Charity - Washington and Lee Universityhome.wlu.edu/~goldbergn/scholarship/Articles/Principle of...
13
The Principle of Charity NATHANIEL GOLDBERG . Mount Saint Mar ABSTRACT: The recent publication of a third ant cles, and anticipated publication of two more, enco binding together Davidson's lifetime of research. O charity (PC). In light of the mileage Davidson ge examination of PC itself In Part 1, I consider some PC. In Part 2, I show that the articulation that Dav temology is untenable given what Davidson says in that Davidson can use PC only in his work on sema RESUME: La parution recente du troisieme recu lequel devrait etre suivi de deux autres, incite a ex tous ses travaux. Parmi ces themes se trouve Ie princ tout Ie parti que Davidson a tire du PC, je me prop Dans la premiere partie, j' examine diverses formul la secondepartie,jemontre que laformulation qu'e est intenable etant donne ce qu'll en dit dans ses tra
Transcript of Charity - Washington and Lee Universityhome.wlu.edu/~goldbergn/scholarship/Articles/Principle of...
The
Pri
ncip
le o
f C
hari
ty�
NA
TH
AN
IEL
GO
LD
BE
RG
. M
ount
Sai
nt M
ary'
s U
nive
rsity
AB
ST
RA
CT
: T
he r
ecen
t pub
lica
tion
ofa
thi
rd a
ntho
logy
of D
onal
d D
avid
son'
s ar
ti
cles
, a
nd
ant
icip
ated
pub
lica
tion
of
two
mor
e, e
ncou
rage
s a
cons
ider
atio
n o
f th
emes
bi
ndin
g to
geth
er D
avid
son'
s li
feti
me
of
rese
arch
. O
ne s
uch
them
e is
the
pri
ncip
le o
f ch
arit
y (P
C).
In
ligh
t o
f th
e m
ilea
ge D
avid
son
gets
out
of
PC
, I
prop
ose
a ca
refu
l ex
amin
atio
no
fPC
itse
lf In
Par
t 1, I
con
side
r so
me
way
s in
whi
ch D
avid
son
arti
cula
tes
PC
. In
Par
t 2,
I sh
ow t
hat
the
arti
cula
tion
tha
t D
avid
son
requ
ires
in h
is w
ork
on e
pis
tem
olog
y is
unt
enab
le g
iven
wha
t D
avid
son
says
in h
is w
ork
on s
eman
tics
. I
conc
lude
th
at D
avid
son
can
use
PC
onl
y in
his
wor
k on
sem
anti
cs o
r no
t at
all.
RE
SU
ME
: L
a p
arut
ion
rece
nte
du t
rois
iem
e re
cuei
l d'a
rtic
les
de D
on
ald
Dav
idso
n,
lequ
el d
evra
it e
tre
suiv
i de
deu
x au
tres
, in
cite
a e
xam
iner
les
the
mes
qui
tra
vers
ent
tous
ses
trav
aux.
Par
mi c
es t
hem
es s
e tr
ouve
Ie p
rinc
ipe
de c
hari
te (
PC
) .C
on
sid
era
nt
tout
Iep
art
ique
Dav
idso
na
tire
du P
C, j
em
epr
opos
ed'
enfa
ire
un e
xam
enat
tent
if.
Dan
s la
pre
mie
re p
arti
e, j
'exa
min
e di
vers
es fo
rmul
atio
ns d
u P
C p
ar D
avid
son.
Dan
s la
sec
onde
part
ie,j
em
ontr
e qu
e la
form
ulat
ion
qu'e
xige
ntse
s tr
avau
x d
'epi
stem
olog
ie
esti
nte
nabl
eet
antd
onne
cequ
'lle
ndi
tdan
sse
str
avau
xde
sem
anti
que.
De
la,j
eco
ncl
us q
ue D
avid
son
ne p
eut s
e se
rvir
du
PC
que
dan
s se
s tr
avau
x de
sem
anti
que
ou p
as
du t
out.
The
rece
nt p
ubli
cati
on o
f a th
ird
anth
olog
y o
f Don
ald
Dav
idso
n's
arti
cles
, an
d an
tici
pate
d pu
blic
atio
n o
f tw
o m
ore,
1 en
cour
ages
a c
onsi
dera
tion
of
them
es b
indi
ng to
geth
er D
avid
son'
s li
feti
me
of
rese
arch
. O
ne s
uch
them
e is
the
pri
ncip
le o
f ch
arit
y (P
C).
In
ligh
t of
the
mil
eage
Dav
idso
n ge
ts o
ut
of
PC, I
pro
pose
a c
aref
ul e
xam
inat
ion
of
PC
itse
lf.
Hen
ce, t
houg
h R
am
berg
is r
ight
that
"pr
ecis
e ar
ticu
lati
on o
f th
e pr
inci
ple
of c
hari
ty tu
rns
ou
t to
be
an e
xtre
mel
y tr
icky
task
" (1
989,
p. 7
0),2
in P
art 1
of
this
art
icle
I co
n-
Dia
logu
e X
LII
I (2
004)
, 671
-83
© 2
004
Can
adia
n P
hilo
soph
ical
Ass
ocia
tion
/Ass
ocia
tion
can
adie
nne
de p
hilo
soph
ie
672
Dia
logu
e
side
r so
me
way
s in
whi
ch D
avid
son
does
art
icul
ate
pc.
In P
art
2 I
show
th
at th
e ar
ticu
lati
on t
hat
Dav
idso
n re
quir
es i
n hi
s w
ork
on e
pist
emol
ogy
is u
nten
able
giv
en w
hat
Dav
idso
n sa
ys i
n hi
s w
ork
on s
eman
tics
.
1.
Dav
idso
n (1
984a
) in
trod
uces
PC
as
a m
etho
dolo
gica
l pri
ncip
le in
sem
an
tics.
Acc
ordi
ng to
Dav
idso
n, a
rad
ical
inte
rpre
ter n
eeds
to
use
PC
to c
on
stru
ct a
Tar
ski-
styl
e th
eory
of
trut
h fo
r an
alie
n's
lang
uage
. Suc
h a
theo
ry,
Dav
idso
n cl
aim
s, a
mou
nts
to a
the
ory
of
mea
ning
for
tha
t la
ngua
ge.
Acc
ordi
ng t
o D
avid
son,
an
alie
n m
eans
by
a pa
rtic
ular
utt
eran
ce w
hat
ever
suc
h a
theo
ry e
ntai
ls th
at sh
e w
ould
mea
n by
it, a
nd b
elie
ves
wha
teve
r is
nec
essa
ry th
at sh
e be
take
n to
bel
ieve
in o
rder
to c
onst
ruct
suc
h a
theo
ry
of
mea
ning
in th
e fi
rst
plac
e.3
My
conc
ern
is n
ot w
heth
er D
avid
son
is r
ight
, but
how
, in
ligh
t of
its
use
spec
ific
ally
as
a m
etho
dolo
gica
l pri
ncip
le i
n se
man
tics
, D
avid
son
arti
cu
late
s pc
. R
elat
ive
to t
hat u
se,
Dav
idso
n of
fers
thr
ee,
som
etim
es o
verl
ap
ping
, ar
ticu
lati
ons
of
PC.
Fir
st, D
avid
son
says
tha
t to
con
stru
ct a
the
ory
of
mea
ning
for
an
alie
n's
lang
uage
, an
int
erpr
eter
max
imiz
es a
gree
men
t be
twee
n th
e al
ien
and·
hers
elf
as f
ar a
s po
ssib
le:
Cha
rity
in
inte
rpre
ting
the
wor
ds a
nd t
houg
hts
of
othe
rs i
s un
avoi
dabl
e· in
an
othe
r di
rect
ion
as w
ell:
just
as
we
mus
t m
axim
ize
agre
emen
t, o
r ri
sk n
ot
mak
ing
sens
e o
f w
hat t
he a
lien
is t
alki
ng a
bout
, so
we
mus
t max
imiz
e th
e se
lf
cons
iste
ncy
we
attr
ibut
e to
him
, o
n p
ain
of
not
unde
rsta
ndin
g hi
m.
(198
4a,
p. 2
7; m
y em
phas
is o
n "m
axim
ize
agre
emen
t,,)4
We
wan
t a t
heor
y th
at s
atis
fies
the
for
mal
con
stra
ints
on
a th
eory
of
trut
h, a
nd
th
at m
axim
izes
agr
eem
ent,
in th
e se
nse
of
mak
ing
[alie
ns]
righ
t, a
s fa
r as
we
can
tell,
as
ofte
n as
pos
sibl
e. (
1984
b, p
. 13
6; m
y em
phas
is)
Now
, ac
cord
ing
to D
avid
son
(198
4a,
I 984
b),
an i
nter
pret
er m
axim
izes
ag
reem
ent
on s
ente
nces
hel
d tr
ue,
and
sent
ence
s he
ld t
rue
are
belie
fs.
So
Dav
idso
n fi
rst
clai
ms
that
PC
adv
ises
an
inte
rpre
ter
to m
axim
ize
agre
em
ent o
n b
elie
fs s
hare
d by
the
ali
en a
nd h
erse
lf.
But
wha
t doe
s "m
axim
ize
agre
emen
t" m
ean?
In
the
lat
ter
quot
atio
n, D
avid
son
expl
icat
es i
t as
an
inte
rpre
ter'
s ta
king
an
alie
n to
be
righ
t by
the
inte
rpre
ter's
ligh
ts a
s of
ten
as p
ossi
ble.
T
his
expl
icat
ion
itse
lf s
eem
s to
be
a se
cond
art
icul
atio
n o
f P
C,
vari
ati
ons
of
whi
ch D
avid
son
offe
rs e
lsew
here
:
[pro
vidi
ng a
the
ory
of
mea
ning
] is
acc
ompl
ishe
d by
ass
igni
ng t
ruth
con
diti
ons
to a
lien
sen
tenc
es th
at m
ake
nati
ve s
peak
ers
righ
t whe
n pl
ausi
bly
poss
ible
, ac
cord
in
g, o
f cou
rse,
to
our
own
view
on
wha
t is
rig
ht.
(198
4b, p
. 13
7; m
y em
phas
is)
Pri
ncip
le o
f Cha
rity
67
3
The
gen
eral
pol
icy,
how
ever
, is
to c
hoos
e tr
uth
cond
itio
ns t
hat
do a
s w
ell a
s po
ssi
ble
in m
akin
g sp
eake
rs h
old
sent
ence
s tr
ue w
hen
(acc
ordi
ng t
o th
e th
eory
and
th
eory
bui
lder
's v
iew
on
the
fact
s) t
hose
sen
tenc
es a
re t
rue.
(19
84c,
p.
150;
my
emph
asis
)
We
get a
fir
st a
ppro
xim
atio
n o
f a
fini
shed
the
ory
by a
ssig
ning
to
sen
tenc
es o
f a
spea
ker
cond
itio
ns o
f tru
th t
hat
actu
ally
obt
ain
(in
our
own
opin
ion)
just
whe
n th
e sp
eake
r hol
ds th
ose
sent
ence
s tr
ue. T
he g
uidi
ng p
olic
y is
to
do th
isas
far
as
poss
ible
. (1
984d
, p.
196;
my
emph
asis
)
Fo
r Dav
idso
n, s
ince
a s
ente
nce
held
tru
e is
a b
elie
f, h
is s
econ
d ar
ticu
lati
on
of
PC
is t
hat
an
inte
rpre
ter
as fa
r as
pos
sibl
e ta
kes
an a
lien
to
have
bel
iefs
tr
ue b
y he
r in
terp
rete
r's
ligh
ts.
Dav
idso
n so
met
imes
use
s th
ese
firs
t tw
o ar
ticu
lati
ons
toge
ther
. B
ut
twic
e he
mod
ifie
s th
e fi
rst
from
"m
axim
ize"
to "
opti
miz
e":
The
met
hodo
logi
cal
advi
ce t
o i
nter
pret
in
a w
ay t
hat
opti
miz
es a
gree
men
t sh
ould
not
be
conc
eive
d as
res
ting
on
a ch
arit
able
ass
umpt
ion
abou
t hu
man
in
tell
igen
ce..
.. I
f w
e ca
nnot
find
a w
ay t
o in
terp
ret t
he u
tter
ance
s an
d ot
her
beha
viou
r of
a cr
eatu
re a
s re
veal
ing
a se
t of
belie
fs la
rgel
y co
nsis
tent
and
true
by
our
own
stan
dard
s, w
e ha
ve n
o re
ason
to
cou
nt th
at c
reat
ure
as r
atio
nal,
as
hav
ing
belie
fs, o
r as
say
ing
anyt
hing
. (1
984b
, p.
137;
my
emph
asis
)
The
bas
ic m
etho
dolo
gica
l pre
cept
is, t
here
fore
, tha
t a g
ood
theo
ry o
f in
terp
re
tati
on m
axim
izes
agr
eem
ent.
Or,
give
n th
at s
ente
nces
are
infi
nite
in n
umbe
r ..
. a
bett
er w
ord
mig
ht b
e op
timiz
e. (
1984
e, p
. 16
9)
The
se s
eem
to
exp
ress
a t
hird
art
icul
atio
n o
f P
C: a
n in
terp
rete
r op
tim
izes
ag
reem
ent
betw
een
the
alie
n an
d h
erse
lf.
No
w w
hy d
oes
Dav
idso
n sw
itch
fro
m "
max
imiz
e" t
o "
opti
miz
e"?
Th
ou
gh
Dav
idso
n m
ight
hav
e m
ore
than
one
rea
son,
the
latt
er q
uo
tati
on
m
akes
cle
ar t
hat
his
ch
ief r
easo
n in
volv
es h
is c
laim
th
at a
n a
lien
has
an
in
fini
te n
um
ber
of
beli
efs
and
th
at o
ne c
ann
ot
"max
imiz
e" a
n i
nfin
ite
num
ber
of
anyt
hing
.5
Why
doe
s D
avid
son
.cla
im t
hat
an
ali
en h
as a
n i
nfin
ite
nu
mb
er o
f be
lief
s? T
ho
ug
h m
y co
ncer
n is
no
t w
heth
er D
avid
son
is r
ight
, b
ut
rath
er
how
his
cla
imin
g th
is r
elat
es t
o h
is a
rtic
ulat
ing
PC
, le
t m
e no
neth
eles
s pr
esen
t D
avid
son'
s re
ason
for
cla
imin
g th
is.
Dav
idso
n do
es s
o, b
ecau
se i
t fo
llow
s fr
om t
he
way
in w
hich
he
uses
Tar
ski's
sem
anti
c th
eory
of
tru
th to
ge
nera
te a
the
ory
of
mea
ning
. Dav
idso
n ad
op
ts T
arsk
i's m
eth
od
of
recu
rsi
vely
gen
erat
ing
an in
fini
te n
umbe
r o
f T
-sen
tenc
es, e
ach
stat
ing
that
on
e o
f an
infi
nite
num
ber
of
recu
rsiv
ely
gene
rate
d ob
ject
-lan
guag
e se
nten
ces
is t
rue
if,
and
onl
y if
, on
e o
f an
inf
init
e nu
mbe
r o
f re
curs
ivel
y ge
nera
ted
met
alan
guag
e se
nten
ces
is t
rue.
And
, for
Dav
idso
n, e
ach
obje
ct-l
angu
age
674
Dia
logu
e
sent
ence
is
a se
nten
ce t
hat
an a
lien,
and
eac
h m
etal
angu
age
sent
ence
a
sent
ence
tha
t an
int
erpr
eter
, ho
lds
true
, re
spec
tivel
y.
Thu
s D
avid
son
wri
tes:
"T
he a
im o
f th
eory
will
be
an in
fini
te n
umbe
r of
sent
ence
s al
ike
in
trut
h,"
imm
edia
tely
con
tinu
ing:
"W
hat
the
[int
erpr
eter
] m
ust
do i
s fi
nd
out,
how
ever
he
can,
wha
t se
nten
ces
the
alie
n ho
lds
true
in
his
own
tong
ue"
(198
4a, p
. 27;
my
emph
asis
). N
ow, f
or D
avid
son,
sin
ce a
sen
tenc
e he
ldtr
ueju
stis
a b
elie
f, an
alie
nth
eref
ore
has
anin
fini
te n
umbe
r ofb
elie
fs.
One
mig
ht o
bjec
t th
at o
n D
avid
son'
s vi
ew a
n in
terp
rete
r ne
ed n
ot
attr
ibut
e to
an
alie
n an
infi
nite
num
ber o
f be
liefs
. Ins
tead
, she
can
take
the
alie
n to
spe
ak a
lan
guag
e w
ith
an i
nfin
ite n
umbe
r o
f se
nten
ces.
Yet
, fo
r D
avid
son,
a l
angu
age
just
is t
he s
et o
f se
nten
ces
(exp
ress
ed h
omop
honi
ca
lly) t
hat a
n al
ien
hold
s tr
ue. A
nd, f
or D
avid
son,
thes
e se
nten
ces
held
true
ar
e de
term
ined
by
an in
terp
rete
r w
hen
cons
truc
ting
a th
eory
of
mea
ning
. I
take
thi
s to
be
one
way
of
unde
rsta
ndin
g D
avid
son'
s re
mar
k: "
I co
ncl
ude
that
ther
e is
no
such
thi
ng a
s a
lang
uage
, no
t if
a l
angu
age
is a
ny
thin
g lik
e w
hat m
any
ling
uist
s ha
ve s
uppo
sed.
The
re is
the
refo
re n
o su
ch
thin
g to
be
lear
ned,
mas
tere
d, o
r bo
rn w
ith"
(19
86,
pp.
445-
46),
for
D
avid
son'
s po
int s
eem
s to
be
that
it is
a m
ista
ke to
und
erst
and
a la
ngua
ge
as s
omet
hing
exi
stin
g in
depe
nden
tly
of
part
icul
ar a
cts
of
inte
rpre
tati
on,
and
so p
arti
cula
r th
eori
es o
f m
eani
ng. N
ow s
ince
suc
h a
theo
ry c
onta
ins
an i
nfin
ite
num
ber
of
T-s
ente
nces
, co
rrel
atin
g an
inf
init
e nu
mbe
r o
f ob
ject
-lan
guag
e se
nten
ces,
whi
ch t
he a
lien
hold
s tr
ue,
wit
h an
inf
init
e nu
mbe
r o
f m
etal
angu
age
sent
ence
s, a
n al
ien
hold
s an
infi
nite
num
ber
of
sent
ence
s tr
ue.
And
so,
for
Dav
idso
n, t
he a
lien
has
an in
fini
te n
umbe
r o
f be
liefs
. O
ne m
ight
obj
ect
to a
n al
ien'
s ha
ving
an·
infi
nite
num
ber
of
belie
fs o
n it
s ow
n te
rms.
Aga
in,
my
conc
ern
is n
ot w
heth
er D
avid
son
is c
orre
ct.
Non
ethe
less
, le
t m
e su
gges
t w
hat
Dav
idso
n ha
s in
min
d. A
ccor
ding
to
Dav
idso
n, a
bel
ief i
s id
entif
ied
only
aga
inst
the
back
grou
nd o
f a
"sys
tem
" (1
984e
, p.
157
) o
r "d
ense
pat
tern
" (1
984f
, p.
200
) o
f be
liefs
. If
an
inte
rpr
eter
take
s an
alie
n to
bel
ieve
, e.g
., th
at it
is r
aini
ng, t
he in
terp
rete
r mig
ht
also
tak
e th
e al
ien
to b
elie
ve t
hat
rain
fal
ls,
that
rai
n fa
lls f
rom
the
sky
, th
at r
ain
falls
fro
m t
he s
ky t
o th
e gr
ound
, th
at r
ain
falls
fro
m t
he s
ky t
o th
e gr
ound
tod
ay,
and
that
the
grou
nd is
bel
ow t
he s
ky.
Fur
ther
ther
e is
in
pri
ncip
le n
o re
ason
why
an
inte
rpre
ter
need
sto
p. I
n fa
ct,
Dav
idso
n .
clai
ms
that
the
only
alt
erna
tive
to id
enti
fyin
g a
beli
ef a
gain
st s
uch
a ba
ck
grou
nd o
f be
liefs
is
to i
dent
ify
it a
s ex
pres
sing
an
anal
ytic
tru
th;6
but
D
avid
son
reje
cts
that
ther
e ar
e su
ch tr
uths
. R
egar
ding
one
's n
ot b
eing
abl
e to
"m
axim
ize"
an
infi
nite
num
ber
of
anyt
hing
, D
avid
son
(198
4b,
p. ·1
37;
1984
e, p
. 16
9) s
eem
s to
und
erst
and
"max
imiz
e ag
reem
ent"
as
som
ethi
ng li
ke t
akin
g th
e al
ien
and
inte
rpre
ter
to a
gree
on
mo
st b
elie
fs.
"Opt
imiz
e ag
reem
ent"
mig
ht t
hen
mea
n so
me
thin
g lik
e ta
king
the
alie
n an
d in
terp
rete
r to
agr
ee o
n as
man
y be
liefs
as
poss
ible
. Onl
y th
is e
xpla
ins
why
Dav
idso
n th
inks
tha
t max
imiz
ing
an in
fi
Pri
ncip
le o
f Cha
rity
67
5
nite
num
ber
of
thin
gs i
s un
inte
llig
ible
, an
d w
hy,
for
Dav
idso
n (1
984b
, p.
137
; 19
84e,
p.
169)
, "o
ptim
ize"
is p
refe
rabl
e to
"m
axim
ize"
: w
here
as
sens
e ca
n be
mad
e o
f ag
reei
ng o
n as
man
y o
f an
infi
nite
num
ber o
f be
liefs
as
pos
sibl
e, n
o se
nse
can
be m
ade
of
agre
eing
on
mo
st o
f an
infi
nite
num
be
r o
f be
liefs
. F
or a
ny n
umbe
r o
f be
liefs
less
tha
n th
e to
tal w
ould
be
infi
ni
tely
less
th
an th
e to
tal;
"m
ost"
can
not q
uant
ify
over
an
infi
nite
num
ber
of
anyt
hing
.7
Yet
, rec
all D
avid
son
(198
4b, p
. 13
6) e
xpli
cati
ng "
max
imiz
e ag
reem
ent"
as
taki
ng a
n a
lien
as
ofte
n as
pos
sibl
e to
be
righ
t by
the
inte
rpre
ter'
s lig
hts.
A
nd t
his
is c
onsi
sten
t w
ith
ther
e be
ing
an in
fini
te n
umbe
r o
f be
liefs
. In
fa
ct,
Dav
idso
n th
ere
seem
s to
und
erst
and
"max
imiz
e ag
reem
ent"
in
the
sam
e w
ay a
s he
els
ewhe
re (1
984b
, p. 1
37;
1984
e, p
. 16
9) u
nder
stan
ds "
opti
m
ize
agre
emen
t."
Non
ethe
less
, as
exp
lain
ed b
elow
, th
is a
mbi
guit
y do
es
not t
hrea
ten
my
unde
rsta
ndin
g hi
m.
Now
,· D
avid
son
atte
mpt
s to
use
PC
, as
it
func
tion
s se
man
tica
lly,
to
draw
tw
o co
nclu
sion
s in
epi
stem
olog
y:
that
sch
eme-
cont
ent
dual
ism
(1
984d
) an
d sc
epti
cism
(19
84f;
2001
b) a
re b
oth
unte
nabl
e.8
Rel
ativ
e to
thes
e us
es,
Dav
idso
n of
fers
two
diff
eren
t, co
nfli
ctin
g ar
tic
ulat
ions
of p
c. T
hese
art
icul
atio
ns s
till c
once
rn P
C a
s it
func
tion
s se
man
tic
ally
, bu
t, u
nlik
e th
e ot
hers
, ar
e m
eant
to
allo
w D
avid
son
to r
each
his
ep
iste
mic
con
clus
ions
. T
he fi
rst
new
art
icul
atio
n, t
he f
ourt
h in
tot
o, a
mou
nts
to t
he c
laim
that
to
con
stru
ct a
the
ory
of
mea
ning
, an
inte
rpre
ter
take
s m
ost
of a
n al
ien'
s be
lief
s to
be
true
by
her
inte
rpre
ter'
s lig
hts:
Cha
rity
is f
orce
d on
us;
whe
ther
we
like
it o
r not
, if
we
wan
t to
unde
rsta
nd o
th
ers,
we
mus
t cou
nt t
hem
rig
ht in
mos
t mat
ters
. (1
984d
, p.
197;
my
emph
asis
)
But
of
cour
se i
t ca
nnot
be
assu
med
tha
t sp
eake
rs n
ever
hav
e fa
lse
belie
fs ...
. W
e ca
n, h
owev
er, t
ake
it a
s a
give
n th
at m
ost b
elie
fs a
re c
orre
ct..
.. A
theo
ry o
f in
terp
reta
tion
can
not
be c
orre
ct. t
hat
mak
es a
man
ass
ent
to v
ery
man
y fa
lse
sent
ence
s: i
t m
ust
gene
rally
be
the
case
tha
t a
sent
ence
is t
rue
whe
n a
spea
ker
hold
s it
to b
e. (
1984
e, p
. 16
9)
So,
now
Dav
idso
n ex
plic
itly
talk
s o
f "m
ost"
of
an i
nfin
ite
num
ber
of
belie
fs.
And
this
fou
rth
arti
cula
tion
exp
licat
es t
he s
ense
of
the
firs
t ar
tic
ulat
ion
not e
xpli
cate
d by
the
sec
ond:
"m
axim
izin
g ag
reem
ent"
can
mea
n ei
ther
, as
per
the
sec
ond
arti
cula
tion
, ta
king
an
alie
n an
d in
terp
rete
r to
sh
are
as m
any
belie
fs a
s po
ssib
le,
or,
as p
er th
e fo
urth
, ta
king
mos
t of
an
alie
n's
belie
fs t
o be
tru
e by
her
inte
rpre
ter's
ligh
ts.
Dav
idso
n ne
eds
to a
rtic
ulat
e P
C in
the
latt
er w
ay t
o re
ach
his
epis
tem
ic
conc
lusi
ons.
For
Dav
idso
n (1
984d
) pur
port
s to
est
abli
sh h
is fi
rst e
pist
emic
co
nclu
sion
, th
e un
tena
bili
ty o
f sc
hem
e-co
nten
t du
alis
m,
by e
stab
lish
ing
the
impo
ssib
ilit
y o
f tw
o ki
nds
of f
ailu
res
of t
rans
lata
bili
ty, v
iz.,
"com
plet
e,
676
Dia
logu
e
and
part
ial,
fai
lure
s o
f tr
ansl
atab
ilit
y. T
here
wou
ld b
e co
mpl
ete
fail
ure
if
no s
igni
fica
nt ra
nge
of [
true
] sen
tenc
es in
one
lang
uage
cou
ld b
e tr
ansl
ated
in
to t
he o
ther
; th
ere
wou
ld b
e pa
rtia
l fa
ilur
e if
som
e si
gnif
ican
t ra
nge
coul
d be
tran
slat
ed a
nd s
ome
rang
e co
uld
not"
(198
4d, p
. 18
5).9
If
part
ial
fail
ure
of
tran
slat
abil
ity
is i
mpo
ssib
le,
then
no
sign
ific
ant
rang
e o
f tr
ue
sent
ence
s in
one
lang
uage
fai
ls t
o be
tra
nsla
tabl
e in
to a
noth
er la
ngua
ge.
Tho
ugh
Dav
idso
n is
not
exp
licit
on w
hat n
o si
gnif
ican
t ran
ge o
f su
ch s
en
tenc
es e
ntai
ls, h
e do
es w
rite
in th
e sa
me
artic
le, a
s qu
oted
abo
ve, t
hat "
we
mus
t cou
nt [o
ur in
terl
ocut
ors]
rig
ht in
mo
st m
atte
rs."
Thu
s, w
hate
ver
else
it
ent
ails
, no
sign
ific
ant r
ange
of s
uch
sent
ence
s en
tail
s th
at m
ost s
ente
nces
he
ld t
rue
in o
ne la
ngua
ge a
re tr
ansl
atab
le i
nto
anot
her.
So,
for
Dav
idso
n to
est
abli
sh th
e un
tena
bili
ty o
f sc
hem
e-co
nten
t dua
lism
, he
mus
t est
abli
sh
that
mos
t sen
tenc
es h
eld
true
in o
ne la
ngua
ge n
eed
to b
e tr
ansl
atab
le in
to
anot
her.
And
sin
ce D
avid
son
does
so
by r
elyi
ng o
n h
is a
ccou
nt o
f ra
dica
l in
terp
reta
tion
, mos
t sen
tenc
es h
eld
true
in o
ne la
ngua
ge n
eed
to b
e tr
ans
lata
ble
into
the
radi
cal
inte
rpre
ter's
lang
uage
. D
avid
son'
s se
cond
epi
stem
ic c
oncl
usio
n, t
hat
scep
tici
sm i
s un
tena
ble,
al
so r
equi
res
talk
of
"mos
t" b
elie
fs.
Dav
idso
n's
argu
men
t ag
ains
t sc
epti
ci
sm is
com
plic
ated
; it
invo
lves
arg
uing
fro
m P
C's
spe
cify
ing
trut
h by
an
inte
rpre
ter'
s lig
hts,
plu
s th
e po
ssib
ilit
y o
f an
"om
nisc
ient
inte
rpre
ter,
" 10 to
re
ach
the
follo
win
g co
nclu
sion
s:
But
now
it
is p
lain
why
mas
sive
err
or a
bout
the
wor
ld is
sim
ply
unin
tell
igib
le.
(198
4f, p
. 20
1; m
y em
phas
is)
Onc
e w
e ag
ree
to t
he g
ener
al m
etho
d o
f in
terp
reta
tion
I h
ave
sket
ched
, it
be
com
es im
poss
ible
cor
rect
ly t
o ho
ld th
at a
nyon
e co
uld
be m
ostl
y w
rong
abo
ut
how
thi
ngs
are.
(20
01b,
p.
151;
my
emph
asis
)
Fro
m th
e re
st o
f D
avid
son'
s ar
gum
ent,
it
beco
mes
cle
ar t
hat
his
conc
lu
sion
is n
ot m
erel
y th
at m
assi
ve e
rror
is u
nint
elli
gibl
e an
d th
at it
is i
mpo
ssi
ble
corr
ectl
y to
hol
d th
at a
nyon
e co
uld
be m
ostl
y w
ron
g a
bout
how
th
ings
are
. His
con
clus
ion
is t
hat o
nly
mas
sive
trut
h is
inte
lligi
ble,
and
that
it
is i
mpo
ssib
le t
o ho
ld t
hat
anyo
ne c
ould
not
be
mos
tly
righ
t ab
out h
ow
thin
gs a
re.
For
ruli
ng o
ut t
he p
ossi
bili
ty o
f m
assi
ve e
rror
or
bein
g m
ostl
y w
rong
stil
l allo
ws
one
to b
e ri
ght a
nd w
rong
the
sam
e am
ount
of t
ime,
and
su
ch a
sta
te o
f af
fair
s do
es n
ot
esta
blis
h th
e un
tena
bili
ty o
f sc
epti
cism
. R
egar
dles
s, a
s w
ith
the
case
of
"no
sig
nifi
cant
ran
ge,"
Dav
idso
n is
no
t ex
plic
it o
n w
hat
"mas
sive
err
or"
or
"mas
sive
tru
th"
and
"mos
tly
wro
ng"
or "
mos
tly
righ
t" e
ntai
l. N
onet
hele
ss, h
is u
ses
of
them
sug
gest
that
, wha
tev
er e
lse
they
ent
ail,
the
y en
tail
tha
t m
ost
belie
fs a
re e
rron
eous
or
true
, an
d w
rong
or
righ
t, r
espe
ctiv
ely.
For
oth
erw
ise
Dav
idso
n w
ould
no
t be
ab
le t
o es
tabl
ish
the
unte
nabi
lity
of
scep
ticis
m.
And
so
his
conc
lusi
ons
amou
nt t
o th
e cl
aim
tha
t it i
s ne
cess
ary
that
mos
t be
liefs
are
true
. R
ecal
l
Pri
ncip
le o
f Cha
rity
67
7
that
Dav
idso
n's
argu
men
t for
thi
s in
volv
es h
is r
elyi
ng o
n P
C's
spe
cify
ing
trut
h by
an
inte
rpre
ter'
s lig
hts.
But
then
to a
rgue
that
sce
ptic
ism
is u
nten
ab
le,
D'a
vids
on n
eeds
to
arti
cula
te P
C a
s an
inte
rpre
ter's
tak
ing
mos
t o
f an
ali
en's
bel
iefs
to
be t
rue
by h
er in
terp
rete
r's li
ghts
. B
ut h
ow c
an D
avid
son
talk
abo
ut "
mos
t" b
elie
fs?
For
Dav
idso
n is
rig
ht
that
no
sens
e ca
n be
mad
e o
f mos
t of
an in
fini
te n
umbe
r of
anyt
hing
, and
, re
call,
for
him
, an
ali
en h
as a
n in
fini
te n
umbe
r o
f be
liefs
. In
fac
t, re
call,
th
is w
orry
pus
hes
Dav
idso
n to
pre
fer
talk
of
"opt
imiz
ing"
to "
max
imiz
in
g" th
e nu
mbe
r o
f tr
ue b
elie
fs i
n th
e fi
rst
plac
e.
Dav
idso
n, c
ogni
zant
of
prob
lem
s co
ncer
ning
"m
axim
izin
g,"
is a
lso
cogn
izan
t of p
robl
ems
conc
erni
ng "
mos
t,"
for
Dav
idso
n tr
ies
to e
xplic
ate,
w
ith
a fi
fth
arti
cula
tion
of
PC
, wha
t he
mea
ns b
y "m
ost b
elie
fs."
Wri
ting
o
f a
cohe
renc
e th
eory
of
trut
h, D
avid
son
expl
ains
: "A
ll th
at a
coh
eren
ce
theo
ry c
an m
aint
ain
is t
hat
mo
st o
f th
e be
lief
s in
a c
oher
ent
tota
l se
t o
f be
liefs
are
tru
e" (2
001
b, p
. 13
8). B
ut D
avid
son
imm
edia
tely
qua
lifi
es th
is:
Thi
s w
ay o
f st
atin
g th
e po
siti
on c
an a
t bes
t be
take
n as
a h
int,
sin
ce th
ere
is n
o us
eful
way
to
coun
t bel
iefs
, and
so
no c
lear
mea
ning
to t
he id
ea t
hat m
ost o
f a
pers
on's
bel
iefs
are
true
. A
som
ewha
t bet
ter
way
to
pu
t the
poi
nt is
to
say
ther
e is
a p
resu
mpt
ion
in fa
vor
of
the
trut
h o
f a
beli
ef t
hat
cohe
res
wit
h a
sign
ific
ant
mas
s o
f be
lief.
(ibi
d., p
p. 1
38-3
9; m
y em
phas
is)
Thu
s, D
avid
son
here
cla
ims,
the
re is
a p
resu
mpt
ion
in f
avou
r o
f th
e tr
uth
of
a be
lief
tha
t coh
eres
wit
h a
sign
ific
ant m
ass
of
belie
f. T
his
quot
atio
n is
not
an
expr
essi
on o
f P
C p
er s
e b
ut a
n ep
iste
mic
con
se
quen
ce o
f P
C t
hat
Dav
idso
n us
es a
s an
int
erm
edia
ry s
tep
in a
rgui
ng
from
PC
, and
his
vie
ws
on s
eman
tics
gen
eral
ly, a
gain
st s
cept
icis
m. F
or P
C
as a
met
hodo
logi
cal p
rinc
iple
in s
eman
tics
doe
s no
t per
se
guar
ante
e th
at
mos
t be
liefs
are
tru
e si
mpl
icit
er,
even
if
unde
rsto
od a
s th
ere
bein
g a
pre
sum
ptio
n th
at a
bel
ief
appr
opri
atel
y co
heri
ng is
tru
e. I
t gu
aran
tees
onl
y th
at m
ost
belie
fs a
re t
rue
by a
n in
terp
rete
r's li
ghts
. In
oth
er w
ords
, th
ere
is m
ore
to D
avid
son'
s ar
gum
ent,
fro
m w
hich
thi
s m
ost
rece
nt e
xcer
pt is
ta
ken,
tha
n pc
.II
Non
ethe
less
, ke
epin
g th
is i
n m
ind,
I u
nder
stan
d th
e qu
otat
ion
as s
ugge
stin
g a
fift
h ar
ticu
lati
on o
f P
C it
self
: th
ere
is a
pre
sum
pti
on i
n th
e fa
vour
of a
n al
ien'
s be
lief
s be
ing
true
by
an i
nter
pret
er's
ligh
ts.
-2. Thu
s D
avid
son
offe
rs fi
ve,
som
etim
es o
verl
appi
ng, a
rtic
ulat
ions
of
PC
:
(i)
an
inte
rpre
ter
max
imiz
es a
gree
men
t on
bel
iefs
bet
wee
n he
r al
ien
and
hers
elf
as f
ar a
s po
ssib
le;
(ii)
an
int
erpr
eter
as
far
as p
ossi
ble
take
s an
ali
en t
o ha
ve b
elie
fs t
rue
by h
er in
terp
,ret
er's
ligh
ts;
678
D
ialo
gue
(iii)
an
int
erpr
eter
opt
imiz
es a
gree
men
t be
twee
n th
e al
ien
and
hers
elf
(= a
n in
terp
rete
r ta
kes
an a
lien
and
her
self
to
agr
ee o
n a
s m
any
belie
fs a
s po
ssib
le);
(iv)
an
int
erpr
eter
tak
es m
ost
of
an a
lien'
s be
liefs
to
be t
rue
by h
er
inte
rpre
ter'
s lig
hts;
and
(v)
ther
e is
a p
resu
mpt
ion
in th
e fa
vour
of
an a
lien
's b
elie
fs b
eing
true
by
an
inte
rpre
ter'
s lig
hts.
Whi
ch o
f th
ese
is b
est?
For
Dav
idso
n, s
ince
(i)
is a
mbi
guou
s, e
xpli
cabl
e in
the
sen
se o
f ei
ther
(ii)
or
(iv)
, le
t me
cons
ider
onl
y (i
i)-(
v).
Art
icul
atio
ns (i
i), (
iii),
and
(v)
are
all t
oo w
eak
to re
ach
eith
er o
f D
avid
so
n's
epis
tem
ic c
oncl
usio
ns.
Con
side
r (i
i).
If a
n in
terp
rete
r as
far
as p
os
sibl
e ta
kes
an a
lien
to
have
bel
iefs
tru
e by
her
inte
rpre
ter'
s li
ghts
, the
n an
al
ien
mig
ht h
ave
no b
elie
f tr
ue b
y he
r int
erpr
eter
's li
ghts
. 12
Hen
ce, m
ost
of
the
alie
n's
belie
fs n
eed
not
be
true
by
her i
nter
pret
er's
ligh
ts. B
ut th
en b
oth
of
Dav
idso
n's
epis
tem
ic c
oncl
usio
ns a
re b
lock
ed.
Fir
st,
tran
slat
ion
is
trut
h-pr
eser
ving
. So
if
mos
t o
f an
alie
n's
belie
fs,
and
so s
ente
nces
hel
d tr
ue in
her
lang
uage
, nee
d n
ot b
e tr
ue b
y he
r in
terp
rete
r's
ligh
ts, t
hen
mos
t se
nten
ces
held
true
in h
er la
ngua
ge n
eed
no
t be
tran
slat
able
into
her
inte
rpr
eter
's la
ngua
ge.
But
then
Dav
idso
n's
argu
men
t aga
inst
sch
eme-
cont
ent
dual
ism
fai
ls.
Sec
ond,
Dav
idso
n's
argu
men
t ag
ains
t sc
epti
cism
pur
port
s to
sho
w t
hat
mos
t o
f an
alie
n's
belie
fs n
eed
to b
e tr
ue,
by
show
ing
(int
er
alia
) th
at m
ost
need
to
be t
rue
by h
er in
terp
rete
r's
light
s. A
nd s
o D
avid
so
n's
argu
men
t aga
inst
sce
ptic
ism
fails
. H
ence
, w
ere
Dav
idso
n to
art
icul
ate
PC
as
(ii)
, th
en h
e w
ould
fai
l to
es
tabl
ish
that
eit
her
sche
me-
cont
ent
dual
ism
or
scep
tici
sm i
s un
tena
ble.
F
urth
er,
the
poin
t gen
eral
izes
to
(iii)
and
(v),
for
eac
h ar
ticu
lati
on is
als
o co
nsis
tent
wit
h an
alie
n's
havi
ng n
o be
lief
tru
e by
her
inte
rpre
ter'
s lig
hts.
A
nd s
o, w
ere
Dav
idso
n to
art
icul
ate
PC
as
eith
er o
f th
ese,
the
n he
wou
ld
likew
ise
fail.
T
hat
leav
es o
nly
(iv)
. D
avid
son'
s ep
iste
mic
con
clus
ions
, re
call,
req
uire
so
met
hing
at l
east
as
stro
ng.
Hen
ce, s
olvi
ng b
ackw
ard
from
the
se c
oncl
usi
ons
to th
eir p
rem
ises
, (iv
) se
ems
the
best
art
icul
atio
n o
f P
C fo
r D
avid
son.
N
onet
hele
ss, (
iv)
invo
lves
mak
ing
sens
e o
f "m
ost"
of
an in
fini
te n
umbe
r.
of
belie
fs, w
hich
Dav
idso
n hi
mse
lf c
laim
s im
poss
ible
. The
re a
re n
ever
the
less
at
leas
t si
x w
ays
in w
hich
Dav
idso
n m
ight
be
able
to
do s
o af
ter
all.
Fir
st,
he m
ight
use
"m
ost
belie
fs"
figu
rativ
ely.
In
fac
t, th
is s
eem
s D
avid
so
n's
stra
tegy
. B
ut th
e on
ly w
ay i
n w
hich
usi
ng "
mos
t bel
iefs
" fi
gura
tivel
y ca
n he
lp is
if
it a
llow
s D
avid
son
to m
ean
both
som
ethi
ng li
ke a
pre
sum
pti
on in
fav
our
of
a ce
rtai
n ki
nd o
f (v
iz.,
true
) be
liefs
an
d m
ost b
elie
fs.
For
on
ly s
omet
hing
like
the
for
mer
can
, by
Dav
idso
n's
own
light
s, a
void
uni
nte
lligi
bilit
y, w
hile
onl
y so
met
hing
lik
e th
at l
atte
r ca
n, a
s I
have
sho
wn,
Pri
ncip
le o
f Cha
rity
67
9
allo
w D
avid
son
to u
se P
C to
arg
ue f
or h
is e
pist
emic
con
clus
ions
. B
ut th
en
this
"fi
gura
tive
" us
e co
mm
its
Dav
idso
n to
bot
h am
bigu
ity
(inv
olvi
ng tw
o di
ffer
ent s
ense
s o
f "m
ost b
elie
f") a
nd
unin
tell
igib
ilit
y (i
nvol
ving
mos
t of a
n in
fini
te n
umbe
r o
f so
met
hing
). S
o, t
his
firs
t w
ay in
whi
ch D
avid
son
mig
ht
mak
e se
nse
of
"mos
t bel
iefs
" le
aves
him
in a
wor
se p
osit
ion
than
bef
ore.
S
econ
d, D
avid
son
mig
ht s
impl
y ob
serv
e th
at a
n in
terp
rete
r ta
kes
such
"o
rdin
ary"
bel
iefs
as
that
it is
rai
ning
, bu
t no
t ne
cess
aril
y su
ch "
extr
aor
dina
ry"
belie
fs a
s th
at e
utha
nasi
a is
per
mis
sibl
e, t
o b
e tr
ue b
y he
r lig
hts.
A
nd D
avid
son
mig
ht a
rgue
tha
t, w
hate
ver
diff
icul
ty t
here
is i
n re
gim
ent
ing
the
clai
m t
hat
ther
e ar
e "m
any
mor
e" o
rdin
ary
than
ext
raor
dina
ry
belie
fs, t
here
is n
o di
sput
ing
that
in s
ome
sens
e th
is c
laim
is t
rue.
But
then
it
is a
pla
in f
act
that
in
som
e se
nse
an i
nter
pret
er d
oes
take
mos
t o
f an
al
ien'
s be
liefs
to
be t
rue
by h
er li
ghts
. T
he p
robl
em w
ith
this
resp
onse
, bes
ides
its
leav
ing
the
sens
e o
f "i
n so
me
sens
e" o
paqu
e, is
tha
t on
Dav
idso
n's
view
it i
s n
ot
a pl
ain
fact
tha
t in
any
sens
e th
ere
are
"man
y m
ore"
ord
inar
y th
an e
xtra
ordi
nary
bel
iefs
. A
bove
, I
show
ed th
at, f
or D
avid
son,
if
an in
terp
rete
r tak
es a
n al
ien
to b
elie
ve th
at
it is
rai
ning
, th
en s
he m
ight
als
o ta
ke t
he· a
lien
to
belie
ve t
hat
rai
n fa
lls,
that
rai
n fa
lls f
rom
the
sky
, tha
t rai
n fa
lls f
rom
the
sky
to
the
grou
nd, e
tc.
Her
e I
sugg
est t
hat,
for
Dav
idso
n, if
an
inte
rpre
ter t
akes
an
ali
en to
bel
ieve
th
at e
utha
nasi
a is
per
mis
sibl
e, th
en s
he m
ight
als
o ta
ke th
e al
ien
to b
elie
ve
that
"eu
than
asia
"wou
ld d
escr
ibe
the
act
done
to
a,
b,c
, et
c.,
bu
t n
ot
to
p,
q, r
, etc
.; th
at e
utha
nasi
a w
ould
be
perm
issi
ble
in c
ase
one
beca
use
of
a,
b, c
, etc
., bu
t no
t bec
ause
of p
,q, r
, etc
., in
cas
e tw
o be
caus
e o
f a,
b, c
, etc
., bu
t no
t bec
ause
ofp
, q,
r, et
c., i
n ca
se th
ree
beca
use
of
a, b
, c, e
tc.,
but n
ot
beca
use
of
p,q,
r,
etc.
, et
c.;
that
eut
hana
sia
is f
row
ned
up
on
by
thos
e be
liev
ing
a, b
, c, e
tc.,
but n
ot t
hose
bel
ievi
ngp,
q, r
, etc
.; et
c. A
nd a
ll th
ese
mig
ht b
e be
liefs
tha
t th
e in
terp
rete
r w
ould
her
self
hol
d fa
lse.
But
the
n it
is
no
t a p
lain
fac
t th
at a
n in
terp
rete
r w
ould
take
an
alie
n to
bel
ieve
man
y m
ore
ordi
nary
tha
n ex
trao
rdin
ary
belie
fs,
so t
his
wou
ld n
ot
be a
way
of
Dav
idso
n's
expl
aini
ng h
ow a
n in
terp
rete
r co
uld
take
mo
st o
f an
ali
en's
be
liefs
to
be
true
by
her
inte
rpre
ter's
ligh
ts.
Thi
rd,
Dav
idso
n m
ight
arg
ue t
hat
the
num
ber
of
belie
fs t
hat
any
alie
n ha
s is
fin
ite.
Yet
, re
call,
thi
s co
ntra
dict
s a
cent
ral
tene
t o
f D
avid
son'
s ad
opti
ng a
Tar
ski-
styl
e th
eory
of
tru
th a
s a
theo
ry o
f m
eani
ng.
Fur
ther
, al
so r
ecal
l, D
avid
son
seem
s to
cla
im t
hat t
he o
nly
alte
rnat
ive
to id
enti
fy
ing
a be
lief
aga
inst
wha
t is
in p
rinc
iple
an
infi
nite
num
ber
of
othe
r be
liefs
is
id
enti
fyin
g it
as
expr
essi
ng a
n an
alyt
ic t
ruth
-an
alt
erna
tive
th
at
Dav
idso
n re
ject
s.
Fou
rth,
Dav
idso
n m
ight
arg
ue t
hat,
tho
ugh
in p
rinc
iple
the
num
ber
of
belie
fs t
hat a
ny a
lien
has
is in
fini
te, i
n pr
acti
ce a
n in
terp
rete
r tak
es a
n al
ien
to h
ave
only
a f
inite
num
ber
of
belie
fs. A
nd o
f th
ese
it d
oes
mak
e se
nse
to
say
that
mos
t are
true
by
her
inte
rpre
ter'
s lig
hts.
Yet
, acc
ordi
ng to
Dav
id
son,
rec
all,
an a
lien
mea
ns b
y a
part
icul
ar u
tter
ance
wha
teve
r a
theo
ry o
f
680
Dia
logu
e
mea
ning
for
her
lang
uage
ent
ails
that
she
wou
ld m
ean
by it
, and
bel
ieve
s w
hate
ver
is n
eces
sary
tha
t sh
e be
tak
en t
o be
lieve
in
orde
r to
con
stru
ct
such
a th
eory
of m
eani
ng in
the
firs
t pla
ce. N
ow a
theo
ry o
f mea
ning
, eve
n in
pra
ctic
e, e
ntai
ls a
n in
fini
te n
umbe
r o
f T
-sen
tenc
es,
each
par
ticu
lar
T
sent
ence
ent
aili
ng w
hat
an a
lien
wou
ld m
ean
by a
par
ticu
lar.
utte
ranc
e.
And
, to
con
stru
ct a
n in
fini
te n
umbe
r o
f T
-sen
tenc
es,
and
so a
the
ory
of
mea
ning
, eve
n in
pra
ctic
e, it
is n
eces
sary
to ta
ke a
n al
ien
to h
ave
an in
fini
te
num
ber
of
belie
fs.
So, f
or D
avid
son,
eve
n in
pra
ctic
e, a
n in
terp
rete
r tak
es
an a
lien
to h
ave
an in
fini
te n
umbe
r o
f be
liefs
. F
ifth
, D
avid
son
mig
ht a
rgue
tha
t, e
ven
thou
gh th
e to
tal s
et o
f be
liefs
is
inf
inite
, bec
ause
he
(197
0) c
laim
s th
at b
elie
fs a
re m
enta
l st
ates
tok
en
iden
tica
l w
ith
brai
n st
ates
, be
liefs
mus
t oc
cupy
phy
sica
l sp
ace
in b
rain
s.
And
, sin
ce b
rain
s ha
ve o
nly
fini
te s
pace
, the
re c
an b
e on
ly a
fin
ite n
umbe
r o
f be
liefs
"in
" an
y on
e o
f th
em.. T
houg
h th
e di
ffer
ence
bet
wee
n be
liefs
"i
n" a
nd n
ot
"in"
the
brai
n w
ould
nee
d ex
plan
atio
n, t
here
wou
ld b
e no
pr
oble
m w
ith
"mos
t" a
ppli
ed t
o th
ose
in t
he b
rain
. O
ne r
espo
nse
to s
uch
an a
rgum
ent
wou
ld b
e m
erel
y to
obs
erve
tha
t D
avid
son'
s vi
ews
on s
eman
tics
are
not
nece
ssar
ily c
onsi
sten
t w
ith
his
view
s on
min
d, f
or,
acco
rdin
g to
the
for
mer
, be
liefs
are
the
oret
ical
con
st
ruct
s at
trib
utab
le d
urin
g in
terp
reta
tion
, and
it is
· not
cle
ar h~w
theo
ret
ical
con
stru
cts
can
be t
oken
-ide
ntic
al w
ith
anyt
hing
phy
sica
l. E
vnin
e (1
991,
con
clus
ion)
and
Chi
ld (
1994
, ch
ap.
4) w
orry
abo
ut th
is i
ncon
sist
en
cy,
the
form
er g
oing
so
far
as t
o ar
gue
that
Dav
idso
n's
view
s on
min
d sh
ould
be
jett
ison
ed i
f ir
revo
cabl
y in
cons
iste
nt w
ith
his
view
s on
sem
an
tics..
At
the
very
lea
st,
this
rai
ses
the
wor
ry t
hat
Dav
idso
n's
view
s on
se
man
tics,
epi
stem
olog
y, a
nd
min
d m
ight
all
be
inco
nsis
tent
. A
noth
er
resp
onse
wou
ld b
e m
erel
y to
obs
erve
that
, reg
ardl
ess
of
whe
ther
ther
e ca
n be
onl
y a
fini
te n
umbe
r o
f be
liefs
"in
" a
brai
n, I
jus
t sh
owed
tha
t, f
or
Dav
idso
n, e
ven
in p
ract
ice,
an
inte
rpre
ter
none
thel
ess
take
s an
ali
en t
o ha
ve a
n in
fini
te n
umbe
r of
belie
fs. S
o, t
he p
robl
em o
f qu
anti
fyin
g ov
er a
n in
fini
te s
et r
emai
ns.
And
six
th,
Dav
idso
n m
ight
tra
nsla
te "
mos
t be
liefs
" in
to s
ome
non
quan
tifi
cati
onal
idio
m. P
erha
ps h
e m
ight
art
icul
ate
PC
as
som
ethi
ng li
ke:
(vi)
cet
eris
par
ibus
, an
int
erpr
eter
take
s an
alie
n's
belie
fs t
o be
tru
e by
he
r in
terp
rete
r's li
ghts
.
He
mig
ht t
hen
prov
ide
a no
n-qu
anti
fica
tion
al c
onst
rual
of
the
cete
ris
pari
bus
clau
se.
Yet
(vi
) is
no
bett
er t
han
(ii)
, (i
ii),
or
(v).
For
(vi
) is
con
si
sten
t wit
h no
bel
ief o
f an
alie
n's
bein
g tr
ue b
y he
r int
erpr
eter
's li
ghts
. No
r is
it
clea
r ho
w t
rans
lati
ng "
mos
t be
liefs
" in
to a
ny n
on-q
uant
ific
atio
nal
idio
m c
an a
void
thi
s pr
oble
m.
Thu
s, g
iven
Dav
idso
n's
view
s on
sem
antic
s, n
one
of
thes
e w
ays
of
han
dlin
g "m
ost b
elie
fs"
succ
eeds
. Non
ethe
less
, Dav
idso
n m
ight
try
a di
ffer
ent
Pri
ncip
le o
f Cha
rity
68
1
tack
. H
e m
ight
arg
ue th
at th
e pr
oble
m o
fmak
ing
sens
e o
f "m
ost
bel
iefs
" is
mer
ely
tech
nica
l and
no
t wor
th th
e at
tent
ion
that
I ha
ve p
aid
it. Y
et o
nly
by i
gnor
ing
the
prob
lem
can
Dav
idso
n es
tabl
ish
his·
sw
eepi
ngep
iste
mic
co
nclu
sion
s. A
nd
so
the
prob
lem
is w
orth
the
atte
ntio
n th
at I
have
pai
d it
, in
sofa
r as
one
take
s D
avid
son
seri
ousl
y th
at h
is v
iew
s o
n s
eman
tics
hav
e ep
iste
mic
con
sequ
ence
s. N
or
can
one
fail
to
tak
e D
avid
son
seri
ousl
y ab
out t
his
sinc
e, a
ccor
ding
to
Dav
idso
n, h
is "
met
hodo
logy
of
inte
rpre
ta
tion
is
. . .
noth
ing
bu
t ep
iste
mol
ogy
seen
in
the
mir
ror
of
mea
ning
" (1
984e
, p.
169)
. H
ence
(iv)
, th
e on
ly a
rtic
ulat
ion
of
PC
cap
able
of e
ntai
ling
Dav
idso
n's
epis
tem
ic c
oncl
usio
ns i
s in
cons
iste
nt w
ith
.. his
. vie
ws
on
sem
anti
cs.
Yet
be
caus
e su
ch v
iew
s sa
ncti
on D
avid
son'
s us
ing
PC
in
the
fir
st p
lace-P
C
is a
met
hodo
logi
cal p
rinc
iple
in s
eman
tics
-an
y a
rtic
ulat
ion
of
PC
inco
nsi
sten
t ,w
ith D
avid
son'
s se
man
tic
view
s in
vali
date
s hi
s us
ing
PC
gen
eral
ly.
Thu
s, D
avid
son
can
use
PC
eit
her
only
as
a m
etho
dolo
gica
l pr
inci
ple
in
sem
anti
cs o
r n
ot
at a
ll. 13
Not
es
1 T
hat
thir
d an
thol
ogy
is D
avid
son
2001
a, i
tsel
f an
tici
pati
ng p
ubli
cati
on o
f D
avid
son
2004
and
fort
hcom
ing,
bri
ngin
g th
e to
tal n
umbe
r o
f an
thol
ogie
s o
f D
avid
son'
s ar
ticl
es t
o fiv
e. (
See
Dav
idso
n 20
01a,
pp.
221
-25.
) 2
Non
ethe
less
, se
e M
alpa
s (1
992,
§5.
3.3)
for
a s
ympa
thet
ic d
iscu
ssio
n o
f th
e tr
icki
ness
of
the
task
. 3
"Wha
t a f
ully
inf
orm
ed in
terp
rete
r cou
ld le
arn
abou
t wha
t a s
peak
er m
eans
is
all
ther
e is
to
lear
n; t
he s
ame
goes
for
wha
t th
e sp
eake
r be
lieve
s" (
Dav
idso
n 20
01b,
p.
148;
my
emph
asis
).
4 A
ccor
ding
to
Dav
idso
n, a
n in
terp
rete
r he
rsel
f ha
s la
rgel
y se
lf-c
onsi
sten
t be
liefs
; oth
erw
ise,
acc
ordi
ng to
him
, the
inte
rpre
ter c
ould
not
her
self
be
inte
rpr
eted
, an
d s
o co
uld
not
have
an
y be
liefs
. T
hus,
the
int
erpr
eter
's m
axim
izin
g th
e se
lf-c
onsi
sten
cy th
at s
he a
ttri
bute
s to
an
alie
n ca
n be
reg
arde
d as
a f
urth
er
inst
ance
of
her m
axim
izin
g he
r agr
eem
ent w
ith
the
alie
n.
5 N
onet
hele
ss,
see
n.7
for
a fu
rthe
r re
ason
. 6
In fa
ct, D
avid
son
(199
0, p
. 319
; 19
91, p
. 19
5) m
akes
this
poi
nt in
term
s o
f PC
. F
or h
e sa
ys t
hat P
C, i
n th
e co
ntex
t of
a T
arsk
i-st
yle
theo
ry o
f tr
uth,
an
d so
in
the
cont
ext
of
attr
ibut
ing
an i
nfin
ite
num
ber
of
belie
fs,
is a
n al
tern
ativ
e to
id
enti
fyin
g an
y be
lief
as
expr
essi
ng a
n an
alyt
ic t
ruth
. 7
The
re m
ay b
e a
furt
her
reas
on w
hy D
avid
son
switc
hes
from
"m
axim
ize"
to
"opt
imiz
e."
Tho
ugh
in la
ter w
riti
ng D
avid
son
cont
inue
s to
em
ploy
PC
"ac
ross
th
e bo
ard"
(198
4g, p
. xvi
i), h
e al
so a
rgue
s th
at s
ome
agre
emen
t is
mor
e im
por
tant
than
oth
ers.
And
, in
the
cont
ext o
f see
king
wei
ghte
dag
reem
ent,
rath
er th
an
mer
ely
coun
ting
the
num
ber
of
belie
fs o
n w
hich
the
re is
agr
eem
ent,
Dav
idso
n so
met
imes
spe
aks
of
"opt
imiz
ing.
" (I
tha
nk a
n an
onym
ous
revi
ewer
for
bri
ng
ing
this
to
my
atte
ntio
n.)
Non
ethe
less
, thi
s w
ould
be
a fu
rthe
r re
ason
, for
, as
all
682
Dia
logu
e
thes
e pa
ssag
es (i
nclu
ding
200
1b, p
p. 1
38-3
9, q
uote
d ab
ove)
mak
e cl
ear,
the
chie
f re
ason
for
the
switc
h is
the
wor
ry th
at a
n al
ien
has
an in
fini
te n
umbe
r of b
elie
fs.
8 D
avid
son'
s (1
984d
) ar
gum
ent a
gain
st s
chem
e-co
nten
t dua
lism
is a
lso
anar
gu
m
ent
agai
nst
conc
eptu
al r
elat
ivis
m.
Dav
idso
n ta
kes
thes
e co
nclu
sion
s to
be
rela
ted
to s
uch
furt
her
conc
lusi
ons
as th
at th
ere
is n
o su
ch th
ing
asla
ngua
ge,
in t
he t
radi
tion
al s
ense
of
"lan
guag
e" (
1986
); t
hat
ther
e is
no
such
thi
ng·.a
s ex
clus
ivel
y su
bjec
tive
know
ledg
e (1
988)
; an
d th
at o
ne s
ees
thro
ugh
lang
uage
, in
Dav
idso
n's
sens
e o
f "l
angu
age,
" to
the
wor
ld it
self
(199
7).
9� D
avid
son
(198
4d) f
ocus
es o
n th
e tr
ansl
atab
ilit
y o
f tru
e se
nten
ces.
His
om
itti
ng
"tru
e" h
ere
seem
s a
mer
e li
ngua
laps
a.
10�
One
par
ticu
lar
com
plic
atio
n in
Dav
idso
n's
.arg
umen
t aga
inst
sce
ptic
ism
is it
s in
voki
ng th
e po
ssib
ilit
y o
f an
om
nisc
ient
inte
rpre
ter.
For
the
clas
sic
resp
onse
to
this
invo
cati
on, s
ee F
oley
and
Fum
erto
n (1
985)
.. 11
� In
fac
t, th
is e
x:ce
rpt
is t
aken
fro
m a
pas
sage
ant
icip
atin
g D
avid
son'
s ar
guin
g fr
om P
C a
ndth
epos
sibi
lity
of a
n om
nisc
ient
inte
rpre
ter t
o th
e co
nclu
sion
that
sk
epti
cism
is u
nten
able
. 12
Q
lne
mig
ht o
bjec
t tha
t thi
s is
an
unch
arit
able
con
stru
al o
f "a
s fa
r as
poss
ible
."�
Non
ethe
less
, it i
s un
clea
r w
hat e
lse
Dav
idso
n m
ight
mea
n by
the
phr
ase.
� 13
I
than
k W
ayne
Dav
is,
Mic
hael
Fer
ry,a
nd
sev
eral
ano
ny
mo
us
revi
ewer
s fo
r�
sugg
esti
ons
and
som
e o
f th
e ob
ject
ions
con
side
red
abov
e.
Ref
eren
ces
Chi
ld, W
illi
am
1994
C
ausa
lity,
Int
erpr
etat
ion
and
the
Min
d N
ew Y
ork:
Oxf
ord
Uni
ver
sity
Pre
ss.
Dav
idso
n, D
onal
d 19
70
"Men
tal E
vent
s."
In E
xper
ienc
e an
d T
heor
y. E
dite
d bu
Law
renc
e F
oste
r an
d J
.. W
. S
wan
son.
Am
bers
t, M
A:U
nive
rsit
y o
f M
assa
ch
uset
ts P
ress
, pp
. 79
-101
. R
epri
nted
in
Dav
idso
n 19
80, p
p. 2
07
24.
1980
E
ssay
s on
Act
ions
and
Eve
nts.
New
Yor
k: C
lare
ndon
Pre
ss.
1984
a�
"Tru
th a
nd M
eani
ng."
In
Inqu
irie
s in
to T
ruth
and
Inte
rpre
tati
on.
New
Yor
k: C
lare
ndon
Pre
ss,
pp.1
7-36
. O
rigi
nall
y pu
blis
hed
in
Syn
thes
e, 1
7 (1
967)
: ·30
4-23
. 19
84b�
"R
adic
al I
nter
pret
atio
n."
In I
nqui
ries
int
o T
ruth
an
d I
nter
pret
atio
n. N
ew Y
ork:
Cla
rend
on P
ress
, pp.
125
-40.
Ori
gina
lly
publ
ishe
d in
Dia
lect
ica,
27
(197
3):
313-
28.
1984
c�
"Bel
ief
and
the
Bas
is o
f M
eani
ng."
In
Inq
uiri
es i
nto
Tru
th a
nd
Inte
rpre
tati
on. N
ew Y
ork:
Cla
rend
on P
ress
, pp.
141
-54.
Ori
gina
lly
publ
ishe
d in
Syn
thes
e,27
(19
74):
309-
23.
1984
d�
"On
the
Ver
y Id
ea o
f a
Con
cept
ual
Sche
me.
" In
Inq
uiri
es i
nto
Tru
th a
nd In
terp
reta
tion
. N
ew Y
ork:
Cla
rend
on P
ress
, pp.
183
-98.
O
rigi
nall
y pu
blis
hed
in P
roce
edin
gs a
ndA
ddre
sses
oft
he A
mer
ican
P
hilo
soph
ical
Ass
ocia
tion
, 47
(197
4):
5-20
.
Pri
ncip
le o
f Cha
rity
68
3
1984
e�
"Tho
ught
and
Tal
k."
In I
nqui
ries
int
o T
ruth
and
Int
erpr
etat
ion.
N
ew Y
ork:
Cla
rend
on P
ress
, pp.
155
-70.
19
84f�
"T
he M
etho
d o
f Tru
th in
Met
aphy
sics
." I
nIn
quir
ies
into
Tru
th a
nd
Inte
rpre
tati
on.
New
Yor
k: C
lare
ndon
Pre
ss,
pp.
199-
214.
Ori
gi
nall
y pu
blis
hed
in M
idw
est
Stud
ies
in P
hilo
soph
y, V
ol.
2: S
tudi
es in
th
e P
hilo
soph
y o
f Lan
guag
e. E
dite
d by
Pet
er A
. F
renc
h, T
heod
ore
E.
Ueh
ling
, Jr
., an
d H
owar
d K
. W
etts
tein
. M
orri
s, M
N:
Uni
ver
sity
of
Min
neso
ta P
ress
, 19
77, p
p. 2
44-5
4.
1984
g In
quir
ies
into
Tru
th a
nd In
terp
reta
tion
. New
Yor
k: C
lare
ndon
Pre
ss.
1986
� "A
Nic
e D
eran
gem
ent
of
Epi
taph
s."
In T
ruth
and
Int
erpr
etat
ion:
P
ersp
ecti
ves
on
the
Phi
loso
phy
of
Don
ald
Dav
idso
n.
Edi
ted
by
Ern
est
Lep
ore.
New
Yor
k: B
lack
wel
l, pp
. 43
3-46
. 19
88�
"The
Myt
h o
f th
e Su
bjec
tive.
" In
Bew
usts
ein,
Sp
rach
e un
d di
e K
unst
. E
dite
d by
M.
Ben
edik
t an
d R
. B
urge
r. V
ienn
a: E
diti
on
S. V
erla
g de
r O
ster
reic
hisc
hen
Sta
atsd
ruck
erei
, pp.
45-
54.
1990
"T
he S
truc
ture
an
d C
onte
nt o
f T
ruth
." Jo
urna
l of P
hilo
soph
y, 8
7:
279-
328.
19
91
"Epi
stem
olog
y E
xter
nali
zed.
" D
iale
ctic
a, 4
5: 1
91-2
02.
Rep
rint
ed
in D
avid
son
2001
a, p
p. 1
93-2
04.
1997
"S
eein
g th
roug
h L
angu
age.
" In
Tho
ught
and
Lan
guag
e. E
dite
d by
Jo
hn P
rest
on. N
ew Y
ork:
Cam
brid
ge U
nive
rsit
y Pr
ess,
pp.
15-
22.
2001
a Su
bjec
tive,
Int
ersu
bjec
tive,
Obj
ectiv
e. N
ew Y
ork:
Oxf
ord
Uni
vers
ity
Pres
s.
2001
b�
"A C
oher
ence
The
ory
of
Tru
th a
nd K
now
ledg
e."
In S
ubje
ctiv
e,
Inte
rsub
ject
ive,
O
bjec
tive.
N
ew Y
ork:
O
xfor
d U
nive
rsit
y Pr
ess,
pp
. 13
7-53
. O
rigi
nall
y pu
blis
hed
in K
ant
oder
Heg
el.
Edi
ted
by
D.
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