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ROMANIAIN WORLD



CONTENTS

The N ature of Romania's Participation in World War I 9 The N eutrali ty Y ears (1914— 1916) ................................... 12 The 1916 Campaign .................................................................. 19 The 1917 Campaign. The Great Battles F ought at the

Gates of M oldavia............................................................... 37 The Battle of M arasti.......................................................... 47 The Battle of M&rksesti ......................................... 51 The Battle of Oi tuz .......................................................... 61A ppreciations on the Battles on the Romanian Frontin Summer 1917................................................................... 66 The Temporary Cessation of Mil itary Operations onthe Romanian F ront. T he Peace of Bucharest.Romania Resumes the F ight............................................ 71

The Completion of the National Unitary State — theW'ork of the E ntire R omanian People......................... 76Notes ...................................................................................... 93



shared the view that that war was a continua-tion, through violent means, of the policy

carried on by the governments and ruling

classes in those states pursuing the redivision

of the world market, the seizing of new colonies

and territories, the quelling of the revolutionary

movements and national liberation struggle of

the oppressed peoples, a policy considered, in its widest sense, as imperialist.



THE NATURE OF ROMANIA’S

PARTICIPATION IN WORLD WAR I

The outbreak of World War I faced the Roma-nian people with issues of paramount importance



possessing Romanian inhabited territories and

pursuing expansionist aims in their foreign policy.Romania’s participation in that war was thusa lawful act determined by the necessity of completing her state unity and not by aims of robbery and invasion. I t was the attainment of the centuryold ideal of the Romanians, i.e. theunion of all Romanian provinces subject to foreignsway into one and the same state, that stood for

the fundamental goal. That is why, in the caseof the Romanians, their taking part in that widescope confrontation would enter the people’sconsciousness as the "war of national completion'’,an expression of their categorical dissociation fromthe aims pursued by other belligerents in thefirst big conflagration of the 20th century. Iherefore, it was a right war waged by the Romanianarmy for the defence of the country’s independenceand sovereignty, for the achievement of nationalunity and the making of the unitary nationalState.

Ever since the outbreak of hostilities, viz.1914 the belligerent powers endeavoured to



achieved by her own forces, by the Romanianpeople’s struggle and sacrifices and not by thegame of foreign forces.

The Crown Council, convened by K ing Carol Iat Sinaia on August 3, 1914, having taken know-ledge of the contents of the secret treaty concludedin 1883 whereby the Romanian state had adhered



THE NEUTRALITY YEARS(1914 1916)

The hostile attitude of the public opinion inRomania visavis the foreign policy of the

Central Powers, considered the main to be blamedfor the outbreak of the great European conflict,was to continuously enhance concomitantly withthe development of events, and to manifestitself through powerful popular pressure in favourof a military collaboration with the Ententemember countries with a view to l iberating theRomanian provinces under A ustriaHungary's

rule. As early as the autumn of 1914, reputedRomanian statesman Nicolae Filipescu, a leaderof the Conservative Party, declared at a publicmeeting: “My wish is for us to enter the war,whatever the international context or the develop-



foreign policy were evincing the RomanianState’s clear option. Against the background of

t lie orientation, on October 1, 1914, the govern-ments in Bucharest and St. Petersburg concludeda secret convention that stipulated mutualpledges clearly set down: Russia committed her-self to recognize Romania’s right to join to her

territory the Romanianinhabited provinces underAustroHungarian rule, namely Transylvania, theBanat, Cri ana, Maramure§ andBukovina; Roma-i ll d t j i th ti t it i



to unite with us now or never”, the Russianmilitary attache in Bucharest said on J uly 1,1916; one day later there came the French answer:“France is entirely sharing the viewpoint of theRussian High Command and thinks that Romaniamust join in now or never”.7 Referring to the

peculiar traits of that historical moment andto the significance of Romania's entering WorldWar I on the Entente’s side, Ion I. C. Bratianu,PrimeMinister of the Romanian governmentat the time, said: “We have not entered thewar like some uninvited solicitants: we haveentered the war as desired and asked for allies.We have joined in daringly when France’s ambas-sador to St. Petersburg said: ‘I f Romania doesnot enter the war, the Western front might becompromised’. We have entered the war whenthe Russians said: ‘now or never’ ”.8

Concomitantly with outside pressures, the publicopinion inside the country favoured undelayed ac-tions alongside the Entente. The Romanian popu-lar masses on both sides of the Carpathians insis-tently asked for entering the war to liberate theterritories inhabited by Romanians from times of yore, territories at the time under A ustriaHunga-ry’s sway. Newspapers, progressive statesmen, va-rious societies enjoying wide audience amidst thepeople like "L igaCulturala” (TheCultural League)



ment signed a treaty of alliance and a militaryconvention with the Entente membercountries Russia, France, Britain and Italy — on August

17, 1916, The treaty provided Romania's com-mitment to assume military action in a ten days’span to liberate the Romanian territories subjectto AustriaHungary’s rule; her partners committedthemselves to acknowledge the right to selfde-

termination of the Romanians living in theterritories ruled by the AustroHungarian Empire,as well as the union of all the Romanianinhabit-d t it i ith R i Th ilit



victory of the Romanian diplomacy in the periodunder discussion. Convinced of the fully justifiedcharacter of their national goals, the Romanianpolicymakers considered the joining of the

Entente’s war effort by their country’s combatpotential as an efficient means — in fact theonly one under the circumstances — for achiev-ing national completion, as well as a properand dignified way of contributing to the Allies’victory. The course of events was to evince,however, that the Entente frequently underrated,if not disregarded the interests of the Romanianally. Important pledges taken in the alliance

treaty would be fulfilled by the Entente Powersto a little degree, their politicalmilitary interestspushing Romania’s vital interests on a secondaryplace or even overlooking them ab initio.11

On August 27, 1916, on the basis of the agree-ment reached with the Entente Powers, Romaniaentered the war against AustriaHungary. Atthe Crown Council held the same day, Priine

Minister Ion. I. C. Bratianu explained the rea-sons underlying that decision of historic impor-tance: "In a vortex like that of the present war, inwhich the world map is remade, a country likeours, a country with national aspirations cannot



to be defeated, by the fact that four of the greatest

powers of the world have recognized the justnessof our national claims, and have sanctionedthrough a solemn act the ethnic borders of theRomanians beyond the Carpathians, the Romani-an cause will make a greater and more important

step forward than any time so far.”12Romania’s entering the war was the expression

of the Romanian nation’s will to selfdetermina



the Romanian people did not take part in thatwar guided by intentions of invasion and terri-torial annexations. Giving way to the pressureexercised by the Entente Powers, the ruling circles

of the country decided to join the war on theside of Britain, France, and Russia who promisedto satisfy our desideratum for national unity.” 14



THE 1916 CAMPAIGN

On August 27, 1916, after two years of neutra-lity, Romania entered the first big world conflagra-tion on the side of the Entente Powers her



The political goal of the campaign plan wasthe achievement of national unity through theliberation of the Romanianinhabited terri-tories under the rule of the AustroHungarian

monarchy. Strategically, it envisaged a generaloffensive to be mounted beyond the Carpathiansand the crushing of enemy forces in Transylvania.For the southern front it contemplated a gene-rally defensive attitude: the Romanian troopswere assigned the mission to deny the enemyforces access north of the Danube and to defendthe territory between the Danube and the Black

Sea. During a subsequent stage, concomitantly

M il itary structures | number

General Headquarters 1

A rmy Comands 4

A rmy Corps Commands 6

Divisions

infantry 23

cavalry 2

IndependentBrigades

horsemen 5

bordermen 1

heavy artillery 2



with the offensive of French General Sarrail’sarmy from Salonica, the Romanian troops wereto join the Russian forces that had set forththe goal of fighting the Bulgarians on the frontin Dobrudja.

Amassed beforehand on the alignment of theCarpathians and at the country’s southern fron-

tier, the Romanian army held, on August 27,1916, the following strategic disposition: theNorth Army (Commander — General ConstantinP ) d f th i f t di i i



offensive in the DevaArad direction, while someof the forces had to assume the offensive through

the valleys of Crisul Negru and Crisul Alb riversand to advance west of the Apuseni Mountains,into the Tisza Plain.

The 1hird Army (Commander — General Mihail

Aslan), made up of six infantry divisions, onecavalry division and two cavalry brigades — witha total strength of 142,000 men—, which wast d f d th D b li d th D b dj



German and AustroHungarian forces amassedin Transylvania had to mount a widescopeoffensive, to arrest the advance of the Romaniantroops, to take hold of the Carpathian passes,and to invade Oltenia andM untenia, concomitant-ly with the assault crossing of the Danube bya German group deployed in the northern partof Bulgaria. These combined offensive actionsaimed at crushing the Romanian army and atgetting Romania out of the war.15

In keeping with the campaign plan stipulations,on the night of August 27 to 28, 1916, the three

Romanian armies deployed in the Carpathiansembarked on the offensive. Easily disruptingthe attack of the AustroHungarian coveringtroops, the vanguards of the Romanian unitsand large units crossed the mountains through 17passes, firmly advancing on the ancient Romaniansoil of Transylvania16. Everywhere, the Romaniantroops were enthusiastically welcomed by the

Romanian population in the freed territory.Voicing those feelings Gazeta Transilvaniei (Tran-sylvania’s Gazette), issued in Brasov, wroteduring those days: "We are still amazed and donot find the proper words to voice our happinesstifl d b t ld ff i [ ] O lib t



I lie Romanian army has not come with hostilethoughts against those of a different religion andnationality, who remained at their home but,on the contrary, animated by the most brotherlyfeelings for all peaceful people.” 18

By the end of August, the Romanian armiescompelled the AustroHungarian troops to with-draw from Brasov, Fagfiras, Sfintu Gheorghe



cavalry division) meanwhile arrived in Dobrudja,could not change the situation on that alignment.

The military developments on the front inDobrudja faced the Romanian Command withtwo alternatives: either to maintain or to change

the general campaign plan. On September 15, 1916the War Council decided in favour of defensiveaction in Transylvania and of offensive operationson the southern front, forces from the First,Second and North Armies being also broughtover to this end. Imposed by strategical reasonsthe solution, mainly meant to remove the dangerfrom the left flank of the Eastern Front, was

also appreciated as opportune by the FrenchSupreme Command, which considered that thetroops in Dobrudja should be reinforced in orderto reach there an incontestable superiority inpoint of numbers. 19

On the other hand, the halting of theoffensive in Transylvania enabled the CentralPowers to gain precious time for bringing largeforces from other zones of operations. The con-sequences would have been otherwise quitedifferent, as in fact German General Erich vonLudendorff also appreciated: “Had Romaniapursued her offensive in Transylvania, not onlywould the Group of Archduke Carol [it consisted



After the Romanian armies on the front in1ransylvania had been ordered, on September

19, 1916, to build up defenses on the alignmentsalready reached, the Higher Command wouldcarry on intense activity for preparing the newlyscheduled offensive. General Averescu, appointedCommander of the South Army Group, decided

I hat while the army in Dobrudja — made upof Romanian and Russian divisions — was topin down the enemy troops on the front bet-



both on the bridge and on the Romanian troopsthat had succeeded in crossing the river or wereamassed on the bank near the crossing point.

Meanwhile, after having brought the German

Ninth Army over on the Romanian front in Transylvania, the Central Powers Command,mounted a strong offensive against the Romaniantroops, on September 26, compelling them toretreat toward the Carpathian peaks. On thefront in Dobrudja, after a period of relative lull,the enemy resumed the offensive and occupiedthe whole territory of Dobrudja, the Romanianand Russian troops there retreating on the lowercourse of the Sereth and the northern bank of the Danube, respectively. Thus, a new stage of the campaign began, the main target of whichwas defence of the mountain passes in front of the ever more threatening enemy invasion.

In October, large forces belonging to theGerman Ninth Army and the AustroHungarianFirst Army, at the cost of huge losses, succeeded

in taking hold of the northern sectors of thedefiles of Bran, Predeal and Buzau. In thosefights, the 21st, loth, 3rd and 22nd I nfantryDivisions that were part of the Romanian SecondArmy valiantly defended every plot of land The



Infantry Division. The latter, called the "IronDivision” for its adamant resistance put up inface of the enemy pressure and for the counteratI neks mounted on the German and AustroHun-garian forces, was commanded by General Eremia(iiigorescu,21 who launched the watchword "Wewoun't be passed by !”, a symbol of the Romanianarmy’s steadfastness in the great battles fought



the 6th Cavalry — conjointly with the AustroHungarian 144th Infantry Brigade mounted anattack by surprise against the positions defendedby units belonging to the Romanian 11th InfantryDivision. A fter grim fights, the attacking troops

in the direction of the main strike advanced nearthe town of Tirgul J iu. The defenders’situationhad become critical, the danger of Oltenia’sinvasion, by the Central Powers’ troops becomingever more obvious. General Ion Dragalina, com-mander of the Romanian First A rmy, who cameat once on the front of the 11th Infantry Divisionalso bringing with him some reinforcements,decided to mount a strong counterattack inconcentric directions with the view to encirclingand shattering the enemy main forces and rebuil-ding the defences on the former positions. OnOctober 27, the Romanian troops pushed avigorous attack that would take the enemy bysurprise and compel it to a hasty retreat. GermanGeneral Falkenhayn, Commander of the GermanNinth Army, would write down that that retreat

“was made through hardly depictable efforts [. . .]Nothing could be done for guns and vehicles. They had to be either destroyed or pushed intoprecipices.” 24 More than 2,000 German militarywere taken prisoners. In the fights fought in the



carried out that year, in which the Romaniantroops succeeded in temporarily checking the

strong offensive of the German Ninth Army andthe AustroHungarian First Army. But, theheaviest weeks and months for the Romanianpeople and its army had just begun.

Setting forth the goal of defeating the Romanianarmy and of getting Romania out of the warduring that very campaign, the Central PowersC d b h f h f f T l i



crossed the Danube near the town of Zimnicea,was coming from the south.

In order to cope with that highly grave situa-tion, the Romanian Supreme Command decidedto make a "manoeuvering group” from theavailable forces, and embark on a counteroffenive to crush the enemy groups of forces one by

one, starting with the nearest and hence, themost dangerous one, General Kosch's group. Thus

larted the military operation known in historyunder the name of the "Battle for Bucharest”or the “Battle on the Arges and Neajlov rivers”.

f l h b ld l ld b



The defeat sustained during that iast battleof the 1916 campaign had heavy consequencesfor the Romanian State. The Capital city anda great part of Romania's territory fell under theoccupation of the Central Powers’ troops. TheRomanian forces deployed between the SouthernCarpathians and the Danube were ordered to

retreat towards Moldavia. I t was not a retreatcarried on in panic but a military action carriedout by an army which had lost a battle but notthe war. The Romanian units marched on roadthat had become almost unpassable owing tothe rainfalls, alongside long columns of peopleretreating out of the way of the enemy invasionforces, nurturing feelings of grief for the greathuman and material losses that the countryhad sustained26. The columns were protectedby the cover of rear guards which were puttingup resistance against pursuers in every village,wood or plot of land, either delaying the enemyadvance or inflicting losses on the enemy andthus gaining time to set up new defensive disposi-tions along the retreat axis. In this way, theCentral Powers’ forces did not succeed in carrying

out a pursuing proper of the Romanian troops,their advance reaching 3—4 km a day. Over thelast days of 1916, after two Russian armies (theFourth and the Sixth) had also intervened toth R i t ’ i th M l



thwarted. Under shelter of the positions takenM11 !>y the Russian forces and those belongingin the Romanian Second Army the rest of theRumanian troops would reshuffle in various11 j;ions of Moldavia, in the rear area, with theImipose of being rebuilt.

I lie 1916 campaign concluded after four andi half months of grim fights with unfavourable11 ",ults for the Romanian army. The absence of i joint plan of cooperation between the Romanianind the Allied troops on other European fronts



of the German General Headquarters was towrite a little later: “We defeated the Romanianarmy, but could not break it down l8”. Thatarmy would rise, before long, over the bitternessof defeats and supported by the entire peoplewould win decisive victories in the fights foughtfor the defence of the Romanian State’s being.

Romania’s intervention in that conflagrationdecisively worsened the Central Powers’ strategicsituation. Compelled to cope with a new frontwith possibly highly dangerous developments, theGerman and A ustroHungarian Command com-mitted to the fights in Romania in the periodbetween August and December 1916 a numberof 33 infantry divisions (17 of which were German)

and 8 cavalry divisions (3 and a half were Ger-man)29. The majority of those forces were broughtfrom other fronts, which thus facilitated toa great extent the situation of the other partnersin the Entente, in particular of the WesternAllies, which could successfully cope with thestrong German offensive at Verdun.



THE 1917 CAMPAIGN. THE GREATBATTLES AT THE GATES OF

MOLDAVIA

The vicissitudes fallen upon the country couldihil h i l ill f



that work required huge efforts and sacrifices.However, in a relatively short span of time,only five months, that work would be completedthanks to the population’s unanimous effort — aconclusive expression of the right character of

the war waged by Romania — as well as to themilitary and material support received from theAllies, especially from France.

The reorganization of the Romanian armywas grounded on lessons and demands derivedfrom the 1916 campaign as well as on the goalof reconstituting a flexible military establishmentthat should correspond to both the availableeconomic capacities and resources and, at thesame time, to the possibilities of ensuring warmateriel supplies either from the country orsent by the Allies. I t was decided to set up asmany large units as could be equipped withthe extant armament and military technology,provided with the necessary cadres and troopsas well as the materiel required by prolongedwar. The divisions were organized in such a

way so as to be able to fight independently too,having at their disposal the strictly logisticalformations that should ensure armament, ammu-nition, equipment and food supplies. I t wasalso envisaged that the large units should have



While the Romanian First Army was beingrebuilt inside the country, the Romanian SecondArmy was facing the enemy in the VranceaMountains, for which reason its divisions wereregrouped and reorganized by turns in the rear.

As far as the equipment of the combat units wasconcerned, the number of automatic rifles substan-tially increased, every infantry battalion havingeight machineguns and eight automatic rifles.A great many of the new armament in the army’sendowment — grenades, metallic helmets andgas masks — were received form France andBritain on the basis of the agreements previouslyconcluded by the Romanian government withthose countries30.

The training of the Romanian troops, carriedout in winter and spring 1917 pursued the assimila-tion of the new methods of fighting and thehandling of the new equipment. J oint exerciseswere carried out to the level of division inclusively,many of them at night, stress being laid on thecooperation between infantry and artil lery, on

the engineering arrangement of combat disposi-tions, etc. Important assistance was renderedby the officers of the French Military Mission,31ahead with General Henry Mathias Berthelot, jwho had arrived in Romania at the request of



Many members of the French M ilitary Missionactually took part in fighting and died alongsidethe Romanian soldiers in the big battles foughtmi the front in Moldavia, in summer 1917. Atthe end of the rebuilding period, the Romanianarmy was able to develop widescope operations

and offensive actions, to face on equal footingits strong enemy for the liberation of the Romani-an territory temporarily subject to the Central



COMPARATIVE TABLE CONCERNING THE DIVISIONSTRUCTURE OF THE BEL L IGER ENT ARM IES ON

T H E ROM ANIA N FRONT IN SUM M ER 1917

Division in theBelligerent Armies

InfantryB atta-

lion

CavalrySqua-drons

Artille-ry Bat-teries

Ma-chineGuns

Remarks

Romanian 1 2

14* 2 13 96

* Divisions 1

110 =14 ba-ttalions each aDivisions 11— j— 15 = 12 batta-lions each

Russian 12 16 1 g* 4 8 9 6 * Actually 6batteries x 6 ;pieces

German 9 1 9 8 1

108

A ustroHungari-an 12 1 12 96

Bulgarian 16 1 12 64

Turkish 9 1 6 5 4 7 3

of the Entente, especially with the United States’entering the war in March 1917.

For Romania, the military defeat of the Central

Powers represented a lifeanddeath questionon which the liberation of the territory occupiedin the wake of the 1916 campaign, the RomanianState’s existence, liberty and independence, aswell as the achievement of the national ideal of



me!hods imposed by battlefield requirementshad strengthened its dispositions on the wholei i ont stretching approximately from the maritimeDanube, the lower course of the Sereth, the

Kastem Carpathians. On that front there werel he Russian Sixth, Romanian First, the Russianfourth, the Romanian Second, and the RussianNinth Armies, on the one side, and the Bul-garian Third (in northern Dobrudja), the GermanNinth and the AustroHungarian First and SevenArmies, the "Ruiz" and "Gerock" Groups on



of the AustroHungarian First Army, and in asubsequent stage, to the driving away of the!enemy from Dobrudja and south of the CarpaIthians.

On its turn, the Central Powers’ Commandintended to crush the Romanian and Russianarmies in Moldavia, to drive Romania out of the war, and to make thus their way to SouthUkraine and the Russian seaports at the BlackSea. According to the estimations of the enemystrategists, an offensive mounted southnorth j wards between the Pruth and the Sereth rivers !combined with the action already assumed by |

two A ustroHungarian armies in Galicia and JBukovina which had disrupted the Russian frontand were advancing southwards should have Iyielded the encirclement of the Romanian and 'Russian troops in Moldavia along the Pruth river.

The operation plans of the belligerent forces jdeployed on the Romanian front, characterized Jby decisive offensive intentions on both sides, j

were to be greatly changed in the course of the’developments. Thus, following the victory scored j by the Romanian and Russian troops in theMarasti sector, the German Command was com-pelled to amend its plan by restricting the targets



and smash the Romanian Second and the Russian

Fourth Armies, and only afterwards, by capitaliz-ing on the drive northwards to join hands withthe AustroHungarian troops in Bukovina andto outflank the entire defensive system of theRussian Ninth Army in the Eastern Carpathians.

The events occured during the Marasti battledetermined the Romanian and Russian Com-mands too to changethe initial plan To remove



THE BATTLE OF MARASTI

At the end of the first decade of J uly 1917, thetroops belonging to the Romanian Second Army(the 1st, 3rd, 6th and 8th Infantry Divisions andthe 2nd Cavalry Brigade) deployed on the hillswest of the locality of Marasti, in contact with

large units belonging to General Gerock Group,were awaiting for the attack order. The SecondArmy under command of General A lexandra



The mission of the Second Army was noteasy at all. The defence of the German andAustroHungarian troops was well organized.Capitalizing on the advantages offered by thehilly and mountainous terrain, with higher heightsthan those wherefrom the Romanian troopswere assuming their attack, the enemy arrangedtwo successive strong positions with resistancecentres, casemates, shelters and barbed wirefences, defended by skilled and wellequippedtroops.

The Romanian soldiers, well equipped andtrained, having an excellent frame of mind,were eager to fight again the enemy who hadcompelled them to retreat a year before, thus ;

ceding almost two thirds of the national territory. ; The determination and combat elan of the Roma-nian fighters were also stimulated by the Orderof the Day given by the Romanian Second Army’sCommander on the eve of the battle. "Soldiers !”,the order read, "The moment so much expectedby the entire Romanian nation, by you especiallymore than anybody else has come; i t is the j

time to resume the fightings in order to removethe barrier beyond which the groans of ourparents, brothers and children under the oppres jsion of the grabbing enemy can be heard. Donot forget that we resume the fight for the right 1



(if the Romanian Second Army embarked uponthe attack. The fighting was grim. In some places,I lie Romanian soldiers, piercing the enemy

|K)sitions, attacked the enemy with the bayonet,thus compelling it to a hasty retreat. However,in other places the resistance put up by the(ierman and AustroHungarian troops was extre-mely stubborn. The Romanians mounted the

Irongest attack for the liberation of the villageof Marasti. Several times they tried to carry byfrontal attack the steep hill on which the village



them a great many killed and wounded, a lotof prisoners and a huge quantity of war materiel. The victories scored by the Romanian and Rus-sian troops compelled the enemy command totake urgent measures to strengthen the frontline in the Marasti region by shifting there agreat many fresh troops as well as three divisions

belonging to the German Ninth Army which hadbeen in readiness for mounting the offensive inthe Namoloasa sector. But, due to the grave si-tuation created on the front in Galicia andBukovina, where the Central Powers' troopshad penetrated deeply into the Russian defensivedispositions, the Romanian and Russian GeneralHeadquarters on the front in Moldavia orderedthe breaking off of the offensive developed bythe Romanian Second Army and the consolidationof the alignments attained. On August 1, quietset in on the battlefield at Marasti. The offensiveof the Romanian Second Army had ended.

Although it was not fully capitalized on, thatbattle yielded important results. Except forthe enemy’s being obliged to give up its initialcampaign plan and to shift troops towards imperil-

led directions, its defensive was breached on asore point of the disposition, on a 30 kmwideand 20 km deep front. The Romanian troopscompelled the enemy forces to withdraw from

f th 5000 k h i b



armament, is able to defeat an enemy no matterhow strong and skilled the latter. The enemylound that the Romanian army was an organizedand valiant adversary, wellled during the fight.

An eyewitness to the events, the correspondentof The Times reported in late J uly 1917: "I amon the front where the Romanian army has wonits first victory against the Germans, and proved1hat if they are well equipped in point of artilleryand war materiel, the people are wonderful. Theirenthusiasm and elan during the fight have aroused(lie admiration of everybody who saw them ” 36



thereby driving Romania out of the war.Actually, the intent to seize Moldavia in itsentirety had already been expressed withundisguised infatuation by FieldMarshal Augustvon Mackensen, the reputed "frontbreaker”,on leaving Bucharest to take over the com-

mand of the group of forces meant to under-take the main strike in the battle to follow. Onbidding ‘goodbye’ to those who accompaniedhim to the North Railway Station, he said "Good-bye, see you in two weeks’ time in J assy”. Howeverthe overratedly optimistic illusions of the Prus-sian commander were soon to be shattered.

The offensive of the German Ninth Army in

the Foc aniMarasestiA djud direction was trig-gered off on the morning of August 6, 1917, afteran intense artillery preparation making extensiveuse of poisonous gas. The sector of the strikedevolved on the I Army Corps, with the 12th,76th and 89th Infantry Divisions deployed inthe first line, over a 15 kmwide front, and othertwo large units in the second line. The two Russiandivisions in the area of contact (the 13th and

the 34th) could not withhold enemy pressuresand started retreating northwards.

Consequently, an extreme predicament crop-ped up. In order to prevent the invading forces



units of the Romanian First Army was calledfor. They were on the move from inland Romania

to the front area or massed up in various areaseast of the Sereth, and were to replace the Russianfroops in the fight disposition and articulate thedisposition according to the initial outlook.

The Romanian First Army, in the first stage

of the battle of Marasesti under the commandof General Constantin Cristescu, was made upof the 5th 9th 13th Infantry Divisions the 2nd



due to their fire and counterattack the enemyadvance. The next day, the I German ArmyCorps resumed the attack. Three enemy divisionsrushed upon the positions of the 5th InfantryDivision. The Romanian and Russian artillery,located on the eastern bank of the Sereth, opened

thick curtain fire, doubled by heavy machinegun fire. During those fights the 32nd "Mircea"Regiment made itself particularly conspicuous,as its "officers and soldiers” — according toan official communique — "taking off their kit bags,helmets and coats proceeded to the attack onlyin shirts and put the enemy on the run."38

The stubborn resistance put up by the Roman-

ian troops in that sector of the front determinedthe German command to abandon the idea of assaultcrossing the Sereth, and after engagingin fight two fresh divisions (the 115th and the62 nd Infantry), to shift the main strike to theleft f lank of the I Army Corps. The commanderof the Romanian First Army committed to battlethe 9th Infantry Division, which, after havingcrossed the Sereth, took up defence dispositions

in front of Mara$e§ti. On August 8, 1917, theGerman — A ustroHungarian Group in the Oituzvalley also assumed the offensive in the directionof One ti. Bloody fights went on during the



divisions (the 5th and tha 9th) and two Russianones dealt a heavy counterblow along the Mara

sestiFoc ani railway track, which resulted ingaining ground, and, implicitely, in a new reduc-tion of the fighting potential of the German andAustroHungarian divisions. In fact, that canalso be inferred from the report the commander

of the German Ninth Army, General von Eben,submitted to FieldMarshal von Mackensen onth t i "Th fi i t ti l f th



grimly holding out in front of Mara esti. I heRomanian 40th Infantry Regiment was encircledand almost entirely smashed. Another defeatof the Romanian troops and the situation couldhave turned into a catastrophe. Nevertheless,the 9th Mountain Regiment timely and powerfulcounterattack finally annihilated the salient thatwas taking shape into the Romanian defencedisposition.

Under those extremely difficult circumstancesGeneral Eremia Grigorescu, one of the mostexperienced Romanian generals, was appointed

commander of the Romanian First A rmy. OnAugust 10, the 13th Infantry Division was com-mitted to battle, right of the 9th Division,which took up defensive dispositions with itsmain forces in the area of the Razoare forest,and two days later, in circumstances of a newpredicament, the 10th Romanian Infantry Divi-sion engaged the fight indepth after protracted

marches; they entrenched right of the 13thInfantry Division. Thus, all Russian troops thathad concurred to checking the German advancewere replaced by Romanian divisions. The Russi-

V II A C t b k t i d f



ing its efforts it should win the longawaitedvictory. At 6.30 the German and AustroHun-garian forces started heavy artillery fire whichI loured explosions, smoke, poisonous and teargas onto the Romanian front for three hours.

From the peak of the Magura Odobe§tilor FieldMarshal von Mackensen, fully confident thatth i t hi id t h d th b ttl



utmost advantage out of it. The Romaniansgrimly resisted. In front of the 100 m height themilitary of the machinegun company commandedby Capitain Grigore Ignat laid down their lives

to the last man but the enemy offensivewas contained. The wellaimed fire conside-rably diminished the attackers’ ranks. Ho-wever, the most efficient support of theRomanian defence was the bayonet charges,!One by one, the reserves or the second echelonsof battalions, regiments and brigades mountedcounterattacks. Neverheless, the enemy, by comlmitting to action fresh forces, managed to piercethe Romanian defence at the junction of tworegiments, and advance with some success. Inorder to restore the situation, General IonPopesculcommander of the 13th Infantry Division, orderedthe reserve to put in converging counterattacksand reorganize the defence. The two reservebattalions, headed by their commanders, CaptainNicolae Miclescu and Major Dimitrie TomescuJ

advancing under the cover of high corn crops]drew closer to the enemy lines, and unleashedthe counterattack with the resolute will to winthe victory. Taken by surprise, after putting up



lorrain. On referring to that defeat, the reportid the German Ninth Army recorded: "Ourinfantry was crossing a field of corn of a man’sheight when it was suddenly attacked on theIhinks by the enemy at closest distance. Parts

of the division [the 115th Infantry — a.n.] hadto withdraw gradually up to the railway track|P i M ti ] B f th h



moment in the fight for the liberation of thj.'homeland, for carrying out the ideal of national

unity. The adversaries themselves were compelled!to acknowledge the bravery and determinationof the soldiers of the Romanian First Army, andof the Russian Allied troops fighting on the frontof M arasesti. General von Eben emphasized inhis report after the battle: “The Russian andRomanian armies valiantly fought, and everyditch, every house, every height were bravelydefended. (. . .) The counterattacks were well

conducted and most of them ended in bodytoJbody fight.”41

Likewise, military and political personalities,!newspapers, radio broadcasting stations, war corlrespondents in various countries praised the;Romanian army. The war correspondent of the

Times wrote: "The defence of the Marasestifront was the most brilliant deed ever performed

by the Romanians; neither the Belgians, northe Serbians’ bravery could surpass it [....] Theenemy was inflicted huge casualties and the1prisoners confessed that they had not seen suchjgrim fights since Verdun [ ] The Romanians



ilown in world history the Sereth alongside theMurna, Y ser and Isonzo."44 To acknowledge the role the fights in summer

I1) 17 played in the development of military

operations throughout the European theatre of war, in 1920 Paul Deschanel, President of France,mwarded the “War Cross” to the town of Mara



in that direction would have deprived Romaniaof the last oil and coal source she still possessedin the triangle Tirgu OcnaM oincstiConuinesti. ‘

The Romanian Second Army (Commander —IGeneral A lexandra Averescu) committed to battlethe 7th and 6th Infantry Divisions of the IVArmy Corps, to be successively joined during ithe fights by other units and large units, eitherfrom the army reserve or reinforcements sentby the Romanian Headquarters: the rest of the Iunits were in contact with the enemy on the ialignment that had been reached at the end of the battle of Marasti. The large unit at the rightwing of the Second Army, namely the 7nd Infantry

Division, entrusted with the special task of denyingenemy access to the main direction, the Oituz jriver valley, was making the junction with thelX X IV Army Corps of the Russian N inth Army, 1which articulated its disposition on the range Iof the Eastern Carpathians, north of the TirguOcnaOnesti line. The shock troops of the Gerock Group included I

the AustroHungarian 71st Infantry Division,the German 117th Infantry Division, and the jAustroHungarian 70th Infantry Division, the .first having to deal the main blow. The German



Divisions, the commander of the AustroHungarianVIII Army Corps had secured superiority in

strength and materiel, as results from the tablebelow. The possibility was foreseen that the shockIroops of the Gerock Group should gain certainlactical success from the very beginning.

Conflicting forces Infantrybattalions

Ratio of forces Muzzles R atio of

forces



artillery, the enemy resumed the advance. Fourtimes did the enemy attempt to carry the Pravilaheight, but each time the fighters of the Romanjian 7th Infantry Division stubbornly defendedit. Eventually, overwhelmed by enemy superi-ority, steadily hit by artillery fire, the Romaniansoldiers were forced to withdraw, which broughtabout an extremly critical situation. GeneralAverescu, Commander of the Second Army, cameto the front line. He realized that the battle hadreached a decisive moment, and consequentlyapplied to the General Headquarters of theRomanian army for support. "The enemy pres:sure on the front of the 6th and 7th InfantryDivisions”, the report read, “is past their resistance

capacity. The need for reinforcements is feltmore than ever.”45

Consequently, the 1st Cavalry Division, amountain battalion and a frontierguard brigade jwere shifted in forced march to the front of theSecond Army. The dismounted squadrons of the j1st Cavalry Division and the mountain troopswere immediately committed to battle, delivering

bayonet charges to reject the enemy who hadmeanwhile seized the Co na Mountain. At theright flank, the Romanian 27th Infantry Regiment :and several battalions of the Russian 2nd Divisionf ht h d t i th iti th j



Romanian soldiers getting dril led at a machinegunner*school during the building up and reorganization of thl

army (1917)



Allied mil itary attaches at the General Headquarters othe Romanian army (1917)



J unior L ieutenant Ecaterina Teodoroiu — the heroine of the?battles on the J iu ri ver and

at M arasesti

Captain Grigore Ignat — a hero Corporal Constantin M usat of the battle of M arasesti a hero of the Oituz battle

The Great National Assembly at A lba Iul ia —Decembsr 1, 1918

The mausoleum at M arasesti



brought about a temporary front stabilization

in the strip of the Romanian 7th Infantry Division. To the left, in the sector of the 6th Infantry

Division, the enemy had succeeded in effectinga breach on the Sticlariei hill, threatening the

main forces of the Romanian large unit withthe encirclement. However, four battalions of the frontierguard brigade came to render assis-



enemy mounted in the Slanic and Oituz valleys,with no regard for casualties, were rejected. Thecounterattacks of our infantry and cavalry troopsput the enemy on the run and enabled the seizingof several heights. Over 600 prisoners and fourmachineguns were captured. Valuable supportwas lent during the action by the Russian troopsin the north which, after containing severalviolent enemy attacks, assumed the offensivealongside the Romanian troops and repelled theenemy.”1®

APPRECIATIONS OF THE BATTLES

ON THE ROMANIAN FRONT IN SUMMER1917

The three battles that have been briefly dealtwith, and particularly the one at Mara§e$ti werethe heaviest and bloodiest on the R omanianfront, with widescope consequences not onlyat home but also for the development of the waras a whole. T heir bi tterness and decisive natureare proved by their length, but particularly bythe great number of forces confronting eachother, and the huge casualties inflicted on bothsides. For instance, Romanian statistical data

show in this respect that in the M arasti battlealone the Romanians lost 27,410 men, of which5,125 killed, 12,467 wounded and 9,818 missing.It is highly probable that the enemy, as it carriedoffensive actions, sustained far greater casual-

66

ties as in a report to Mackensen General vonliben admitted that in some divisions of theNinth Army the effective strengh of the battalions

had dropped to less than half. According tosome estimations, during that battle the CentralPowers lost some 65,000 soldiers and officers,killed and wounded.

The German and AustroHungarian offensivewas carried on a relatively small area, but witha great number of forces; the Romanian defenceproved firm and particularly active. The indepthdisposition of forces (sometimes on four and evenfive lines) and the engineer works allowed theRomanians to frequently counterattack the enemyadvancing in successive waves and graduallyexhaust its reserves. No other area of the frontwitnessed so many counterattacks by the defend-ing side as at Marasesti: "The enemy resistance —particularly that put up by the Romanians",General K urt von Morgen, former commander of the German I A rmy Corps wrote after the war,"was unusually grim and materialized in 61 couterattacks during the 19 days of fighting. Most of them ended in bayonet charges, which inflictedgreat casualties.”47

The active nature of the defence manifestedalso in the counterblows dealt by the Romanianand Russian troops. Although their results were

minimal in point of territorial gains, they impliedgreat casualties and shared a substantial contri-bution to checking the enemy advance, to wither-ing its offensive morale and decimating its forces.

67



The Romanians made a skilful and timely useof the reserves, barring the enemy advance eachtime it managed to break through the defencedispositions. An element of the terrain whichat Marasest i favoured the Romanians to bringin fresh troops and engage them in battle often

on the move was the high and steep left bankof the Sereth, which in spite of all attempts theenemy could not set foot on.

The fights in the summer 1917 on the Romanianfront were also characterized by the massiveuse of artillery and a great amount of ammunition.For instance, at M arasti , over 1,820 cannonof various calibres were used(some 700 Romanian

and Russian, the rest being German and AustroHungarian), and during an interval of two hoursalone the Romanian artillery fired some 19,000projectiles.48In this context, it is worth mentioningboth the timely intervention and the results of the artillery fire, and the perfect correlationbetween the latter and the infantry. In this respecttoo, the Sereth left bank, where the bulk of theartillery had been deployed, proved of great help,

as it permitted to strike the flank of the attackingtroops in the entire depth of the offensive disposi-tion.

Th R i d t ll h l t



and Oituz was the cooperation between theRomanian and the Russian forces, especially bet-ween the Romanian and the Russian artillery. L ike-

wise, due emphasis should be laid on the roleof the French M ilitary Mission, which lent notablesupport for remaking the Romanian army andtraining its military to use the new armamentmostly of French make and also to the selfabne-

gation proved by the French instructors duringthe fights, some of them laying down their liveson the battlefields at the gates of Moldavia



The soldierly virtues of the Romanians Werepraised by foreign prominent figures, by pressagencies in various countries. The British PrimeMinister Lloyd George acknowledged that the"remaking of the Romanian army and the firmresistance — so precious to the Allied cause —

that this army is putting up against the enemy,in circumstances of outstanding hardship, area magnificent example of the force that freedombestows on a free people”49 The same Britishgtatesman payed homage to the valiance of theRomanian peasant, who “showed the entireworld that he is the bravest soldier in the worldwhen he is given the occasion to prove it”.50"The Romanians”, wrote a Russian war journalist,

"are brave and fight like lions [...]. They diebut do not surrender. They fight for each stripof their land as savagely as a lioness when thelast cub is taken away from her [. . .[.”51 Theground of that heroism was the awareness of each soldier that he was fighting to defend themotherland, to free it of foreign occupation,to accomplish State unity.

The heroism of the Romanian soldiers wasalso grounded on the unremitting support thatthe people's masses lent to the front, enduring



a powerful influence on the military situationon the Eastern front in general and on the Roman-ian one in particular. The victory that the

Entente powers had contemplated was not loom-ing ahead yet. The offensive of the Frenchand English forces in the Arras sector was finallyfrustrated by the Germans. I n Galicia, after apromising advance, the Russian General Brusilovhad to order his men to take up defensive positionson a wide front. The Italian troops had sustaineda serious defeat.

In consequence of the deepgoing political andsocial changes that had occurred in Russia asa result of the Great Socialist Revolution of October, the Russian soldiers refused to fightin a war alien to them and left the front in greatnumbers.

Under such circumstances, France set her hopeson Romania's resistance capacity, as her armywas — according to Marshal Foch’s appreciation

in December 1917 — the "sole still reliable ele-ment of the Eastern front. The stout resistanceof the Romanian army had to prevent the Germanand AustroHungarian Commands to transfer



Romanian divisions had to secure the defence

by reducing very much the depth of their disposi-tions. The appeals for assistance addressed toFrance and Britain were no longer answered.Soviet Russia had started negotiations with theCentral Powers at BrestLitovsk, and the sole

route for supplying the Romanian army witharmament, ammunition and other war materiel,passing through that country, could no longer be



with Mackensen at Buftea (March 6, 1918) andduring the following days with the German andAustroHungarian Ministers for Foreign Affairs

were highly relevant for the terms the CentralPowers intended to impose. A t the end of themeeting between K ing Ferdinand and OttokarCzernin, the AustroHungarian Minister for Fo-reign A ffairs threatened: "If Romania does notaccept the terms [including changes of the bordersin favour of AustriaHungary, economic conces-sions and the ceding of Dobrudja to the Central

Powers — a.n.] then, the Central Powers will get,in four weeks ’ time, a far more favourable peacethan that which she should consider herself fortunate to sign today.”55

Having no chance to get efficient support fromher Allies, completely at the mercy of the enemypowers, Romania had to sign, on May 7, 1918,the Peace Treaty of Bucharest, a true model of

imperialist "peace”, very hard and humiliating,seriously infringing on the independence of theRomanian State. Besides the economic andfinancial subjugation of the country and the



der, refused to pass it and was dissolved. Thenew Parliament ratified the Treaty of Bucharest,but K ing Ferdinand did not sanction the ratifica-

tion, so that the ambiguous situation was protract-ed till autumn 1918. Under the circumstances,as a result of the successful fights carried on bythe Allies on the Western front, Germany, ina compromised politicalstrategical situation, and

left without allies in south and southwesternEurope, was forced to ask for peace (November11, 1918). A day before, on November 10, K ing



THE COMPLETION OF THE NATIONALUNITARY STATE—WORK OF

THE ENTIRE ROMANIAN PEOPLE

Due to the military defeats and the revolutionaryand national liberation movements of oppressed

peoples and nations, the AustroHungarian Empireunderwent a hastened disintegration. During1918, on the ruins of the former empire, nationalsovereign and independent states emerged: Czecho-slovakia, the Kingdom of Serbians, Croatiansand Slovenians, the Republic of A ustria andthe Hungarian Republic. Pointing to the suddendissolution of the dual AustroHungarian monar-

chy, English historian Seton Watson pointedout that the "empire vanished so rapidly andcompletely that during the fi ist week of November1918 the Allies could hardly find a central authori-



territory of Moldavia the population had kepta high morale and followed with interest themilitary developments on other fronts, rejoicing

at the successes of the Entente armies and wait-ing for the favourable moment to rejoin thefight for the liberation of the Romanian territoryfrom foreign occupation, and continue the natio-nal effort for the fulfilment of the ideal of State

unity.On the territories of Oltenia, Muntenia and



etc. The overall value of the damages the occu-pants inflicted to Romania amounted to 17,722,302, 997 gold francs.57

The instauration of the mil itary occupationadministration aroused the discontent and power-ful resistance with all strata of the Romanianpeople in towns and villages.58 The popularresistance assumed various, steady and daringforms; in villages, the peasants eluded requisitionsand refused to work the land, organizing sabo-tage actions. Armed groups made up of members

of the intelligentsia, workers and peasants attack-ed the soldiers of the occupation forces, helpedthe Romanian prisoners to escape from Germanand AustroHungarian camps. An example isthe detachment lead by J unior L ieutenant inthe reserve Victor Popescu, made up of Romaniansoldiers of the 18th Gorj Regiment, who, duringthe retreat in autumn 1916 remained in the

occupied territory. W ith the help of peasantsin the Mehedinti county, they harassed forseveral months the occupation troops, attackedand destroyed depots and headquarters of halt



brought about favourable circumstances for theRomanians to successfully conclude their nationalfight. A lawlike objective process — the union

of all territories inhabited by Romanians intoone single State, a centuryold aspiration of theRomanian nation, the goal in pursuance of whichRomania had fought alongside the Entente inWorld War I — was about to be carried through.

The sense of this historical process had become

obvious for any unbiassed observer: the peoples'selfdetermination, a principle proclaimed bothb th R i O t b R l ti d P id t



body which was to take over and rule Transyl-vania for a month, until the proclamation of herunion to Romania. The supreme forum — theRomanian Central National Council (RCNC) —was made up on parity grounds of six represen-tatives of each party.

The establishment of the Romanian CentralNational Council represented the moment fortriggering off the bourgeoisdemocratic revolutionin Transylvania. Under its leadership, throughoutthe province, the Banat included, regional and

local national councils were set up, elected inpopular assemblies attended by tens of thousandsof people from villages and towns The councils



decision taken at Oradea, which meant theproclamation of the Romanian nation’s right toselfdetermination, was virtually equivalent withthe declaration of Transylvania’s severing fromHungary by which it had been annexed in 1867.It also included the idea of historic consequenceto summon the National Assembly. The selfdeter-mination declaration, a document of outstandingprogramne and practical value, fundamental forthe accomplishment of the Romanian nation’spolitical and State unity, was submitted to theParliament in Budapest on October 18, 1918.

In parallel with these events and in the samespirit, in Bukovina, the Romanian territory

situated in northern Moldavia, which had beenwrenched by Austria in 1775, the Romanianscarried on the same struggle. On October 27, 1918,a great political meeting was organized at Chernowitz, were the Romanian members of the Parlia-ment in V ienna and mayors from the wholeprovince were present. The meeting was proclaim-ed Constituent Assembly and all those presentvoted a motion for the ’’Union of Bukovina tothe Mothercountry”, firmly protesting againstany intention of the Great Powers to maim herterritory in favour of any of the neighbouring



body which was to take over and rule Transyl-vania for a month, until the proclamation of herunion to Romania. The supreme forum — theRomanian Central National Council (RCNC) —was made up on parity grounds of six represen-tatives of each party.

The establishment of the Romanian Central

National Council represented the moment fortriggering off the bourgeoisdemocratic revolutionin Transylvania Under its leadership throughout



ties, was the oath generally taken at the end of the meetings for the setting up of national guards."We — said the inhabitants of Micasasa com-mune, Tirnava Mica County — "swear in God'sname, that in hard days like these, we shalldefend with all faith the common property, andthe life and property of each man, irrespectiveof his language or faith; we want to live in peaceand good understanding with one another, whe-ther Romanian, Magyar or Saxon or any othernation, and we shall obey the Romanian NationalCommittee of Blaj. So help us God.”83

The representatives of the other nationalitiespraised the policy of the Transylvanian Romani-ans, who although oppressed in the past by theformer dual system, now declared ready to grantall inhabitants the national rights they hadbeen deprived of. At Argibiciu, Tirnava MareCounty, the Saxon inhabitants also took partin electing the Romanian national council and

guard. Herman Schlosser spoke in their name,expressing the "joy beyond words when seeingthe Romanian and Saxon peoples stretching outh i h d lik b h d d di



tegrity, freedom and independence is a point of

honour for the Allies,” that the Allies would back“Romania’s national claims.”®5

On November 20, the Romanian CentralNational Council made public that the NationalAssembly was summoned in Alba Iulia on Decem-

ber 1, 1918. The ten days preceding the meetingof the great national forum were the most enthu-



of all nationalities were also present at the placeof the meeting. "The General Congress of Buko-vina", the motion passed on November 28,1918read, "embodying the country's supreme powerand having legislative power, in the name of

national sovereignty, decides the unconditionalUnion of Bukovina to the kingdom of Romaniafor ever".86The 105 official delegates and togetherwith them thousands of participants decided thereunion of Bukovina with Romania. Anotherhistoric unjustice was thus set right; after oneand half century, a dream of the Romaniannation came true. A Romanian territory from

times of yore, stretching over 10,000 sq km andinhabited by almost 100,000 people, includingSuceava, the old capital of Moldavia, Putna,where the glorious Stephen the Great was buried,other towns like Sereth and Cernauti and some200 villages returned to the Romanian motherland.

December 1, 1918, was to crown the centuryoldstruggle of the Romanian people to accomplish

its national unitary State. That day, 1,228 electeddelegates and some tens of deputies gatheredin Alba Iulia with the imperative mandate to votethe unconditional union of Transylvania to



The solemn speech was delivered by VasileGoldis, a wellknown democratic political figure,

a militant for the national cause and sympathizerof the workingclass movement. First, he madean outline of the dramatic and heroic history of the Romanian people, emphasizing the idea of national liberty as a prerequisite of human

development and asserting the thesis of thenations' liberation through selfdetermination, thei i tibl i ht f th R i i T l



F F T E R

T H E

G R E A T

U N I O N

O F

1 9 1 8



same rights and advantages as in the most advan-ced Western countries, etc.

The resolution was passed unanimously in an

atmosphere of great enthusiasm. In the acclama-tions of those present, chairman Gheorghe Popof Basesti announced that the "National Assemblyof the Romanian people of Transylvania, theBanat and the Hungarian area [Maramures —a.n.] passed the resolution in its entirety, andthus the union of the three provinces with the



when the crowd was asked if it wants to uniteto Romania, the "answer in the affirmative echoedlike thunder”. Thus, the decision taken by 1,228

representatives was sanctioned through the voicesof 100,000 people on Horea's Field, the finalapproval of millions of Romanians from Transyl-vania and the Banat, and actually of the entireRomanian nation on both sides of the Carpathians.

The Union of Transylvania, Bukovina andBessarabia to Romania was carried out throughthe will of the entire people. I ts representatives,

who were elected on the "principle of universalsuffrage or by legally set up organizations, hadthe mandate to express the sovereign will of the Romanian nation, which is alone responsiblefor its future,,. The masses of people who tookpart in the meetings at Cernauti and AlbaIulia conferred the assemblies besides a represen-tative character a plebiscitary one as well. VasileGoldi , one of the main artisans of the union,

was well entitled to say: "Great Romania isthe creation of neither the political parties northe army, but the result of the historical evolu-



Wilson’s emissary in Transylvania: "N opressurebroughta bout the adhesion of Medias. The Saxonsconsider therefore the union of all Romaniansas the result of a natural legitimate process.” 71

The exemple set by the Saxons was followed

by the Swabian population in the Banat whosent the Paris Peace Conference a memorandumto this effect The Mag ar and S eckler pop la