ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK

IN ABKHAZIA, GEORGIA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 3

Part I. Post-War Negotiations and Moscow Agreement ..................................................... 4

Initial Meetings and Agreements .................................................................................... 4

The 1994 Moscow Agreement ........................................................................................ 6

Part II. United Nations ........................................................................................................ 8

UNOMIG ........................................................................................................................ 8

Geneva Process ............................................................................................................. 10

Geneva process in 1997-2002 ................................................................................... 10

Geneva process in 2003-2008 ................................................................................... 12

Coordinating Council ................................................................................................ 14

Confidence-Building Meetings ................................................................................. 16

Part III. Commonwealth of Independent States ................................................................ 18

Part IV. CSCE/OSCE........................................................................................................ 21

Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 23

Introduction

The war in Abkhazia that started in August 1992 resulted in the de facto loss of this

region for Georgia and the exodus of a large majority of its Georgian population in

September 1993. The end of armed hostilities set in motion various international

mechanisms of conflict resolution.

The Moscow Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of Forces signed in 1994 formed

the basis for the conflict resolution framework and the subsequent negotiating process. It

is the only major agreement signed by the Georgian and the Abkhaz sides to date.

Three international organizations - the United Nations, the Commonwealth of

Independent States and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe - have

been involved in the Abkhazia settlement process since 1993 and have thus formed the

international framework for this process.

The United Nations played a leading role in the conflict resolution process from the very

outset. It established its presence on the ground as early as in October 1992 by sending its

observers to Georgia, while the Secretary-General appointed his Special Envoy for

Georgia in May 1993. The UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) has maintained

its presence in the conflict zone to date. The United Nations and representatives of the

countries known as the Group of Friends of the UN Secretary-General on Georgia later

set out to facilitate a comprehensive political settlement through a series of high-level

meetings usually referred to as the Geneva Process.

The CIS contributed to the conflict resolution framework by deploying a peacekeeping

mission in the conflict zone in 1994. A number of noteworthy decisions were also

adopted during CIS summits in different years.

The CSCE/OSCE has been part of the international efforts to resolve the conflict in

Abkhazia since the early years of the process. The Abkhazia conflict was discussed at

OSCE summits and repeatedly mentioned in the relevant declarations.

The paper examines the performance of these organizations (and some of the mechanisms

that these organizations have set up) according to the degree of their involvement in the

peace process, in order to determine how effective the general conflict resolution

framework and its components have been.

Part I. Post-War Negotiations and Moscow Agreement

Initial Meetings and Agreements

About two months after the end of the war, on 30 November and 1 December 1993, the

Georgian and the Abkhaz sides met in Geneva under the auspices of the United Nations

to discuss a comprehensive settlement of the conflict. The Russian Federation in its

capacity as facilitator and representative of the Conference on Security and Cooperation

in Europe (CSCE) participated in the meeting. The sides signed the Memorandum of

Understanding whereby they, inter alia:

committed to refrain from the use of force or the threat of force against each other

while the negotiations continued;

stressed that peace would be promoted by an increase in the number of international

observers and by the deployment of an international peacekeeping contingent;

decided to exchange prisoners of war on the basis of "all for all" principle and to

take "urgent measures" to find the people who went missing during the hostilities;

undertook to create conditions for the voluntary, safe and speedy return of the

refugees and displaced persons and to return all the lost property to the refugees

and displaced persons who would return;

decided to establish a group of experts1 that would include representatives of the

parties to the conflict, the United Nations, Russia and the CSCE in order to prepare

recommendations on the political status of Abkhazia.

The sides also asked for international assistance in tackling economic and humanitarian

problems in the conflict area and for the establishment of an international commission to

promote economic recovery in the conflict zone.2

The second round of negotiations was held in Geneva 11-13 January 1994. The sides

signed a Communiqué in which they, inter alia:

reaffirmed their commitment not to use force or the threat of force against each

other;

noted that the deployment of a full-scale peacekeeping operation in the conflict area

would be conducive to further progress towards a political settlement of the conflict

and appealed to the UN Security Council to extend the mandate of the UN

Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG);

1 The first meeting of the group of experts consisting of the representatives of the parties to the conflict, the

United Nations, the Russian Federation and a CSCE observer was held in Moscow on 15-16 December

1993. 2 Memorandum of Understanding between the Georgian and the Abkhaz sides at the negotiations in

Geneva, 1 December 1993. http://smr.gov.ge/uploads/file/annex/annex7.pdf (accessed on 16/12/2008)

pledged to continue working on a quadripartite agreement (involving the Georgian

and the Abkhaz sides, the Russian Federation and the United Nations) on the return

of refugees and displaced persons to Abkhazia and agreed to establish a special

commission on refugees. They also agreed to start on 10 February 1994 a phased

process of the return of refugees and displaced persons to Abkhazia;

agreed to continue discussing Abkhazia's political status within the framework of

expert meetings3 in Moscow.

In the Communiqué, the sides noted that the provisions of the Memorandum they signed

on 1 December 1993 were "for the most part" being implemented.4

A further round of talks took place in Geneva 22-25 February, in New York 7-9 March

and in Moscow 29-31 March 1994. As a result, two documents were signed on 4 April

1994: the Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz

conflict and the Quadripartite Agreement on Voluntary Return of Refugees and

Displaced Persons.

The Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict

drew on the documents signed at the two previous rounds of negotiations. By signing the

Declaration, the parties to the conflict committed themselves to a "strict formal cease-

fire" and reaffirmed their commitment to refrain from the use of force or threat of the use

of force. The parties also:

signed a quadripartite agreement on the repatriation of refugees and displaced

persons;

reaffirmed their request for the deployment of a peacekeeping operation which, in

addition to its direct task, would also facilitate a safe return of refugees and

displaced persons;

agreed that Abkhazia would have its own constitution and legislation and

appropriate state symbols;

agreed to intensify efforts to investigate war crimes, crimes against humanity and

other serious crimes as defined by international and national law.

No agreement on Abkhazia's political status was reached but the Declaration stated that

the sides discussed the issue of distribution of powers between Georgia's central

government and the authorities in Abkhazia. As the Abkhaz side would not sign any

document that endorsed Georgia's territorial integrity, the Declaration contained no

reference to it.5

3 In accordance with the 13 January 1994 Communiqué, the second meeting of the group of experts took

place in Moscow on 8-10 February to address the issue of Abkhazia's political status. In his report dated 3

March 1994 (S/1994/253), the UN Secretary General stated that "the points of view of the two delegations

seemed to have drawn visibly closer". 4 Communiqué on the second round of negotiations between the Georgian and Abkhaz sides in Geneva, 11-

13 January 1994. http://smr.gov.ge/uploads/file/annex/annex8.pdf (accessed on 16/12/2008) 5 Declaration on Measures for a Political Settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict signed on 4 April

1994. http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/keytext1.php (accessed on 16/12/2008)

The Declaration, along with the 13 January Communiqué, eventually became a basis for

the Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of Forces that was signed in Moscow on

14 May 1994.

By signing the second document - the Quadripartite Agreement on Voluntary Return of

Refugees and Displaced Persons - the parties, inter alia:

agreed to cooperate in their efforts to guarantee a "safe, secure and dignified" return

of refugees and displace persons to their homes;

undertook to respect the voluntary nature of repatriation and agreed that the

returnees would not face risk of arrest, detention, imprisonment or legal criminal

proceedings unless "serious" evidence indicating that they had committed war

crimes and crimes against humanity could be presented. The parties also agreed that

such immunity would not apply to those who participated in armed hostilities and

those serving in the armed formations, preparing to fight in Abkhazia;

agreed to ensure that the returnees would be protected from harassment, their

expired documents would be extended and they would regain ownership of the

property that they left behind and receive compensation where the return of

property was not feasible.

to establish a quadripartite commission that would address practical issues related

to the return process.6

The 1994 Moscow Agreement

The parties to the conflict signed the Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of

Forces in Moscow on 14 May 1994 in order to formalize their commitment to cease-fire

and non-use of force stipulated first in their 13 January 1994 Communiqué and then in

the 4 April 1994 Declaration. The Agreement, inter alia:

obliged the sides to "scrupulously" observe a cease-fire;

established a security zone - a 12-km area along each side of the Inguri river, and a

restricted weapons area which represented an extension of the security zone on

each side. The Agreement prohibited the presence of any armed forces or heavy

military equipment7 within the security zone. As for the restricted weapons zone,

the agreement stipulated that no heavy military equipment would be allowed there.

Local civil authorities (the police) could operate within both zones and carry

"personal arms"8;

stipulated that the CIS peacekeeping force would be deployed in the security zone

to monitor the compliance with the Agreement;

6 Quadripartite Agreement on Voluntary Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons Signed on 4 April

1994. http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/keytext2.php (accessed on 16/12/2008) 7 The Agreement defined heavy military equipment as a) all artillery and mortars of caliber exceeding 18

mm; b) all tanks; c) all armored transport vehicles. 8 The term "personal arms" later caused difference of opinion as the Abkhaz "militia" was armed with

automatic weapons while the Georgian police carried pistols.

ruled that special areas be designated for the heavy military equipment withdrawn

from the security and the restricted-weapons zone (subject to monitoring by UN

observers);

obliged Georgia to withdraw its troops from the Kodori Valley.

The agreement also mentioned the role of the UN military observers on the ground and

contained a map defining the security and restricted-weapons zones.

One of the key tasks of the CIS peacekeeping force in addition to maintaining a cease-fire

as stipulated in the special Protocol of the Agreement on the CIS peacekeeping force was,

by its presence, to "promote the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, especially

to the Gali district".9

Following the Georgian-Russian war in August 2008, Georgia withdrew from the

Moscow Agreement.

9 See S/1994/583, Annex I for the text of the Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of Forces, signed

in Moscow on 14 May 1994.

Part II. United Nations

UNOMIG

The United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) was established by the UN

Security Council Resolution 858 of 24 August 1993. Initially, the Mission was to monitor

the observance of the Cease-Fire Agreement signed by the parties to the conflict on 27

July 1993, investigate reports of violations of the agreement and attempt resolving them

with the sides and report to the UN Secretary-General on such violations.10

Following the signing of the 14 May 1994 Moscow Agreement which, among other

things, envisaged the deployment of the CIS peacekeeping force in the conflict zone, the

Security Council on 21 July 1994, adopted a resolution, expanding the mandate of

UNOMIG and increasing its presence on the ground. The Mission was mandated, inter

alia:

to monitor and verify the implementation of the Moscow Agreement;

to observe the operation of the CIS peacekeeping force within the framework of

the implementation of the Moscow Agreement;

to monitor the situation in the security and restricted weapons zone defined by

the agreement and, by its presence in the area, contribute to the creation of

conditions that would allow safe return of refugees and IDPs;

to regularly patrol the Kodori Valley.11

UNOMIG has been led since 1997 by the Special Representative of the Secretary-

General who has been a leading figure in the conflict settlement process. The Special

Representative arranged and presided over meetings between parties to the conflict in

various formats. The Special Representative has also facilitated visits by Georgian

officials and envoys to Sukhumi as well as visits by Abkhaz leaders and representatives

to Tbilisi on multiple occasions.

UNOMIG has operated in close cooperation with the CIS peacekeeping force on the

ground, participating in joint patrolling of the security and restricted weapons zones and

the Kodori valley, exchanging information. Most of the time, their cooperation was

described as "satisfactory" by the UN Secretary-General though occasional difficulties

did apparently occur.12

The most serious incident of this sort occurred in April 2002

when a contingent of the CIS peacekeepers was deployed in the Georgian-controlled

upper Kodori Valley without a prior coordination with UNOMIG. It is noteworthy that

10

United Nations Security Council Resolution 858, 24 August 1993 (S/RES/858) 11

United Nations Security Council Resolution 937, 21 July 1994 (S/RES/937) 12

See, for example, Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia of 8

November 1995 (S/1995/937) and Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation in

Abkhazia, Georgia of 29 October 1998 (S/1998/1012)

the United Nations has linked the extension of UNOMIG's mandate to the presence of the

CIS peacekeepers on the ground due to security reasons.

UNOMIG's senior representatives regularly attended the weekly quadripartite meetings at

the main bridge over Inguri. Attended by heads of Zugdidi and Gali administrations and

chaired by the Commander or the Chief of Staff of the CIS peacekeeping force, these

meetings were used to discuss practical matters on the ground. Subsequently, the

meetings were expanded to include the police and security representatives from both

sides. The meetings were suspended and resumed depending on the situation until the

autumn of 2006 when the last such meeting took place.

The UNOMING Chief Military Observer chaired the Joint Fact-Finding Group that was

established in January 2000 to investigate alleged violations of the Moscow Agreement.

The group brought together representatives of the Georgian and the Abkhaz sides and the

CIS peacekeeping force and continued to operate until the events of August 2008.

While UNOMIG was able to conduct patrolling in the Gali and Zugdidi sectors on a

regular basis from the moment of its establishment until the August 2008 events, the

mission's patrols in the Kodori Valley (both the Georgian-controlled and the Abkhaz-

controlled parts) were suspended on numerous occasions over security concerns.

In 2003, the UN Security Council endorsed the Secretary-General's recommendation to

add a civilian police component of 20 officers to UNOMIG to contribute to the creation

of conditions for a safe and dignified return of refugees and internally displaced

persons.13

However, it subsequently proved impossible to extend the operation of the

civilian police component to Gali District due to the continued objection by the Abkhaz

side. The plans to open a branch of the mission's Human Rights Office in Gali also never

materialized for the same reason.

Given that, as mentioned above, the extension of UNOMIG's mandate was repeatedly

linked by the United Nations to the presence of the CIS peacekeepers on the ground, the

August 2008 war and Georgia's subsequent decision to withdraw from the

commonwealth and terminate the peacekeeping operation has raised questions over the

future of the mission. However, in his October 2008 report to the Security Council, the

Secretary-General recommended extension of the UNOMIG mandate "on a technical

basis" for a period of four months. The Secretary-General noted that, while it was too

early to define the future role of UNOMIG, he had received a formal indication from both

the Georgian and the Abkhaz sides that they supported the continuation of the mission.

The report also noted that the Secretary-General would hold consultations with the two

sides and with the relevant international actors over the possible adjustment of the

mission's role and report to the Security Council on the outcome of those consultations

before the end of the technical extension.14

The Security Council subsequently voted to

extend the mandate of UNOMIG until 15 February 2009.15

13

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1494, 30 July 2003 (S/RES/1494) 14

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia of 3 October 2008 (S/2008/631) 15

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1839, 9 October 2008 (S/RES/1839)

Geneva Process

The UN Secretary-General informed the Security Council in his April 1997 report on the

situation in Abkhazia that he intended to convene a meeting involving both parties to the

conflict in order to map out the areas where concrete political progress could be made.16

The decision was made to strengthen the UN role in conflict resolution and revitalize the

peace process after a prolonged stalemate and continued disagreement of the sides on two

key issues: Abkhazia's political status and the return of refugees and internally displaced

persons to their original places of residence.17

This can be considered the beginning of

the process that is usually referred to as the Geneva process and has served as the main

format for the international efforts towards a comprehensive political settlement.

The United Nations, the Russian Federation, the CSCE/OSCE and the Group of Friends18

have since been involved in the Geneva process along with the Georgian and the Abkhaz

sides.

Geneva process in 1997-2002

On 23-25 July 1997, a high-level meeting involving both parties to the conflict was held

in Geneva. At the meeting, the parties reaffirmed their commitment to non-use of force or

threat of use of force. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General said that the

parties welcomed the reinvigoration of the UN role in the conflict resolution efforts.19

The high-level Geneva meeting was resumed on 17 November 1997 when the

participants adopted the Concluding Statement, approving a program of action

concerning the resolution of the conflict and setting up a mechanism for the

16

Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, 25 April 1997

(S/1997/340) 17

UN-led negotiations between the sides continued after the signing of the Moscow Agreement in May

1994. A number of meetings were held in Geneva in 1994-1995. During those meetings, the parties

discussed a draft paper on Abkhazia's possible status within a "union state" prepared jointly by the United

Nations, the OSCE and Russia. No agreement was reached and the negotiations came to a standstill

following the hostilities in Gali District in the spring 1995. 18

Although the status of the Group of Friends of the UN Secretary-General on Georgia was officially

defined by the Concluding Statement of the 17 November 1997 high-level meeting in Geneva,

representatives of the states that comprise the group - Germany, France, Britain, the United States and the

Russian Federation - have been actively involved in conflict resolution efforts since very early stages of the

peace process. Initially referred to simply as Friends of Georgia, the ambassadors of these countries

frequently met with the Georgian and Abkhaz separatist leadership whether to discuss pressing problems,

convey concerns over the lack of progress towards political settlement of the conflict or call for the

resumption of dialogue between the parties when it was absent. Representatives of the Group of Friends

supported UN-led efforts and its decision to convene the aforementioned high-level meeting in Geneva and

became active participants in the Geneva Process that started with that meeting. In addition to participating

in the Geneva Process and the sessions of the Coordinating Council (established by the Concluding

Statement of the 17 November 1997 Geneva meeting), the Group of Friends has continued maintaining

contacts with the two sides outside this framework. 19

Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, Addendum, 29 July

1997 (S/1997/558/Add.1)

implementation of this program - the Coordinating Council (see separate section). The

Statement also defined the status of the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General on

Georgia in the peace process: representatives of the Group were authorized to participate

in meetings and make statements and proposals without being a party to the

negotiations.20

Following a low point in the peace process that was caused by the resumption of armed

hostilities in May 1998 and the Special Representative's efforts to put the Geneva Process

back on track, the second high-level meeting between the Georgian and the Abkhaz sides

was held in Geneva on 23-25 July 1998. The participants, inter alia, reiterated their

support for greater UN involvement in the conflict resolution process, stressed the need

for a full activation of the mechanisms established at the previous Geneva meeting (the

Coordinating Council), underscored the importance of direct dialogue between the parties

to the conflict at various levels and reaffirmed their commitment to a peaceful settlement.

The return of refugees was discussed in detail but no concrete agreement was reached.21

The Concluding Statement was accompanied by a statement on behalf of the Group of

Friends of the Secretary-General. The Group lamented the lack of progress with regard to

a political settlement, called on the parties to search for one using the mechanism

established in November 1997 and stressed the importance of providing for a safe return

of refugees and displaced persons.22

In 1999, the work commenced on a draft document that was to serve as the basis for the

eventual resolution of the conflict. In Resolution 1255 adopted on 30 July 1999, the UN

Security Council stated its support for the "intention of the Secretary-General and his

Special Representative, in close cooperation with the Russian Federation, in its capacity

as facilitator, the OSCE and the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General, to continue to

submit proposals for the consideration of the parties on the distribution of constitutional

competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi as part of a comprehensive settlement".23

In a related development, later in the same year, Abkhazia held a referendum on its

constitution and declared independence. The decision had a profound and lasting impact

on the Geneva process as the Abkhaz side repeatedly refused to discuss the question of its

possible status within the single Georgian state in the years that followed.

The first draft of the Basic Principles for the Distribution of Constitutional Competencies

between Tbilisi and Sukhumi was presented to Russia, the OSCE and the Group of

Friends in late 1999. Revised versions of the draft were produced in March and May

2000 following the Special Representative's consultations with the Group of Friends

though the Secretary-General noted in his July 2000 report to the Security Council that

20

Concluding statement on the outcome of the resumed meeting between the Georgian and Abkhaz parties

held in Geneva from 17 to 19 November 1997, http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-

abkhazia/keytext7.php (accessed on 16/12/2008) 21

Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation on Abkhazia, Georgia, Addendum, 28 July

1998 (S/1998/647/Add.1, Annex) 22

Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation on Abkhazia, Georgia, Addendum, 28 July

1998 (S/1998/647/Add.1, Appendix) 23

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1255, 30 July 1999 (S/RES/1255)

differences of views had arisen among the Friends themselves concerning both content

and strategy.24

The Secretary-General continued to voice his concern in the subsequent

reports as the Group of Friends was unable to reach a consensus due to disagreements

between Russia and the rest of the Group.25

In December 2001, more than two years after the adoption of Resolution 1255, the

Special Representative was finally able to produce a text of the paper that had the full

support of all members of the Group of Friends.26

The document offered the following

basic principles for the future settlement:

Abkhazia was to become a sovereign entity within the sovereign state of Georgia

Distribution of competencies between Tbilisi and Sukhumi was to be based on a

federal agreement which was not to be amended without mutual consent

The constitutions of Georgia and Abkhazia were to be amended in accordance

with the federal agreement

The constitutions of Georgia and Abkhazia would endorse the rights of national

minorities and the right of displaced persons to return to their homes

Georgia and Abkhazia were to agree on the composition of the Constitutional

Court whose work was to be guided by the Georgian and the Abkhaz

constitutions and the federal agreement.27

Despite the Secretary-General's assurance that the paper on the distribution of

competences was "simply a means to open the door to substantive negotiations in which

the parties themselves will work out a settlement"28

, the Abkhaz leadership refused to

receive the paper for consideration and emphasized that the status of Abkhazia had

already been determined through its declaration of independence. The Abkhaz leadership

also refused to meet the Group of Friends in 1999-2002.

Geneva process in 2003-2008

During this period of time, the United Nations tried to advance the negotiating process

through a series of high-level meetings of the Group of Friends held under the

chairmanship of the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. As the

Abkhaz side continued to refuse to engage in any discussions involving the question of

status, the UN efforts focused on facilitating agreements on non-resumption of hostilities

and return of refugees and displaced persons.

24

Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation on Abkhazia, Georgia, 17 July 2000

(S/2000/697) 25

See, for example, Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation on Abkhazia, Georgia, 24

October 2001 (S/2001/1008) which mentions that the Group of Friends disagreed with Russia's proposal to

include security guarantees in the draft. 26

The plan is often referred to as the Boden document after the Special Representative of the Secretary-

General, Dieter Boden. 27

Office of the Georgian Minister of State for Reintegration,

http://smr.gov.ge/en/abkhazia/documents/bodens_document (accessed on 15/12/2008) 28

Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation on Abkhazia, Georgia, 18 January 2002

(S/2002/88)

In February 2003, senior representatives of the Group of Friends held a brainstorming

session in Geneva in order to overcome the deadlock in the negotiating process. They

identified three sets of issues as key to achieving progress in the negotiations: (a)

economic affairs, (b) the return of refugees and displaced persons and (c) political and

security matters. In order to facilitate work on these issues, they proposed the

establishment of three task forces that would operate under UN chairmanship and

comprise representatives of the two parties, the Group of Friends and external experts.29

Georgian and Abkhaz delegations attended parts of a follow-up meeting held in July and

held separate discussions with the Group of Friends. The Georgian side emphasized the

need to promote the return of refugees and displaced persons to Gali District, while the

Abkhaz delegation focused primarily on mechanisms for ensuring non-resumption of

hostilities.30

Several meetings of the Group of Friends were held in 2004-2006 to review progress on

the three sets of issues identified earlier. The Georgian and Abkhaz delegations continued

to attend the meetings and present their views on the key issues. The Secretary-General

noted in his April 2005 report to the Security Council that the latest meeting had

highlighted the "differing priorities" of the sides and the importance of building trust as a

precondition for progress on political issues.31

In order to implement the recommendations of the February 2003 Geneva brainstorming

session, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General also arranged, together with

the Group of Friends ambassadors, a number of meetings between the Georgian and the

Abkhaz sides on security guarantees in 2003-2005. A draft text on non-resumption of

hostilities and return of refugees and internally displaced persons, in the first instance to

Gali District, was discussed at the last such meeting which took place in Tbilisi in August

2005.32

The negotiating process stalled following the Georgian police operation in the upper

Kodori Valley in July 2006 and Tbilisi's subsequent decision to relocate the exiled

Abkhaz government to the area. The Abkhaz side refused to engage in a political

dialogue with Tbilisi so long as Georgian armed personnel and the exiled government

remained in Kodori.

Two meetings of the Group of Friends were held in 2007 (in February and in June) and

the Georgian and Abkhaz delegations were again invited to participate. The Abkhaz side

reiterated that the withdrawal of Georgian forces from Kodori was a precondition to the

29

Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, 9 April 2003

(S/2003/412) 30

Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, 21 July 2003

(S/2003/751) 31

Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, 25 April 2005

(S/2005/269) 32

Statement of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN for Georgia, Ms Heidi

Tagliavini, 4 August 2005. http://www.unomig.org/data/file/693/security_forth_eng.pdf (accessed on

16/12/2008)

resumption of dialogue. In response to the Georgian proposal to hold a meeting at the

highest level to discuss security, the Abkhaz delegation stated that such a meeting could

take place so long as it would result in the signing of a non-use of force agreement or the

lifting of economic sanctions. The political dialogue remained suspended as the sides

continued to differ on the question of the Kodori Valley.33

The attempts to revive the negotiating process continued in 2008. At the February

meeting of the Group of Friends in Geneva, the Georgian side stated its readiness to

develop economic links and to lift economic sanctions provided an agreement was

reached on a number of issues including a safe and dignified return of refugees and

internally displaced persons. Meanwhile, the Abkhaz side called on the Group of Friends

to revise its approach to the conflict settlement process in the light of the developments

concerning Kosovo. The members of the group urged the sides to resume the meetings on

security guarantees and to finalize the documents on non-resumption of hostilities and

return of refugees.34

In July 2008, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier presented a conflict

settlement plan that envisaged a three-phase process: 1) agreements on security measures

(non-use of force) and return of refugees; 2) economic rehabilitation and confidence-

building measures; 3) discussion of political status.35

The German government also

proposed to hold a meeting in Berlin to discuss the plan. The Abkhaz side once again

stated that Georgia's commitment to non-use of force and the withdrawal of armed

personnel from Kodori were prerequisites to any talks. The Abkhaz leadership also

requested postponement of the Berlin meeting from July to August. The meeting was

eventually cancelled due to the outbreak of hostilities in South Ossetia.

Following the August war in 2008, the Russian Federation, a member of the Group of

Friends, unilaterally recognized the independence of Abkhazia.

Coordinating Council

The Coordinating Council was established through the Concluding Statement adopted by

the participants of the high-level meeting between the Georgian and the Abkhaz sides

that was held in Geneva on 17 November 1997.36

The Council was set up as a mechanism

for the implementation of the program of action for the settlement of the conflict

approved at the Geneva meeting. Within the framework of the Coordinating Council,

three working groups were set up to address the following issues: 1) lasting non-

33

Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, 3 April 2007

(S/2007/182); Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, 18 July 2007

(S/2007/439) 34

Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation on Abkhazia, Georgia, 23 July 2008

(S/2008/480) 35

Report of the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation on Abkhazia, Georgia, 3 October 2008

(S/2008/631) 36

Concluding statement on the outcome of the resumed meeting between the Georgian and Abkhaz parties

held in Geneva from 17 to 19 November 1997. http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-

abkhazia/keytext7.php

resumption of hostilities and security problems; 2) refugees and internally displaced

persons; and 3) economic and social problems.

The first session of the Coordinating Council took place in Sukhumi on 18 December

1997 under the chairmanship of UN Secretary-General's Special Representative for

Georgia. Representatives of the Russian Federation, the OSCE and the Group of Friends

participated in the session along with the Georgian and the Abkhaz delegations.

Separatist leader Vladislav Ardzinba addressed the opening session. Participants of the

first meeting adopted the Statute of the Coordinating Council which stated that the aim of

the Council was to implement the stipulations of the Concluding Statement adopted in

Geneva. According to the statute, the Council was to meet at least once every two months

and its decisions were to be considered binding on the parties. Each of the parties was

entitled to call an extraordinary session.37

The three working groups of the Council held

separate meetings where they approved their respective programs of action.38

The Coordinating Council met regularly between December 1997 and April 1999 when

eight sessions (out of the total of 13 sessions held to date) took place. During this period

of time, two extraordinary sessions of the council were convened in order to address the

tense situation in the conflict zone. Another four sessions were held between January

2000 and January 2001.

The 12th session held in January 2001 was followed by a lengthy break in the Council's

activities as the next scheduled meeting was postponed on several occasions due to the

deterioration of the situation on the ground (notably the developments in the Kodori

Valley in the autumn 2001). The Secretary-General noted in his October 2001 report to

the UN Security Council that the meeting had to be postponed due to "insufficient

political will on either side to engage in serious dialogue within the available peace

process mechanisms".39

The Coordinating Council did not meet again until May 2006 when the first session of

the resumed Coordinating Council was convened in Tbilisi. The parties drew up a

schedule of meetings of the three working groups and also agreed to hold the next session

in July as part of the Council's original bimonthly schedule. However, the Special

Representative of the Secretary-General was unable to convene a meeting of the Council

due to the developments on the ground, including the Georgian police operation in the

upper Kodori Valley. The Council has not assembled since 2006.

The Coordinating Council was thus unable to meet on a regular basis between 1997 and

2008 or to achieve tangible progress in any of the three areas of its work.

37

Record of the first session of the Coordination Council of the Georgian and Abkhaz Parties, held in

Sukhumi on 18 December 1997. http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/keytext8.php

(accessed on 13/12/2008) 38

Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, 19

January 1998 (S/1998/51) 39

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, 24 October 2001

(S/2001/1008)

Confidence-Building Meetings

The confidence-building meetings (conferences) between the Georgian and the Abkhaz

sides were held as part of the Geneva process under the chairmanship of the Special

Representative of the Secretary-General. The Georgian and the Abkhaz sides were

represented by the minister of state and the de facto prime minister respectively.

The first meeting was held in Athens 16-18 October 1998 and was subsequently

described by the Secretary-General in his report to the Security Council as "the largest

and most representative meeting between the parties since the end of the war of 1993".40

Along with government officials and MPs, the delegations included representatives of

academic circles, members of NGOs and journalists. Representatives of the Russian

Federation, the OSCE and the Group of Friends also attended the meeting. The parties

reaffirmed their previous commitment regarding the right of refugees and displaced

person to return to their places of permanent residence and agreed to speed up the work

on the relevant documents. They also proposed a number of confidence-building

measures including the creation of a joint mechanism for the investigation of alleged

violations of the 1994 Moscow Agreement and the relevant complaints and the

establishment of an operative link between the military structures of the sides for rapid

response to situations and actions that could aggravate the situation in the conflict zone. It

was decided that confidence-building measures were to be implemented within the

framework of the Coordinating Council and bilateral meetings.41

The second meeting was held in Istanbul 7-9 June 1999. The Georgian and the Abkhaz

delegations included, among others, military commanders who had participated in the

armed conflict. The parties agreed to revive the activities of the three working groups set

up within the Coordinating Council, to organize meetings between political and public

figures from both sides, to study possibilities for specific types of cooperation in various

areas (in particular, the economic area), to develop and establish mechanisms for regular

exchange of information. They also decided that the law-enforcement bodies would

exchange information on illegal activities and would consult with each other on the

measures to be taken jointly to prevent such activities.42

The third meeting on confidence-building measures was originally expected to take place

later in 1999 but was only held in March 2001. At the meeting, the parties requested the

Special Representative to appeal to the United Nations, the Group of Friends, the OSCE

and the CIS to "become guarantors for the non-resumption of hostilities, the steady and

safe return of refugees and displaced persons, in the first phase to the Gali district within

40

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, 20 January 1999, p 1.

http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/013/68/IMG/N9901368.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on

12/12/2008) 41

Athens Meeting of the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides on Confidence-Building Measures, 16-18 Oct 1998.

http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/keytext10.php (accessed on 12/12/2008)

42

Istanbul Statement of the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides on Confidence-Building Measures, 7–9 June 1999.

http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/georgia-abkhazia/keytext11.php (accessed on 12/12/2008)

the old borders, and to elaborate, with the participation of the Sides, the mechanism to

implement these guarantees."43

The parties also agreed on a list of 15 confidence-building

measures.44

The possibility of holding a fourth meeting on confidence-building measures was

discussed during the February 2003 gathering of the Group of Friends where it was

suggested that the meeting would address all aspects of the peace process.45

Also, the UN

Security Council resolutions adopted in 2003-2006 repeatedly called on the parties to the

conflict to consider holding a fourth meeting (conference) on security-building measures.

However, the meeting was not convened.

43

Yalta Declaration of the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides, 15-16 March 2001.

http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/293/95/PDF/N0129395.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on

12/12/2008) 44

Annex to the Programme of Action on Confidence-building between the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides.

http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/293/95/PDF/N0129395.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on

12/12/2008) 45

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, 9 April 2003,

http://www.unomig.org/data/file/105/030409.pdf (accessed on 12/12/2008).

Part III. Commonwealth of Independent States

The involvement of the CIS in the conflict settlement process in Abkhazia dates back to

April 1994 when the Council of Heads of State adopted a statement expressing the

readiness of the members of the commonwealth to launch a peacekeeping operation in

the conflict zone. The Moscow Agreement signed in May 1994 provided for the

deployment of a CIS peacekeeping force and the mandate of the peacekeepers was

approved by the CIS heads of state in October 1994. The operation was to start on 15

November 1994 and to last until 15 May 1995 unless the mandate was extended by the

Council of Heads of State.

The mandate was subsequently extended repeatedly though the extension was delayed on

several occasions as Georgia sought its modification while the Abkhaz side objected to

any such changes. During their March 2003 meeting in Sochi, Georgian President Eduard

Shevardnadze and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed that the CIS peacekeepers

would stay in the conflict zone until consent was withdrawn by one of the parties.

Along with sending a peacekeeping force to Abkhazia in 1994, the CIS Council of Heads

of State adopted a number of noteworthy acts on the conflict settlement process in

subsequent years.

In its 19 January 1996 decision, the Council condemned the "destructive stance" of the

Abkhaz side which, in the Council's opinion, was an obstacle to the settlement of the

conflict and the return of refugees and displaced persons. The Council imposed a number

of sanctions on the breakaway region, noting that the member-states:

would refrain from delivering all types of armaments, ammunition and military

hardware to Abkhazia;

would prevent their citizens from joining the armed groups operating in Abkhazia

and ensure return of their citizens who served in such groups at the time;

would not engage in trade, economic, finance and transport communications with

the Abkhaz authorities or in contacts with Abkhaz officials without the Georgian

government's consent;

would not allow the operation of Abkhaz diplomatic missions on their territory.46

In March 1997, the Council passed a decision which criticized the Abkhaz side for

obstructing the settlement of the conflict and the return of refugees and displaced persons

and reaffirmed the sanctions introduced the previous year.47

The Council also supported

the proposed expansion of the security zone and redeployment of the peacekeepers in

46

Решение Совета глав государств-участников Содружества Независимых Государств о мерах по

урегулированию конфликта в Абхазии, Грузия, 19 января 1996 г.

http://www.apsny.ge/notes/1128822468.php (accessed on 16/12/2008) 47

Решение Совета глав государств-участников Содружества Независимых Государств о ходе

урегулирования конфликта в Абхазии, Грузия, 28 марта 1997 г.

http://www.apsny.ge/notes/1128994710.php (accessed on 16/12/2008)

order to provide conditions for a safe return of refugees and displaced persons to Gali

District.48

In April 1998, the Council expressed concern over the fact that its decision on

the expansion of the security zone had not been implemented due to the Abkhaz side's

objection and called for the completion of the process of return of refugees and displaced

persons to Gali District before the end of the year. The Council also recommended

establishment of an interim administration involving UN and OSCE representatives in

Gali.49

During the April 1999 meeting in Moscow, the Council adopted a decision on further

steps towards the resolution of the conflict, reiterating its support for the sovereignty and

territorial integrity of Georgia and urging the member-states to consider the possibility of

contributing to the CIS peacekeeping operations in Abkhazia through the deployment of

military contingents or observers. The Council called on the parties to the conflict to

finalize a draft agreement on peace and guarantees for the prevention of armed

confrontation and a draft protocol on the return of refugees to Gali District and measures

for economic rehabilitation. The Council emphasized that measures towards the

economic revival of the region were to be linked to the process of continuous and

organized return of refugees.50

In a March 2003 decision, the Council of Heads of State reaffirmed its support for the

territorial integrity of Georgia and emphasized the need for a safe and dignified return of

refugees. The Council also voiced its support for the document on the Basic Principles

for the Distribution of Competencies between Tbilisi and Sukhumi.51

In a statement

adopted later in the same year, the Council once again expressed the support for the

sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia and called for the implementation of the

measures outlined in its decision of 19 January 1996.52

Georgia's overall discontent with the activities of the CIS peacekeeping force was

reflected in a number of resolutions adopted by the country's parliament in different

years. In May 1997, parliament adopted a resolution requesting the president of Georgia

to take a number of steps to ensure the withdrawal of the CIS peacekeepers unless

considerable progress was made towards a peaceful settlement of the conflict by 31 July

1997. The resolution noted that the peacekeepers effectively served as Abkhaz border

48

Решение Совета глав государств-участников Содружества Независимых Государств о развитии

операции по поддержанию мира в зоне конфликта в Абхазии, Грузия, 28 марта 1997 г.

http://www.apsny.ge/notes/1128994687.php (accessed on 16/12/2008) 49

Решение Совета глав государств-участников Содружества Независимых Государств о

дополнительных мерах по урегулированию конфликта в Абхазии, Грузия, 28 апреля 1998 г. 50

Письмо постоянного представителя Российской Федерации от 6 апреля 1999 года на имя

генерального секретаря (S/1999/392) 51

Решение Совета глав государств Содружества Независимых Государств о продлении срока

пребывания Коллективных сил по поддержанию мира в зоне конфликта в Абхазии, Грузия, 22 марта

2003 г. http://pravo.kulichki.com/megd2007/bz01/dcm01102.htm (accessed on 16/12/2008) 52

Заявление Совета глав государств Содружества Независимых Государств. Ялта, 19 сентября 2003

г. http://www.bankzakonov.com/inter/razdel114/time1/lavz0058.htm (accessed on 16/12/2008)

troops and supported and strengthened the separatist regime. 53

In October 2001,

parliament proposed that the president implemented procedures for an "immediate and

unconditional" pullout of the CIS peacekeepers and raised the question of deployment of

an international peacekeeping force with the United Nations, the OSCE and the Group of

Friends.54

In October 2005, parliament passed another resolution that referred to a

possible withdrawal of the Russian peacekeepers from Abkhazia and South Ossetia the

following year.55

Finally, in a July 2006 resolution, parliament called on the government

to start procedures for immediate suspension of the peacekeeping operations and

immediate withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the country and to work towards the

deployment of an international police force in Georgia's conflict zones.56

The Georgian

government did not follow parliament's advice on any of these occasions though it

repeatedly called for internationalization of the peacekeeping operation, particularly after

President Saakashvili's accession to power.

In October 2007, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili declared the commander of the

CIS peacekeeping force persona non grata following an incident in which the CIS

peacekeepers confronted the Georgian Interior Ministry personnel near the Ganmukhuri

Patriotic Youth Camp.

In the spring of 2008, after Russia unilaterally withdrew from the 1996 CIS decision on

economic sanctions against Abkhazia and President Putin instructed his government to

establish direct contacts with the separatist Abkhaz and South Ossetian governments in a

number of areas, Georgia warned that it was prepared to formally request withdrawal of

the CIS peacekeepers unless a significant change of the peacekeeping format was

implemented.

Following the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia, Georgia withdrew from

CIS and from several key agreements and informed the CIS Executive Council of its

decision to terminate the CIS peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia.

53

Постановление Парламента Грузии о дальнейшем пребывании в зоне конфликта в Абхазии

находящихся под эгидой Содружества Независимых Государств сооруженных сил Российской

Федерации, 30 мая 1997 г. Свободная Грузия, №69-70, 3 июня 1997 г. 54

The Georgian Parliament's Statement on the Situation on the Territory of Abkhazia, 11 October 2001 (in

Georgian), http://www.parliament.ge/index.php?lang_id=GEO&sec_id=98&info_id=5092 (accessed on

15/12/2008) 55

The Georgian Parliament Resolution on the Situation in the Country's Conflict Zones and the Conduct of

Peacekeeping Operations, 11 October 2005 (in Georgian),

http://www.parliament.ge/index.php?lang_id=GEO&sec_id=98&info_id=6606 (accessed on 15/12/2008) 56

The Georgian Parliament Resolution on the Peacekeeping Forces Stationed on Georgian Territory, 18

July 2006 (in Georgian), http://www.parliament.ge/index.php?lang_id=GEO&sec_id=63&info_id=12710

(accessed on 13/12/2008)

Part IV. CSCE/OSCE

Although the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and

subsequently the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)57

has

always been part of the international efforts to resolve the conflict in Abkhazia, its role

can be safely described as auxiliary to that of the United Nations.

From the very start of the conflict settlement process, representatives of the CSCE/OSCE

participated in the negotiations that were held under the auspices of the United Nations

and maintained close cooperation with UNOMIG. The organization's involvement on the

ground, however, has been limited: when the United Nations (with the help from the

OSCE in negotiations with the Abkhaz authorities to this end) opened its Human Rights

Office in Sukhumi in December 1996, the OSCE deployed a human rights officer there.

In 1997, the OSCE lent its strong support to the UN-initiated effort to revitalize the

stalled peace process and the subsequent establishment of the Geneva process. Its

representatives also participated in the sessions of the Coordinating Council.

In the final documents of the OSCE summits held in Budapest (1994), Lisbon (1996) and

Istanbul (1999), the organization expressed its strong support for the sovereignty and

territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized borders, called for a

safe and dignified return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes and

condemned "ethnic cleansing" which had resulted in "mass destruction and forcible

expulsion of predominantly Georgian population in Abkhazia" and the death of a "large

number of innocent civilians".58

In addition, the Budapest Document (1994) expressed "concern" over the adoption by the

separatist authorities on 26 November 1994 of a constitution that referred to Abkhazia as

a sovereign state. The participating states regarded this decision as undermining both the

UN and CSCE efforts to promote peaceful resolution of the conflict. The Lisbon

Document (1996) strongly criticized the Abkhaz separatist authorities for obstructing the

return of refugees and displaced persons as well as their decision to hold elections in

Abkhazia, noting that those actions undermined the peace process. The Istanbul

Document (1999) reiterated the statements made at the previous two summits, describing

the referendum and the election held in Abkhazia the same year as illegitimate and once

again condemning the "ethnic cleansing" perpetrated in the conflict area. Further, the

participating states recommended dispatching a joint UN-OSCE fact-finding mission to

57

To give a "new political impetus" to the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), it

was transformed into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) at the 1994

Budapest summit (see the CSCE Budapest Document 1994 at

http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1994/12/4048_en.pdf, accessed on 15 Dec 2008) 58

The Budapest Document 1994 (http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1994/12/4048_en.pdf, accessed on

15 Dec 2008); the Lisbon Document 1996 (http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1996/12/4049_en.pdf,

accessed on 15 Dec 2008); the Istanbul Document 1999

(http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1999/11/4050_en.pdf, accessed on 15 Dec 2008)

investigate reports on continued ethnic cleansing in the region.59

The participant states

also underscored the importance of finding the way out of the stalemate that had emerged

at the time and, to this end, expressed readiness to elaborate, together with the United

Nations, a draft document on the distribution of competencies between Georgia's central

authorities and authorities of Abkhazia.

The conflict in Abkhazia has also been repeatedly discussed at the meetings of the OSCE

Ministerial Council.

59

The Istanbul Document 1999

Conclusions

The framework for the settlement of the Abkhazia conflict was established by the 1994

Moscow Agreement on a Cease-Fire and Separation of Forces and a number of UN

Security Council resolutions, as well as decisions by the CIS Council of Heads of State.

The UN-led Geneva process failed to bring the parties closer to reconciliation despite the

continuous efforts by the United Nations and the Group of Friends. The draft document

on the distribution of competencies between Tbilisi and Sukhumi that was finalized in

2001 did not become a basis for negotiations on a comprehensive settlement as the

Abkhaz side refused to even accept the document for consideration, let alone engaging in

a discussion. Subsequently, the Geneva process was focused on issues that were

considered less sensitive though little progress was made in those areas too.

The mechanisms set up within the framework of the United Nations/Geneva process in

order to facilitate the negotiating process seemed to operate with a certain degree of

success at the initial stage but were eventually paralyzed as a result of the failure of the

parties to reach agreement on key issues and/or because of the deterioration of the

situation on the ground. The Coordinating Council met on a regular basis in 1997-1999

and between January 2000 and January 2001 but has effectively ceased operation

afterwards. The meetings (conferences) on confidence-building measures also failed to

become a meaningful tool for enhancing mutual trust: three meetings were held in 1999-

2001 but a fourth conference never took place despite the numerous calls by the Security

Council and the Group of Friends.

The CIS did not prove to be an effective framework for conflict settlement efforts either.

While the summits of CIS leaders repeatedly voiced their support for the territorial

integrity of Georgia and the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to

Abkhazia, the CIS peacekeeping force failed to create conditions for their safe return.

Georgia continued to call into question the credibility of the Russian-led peacekeeping

force and sought internationalization of the operation.

The OSCE only played a limited role in the conflict settlement process in 1993-2008.

Ultimately, while the parties to the conflict never came close to drawing up a mutually-

acceptable agreement on Abkhazia's status, they did not make considerable progress on

other important issues either. As a result, matters like security guarantees, non-

resumption of hostilities and return of refugees and displaced persons were on the agenda

in 2008 as much as they were in 1993.

Moreover, the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia led to a collapse of some of

the conflict settlement mechanisms while rendering the future of others uncertain.

The abrogation of the 1994 Moscow Agreement by Georgia was the most significant

post-war development, as far as the impact on the conflict settlement process in Abkhazia

is concerned, since a large part of the conflict settlement framework was based on the

ceasefire agreement.

The CIS was effectively excluded from any future conflict settlement efforts following

Georgia's decision to withdraw from the commonwealth and to terminate the CIS

peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia.

Russia's unilateral recognition of the independence of Abkhazia, followed by Georgia's

decision to sever diplomatic ties with Moscow, raises serious doubts as to whether the

Group of Friends can continue to operate in its old format since Russia was an integral

part of the Group.

The mandate of UNOMIG was extended by the UN Security Council on a technical basis

until 15 February though the Secretary-General noted in his latest report to the Council

that it is presently too early to define the role that the UNOMIG could play in the future

as the Moscow Agreement which formed the basis for the mission's mandate was

declared null and void by Georgia.

It is therefore safe to say that the framework for the resolution of the Abkhazia conflict

that was established between 1993 and 2008 failed to bring the parties closer to a

settlement and was largely rendered obsolete by the August 2008 war.