what regards the destiny of Man, freedom,democracy and values. (Helio Jaguaribe, in History opens for usspaces of permissibility that are not permanent).


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PRESENTATIONANDACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Te aim of this dissertation is to focus upon Brazil-United

States relations from a dual perspective: the main events andchallenges of the contemporary history of bilateral ties and theoverall political significance these have assumed for Brazilianinternational affairs. I intend to show and discuss the kind ofinfluence US pressures and interests have played for Brazilsforeign policy. At the same time, I wish to show in what way thatrelationship has always been subordinated to the processes ofchange both in domestic and international contexts.

I

Firstly, I would like to point out the connection between theimportance of this set of themes and my academic trajectory in theIR field. My work on Brazilian foreign policy has led me to alwayspay close attention to the relationship with the United States,both in the analysis of the key moments in its evolution and in


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the critical thinking regarding the present political and strategicshaping factors that explain its complexity. In both cases I havetried to understand the peculiarities of US-Brazil bilateralism andits articulation with the global and regional contexts.

From the historic perspective, I examined this link in threecrucial moments. Firstly my concern was the process of alignment(1942-45) that took shape during World War II, the subject of mydissertation for a Masters degree at UPERJ in 1982. Te secondmoment I focused upon was that of the unmet expectations ofBrazil during the second Vargas government (1951-54), whenit was not possible to repeat with Washington the pattern ofnegotiations and reciprocities achieved in the previous decade. Testudy of this period was encouraged by a research project supportedby Alexandre de Gusmo Foundation of the Brazilian Ministry ofExternal Relations. Te third phase deserving attention was thatof the ending of the automatic alignment to the US, during the

years of the responsible pragmatism (1974-78). Te analysis ofthis crucial period for Brazilian foreign policy started with the richexperience shared with Maria Regina Soares de Lima within theoral history project of CPDOC that involved a lengthy interviewwith Foreign Minister Antonio Francisco Azeredo da Silveira.

Although not exhausting, the research carried forwardregarding these three moments was profound, based on primarysources from Brazilian and American archives, enriched by

the bibliographical production and interpretations from bothcountries. I am especially grateful to the opportunity to work forseveral years at CPDOC-FGV/RJ, where I had the chance, togetherwith my colleague Gerson Moura, to participate in the task oforganizing the documentary collection and recording statementsof prominent historical actors as well as in that of research inan area then incipient in the studies of contemporary historyin Brazil.


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Te motivation for the analysis of political and strategicissues pertaining to US-Brazil relations however, was related tothe interest in questions of international politics and especiallyin the Latin American agenda, arising in the years when thetransformations in the lines of Brazilian external action precededthe democratic winds in domestic politics. Te innovative profileof Brazilian diplomacy in the middle of the 70s was crucial forthe opening of a unexplored field of academic concern in Brazil

concerned with understanding the meaning of concepts such asautonomy, universalism and bi-polar equidistance. In the samecontext, the divergences expressed by the Brazilian governmenttoward the United States required a critical understanding ofissues such as nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and coercivediplomacy. As part of a reduced academic group concerned withinternational affairs, I endeavored to understand the dynamics ofthe Brazil-United States relationship as a result of the combination

of perceptions and interests of both countries.Te exchanges with a generation of Latin-American analysts

who shared similar perceptions soon gave me the opportunity todevelop a comparative perspective that helped to envisage thepeculiarities of US-Brazil bilateralism within the regional context.Te opportunity to spend time as a visiting researcher at theCentro de Estudios de los Estados Unidos of CIDE, in Mexico, headedby Luis Maira, contributed to deepen such perspective. Te years

of insertion and institution building in Argentina should also beunderlined in this trajectory. Te persistent reference to the pastin IR studies in Argentina allowed me to understand the truncateddynamics of Argentina-Brazil-United States, always resoundingin the backstage of the interaction between the three countries.I believe that this is the main explanation for the alternatingdynamics between the cycles of regional integration and alignmentto the US in the foreign policies of Brazil and Argentina; such


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cycles have always led to alternating periods of convergence aswell as of divergence between Argentina and Brazil. Washingtonalways perceived a strong link between Brazil and Argentinaas an undesirable development, as a factor of imbalance in theinter-American realm. Tese issues have always been a motive for arich exchange of ideas and perceptions with my colleagues RobertoRussell and Juan okatlian at the orcuato di ella University.

Relations with the United States have become the subject ofmy renewed attention in the framework of the changes in Brazil-ian international affairs. Te recent complexity of the countrys in-terests and actors, in the regional and global chessboards, touch-ing on the economic, political and security fields, make it inevi-table to rethink the link between both countries. Tis is a theme ofpermanent reflection and exchange shared with several Braziliancolleagues, many of whom belong to the new generation of IR re-searchers. In this case I wish to underline the work shared with Le-

ticia Pinheiros to define new analytical tools useful to understandthe present changes in Brazilian foreign policy decision making.

In this dissertation I have tried to bring together textsthat reflect the trajectory briefly outlined above. My aim hasbeen to articulate a coherent narrative and analytical text whichcould contribute to the understanding of the present phase ofthe relationship between Brazil and the United States, of thedomestic transformations and of the regional/global context

of Brazilian international insertion. Although it could seemincoherent, the present phase may be the one in which this linkhas the least relative importance for Brazilian foreign policy. Teensemble of transformations in this policy, derived from internalfactors but also from new configurations in the internationalorder, lead inevitably to a re-thinking of that relationship. Inother words, Brazil is at a crucial moment for the reshaping of theplace and meaning of the relations with the United States when


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addressing its external insertion. Te US is no longer a centralelement for Brazilian international affairs. Tis loss of centralityrenders necessarily a deep re-evaluation that will certainlyhave an influence on the academic production in InternationalRelations in the future. I hope that the texts put together in thisdissertation may contribute to a better understanding of thischanging reality.

II

Te body of this dissertation is divided into three main units,followed by a concluding chapter and a bibliographic appendix.Te first unit contains a narrative text that summarizes theevolution of the relations between Brazil and the United Statessince the beginning of the twentieth century, in which the political

and economic aspects of the different phases that succeeded eachother are highlighted.

Te second unit deals with the post-Cold War, it focuseson the impact of the ending of a bipolar world order for inter-

American relations, the emergence of a South American politicaland security agenda and the specificity of the Brazilian-Americanrelations during the 1990s. In this unit the challenges posed bythe Brazil-United States economic relations are examined withspecial attention to four subjects: (a) Brazilian economic policiesand the impact of American direct investments; (b) bilateral trade;(c) the multilateral dimension of trade relations; (d) the FAAnegotiations. Next, the bilateral political relations are reviewed,with stress on two types of agenda: one involving first levelissues,mainly connected with the inter-State matters, covering regionaland world politics agendas and those of international security;and another dealing with second levelissues, generated chiefly by


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the action of non-governmental actors in topics such as humanrights, environment, Brazilian migration to the United States, theformation of public opinion and the political perceptions whichprevail on both sides.

Te third unit of the dissertation deals with the periodidentified as post-post-Cold War, initiated on 9/11/2001. Tissection examines initially the consequences for Latin Americaof the process of securitization of the international politicalagenda and the gradual dismantle of South America as a USarea of influence. Tis unit also deals with the frame of changesexperienced by Brazil in its external insertion, starting fromthe Lula government, with special focus on the new importanceascribed to the South-South axis and the new responsibilitiesundertaken in questions of international security and policy as exemplified by the action of Brazil in the process of Haitianreconstruction. Tis unit addresses the recent trends of US-Brazil

relations and the built-up of, a pragmatic and affirmative profile,both in the economic and the political fronts. Te aim of this

chapter is to show that this configuration corresponds to a phase

of new bilateral attunement but also of political differentiationsbrought about by expectations and interests not alwaysconvergent between the two countries.

III

I wish to highlight several expressions of gratitude. I muststart by stressing my thanks to the Federal University of RioGrande do Sul and particularly to the Post-graduation Program inStrategic International Studies, in the person of its coordinator,Paulo Vizentini, for the chance to present directly the defense ofthis dissertation. I also thank Marco Cepik for his role in opening


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up this possibility which has deepened even more a relationship ofexchange and camaraderie that exists for many years.

I am particularly indebted to Natalia Herbst for her assistancein the task of editing, which enabled the quick and effectiveedition of the texts included in this dissertation, and to DaniloMarcondes, who helped me in the final phase of its preparation.I am grateful for the assistance of Maria Rivera, Ximena Simpson,Maria Emilia Barsanti, Jazmin Sierra and Brenda Finkelstein, whoin different moments contributed to the elaboration of many ofthe texts assembled in this dissertation. Finally, and regardlessof the support I received, I shall be responsible for any faults orinconsistencies that may be found in this dissertation.


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CONTENTS

Preface .......................................................................................................21

Marco Cepik

Part I: Past and present: Te 5 As of the US-Brazil relations .........27

1.1 Alliance ..................................................................................................... 29

1.2 Alignment ................................................................................................ 34

1.3 Autonomy ................................................................................................ 54

1.4 Adjustment .............................................................................................. 59

1.5 Affirmation .............................................................................................. 62

Part II: Brazil - United States in the post-Cold

War period .................................................................................................65

2.1 World order, renewed multilateralism and the

emergence of a global agenda ................................................................... 65

2.2 Te new inter-American context ...................................................... 69

2.3 Te South American uniqueness ....................................................... 75


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2.4 Te Brazilian experience: foreign policy and

democratization ............................................................................................ 79

2.5 Te new challenges in US-Brazil economic relations ................... 90

2.6 Te new contents in US-Brazil political relations ........................ 116

Part III: Brazil-United States relations in the

post-post-Cold War context ...........................................................163

3.1 Te effects of macro-securitization and the imperialover-extension .............................................................................................164

3.2 Te new framework of the international insertion

of Brazil .........................................................................................................197

3.3 Te configuration of a pragmatic and affirmative

bilateralism ................................................................................................... 227

Final remarks ...........................................................................................245

References ................................................................................................265


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PREFACE

I am honored to present this book written by Monica Hirst

for two reasons. In personal terms, this is an opportunity toshow my admiration and respect for the intellectual work Hirstdevelops in the area of International Relations, persistentlyand masterfully weaving a tapestry of themes that range frominternational cooperation for development to internationalsecurity, foreign policy, bilateral relations and regional integration.From an institutional standpoint, it honors us that this bookoriginated from the doctorate thesis defended by Professor Hirst

in our Graduate Program for International Strategic Studies of theFederal University of Rio Grande do Sul.

After all, the story of an intellectual life is partly told bythe institutions where one studies, researches, tutors, teaches,directs and cooperates. In Professor Hirsts case, we trace hertrajectory in the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro,the University Research Institute of Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ),


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Marco Cepik

FLACSO-Argentina, the Argentine National Foreign ServiceInstitute (ISEN), the Center of Brazilian Studies, Buenos Aires,CIDE Mexico, the Universidade de Buenos Aires, the University ofSo Paulo, Stanford University, Harvard University, Universidadorcuato di ella, UNDP, the Brazilian Ministry of ExternalRelations, the Argentinian Ministry of External Relations, theColombian Ministry of External Relations, the Ford Foundationand the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. We can now add the FederalUniversity of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) to that list.

Another part of our academic experience is revealed by thosewith whom we have shared our work. Te relationship betweenBrazil and the United States, the main theme of this work, hasbeen an outstanding area of exchange in the collaboration betweenMonica Hirst and Maria Regina Soares de Lima, whom, from allof Hirsts intellectual partners, deserves a special mention forhaving directed Hirsts MA dissertation at IUPERJ, and also forbeing the first person who brought Hirst and myself together.Becoming part of this cluster allowed me to work and learn fromboth authors in research projects and debates on security andintegration in South America, the comparison between Brazil,South Africa and India, as well as the Brazilian foreign policythemes and relations with Argentina and the United States.

Finally, I would like to address the question of methods andcontents involved in the process of intellectual production, which,in Hirsts case, are distinguishable by their historic focus, thecapacity of political synthesis and by the use of a multidimensionalapproach, as has been made explicit in the books title. In the 1980s,her analytical focus on Brazilian foreign policy could already beclearly perceived, with particular attention to the relations with theUnited States and the diplomatic rapprochement with Argentina.By dedicating herself to the analysis of PICE (the Program for


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Preface

Integration and Economic Cooperation), established in 1986, forexample, Hirst already sought a multidimensional and strategicapproach in addressing inter-regional affairs.

Besides, her work has always been enriched by a farseeing vision.Concerned with transcending the economistic and corporative viewsof MERCOSUR, this author soon diagnosed that the perceptionof common historic trajectories had stimulated the development of

mutual and pragmatic loyalties between the two countries, whichbestowed a political sense to MERCOSUR, particularly in the contextof the FAA negotiations and of hemispheric security matters.

Another specific aspect of this thesis was the understanding, sincethe beginning, of the Brazil-Argentina integration not only as abilateral cooperation initiative, but a strategy for South Americanautonomy and development as well.

When addressing regional security, Hirst emphasizes the present

obsolescence of the inter-American system. Tis has been a processstarting in the 1970s with the gradual adherence to autonomousforeign policies on the part of Latin American governments(Mexico, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, etc.), coupled with the effects of theOAS reforms in 1967 and 1973 and the Inter-American reaty ofReciprocal Assistance reform in 1975 (which guaranteed ideologicalpluralism and collective economic security), and the blow producedby the wt Malvinas/Falklands War in 1982. In the 1990s and 2000s,Professor Hirst presented arguments that have been incorporated aspertinent insights to the debate on hemispheric relations and South

America, especially in view of the need to understand the differentsecurity dynamics in the Andes and the Southern Cone. Contrastingrealities between these two subregions are explained as an inevitableconsequence of the institutional contexts in which the State has beenbuilt and the democratic traditions and values of each area added tothe pattern of relations between local elites and the United States.


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Marco Cepik

In this sense, when discussing US-Latin America relationsafter 9/11, Hirst refuted the argument that unconventional threats such as international terrorism would replace the menacesposed by inter-State war and, therefore, that which would justifyrobust defense policies aligned to a macro securitized strategy led byWashington. She then proposed the co-existence of three agendas,the traditional (inter-State rivalries and security dilemmas), thenew (peace operations, illegal immigration, environment, drugtrafficking and violent organized crime) and the brand-new(global war on terror).

Te crisis of the legitimacy faced by the United States, whichhas deeply affect its leadership capacity, added to an expandedautonomous international insertion on the part of Brazil as wellas other intermediate countries in recent years is one of Hirstspoints. Tis has led her to broaden the scope of her analysis beyondhemispheric affairs with special attention to Brazils South-Southcooperation strategies, analyzing both the IBSA Dialogue Forum(India, Brazil and South Africa) and the BRICS initiative, both ofwhich have been accompanied by the build-up of a global socialagenda for the access of public goods in developing countries.

As highlighted by Juan okatiln and Paulo Vizentini, thisbook synthesizes, updates and broadens a research agenda builtalong a fruitful intellectual trajectory. Her analytical synthesisof the several periods of the US-Brazil relations, explained in thethesis of the five As (alliance, alignment, autonomy, adjustmentand affirmation), is an example of lucidity and perspective. Shetakes into account each cycle, addressing the transformations andthe persistent asymmetries between the two countries (and therecurring illusions of the Brazilian elite regarding the possibility ofa special relationship with Washington). Besides, Hirsts analysis ofthe bilateral relations takes into account the current international


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Preface

environment influenced by a continuous diffusion of power inworld politics.

Tus, when analyzing the impact of the global war on terrorduring the Bush administration and of the 2008 economic crisis,Hirst contributes to broaden the research agenda for foreignpolicy analysts. According to her view, the relations betweenBrazil and the United States will depend, in the future, on the

combined results of the internal political struggles between moreand less inclusive society projects in each of the two countries.Also, from the Brazilian viewpoint, they depend on the degree ofstrategic consistency and on the success of the Brazilian visionfor multidimensional integration in South America, in oppositionto alternative visions regarding the future of the region, rangingfrom Latin-American Bolivarianism to the more strictly liberalperspective of a free-trade area proposed by Chile, Colombia andMexico.

Te South-South axis of Brazilian foreign policy axis will alsobe relevant for the future of the Brazil-United States relations,as well as the role of China and Europe. However, as the authorstates, much depends on the reconfiguration of the presence of theUnited States near the global South, especially after the damagewrought during the years of the Bush Administration. During hisfirst term, Obama recognized the Brazilian projection, its expandedregional and global presence, expressed, for instance, duringthe G-20 meeting on the international financial crisis and the VSummit of the Americas. But it remains to be seen whether theconstraints faced by this administration will lead to a revival of theexpectation that Brazils role is to become a benevolent gendarmein the region, or if a more balanced multipolar international order,in which this country has a say, will be accepted as a positivescenario by Washington.


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Marco Cepik

Nothing can be better to grasp such challenges than theunderstanding of the political history of US-Brazil relations froma multidimensional perspective, as addressed by Monica Hirst inthis book.

Marco Cepik1

Porto Alegre, May 2013.

1 Associate Professor of the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) and Director of the Centerfor International Studies on Government (CEGOV). [http://lattes.cnpq.br/3923697331385475].


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PARTI: PASTANDPRESENT: THE5 ASOF

THEUS-BRAZILRELATIONS

Te first part of this dissertation presents a brief historical

retrospective of the bilateral relations, up to the currentconfiguration of its most relevant inter-State and inter-societaldevelopments. Its main purpose is to show, by means of a narrativetext, that this relationship, which went through different phases,oscillating between good and bad moments, never crossed a redline that might lead to open confrontation.

Troughout the 20th century, the bilateral relationshipoccupied a central position among Brazilian external issues and

in the hemispheric agenda of the United States. It is possible toidentify clearly different phases. Te first one became known asan informal alliance (unwritten alliance), starting from the firstfew years of the Brazilian First Republic and remaining until thebeginning of the 1940s. Te second one is characterized by theautomatic alignment of Brazil with the United States, which,despite some hitches, comprises the period from 1942 to 1977.In the third phase, Brazil assumes an autonomous policy vis--vis


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Monica Hirst

the United States that remained so until 1990, when Brazil started

a period of readjustment of its relations with the US. Tis latterphase is characterized by a more flexible stance toward Americanexpectations in the realm of economic-commercial, diplomaticand international policies. Finally, one might say that in recentyears a fifth period was opened in the relationship, marked byits affirmative character, often interpreted as a sign of maturity.It started with the affirmative tone of the Lula government,

with proud and pragmatic positions that set the limits for theconcessions and the scope of Brazilian ambitions, both in therelationship with the United States and with other relevant actorsin the international system. Tis relationship, however, alsocame to reflect an effort to reach certain agreements, sustainedby the identification of mutual interests, revealing a reciprocalacknowledgement of international responsibilities and politicalpreferences.

In sum, the relations between Brazil and the United Statesfaced periods of nearness and distance though time. For almosttwo hundred years that interaction oscillated between friendlydialogue and prudent indifference according to the degree ofconvergence and/or divergence between the two countries. At thesame time, the shared American identity, added to the attributesof power of both nations territory, population and size of theeconomy have always constituted factors of attraction for one and

the other1

; I shall unfold below some of the most relevant politicaland economic aspects of the evolution of this relationship, takingas the point of departure the advent of the Brazilian Republic atthe close of the 20thcentury.

1 In the Americas, Brazil is third in territorial extension, only behind Canada and the United States; it issecond in population and economy after the USA.


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Past and present: The 5 As of the Brazil-United States relations

1.1 Alliance

Up to the final decade of the 19th century, the relationshipbetween Brazil and the United States was sporadic. Te dominantlinks with the European world particularly Great Britain andthe disputes and negotiations for the definition of the respectiveterritorial spaces took up almost all of the external agenda ofboth countries. In reality, relations between Brazil and the United

States acquired consistency in the last part of the 19th

century,when the Brazilian Republican movement started to see the NorthAmerican political experience as a source of inspiration. It was alsoat this time that the USA opened its market to Brazilian coffee.Te nearness in the political and economic fields accelerated withthe inauguration of the Brazilian Republic and the abolition ofslavery.

During the First Republic, US-Brazil relations followed themodel of an informal alliance, or as characterized by Bradford

Burns, of an unwritten alliance2. Although devoid of mutualmilitary assistance, reciprocal diplomatic support and intensecommercial relations wove a strong friendship between the twonations. According to the Brazilian view, the world order dominatedby Eurocentric interests would face a process of exhaustion,leading the United States to become a powerful international actor.In other words, the United States was perceived as a relevant powerin ascendancy in the international system. Baron of Rio Branco,

minister for External Relations (1902-1912) and founding fatherof Brazilian diplomacy in the 20th century was the main figureresponsible for this view.

It is worth stressing, however, that the determination toprivilege the United States as an external alliance was conceived

2 See BURNS, Bradford, 1966. Te Unwritten Alliance. Rio Branco and the Brazilian-American Relations.New York: Columbia University Press.


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Monica Hirst

in a multi-polar world system. At the time, relations with theUS did not foresee the exercise of pressures and coercion, whichwould appear later when that nation assumed the role of hegemonicpower. During the first few decades of the 20thcentury, Brazil andthe United States shared expectations of international postures,both regional and bilateral, while a fraternal dialogue between Riode Janeiro and Washington took place.

One must recall that the First Republic corresponds to acrucial moment in Brazilian diplomatic history. Te essentialtenets instituted during this period established the foundationsof contemporary Brazilian foreign policy. It was also at this timethat the Ministry for External Relations (MRE) of Brazil knownas the Itamaraty affirmed itself as the central agency of the Statefor the formulation and conduct of the countrys internationalaffairs. Since the resolution of most territorial disputes with itsSouth American neighbors, many of which inherited from the

colonial period, Brazil started simultaneously to show interest inmultilateral diplomacy and in the construction of more solid linkswith the American government.

As the European system started to shown signs of fatigue,the United States was beginning to rise from the other sideof the Atlantic as a new economic and political reference in theinternational community. Its victory in the war against Spain in1898 and the start of its imperialistic policy in Central America

and the Caribbean are the marks of this process. Between 1898and 1934 there were many episodes of military interventionon the part of the United States sometimes accompanied byprolonged occupation in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Cuba,Honduras, Guatemala, Panama; this practice, legitimized by theRoosevelt Corollary, was accompanied by a policy of open supportto American enterprises, known as dollar diplomacy. In thispanorama, the inter-American environment became conditioned


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by the new projection of the United States with its interventionistpolicies in the Caribbean and in Central America, by the diplomaticactivism of Argentina encouraged by its economic opulence andby the activity of Brazil, which tried to harmonize positions thatcould reinforce its dialogue with the South American countrieswithout harming the interest in deepening its friendly relationshipwith the United States.

In Brazil, the beginning of the Republic was the stage forcontroversy about the direction to be followed by the countrysdiplomacy. Since 1870, the Manifest of the Republican Partysupported closer relations with the American nations, whichsupposed the abandonment of a foreign policy essentiallyturned toward the European world. After November 15, relevantsegments of the political class believed that the transformationof the institutional life should lead to the Republicanization ofBrazilian international relations, meaning its Americanization.

A project of a more intense relationship with the Americancontinent implied the valorization of two partners: Argentina andthe United States. Regarding Argentina, a new political sympathywas rising in the political and diplomatic milieu that tried toidentify points of cooperation as old rivalries were overcome.

As for the United States, the view that a friendly policy could bebeneficial to the Brazilian interests gained strength, especiallyhaving in mind the growing weight of the former in international

and regional affairs.At the turn of the 19th century, evidence that the ties with

Great Britain were suffering a process of exhaustion came to thefore, despite the fact that the presence of British interests inkey sectors of the Brazilian economy such as transportation,communications and finance maintained its importance untilthe eruption of World War I.


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It was at this time that the ties between Brazil and the UnitedStates became increasingly consistent: with North Americansupport to the Provisional Republican Government the trustand the exchanges between the two countries quickly grew. Teexpansion of its naval presence was accompanied by an increasein the commercial links by means of the signing of the radeReciprocity reaty in 1891. Even in a context of strong Americancustoms protectionism, Brazil assured exception measures and

tariff reduction for its products, especially coffee. In reciprocity,Brazil granted advantageous reductions of 20% and 30% toproducts originating in the US.

During the whole period of the First Republic the UnitedStates looked for deeper relations with Brazil; participation inborder negotiations with Argentina was followed by support tothe Brazilian government in the resolution of the boundaries withFrench and British Guyanas. In counterpart, Brazil supported the

American government politically and logistically in 1898, in theconflict with Spain. Te diplomatic action of Salvador de Mendonaduring the long stretch (1890-98) of his tenure in Washingtoncontributed much to bringing the two countries together. Besidesensuring the entry of Brazilian products in the United States,minister Mendona tried to attune Brazilian diplomacy to thePan-American premises. Te two countries elevated their

diplomatic legations in the respective capitals to the rank of

embassy. For the American government, it was the first diplomaticrepresentation of this kind in South America. For Brazil, it was itsfirst embassy abroad, which justified the appointment of JoaquimNabuco as its head. As Ambassador in Washington, Nabuco triedto imprint a feeling of brotherhood to the US-Brazil relationship.Having in mind the formation of a single continental politicalsystem, he expected to contribute to the strengthening of theMonroe Doctrine.


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Baron of Rio Branco shared this vision and gave it a defensivemeaning that could protect the region against European claimsthat might jeopardize the sovereignty of American countries.In the years following Rio Brancos tenure, the two countriesdeepened and diversified their ties. With very rare exceptions,such as Domicio da Gamas administration, the foreign ministerswho followed were partisans of an external policy attuned toWashington. Te presence of Ambassador Edwin Morgan during

the long period from 1912 to 1933 contributed to cement thebond. In that way the North American nation gave consistent proofof friendship toward the governments of the First Republic: thesupport to Brazilian naval rearmament, in 1913, was reinforcedwith the inauguration, in 1922, of a military cooperation program.

As Washington put its dollar diplomacy into practice italso hardened its posture vis--vis the Latin American nationsin the commercial and political fields. From that time on, the

debate on the pros and cons of a close relationship with theUnited States started to figure more prominently in Brazilianpolitical and diplomatic circles. Te good terms of the relationshipdid not prevent differences between the two countries to ariseduring the whole of the First Republic. Suffice it to mention thenon-convergent postures at the II Peace Conference in Te Hague,with regard to the division between Colombia and Panama and inmoments of difficult bilateral trade negotiations.

In the economic arena, ties with the United States con-centrated in the area of commercial transactions. Tese would,however, show strong imbalances since the beginning; in the years

1910-1914, 38% of Brazilian exports were absorbed by the Americanmarket, while only 1,5% of the external sales of the United Statescame to Brazil. Soon after World War I, imports of Americanproducts increased substantially and the participation of theUnited States in imports by Brazil increased from 14% to 26%


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in the period 1914-1928. Automobiles and accessories, wheat,gasoline, steam locomotives, cement, machinery and electricalappliances were among the most sought-after goods by Brazil.

American foreign investment became significant since the 1920s,especially in the transportation, mining and cold storage sectors.Data on foreign enterprises in Brazil in the years 1891-1928 showthat the increased American presence coincided with the decreasein the number of English firms.

1.2 Alignment

Te 1930 revolution in Brazil ushered in a period of significantpolitical and economic changes, with immediate reflection onthe countries foreign affairs. In the United States, the victory ofFranklin Roosevelt, in 1932, gave rise to new political and economicexpectations. In the external field, the democratic Administrationlaunched an international leadership project intended to break the

previous isolation of the United States and to ensure conditions ofeconomic peace and stability to the world system.

Te changes introduced in American external policy hadimportant implications for Latin America, as they opened the wayfor a new style of relationship known as the good neighbor policythat came to value political dialogue with the countries in theregion. Te intention was to reinforce the presence of the UnitedStates in the area, through economic, cultural and military links, as

well as frequent multilateral conferences. Both secretary of StateCordell Hull and undersecretary for American Affairs SumnerWelles preached the replacement of interventionist practices bydiplomatic negotiation.

Te American government formalized reciprocal tradeagreements with eleven Latin American countries and in the1940s, through American involvement in the world conflict, asystem of hemispheric security was quickly put in place, based


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on bilateral military assistance programs. Te convening ofconferences of Latin American foreign ministers generated a newinter-American agenda, and already at the Montevideo meeting,in 1933, Washington announced the good neighbor policy withthe withdrawal of its troops from Haiti. Tat conference wasfollowed by those in Buenos Aires in 1936, Lima in 1938, Panamain 1939, Havana in 1940 and Rio de Janeiro in 1942. Te last threemeetings were decisive to assure the support of the continent

to the growing American involvement in World War II. At thePanama conference a declaration of neutrality was approved; later,in Havana, the countries of the region agreed to principles ofdefensive cooperation; finally, at the Tird Consultation Meetingof Foreign Ministers held in Rio de Janeiro, the commitment tosever of relations with the Axis (opposed only by Argentina andChile) was adopted, with a prominent role played by Brazil.

Tree different moments during which Brazil kept a policy of

alignment with the United States can be identified.

1.2.1 Phase 1

Tis period begins with the entry of the United States in thewar, in December 1941, after the Japanese attack against PearlHarbor, when new pressures on Latin America were imposed.Besides political support, some countries became important forthe supply of strategic materials and/or the cession of military

bases. Latin American participation was differentiated, and onlyColombia, Mexico and Brazil opted for direct military involvement.

At that time, the construction of a base in the Brazilian Northeasthad become crucial in support of the Allied military operations inthe North of Africa.

In the economic field, the 1929 crisis had an immediate impacton Brazil, which soon suffered a strong decrease of its importingcapacity as a result of the fall of the prices of its exports in the


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international market. At the same time, the loss of the value ofthe national currency rendered more difficult the service of thefinancial commitments of the country, leading to the negotiationof a funding loan in 1931, aimed at alleviating the accumulateddebt with English banks. Te non-inclusion of American loansgave rise to immediate complaints from the United States. TeProvisional Government confronted the effects of the internationalcrisis with policies aiming at the expansion of the economic activity.

Foreign exchange policies were also adopted, which inhibitedimports and benefitted domestic production. In this period, FDI inBrazil decreased, with a gradual recovery from 1936 on, when anincrease in American investment became visible. Foreign capitalwas concentrated in productive sectors than public utility which wasprotected by nationalistic legislation.

Te adoption of centralizing policies in Brazil also favoredeconomic planning and industrial activity. Te strengthening of

entrepreneurial interests reverberated on the internal debate ontrade policies and, in particular, on the agreement negotiatedin 1935 with the United States. According to the liberal tenetsof American trade policy this treaty provided for reciprocalconcessions of most favored nation treatment and contemplatedexemptions for certain Brazilian products (coffee, cocoa, rubberand others) in exchange for tariff reductions of 20% to 60% ona number of industrial goods (machinery, steel and others). Te

difficulties encountered for its approval in Brazil became a source ofapprehension in the United States, which, besides worrying aboutBrazilian protectionist resistances, feared the increase of Brazilianexchanges with Germany. In 1936, the Brazilian Congress ratifiedthe agreement.

For Brazil, the compensated trade offered by the Germangovernment had become advantageous, allowing the exchangeof coffee and cotton for heavy electrical and metalworking


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equipment previously exported by the British that wouldcome to favor the industrial policies of the Vargas Administration.Such trade enjoyed the endorsement of the armed forces, whichviewed the commercial link with Germany as a way to facilitate there-equipment of the military. Tanks to this equation, from 1934to 1938, part of the unconvertible foreign currency from exports to

Germany could be used for the purchase of military equipment.

From the mission of Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha toWashington, in 1939, the double game of the Vargas governmentstarted its countdown at the same time as bilateral negotiationsresponded to the economic interest of the country. In exchange,Brazil would give up the compensated trade with Germany, adopt aliberal trade policy and resume external debts payments, which hadbeen suspended since 1937 when the Estado Novo(New State) wasinaugurated. Soon the limited credit granted by the United Statesand the effects of World War II on Brazilian exports would impose

new economic constraints upon the Vargas government. But from1941 on external sales of Brazilian products got a new thrust asa result of several factors supplies of strategic materials to theUnited States, sales of beef and cotton to Great Britain and theimprovement of coffee prices, guaranteed by the inter-AmericanCoffee Agreement. Hence the restrictions on external purchasesimposed by the world conflict had an undeniable positive effect forBrazil by permitting a significant accumulation of foreign currency.

When World War II broke out, in 1939, Brazil declared itsneutrality, seeking to keep an equidistant position from the partsin conflict. Soon the ensuing decline of the flow of trade withGermany due to the war narrowed the margin of maneuver of the

Vargas government. On the American side, Brazilian collaborationbecame ever more important on account of new strategic interests,which was immediately capitalized by the Vargas Administration asa negotiating tool. From that moment on, the relationship between


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the two countries gained density in the economic, military andcultural fields. In this context, the negotiations with the US forthe financing of a national steel mill project became quite relevant.Tis project turned into reality in 1940 with the signature of abilateral agreement for the construction of a steel company at

Volta Redonda, to which understandings for the re-equipment ofthe Brazilian armed forces were added. On the diplomatic front,the collaboration between Brazil and the United States benefitted

from the efforts of Carlos Martins, ambassador in Washington inthe years 1938-1945, and Jefferson Caffery, who performed thesame role for the USA in Rio de Janeiro from 1937 to 1944.

With the entry of the United States in the war, in December1941, the pressure for Brazilian alignment increased. ForWashington it became crucial to assure a military base on theBrazilian Northeast coast in order to support its operations inthe North of Africa. Besides, the supply of a number of strategic

materials from Brazil also gained in importance, especiallyaluminum, zinc, nickel, copper, tungsten, magnesium, quartzcrystal, rubber, mica and tin. For the Vargas government, theconcessions made to the US had to be compensated by the re-equipment of the Brazilian armed forces.

Te negotiations with the American government concludedwith a secret military agreement signed in May 1942. TeWashington Agreements provided a US$ 100 million loan for the

Brazilian steel mill project and a credit of US$ 200 million for thepurchase of war material based on the American Lend Lease Act.Te new terms of the link with the United States were accompaniedby the Brazilian decision to sever relations with the Axis countries,which provoked the sinking of five Brazilian ships by torpedoesfrom German submarines. Te option for a hemispheric solidaritypolicy guided the Brazilian diplomatic performance at the TirdConsultation Meeting of American Foreign Ministers, held in


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January 1942 in Rio de Janeiro. As already mentioned, the mainresult of this meeting was the adoption of a recommendation tothe effect that the American republics would take collectively thedecision to sever diplomatic ties with the Axis.

wo joint military commissions were created, one based inWashington and the other in Rio de Janeiro, and the commitmentto supply armaments to Brazil was extended. Brazil started toreceive more than double of the value of the material shippedto any other Latin American country. Te announcement of thepermission to build an American base on Brazilian soil was madetogether with the declaration of war against Germany and Italy(August 1942). Te importance of Brazilian support was stressedby the United States in January 1943 on the occasion of theRoosevelt-Vargas meeting at the base in Natal, which marked themoment of maximum nearness between the two countries duringthe war.

Collaboration with the United States allowed Brazil to greatlyexpand it military capability. Besides the expansion of the Armytroops from 80,000 to 200,000 men, the merchant fleet wassignificantly increased and the Brazilian Air Force was created, with500 aircraft in operation. Contacts with American military officialsalso became intense for training activities and dissemination ofdefense doctrines. Equally important were the initiatives in thefield of economic cooperation leading to the organization of an

American economic mission to Brazil known as the Cooke Mission,whose task was to examine the condition of Brazilian industry andthe areas of interest to the United States in the country.

On the internal sphere, alignment with the United Statesprovoked some changes in Vargass support base. Te new linesof external policy implied the revision of the positions of highmilitary leaders and as a consequence the distancing from the


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sectors more identified with European fascism. Popular support tothe declaration of war led the Brazilian government to considerthe expansion of the participation of the country in the worldconflict. At the close of 1942 Brazil announced to the Allied forcesits decision to dispatch troops to the combat front in Europe. ForBrazil, the organization of a Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB)responded simultaneously to the project of strengthening of thearmed forces and to the interest in increasing its international

projection. Despite the initial reluctance of the Americangovernment, the departure of FEB to Europe took place in thesecond half of 1944, with a total of 25,000 men sent to Italy to jointhe 5thDivision of the United States Army. Brazil-United Statescollaboration during the war brought the bilateral ties even closer,as shown by the Brazilian moves to declare war on Japan in July1945 and to sign an agreement for the sale of monazitic sandsto the United States for three years. In exchange Brazil would

continue to benefit from the supply or arms under the AmericanLend Lease Act.

By the time the war ended, the Roosevelt-Vargas dialogueno longer kept its previous friendly tone. For the Braziliangovernment, the negotiation of favorable prices for coffee as wellas the securing of credits for industrial projects in the countrybecame more difficult. Te American government started to makepublic its sympathy toward the Brazilian political sectors that

favored liberal economic policies, which quickly contributed to afluid dialogue between anti-Vargas segments and supporters ofthe economic liberalism in the two countries.

Brazil was the only Latin American country to dispatch troopsto the war in Europe. Both Itamaraty and local political leadersshared the view that this presence would ensure a position ofprestige in the post-war conferences. Te notion that the status ofassociated power would benefit the interests of Brazil in future


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international negotiations gained strength. However, the ideathat the participation of Brazil deserved political and economiccompensation soon lost ground. From 1945 on the concerns ofthe United States focused on European reconstruction, leavinglittle room for Latin American aspirations in the process ofrebuilding the world order. During the Inter-American conferenceat Chapultepec, in 1945, the United States made clear its lackof interest towards the region as it refused to respond to the

aspirations of Brazil and of Latin America as a whole to occupya permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. TeUnited States also expounded the need for the Brazilian foreignpolicy to be adapted to the new world reality in which the SovietUnion would have to be recognized as a relevant player in theinternational community.

For Washington, to detach from non-democratic regimes inLatin America had become a priority, leading the adversaries of

Vargas to count on the support of the American government forthe return of Brazil to democracy. Te United States also becamequite concerned that Getlio Vargass nationalistic discoursewould take him closer to other Latin American leaders, especiallyJuan Domingo Pern in Argentina. In October 1945, Vargaswas deposed by the military chiefs of his own government andelections were held in the next year, opening a democratic periodwhich lasted until 1964.

1.2.2 Phase 2

Tis period starts in 1946 when more and more politicaloptions in Latin America became strongly conditioned by theCold War. Te identification of the region as an area of Americaninfluence determined its external ties in the economic, politicaland military fields, with important effects on Brazilian diplomacy.Te limitations imposed by the bipolarity, however, did not


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prevent Brazil from adopting creative policies linked to its economic

development aims. Tis endeavor was evident in the nationalisticpriorities of the second Vargas government, in the appeal todevelopment by Juscelino Kubitschek and in the innovativedirection of the independent foreign policy of the Quadros-Goulartadministrations. Te evolution of Brazilian foreign policy in thisperiod was influenced by domestic ebbs and flows, that which ledthe countrys diplomatic action to follow partisan positions and

interests.Brazilian economic policy in the immediate post-war period

was marked by the implementation of measures along the liberalprinciples that dominated the international economy. At the sametime, commercial relations with the United States flourished;in the years 1947-1950, 60% of Brazilian exports went to the

American market, while coffee was responsible for over 60% of theexternal sales of Brazil. Te Dutra administration, inaugurated in

1946, expected that relations with the US would follow the samepattern of understanding reached during World War II, assuringfull Brazilian support to Washington in the build-up of theinter-American system. In parallel, military cooperation betweenthe two countries assumed a new configuration: together with theexpansion of bilateral ties, American influence in the training andformation of the Brazilian armed forces increased and the activitiesof the Joint Brazil-United States Military Commission wereexpanded. Te most evident examples of this influence were the

institution, in 1946, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Creationof the Brazilian War College (Escola Superior de Guerra) inspired bythe National War College in Washinston. In what regards doctrine,the basic principles of national security came to reproduce thesame ideological tenets of hemispheric security.

In September 1947 Brazil hosted the Rio de Janeiro Conference

for the Maintenance of Peace and Security in the Continent,when the Inter-American reaty for Reciprocal Assistance (IAR)


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was signed with the presence of the American president Harryruman. Still under Dutra the validity of the Cooperation Programfor the Supply of Mineral Resources with the United States wasextended. Tis instrument authorized the export of monaziticsands, an important strategic product for the American atomicenergy program. Simultaneously, Brazil supported the BaruchPlan, which called for the creation of an International AtomicEnergy Authority. On the same lines, the Brazilian government

kept its position as a special ally of the United States during theBogot Conference (1948) at which the Organization of AmericanStates (OAS) was created.

Te Dutra government experienced its greatest frustrationwith the United States in the area of economic cooperation,especially in the face of the narrow scope of the Abbink Mission(Brazil-United States Joint echnical Commission), created in1948 with the objective of stimulating Brazilian development.

Against expectations, this mission confined itself to issue somevague recommendations, such as: the need to increase Brazilianproductivity, redirect internal capital and guarantee a larger flowof foreign investment to the country. It was replaced two yearslater by the Joint Brazil-United States Commission for EconomicDevelopment, soon generating new illusions of American supportto Brazilian industrialization.

Brazil remained aligned with the United States during the

Korean War: first, by recognizing the government of the Republicof Korea (South Korea) in 1949 and then supporting the resolution,promoted by the American government, to condemn the PopularRepublic of China for invading the Korean nation. Nevertheless,the alignment with Washington was shaken when the Dutraadministration did not obtain the necessary internal support forresponding favorably to the American government request to thedispatch Brazilian soldiers to the Korean war theater.


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From 1950 on, the Vargas administration tried to revivethe formula of using alignment with the United States as abargaining tool, expecting that political-military support wouldbe rewarded by economic cooperation to accelerate the countrysindustrialization. Optimism regarding material assistance fromthe United States led Brazilian authorities to strengthen thepromises of supply of strategic materials and of involvement inthe Korean conflict. Te latter move was rejected by the National

Congress, despite the appeals by President Vargas. Nevertheless,positive understandings were achieved and formalized in the 1952Brazil-United States Military Agreement, approved after ninemonths of intense legislative debate.

In this context, polarization erupted in Brazilian politicalcircles between nationalistic and pro-American postures. Whilethe nationalistic banners were marked by preference for Statecontrols and strong hostility to foreign capital, opposing positions

promoted alignment with the United States and the importance ofinvestments coming from that country. Tis confrontation couldbe observed in the protracted debate on the military agreement inCongress and in the heated national controversy around petroleum,which had already arisen since the countrys re-democratization in1945.

During the sessions of the National Constitutional Assembly(February-September 1946) the petroleum issue had already

brought divisions between Brazil and the US to the fore asAmerican oil companies demanded a liberal legislation bothfor the exploitation and for the distribution of oil and othermineral resources. In February 1948 the Dutra administrationsent to Congress a draft bill which addressed the legislation onOil, accepting that 60% of the capital of enterprises in the sectorcould be of foreign origin. Te opposing reaction from publicopinion was accompanied by an important political mobilization


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and a campaign in defense of petroleum was started, led byseveral organizations among which chiefly the National DefenseLeague, the Military Club, the Center for Studies for the Defenseof Petroleum and the National Students Union, Rallied aroundthe slogan the oil is ours, the campaign tried to prevent foreigncompanies such as Standard Oil, exaco and Atlantic RefiningCompany from setting up refineries in Brazil and insisted on thenotion that the State monopoly should be preserved in all activities

related to petroleum.

In his 1950 presidential campaign, Vargas defended thecreation of a national oil company as a priority project in his newadministration. In December 1951 a draft bill was sent to Congressproviding for the setting up of Petrobras as a mixed economyenterprise, with fixed proportions of national and foreign capital.

After almost two years of intense debate, within and withoutCongress, Law no. 2004 was adopted in October 1953, assuring

State monopoly in prospection, drilling, exploitation, refining andtransport of oil. Tis result was achieved thanks to the support ofthe opposition party National Democratic Union, whose positionhad been influenced by anti-Vargas sentiment rather than bynationalistic beliefs.

Vargas believed that the military negotiations with theruman administration should be compensated by support tohis economic development projects. o this end an agreement

was signed in December 1950 providing for the installation of aJoint Brazil-United States Commission (CMBEU). asked with theelaboration of projects to stimulate economic development to befinancially supported by the American Eximbank, this commissionwas composed of governmental agencies and technical andentrepreneurial elements who wished to ensure permanentinstruments for economic development. Te creation of a bank wasenvisaged to coordinate the use of external and internal resources


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to finance the 41 projects approved by the Joint Commission,several of them in the areas of transportation and energy.

Already in the beginning of 1952 the expectations created byCMBEU were reversed on account of tensions with the Americangovernment due to the decision by the Brazilian administration torestrict the remittance of benefits and the repatriation of capitals.o this scenario a number of external setbacks were added: the

end of the boom created by the Korean War, which had benefittedBrazilian exports; the lack of interest on the part of the Eisenhoweradministration on economic development projects; the hardenedattitude of the multilateral credit agencies, particularly the WorldBank; and the accumulation of commercial arrears with the UnitedStates. In this context, Vargas submitted to Congress, in February1952, the draft bill to create the National Economic DevelopmentBank (BNDE), approved four months later.

As mentioned above, the difficulties to obtain externalfinancing from the United States increased in the Eisenhoweradministration (1953-61). Te unwillingness of the Americangovernment to apply resources from the BIRD and the Eximbankin development projects in Brazil led to the dismantlement ofthe Joint Commission in December 1953. Since then, economicrelations between Brazil and the United States were confined totrade issues. Despite this reversal in expectations, the Braziliangovernment went forward with the project of creation of BNDEbased on the capture of internal resources.

Vargass suicide in August 1954 produced deep commotion in

Brazil, with reverberations around the world. In his Letter-Will,Getlio mentioned the weight of international pressures

(understood as coming from the United States) among the reasonsthat had led him to resort to such a dramatic gesture, revealing theinter-linkage of internal and external problems in his government.


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After the political interlude between this tragic event andthe presidential elections held in October 1955, the JuscelinoKubitschek government (1955-60) provided Brazil with a cycle ofpolitical stability and economic development. As president-elect,Kubitschek traveled to the United States and the main Europeancapitals in search of support for his development crusade. Hisefforts aimed at the change in the substance of the dialogue withthe United States, without affecting the strategic commitments of

Brazil. Te military links between the two countries maintained thedoctrinal loyalties in the field of defense policies. In this context,the installation of an American outpost for the observation ofguided rockets on Fernando de Noronha Island was negotiated andan agreement on civilian uses of atomic energy was signed betweenthe two countries, providing for the supply of enriched uranium forthe building of reactors in Brazil.

Multilateral forums gained importance for the dissemina-

tion of the new priorities of Brazilian foreign policy. At the 1958General Assembly of the United Nations a regional mobilizationaround the need for Latin American development was announced.Without shying away from the political commitments that linkedBrazil to the American sphere of influence, development waspromoted as an instrument of hemispheric security. Te Pan-

American Operation (OPA) was the main external policy initiativeof the Kubitschek government. It was proposed in a letter sent by

the Brazilian president to president Eisenhower in May 1958 andreceived immediate support from the Latin American countries.In Brazil, OPA was a project conceived by the president himself,with the support of Itamaraty and close aides, especially AugustoFrederico Schmidt, who defended the initiative in several multi-lateral forums. OPA encompassed a number of recommendations,such as investments in backward areas of the continent; technicalassistance programs; protection for prices of commodities; and


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resources from international financing agencies for the fightagainst underdevelopment. Consequently, a Committee of 21was created within the OAS to examine the forms and mo-dalities of its implementation, leading to the creation of theInter-American Development Bank (IDB).Tis first institutionalinitiative for the promotion of development within the inter-

American community.

With the Cuban revolution, the American concern with thespread of Communism in Latin America translated into newpriorities which dominated the hemispheric agenda. Tis switchled to the rapid exhaustion of OPA. At the same time, the Kennedyadministration brought forth its own prescription to deal with theLatin American economic reality by announcing, in March 1961, aprogram of assistance to the development of the region, known as

Alliance for Progress.

Te importance of the relations with the United States and

the influence of the Cold War upon the foreign policy options ofBrazil did not prevent the latter from reinforcing its ties with someEuropean nations. Former powers such as Germany and Franceoffered new opportunities, encouraged by the growth of theireconomies and by the need of expanding the investments oftheir enterprises. At the same time the ideological barriers thatuntil then had prevented commercial contacts with the SovietUnion and Eastern European countries became more flexible.

Competition between American and European companieshad beneficial effects for the expansion of the Brazilian industrialbasis which, besides representing a source of attraction for foreigninvestment, stimulated the importation and/or the productionof capital goods. By the same token, changes in external tradepolicies pushed forward the purchase of intermediary goods andraw materials used in the production of equipment. In the viewof the Kubitschek government the diversification of external


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economic links should not affect the support of the United Statesand a stronger American commitment toward the development ofLatin America was expected.

Besides the problems stemming from the absence of theexpected external support, the JK government also faceddifficulties to control its budget deficit and the rise of inflation.Te formulation of a Monetary Stabilization Program wassoon followed by a request for financing from the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Neither initiativeprospered: the first, due to internal resistance to measures withrecessive effects; the second, because of disagreements betweenthe Brazilian government and the IMF when the latter startedconditioning the granting of financial resources to a revision of themonetary and foreign exchange policies. Te Brazilian governmentreacted by severing the dialogue with that organism, counting onstrong internal support.

Te stagnation of internal accounts brought serious problemsfor the Quadros-Goulart government, inaugurated in January1961. Besides a heavy public deficit, the Brazilian economypresented an increasing inflationary trend. Harsh stabilizationpolicies were adopted, involving currency devaluation, restrictionson money printing and controls on governmental expenses.Tese measures permitted the re-establishment of the dialoguewith the international financial community, with the immediate

consequence of a reschedulingof external debt payments and thegranting of new loans. However, the relief experienced in the fieldof economic relations was short-lived.

Te Jnio Quadros-Joo Goulart government resorted toa new configuration of the basic tenets of Brazilian diplomaticaction known as Independent Foreign Policy (IFP). Tis momentrepresented a turning pointin theinternational projection of the


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country and consequently in the relationship with the UnitedStates. According to the basic postulates of IFP, Brazil wouldexpand its autonomy in the international sphere and shake offthe constraints imposed by the bipolarity. Te countrys posturesshould stem from the national interest and not from pressuresby the great powers, particularly the United States. Tis policyunderlined commonalities between Brazil and other developingnations in Latin America, Asia and Africa; it assumed a neutralist

identity and coincided in many points with those of the Non-Aligned Movement-particularly its criticism of colonialism,neo-colonialism, racism and the armaments race.

In accordance with the premises of IFP, Brazil adopted aposture of non-alignment with the United States at the VIIIConsultation Meeting of American Foreign Ministers held inPunta del Este (January 1962) and decided not to adhere to theembargo on Cuba. Months later, in the context of the missile crisis

and the naval blockade of Cuba (October 1962) Brazil offered itsgood offices to Fidel Castro to help overcome the impasse betweenHavana and Washington. In the end, the seriousness of thesituation led Brazil to remain loyal to the United States and tothe majority of the countries in the region by voting in favor of theblockade of Cuba at the OAS.

Te domestic crisis resulting from the resignation ofpresident Quadros in August 1961 caused immediate monetary,

fiscal and credit disruption. Instability persisted until the end ofthe Goulart government, in March 1964. Te lack of sympathy onthe part of the United States for the new ideological profile of theBrazilian government became more visible after measures takenby Goularts administration affecting the interests of Americancompanies based in the country. Most prominent were new rulesfor remittance of profits, support to nationalization of enterprisesand an end to concessions for the exploitation of natural resources.


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Te disagreements between the two countries were reinforcedby divergences arising in the diplomatic arena. Te visits to theUnited States of president Goulart in April 1962 and of Financeminister San iago Dantas in March 1963 did not yield fruitfulresults. In fact, the Goulart government, concerned with there-establishment of credit lines from multilateral agenciesand private American banks, attempted on several occasionsto get closer to the United States. Te negative perceptions in

Washington regarding the autonomist discourse of Brazil becameirremovable, added to the strong condemnation to the measuresof nationalization of foreign companies taken by the governor ofRio Grande do Sul, Leonel Brizola.

1.2.3 Phase 3

Tis period starts with the regime change in Brazil in March1964, in which internal and external factors interplayed. Te US

support to military and civilian leadership prone to a coup gaverise to an open commitment between the two parties. Tus, duringthe first phase of the military regime, the foreign policy wasmarked by a revival of the alignment with the United States andthe abandonment of the tenets of the IFP. Te link with the West,under American leadership, shaped the ideological profile of theBrazilian diplomacy. Relations with countries in the Socialist orbitwaned, the initiatives aiming at getting closer to African countries

was left aside and the between the military regime of Brazil andthe Salazar government in Portugal were strengthened.

Te concepts of ideological boundaries, limited sovereigntyand concentric circles were incorporated into the foreign policydesign. Te doctrine of national security established a bridgebetween external an internal threats based on policies of collectivedefense, while the perception of the US as the great leader ofthe free world warranted a strong bilateral alliance that would


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reinforce the Western coalition. According to this formulation,the support of Brazil to the institutions of the Inter-AmericanSystem was reactivated with the endorsement to the creation of anInter-American Peace Force. As Foreign ministers (1964-66 and1966-67, respectively) in the Castello Branco government, VascoLeito da Cunha e Juracy Magalhes supported continentalunity and solidarity together with the principles outlined in thehemispheric collective security concept.

Minister Juracy Magalhes statement that what is good forthe United States is good for Brazil became emblematic of thenew direction of the countrys foreign policy. Tat perspectiveled to decisions like the severance of relations with Cuba andparticipation in the military operation for the invasion of theDominican Republic in 1965, when Brazil took part in the Inter-

American Peace Force with 1,100 soldiers. Besides supporting theUS intervention, the Brazilian government backed the creation of

a permanent force to safeguard hemispheric security. Followingthe same line, the dispatch of a Brazilian contingent to the VietnamWar was considered by the Castello Branco administration haddomestic support been obtained.

Te demonstrations of affinity with the United Stateswere complemented by measures that eliminated restrictionsto the movement of foreign capital and to the presence offoreign enterprises in Brazil. An effort to recover credibility in

international credit agencies, foreign investors and industrializedcountries, particularly the United States, was made. Te entry offoreign capitals was encouraged together with the expectationthat the Alliance for Progress would become a relevant source forexternal financial support.

Te first signs of change were noticed two years after themilitary coup, when statist economic measures were accompanied


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by policies that aimed at the transformation of the externalprofile of the country. Te importance of the relationshipwith the United States was kept, but it no longer translatedinto automatic alignment. Te inter-linking of the Brazilianinternational initiatives with economic interests led foreignpolicy under Foreign minister Magalhes Pinto to be labeleddiplomacy for prosperity. Within military circles a criticalevaluation of the relations with the United States in the previous

period was gaining ground. A revision of the Brazilian ideologicalposture in world politics was facilitated by the momentaryexhaustion of the bipolar confrontation during the dtenteyears. Te concept of limited sovereignty was replaced by thatof full sovereignty and development was defined as the primaryobjective of Brazilian diplomacy. Tese conceptual changes weresupported by the younger strata of Itamaraty, identified with thetenets of the IFP at the start of the decade.

From 1969 on, Brazilian foreign policy deepened the changesof course tested in the previous period. However, the internalpolitical context, of growing political repression, set limits tothe countrys possibilities of external action. Te ideologicalboundaries set by Brazilian foreign policy were reinforced atthe same time as the results of the economic policy consolidatedthe option for the national-developmental model. During theyears Gibson Barboza acted as foreign minister (1969-1974)

Brazil international affairs followed three basic postures: the first,of an ideological character, defended the presence of militarygovernments in Latin America; the second criticized the distensionbetween the two superpowers by condemning the effects of thepower politics of both the United States and the Soviet Union; thethird demanded support to development and stated that Brazildeserved to assume more responsibilities in the internationalsystem by virtue of its economic potentialities.


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Monica Hirst

Tus, new demands and aspirations were arising, linked tothe perception that Brazil was increasing its bargaining powerin the world economic system. In international forums, its mainpostulation became that of collective economic security. Teeffort to assume a leadership role in the Tird World led Brazil tovalue multilateral diplomacy, as could be observed at the UnitedNations Conference on the Environment (1972), the GAmeeting in okyo (1973), and the Conference on the Law of the

Sea (1974). Tis new posture was the basis for a revision of theties with the United States; it was sustained by a differentiationvis--vis the rest of the Latin American countries that shouldtranslate into special relations. Te presence of Arajo Castro asambassador in Washington at that time contributed to the revisionof the links with the American government. Te strategy was tosupport the expansion of external negotiations with stress on thediversification of commercial relations, the beginning of nuclear

cooperation and the inclusion of new issues in the bilateral agenda.Te frustration of this project stimulated nationalistic sentimentsin military and diplomatic circles which came to question thealignment to the United States.

1.3 Autonomy

Tis phase starts with the Ernesto Geisel government, whenBrazil opened a new chapter in domestic and external affairs.

Te military regime started to take its first steps toward politicalopening and new contents were sought for the countries foreignpolicy design. Under foreign minister Antonio Francisco Azeredoda Silveira (1974-1979) the terms of the reinsertion of the countryin the world system were reformulated. Te fundamental tenets ofthe Brazilian international insertion were to include: commitmentto the principles of autonomy, the sovereign equality of States, thedefense of self-determination and non-interference in internal


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and external affairs of States and support to the peaceful solutionof disputes. Strongly committed to autonomy and universalism,Brazilian foreign policy supposed the end of automatic alignmentwith the United States, the abandonment of the ideologicalconditions imposed by the Cold War and a Tird World identity.Besides, new areas of coincidence between the Ministry of ExternalRelations and the armed forces came to the fore, postulating theexpansion of Brazilian autonomy in the realm of security; the

redefinition of the military relations with the United States;the negotiation of a nuclear agreement with Germany; and theincrease of Brazilian exports of military equipment.

In this period decisive changes in US-Brazil relations took place.At first, the intention was to reach a new level of understandingwith Washington that would permit the replacement of alignmentby a special relationship formula. With this aim in mind aMemorandum of Understanding between minister Azeredo da

Silveira and secretary of State Henry Kissinger was signed (1979),which created a mechanism of reciprocal consultations eachsemester on political and strategic issues of common interest.Tat initiative began to wane in the following year, when theelection of Jimmy Carter changed the priorities of the Americaninternational policy, which naturally affected relations with Brazil.

Carters campaigns in defense of human rights and nuclearnon-proliferation generated strong disagreements with Brazil.

In retaliation to American pressures, Brasilia denounced the1952 military agreement. Te Geisel government also chose notto yield to the efforts by Washington for the interruption of thenegotiations of the nuclear agreement with Germany. At first, theseunderstandings collided with the Brazil-United States nuclearagreement of 1972, for the construction of the Angra-I plant,which, by its turn, was denounced by the American government in1978 on the occasion of its ratification of the reaty on the Non-


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Monica Hirst

proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NP). It is worth stressing thatthis agreement, unlike the one negotiated with Germany, providedonly for the transfer of equipment, with no mention to technologyaccess. For the Geisel government this limitation was not acceptedas the nuclear project had become a high priority aimed atmaking possible a strategy that linked development, security andpragmatism.

After a period of strong tensions, relations between the twocountries took on a low political profile which persisted until the

1043-Understanding Brazil - United States Relations

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