Download - Charity - Washington and Lee Universityhome.wlu.edu/~goldbergn/scholarship/Articles/Principle of Charity.pdf · charity (PC). In light of the mileage Davidson gets out of PC, I propose

Transcript

The

Pri

ncip

le o

f C

hari

ty�

NA

TH

AN

IEL

GO

LD

BE

RG

. M

ount

Sai

nt M

ary'

s U

nive

rsity

AB

ST

RA

CT

: T

he r

ecen

t pub

lica

tion

ofa

thi

rd a

ntho

logy

of D

onal

d D

avid

son'

s ar

ti­

cles

, a

nd

ant

icip

ated

pub

lica

tion

of

two

mor

e, e

ncou

rage

s a

cons

ider

atio

n o

f th

emes

bi

ndin

g to

geth

er D

avid

son'

s li

feti

me

of

rese

arch

. O

ne s

uch

them

e is

the

pri

ncip

le o

f ch

arit

y (P

C).

In

ligh

t o

f th

e m

ilea

ge D

avid

son

gets

out

of

PC

, I

prop

ose

a ca

refu

l ex

amin

atio

no

fPC

itse

lf In

Par

t 1, I

con

side

r so

me

way

s in

whi

ch D

avid

son

arti

cula

tes

PC

. In

Par

t 2,

I sh

ow t

hat

the

arti

cula

tion

tha

t D

avid

son

requ

ires

in h

is w

ork

on e

pis­

tem

olog

y is

unt

enab

le g

iven

wha

t D

avid

son

says

in h

is w

ork

on s

eman

tics

. I

conc

lude

th

at D

avid

son

can

use

PC

onl

y in

his

wor

k on

sem

anti

cs o

r no

t at

all.

RE

SU

ME

: L

a p

arut

ion

rece

nte

du t

rois

iem

e re

cuei

l d'a

rtic

les

de D

on

ald

Dav

idso

n,

lequ

el d

evra

it e

tre

suiv

i de

deu

x au

tres

, in

cite

a e

xam

iner

les

the

mes

qui

tra

vers

ent

tous

ses

trav

aux.

Par

mi c

es t

hem

es s

e tr

ouve

Ie p

rinc

ipe

de c

hari

te (

PC

) .C

on

sid

era

nt

tout

Iep

art

ique

Dav

idso

na

tire

du P

C, j

em

epr

opos

ed'

enfa

ire

un e

xam

enat

tent

if.

Dan

s la

pre

mie

re p

arti

e, j

'exa

min

e di

vers

es fo

rmul

atio

ns d

u P

C p

ar D

avid

son.

Dan

s la

sec

onde

part

ie,j

em

ontr

e qu

e la

form

ulat

ion

qu'e

xige

ntse

s tr

avau

x d

'epi

stem

olog

ie

esti

nte

nabl

eet

antd

onne

cequ

'lle

ndi

tdan

sse

str

avau

xde

sem

anti

que.

De

la,j

eco

n­cl

us q

ue D

avid

son

ne p

eut s

e se

rvir

du

PC

que

dan

s se

s tr

avau

x de

sem

anti

que

ou p

as

du t

out.

The

rece

nt p

ubli

cati

on o

f a th

ird

anth

olog

y o

f Don

ald

Dav

idso

n's

arti

cles

, an

d an

tici

pate

d pu

blic

atio

n o

f tw

o m

ore,

1 en

cour

ages

a c

onsi

dera

tion

of

them

es b

indi

ng to

geth

er D

avid

son'

s li

feti

me

of

rese

arch

. O

ne s

uch

them

e is

the

pri

ncip

le o

f ch

arit

y (P

C).

In

ligh

t of

the

mil

eage

Dav

idso

n ge

ts o

ut

of

PC, I

pro

pose

a c

aref

ul e

xam

inat

ion

of

PC

itse

lf.

Hen

ce, t

houg

h R

am­

berg

is r

ight

that

"pr

ecis

e ar

ticu

lati

on o

f th

e pr

inci

ple

of c

hari

ty tu

rns

ou

t to

be

an e

xtre

mel

y tr

icky

task

" (1

989,

p. 7

0),2

in P

art 1

of

this

art

icle

I co

n-

Dia

logu

e X

LII

I (2

004)

, 671

-83

© 2

004

Can

adia

n P

hilo

soph

ical

Ass

ocia

tion

/Ass

ocia

tion

can

adie

nne

de p

hilo

soph

ie

672

Dia

logu

e

side

r so

me

way

s in

whi

ch D

avid

son

does

art

icul

ate

pc.

In P

art

2 I

show

th

at th

e ar

ticu

lati

on t

hat

Dav

idso

n re

quir

es i

n hi

s w

ork

on e

pist

emol

ogy

is u

nten

able

giv

en w

hat

Dav

idso

n sa

ys i

n hi

s w

ork

on s

eman

tics

.

1.

Dav

idso

n (1

984a

) in

trod

uces

PC

as

a m

etho

dolo

gica

l pri

ncip

le in

sem

an­

tics.

Acc

ordi

ng to

Dav

idso

n, a

rad

ical

inte

rpre

ter n

eeds

to

use

PC

to c

on­

stru

ct a

Tar

ski-

styl

e th

eory

of

trut

h fo

r an

alie

n's

lang

uage

. Suc

h a

theo

ry,

Dav

idso

n cl

aim

s, a

mou

nts

to a

the

ory

of

mea

ning

for

tha

t la

ngua

ge.

Acc

ordi

ng t

o D

avid

son,

an

alie

n m

eans

by

a pa

rtic

ular

utt

eran

ce w

hat­

ever

suc

h a

theo

ry e

ntai

ls th

at sh

e w

ould

mea

n by

it, a

nd b

elie

ves

wha

teve

r is

nec

essa

ry th

at sh

e be

take

n to

bel

ieve

in o

rder

to c

onst

ruct

suc

h a

theo

ry

of

mea

ning

in th

e fi

rst

plac

e.3

My

conc

ern

is n

ot w

heth

er D

avid

son

is r

ight

, but

how

, in

ligh

t of

its

use

spec

ific

ally

as

a m

etho

dolo

gica

l pri

ncip

le i

n se

man

tics

, D

avid

son

arti

cu­

late

s pc

. R

elat

ive

to t

hat u

se,

Dav

idso

n of

fers

thr

ee,

som

etim

es o

verl

ap­

ping

, ar

ticu

lati

ons

of

PC.

Fir

st, D

avid

son

says

tha

t to

con

stru

ct a

the

ory

of

mea

ning

for

an

alie

n's

lang

uage

, an

int

erpr

eter

max

imiz

es a

gree

men

t be

twee

n th

e al

ien

and·

hers

elf

as f

ar a

s po

ssib

le:

Cha

rity

in

inte

rpre

ting

the

wor

ds a

nd t

houg

hts

of

othe

rs i

s un

avoi

dabl

e· in

an

othe

r di

rect

ion

as w

ell:

just

as

we

mus

t m

axim

ize

agre

emen

t, o

r ri

sk n

ot

mak

ing

sens

e o

f w

hat t

he a

lien

is t

alki

ng a

bout

, so

we

mus

t max

imiz

e th

e se

lf­

cons

iste

ncy

we

attr

ibut

e to

him

, o

n p

ain

of

not

unde

rsta

ndin

g hi

m.

(198

4a,

p. 2

7; m

y em

phas

is o

n "m

axim

ize

agre

emen

t,,)4

We

wan

t a t

heor

y th

at s

atis

fies

the

for

mal

con

stra

ints

on

a th

eory

of

trut

h, a

nd

th

at m

axim

izes

agr

eem

ent,

in th

e se

nse

of

mak

ing

[alie

ns]

righ

t, a

s fa

r as

we

can

tell,

as

ofte

n as

pos

sibl

e. (

1984

b, p

. 13

6; m

y em

phas

is)

Now

, ac

cord

ing

to D

avid

son

(198

4a,

I 984

b),

an i

nter

pret

er m

axim

izes

ag

reem

ent

on s

ente

nces

hel

d tr

ue,

and

sent

ence

s he

ld t

rue

are

belie

fs.

So

Dav

idso

n fi

rst

clai

ms

that

PC

adv

ises

an

inte

rpre

ter

to m

axim

ize

agre

e­m

ent o

n b

elie

fs s

hare

d by

the

ali

en a

nd h

erse

lf.

But

wha

t doe

s "m

axim

ize

agre

emen

t" m

ean?

In

the

lat

ter

quot

atio

n, D

avid

son

expl

icat

es i

t as

an

inte

rpre

ter'

s ta

king

an

alie

n to

be

righ

t by

the

inte

rpre

ter's

ligh

ts a

s of

ten

as p

ossi

ble.

T

his

expl

icat

ion

itse

lf s

eem

s to

be

a se

cond

art

icul

atio

n o

f P

C,

vari

a­ti

ons

of

whi

ch D

avid

son

offe

rs e

lsew

here

:

[pro

vidi

ng a

the

ory

of

mea

ning

] is

acc

ompl

ishe

d by

ass

igni

ng t

ruth

con

diti

ons

to a

lien

sen

tenc

es th

at m

ake

nati

ve s

peak

ers

righ

t whe

n pl

ausi

bly

poss

ible

, ac

cord

­in

g, o

f cou

rse,

to

our

own

view

on

wha

t is

rig

ht.

(198

4b, p

. 13

7; m

y em

phas

is)

Pri

ncip

le o

f Cha

rity

67

3

The

gen

eral

pol

icy,

how

ever

, is

to c

hoos

e tr

uth

cond

itio

ns t

hat

do a

s w

ell a

s po

s­si

ble

in m

akin

g sp

eake

rs h

old

sent

ence

s tr

ue w

hen

(acc

ordi

ng t

o th

e th

eory

and

th

eory

bui

lder

's v

iew

on

the

fact

s) t

hose

sen

tenc

es a

re t

rue.

(19

84c,

p.

150;

my

emph

asis

)

We

get a

fir

st a

ppro

xim

atio

n o

f a

fini

shed

the

ory

by a

ssig

ning

to

sen

tenc

es o

f a

spea

ker

cond

itio

ns o

f tru

th t

hat

actu

ally

obt

ain

(in

our

own

opin

ion)

just

whe

n th

e sp

eake

r hol

ds th

ose

sent

ence

s tr

ue. T

he g

uidi

ng p

olic

y is

to

do th

isas

far

as

poss

ible

. (1

984d

, p.

196;

my

emph

asis

)

Fo

r Dav

idso

n, s

ince

a s

ente

nce

held

tru

e is

a b

elie

f, h

is s

econ

d ar

ticu

lati

on

of

PC

is t

hat

an

inte

rpre

ter

as fa

r as

pos

sibl

e ta

kes

an a

lien

to

have

bel

iefs

tr

ue b

y he

r in

terp

rete

r's

ligh

ts.

Dav

idso

n so

met

imes

use

s th

ese

firs

t tw

o ar

ticu

lati

ons

toge

ther

. B

ut

twic

e he

mod

ifie

s th

e fi

rst

from

"m

axim

ize"

to "

opti

miz

e":

The

met

hodo

logi

cal

advi

ce t

o i

nter

pret

in

a w

ay t

hat

opti

miz

es a

gree

men

t sh

ould

not

be

conc

eive

d as

res

ting

on

a ch

arit

able

ass

umpt

ion

abou

t hu

man

in

tell

igen

ce..

.. I

f w

e ca

nnot

find

a w

ay t

o in

terp

ret t

he u

tter

ance

s an

d ot

her

beha

viou

r of

a cr

eatu

re a

s re

veal

ing

a se

t of

belie

fs la

rgel

y co

nsis

tent

and

true

by

our

own

stan

dard

s, w

e ha

ve n

o re

ason

to

cou

nt th

at c

reat

ure

as r

atio

nal,

as

hav­

ing

belie

fs, o

r as

say

ing

anyt

hing

. (1

984b

, p.

137;

my

emph

asis

)

The

bas

ic m

etho

dolo

gica

l pre

cept

is, t

here

fore

, tha

t a g

ood

theo

ry o

f in

terp

re­

tati

on m

axim

izes

agr

eem

ent.

Or,

give

n th

at s

ente

nces

are

infi

nite

in n

umbe

r ..

. a

bett

er w

ord

mig

ht b

e op

timiz

e. (

1984

e, p

. 16

9)

The

se s

eem

to

exp

ress

a t

hird

art

icul

atio

n o

f P

C: a

n in

terp

rete

r op

tim

izes

ag

reem

ent

betw

een

the

alie

n an

d h

erse

lf.

No

w w

hy d

oes

Dav

idso

n sw

itch

fro

m "

max

imiz

e" t

o "

opti

miz

e"?

Th

ou

gh

Dav

idso

n m

ight

hav

e m

ore

than

one

rea

son,

the

latt

er q

uo

tati

on

m

akes

cle

ar t

hat

his

ch

ief r

easo

n in

volv

es h

is c

laim

th

at a

n a

lien

has

an

in

fini

te n

um

ber

of

beli

efs

and

th

at o

ne c

ann

ot

"max

imiz

e" a

n i

nfin

ite

num

ber

of

anyt

hing

.5

Why

doe

s D

avid

son

.cla

im t

hat

an

ali

en h

as a

n i

nfin

ite

nu

mb

er o

f be

lief

s? T

ho

ug

h m

y co

ncer

n is

no

t w

heth

er D

avid

son

is r

ight

, b

ut

rath

er

how

his

cla

imin

g th

is r

elat

es t

o h

is a

rtic

ulat

ing

PC

, le

t m

e no

neth

eles

s pr

esen

t D

avid

son'

s re

ason

for

cla

imin

g th

is.

Dav

idso

n do

es s

o, b

ecau

se i

t fo

llow

s fr

om t

he

way

in w

hich

he

uses

Tar

ski's

sem

anti

c th

eory

of

tru

th to

ge

nera

te a

the

ory

of

mea

ning

. Dav

idso

n ad

op

ts T

arsk

i's m

eth

od

of

recu

r­si

vely

gen

erat

ing

an in

fini

te n

umbe

r o

f T

-sen

tenc

es, e

ach

stat

ing

that

on

e o

f an

infi

nite

num

ber

of

recu

rsiv

ely

gene

rate

d ob

ject

-lan

guag

e se

nten

ces

is t

rue

if,

and

onl

y if

, on

e o

f an

inf

init

e nu

mbe

r o

f re

curs

ivel

y ge

nera

ted

met

alan

guag

e se

nten

ces

is t

rue.

And

, for

Dav

idso

n, e

ach

obje

ct-l

angu

age

674

Dia

logu

e

sent

ence

is

a se

nten

ce t

hat

an a

lien,

and

eac

h m

etal

angu

age

sent

ence

a

sent

ence

tha

t an

int

erpr

eter

, ho

lds

true

, re

spec

tivel

y.

Thu

s D

avid

son

wri

tes:

"T

he a

im o

f th

eory

will

be

an in

fini

te n

umbe

r of

sent

ence

s al

ike

in

trut

h,"

imm

edia

tely

con

tinu

ing:

"W

hat

the

[int

erpr

eter

] m

ust

do i

s fi

nd

out,

how

ever

he

can,

wha

t se

nten

ces

the

alie

n ho

lds

true

in

his

own

tong

ue"

(198

4a, p

. 27;

my

emph

asis

). N

ow, f

or D

avid

son,

sin

ce a

sen

tenc

e he

ldtr

ueju

stis

a b

elie

f, an

alie

nth

eref

ore

has

anin

fini

te n

umbe

r ofb

elie

fs.

One

mig

ht o

bjec

t th

at o

n D

avid

son'

s vi

ew a

n in

terp

rete

r ne

ed n

ot

attr

ibut

e to

an

alie

n an

infi

nite

num

ber o

f be

liefs

. Ins

tead

, she

can

take

the

alie

n to

spe

ak a

lan

guag

e w

ith

an i

nfin

ite n

umbe

r o

f se

nten

ces.

Yet

, fo

r D

avid

son,

a l

angu

age

just

is t

he s

et o

f se

nten

ces

(exp

ress

ed h

omop

honi

­ca

lly) t

hat a

n al

ien

hold

s tr

ue. A

nd, f

or D

avid

son,

thes

e se

nten

ces

held

true

ar

e de

term

ined

by

an in

terp

rete

r w

hen

cons

truc

ting

a th

eory

of

mea

ning

. I

take

thi

s to

be

one

way

of

unde

rsta

ndin

g D

avid

son'

s re

mar

k: "

I co

n­cl

ude

that

ther

e is

no

such

thi

ng a

s a

lang

uage

, no

t if

a l

angu

age

is a

ny­

thin

g lik

e w

hat m

any

ling

uist

s ha

ve s

uppo

sed.

The

re is

the

refo

re n

o su

ch

thin

g to

be

lear

ned,

mas

tere

d, o

r bo

rn w

ith"

(19

86,

pp.

445-

46),

for

D

avid

son'

s po

int s

eem

s to

be

that

it is

a m

ista

ke to

und

erst

and

a la

ngua

ge

as s

omet

hing

exi

stin

g in

depe

nden

tly

of

part

icul

ar a

cts

of

inte

rpre

tati

on,

and

so p

arti

cula

r th

eori

es o

f m

eani

ng. N

ow s

ince

suc

h a

theo

ry c

onta

ins

an i

nfin

ite

num

ber

of

T-s

ente

nces

, co

rrel

atin

g an

inf

init

e nu

mbe

r o

f ob

ject

-lan

guag

e se

nten

ces,

whi

ch t

he a

lien

hold

s tr

ue,

wit

h an

inf

init

e nu

mbe

r o

f m

etal

angu

age

sent

ence

s, a

n al

ien

hold

s an

infi

nite

num

ber

of

sent

ence

s tr

ue.

And

so,

for

Dav

idso

n, t

he a

lien

has

an in

fini

te n

umbe

r o

f be

liefs

. O

ne m

ight

obj

ect

to a

n al

ien'

s ha

ving

an·

infi

nite

num

ber

of

belie

fs o

n it

s ow

n te

rms.

Aga

in,

my

conc

ern

is n

ot w

heth

er D

avid

son

is c

orre

ct.

Non

ethe

less

, le

t m

e su

gges

t w

hat

Dav

idso

n ha

s in

min

d. A

ccor

ding

to

Dav

idso

n, a

bel

ief i

s id

entif

ied

only

aga

inst

the

back

grou

nd o

f a

"sys

tem

" (1

984e

, p.

157

) o

r "d

ense

pat

tern

" (1

984f

, p.

200

) o

f be

liefs

. If

an

inte

r­pr

eter

take

s an

alie

n to

bel

ieve

, e.g

., th

at it

is r

aini

ng, t

he in

terp

rete

r mig

ht

also

tak

e th

e al

ien

to b

elie

ve t

hat

rain

fal

ls,

that

rai

n fa

lls f

rom

the

sky

, th

at r

ain

falls

fro

m t

he s

ky t

o th

e gr

ound

, th

at r

ain

falls

fro

m t

he s

ky t

o th

e gr

ound

tod

ay,

and

that

the

grou

nd is

bel

ow t

he s

ky.

Fur

ther

ther

e is

in

pri

ncip

le n

o re

ason

why

an

inte

rpre

ter

need

sto

p. I

n fa

ct,

Dav

idso

n .

clai

ms

that

the

only

alt

erna

tive

to id

enti

fyin

g a

beli

ef a

gain

st s

uch

a ba

ck­

grou

nd o

f be

liefs

is

to i

dent

ify

it a

s ex

pres

sing

an

anal

ytic

tru

th;6

but

D

avid

son

reje

cts

that

ther

e ar

e su

ch tr

uths

. R

egar

ding

one

's n

ot b

eing

abl

e to

"m

axim

ize"

an

infi

nite

num

ber

of

anyt

hing

, D

avid

son

(198

4b,

p. ·1

37;

1984

e, p

. 16

9) s

eem

s to

und

erst

and

"max

imiz

e ag

reem

ent"

as

som

ethi

ng li

ke t

akin

g th

e al

ien

and

inte

rpre

ter

to a

gree

on

mo

st b

elie

fs.

"Opt

imiz

e ag

reem

ent"

mig

ht t

hen

mea

n so

me­

thin

g lik

e ta

king

the

alie

n an

d in

terp

rete

r to

agr

ee o

n as

man

y be

liefs

as

poss

ible

. Onl

y th

is e

xpla

ins

why

Dav

idso

n th

inks

tha

t max

imiz

ing

an in

fi­

Pri

ncip

le o

f Cha

rity

67

5

nite

num

ber

of

thin

gs i

s un

inte

llig

ible

, an

d w

hy,

for

Dav

idso

n (1

984b

, p.

137

; 19

84e,

p.

169)

, "o

ptim

ize"

is p

refe

rabl

e to

"m

axim

ize"

: w

here

as

sens

e ca

n be

mad

e o

f ag

reei

ng o

n as

man

y o

f an

infi

nite

num

ber o

f be

liefs

as

pos

sibl

e, n

o se

nse

can

be m

ade

of

agre

eing

on

mo

st o

f an

infi

nite

num

­be

r o

f be

liefs

. F

or a

ny n

umbe

r o

f be

liefs

less

tha

n th

e to

tal w

ould

be

infi

­ni

tely

less

th

an th

e to

tal;

"m

ost"

can

not q

uant

ify

over

an

infi

nite

num

ber

of

anyt

hing

.7

Yet

, rec

all D

avid

son

(198

4b, p

. 13

6) e

xpli

cati

ng "

max

imiz

e ag

reem

ent"

as

taki

ng a

n a

lien

as

ofte

n as

pos

sibl

e to

be

righ

t by

the

inte

rpre

ter'

s lig

hts.

A

nd t

his

is c

onsi

sten

t w

ith

ther

e be

ing

an in

fini

te n

umbe

r o

f be

liefs

. In

fa

ct,

Dav

idso

n th

ere

seem

s to

und

erst

and

"max

imiz

e ag

reem

ent"

in

the

sam

e w

ay a

s he

els

ewhe

re (1

984b

, p. 1

37;

1984

e, p

. 16

9) u

nder

stan

ds "

opti

­m

ize

agre

emen

t."

Non

ethe

less

, as

exp

lain

ed b

elow

, th

is a

mbi

guit

y do

es

not t

hrea

ten

my

unde

rsta

ndin

g hi

m.

Now

,· D

avid

son

atte

mpt

s to

use

PC

, as

it

func

tion

s se

man

tica

lly,

to

draw

tw

o co

nclu

sion

s in

epi

stem

olog

y:

that

sch

eme-

cont

ent

dual

ism

(1

984d

) an

d sc

epti

cism

(19

84f;

2001

b) a

re b

oth

unte

nabl

e.8

Rel

ativ

e to

thes

e us

es,

Dav

idso

n of

fers

two

diff

eren

t, co

nfli

ctin

g ar

tic­

ulat

ions

of p

c. T

hese

art

icul

atio

ns s

till c

once

rn P

C a

s it

func

tion

s se

man

­tic

ally

, bu

t, u

nlik

e th

e ot

hers

, ar

e m

eant

to

allo

w D

avid

son

to r

each

his

ep

iste

mic

con

clus

ions

. T

he fi

rst

new

art

icul

atio

n, t

he f

ourt

h in

tot

o, a

mou

nts

to t

he c

laim

that

to

con

stru

ct a

the

ory

of

mea

ning

, an

inte

rpre

ter

take

s m

ost

of a

n al

ien'

s be

lief

s to

be

true

by

her

inte

rpre

ter'

s lig

hts:

Cha

rity

is f

orce

d on

us;

whe

ther

we

like

it o

r not

, if

we

wan

t to

unde

rsta

nd o

th­

ers,

we

mus

t cou

nt t

hem

rig

ht in

mos

t mat

ters

. (1

984d

, p.

197;

my

emph

asis

)

But

of

cour

se i

t ca

nnot

be

assu

med

tha

t sp

eake

rs n

ever

hav

e fa

lse

belie

fs ...

. W

e ca

n, h

owev

er, t

ake

it a

s a

give

n th

at m

ost b

elie

fs a

re c

orre

ct..

.. A

theo

ry o

f in

terp

reta

tion

can

not

be c

orre

ct. t

hat

mak

es a

man

ass

ent

to v

ery

man

y fa

lse

sent

ence

s: i

t m

ust

gene

rally

be

the

case

tha

t a

sent

ence

is t

rue

whe

n a

spea

ker

hold

s it

to b

e. (

1984

e, p

. 16

9)

So,

now

Dav

idso

n ex

plic

itly

talk

s o

f "m

ost"

of

an i

nfin

ite

num

ber

of

belie

fs.

And

this

fou

rth

arti

cula

tion

exp

licat

es t

he s

ense

of

the

firs

t ar

tic­

ulat

ion

not e

xpli

cate

d by

the

sec

ond:

"m

axim

izin

g ag

reem

ent"

can

mea

n ei

ther

, as

per

the

sec

ond

arti

cula

tion

, ta

king

an

alie

n an

d in

terp

rete

r to

sh

are

as m

any

belie

fs a

s po

ssib

le,

or,

as p

er th

e fo

urth

, ta

king

mos

t of

an

alie

n's

belie

fs t

o be

tru

e by

her

inte

rpre

ter's

ligh

ts.

Dav

idso

n ne

eds

to a

rtic

ulat

e P

C in

the

latt

er w

ay t

o re

ach

his

epis

tem

ic

conc

lusi

ons.

For

Dav

idso

n (1

984d

) pur

port

s to

est

abli

sh h

is fi

rst e

pist

emic

co

nclu

sion

, th

e un

tena

bili

ty o

f sc

hem

e-co

nten

t du

alis

m,

by e

stab

lish

ing

the

impo

ssib

ilit

y o

f tw

o ki

nds

of f

ailu

res

of t

rans

lata

bili

ty, v

iz.,

"com

plet

e,

676

Dia

logu

e

and

part

ial,

fai

lure

s o

f tr

ansl

atab

ilit

y. T

here

wou

ld b

e co

mpl

ete

fail

ure

if

no s

igni

fica

nt ra

nge

of [

true

] sen

tenc

es in

one

lang

uage

cou

ld b

e tr

ansl

ated

in

to t

he o

ther

; th

ere

wou

ld b

e pa

rtia

l fa

ilur

e if

som

e si

gnif

ican

t ra

nge

coul

d be

tran

slat

ed a

nd s

ome

rang

e co

uld

not"

(198

4d, p

. 18

5).9

If

part

ial

fail

ure

of

tran

slat

abil

ity

is i

mpo

ssib

le,

then

no

sign

ific

ant

rang

e o

f tr

ue

sent

ence

s in

one

lang

uage

fai

ls t

o be

tra

nsla

tabl

e in

to a

noth

er la

ngua

ge.

Tho

ugh

Dav

idso

n is

not

exp

licit

on w

hat n

o si

gnif

ican

t ran

ge o

f su

ch s

en­

tenc

es e

ntai

ls, h

e do

es w

rite

in th

e sa

me

artic

le, a

s qu

oted

abo

ve, t

hat "

we

mus

t cou

nt [o

ur in

terl

ocut

ors]

rig

ht in

mo

st m

atte

rs."

Thu

s, w

hate

ver

else

it

ent

ails

, no

sign

ific

ant r

ange

of s

uch

sent

ence

s en

tail

s th

at m

ost s

ente

nces

he

ld t

rue

in o

ne la

ngua

ge a

re tr

ansl

atab

le i

nto

anot

her.

So,

for

Dav

idso

n to

est

abli

sh th

e un

tena

bili

ty o

f sc

hem

e-co

nten

t dua

lism

, he

mus

t est

abli

sh

that

mos

t sen

tenc

es h

eld

true

in o

ne la

ngua

ge n

eed

to b

e tr

ansl

atab

le in

to

anot

her.

And

sin

ce D

avid

son

does

so

by r

elyi

ng o

n h

is a

ccou

nt o

f ra

dica

l in

terp

reta

tion

, mos

t sen

tenc

es h

eld

true

in o

ne la

ngua

ge n

eed

to b

e tr

ans­

lata

ble

into

the

radi

cal

inte

rpre

ter's

lang

uage

. D

avid

son'

s se

cond

epi

stem

ic c

oncl

usio

n, t

hat

scep

tici

sm i

s un

tena

ble,

al

so r

equi

res

talk

of

"mos

t" b

elie

fs.

Dav

idso

n's

argu

men

t ag

ains

t sc

epti

­ci

sm is

com

plic

ated

; it

invo

lves

arg

uing

fro

m P

C's

spe

cify

ing

trut

h by

an

inte

rpre

ter'

s lig

hts,

plu

s th

e po

ssib

ilit

y o

f an

"om

nisc

ient

inte

rpre

ter,

" 10 to

re

ach

the

follo

win

g co

nclu

sion

s:

But

now

it

is p

lain

why

mas

sive

err

or a

bout

the

wor

ld is

sim

ply

unin

tell

igib

le.

(198

4f, p

. 20

1; m

y em

phas

is)

Onc

e w

e ag

ree

to t

he g

ener

al m

etho

d o

f in

terp

reta

tion

I h

ave

sket

ched

, it

be

com

es im

poss

ible

cor

rect

ly t

o ho

ld th

at a

nyon

e co

uld

be m

ostl

y w

rong

abo

ut

how

thi

ngs

are.

(20

01b,

p.

151;

my

emph

asis

)

Fro

m th

e re

st o

f D

avid

son'

s ar

gum

ent,

it

beco

mes

cle

ar t

hat

his

conc

lu­

sion

is n

ot m

erel

y th

at m

assi

ve e

rror

is u

nint

elli

gibl

e an

d th

at it

is i

mpo

s­si

ble

corr

ectl

y to

hol

d th

at a

nyon

e co

uld

be m

ostl

y w

ron

g a

bout

how

th

ings

are

. His

con

clus

ion

is t

hat o

nly

mas

sive

trut

h is

inte

lligi

ble,

and

that

it

is i

mpo

ssib

le t

o ho

ld t

hat

anyo

ne c

ould

not

be

mos

tly

righ

t ab

out h

ow

thin

gs a

re.

For

ruli

ng o

ut t

he p

ossi

bili

ty o

f m

assi

ve e

rror

or

bein

g m

ostl

y w

rong

stil

l allo

ws

one

to b

e ri

ght a

nd w

rong

the

sam

e am

ount

of t

ime,

and

su

ch a

sta

te o

f af

fair

s do

es n

ot

esta

blis

h th

e un

tena

bili

ty o

f sc

epti

cism

. R

egar

dles

s, a

s w

ith

the

case

of

"no

sig

nifi

cant

ran

ge,"

Dav

idso

n is

no

t ex

plic

it o

n w

hat

"mas

sive

err

or"

or

"mas

sive

tru

th"

and

"mos

tly

wro

ng"

or "

mos

tly

righ

t" e

ntai

l. N

onet

hele

ss, h

is u

ses

of

them

sug

gest

that

, wha

t­ev

er e

lse

they

ent

ail,

the

y en

tail

tha

t m

ost

belie

fs a

re e

rron

eous

or

true

, an

d w

rong

or

righ

t, r

espe

ctiv

ely.

For

oth

erw

ise

Dav

idso

n w

ould

no

t be

ab

le t

o es

tabl

ish

the

unte

nabi

lity

of

scep

ticis

m.

And

so

his

conc

lusi

ons

amou

nt t

o th

e cl

aim

tha

t it i

s ne

cess

ary

that

mos

t be

liefs

are

true

. R

ecal

l

Pri

ncip

le o

f Cha

rity

67

7

that

Dav

idso

n's

argu

men

t for

thi

s in

volv

es h

is r

elyi

ng o

n P

C's

spe

cify

ing

trut

h by

an

inte

rpre

ter'

s lig

hts.

But

then

to a

rgue

that

sce

ptic

ism

is u

nten

­ab

le,

D'a

vids

on n

eeds

to

arti

cula

te P

C a

s an

inte

rpre

ter's

tak

ing

mos

t o

f an

ali

en's

bel

iefs

to

be t

rue

by h

er in

terp

rete

r's li

ghts

. B

ut h

ow c

an D

avid

son

talk

abo

ut "

mos

t" b

elie

fs?

For

Dav

idso

n is

rig

ht

that

no

sens

e ca

n be

mad

e o

f mos

t of

an in

fini

te n

umbe

r of

anyt

hing

, and

, re

call,

for

him

, an

ali

en h

as a

n in

fini

te n

umbe

r o

f be

liefs

. In

fac

t, re

call,

th

is w

orry

pus

hes

Dav

idso

n to

pre

fer

talk

of

"opt

imiz

ing"

to "

max

imiz

­in

g" th

e nu

mbe

r o

f tr

ue b

elie

fs i

n th

e fi

rst

plac

e.

Dav

idso

n, c

ogni

zant

of

prob

lem

s co

ncer

ning

"m

axim

izin

g,"

is a

lso

cogn

izan

t of p

robl

ems

conc

erni

ng "

mos

t,"

for

Dav

idso

n tr

ies

to e

xplic

ate,

w

ith

a fi

fth

arti

cula

tion

of

PC

, wha

t he

mea

ns b

y "m

ost b

elie

fs."

Wri

ting

o

f a

cohe

renc

e th

eory

of

trut

h, D

avid

son

expl

ains

: "A

ll th

at a

coh

eren

ce

theo

ry c

an m

aint

ain

is t

hat

mo

st o

f th

e be

lief

s in

a c

oher

ent

tota

l se

t o

f be

liefs

are

tru

e" (2

001

b, p

. 13

8). B

ut D

avid

son

imm

edia

tely

qua

lifi

es th

is:

Thi

s w

ay o

f st

atin

g th

e po

siti

on c

an a

t bes

t be

take

n as

a h

int,

sin

ce th

ere

is n

o us

eful

way

to

coun

t bel

iefs

, and

so

no c

lear

mea

ning

to t

he id

ea t

hat m

ost o

f a

pers

on's

bel

iefs

are

true

. A

som

ewha

t bet

ter

way

to

pu

t the

poi

nt is

to

say

ther

e is

a p

resu

mpt

ion

in fa

vor

of

the

trut

h o

f a

beli

ef t

hat

cohe

res

wit

h a

sign

ific

ant

mas

s o

f be

lief.

(ibi

d., p

p. 1

38-3

9; m

y em

phas

is)

Thu

s, D

avid

son

here

cla

ims,

the

re is

a p

resu

mpt

ion

in f

avou

r o

f th

e tr

uth

of

a be

lief

tha

t coh

eres

wit

h a

sign

ific

ant m

ass

of

belie

f. T

his

quot

atio

n is

not

an

expr

essi

on o

f P

C p

er s

e b

ut a

n ep

iste

mic

con

­se

quen

ce o

f P

C t

hat

Dav

idso

n us

es a

s an

int

erm

edia

ry s

tep

in a

rgui

ng

from

PC

, and

his

vie

ws

on s

eman

tics

gen

eral

ly, a

gain

st s

cept

icis

m. F

or P

C

as a

met

hodo

logi

cal p

rinc

iple

in s

eman

tics

doe

s no

t per

se

guar

ante

e th

at

mos

t be

liefs

are

tru

e si

mpl

icit

er,

even

if

unde

rsto

od a

s th

ere

bein

g a

pre­

sum

ptio

n th

at a

bel

ief

appr

opri

atel

y co

heri

ng is

tru

e. I

t gu

aran

tees

onl

y th

at m

ost

belie

fs a

re t

rue

by a

n in

terp

rete

r's li

ghts

. In

oth

er w

ords

, th

ere

is m

ore

to D

avid

son'

s ar

gum

ent,

fro

m w

hich

thi

s m

ost

rece

nt e

xcer

pt is

ta

ken,

tha

n pc

.II

Non

ethe

less

, ke

epin

g th

is i

n m

ind,

I u

nder

stan

d th

e qu

otat

ion

as s

ugge

stin

g a

fift

h ar

ticu

lati

on o

f P

C it

self

: th

ere

is a

pre

sum

p­ti

on i

n th

e fa

vour

of a

n al

ien'

s be

lief

s be

ing

true

by

an i

nter

pret

er's

ligh

ts.

-2. Thu

s D

avid

son

offe

rs fi

ve,

som

etim

es o

verl

appi

ng, a

rtic

ulat

ions

of

PC

:

(i)

an

inte

rpre

ter

max

imiz

es a

gree

men

t on

bel

iefs

bet

wee

n he

r al

ien

and

hers

elf

as f

ar a

s po

ssib

le;

(ii)

an

int

erpr

eter

as

far

as p

ossi

ble

take

s an

ali

en t

o ha

ve b

elie

fs t

rue

by h

er in

terp

,ret

er's

ligh

ts;

678

D

ialo

gue

(iii)

an

int

erpr

eter

opt

imiz

es a

gree

men

t be

twee

n th

e al

ien

and

hers

elf

(= a

n in

terp

rete

r ta

kes

an a

lien

and

her

self

to

agr

ee o

n a

s m

any

belie

fs a

s po

ssib

le);

(iv)

an

int

erpr

eter

tak

es m

ost

of

an a

lien'

s be

liefs

to

be t

rue

by h

er

inte

rpre

ter'

s lig

hts;

and

(v)

ther

e is

a p

resu

mpt

ion

in th

e fa

vour

of

an a

lien

's b

elie

fs b

eing

true

by

an

inte

rpre

ter'

s lig

hts.

Whi

ch o

f th

ese

is b

est?

For

Dav

idso

n, s

ince

(i)

is a

mbi

guou

s, e

xpli

cabl

e in

the

sen

se o

f ei

ther

(ii)

or

(iv)

, le

t me

cons

ider

onl

y (i

i)-(

v).

Art

icul

atio

ns (i

i), (

iii),

and

(v)

are

all t

oo w

eak

to re

ach

eith

er o

f D

avid

­so

n's

epis

tem

ic c

oncl

usio

ns.

Con

side

r (i

i).

If a

n in

terp

rete

r as

far

as p

os­

sibl

e ta

kes

an a

lien

to

have

bel

iefs

tru

e by

her

inte

rpre

ter'

s li

ghts

, the

n an

al

ien

mig

ht h

ave

no b

elie

f tr

ue b

y he

r int

erpr

eter

's li

ghts

. 12

Hen

ce, m

ost

of

the

alie

n's

belie

fs n

eed

not

be

true

by

her i

nter

pret

er's

ligh

ts. B

ut th

en b

oth

of

Dav

idso

n's

epis

tem

ic c

oncl

usio

ns a

re b

lock

ed.

Fir

st,

tran

slat

ion

is

trut

h-pr

eser

ving

. So

if

mos

t o

f an

alie

n's

belie

fs,

and

so s

ente

nces

hel

d tr

ue in

her

lang

uage

, nee

d n

ot b

e tr

ue b

y he

r in

terp

rete

r's

ligh

ts, t

hen

mos

t se

nten

ces

held

true

in h

er la

ngua

ge n

eed

no

t be

tran

slat

able

into

her

inte

r­pr

eter

's la

ngua

ge.

But

then

Dav

idso

n's

argu

men

t aga

inst

sch

eme-

cont

ent

dual

ism

fai

ls.

Sec

ond,

Dav

idso

n's

argu

men

t ag

ains

t sc

epti

cism

pur

port

s to

sho

w t

hat

mos

t o

f an

alie

n's

belie

fs n

eed

to b

e tr

ue,

by

show

ing

(int

er

alia

) th

at m

ost

need

to

be t

rue

by h

er in

terp

rete

r's

light

s. A

nd s

o D

avid

­so

n's

argu

men

t aga

inst

sce

ptic

ism

fails

. H

ence

, w

ere

Dav

idso

n to

art

icul

ate

PC

as

(ii)

, th

en h

e w

ould

fai

l to

es

tabl

ish

that

eit

her

sche

me-

cont

ent

dual

ism

or

scep

tici

sm i

s un

tena

ble.

F

urth

er,

the

poin

t gen

eral

izes

to

(iii)

and

(v),

for

eac

h ar

ticu

lati

on is

als

o co

nsis

tent

wit

h an

alie

n's

havi

ng n

o be

lief

tru

e by

her

inte

rpre

ter'

s lig

hts.

A

nd s

o, w

ere

Dav

idso

n to

art

icul

ate

PC

as

eith

er o

f th

ese,

the

n he

wou

ld

likew

ise

fail.

T

hat

leav

es o

nly

(iv)

. D

avid

son'

s ep

iste

mic

con

clus

ions

, re

call,

req

uire

so

met

hing

at l

east

as

stro

ng.

Hen

ce, s

olvi

ng b

ackw

ard

from

the

se c

oncl

u­si

ons

to th

eir p

rem

ises

, (iv

) se

ems

the

best

art

icul

atio

n o

f P

C fo

r D

avid

son.

N

onet

hele

ss, (

iv)

invo

lves

mak

ing

sens

e o

f "m

ost"

of

an in

fini

te n

umbe

r.

of

belie

fs, w

hich

Dav

idso

n hi

mse

lf c

laim

s im

poss

ible

. The

re a

re n

ever

the­

less

at

leas

t si

x w

ays

in w

hich

Dav

idso

n m

ight

be

able

to

do s

o af

ter

all.

Fir

st,

he m

ight

use

"m

ost

belie

fs"

figu

rativ

ely.

In

fac

t, th

is s

eem

s D

avid

­so

n's

stra

tegy

. B

ut th

e on

ly w

ay i

n w

hich

usi

ng "

mos

t bel

iefs

" fi

gura

tivel

y ca

n he

lp is

if

it a

llow

s D

avid

son

to m

ean

both

som

ethi

ng li

ke a

pre

sum

p­ti

on in

fav

our

of

a ce

rtai

n ki

nd o

f (v

iz.,

true

) be

liefs

an

d m

ost b

elie

fs.

For

on

ly s

omet

hing

like

the

for

mer

can

, by

Dav

idso

n's

own

light

s, a

void

uni

n­te

lligi

bilit

y, w

hile

onl

y so

met

hing

lik

e th

at l

atte

r ca

n, a

s I

have

sho

wn,

Pri

ncip

le o

f Cha

rity

67

9

allo

w D

avid

son

to u

se P

C to

arg

ue f

or h

is e

pist

emic

con

clus

ions

. B

ut th

en

this

"fi

gura

tive

" us

e co

mm

its

Dav

idso

n to

bot

h am

bigu

ity

(inv

olvi

ng tw

o di

ffer

ent s

ense

s o

f "m

ost b

elie

f") a

nd

unin

tell

igib

ilit

y (i

nvol

ving

mos

t of a

n in

fini

te n

umbe

r o

f so

met

hing

). S

o, t

his

firs

t w

ay in

whi

ch D

avid

son

mig

ht

mak

e se

nse

of

"mos

t bel

iefs

" le

aves

him

in a

wor

se p

osit

ion

than

bef

ore.

S

econ

d, D

avid

son

mig

ht s

impl

y ob

serv

e th

at a

n in

terp

rete

r ta

kes

such

"o

rdin

ary"

bel

iefs

as

that

it is

rai

ning

, bu

t no

t ne

cess

aril

y su

ch "

extr

aor­

dina

ry"

belie

fs a

s th

at e

utha

nasi

a is

per

mis

sibl

e, t

o b

e tr

ue b

y he

r lig

hts.

A

nd D

avid

son

mig

ht a

rgue

tha

t, w

hate

ver

diff

icul

ty t

here

is i

n re

gim

ent­

ing

the

clai

m t

hat

ther

e ar

e "m

any

mor

e" o

rdin

ary

than

ext

raor

dina

ry

belie

fs, t

here

is n

o di

sput

ing

that

in s

ome

sens

e th

is c

laim

is t

rue.

But

then

it

is a

pla

in f

act

that

in

som

e se

nse

an i

nter

pret

er d

oes

take

mos

t o

f an

al

ien'

s be

liefs

to

be t

rue

by h

er li

ghts

. T

he p

robl

em w

ith

this

resp

onse

, bes

ides

its

leav

ing

the

sens

e o

f "i

n so

me

sens

e" o

paqu

e, is

tha

t on

Dav

idso

n's

view

it i

s n

ot

a pl

ain

fact

tha

t in

any

sens

e th

ere

are

"man

y m

ore"

ord

inar

y th

an e

xtra

ordi

nary

bel

iefs

. A

bove

, I

show

ed th

at, f

or D

avid

son,

if

an in

terp

rete

r tak

es a

n al

ien

to b

elie

ve th

at

it is

rai

ning

, th

en s

he m

ight

als

o ta

ke t

he· a

lien

to

belie

ve t

hat

rai

n fa

lls,

that

rai

n fa

lls f

rom

the

sky

, tha

t rai

n fa

lls f

rom

the

sky

to

the

grou

nd, e

tc.

Her

e I

sugg

est t

hat,

for

Dav

idso

n, if

an

inte

rpre

ter t

akes

an

ali

en to

bel

ieve

th

at e

utha

nasi

a is

per

mis

sibl

e, th

en s

he m

ight

als

o ta

ke th

e al

ien

to b

elie

ve

that

"eu

than

asia

"wou

ld d

escr

ibe

the

act

done

to

a,

b,c

, et

c.,

bu

t n

ot

to

p,

q, r

, etc

.; th

at e

utha

nasi

a w

ould

be

perm

issi

ble

in c

ase

one

beca

use

of

a,

b, c

, etc

., bu

t no

t bec

ause

of p

,q, r

, etc

., in

cas

e tw

o be

caus

e o

f a,

b, c

, etc

., bu

t no

t bec

ause

ofp

, q,

r, et

c., i

n ca

se th

ree

beca

use

of

a, b

, c, e

tc.,

but n

ot

beca

use

of

p,q,

r,

etc.

, et

c.;

that

eut

hana

sia

is f

row

ned

up

on

by

thos

e be

liev

ing

a, b

, c, e

tc.,

but n

ot t

hose

bel

ievi

ngp,

q, r

, etc

.; et

c. A

nd a

ll th

ese

mig

ht b

e be

liefs

tha

t th

e in

terp

rete

r w

ould

her

self

hol

d fa

lse.

But

the

n it

is

no

t a p

lain

fac

t th

at a

n in

terp

rete

r w

ould

take

an

alie

n to

bel

ieve

man

y m

ore

ordi

nary

tha

n ex

trao

rdin

ary

belie

fs,

so t

his

wou

ld n

ot

be a

way

of

Dav

idso

n's

expl

aini

ng h

ow a

n in

terp

rete

r co

uld

take

mo

st o

f an

ali

en's

be

liefs

to

be

true

by

her

inte

rpre

ter's

ligh

ts.

Thi

rd,

Dav

idso

n m

ight

arg

ue t

hat

the

num

ber

of

belie

fs t

hat

any

alie

n ha

s is

fin

ite.

Yet

, re

call,

thi

s co

ntra

dict

s a

cent

ral

tene

t o

f D

avid

son'

s ad

opti

ng a

Tar

ski-

styl

e th

eory

of

tru

th a

s a

theo

ry o

f m

eani

ng.

Fur

ther

, al

so r

ecal

l, D

avid

son

seem

s to

cla

im t

hat t

he o

nly

alte

rnat

ive

to id

enti

fy­

ing

a be

lief

aga

inst

wha

t is

in p

rinc

iple

an

infi

nite

num

ber

of

othe

r be

liefs

is

id

enti

fyin

g it

as

expr

essi

ng a

n an

alyt

ic t

ruth

-an

alt

erna

tive

th

at

Dav

idso

n re

ject

s.

Fou

rth,

Dav

idso

n m

ight

arg

ue t

hat,

tho

ugh

in p

rinc

iple

the

num

ber

of

belie

fs t

hat a

ny a

lien

has

is in

fini

te, i

n pr

acti

ce a

n in

terp

rete

r tak

es a

n al

ien

to h

ave

only

a f

inite

num

ber

of

belie

fs. A

nd o

f th

ese

it d

oes

mak

e se

nse

to

say

that

mos

t are

true

by

her

inte

rpre

ter'

s lig

hts.

Yet

, acc

ordi

ng to

Dav

id­

son,

rec

all,

an a

lien

mea

ns b

y a

part

icul

ar u

tter

ance

wha

teve

r a

theo

ry o

f

680

Dia

logu

e

mea

ning

for

her

lang

uage

ent

ails

that

she

wou

ld m

ean

by it

, and

bel

ieve

s w

hate

ver

is n

eces

sary

tha

t sh

e be

tak

en t

o be

lieve

in

orde

r to

con

stru

ct

such

a th

eory

of m

eani

ng in

the

firs

t pla

ce. N

ow a

theo

ry o

f mea

ning

, eve

n in

pra

ctic

e, e

ntai

ls a

n in

fini

te n

umbe

r o

f T

-sen

tenc

es,

each

par

ticu

lar

sent

ence

ent

aili

ng w

hat

an a

lien

wou

ld m

ean

by a

par

ticu

lar.

utte

ranc

e.

And

, to

con

stru

ct a

n in

fini

te n

umbe

r o

f T

-sen

tenc

es,

and

so a

the

ory

of

mea

ning

, eve

n in

pra

ctic

e, it

is n

eces

sary

to ta

ke a

n al

ien

to h

ave

an in

fini

te

num

ber

of

belie

fs.

So, f

or D

avid

son,

eve

n in

pra

ctic

e, a

n in

terp

rete

r tak

es

an a

lien

to h

ave

an in

fini

te n

umbe

r o

f be

liefs

. F

ifth

, D

avid

son

mig

ht a

rgue

tha

t, e

ven

thou

gh th

e to

tal s

et o

f be

liefs

is

inf

inite

, bec

ause

he

(197

0) c

laim

s th

at b

elie

fs a

re m

enta

l st

ates

tok

en­

iden

tica

l w

ith

brai

n st

ates

, be

liefs

mus

t oc

cupy

phy

sica

l sp

ace

in b

rain

s.

And

, sin

ce b

rain

s ha

ve o

nly

fini

te s

pace

, the

re c

an b

e on

ly a

fin

ite n

umbe

r o

f be

liefs

"in

" an

y on

e o

f th

em.. T

houg

h th

e di

ffer

ence

bet

wee

n be

liefs

"i

n" a

nd n

ot

"in"

the

brai

n w

ould

nee

d ex

plan

atio

n, t

here

wou

ld b

e no

pr

oble

m w

ith

"mos

t" a

ppli

ed t

o th

ose

in t

he b

rain

. O

ne r

espo

nse

to s

uch

an a

rgum

ent

wou

ld b

e m

erel

y to

obs

erve

tha

t D

avid

son'

s vi

ews

on s

eman

tics

are

not

nece

ssar

ily c

onsi

sten

t w

ith

his

view

s on

min

d, f

or,

acco

rdin

g to

the

for

mer

, be

liefs

are

the

oret

ical

con

­st

ruct

s at

trib

utab

le d

urin

g in

terp

reta

tion

, and

it is

· not

cle

ar h~w

theo

ret­

ical

con

stru

cts

can

be t

oken

-ide

ntic

al w

ith

anyt

hing

phy

sica

l. E

vnin

e (1

991,

con

clus

ion)

and

Chi

ld (

1994

, ch

ap.

4) w

orry

abo

ut th

is i

ncon

sist

­en

cy,

the

form

er g

oing

so

far

as t

o ar

gue

that

Dav

idso

n's

view

s on

min

d sh

ould

be

jett

ison

ed i

f ir

revo

cabl

y in

cons

iste

nt w

ith

his

view

s on

sem

an­

tics..

At

the

very

lea

st,

this

rai

ses

the

wor

ry t

hat

Dav

idso

n's

view

s on

se

man

tics,

epi

stem

olog

y, a

nd

min

d m

ight

all

be

inco

nsis

tent

. A

noth

er

resp

onse

wou

ld b

e m

erel

y to

obs

erve

that

, reg

ardl

ess

of

whe

ther

ther

e ca

n be

onl

y a

fini

te n

umbe

r o

f be

liefs

"in

" a

brai

n, I

jus

t sh

owed

tha

t, f

or

Dav

idso

n, e

ven

in p

ract

ice,

an

inte

rpre

ter

none

thel

ess

take

s an

ali

en t

o ha

ve a

n in

fini

te n

umbe

r of

belie

fs. S

o, t

he p

robl

em o

f qu

anti

fyin

g ov

er a

n in

fini

te s

et r

emai

ns.

And

six

th,

Dav

idso

n m

ight

tra

nsla

te "

mos

t be

liefs

" in

to s

ome

non­

quan

tifi

cati

onal

idio

m. P

erha

ps h

e m

ight

art

icul

ate

PC

as

som

ethi

ng li

ke:

(vi)

cet

eris

par

ibus

, an

int

erpr

eter

take

s an

alie

n's

belie

fs t

o be

tru

e by

he

r in

terp

rete

r's li

ghts

.

He

mig

ht t

hen

prov

ide

a no

n-qu

anti

fica

tion

al c

onst

rual

of

the

cete

ris­

pari

bus

clau

se.

Yet

(vi

) is

no

bett

er t

han

(ii)

, (i

ii),

or

(v).

For

(vi

) is

con

­si

sten

t wit

h no

bel

ief o

f an

alie

n's

bein

g tr

ue b

y he

r int

erpr

eter

's li

ghts

. No

r is

it

clea

r ho

w t

rans

lati

ng "

mos

t be

liefs

" in

to a

ny n

on-q

uant

ific

atio

nal

idio

m c

an a

void

thi

s pr

oble

m.

Thu

s, g

iven

Dav

idso

n's

view

s on

sem

antic

s, n

one

of

thes

e w

ays

of

han­

dlin

g "m

ost b

elie

fs"

succ

eeds

. Non

ethe

less

, Dav

idso

n m

ight

try

a di

ffer

ent

Pri

ncip

le o

f Cha

rity

68

1

tack

. H

e m

ight

arg

ue th

at th

e pr

oble

m o

fmak

ing

sens

e o

f "m

ost

bel

iefs

" is

mer

ely

tech

nica

l and

no

t wor

th th

e at

tent

ion

that

I ha

ve p

aid

it. Y

et o

nly

by i

gnor

ing

the

prob

lem

can

Dav

idso

n es

tabl

ish

his·

sw

eepi

ngep

iste

mic

co

nclu

sion

s. A

nd

so

the

prob

lem

is w

orth

the

atte

ntio

n th

at I

have

pai

d it

, in

sofa

r as

one

take

s D

avid

son

seri

ousl

y th

at h

is v

iew

s o

n s

eman

tics

hav

e ep

iste

mic

con

sequ

ence

s. N

or

can

one

fail

to

tak

e D

avid

son

seri

ousl

y ab

out t

his

sinc

e, a

ccor

ding

to

Dav

idso

n, h

is "

met

hodo

logy

of

inte

rpre

ta­

tion

is

. . .

noth

ing

bu

t ep

iste

mol

ogy

seen

in

the

mir

ror

of

mea

ning

" (1

984e

, p.

169)

. H

ence

(iv)

, th

e on

ly a

rtic

ulat

ion

of

PC

cap

able

of e

ntai

ling

Dav

idso

n's

epis

tem

ic c

oncl

usio

ns i

s in

cons

iste

nt w

ith

.. his

. vie

ws

on

sem

anti

cs.

Yet

be

caus

e su

ch v

iew

s sa

ncti

on D

avid

son'

s us

ing

PC

in

the

fir

st p

lace-P

C

is a

met

hodo

logi

cal p

rinc

iple

in s

eman

tics

-an

y a

rtic

ulat

ion

of

PC

inco

n­si

sten

t ,w

ith D

avid

son'

s se

man

tic

view

s in

vali

date

s hi

s us

ing

PC

gen

eral

ly.

Thu

s, D

avid

son

can

use

PC

eit

her

only

as

a m

etho

dolo

gica

l pr

inci

ple

in

sem

anti

cs o

r n

ot

at a

ll. 13

Not

es

1 T

hat

thir

d an

thol

ogy

is D

avid

son

2001

a, i

tsel

f an

tici

pati

ng p

ubli

cati

on o

f D

avid

son

2004

and

fort

hcom

ing,

bri

ngin

g th

e to

tal n

umbe

r o

f an

thol

ogie

s o

f D

avid

son'

s ar

ticl

es t

o fiv

e. (

See

Dav

idso

n 20

01a,

pp.

221

-25.

) 2

Non

ethe

less

, se

e M

alpa

s (1

992,

§5.

3.3)

for

a s

ympa

thet

ic d

iscu

ssio

n o

f th

e tr

icki

ness

of

the

task

. 3

"Wha

t a f

ully

inf

orm

ed in

terp

rete

r cou

ld le

arn

abou

t wha

t a s

peak

er m

eans

is

all

ther

e is

to

lear

n; t

he s

ame

goes

for

wha

t th

e sp

eake

r be

lieve

s" (

Dav

idso

n 20

01b,

p.

148;

my

emph

asis

).

4 A

ccor

ding

to

Dav

idso

n, a

n in

terp

rete

r he

rsel

f ha

s la

rgel

y se

lf-c

onsi

sten

t be

liefs

; oth

erw

ise,

acc

ordi

ng to

him

, the

inte

rpre

ter c

ould

not

her

self

be

inte

r­pr

eted

, an

d s

o co

uld

not

have

an

y be

liefs

. T

hus,

the

int

erpr

eter

's m

axim

izin

g th

e se

lf-c

onsi

sten

cy th

at s

he a

ttri

bute

s to

an

alie

n ca

n be

reg

arde

d as

a f

urth

er

inst

ance

of

her m

axim

izin

g he

r agr

eem

ent w

ith

the

alie

n.

5 N

onet

hele

ss,

see

n.7

for

a fu

rthe

r re

ason

. 6

In fa

ct, D

avid

son

(199

0, p

. 319

; 19

91, p

. 19

5) m

akes

this

poi

nt in

term

s o

f PC

. F

or h

e sa

ys t

hat P

C, i

n th

e co

ntex

t of

a T

arsk

i-st

yle

theo

ry o

f tr

uth,

an

d so

in

the

cont

ext

of

attr

ibut

ing

an i

nfin

ite

num

ber

of

belie

fs,

is a

n al

tern

ativ

e to

id

enti

fyin

g an

y be

lief

as

expr

essi

ng a

n an

alyt

ic t

ruth

. 7

The

re m

ay b

e a

furt

her

reas

on w

hy D

avid

son

switc

hes

from

"m

axim

ize"

to

"opt

imiz

e."

Tho

ugh

in la

ter w

riti

ng D

avid

son

cont

inue

s to

em

ploy

PC

"ac

ross

th

e bo

ard"

(198

4g, p

. xvi

i), h

e al

so a

rgue

s th

at s

ome

agre

emen

t is

mor

e im

por­

tant

than

oth

ers.

And

, in

the

cont

ext o

f see

king

wei

ghte

dag

reem

ent,

rath

er th

an

mer

ely

coun

ting

the

num

ber

of

belie

fs o

n w

hich

the

re is

agr

eem

ent,

Dav

idso

n so

met

imes

spe

aks

of

"opt

imiz

ing.

" (I

tha

nk a

n an

onym

ous

revi

ewer

for

bri

ng­

ing

this

to

my

atte

ntio

n.)

Non

ethe

less

, thi

s w

ould

be

a fu

rthe

r re

ason

, for

, as

all

682

Dia

logu

e

thes

e pa

ssag

es (i

nclu

ding

200

1b, p

p. 1

38-3

9, q

uote

d ab

ove)

mak

e cl

ear,

the

chie

f re

ason

for

the

switc

h is

the

wor

ry th

at a

n al

ien

has

an in

fini

te n

umbe

r of b

elie

fs.

8 D

avid

son'

s (1

984d

) ar

gum

ent a

gain

st s

chem

e-co

nten

t dua

lism

is a

lso

anar

gu

­m

ent

agai

nst

conc

eptu

al r

elat

ivis

m.

Dav

idso

n ta

kes

thes

e co

nclu

sion

s to

be

rela

ted

to s

uch

furt

her

conc

lusi

ons

as th

at th

ere

is n

o su

ch th

ing

asla

ngua

ge,

in t

he t

radi

tion

al s

ense

of

"lan

guag

e" (

1986

); t

hat

ther

e is

no

such

thi

ng·.a

s ex

clus

ivel

y su

bjec

tive

know

ledg

e (1

988)

; an

d th

at o

ne s

ees

thro

ugh

lang

uage

, in

Dav

idso

n's

sens

e o

f "l

angu

age,

" to

the

wor

ld it

self

(199

7).

9� D

avid

son

(198

4d) f

ocus

es o

n th

e tr

ansl

atab

ilit

y o

f tru

e se

nten

ces.

His

om

itti

ng

"tru

e" h

ere

seem

s a

mer

e li

ngua

laps

a.

10�

One

par

ticu

lar

com

plic

atio

n in

Dav

idso

n's

.arg

umen

t aga

inst

sce

ptic

ism

is it

s in

voki

ng th

e po

ssib

ilit

y o

f an

om

nisc

ient

inte

rpre

ter.

For

the

clas

sic

resp

onse

to

this

invo

cati

on, s

ee F

oley

and

Fum

erto

n (1

985)

.. 11

� In

fac

t, th

is e

x:ce

rpt

is t

aken

fro

m a

pas

sage

ant

icip

atin

g D

avid

son'

s ar

guin

g fr

om P

C a

ndth

epos

sibi

lity

of a

n om

nisc

ient

inte

rpre

ter t

o th

e co

nclu

sion

that

sk

epti

cism

is u

nten

able

. 12

Q

lne

mig

ht o

bjec

t tha

t thi

s is

an

unch

arit

able

con

stru

al o

f "a

s fa

r as

poss

ible

."�

Non

ethe

less

, it i

s un

clea

r w

hat e

lse

Dav

idso

n m

ight

mea

n by

the

phr

ase.

� 13

I

than

k W

ayne

Dav

is,

Mic

hael

Fer

ry,a

nd

sev

eral

ano

ny

mo

us

revi

ewer

s fo

r�

sugg

esti

ons

and

som

e o

f th

e ob

ject

ions

con

side

red

abov

e.

Ref

eren

ces

Chi

ld, W

illi

am

1994

C

ausa

lity,

Int

erpr

etat

ion

and

the

Min

d N

ew Y

ork:

Oxf

ord

Uni

ver­

sity

Pre

ss.

Dav

idso

n, D

onal

d 19

70

"Men

tal E

vent

s."

In E

xper

ienc

e an

d T

heor

y. E

dite

d bu

Law

renc

e F

oste

r an

d J

.. W

. S

wan

son.

Am

bers

t, M

A:U

nive

rsit

y o

f M

assa

­ch

uset

ts P

ress

, pp

. 79

-101

. R

epri

nted

in

Dav

idso

n 19

80, p

p. 2

07­

24.

1980

E

ssay

s on

Act

ions

and

Eve

nts.

New

Yor

k: C

lare

ndon

Pre

ss.

1984

a�

"Tru

th a

nd M

eani

ng."

In

Inqu

irie

s in

to T

ruth

and

Inte

rpre

tati

on.

New

Yor

k: C

lare

ndon

Pre

ss,

pp.1

7-36

. O

rigi

nall

y pu

blis

hed

in

Syn

thes

e, 1

7 (1

967)

: ·30

4-23

. 19

84b�

"R

adic

al I

nter

pret

atio

n."

In I

nqui

ries

int

o T

ruth

an

d I

nter

pret

a­tio

n. N

ew Y

ork:

Cla

rend

on P

ress

, pp.

125

-40.

Ori

gina

lly

publ

ishe

d in

Dia

lect

ica,

27

(197

3):

313-

28.

1984

c�

"Bel

ief

and

the

Bas

is o

f M

eani

ng."

In

Inq

uiri

es i

nto

Tru

th a

nd

Inte

rpre

tati

on. N

ew Y

ork:

Cla

rend

on P

ress

, pp.

141

-54.

Ori

gina

lly

publ

ishe

d in

Syn

thes

e,27

(19

74):

309-

23.

1984

d�

"On

the

Ver

y Id

ea o

f a

Con

cept

ual

Sche

me.

" In

Inq

uiri

es i

nto

Tru

th a

nd In

terp

reta

tion

. N

ew Y

ork:

Cla

rend

on P

ress

, pp.

183

-98.

O

rigi

nall

y pu

blis

hed

in P

roce

edin

gs a

ndA

ddre

sses

oft

he A

mer

ican

P

hilo

soph

ical

Ass

ocia

tion

, 47

(197

4):

5-20

.

Pri

ncip

le o

f Cha

rity

68

3

1984

e�

"Tho

ught

and

Tal

k."

In I

nqui

ries

int

o T

ruth

and

Int

erpr

etat

ion.

N

ew Y

ork:

Cla

rend

on P

ress

, pp.

155

-70.

19

84f�

"T

he M

etho

d o

f Tru

th in

Met

aphy

sics

." I

nIn

quir

ies

into

Tru

th a

nd

Inte

rpre

tati

on.

New

Yor

k: C

lare

ndon

Pre

ss,

pp.

199-

214.

Ori

gi­

nall

y pu

blis

hed

in M

idw

est

Stud

ies

in P

hilo

soph

y, V

ol.

2: S

tudi

es in

th

e P

hilo

soph

y o

f Lan

guag

e. E

dite

d by

Pet

er A

. F

renc

h, T

heod

ore

E.

Ueh

ling

, Jr

., an

d H

owar

d K

. W

etts

tein

. M

orri

s, M

N:

Uni

ver­

sity

of

Min

neso

ta P

ress

, 19

77, p

p. 2

44-5

4.

1984

g In

quir

ies

into

Tru

th a

nd In

terp

reta

tion

. New

Yor

k: C

lare

ndon

Pre

ss.

1986

� "A

Nic

e D

eran

gem

ent

of

Epi

taph

s."

In T

ruth

and

Int

erpr

etat

ion:

P

ersp

ecti

ves

on

the

Phi

loso

phy

of

Don

ald

Dav

idso

n.

Edi

ted

by

Ern

est

Lep

ore.

New

Yor

k: B

lack

wel

l, pp

. 43

3-46

. 19

88�

"The

Myt

h o

f th

e Su

bjec

tive.

" In

Bew

usts

ein,

Sp

rach

e un

d di

e K

unst

. E

dite

d by

M.

Ben

edik

t an

d R

. B

urge

r. V

ienn

a: E

diti

on

S. V

erla

g de

r O

ster

reic

hisc

hen

Sta

atsd

ruck

erei

, pp.

45-

54.

1990

"T

he S

truc

ture

an

d C

onte

nt o

f T

ruth

." Jo

urna

l of P

hilo

soph

y, 8

7:

279-

328.

19

91

"Epi

stem

olog

y E

xter

nali

zed.

" D

iale

ctic

a, 4

5: 1

91-2

02.

Rep

rint

ed

in D

avid

son

2001

a, p

p. 1

93-2

04.

1997

"S

eein

g th

roug

h L

angu

age.

" In

Tho

ught

and

Lan

guag

e. E

dite

d by

Jo

hn P

rest

on. N

ew Y

ork:

Cam

brid

ge U

nive

rsit

y Pr

ess,

pp.

15-

22.

2001

a Su

bjec

tive,

Int

ersu

bjec

tive,

Obj

ectiv

e. N

ew Y

ork:

Oxf

ord

Uni

vers

ity

Pres

s.

2001

b�

"A C

oher

ence

The

ory

of

Tru

th a

nd K

now

ledg

e."

In S

ubje

ctiv

e,

Inte

rsub

ject

ive,

O

bjec

tive.

N

ew Y

ork:

O

xfor

d U

nive

rsit

y Pr

ess,

pp

. 13

7-53

. O

rigi

nall

y pu

blis

hed

in K

ant

oder

Heg

el.

Edi

ted

by

D.

Hei

nric

h. S

tutt

gart

: K

lett

-Cot

ta,

1983

, pp.

423

-38.

20

04

Pro

blem

s o

f Rat

iona

lity

. N

ew Y

ork:

Oxf

ord

Uni

vers

ity

Pres

s.

For

thco

min

g Tr

uth,

Lan

guag

e an

d H

isto

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