F 35 brief

Post on 20-Jan-2015

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This is a brief about F-35 strike aircraft. Lockheed Martin had stated many things about it, but not many are correct. For details, see inside.

Transcript of F 35 brief

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter

Requirements jungle● air superiority● fleet defense● tactical bombing● ground attack / strike● CAS● reconnaissance● air control● intelligence gathering

● CTOL● STOL● CATOBAR

● replaces F-16, AV-8, F-18, A-10, F-117, F-111, A-6, Tornado

● closest foreign counterpart Dassault Rafale

Conflicting requirements● air superiority

– low wing loading– high thrust to weight

ratio– small size– ability to achieve

quick kills

● low-level strike– high wing loading

● tactical bombing– high payload

● stealth– internal missile

carriage– gun doors

Programme mismanagement● LRIP● no competetive prototyping● 30% parts commonality between different versions● cost increases

– 197 million USD F-35A, 237,7 million USD F-35B, 236,8 million USD F-35B >> flyaway costs

Is it really the best multirole aircraft?● Establish important requirements● Compare it with most similar US and foreign

aircraft– F-16– Saab Gripen– Dassault Rafale– Eurofighter Typhoon

F-35 air combat philosophy● maneuverability is irrelevant = depends on radar

missile BVR shots to shoot down opponent– AIM-7

● promised Pk: 0,7● actual Pk: 0,08

– AIM-120● combat Pk: 0,46● ten recorded kills; 4 kills from WVR● targets:

– no sensors– no ECM– not maneuvering

● US had numerical superiority

BVR vs WVR● Vietnam Pk (vs maneuvering targets):

– gun: 28%– IR missile: 15%– BVR missile: 8%

● Deset Storm PK (vs non-maneuvering targets):– gun: 100% (A-10 vs helicopters)– IR missile: 67%– BVR missile: 34%

BVR vs WVR● Pk ratios have stayed the same: radar missile

lethality 1/2 of IR missile lethality; IR missile lethality 1/2 of gun lethality

● Even LPI radars vulnerable to detection and countermeasures

● Result: WVR combat between capable opponents as important as ever

BVR vs WVR● BVR requirements add:

– size– weight– cost– maintenance downtime

● result:– smaller numbers– more vulnerable– less time for pilot training

LPI - frequency hopping

Combat requirements● first look● first shot● first kill● avoid getting bounced● outmaneuver opponent to fire● high cruise speed● outnumber enemy in the air

First look● F-117 VLO● 1 shot down, 1 irrepareably damaged from 1 300

sorties in Kosovo war● flew only at night● F-16 "legacy" aircraft● 1 shot down from 4 500 sorties in Kosovo war● flew both at day and at night● IRST can detect stealth aircraft completely

passively, and at long range; radar gives away position

First look● F-35 assumptions:

– LPI radar cannot be detected– F-35s IRST better than opponent's– F-35s IR signature lower than opponent's

● Reality:– Russians and Europeans have advantage in IRST

technology– F-35s visual and IR signature larger than that of F-

16, Gripen, Rafale and Typhoon– LPI radar can be detected and jammed by modern

EW suites

First look

First shot● stealth requires internal weapons carriage

– gun bay doors cause 0,5 seconds to time between pressing the button and first bullet leaving the gun

– F-35s gun has 0,4 s spin-up time; F-16s 0,5 s, revolver guns 0,05 s

● result: F-35s gun needs almost full second to reach full rate of fire after pilot has pressed the trigger

– IR missile has to be lowered by mechanism before being fired: at least 1 second delay

First shot● radar-guided missiles require 10 - 15 s acquisition

for cooperative target● radar warns enemy and allows it to track and ID

radar-using fighter● radar still has to penetrate any possible jamming● enemy can cue in BVR IR missile or use anti-

radiation missile● unlike F-22, F-35 can use IRST: renders opponent's

radar LO measures meaningless

F-35: bounce● rearward visibility: angle obscured

Maneuverability● Operational/ultimate g limits:

– F-35A: 9 g / 13,5 g– F-35B: 7 g / 10,5 g– F-35C: 7,5 g / 11,3 g

● G limits for 4,5th generation aircraft: 9 g operational, 13,5 g ultimate

– Rafale 9 g / 16,7 g, Gripen 9 g / 13,5 g, F-16 9 g / 13,5 g, Typhoon 9 g / 12,6 g

● Instanteneous g limits for 3rd generation aircraft: 7-8 g operational, 10,5-12 g ultimate

Maneuverability● Sustained g limits:

– F-35A: 4,95 g @ M 0,8 and 4 600 m– F-4E: 5,5 g @ M 0,8 and 3 100 m with 40% fuel

● Wing loading @ 50% fuel, 4 AMRAAM and 2 Sidewinder:

– F-35A: 428 kg/m2, F-35B: 434,2 kg/m2, F-35C: 338 kg/m2

– Rafale C: 276 kg/m2– Gripen C: 287 kg/m2– F-16 C: 392 kg/m2

Maneuverability● Thrust-to-weight ratio @ 50% fuel, 4 AMRAAM

and 2 Sidewinder:– F-35A: 1,07– F-35B: 1,05– F-35C: 0,93– Rafale C: 1,22– Gripen C: 0,95– F-16C: 1,186

Maneuverability● Combat weight:

– 18 270 kg F-35A– 18 541 kg F-35B– 21 009 kg F-35C– 12 629 kg Rafale C– 8 605 kg Gripen C– 10 936 kg F-16C

Speed● internal carriage means that speed is same in combat

and in clean configuration– M 1,6 maximum

● maximum speed in combat configuration: – Rafale M 1,8, Typhoon M 1,8, Gripen M 1,8, F-16 M

1,6● maximum speed in clean configuration:

– Rafale M 2, Typhoon M 2, Gripen M 2, F-16 M 1,8

Combat persistence● measured by fuel fraction

– F-35A: 0,38– F-35B: 0,29– F-35C: 0,36– Rafale C: 0,31– Typhoon: 0,29– Gripen C: 0,27– F-16C: 0,26

Numbers● F-35A: 197 million USD flyaway cost● F-35B: 237,7 million USD flyaway cost● F-35C: 236,8 million USD flyaway cost● likely 36 hours of maintenance per hour in the air (80% of F-22s

maintenance downtime)● force presence: aircraft for equal cost x sortie rate● Rafale C: 88,43 million USD flyaway cost, 8 hours of maint.● Typhoon T3: 130 million USD flyaway cost, 9 hours of maint.● Gripen C: 42,98 million USD flyaway cost, 19 hours of maint.● F-16 C: 68,8 million USD flyaway cost; 19 hours of maint.● all values in FY 2012 USD

Numbers● Aircraft for 1 billion USD:

– F-35 A: 5– F-35 B: 4– F-35 C: 4– F-16 C: 14– Gripen C: 23– Rafale C: 11– Typhoon T3: 7

Numbers● 1 bln USD force sorties per week:

– F-35A: 22– F-35B: 18– F-35C: 18– F-16C: 117– Gripen C: 351– Rafale C: 205– Typhoon T3: 117

Comparision: weapons effectiveness

vs maneuvering targets

vs non-maneuvering targets

0 20 40 60 80 100 120

gunIR missileradar missile

Comparision: bounce

Comparision: gun firing delay

Gun

0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1

F-35F-16Rafale/Gripen

Comparision: maneuverability

Ultimate g limit

Operational g limit

Wing loading

Thrust-to-w eight

Combat w eight

F-35 AF-35 BF-35 CRafale CGripen CF-16 CT3 Typhoon

Comparision: force presence

Sorties per day

Aircraft

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Rafale CGripen CT3 TyphoonF-16CF-35AF-35BF-35C

Conclusion: air combat● F-35 is failure on all fronts

– unlikely to achieve first look or first shot– unable to outmaneuver modern fighter aircraft in

order to gain firing solution– unable to escape if detected– unable to provide required force presence– unable to withstand attrition

Fleet defense● F-35 incapable of fighting modern fighter aircraft or

performing most missions other than ground attack● low sortie rate especially problematic due to limited

number of aircraft carrier can carry● single engine: more vulnerable to corrosion

Tactical bombing● requirements

– ability to attack tactical targets on the ground● only mission F-35 can actually do● still requires cooperation with slower aircraft if there

is danger of unwanted collateral damage

CAS● definition: usage of aircraft against hostile targets

representing possible threat to friendly forces– result: targets attacked are often in close proximity to

friendly forces● F-35 too delicate to survive ground fire and too fact

to find and attack ground targets

Reconnaissance● sensory suite is suitable for scout missions, but it

cannot escape if attacked● low sortie rate and high cost - both per-aircraft and

per-sortie - will make such missions rare and high risk

Forward air control● too fast and high flying for pilot to recognise tactical

targets or telltale signs of hidden enemy forces, and to distinguish between friendly troops, enemy troops and civillians

● same problems cause it to be incapable of assessing the damage done to enemy troops precisely

Written by● Picard578● http://defenseissues.wordpress.com/● 13. 3. 2013.