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RETHINKING THE ARAB “SPRING”

STABILITY AND SECURITY IN

EGYPT, LIBYA, TUNISIA, AND THE

REST OF THE MENA REGION

By Anthony Cordesman

November 8, 2011

Anthony H. Cordesman

Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy

[email protected]

Cordesman: Stability, security, and the New MENA Spring 11/8/11 2

No one can ignore the short-term problems the political upheavals in Egypt, Libya, and

Tunisia create for each country. New leaders must be chosen and security systems must

be changed. The problems involved can kill political, economic and demographic reforms

before they even begin. There is a serious danger, however, in focusing on short term

needs and failing to focus on the depth of the problems that Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and

virtually every other Middle Eastern and North African state now faces.

Experts can debate just how much the structural problems in each state led to the current

round of political unrest and upheavals, but there is no debate over the fact that only a

few oil-rich states with tiny native populations are free from massive problems in dealing

with population growth, youth unemployment, failed or weak governance, and security

structures that do as much to repress as to protect. These are problems both the Arab

world and outside analysts have tended to downplay and neglect, but they are so serious

that no advances in democracy and human rights can offer most MENA countries either

security or stability. Even the best election, and major reforms of national security

structures, will be a prelude to a new round of political upheaval unless these forces are

given fare more consideration that they have been given to date.

The Impact of Demographics and Low Economic Growth

Both Muslim and Western states have ceased to focus on population growth for differing

religious and political reasons. As the detailed numbers for population growth in Figure

One show, however, population growth has been truly explosive in virtually every

MENA state.

It is true that population growth rates have been dropping, but they are dropping far more

slowly than many predicted in the past, and populations that have grow 4 to 6 times since

1950 will generally double again by 2050. They will do so in nations that have far more

restrictions in terms of water and arable land than most states in the world, and where the

policies of past regimes have often kept economic growth and diversification far below

the rates of progress in Asia and Latin America.

Governments have failed both to create the social and political conditions that will reduce

population growth and deal with the growth that has already occurred. As Figure Two

shows, the end result is a massive “youth bulge” that is pouring more and more young

men and women into economies that cannot offer them productive jobs, or meaningful

per capita incomes. This is as true of many oil-exporting states as it is of oil poor states.

Even if one ignores the corruption, cronyism, and nepotism that has sharply increased the

gap between rich and poor in most MENA states, and that has lowered the status and

security of much of the middle class, Figure Three shows just how low the CIA World

Factbook ranks the average per capita income of far too many MENA states. It is striking

to see just how poor Algeria, Iraq, and Iran now are – largely because of history of

internal conflict, terrible economic policies, and gross over dependence on the petroleum

sector.


Many other states, however, have per capita incomes ranking below 100 – a rough

indication of serious overall poverty in today’s global economy. This is often disguised

by the growth of modern urban areas, but it is all too real in practice. While there is no

direct correlation between poverty and political unrest, it is all too clear even from these

numbers why so many Arabs and Iranians could regard their governments as having

failed them.

These data, however, only hint at how much sharper the disparities between the richest

and poorest MENA states have become. (A sparsely populated Libya with major oil

wealth still had a poverty rate of some 30% of its population before the current political

upheavals began. Models that focus on GNP growth or on per capita income without

addressing income distribution are little more than political and economic rubbish.)

These basic economic pressures interact with hyperurbanization throughout the region

which has forced radical shifts in tribal, ethnic, sectarian and social structures in every

state (Saudi Arabia has gone from 8% urbanization in 1950 to over 80% today).

Traditional elements have sometimes adapted, but traditional societies of the kind that

existed before 1950s have virtually vanished.

No Arab or Persian cleric, leader, regime, or political party that keeps ignoring these

realities can serve a given nation’s people or create the groundwork for political stability.

Political change in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia – as is the case with states that so far have

been more stable – will fail, or will make the future even worse if it does not face the

need for major improvements in the economy, infrastructure, education, and governance

that can deal with these pressures. No amount of progress in democracy or human rights

can succeed unless these issues are addressed as well.

The Issues MENA Governments Must Now Address

It is dangerous to generalize too much in addressing the challenges MENA government

must now address. They do differ sharply by country, and polling data in the Arab

Development Report for 2009, as well as in polls that have never had public distribution,

show very different priorities and perceptions in given countries, and within given ethnic,

sectarian, tribal, and income groups in the same country. Once again, there is no

consistent correlation between public perceptions and potential political unrest, and any

given factor or metric.

There are, however, a list of factors that every country must consider, and that do emerge

as proven or potential causes of unrest – many driven by the combination of demographic

and economic pressures summarized earlier. These factors – along with measures to

address population growth and a youth bulge that must continue for at least another

decade, have become a virtual check list of the measures that MENA governments must

address to avoid future unrest, failed states and governments:


Middle Class status, income distribution, poverty line, perceptions of social

equity: Demonstration after demonstration has made it clear that perceptions

of economic status and future opportunity are as critical as baseline metrics.

Traditional metrics like national per capita income, GDP growth, and poverty

lines set near the subsistence level do not measure potential or real unrest.

Employment and job quality: The issue is not simply employment, it is

whether the job is real, has status, provides the ability to marry and have a

family, and is seen as offered on the basis of merit for those outside a

privileged elite. Job creation alone will not address the causes of unrest.

Education: Governments differ radically in investment in education,

educational quality, and the relevance of education. Some countries provide

limited access. Others create low-quality higher education that is little more

than a series of diploma mills. Where employment rates are low, education

often does not create meaningful or reliable skills.

Role of women: Women now make up a majority of secondary school and

university graduates in countries like Saudi Arabia but lag badly in both

employment rates and real jobs with serious productivity gain. This wastes a

critical part of the labor force, raises population growth, and puts a heavier

burden on young men and their families to finance marriage and careers. The

human right issue is only part of the story, and discrimination penalizes men

as well as women.

Services and utilities: Countries differ sharply in providing services –

sometimes grossly distorting demand and their economies through mixes of

subsidies and free services. Electricity, water, fuel prices, medical services,

and housing all present serious mixes of problems in many MENA countries.

The scale of these problems is often disguised by ignoring how well and how

fairly government funded efforts are distributed and the quality of distribution

of services. Gross measures of total national effort – e.g. total power

generation or “access” to medical services – are worse than useless: they are

sharply misleading.

Foreign labor: Many Gulf countries, and Libya have far too much

dependence on foreign labor, often as a result of government policies that

favor low cost foreign labor and distort the domestic labor market. These

problems continue to grow in most such states, in spite of policies that claim

to favor local labor, and are a source of serious corruption in terms of the

ruling elite’s manipulation of foreign labor permits for its own advantage in at

least one Gulf state.

Hyperurbanization: Showpiece buildings can disguise a lack of proper

housing, urban services, and commuting capability. The quality of urban life

is a serious problem.

State sectors and employment: The failure to create effective private sectors

and market systems, gross over-employment in the state sector, reliance on

inefficient state industries, and lack of effective and implemented economic


planning often make governments a de facto burden or threat to their own

economy as well as job creation and economic equity.

Agriculture: Sharp rises in population pressure, and sometimes limits to water,

increase land density or drive people out of agricultural areas. A lack of

capital and modern farming techniques adds to the problem. Most countries

lack effective government planning and services for the agricultural sector,

and government actions and incentives often distort agriculture in ways that

lower productivity and income.

Military spending: Governments often spend far too much on their military

forces, and particularly new military equipment of uncertain mission value

and sustainability, when funds are badly needed in the civil sector.

Security services, national security courts, and emergency laws: The

legitimate struggle with terrorism and extremism affects some countries, but

far too many have steadily increase the internal security role of their military

forces, and increased the size of their security and paramilitary/police forces

to secure the regime. Special national security courts and legal procedures are

abused, along with open-ended national emergency laws (some of which are

de facto rather that formal legal actions). Access to lawyers, abuses of

detention, closed trial procedures, and inability to locate prisoners and learn

their status are all problems in the more repressive MENA states.

Rule of law: Quite aside from the internal security issues, there are serious

abuses of property, criminal, business, and other civil law. Corruption in the

courts and legal system is a key problem, along with delays in procedures,

cost, and access to police and legal systems than function without corruption

or special charges. These affect economic as well as personal security.

Corruption: A rough measure of corruption is shown in Figure Four.

Corruption, however, is seen in terms of special privilege, unfair income

distribution, nepotism, and a lack of social equity and not simply corruption in

the narrow sense of the term. It is often coupled to poor governance, grossly

over-staffed government offices, small fees and bribes, and delays or failures

by bureaucracies to perform their jobs. It has become a top to bottom source

of unrest or anger.

Failed censorship and impact of alternative media and communications:

Many countries still attempt to control or limit media, use of the Internet,

access to satellite TV, etc. The end result is increasingly to drive populations

to rely on illegal or alternative media and social networking systems. This

reinforces patterns of unrest and distrust of governments.

Moving Forward

None of these issues mean reforms like creating effective representative governments,

rule of law, and human rights are less important. These reforms, however, are only part of

the reforms necessary to bring stability and security. MENA states must act as quickly as


possible to address all of the previous issues as well. Elections alone will serve little

purpose, particularly if inexperience and self-serving new political parties end up

endlessly feuding, the quality of governance remains low, corruption and inequity

continue to affect daily life, and economic progress only benefits the limited portion of

the population favored by the state.

This presents serious problems for both new governments that must build on a legacy of

decades of failure and incompetence, that lack experience political parties that know how

to work with their opposition, that have leaders who have never really governed, and that

must work with bureaucracies, militaries, and internal security services that lack

competence and often integrity and basic capacity. The better and more stable

governments will have far fewer problems in basic institution building, but still face

daunting challenges out of sheer population pressure.

One key suggestion is that the wealthier Arab states work with the poorer states to create

the equivalent of an Arab Marshall Plan. As has been shown earlier, however, the wealth

of the oil states is relative and even nations like Saudi Arabia need to focus on the needs

of their own people. The wealth of the smaller and wealthier oil states is also limited

relative to the needs of the larger of more highly populated MENA states.

Moreover, it is the quality of governance that will be the key issue. Aid is pointless if it

exceeds the capacity to use it effectively, and destructive and corrupting if it is misused.

In practice, this means each Arab state needs to reexamine its own structure, the forces

affecting its future, and develop plans and improved institutions to both use its own

resources and outside aid more effectively.

In practice, it may well take a decade or more to make the necessary changes and

implement them in ways that meeting popular expectations. Certainly, as has been clear

in Iraq, elections alone do not produce either effective representative government or

address the key issues shaping the future of the MENA region.

This also requires:

The creation of effective governance and a civil service with adequate capacity,

efficiency, and integrity.

Adequate urban, local, and regional governance that meets sectarian, ethnic, and

tribal needs; rather than the current degree of over-centralization.

Political partiers capable of addressing key issues with honesty and transparency,

willing to work with their opposition, and experience in actually governing.

Acceptance of checks and balances to limit the role of the state and preserve

human rights.

An effective and honest rule of law based on social justice, and one that can check

leaders that seek to abuse their power.


Security services that respect human rights as well as provide security.

Militaries sized to meet real nation security needs, not pointless regional rivalries

and competing in glitter-factor military purchases.

Effective economic planning that frees market forces while protecting the people

and creating real jobs and economic diversification.

Restructuring of government services to reflect popular needs and priorities, and

effective planning and expansion of education, health, and key government

services.

Educational reform to create job-oriented skills and competitive teaching and

educational standards on a global basis.

Major anti-corruption efforts coupled to dealing with nepotism and special

privileges. Use of the tax structure to limit gross problems in income distribution.

Effective efforts to address population growth.

Policies that give women equity and a productive role in the labor force.

Actions by the government and media to provide full transparency, and look

beyond elections to use polling, focus groups, public meetings, and other

mechanism to find out the priorities of their population, their perceptions of

governance, and deal with sectarian, ethnic, tribal and regional tensions and

grievances.

Above all, it requires the kind of leadership and honesty that can explain that most of the

expectations that have led to the most violent upheavals in the “Arab Spring” will take a

decade or so to fully address, that even an Arab Marshal Plan will have serious limits in

terms of outside aid and spending, and that no one can (or should) help a MENA state

that cannot help itself.

No MENA nation is going to be able to address even its most serious problems quickly

and easily, any more than the US can. Managing expectations is going to be a critical

challenge for years to come – particularly given the fact there is a nearly two-decade long

bow wave of new workers that are already born and still have to enter the labor force. It

will be al too easy for new (and old) governments to fail, and be replaced by a new set of

authoritarians, demagogues, failed governments, or extremists. The promise of the “Arab

spring” is going to be anything but easy to keep.


Figure One: The Population Explosion in the Middle East North Africa (In Millions)

Levant (In Millions)

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Algeria 8.893 10.909 13.932 18.806 25.089 30.429 34.586 38.594 41.641 43.425 44.163

Morocco 9.343 12.423 15.909 19.487 24 28.113 31.627 34.956 37.887 40.267 42.026

Libya 0.961 1.338 1.999 3.069 4.146 5.125 6.461 7.759 8.901 9.981 10.872

Tunisia 3.517 4.149 5.099 6.443 8.207 9.508 10.525 11.494 12.086 12.284 12.18

0

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10

15

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25

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35

40

45

50

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Egypt 21.198 26.847 33.574 42.634 54.907 65.159 80.472 96.26 111.057 125.242 137.873

Israel 1.286 2.141 2.903 3.737 4.478 6.115 7.354 8.479 9.459 10.28 10.828

Jordan 0.561 0.849 1.503 2.163 3.267 4.688 6.407 7.278 8.611 9.954 11.243

Lebanon 1.364 1.786 2.383 2.899 3.44 3.791 4.125 4.243 4.335 4.298 4.155

Syria 3.495 4.533 6.258 8.752 12.5 16.471 22.198 24.744 28.224 31.257 33.658

0

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40

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Figure One: The Population Explosion in the Middle East (Part Two) The Gulf (In Millions)

Source: U.S. Census Bureau: International Database, http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/informationGateway.php, accessed 21/4/2011

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Bahrain 0.115 0.157 0.22 0.348 0.506 0.655 1.18 1.505 1.639 1.758 1.847

Kuwait 0.145 0.292 0.748 1.37 2.131 1.972 2.543 2.994 3.331 3.623 3.863

Iran 16.367 21.6 28.994 39.709 58.1 68.632 76.923 86.543 93.458 97.685 100.045

Iraq 5.163 6.822 9.414 13.233 18.14 22.679 29.672 36.889 43.831 50.459 56.316

Oman 0.489 0.601 0.783 1.185 1.794 2.432 2.968 3.635 4.305 4.879 5.402

Qatar 0.025 0.046 0.115 0.237 0.446 0.627 0.841 0.905 0.971 1.04 1.116

Saudi Arabia 3.86 4.718 6.109 10.022 16.061 21.312 25.732 29.819 33.825 37.25 40.251

UAE 0.715 0.103 0.249 1 1.826 3.219 4.976 6.495 7.484 7.948 8.019

Yemen 4.777 5.872 7.098 9.133 12.416 17.407 23.495 29.727 35.473 40.901 45.781

0

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40

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120

http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/informationGateway.php

http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/informationGateway.php


Figure Two: The Impact of the Youth Bulge in the MENA Region

Percent of total Population of 0 to 14 Years

CIA World Factbook, 2011

Young People Entering the Labor Force Each Year and Impact on total Labor Force

CIA World Factbook, 2011

0

5

10

15

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QatarBahrai

nKuwai

tUAE Oman

Lebanon

Libya JordanTunisi

aSyria

SaudiArabia

Yemen

Morocco

IraqAlgeri

aIran Egypt

Women Entering Labor Force Annually 5,162 8,117 16,232 24,419 30,264 35,121 57,070 69,420 87,346244,712244,763277,612298,366322,010330,098677,372748,647

Men Entering Labor Force Annually 6,429 8,988 17,653 27,439 31,959 36,856 59,547 73,574 90,436256,698261,105287,141300,327332,194342,895715,111783,405

New Women as a % of the Total Existing Labor Force 0.41% 1.33% 0.75% 0.62% 3.12% 1.42% 3.30% 4.04% 2.28% 4.43% 3.34% 4.06% 2.57% 3.79% 3.34% 2.64% 2.87%

New Men as a % of the Total Existing Labor Force 0.51% 1.47% 0.82% 0.70% 3.30% 1.49% 3.44% 4.28% 2.36% 4.64% 3.56% 4.20% 2.58% 3.91% 3.47% 2.78% 3.00%

0

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400,000

600,000

800,000

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1,400,000

1,600,000

1,800,000


Figure Two: The Impact of the Youth Bulge in the MENA Region (Part Two)

Unemployment Rate Among Arab Youth

Youth Unemployment as Percent of Total Unemployment

MENA Youth Unemployment vs. Other Regions

Levels of Unemployment Ignore Disguised Unemployment and Government and Private Sector Jobs With No Productive or Useful Output, and predate Arab unrest (2008-2009) Source: Arab Development Report, 2009, p. 109, and IMF, World Economic and Financial Surveys, Regional Economic Outlook, Middle East and Central Asia, October 2010, p. 38

REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: MI DDLE EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA

38

and participation rates in tertiary education

exceed 25 percent in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon,

and Tunisia. Yet, entrepreneurs regularly cite the

lack of suitable skills as an important constraint

to hiring (Figure 3), and unemployment rates

are highest among the most educated. Taken

together, this suggests that education systems in

the region fail to produce graduates with needed

skills.

Labor market rigidities. According to the latest

Global Competitiveness Report, hiring and fi ring

regulations in most MENA6 countries are more

restrictive than those in the average emerging and

developing country. Moreover, data from enterprise

surveys indicate that, worldwide, the percent of fi rms

identifying labor regulation as a major constraint to

their business operations is, on average, greatest in the

MENA6 (Figure 4). Such rigidities limit employment

creation by discouraging fi rms from expanding

employment in response to favorable changes in the

economic climate.

Large public sectors. In the MENA6, the public

sector has been an extraordinarily impor tant

source of employment. Around the turn of this

century, the public sector accounted for about

one-third of total employment in Syria, 22 percent

in Tunisia, and about 35 percent in Jordan and

Egypt. Public-sector employment shares are

to outpace most other regions. The number

of labor force entrants remains daunting—

approximately 10 million new entrants are expected

to join the labor force in the coming decade ,

compared with 13½ million in the previous decade .

As such, demographic pressures will remain high.

Skill mismatches. The MENA6 countries have

made important strides in providing education.

Primary enrollment rates range from 88 percent

in Lebanon and Egypt to 98 percent in Tunisia,

MENA6

Central and

South-Eastern

Europe(non- EU)

and CIS

Sub-Saharan

Africa

Latin America

and the

Carribean

Developed

Economies and

EU

World

South-East Asia

and the

Pacif ic

South Asia

East Asia

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Total unemployment rate (Percent)

Figure 2

Total and Youth Unemployment Rates by Region1,2

(20083)

Sources: National authorities; IMF, World Economic Outlook; staf f

estimates; and International Labor Organization.1Unemployment rate for Morocco reflects data from Urban Labor Force Survey .2Youth unemployment estimate for MENA6 excludes Jordan.3Or most recent year for which data are available.

Source: World Bank, Enterprise Survey Results.

Figure 3

Firms Identifying Labor Skill Level

as a Major Constraint(Most recent; percent)

3836

33 31 31 30

21 2119 18 18

11

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Figure 4

Firms Identifying Labor Regulations

as a Major Constraint(Most recent; percent)

Source: World Bank, Enterprise Survey Results.

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34

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14 14 13 12

10 9 9

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Figure Three: Global Rankling in Per Capita Income

World Ranking Limits to Oil Wealth ($ Per Capita in 2010)

Maghreb

Morocco 150

Algeria 127 $1,540

Tunisia 113

Libya 52 $6,837

Levant

Egypt 137

Palestinian 169

Israel 46

Jordan 143

Lebanon 81

Syria 152

Gulf

Bahrain 54

Iran 104 $1,085

Iraq 159 $1,686

Kuwait 10 $21,416

Oman 54

Qatar 1 $38,281

Saudi Arabia 55 $7,685

UAE 9 $13,508

Yemen 172

Source: CIA World Factbook, 2011 for per capita income ranking, DOE/EIA, http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=OPEC for per capita oil export revenues

http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=OPEC


Figure Four: The Burden of Corruption

Note: 1.0 = most corrupt; 10 = least corrupt Source: Transparency International, Corruptions Perceptions Index 2010. Transparency International (TI) defines corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. This definition encompasses corrupt practices in both the public and private sectors. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks countries according to perception of corruption in the public sector. The CPI is an aggregate indicator that combines different sources of information about corruption, making it possible to compare countries. The 2010 CPI draws on different assessments and business opinion surveys carried out by independent and reputable institutions. It captures information about the administrative and political aspects of corruption. Broadly speaking, the surveys and assessments used to compile the index include questions relating to bribery of public officials, kickbacks in public procurement, embezzlement of public funds, and questions that probe the strength and effectiveness of public sector anti-corruption efforts. For a country or territory to be included in the index a minimum of three of the sources that TI uses must assess that country. Thus inclusion in the index depends solely on the availability of information.Perceptions are used because corruption – whether frequency or amount – is to a great extent a hidden activity that is difficult to measure. Over time, perceptions have proved to be a reliable estimate Perceptions are used because corruption – whether frequency or amount– is to a great extent a hidden activity that is difficult to measure. Over time, perceptions have proved to be a reliable estimate of corruption. Measuring scandals, investigations or prosecutions, while offering ‘non-perception’ data, reflect less on the prevalence of corruption in a country and more on other factors, such as freedom of the press or the efficiency of the judicial system. TI considers it of critical importance to measure both corruption and integrity, and to do so in the public and private sectors at global, national and local levels.2 The CPI is therefore one of many TI measurement tools that serve the fight against corruption Source: : Transparency International, Corruptions Perceptions Index 2010