Authority & DemocracyPolitical Obligation II: Natural Duties and Associative Reponsibilities

Natural duty view

Natural Duty of Justice: ‘first, we are to comply with and to do

our share in just institutions when they exist and apply to us;

and second, we are to assist in the establishment of just

arrangements when they do not exist, at least when this can be

done with little cost to ourselves’ (Rawls, 1971, p. 351).

Wellman’s samaritan theory

Wellman grounds political obligation in state benefits, but focuses on

benefits provided to other people rather than to ourselves.

We have a duty to obey the state because this is the only way

to save others from the perils of the state of nature.

NB: Since we do not expect that a person in danger has to accept our

help explicitly before we aid her, we do not need to give any account

of the acceptance conditions required for such aid being justified.

Structure of Wellman’s argument

(1) States provide vitally important benefits;

(2) These benefits could not be secured in the absence of states;

(3) States can provide such benefits without imposing unreasonable

costs upon their citizens.

Car example

“State’s nonconsensual coercion of its citizens is morally analogous to

Beth’s nonconsensual borrowing of Cathy’s car insofar as each is

necessary ‘to prevent extremely unhappy occurrences.’”

Legitimacy Political Obligation

Without citizens’ compliance states would not be able to

perform their functions if enough people did not support them.

But not everyone’s support is necessary.

Doe everyone have PO?

Fair-play approach complements the Natural Duty approach

NB: pluralist approach (J. Wolff, Klosko, Renzo)

What kind of duty?

• Rawls, Buchanan: Duty to realize justice

• Christiano: Duty to realize equality

• Wellman: Samaritan duty

• Renzo: Duty not to expose others to dangers

NB: positive duties vs negative duties

Particularity Requirement

Particularity requirement: “that we are only interested in those

moral requirements [including obligations and duties] which

bind an individual to one particular political community, set of

political institutions, etc.” (1979, p. 31; emphasis in original).

Can natural duty theories account for the particularity

requirement?

Transactional Theories

Transactional theories ground political obligation in some kind of

interaction between the state and its citizens. (Contract, Fair-

play)

Appeal: PO is treated as something that individuals choose to

incur, rather than as an imposition.

Problem: under-inclusiveness Cannot account for Universality

Natural duty theories

Natural duty theories ground PO in some moral duty that all

individuals owe to all human beings, regardless of any

transaction. (E.g. promote justice, promote utility).

Appeal: These theories account for universality,

Problem: overinclusiveness cannot account for Particularity

Three requirements for a theory of Political Obligation

Universality: everyone living on the territory of the state has a

duty to obey the law

Particularity: political obligation involves a duty to obey the laws

of a particular state (the one to which we belong);

Generality: political obligation involves a prima facie obligation

to obey all the laws of the state any time we are in a position to

do so

Associativism

PO is grounded in our occupation of certain social roles. These

roles have not been voluntarily entered, but are duty-laden, and

thus generate obligations.

Compare: Family obligations, friendship obligations.

NB: Associativism seems able to account both for universality

and particularity because the theory grounds a duty to obey the

law for all and only the members of the political community.

Objections

1) Do associative obligations exist?

2) If they do, can they be ultimately reduced to transactional

obligations?

3) If they exist and create genuine moral obligations, can they

ground political obligation?

Structure of Associativism

‘Commonplaces’ about the way we relate to our polity:

- we regard taxes and legal punishment as conceptually distinct

from theft and the mere threat of harm.

- we feel pride or shame in relation to the actions of our polity

- we normally accept that the polity can act in our name,

thereby committing us in many ways

- we generally accept that we are answerable for what our

polity does, whether or not we support its policies

Structure of Associativism“Our membership of a particular polity not only shapes our lives

in a causal sense, it also enters conceptually and morally into the

way we think about ourselves, our relationships with others, in

what we feel and how we think about what we should do” (J.

Horton, Political Obligation)

“Proof” of PO

Vs

drawing our attention to the many ways in which we think of

ourselves as members of a polity

2 steps in the Associativist argument

1) Our identity is determined by our being part of a specific

political community (M. Sandel, C. Taylor)

2) Conceptual relationship between membership within the

political community and the obligations owed to the

community.

Acknowledging that membership within the political community

has non-instrumental value is to see the other members as

sources of special responsibilities in virtue of our relationship

with them.

Rejection of “External Justification”

PO does not need an ‘external justification’ (based on an independent moral principle such as consent or a natural duty of justice).

Hermeneutic effort aiming to uncover the social pre-conditions of our identity, and the role that political obligation plays within the relationships generated by them.

1) PO is constitutive of our relationship to our polity of which we are members

2) this relationship is constitutive of our own identity

Objections

1) Circularity: the commonplaces listed by associativists are a

consequence of the fact that we grow up in political

communities. Not what justifies our membership in these

communities.

2) Individuals can be manipulated into identifying themselves

with morally repugnant or degrading practices.

• manipulation objection

• repugnance

3) Do we need to accept somehow membership?

Answers to 2

Tamir: Associative obligations are only prima facie

Horton: associative obligations can only be generated in the

case of associations that have a minimal threshold of value

“Institutions which give rise to moral obligations … exist within a

wider context of other moral beliefs and commitments, … [and

t]hese may set various limits to the moral obligations to which

institutions can legitimately give rise” (Horton, Political

Obligation)