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MAKING UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE CONVENTIONAL GENE PUERTA Seeing Through the Sandstorm
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This research analyzes the sectarian violence that was an end product of the destruction of the golden dome of the mosque of al-Askari on February 22nd, 2006 and the effectiveness of US military responses to that event. According to many policy think tanks, the destruction of the golden dome was simply a catalyst of sectarian strife of an unexplained origin.i This on-the-spot characterization of the mosque bombing as an igniter of sectarian warfare does not give justice to the deep historical nature of the religious complexities of the violence which the bombing caused; any violent event of equivalent magnitude (a similar attack at Karbala or Najaf for example) would have spurred similar reactions. Instead this study of an effective counterinsurgency theory will utilize primary sources such as interviews from ex-military personnel, Iraqi weblogs composed around the year 2006 and recent scholarly works concerning counterinsurgency theory and tactics (such as FM 3-24) in order to better frame the issue on why the mosque bombing had such violent responses and an explanation on how the US responded (in Baghdad). Contrary to common viewpoint that the mosque bombing in Samarra was the source of sectarian violence in Iraq, it was simply an event in a larger mosaic that comprises the history of Islamic sectarian conflict in Iraq, the endgame of which is currently out of reach. This study also addresses the shortcomings of conventional thinking (as evidence by veteran interviews) that the regular military operates under when it comes to post-invasion standard operating procedures in the months preceding the mosque bombing in Samarra and after it. These interviews will address the fact that in order to combat sectarian violence in Iraq, the occupying force must work in tandem with local security forces focusing on the desires of the population. The operations that will be analyzed (and taken into context within the veteran interviews and Iraqi weblogs) are those that were conducted in the city of Baghdad due to the city’s near resemblance of the ethnic composition of Iraq and the socio-political importance that the city holds on Iraq’s national stage. The findings of research concluded that there were several factors that were present in Baghdad during the months after the mosque bombing that influenced the feelings of the population and the response of US forces. These factors include (but are not limited to): the perception of al Qaeda to occupying forces and local inhabitants, the influence of Iran with regards to sectarian groups and Sunni and Shiite relations. This research advocates that standard operating procedures need to be replaced with unconventional strategy and tactics (akin to Special Forces, for example) which tends to be more population-centric when dealing with known and unknown challenges.
Transcript of New Seeing Through The Sandstorm
MAKING UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE CONVENTIONAL
GENE PUERTA
Seeing Through the Sandstorm
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/maps/maptemplate_IZ.html
al Askari
Before After
The Reason behind the Research
Why does the bombing matter?
Internally Displaced PeoplesShia insurgent groups Sunni death squadsTroop Surge of 2007Violence is still occurring to this day:
At the writing of this paper there was an attack in Baghdad that killed two Iraqis in a drive-by shooting marking the third day in a row of consecutive attacks for an appalling total of 202 wounded and 75 people killed.
Source: http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/07/10/iraq.violence/index.html (accessed July 10, 2009)
Sectarian Violence: an Iraqi Context
The Succession to Muhammad : who succeeds him after his death? Family or devout believers?
Shiite: the extended family or tribe of Muhammad.
Sunni: the umma, or Islamic community of declared believers, as long as those selected are done by a majority.
Shia: comprise of 10-15% of the Islamic community.
Breakdown of Terminology
Force Force
Force Network
Definitions courtesy of:http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
Conventional Force
Population-Centric Counterinsurgency Theory
Research concludes that the best way to go about defeating an insurgency influenced by a network is for the conventional “force” to influence the opinion of the population by providing basic needs and services such as security, sanitation and social services thus making it harder for an insurgent to coerce the population in to giving in to their demands. An example of how unconventional tactics and strategy could be incorporated in the war on terror may be to send out platoon sized elements in each neighborhood with the sole mission of working side-by-side with police forces-in training (and national guards men) while conducting missions with them and not for them. This would be a hybrid of Poole’s tactical approach and Kilcullen’s emphasis on getting a more regional view of the campaign along with the native force’s show of force and commitment to security, which the populace will see the effects of on a daily basis. It is a complete about face on conventional force-on-force strategy while maintaining the integrity of unconventional tactics of immersing in the population and pushing them to take the fight to the enemy: the insurgent.
Wrapping Up: Why A Change of Strategy is Needed
Up front a change of strategy that focuses on population centric theories is cheaper: new weapon technologies are expensive.
Proper population centric counterinsurgency theory involves more training and deploying of local forces, not those of the occupying nation. Involves more law enforcement strategies to combat the insurgency rather than military ones.
Since population centric counterinsurgency theory has a track record of success and deployment of it requires extensive funding in reconstruction of infrastructure and reconstitution of military/paramilitary forces; the US may be obliged to intervene in the internal affairs of developing nations on a limited basis.
Obama’s new plan of withdrawing the troops out of the major urban areas with an eventual withdrawal of most troops by 2011, looks like it was constructed so the Iraqi forces are taking the lead in securing the trust of the population, one the keys in population-centric counterinsurgency theory.
Works Cited
1. Abbas, Saleh. Iraq on the Brink of Civil War The Plight of a Nation. Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 2006.2. Sarah Kenyon Lischer. “Security and Displacement in Iraq: Responding to the Forced Migration
Crisis." International Security 33, no. 2 (2008): 95-119. http://muse.jhu.edu/ (accessed March 9, 2009).3. O’Donnell, K. and K. Newland. 2008. The Iraqi Refugee Crisis: The Need for Action. Washington, DC:
Migration Policy Institute. 4. Greg Bruno, “Profile: Al-Qaeda in Iraq (a.k.a. al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia),” Council on Foreign Relations,
December 14, 2007. http://www.cfr.org/publication/14811/ (accessed March 10, 2009). 5. Jean E. Krasno and James S. Sutterlin, The United Nations and Iraq: Defanging The Viper. Westport,
CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003. 6. Cockburn, Patrick. Muqtada Al-Sadr and the Battle for the Future of Iraq. New York, NY: Simon and
Schuster, 2008. 7. Trinquier, Roger. Modern Warfare: a French view of counterinsurgency. Westport, CT: Praeger
Security International, 1964. 8. Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. New York,
NY: Oxford University Press, 2009. 9. Poole, John H. Terrorist Trail. Emerald Isle, NC: Posterity Press, 2006. 10. Long, Austin. On “Other War”: Lessons from five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research.
Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2006.11. John Mackinlay and Alison Al-Baddawy. Rethinking Counterinsurgency. Arlington, VA: RAND
Corporation, 2008. 12. Beede, Benjamin R. Intervention and Counterinsurgency: An Annotated Bibliography of the Small Wars
of the United States, 1898-1984. New York, NY: Garland Publishing, Inc, 1985.
Works Cited (cont.)
13. Joes, Anthony James. Modern Guerrilla Insurgency. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1992.14. Hourani, Albert. A History of the Arab Peoples. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1991. 15. LTC Bruce Floersheim, “Forging the Future of American Security with a Total Force Strategy”,
Orbis, Volume 53, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 471-488, ISSN 0030-4387, DOI: 10.1016/j.orbis.2009.04.012. (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6W5V-4W9V7N1-1/2/f6cca0ae75e909e912b0e8c6e124d737)
16. Michael C. Horowitz, Dan A. Shalmon, “The Future of War and American Military Strategy”, Orbis, Volume 53, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 300-318, ISSN 0030-4387, DOI: 10.1016/j.orbis.2009.01.013 (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6W5V-4VP1CV1-9/2/0ad8b4207bcd89fb2b4c2364666d8cfa)
17. Myerson, Roger B. “A Field Manual for the Cradle of Civilization: Theory of Leadership and Lessons of Iraq.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2009 53: 470-482
18. Roper, Daniel S. "Global Counterinsurgency: Strategic Clarity for the Long War." Parameters: US Army War College 38, no. 3 (September 2008): 92-108. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed June 12, 2009).
19. Daniel H. Levine, “Organizational Disruption and Change in Mozambique’s Peace Process,” International Peacekeeping 14, 3 (2007): 368-383.
20. Bush, George W. 2007. "Statement on the Bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, Iraq." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 43, no. 24: 798-798. Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed March 12, 2009).
21. Headquarters U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual No. 3-24: Counterinsurgency. Washington, DC: GPO, 15 December 2006.
Works Cited (cont.)
22. Nelson, Lewis. Interview by Gene Puerta. Cellular phone. Champaign, IL. 03 June 2009. Champaign, IL.
23. Placchetti, Ryan. Interview by Gene Puerta. Cellular phone. Champaign, IL. 03 June 2009. Champaign, IL.
24. Hawks, Stephen. Interview by Gene Puerta. Cellular phone. Champaign, IL. 08 June 2009. Champaign, IL.
25. Alaa. THE MESOPOTAMIAN: TO BRING ONE MORE IRAQI VOICE OF THE SILENT MAJORITY TO THE ATTENTION OF THE WORLD. November 30, 2003. http://messopotamian.blogspot.com/ (accessed July 4, 2009).
26. Unknown (Riverbend). Baghdad Burning: Girl Blog From Iraq. August 31, 2003. http://riverbendblog.blogspot.com/ (accessed July 4. 2009).
Acknowledgements
OMSAThe entire McNair Staff
Dr. HogansonFriends and Family
