MAKING UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE CONVENTIONAL

GENE PUERTA

Seeing Through the Sandstorm

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/maptemplate_IZ.html

al Askari

Before After

The Reason behind the Research

Why does the bombing matter?

Internally Displaced PeoplesShia insurgent groups Sunni death squadsTroop Surge of 2007Violence is still occurring to this day:

At the writing of this paper there was an attack in Baghdad that killed two Iraqis in a drive-by shooting marking the third day in a row of consecutive attacks for an appalling total of 202 wounded and 75 people killed.

Source: http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/07/10/iraq.violence/index.html (accessed July 10, 2009)

Sectarian Violence: an Iraqi Context

The Succession to Muhammad : who succeeds him after his death? Family or devout believers?

Shiite: the extended family or tribe of Muhammad.

Sunni: the umma, or Islamic community of declared believers, as long as those selected are done by a majority.

Shia: comprise of 10-15% of the Islamic community.

Breakdown of Terminology

Force Force

Force Network

Definitions courtesy of:http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/

Conventional Force

Population-Centric Counterinsurgency Theory

Research concludes that the best way to go about defeating an insurgency influenced by a network is for the conventional “force” to influence the opinion of the population by providing basic needs and services such as security, sanitation and social services thus making it harder for an insurgent to coerce the population in to giving in to their demands. An example of how unconventional tactics and strategy could be incorporated in the war on terror may be to send out platoon sized elements in each neighborhood with the sole mission of working side-by-side with police forces-in training (and national guards men) while conducting missions with them and not for them. This would be a hybrid of Poole’s tactical approach and Kilcullen’s emphasis on getting a more regional view of the campaign along with the native force’s show of force and commitment to security, which the populace will see the effects of on a daily basis. It is a complete about face on conventional force-on-force strategy while maintaining the integrity of unconventional tactics of immersing in the population and pushing them to take the fight to the enemy: the insurgent.

Wrapping Up: Why A Change of Strategy is Needed

Up front a change of strategy that focuses on population centric theories is cheaper: new weapon technologies are expensive.

Proper population centric counterinsurgency theory involves more training and deploying of local forces, not those of the occupying nation. Involves more law enforcement strategies to combat the insurgency rather than military ones.

Since population centric counterinsurgency theory has a track record of success and deployment of it requires extensive funding in reconstruction of infrastructure and reconstitution of military/paramilitary forces; the US may be obliged to intervene in the internal affairs of developing nations on a limited basis.

Obama’s new plan of withdrawing the troops out of the major urban areas with an eventual withdrawal of most troops by 2011, looks like it was constructed so the Iraqi forces are taking the lead in securing the trust of the population, one the keys in population-centric counterinsurgency theory.

Works Cited

1. Abbas, Saleh. Iraq on the Brink of Civil War The Plight of a Nation. Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2006.2. Sarah Kenyon Lischer. “Security and Displacement in Iraq: Responding to the Forced Migration

Crisis." International Security 33, no. 2 (2008): 95-119. http://muse.jhu.edu/ (accessed March 9, 2009).3. O’Donnell, K. and K. Newland. 2008. The Iraqi Refugee Crisis: The Need for Action. Washington, DC:

Migration Policy Institute. 4. Greg Bruno, “Profile: Al-Qaeda in Iraq (a.k.a. al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia),” Council on Foreign Relations,

December 14, 2007. http://www.cfr.org/publication/14811/ (accessed March 10, 2009). 5. Jean E. Krasno and James S. Sutterlin, The United Nations and Iraq: Defanging The Viper. Westport,

CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003. 6. Cockburn, Patrick. Muqtada Al-Sadr and the Battle for the Future of Iraq. New York, NY: Simon and

Schuster, 2008. 7. Trinquier, Roger. Modern Warfare: a French view of counterinsurgency. Westport, CT: Praeger

Security International, 1964. 8. Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. New York,

NY: Oxford University Press, 2009. 9. Poole, John H. Terrorist Trail. Emerald Isle, NC: Posterity Press, 2006. 10. Long, Austin. On “Other War”: Lessons from five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research.

Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2006.11. John Mackinlay and Alison Al-Baddawy. Rethinking Counterinsurgency. Arlington, VA: RAND

Corporation, 2008. 12. Beede, Benjamin R. Intervention and Counterinsurgency: An Annotated Bibliography of the Small Wars

of the United States, 1898-1984. New York, NY: Garland Publishing, Inc, 1985.

Works Cited (cont.)

13. Joes, Anthony James. Modern Guerrilla Insurgency. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1992.14. Hourani, Albert. A History of the Arab Peoples. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard

University Press, 1991. 15. LTC Bruce Floersheim, “Forging the Future of American Security with a Total Force Strategy”,

Orbis, Volume 53, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 471-488, ISSN 0030-4387, DOI: 10.1016/j.orbis.2009.04.012. (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6W5V-4W9V7N1-1/2/f6cca0ae75e909e912b0e8c6e124d737)

16. Michael C. Horowitz, Dan A. Shalmon, “The Future of War and American Military Strategy”, Orbis, Volume 53, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 300-318, ISSN 0030-4387, DOI: 10.1016/j.orbis.2009.01.013 (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6W5V-4VP1CV1-9/2/0ad8b4207bcd89fb2b4c2364666d8cfa)

17. Myerson, Roger B. “A Field Manual for the Cradle of Civilization: Theory of Leadership and Lessons of Iraq.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2009 53: 470-482

18. Roper, Daniel S. "Global Counterinsurgency: Strategic Clarity for the Long War." Parameters: US Army War College 38, no. 3 (September 2008): 92-108. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed June 12, 2009).

19. Daniel H. Levine, “Organizational Disruption and Change in Mozambique’s Peace Process,” International Peacekeeping 14, 3 (2007): 368-383.

20. Bush, George W. 2007. "Statement on the Bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, Iraq." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 43, no. 24: 798-798. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed March 12, 2009).

21. Headquarters U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual No. 3-24: Counterinsurgency. Washington, DC: GPO, 15 December 2006.

Works Cited (cont.)

22. Nelson, Lewis. Interview by Gene Puerta. Cellular phone. Champaign, IL. 03 June 2009. Champaign, IL.

23. Placchetti, Ryan. Interview by Gene Puerta. Cellular phone. Champaign, IL. 03 June 2009. Champaign, IL.

24. Hawks, Stephen. Interview by Gene Puerta. Cellular phone. Champaign, IL. 08 June 2009. Champaign, IL.

25. Alaa. THE MESOPOTAMIAN: TO BRING ONE MORE IRAQI VOICE OF THE SILENT MAJORITY TO THE ATTENTION OF THE WORLD. November 30, 2003. http://messopotamian.blogspot.com/ (accessed July 4, 2009).

26. Unknown (Riverbend). Baghdad Burning: Girl Blog From Iraq. August 31, 2003. http://riverbendblog.blogspot.com/ (accessed July 4. 2009).

Acknowledgements

OMSAThe entire McNair Staff

Dr. HogansonFriends and Family