Authority & DemocracyPolitical Obligation II: Natural Duties and Associative Reponsibilities
Natural duty view
Natural Duty of Justice: ‘first, we are to comply with and to do
our share in just institutions when they exist and apply to us;
and second, we are to assist in the establishment of just
arrangements when they do not exist, at least when this can be
done with little cost to ourselves’ (Rawls, 1971, p. 351).
Wellman’s samaritan theory
Wellman grounds political obligation in state benefits, but focuses on
benefits provided to other people rather than to ourselves.
We have a duty to obey the state because this is the only way
to save others from the perils of the state of nature.
NB: Since we do not expect that a person in danger has to accept our
help explicitly before we aid her, we do not need to give any account
of the acceptance conditions required for such aid being justified.
Structure of Wellman’s argument
(1) States provide vitally important benefits;
(2) These benefits could not be secured in the absence of states;
(3) States can provide such benefits without imposing unreasonable
costs upon their citizens.
Car example
“State’s nonconsensual coercion of its citizens is morally analogous to
Beth’s nonconsensual borrowing of Cathy’s car insofar as each is
necessary ‘to prevent extremely unhappy occurrences.’”
Legitimacy Political Obligation
Without citizens’ compliance states would not be able to
perform their functions if enough people did not support them.
But not everyone’s support is necessary.
Doe everyone have PO?
Fair-play approach complements the Natural Duty approach
NB: pluralist approach (J. Wolff, Klosko, Renzo)
What kind of duty?
• Rawls, Buchanan: Duty to realize justice
• Christiano: Duty to realize equality
• Wellman: Samaritan duty
• Renzo: Duty not to expose others to dangers
NB: positive duties vs negative duties
Particularity Requirement
Particularity requirement: “that we are only interested in those
moral requirements [including obligations and duties] which
bind an individual to one particular political community, set of
political institutions, etc.” (1979, p. 31; emphasis in original).
Can natural duty theories account for the particularity
requirement?
Transactional Theories
Transactional theories ground political obligation in some kind of
interaction between the state and its citizens. (Contract, Fair-
play)
Appeal: PO is treated as something that individuals choose to
incur, rather than as an imposition.
Problem: under-inclusiveness Cannot account for Universality
Natural duty theories
Natural duty theories ground PO in some moral duty that all
individuals owe to all human beings, regardless of any
transaction. (E.g. promote justice, promote utility).
Appeal: These theories account for universality,
Problem: overinclusiveness cannot account for Particularity
Three requirements for a theory of Political Obligation
Universality: everyone living on the territory of the state has a
duty to obey the law
Particularity: political obligation involves a duty to obey the laws
of a particular state (the one to which we belong);
Generality: political obligation involves a prima facie obligation
to obey all the laws of the state any time we are in a position to
do so
Associativism
PO is grounded in our occupation of certain social roles. These
roles have not been voluntarily entered, but are duty-laden, and
thus generate obligations.
Compare: Family obligations, friendship obligations.
NB: Associativism seems able to account both for universality
and particularity because the theory grounds a duty to obey the
law for all and only the members of the political community.
Objections
1) Do associative obligations exist?
2) If they do, can they be ultimately reduced to transactional
obligations?
3) If they exist and create genuine moral obligations, can they
ground political obligation?
Structure of Associativism
‘Commonplaces’ about the way we relate to our polity:
- we regard taxes and legal punishment as conceptually distinct
from theft and the mere threat of harm.
- we feel pride or shame in relation to the actions of our polity
- we normally accept that the polity can act in our name,
thereby committing us in many ways
- we generally accept that we are answerable for what our
polity does, whether or not we support its policies
Structure of Associativism“Our membership of a particular polity not only shapes our lives
in a causal sense, it also enters conceptually and morally into the
way we think about ourselves, our relationships with others, in
what we feel and how we think about what we should do” (J.
Horton, Political Obligation)
“Proof” of PO
Vs
drawing our attention to the many ways in which we think of
ourselves as members of a polity
2 steps in the Associativist argument
1) Our identity is determined by our being part of a specific
political community (M. Sandel, C. Taylor)
2) Conceptual relationship between membership within the
political community and the obligations owed to the
community.
Acknowledging that membership within the political community
has non-instrumental value is to see the other members as
sources of special responsibilities in virtue of our relationship
with them.
Rejection of “External Justification”
PO does not need an ‘external justification’ (based on an independent moral principle such as consent or a natural duty of justice).
Hermeneutic effort aiming to uncover the social pre-conditions of our identity, and the role that political obligation plays within the relationships generated by them.
1) PO is constitutive of our relationship to our polity of which we are members
2) this relationship is constitutive of our own identity
Objections
1) Circularity: the commonplaces listed by associativists are a
consequence of the fact that we grow up in political
communities. Not what justifies our membership in these
communities.
2) Individuals can be manipulated into identifying themselves
with morally repugnant or degrading practices.
• manipulation objection
• repugnance
3) Do we need to accept somehow membership?
Answers to 2
Tamir: Associative obligations are only prima facie
Horton: associative obligations can only be generated in the
case of associations that have a minimal threshold of value
“Institutions which give rise to moral obligations … exist within a
wider context of other moral beliefs and commitments, … [and
t]hese may set various limits to the moral obligations to which
institutions can legitimately give rise” (Horton, Political
Obligation)
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